OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

The Stone Age of Campaigning. During most part of the history, operational art did not exist 2 .
However, this absence was not necessarily due to any lesser understanding of wars, campaigns and
battles. Instead it can be largely attributed to the lack of technology, especially transport and
communication. Therefore, commanders of that time could only exercise effective command over
the forces that marched with them.
Napoleonic Wars – The Dawn of Operational Art. In the wars of 18th century, field armies
seldom exceeded 50,000 men, however, it was Napoleon who attacked Prussia in 1805 with
1,70,000 troops. As a result, the dimensions of battlefield also grew to a span of more than 60
kilometers 3 in the Franco-Prussian War. Napoleon brought about a revolution in the military
affairs by forming ‘the Grande Armee’, which introduced his new system of ‘the Corps d’ Armee’.
Each corps was commanded by a separate Marshal with relatively greater degree of independence;
however, lack of appropriate technology still restricted Napoleon to converge on a single point of
application.
Great Military Thinkers and Operational Art
Summary
Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Henry Jomini (1779 – 1869) generally followed the traditional
view that tactics was what happened on the battlefield, and strategy was everything that led to and
from it. These two great theorists did not suggest the existence of an intermediate level of war
between strategy and tactics, as in their context, the need for such a level did not exist. The Kings
and emperors went to war themselves and directed its conduct for an acceptable outcome. Strategy
directed tactics with great immediacy and intimacy and there was thus no need or role of another
intervening level for operations or operational art, and so neither Clausewitz nor Jomini had
suggested such a construct 4 .
Helmuth Von Moltke. The Industrial revolution by year 1850, besides escalating the war canvas,
also brought in effective technological advancements, including railways and telegraph 5 , which
greatly impacted operational art in its evolution. Moltke (the elder), while effectively utilising the
railways, concentrated more than 4,50,000 men at the decisive point during the Franco-Prussian
War (1871). Moltke quite implicitly recognized the fact that strategy has political content, while
operations have a military basis 6 .
To summarize, the historical overview, it was the Napoleonic campaigns and then Moltke’s most
innovative operational concepts in the Franco-Prussian War that set the stage for operational art to evolve.
Thus began a new era in the field of warfare, where the political strategist without being present at the
battlefield was effectively connected to the tactician at the front. By year 1910, the industrial revolution,
mass mobilization, expanded theatre of operations coupled with multiple point applications had triggered
the beginning of operational art.
World War – I (1914 - 1918)
PART - I
THE TWO GREAT WARS (1914 TO 1945)
WW I was fought by a coalition of nations in which the complete society and the nation’s
economy were mobilized for fighting a “Total War”. Certain highlights of the evolutionary process of
operational art are discussed in the following paragraphs:
Operational Art in Germany – WW I 7
• In German operational thinking during WW-I, frontal pressure along with envelopment were the
basic forms of manoeuvre aimed at achieving enemy’s encirclement leading to his ultimate
destruction.
• Trench warfare resulted into a gruelling form of warfare in which the defence held the advantage.
There were no assailable flanks and the attacks, even if successful, often sustained severe
casualties and thus had a major impact on steering Germany towards the development of
operational art.
• Free Operations were conducted by German troops, aimed at facilitating ingenuity in tactical
actions and adapting to local circumstances, while remaining within the overall framework of the
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 115 June 2013