OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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confronted with unforeseen threats such as suicide bombers, car bombs and IEDs. The search for solutions to these new challenges have led to a major change in the design of equipment deployed on the ground and has created a new relationship between industry and the military 44 . The new design will have little to do with manoeuvre but more to do with information. PART IV RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS In this paper an endeavour has been made to understand the evolution of operational art from the period of the Great Wars to the end of Russo – Afghan War in year 1989. While the lessons of the Great Wars mostly focus on immediate results with greater reliance on destruction / annihilation of the adversary, the character of war during the later stages (of the period understudy) transformed into prolonged series of conflicts fought amongst the people. Salient conclusions relevant to the evolutionary process of operational art have been grouped into Policy and Military realms. Policy Realm "A nation that makes distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its laws made by cowards and its wars fought by fools." OPINION Vol.1 No.1 124 June 2013 (Thucydides) Dividends of Positive Friction between Strategy and Operational Art. While singleness of conception should be the desired outcome, the systemic effect of strategy and operational art can only be completed once they are interdependent entities. Their positive friction, while formulating a strategic direction would bring about much needed balance and refinement in the entire process. Subservience to Political Strategist. Notwithstanding the requirement of the military commanders advising the Political Strategist on setting doable goals, the unwanted trend of operational art guiding the strategy, has always had negative implications on the outcome of the war [MacArthur – Truman Rift (Korean War - 1953)]. Coherence in Operational Vision. A close and intimate interplay between the strategist (the politicians) and the operational artist (the military commanders) is essential, which demands better understanding of each others’ domains, including their respective capacities and limitations (Adolf Hitler’s ambitions during Battle of Stalingrad – August 1942). Application of Mid-course Correction by Political Strategist. The political strategist should be able to apply mid-course corrections to any campaign and for this; there is a need of an intimate relationship between the strategist and the operational commander. The operational reverses (if any) should also be absorbed by the strategist and necessary modifications applied there-to the stated goal (Vietnam War – 1973). Military Realm – Conventional Domain Evolution of Character of War. While the nature of war remains constant (being an act of violence), the character of war kept changing throughout the evolutionary process of operational art, with technology being the sole driver. The evolution in the character of war can be summarised as under:- Pre-World War (19 th Century) • Shift from Single Point to Multiple Point Application. • Use of Railroads for simultaneous deployment and concentration at the decisive point. WW-1 • Mass mobilization. • Increased firepower with reduced manoeuvrability. • Trench warfare. • Inter-arm cooperation. • Submarine Warfare.
WW-2 • Joint Warfare. • Amphibious Operations. • Manoeuvre (Blitzkrieg / Deep Battle Theory). • Effective use of airpower (airborne landings / bombers). • Use of Atomic Bomb - Artist turned into a Technician. • Use of Radar. Cold War Era • Nuclear Deterrence. • Limited War. • Counter Insurgency Operations. • The Proxy wars. Over Reliance on Strategic Means. Operational artist has certain resources at his disposal for achieving laid down strategic objectives through conventional means. His operational plan should thus be self contained, without any looking back towards strategic means, which are at the disposal of the political strategist (Macarthur’s assertion to Truman during the Korean War to bomb communist China). Exploitation of Fleeting Opportunities. There is a need to avoid rigid adherence to the scheme of manoeuvre and instead exploit whatever opportunities are presented; the enemy should be fought with and not the plan (American Expeditionary Force – WW I). Sustained Logistic Support. Logistic support and its continued sustenance during the subsequent period of war have a significant impact on application of operational art. An extremely motivated, well trained and well led army can even succumb to drying up of resources due to ineffective logistic planning [Operation Torch – North African Campaign (WW-II)]. Military Realm – Sub-Conventional Warfare Operational art in counterinsurgency is a complex series of tactical, operational and strategic transitions. These transitions require employment of military, political, economic and diplomatic forces in sequence and simultaneity. Each of these transitions can take weeks and months. There is no well-defined time for the transition from clearing to holding or holding to building. Timetables are helpful, but it is important not to declare prematurely that the transitions are complete. Salient conclusions in this regard are:- Conclusion Shared Operational Vision. The entire command and control structure should share a common view of the desired end state in any conflict. There is a need to develop and disseminate a unified and holistic approach in the design, execution and sustainment of the operation (Chinese Civil War – 1949). Campaign Planning – Operational Linkage. The integration of battles and engagements into an overall major campaign is a must for planning as well as for execution. The strategy of attrition through repeated battles without any linkage cedes the initiative to the enemy, leaving the force to fight on the enemy's terms (Vietnam War – 1974). Reactionary Application of Force. War favours the side which does not wait for adversary’s application of force. If the major part of the combat strength remains committed in escort duties, fortifications and static patrolling, the force is liable to remain reactive and thus cannot enhance its depth of operations [Russian Invasion of Afghanistan (1979-89)]. In this paper, the effort has been to highlight various perspectives on the evolution of operational art, with special focus on US, UK, German, Russian and Chinese ways of war. It certainly did not emerge all at once. Ideas developed, they were tested in wars, and new concepts were built upon them. Over time, the theory and practise of operational art adapted to accord with contemporary circumstances ensuring its continued relevance. Even at the sub-conventional front, where the war is now being fought amongst the people, its application remains most significant. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 125 June 2013
