OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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• Blitzkrieg. This operational method of the German Army along with the use of Luftwaffe was a revolution in warfare, which was most successfully applied by the German military to achieve its ambitions in Europe. • Allied Strategic Errors 19 . It's an old cliché that generals like to re-fight the last war. The disastrous errors of 1940 can only be seen in this light. One of the mistakes was over-reliance on the Maginot line and the other was the abandonment of prepared fortified positions by the Allies to resist the Germans in an open and unfamiliar territory, which set the scene for the great disaster. • The Germans were able to strike the French Centre of Gravity (COG) - Paris and made enemy’s system of forces imbalanced by coaxing them into Belgium while exploiting the thinly held Ardennes and Stenay Gap, resulting into surrender of three fifth of France’s territory to Germany 20 . Operation Barbarossa. Earlier successes with frontal pressure and deep penetration notwithstanding, the Germans could not hold on long enough to capitalize on their gains, thus falling short of their strategic aim. Hitler’s decision of not getting Moscow but to go for Ukraine’s resources diverted him from hitting the COG (Moscow), which led the Germans system of forces to be imbalanced subsequently. Despite heavy losses to Russians in men and material, the German forces could not take them to their culminating point 21 and thus the Germans were forced to surrender on 8 May 1945. Few other factors impacting the German operational art negatively during WW-II were grossly underestimated mobilization potential of the Red Army. German logistic weaknesses made it extremely difficult to sustain their mobility and armament industry had limited production. Operational Art in Russia – WW II. It was not until 1943 that the Russians emerged with a much better version of operational art. They had quite correctly realized their weaknesses after their initial failures and had raised tank and mechanized corps to spearhead their offensive operations. A brief explanation of some of the major campaigns fought by the Red Army during WW-II is:- Soviet Counter Offensive • Stalingrad (Operation Uranus). Russians were able to successfully maintain balance despite suffering more casualties than the Germans. Their actions led to the Germans losing their much desired tempo of operations 22 . The decisive victory demonstrated the Red Army’s mastery of operational art. 23 • The Belorussian Offensive (Jun-Aug 1943). The Soviets reinforced Germans’ misperception by deliberately posturing offensively in the South, while secretly moving large mobile formations northward into Belorussia, inflicting devastating defeat on German Army Group Centre 24 . • Germans being overextended, could not improve their defensive posture and were thus not in a state of balance; the Russians were able to correctly exploit this imbalance 25 . Deep-Battle Theory 26 . During the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced the concept of deep battle, which was formally evolved in the Russian Field Manual in year 1936 by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Salient contours of the theory included Deep Operations encompassed manoeuvre by multiple corps or army sized formations simultaneously, and it was not meant to deliver a victory in a single operation, but instead multiple operations conducted in parallel or successively. From Stalingrad to Berlin during 1943 to 1945, the Soviets perfected sequential and simultaneous operations. Stalin’s marshals learned to command and control these operations in depth and breadth, while coordinating air support with armoured thrusts. These successes signify Russian operational art during WW-II 27 . OPINION Vol.1 No.1 118 June 2013
American Operational Art - WW II Operation Overlord (Normandy Landing). The Normandy landing was the largest seaborne invasion in the world history. Correct and timely application of allied forces imbalanced the German system of forces by executing a proficiently planned deception, efficiently executed joint operations coupled with airborne landings behind enemy lines ensuring achievement of simultaneous effects with great skill 28 . Eisenhower, against the expectations of many was able to integrate large and diverse military forces into a coherent fighting team. He was perhaps the first U.S. master of operational art for ‘the machine age armies’. 29 Battle of Bulge (Dec 1944 - Jan 1945) - General Patton. Patton demonstrated a great deal of competence in massing and applying combined arms in a joint environment. Using the air force and organic field artillery in mutually supporting roles, he was able to use operational fires as a force enhancer to shape the battlefield. Pacific Campaign / General MacArthur (1943-45). 30 MacArthur’s tri-phibious concept combined all service capabilities into an effective whole. The corner stone of the Allied success was the skilful implementation of MacArthur's operational vision and the cooperation among the air, naval and ground forces, which made the allies more effective than the Japanese. Britain. The British approach to warfare is conditioned by the nation’s history. Relatively secure on their mooted island, the British traditionally committed modest land forces to European wars in order to cement alliances and demonstrate commitment rather than to seek decisive victory in their own right. Salient aspects pertaining to the application of operational art during North African Campaign (Jun 1940 - May 1943)are:- General Bernard Montgomery (Eighth Army) delivered a decisive defeat to the Axis forces in the 2 nd Battle of El Alamein. The battle-hardened general, conscious that the mobile tank battle was Rommel’s forte, unleashed the Battle of El Alamein as a battle of attrition, using his huge advantages in artillery, infantry and supplies. Operation Torch (Nov 1942). More than 2,30,000 troops surrendered to the Allies in Tunisia. Success of Operation Torch can be attributed to Joint British and American invasion plan (for the 1 st time), successful amphibious landing, first large scale American airborne drop, which captured two airfields near Oran and sustained logistic support. Technological Advancements – WW II Technology played a crucial role in determining the outcome of WW II. Some of the highlights include introduction of anti-tank weapons to counter German Blitzkrieg, the use of Torpedoes (both by naval and air platforms) and the effective use of tanks. In naval warfare, the radars were a great breakthrough in navigation