OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

INDO – PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE
“We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great to
produce results in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a
peaceful policy towards Pakistan, and at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not
from the armed forces but the industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength,
as we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less inclined to threaten or harass us, and a time will
come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement that we
consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere.”
Introduction
(Nehru 1 , August 1952)
The continuum spanning almost fourteen years from 1998 to date appears to be a one long India –
Pakistan crisis punctuated by periods of apparent peace yet marred by the intense struggle at sub
conventional level, both within the kinetic and non-kinetic domains. The bilateral relationship between the
two arch-rivals has been clouded by territorial disputes leading to a series of wars and crises. Kashmir,
which remains to be the bone of contention since 1947, is not merely a living symbol of incomplete
identities but a continuing reminder of an extraordinarily violent separation that cost as many as two
million lives without a war being fought 2 . Since May 1998, with overt nuclearization, the traditional rivalry
between India and Pakistan acquired a new dimension. With the war becoming increasingly unthinkable,
the advent of nuclear weapons generated a twin proclivity for crisis and caution. The “stability –
instability paradox”, produced a high degree of stability at the strategic level yet it bred instability at
lower levels enabling both the countries to continue their confrontation short of war. In 1999, during Kargil
Conflict, in spite of mutual provocations, neither side sought to mobilize for a full-scale war. Immediately
after 9/11, Twin Peaks Crisis was triggered between India and Pakistan by a terrorist attack on Indian
Parliament on 13 December 2001. In this ten months long crisis, both sides mobilized for war, but
remained short of indulging in an armed engagement. Sequel to realization by both, of the futility of armed
conflict between nuclear rivals and consequent devastation which it may cause, they began a
comprehensive “Composite Dialogue” in 2004 on a wide range of political and strategic issues and agreed
to reduce nuclear risks through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). However, the dialogue had hardly
gained momentum that it was brought to a grinding halt by Mumbai terrorists’ attacks in November 2008
which marked the third conflict in a short span of nine years.
Consequent to 9/11, India, having made inroads into Afghanistan under the patronage of USA,
launched sub conventional/proxy war against Pakistan to foment and aggravate unrest in Balochistan 3 and
support violence in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The radicalized Pakistani society, due to
a host of reasons, is also being utilized as an ideal testing ground for the implementation of Kautilya –
Chanakya’s insidious strategies to destabilize Pakistan while keeping it under the perpetual assault of non
kinetic forces. Global War on Terror and continuing tensions between the two nuclear neighbours saw the
United States plunging deeper into the region’s strategic politics and crises, yet in the overall assessment, it
did succeed in defusing those crises which came in a succession. Currently, in the backdrop of resumption
of Composite Dialogue in 2010, both the countries appear to be determined to normalize their relations so
as to give peace a chance once again.
Aim
To analyze the Indo – Pak conflicts from 1998 to date with a view to drawing lessons from
policy/strategic dimensions.
Scope
The paper, while focusing on Decision Making at strategic level, Impact/efficacy of nuclear deterrence,
Sub conventional domain of the conflict, Role of US in de-escalation and Strategic coercion will
encompass following:-
Part 1. Kargil Conflict – 1999.
Part 2. Mil Standoff – 2001/2002 (Twin Peaks Crisis).
Part 3. Escalation – 2008 (Mumbai Terrorists Attack).
Part 4. Lessons learnt from policy/strategic dimensions.
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 105 June 2013