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O P I N I O N VOL.1, NO.1 JUNE 2013
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MESSAGE OF PATRON The depth of know
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Part-1 Global / R
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Introduction SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
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Hydropower Resources. Tajikistan is
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post-Arab Spring transition in the
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Opportunities • Russian aspiratio
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Infrastructural Development It
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Introduction AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLI
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Attacks in mainland USA - 09 Sep 20
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of peace negotiations, saying that
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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Aft
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Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.
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Deportation / Repatriation of Illeg
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COERCIVE STATECRAFT "The most compl
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US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile
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Indian Coercion of Pakistan - Opera
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• Determine the punishment regime
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other states, or produce counter na
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Introduction RISING INDIA - A CRITI
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protecting Indian investments overs
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India’s Military. Indian military
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India has neither been able to prod
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In an idealistic scenario, where In
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Introduction RISING POWERS AND GLOB
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come to dominate the 21 st century
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In the face of the growing importan
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Better Security Hope in Sight Prosp
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power in central and provincial gov
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Introduction ARAB UPRISING - A CRIT
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Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed p
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the region of Northwest Africa, wes
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Transparency International report f
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leading to the best case scenario.
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Recommended Areas for Immediate Att
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PART - 2 National Security ‣ Glob
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the establishment of the Bretton Wo
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Globalization and Poverty Alleviati
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years and yet an air of distrust st
Page 79 and 80: can cause capital flight, which is
Page 81 and 82: Imperatives for Reaping the Benefit
Page 83 and 84: Conclusion of other hostile element
Page 85 and 86: 58 TasneemNoorani, “MFN Status an
Page 87 and 88: Elections 2014 Joint appeal to the
Page 89 and 90: Tranche 1: began transition in July
Page 91 and 92: PART- IV FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AN
Page 93 and 94: Indian and Chinese involvement in d
Page 95 and 96: influence and eastern and southern
Page 97 and 98: scenario would have grave implicati
Page 99 and 100: In present day Asia, three big demo
Page 101 and 102: Major Conclusions. Major conclusion
Page 103 and 104: The increase in glacial melting may
Page 105 and 106: Demography. Unplanned expansion of
Page 107 and 108: Legislate to ensure energy efficien
Page 109 and 110: 26 http://www.pmd.gov.pk/rnd/rnd_fi
Page 111 and 112: INDO - PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE
Page 113 and 114: During the conflict, leaders/offici
Page 115 and 116: Pakistan, India, without any formal
Page 117 and 118: or the establishment of stability a
Page 119 and 120: Researchers: Supervisor: Brig Asim
Page 121 and 122: The Stone Age of Campaigning. Durin
Page 123 and 124: Technological Advancements - WW 1 F
Page 125 and 126: American Operational Art - WW II O
Page 127 and 128: war began. By early 1951, the fight
Page 129: • Freedom of Action for Afghan Fi
Page 133 and 134: 35 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Ame
Page 135 and 136: are not necessarily new. The four e
Page 137 and 138: Fifth Generation Warfare Theoretica
Page 139 and 140: • Terrorists now have transnation
Page 141 and 142: hierarchical organizations. Technol
Page 143 and 144: Conclusion Force Multipliers. Avail
Page 145 and 146: PART - 4 VIEWS ‣ Human Security O
Page 147 and 148: Commission for Human Security, co c
Page 149: 3 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “W
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