and also the development of Sonar. Aircraft carriers were also very effective. Similarly in air force, the aircrafts became stronger, lighter and more efficient, which also allowed them to carry more weapons. In the category of bombers, the development of pressurized pilot cabins with enhanced munitions carrying capacity and range, made them most relevant. Finally, the advent and the very use of atomic bomb brought about a sea change in the warfare to follow. According to one of the notable US theorists (Herman Kahn):- “the use of the most lethal weapon in the human history, led to a continual decline of operational art (in the conventional plane) and the artist was envisioned to instead turn into a technician”. Evolution of Naval Operational Art during the Great Wars Surface ships were the principle weapons during WW-I, whereas German Navy being weaker came up with U-Boats. During WW-II, anti-submarine warfare got pronounced through use of radars, Sonars and torpedoes. Besides this, aircraft carriers and amphibious landings were also very useful. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 119 June 2013
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O P I N I O N VOL.1, NO.1 JUNE 2013
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MESSAGE OF PATRON The depth of know
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Part-1 Global / R
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Introduction SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
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Hydropower Resources. Tajikistan is
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post-Arab Spring transition in the
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Opportunities • Russian aspiratio
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Infrastructural Development It
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Introduction AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLI
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Attacks in mainland USA - 09 Sep 20
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of peace negotiations, saying that
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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Aft
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Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.
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Deportation / Repatriation of Illeg
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COERCIVE STATECRAFT "The most compl
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US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile
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Indian Coercion of Pakistan - Opera
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• Determine the punishment regime
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other states, or produce counter na
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Introduction RISING INDIA - A CRITI
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protecting Indian investments overs
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India’s Military. Indian military
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India has neither been able to prod
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In an idealistic scenario, where In
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Introduction RISING POWERS AND GLOB
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come to dominate the 21 st century
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In the face of the growing importan
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Better Security Hope in Sight Prosp
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power in central and provincial gov
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Introduction ARAB UPRISING - A CRIT
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Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed p
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the region of Northwest Africa, wes
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Transparency International report f
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leading to the best case scenario.
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Recommended Areas for Immediate Att
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PART - 2 National Security ‣ Glob
Page 73 and 74: the establishment of the Bretton Wo
Page 75 and 76: Globalization and Poverty Alleviati
Page 77 and 78: years and yet an air of distrust st
Page 79 and 80: can cause capital flight, which is
Page 81 and 82: Imperatives for Reaping the Benefit
Page 83 and 84: Conclusion of other hostile element
Page 85 and 86: 58 TasneemNoorani, “MFN Status an
Page 87 and 88: Elections 2014 Joint appeal to the
Page 89 and 90: Tranche 1: began transition in July
Page 91 and 92: PART- IV FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AN
Page 93 and 94: Indian and Chinese involvement in d
Page 95 and 96: influence and eastern and southern
Page 97 and 98: scenario would have grave implicati
Page 99 and 100: In present day Asia, three big demo
Page 101 and 102: Major Conclusions. Major conclusion
Page 103 and 104: The increase in glacial melting may
Page 105 and 106: Demography. Unplanned expansion of
Page 107 and 108: Legislate to ensure energy efficien
Page 109 and 110: 26 http://www.pmd.gov.pk/rnd/rnd_fi
Page 111 and 112: INDO - PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE
Page 113 and 114: During the conflict, leaders/offici
Page 115 and 116: Pakistan, India, without any formal
Page 117 and 118: or the establishment of stability a
Page 119 and 120: Researchers: Supervisor: Brig Asim
Page 121 and 122: The Stone Age of Campaigning. Durin
Page 123: Technological Advancements - WW 1 F
Page 127 and 128: war began. By early 1951, the fight
Page 129 and 130: • Freedom of Action for Afghan Fi
Page 131 and 132: WW-2 • Joint Warfare. • Amphibi
Page 133 and 134: 35 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Ame
Page 135 and 136: are not necessarily new. The four e
Page 137 and 138: Fifth Generation Warfare Theoretica
Page 139 and 140: • Terrorists now have transnation
Page 141 and 142: hierarchical organizations. Technol
Page 143 and 144: Conclusion Force Multipliers. Avail
Page 145 and 146: PART - 4 VIEWS ‣ Human Security O
Page 147 and 148: Commission for Human Security, co c
Page 149: 3 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “W
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OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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