OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

PART III
THE BEGINNING OF THE END (OF COLD WAR) - 1976 TO 1989
With the continuation of Cold War, no direct military action took place till late 70s. Then came
the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989), which was later converted into a proxy war between the
two global powers, that ended up with the disintegration of USSR. The uni-polar world order thereafter
saw the 1 st and the 2 nd Gulf Wars and the US / NATO invasion of Afghanistan, which continues to date.
Most of the conflicts during this period were expressed through military coalitions, strategic force
deployments, extensive aid to client states, espionage, massive propaganda campaigns, conventional /
nuclear arms races and technological competitions.
In this part, the emphasis would be to analyze the application and periodic evolution of operational
art mainly focusing on:-
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.
Introduction of Operational Level of War by US (1982 - 86).
Operational Art in COIN and the World of the Future.
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979 to 1989)
At the onset of war, Soviet doctrine was deeply entrenched in a European warfare paradigm; large
scale, conventional and mechanized, ideally suited to terrain and climatic conditions of Western Europe. It
is hard to understand, why an army which was eminent in the development of operational art entered
Afghanistan, so ill-equipped and unprepared 37 . Some of the salient draw backs were 38 :-
• Inadequate preparation, visualizing an unopposed march into Afghanistan.
• Composition of Motorised Rifle Divisions of 40th Army (mostly comprised of reservists
with old equipment).
• Less preparation/mobilization time for ground divisions. (15 days for preparation and
another 15 days for mobilization).
• Inability to use multiple supply lines due to lack of infrastructure.
Soviet Strategy. The Soviets followed three main strategies aimed at quelling the Afghan
uprising:-
• Intimidation. Use of airborne / armoured ground attacks to deprive the local support.
• Subversion. Use of spies for bribing local tribes and guerrilla leaders in order to cease
operations.
• Military Raids / Ambushes. Use of raids with air support to destroy guerrillas and limit
their options.
Grey Areas in Soviet Operational Art 39 . Although the Soviets won most of the major battles,
ultimately they got defeated by being plunged into a protracted anti-guerrilla war. Certain grey
areas were:-
• Terrain. The terrain of Afghanistan was the primary obstacle to Soviet forces, due to
major factors like inability to control or isolate the battlefield, tendency of
compartmentalizing the Soviet military elements, limiting communications and command
and control, and critical logistic tail absorbing combat troops for convoy escorts and
related duties.
• Time. Soviets lost the time factor due to their inability to seize and hold the initiative;
disrupt the enemy's observe, orientate, decide, and act (OODA) loop; create the element of
surprise and fight a prolonged battle due to lack of preparedness.
• Balance of Forces. Soviets never balanced their forces effectively and could not deploy
a proper force-to-space ratio to achieve a quick decisive victory or a negotiated settlement;
evaluate the will and faith of Afghan fighters thus viewing it as a local war with limited
objectives and synchronize air and ground forces against specific targets.
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 122 June 2013