OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

confronted with unforeseen threats such as suicide bombers, car bombs and IEDs. The search for solutions
to these new challenges have led to a major change in the design of equipment deployed on the ground and
has created a new relationship between industry and the military 44 . The new design will have little to do
with manoeuvre but more to do with information.
PART IV
RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS
In this paper an endeavour has been made to understand the evolution of operational art from the
period of the Great Wars to the end of Russo – Afghan War in year 1989. While the lessons of the Great
Wars mostly focus on immediate results with greater reliance on destruction / annihilation of the adversary,
the character of war during the later stages (of the period understudy) transformed into prolonged series of
conflicts fought amongst the people. Salient conclusions relevant to the evolutionary process of operational
art have been grouped into Policy and Military realms.
Policy Realm
"A nation that makes distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its laws made by
cowards and its wars fought by fools."
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 124 June 2013
(Thucydides)
Dividends of Positive Friction between Strategy and Operational Art. While singleness of
conception should be the desired outcome, the systemic effect of strategy and operational art can
only be completed once they are interdependent entities. Their positive friction, while formulating
a strategic direction would bring about much needed balance and refinement in the entire process.
Subservience to Political Strategist. Notwithstanding the requirement of the military
commanders advising the Political Strategist on setting doable goals, the unwanted trend of
operational art guiding the strategy, has always had negative implications on the outcome of the
war [MacArthur – Truman Rift (Korean War - 1953)].
Coherence in Operational Vision. A close and intimate interplay between the strategist (the
politicians) and the operational artist (the military commanders) is essential, which demands better
understanding of each others’ domains, including their respective capacities and limitations (Adolf
Hitler’s ambitions during Battle of Stalingrad – August 1942).
Application of Mid-course Correction by Political Strategist. The political strategist should be
able to apply mid-course corrections to any campaign and for this; there is a need of an intimate
relationship between the strategist and the operational commander. The operational reverses (if
any) should also be absorbed by the strategist and necessary modifications applied there-to the
stated goal (Vietnam War – 1973).
Military Realm – Conventional Domain
Evolution of Character of War. While the nature of war remains constant (being an act of
violence), the character of war kept changing throughout the evolutionary process of operational
art, with technology being the sole driver. The evolution in the character of war can be
summarised as under:-
Pre-World War (19 th Century)
• Shift from Single Point to Multiple Point Application.
• Use of Railroads for simultaneous deployment and concentration at the decisive
point.
WW-1
• Mass mobilization.
• Increased firepower with reduced manoeuvrability.
• Trench warfare.
• Inter-arm cooperation.
• Submarine Warfare.