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OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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During the conflict, leaders/officials of both countries did not hesitate to exchange direct or indirect<br />

nuclear threats which rang alarm bells in the international community.<br />

Deterrent Effect on India<br />

Due to deterrence, India did not enlarge its theatre of hostilities against the military logic, which<br />

required extension of the conflict to other sectors to release pressure on Indian forces in the confined<br />

Drass – Kargil Sector. Fear of uncontrollable escalation prevented India from attacking Pakistani forces<br />

and targets across the LOC. Indian Air Force was used to support its ground forces, but under strict orders<br />

not to cross the LOC which entailed great flying risks in mountainous terrain.<br />

Deterrent Effect on Pakistan<br />

Capability notwithstanding, Pakistan, for its part, did not extend its ground operations to other<br />

sectors to draw off Indian ground forces concentrating in the Drass – Kargil area or exploit the relative<br />

vacuum presented by Indian forces elsewhere. Pakistan also did not use its Air Force in support of the<br />

infiltrators or to counter Indian Air Force. Was Pakistan worried that opening the other sectors or use of air<br />

force would escalate the conventional conflict Was Pakistan inhibited by the nuclear deterrent available to<br />

India What forced Pakistan to meet restraint with a reciprocal restraint Or it can be concluded that<br />

nuclear deterrence did delimit, if not deter, Indo-Pak conflict for the first time but actually, unfavourable<br />

environment, sagging economy and cleavages in the civil-military relations had a greater restraining<br />

impact on Pakistan.<br />

Role of US in Defusing of Kargil Conflict<br />

Through deft exterior manoeuvre, India successfully isolated and portrayed Pakistan as a<br />

revisionist state attempting to change the status quo which must be restrained else it could lead to<br />

catastrophic consequences. Therefore, international community led by United States urged Pakistan to<br />

respect the LOC and withdraw its forces from across, while at the same time, urged India to restrain itself<br />

from crossing the LOC or open another front in the conflict. As stated earlier, this led to US President Bill<br />

Clinton’s brokered peace deal in July 99 which necessitated Pakistani withdrawal from across and<br />

restoration of the LOC which was done 5 . Formal ending of Kargil conflict by USA in India’s favour<br />

surprised even Indians as it was the first time in fifty years that the United States had sided with India<br />

against Pakistan ‘openly and firmly’. Kargil initiated a period of greater harmony between the United<br />

States and India which developed into strategic partnership in the later years.<br />

Outcome of the Conflict<br />

There has been a lack of consensus among Indian and Pakistani observers about the outcome of the<br />

conflict as well as the influence of nuclear weapons. Pakistan felt that the military victory on the battlefield<br />

though could not be sustained on political grounds; yet the central objective of bringing Kashmir back to<br />

international focus was largely achieved. In contrast, India was convinced that Kargil was a victory for it<br />

as its forces had prevailed on the battlefield, its political leaders had not been intimidated by Pakistan’s<br />

nuclear weapons, and Pakistan had been portrayed to the international community as an aggressor and<br />

reckless state while India attained the reputation of a responsible and restrained nuclear power.<br />

Recapitulation of the Conflict<br />

PART 2<br />

MILITARY STANDOFF – 2001/ 2002 (THE TWIN PEAKS CRISIS)<br />

The military standoff between Pakistan and India in 2001/2002 spanned over a period of 10<br />

months and was a product of 2 separate terrorist activities. Due to the severity of events, bringing both the<br />

countries to the peaks of tension, these crises are referred to as “Twin Peaks Crisis.” The “First Peak of<br />

Crisis” began on 13 December 2001, when the terrorists attacked Indian parliament, killing a number of<br />

guards there 6 . The Indian leadership portrayed the attack as an assault upon the very foundations of Indian<br />

democracy and quickly pointed an accusing finger towards Pakistan. Blaming Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LET)<br />

and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) for the terrorists attack, India demanded that Pakistan must end the<br />

activities of these two organizations, arrest their leadership and freeze their financial assets. India also<br />

demanded extradition of some twenty alleged criminals who were on its wanted list and had been given<br />

asylum in Pakistan. Pakistan demanded concrete evidence against these individuals. India cut diplomatic<br />

links with Pakistan and geared up the war hysteria by deploying more than half a million troops along the<br />

LOC and the international border. Pakistan also responded in kind and this became the biggest<br />

<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 107 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>

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