OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

Decision Making During Mumbai Attacks
India. Like the 2001/2002 military standoff, the CCS headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
was entrusted with the responsibility of handling the crisis. However, there were indications of
strain within the decision makers. External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee was pushing for a
military response, while the Prime Minister was counselling restraint. Inability of the decision
makers to find a potent workable option of retaliation against Pakistan in the face of growing
domestic pressure added much to their anxiety and frustration. Overall Indian leadership acted
with maturity.
Pakistan. In Pakistan there was nascent democratic set-up and diffusion of power within the
country and visible lack of cohesion among the decision makers with regard to the response to the
crisis. Confusion about the dispatch of DG ISI to India, resignation of National Security Advisor
and identity of lone survivor of the militants spoke ill of the coordination among the decision
makers. Initial responses notwithstanding, later the decision makers harmonized their efforts and
cobbled a cogent response in the backdrop of ground realities which greatly contributed in
mitigating the crisis.
Effects of Nuclear Deterrence
No nuclear posturing was carried out by either side. This indicated that probably both sides learnt
good lessons from the previous crises, fully came to realize the operation of nuclear deterrence in the
region, understood the futility of coercive diplomacy and till the advent of potential spoilers like ballistic
missile defence, preferred to settle their disputes through peaceful means.
US Role in Escalation Control
US diplomacy certainly remains at the forefront of efforts directed at escalation prevention,
escalation control, crisis mitigation and crisis management between India and Pakistan 14 . The crisis
occurred during the period of transition between the Bush and Obama administrations, which compounded
the efforts of US diplomats to handle it. US had at least four interests in the crisis which demanded its
active involvement: firstly, American lives had been lost in the attacks, secondly manage relations with
two friendly countries mutually hostile to each other, thirdly prevent shifting of Pakistan Army from
Afghan border to Indian border which would have affected the GWOT and finally the possibility of war
between India and Pakistan would have directly impacted US forces/assets in the region. Consequently, the
US immediately involved itself in the crisis and sought its prompt management. US, applied carrot and
stick policy on both countries and resorted to high level diplomacy including calls by US President to
leaders of both the countries and visits by senior diplomats.
PART 4
LESSONS LEARNT FROM POLICY/STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS
Due to unresolved disputes and role of Non State Actors, attempts to the contrary notwithstanding,
Indo-Pakistani relations are and will remain prone to periodic crises and any peace process between them
will at best remain fragile. The critical analysis of crises occurring in the period from 1998 to date yields
few useful lessons which are given in the ensuing paragraphs.
Stability – Instability Paradox
Nuclear weapons, in theory, can only deter nuclear weapons and large-scale conventional wars.
But, the stability part of the paradox has decisively pushed Indo – Pakistan antagonism to subterranean
channels with its manifestations in subversive activities, enhanced militancy and cross-border terrorism
and so on directed against each other, illustrating the operations of the instability part of the paradox. Such
incidence of perpetual conflict in subterranean channels in South Asia, raise problems for escalation
control as well as mar the prospects of durable peace in the region hence the need to resolve those
underlying issues which vitiate the environment and yield periodic conflicts 15 .
Lack of Institutional Mechanisms
The manner in which Indo-Pakistan crises suddenly erupt and escalate highlights the paucity of
institutional mechanisms to prevent, contain and manage them. The on-going composite dialogue
notwithstanding, till the institution of a robust and meaningful risk reduction mechanism with in-built
capacity to sustain the shocks of spoiler attacks unleashed by Non State Actors, real reduction of tensions
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 110 June 2013