Police-Encounters-With-People-In-Crisis
Police-Encounters-With-People-In-Crisis Police-Encounters-With-People-In-Crisis
e used in practice as alternatives to firearms in situations where lethal force may be authorized. 38. Similar to the submissions this Review has received, the Braidwood Commission noted the unanimous view of mental health professionals that the best practice in dealing with people in crisis is to: de-escalate the agitation, which can best be achieved through the application of recognized crisis intervention techniques. Conversely, the worst possible response is to aggravate or escalate the crisis, such as by deploying a conducted energy weapon and/or using force to physically restrain the subject. It is accepted that there may be some extreme circumstances, however rare, when crisis intervention techniques will not be effective in de-escalating the crisis. But even then, there are steps that officers can take to mitigate the risk of deployment. 45 39. The Braidwood Commission identified 25 people nation-wide who died during or after an incident involving a CEW between 2003 and 2008. The Commission also found that, in 24% of uses in B.C., the subject suffered a CEW-related injury. Although the majority of injuries were minor, the Commission noted cases of lung collapse, loss of consciousness from falling and hitting one’s head, facial wounds, broken ankle, and a probe dart imbedded in the subject’s clavicle bone. 40. Commissioner Braidwood noted that, although it is difficult to determine whether a CEW caused a person’s death, the risk of ventricular fibrillation (which can be fatal if the person is not defibrillated promptly) increases significantly if the subject has cardiovascular disease, a short skin-to-heart distance, or an implanted pacemaker or defibrillator. This risk appeared to increase when a person was subjected to multiple CEW deployments. 41. In his review of the use of CEWs in B.C. up to 2007, Commissioner Braidwood found that the number of deployments increased at a rate faster than the increase in the number of CEWs, indicating that officers chose to use the devices more often over time. The Commission found a large variation in the frequency of deployments by police services, ranging from 5.2 to 130.7 uses per 100,000 people depending on the police service. The B.C. Transit Authority Police used a CEW six times in 2007. Troublingly, in three cases the subject’s active resistance consisted of fleeing after being stopped for a fare check. 42. The Commissioner emphasized that the actual use of CEWs among municipal and provincial police services was likely much higher than the numbers reported, making a complete analysis challenging. He urged the B.C. government to work with other provinces and the federal government to develop and fund a national research program for CEWs. 45 Restricting Use, supra note 40 at 15. Police Encounters With People in Crisis |251
43. Commissioner Braidwood found that the thresholds for both “subject matter” (the offence that the subject has committed) and “subject behaviour” (the person’s conduct toward the officer or others) should be increased before the use of a CEW be considered justified. He concluded that CEWs should only be used in connection with the commission of criminal offences, not regulatory violations. 44. Further, the Commission found that the existing threshold for authorized use of CEWs against people demonstrating “active resistance” was not proportionate to the medical risks and pain the device can inflict. The Commission Report recommended that a CEW be used only when the subject is causing bodily harm or the officer is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that the subject’s behaviour will imminently cause bodily harm. Even then, the Commissioner held, an officer should not deploy a CEW unless satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that no lesser force option, de-escalation or crisis intervention technique would be effective. De-escalation efforts were emphasized for people in crisis: the Commission’s Phase 1 Report recommended that officers be required to use de-escalation and/or crisis intervention techniques before deploying a CEW unless they are reasonably satisfied that such techniques will not eliminate the risk of bodily harm. 45. The Report recommended that officers be required to stop using a CEW after the first five seconds of charge in order to re-assess the situation, and that all officers equipped with CEWs be required to have an automated external defibrillator available. 46. Phase two of the Braidwood Commission reviewed the circumstances surrounding Mr. Dziekanski’s death. The Commissioner noted that incidents of excessive force by police, especially incidents in which the officers involved are not completely forthright about the circumstances in their use-of-force reports and debriefings, have far-reaching repercussions. In particular, a single fatality at the hands of police can galvanize public antipathy against an entire police service, its members, and the weapon used on the subject. As the Commission Report noted, the resulting crisis of confidence can be devastating for the vast majority of police officers who do their job fairly and protect lives, as the most important weapon in the arsenal of the police is public support. 46 (c) Conclusions on the state of current scientific evidence 47. The Goudge and Braidwood reports highlight the absence of authoritative research on the health effects of CEWs. Although the medical evidence is inconclusive as to a link between CEW use and death, it appears to be accepted that fatal complications are biologically possible. The paucity of reliable data regarding the effects of CEWs on individuals with medical conditions, people in crisis and subjects with prescription medications, illegal drugs or alcohol in their system makes it difficult for police to predict whether a given subject in a real-life interaction will suffer serious consequences from exposure to a CEW charge. 46 Dziekanski Tragedy, supra note 40 at 24. Police Encounters With People in Crisis |252
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e used in practice as alternatives to firearms in situations where lethal force may be<br />
authorized.<br />
38. Similar to the submissions this Review has received, the Braidwood Commission<br />
noted the unanimous view of mental health professionals that the best practice in<br />
dealing with people in crisis is to:<br />
de-escalate the agitation, which can best be achieved through<br />
the application of recognized crisis intervention techniques.<br />
Conversely, the worst possible response is to aggravate or<br />
escalate the crisis, such as by deploying a conducted energy<br />
weapon and/or using force to physically restrain the subject.<br />
It is accepted that there may be some extreme<br />
circumstances, however rare, when crisis intervention<br />
techniques will not be effective in de-escalating the crisis.<br />
But even then, there are steps that officers can take to<br />
mitigate the risk of deployment. 45<br />
39. The Braidwood Commission identified 25 people nation-wide who died during or<br />
after an incident involving a CEW between 2003 and 2008. The Commission also found<br />
that, in 24% of uses in B.C., the subject suffered a CEW-related injury. Although the<br />
majority of injuries were minor, the Commission noted cases of lung collapse, loss of<br />
consciousness from falling and hitting one’s head, facial wounds, broken ankle, and a<br />
probe dart imbedded in the subject’s clavicle bone.<br />
40. Commissioner Braidwood noted that, although it is difficult to determine<br />
whether a CEW caused a person’s death, the risk of ventricular fibrillation (which can be<br />
fatal if the person is not defibrillated promptly) increases significantly if the subject has<br />
cardiovascular disease, a short skin-to-heart distance, or an implanted pacemaker or<br />
defibrillator. This risk appeared to increase when a person was subjected to multiple<br />
CEW deployments.<br />
41. <strong>In</strong> his review of the use of CEWs in B.C. up to 2007, Commissioner Braidwood<br />
found that the number of deployments increased at a rate faster than the increase in the<br />
number of CEWs, indicating that officers chose to use the devices more often over time.<br />
The Commission found a large variation in the frequency of deployments by police<br />
services, ranging from 5.2 to 130.7 uses per 100,000 people depending on the police<br />
service. The B.C. Transit Authority <strong>Police</strong> used a CEW six times in 2007. Troublingly, in<br />
three cases the subject’s active resistance consisted of fleeing after being stopped for a<br />
fare check.<br />
42. The Commissioner emphasized that the actual use of CEWs among municipal<br />
and provincial police services was likely much higher than the numbers reported,<br />
making a complete analysis challenging. He urged the B.C. government to work with<br />
other provinces and the federal government to develop and fund a national research<br />
program for CEWs.<br />
45<br />
Restricting Use, supra note 40 at 15.<br />
<strong>Police</strong> <strong>Encounters</strong> <strong>With</strong> <strong>People</strong> in <strong>Crisis</strong> |251