OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

stated goal. In March 1918; the Germans also resorted to specially trained storm-troopers across
the trenches, in response to the Western stabilized front with focus on free operations concept.
• On the Eastern front, Russia was defeated by Germany in a number of battles, which subsequently
came to be known as the Battle of Tannenberg. Through speedy movement of a single German
corps by train, the Germans were able to sequentially concentrate superior troops ratio against two
different Russian armies, which became the most distinct feature of the battle. This was an
excellent example of leverage of the operational art factor of force deployment, in which the
Germans were able to maintain balance against a numerically superior Russian Army.
• By November 1918, the Germans, despite being on enemy’s soil, had to request for an armistice.
They were not left with much choices thus losing balance and had also reached their culminating
point by considerably losing the tempo of their operations.
Operational Art in Russia – WW I
• Russian training and regimental system could not produce an effective staff system or higher
command structure, whereas they did have high-quality junior officers 8 .
• Successful Austro-Hungarian Offensive in the Battle of Kraśnik – 1914, is a case in point in which
multiple operational problems occurred, especially ineffective command and control and the
Russians also misjudged the Austrian concentration at Lemberg (in western Ukraine). The Austro-
Hungarian 1 st Army defeated the Russian Fourth Army by ensuring balance through better
strategic positioning around Krasnik.
• The Russian Empire collapsed in March 1917, and Russia left the war prematurely after the
Bolshevik Revolution later that year.
Operational Art by USA – WW I
• American pre-war doctrine was written in vacuum and was developed for a generic foe 9 . American
ground operational doctrine stressed on conducting offensive operations and massing
overwhelming combat power at the decisive point, which was in sync with the attrition-based
strategy of the Allies. 10
• The American Command had only three months of experience at practicing operational art before
the armistice ended the hostilities in November 1918. However, even in this short time, the US
forces proved successful in number of battles, which took place towards the end of WW-I; Battle
of St. Mihiel (September 1918) is a case in point 11 .
• The major problems which confronted the operations by US forces (AEF) were that senior
commanders and staff lacked practical operational experience and consequently, were slow to
perceive and respond to the changes in the situation, they fought the plan rather than the enemy,
and coordination of fire and movement of large number of troops over vast expanses of space in
the face of stiffening German resistance was a difficult proposition. 12
Operational Art in Britain – WW I
• The British, who had always relied on a strong navy and a small regular army, were forced to
undertake a rapid expansion of their field army. This outpaced the rate of training of generals and
staff officers ability to handle such a mammoth force.
• However, the British Expeditionary Forces under the command of General Douglas Haig were able
to deliver in the Battle of Somme particularly when they first used tanks.
• Battles of Hundred Days – 1918. During the last stages of WW-1, the allies (British Empire)
launched a series of attacks against the Germans, famously known as the Battles of 100 Days,
which saw inter-arm cooperation at its peak. Tanks and infantry assaulted under the cover of a
fast moving artillery barrage, while spotter planes directed friendly artillery fire and other aircrafts
engaged enemy troops in ground attack role. The offensive, which commenced with the Battle of
Amiens (August 1918) forced the German armies to retreat beyond the Hindenburg Line and
finally ended with an armistice on 11 November 1918.
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 116 June 2013