OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

war began. By early 1951, the fighting settled into an uneasy stalemate. Active combat involving UN
forces in Korea ended in 1953 with the signing of a cease-fire 33 .
MacArthur - Truman Rift 34 . The American intervention in the Korean peninsula saved South
Korea from a collapse, but efforts to go further, with an objective to roll back the communist North
Korean regime, ended in defeat and bitter acrimony between the operational commander (Mac
Arthur) and the political strategist (President Truman). And finally, Truman relieved Gen
McArthur of his command over American forces in Korea.
The notion of balance was in favour of the UN forces till the Chinese counter offensive. However,
thereafter, Chinese surprised advance critically imbalanced the US system of forces, which
ultimately resulted in their retreat to 38 th Parallel and making them reach their culmination. As a
whole, the UN Forces’ COG rested in their alliance, whereas on the other hand, with the
involvement of the Chinese People’s Army in November 1950, it became the Communists’ COG.
The Vietnam War (1964 – 75)
Vietnam War was fought between North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies and the
government of South Vietnam, supported mainly by the US. During ten most brutal years of the Vietnam
War (1965 – 75), USA clung into two fatal illusions: firstly, it assumed that military might and superior
firepower would win the war, which it grossly underestimated and; secondly, it misunderstood, the fierce
nationalism that drove the Vietnamese resistance.
American operational art although assumed that winning tactical battles would lead ultimately to
winning wars and it also won almost all of them, however, still in the end those victories were not enough.
The U.S. failed to achieve its strategic objectives. The reasons for this defeat in Vietnam were numerous
and complicated, however, one of them was the failure of U.S. military to practice the operational art 35 .
Phases of the War. There were three basic phases of U.S. military’s involvement in Vietnam:-
• The first phase ran from withdrawal of the French military in 1956 to employment of U.S.
forces in late 1964 in support of South Vietnamese forces, (there was no employment of
U.S. forces in a direct combat role).
• The second phase began with the decision to commit U.S. combat forces in 1965 and ran
through the decision to begin withdrawal in 1968. (U.S. forces conducted the majority of
combat operations in the theatre).
• The third and last phase was from the decision to begin the programme of Vietnamization
in 1969 to the fall of Saigon in 1975.
Significant Fault Lines in US Operational Art – Vietnam War. During this prolonged war, a
number of misjudgements became major fault lines of US Army’s employment in Vietnam 36 , like:-
• Absence of a Campaign Plan. The integration of battles and engagements into an overall
major operation or campaign was neither well planned nor executed. The strategy of
attrition through repeated battles without any linkage ceded the initiative to the enemy and
forced the U.S. to fight on the enemy's terms.
• The strategy of Military Assistance Command of Vietnam lacked an integrated plan to
work with other elements of national power.
• There were visible cleavages between the political and military leadership, as Gen
Westmoreland the operational commander had developed a serious rift with Ambassador
Henry Lodge (a representative of President Johnson). The General lost sight of the
strategic objective and thus failed to maintain subordination of the military mission to the
political object.
For approximately fifteen years, the North Vietnamese fought against US and South Vietnam. After
withdrawal of American combat troops in 1973, South Vietnam fell to the North in 1975 resulting into
unification of Vietnam under the communist government in July 1976. US Army had decisively failed to
achieve its objectives and thus a nation accustomed to grand victories of the world wars suffered its first
major defeat.
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 121 June 2013