Police-Encounters-With-People-In-Crisis
Police-Encounters-With-People-In-Crisis Police-Encounters-With-People-In-Crisis
65. Communication is central to every stage of this crisis intervention model, from developing rapport with the patient and identifying the problem to creating and implementing a plan of action. 58 66. As the Review heard with respect to the Metropolitan Police Service, when professionals dealing with people in crisis have no option to use lethal force, they are more likely to default to verbal de-escalation and develop multiple communications techniques to resolve a crisis situation. E. Difficulty in comparing statistics regarding use of force 67. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Context), between 2002 and 2012, TPS use of lethal force involving members of the public ranged from one to five incidents per year. For Ontario as a whole, the Special Investigations Unit reports a range of 1 to 10 lethal incidents per year resulting from police use of firearms against members of the public. 59 68. It is difficult to compare the use of force of Canadian municipal police services not only because of challenges in obtaining data from those sources, but also because police services collect and report different information, and code their data differently. Thus, the Review was not able to compare TPS data regarding police use of force in encounters with people in crisis with the same information from other cities. Further, the criteria for assessing mental illness continue to evolve, which may affect how various police services record calls involving people in crisis at different times. 69. At the same time, some notable comparators stand out, without the need for detailed statistical analysis. For example, the Review was informed that the Metropolitan Police Service in London has been involved in shooting four people in crisis in the last 10 years—in a city of 8 million people. This compares with five lethal shootings of people in crisis in Toronto in the 2002-2012 period, with Toronto having only a third of the population of London. Although the absence of a “gun culture” in England is often cited as a relevant factor when considering use of lethal force by London police more generally, it should be irrelevant when considering encounters with people in crisis specifically. There is no reason to believe that London has fewer people in crisis than Toronto, or that people in crisis in London are less dangerous than in Toronto, yet police in London are involved in substantially fewer lethal shootings of people in crisis than the TPS. 70. The Rand Corporation, a policy research institution, has issued a report canvassing best practices in measuring police performance. 60 The Rand Report notes the importance of comparing performance across police agencies to determine how a service is performing relative to similar agencies. The Report recommends using data from multiple agencies to create a standard comparator and “synthetic controls” against 58 See e.g. id. at 25-29. 59 Ontario Special Investigation Unit, “Special Investigations Unit Annual Report, 2011-2012: Shaping Civilian Oversight” (2012), online: Ontario Special Investigation Unit at 17. 60 Robert C. Davis, “Selected International Best Practices in Police Performance Measurement” (2012), online: RAND Corporation http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1153.html [Davis, “Best Practices”]. Police Encounters With People in Crisis |211
which to measure performance. There are several ways to measure police performance, including the extent to which service members use force sparingly and fairly to minimize shootings and treat people equally, and the level of “customer satisfaction” of the people police serve. 61 Given that it can be difficult to accurately measure performance based on a police service’s records alone, some experts recommend other measures such as surveys of the community, of those who interact with police and of officers. 62 Used in connection with citizen complaints and other internal records, a service may be able to create a database of information that can be used as an early warning system for inappropriate use of force. 63 Further, the effective use of the data collected may improve police culture by encouraging officers to strive for higher levels of accomplishment. 64 II. Overview of Issues Highlighted by Stakeholders 71. The Review received submissions from several organizations and individuals which addressed the current provincial Use of Force Model, use-of-force policies within Ontario and the TPS, and recommendations for reforms. The Review also received comparative use-of-force policies and procedures, such as those produced by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the UN, and police services in other jurisdictions, some of which were described above. 72. The Review received suggestions for changes to the Use of Force Model. For example, both a former police officer and a relative of a person shot by police during a crisis suggested changes to the current training that shots must be fired to the chest to stop individuals. Another relative of a person with mental illness shot by police suggested improvements to training for officers on how to deal with individuals who do not respond in a typical way to yelled commands. Others suggested that police should better incorporate information about an individual’s mental illness or crisis state and input from the subject’s family into the assessment of the appropriate use of force. 73. One organization expressed concern that misconceptions about mental health symptoms can distort police perceptions of the risk posed by people in crisis. That organization suggested reviewing the Ontario Use of Force Model with a human rights lens to combat adverse effects of the Model on people in crisis. Another stakeholder expressed dismay that the Use of Force Model has changed minimally since its introduction in 1993, and suggested that this is indicative of minimal change in police training in the area of use of force. 74. Several individuals raised concerns that the focus on ensuring officer safety has overshadowed the need to protect the lives of subjects and bystanders. One mental health care provider suggested that the Use of Force Model should better emphasize the 61 Id. at 2-3 (Davis describes customer satisfaction as “services to the public above and beyond crime fighting,” and writes that, “[p]roviding good service to citizens increases police legitimacy.”) 62 See e.g. Dr. Johann Brink et al., A Study of How People with Mental Illness Perceive and Interact with the Police (Calgary, AB: Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2011). 63 Davis, supra note 60 at 6. 64 Id. at 12. Police Encounters With People in Crisis |212
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65. Communication is central to every stage of this crisis intervention model, from<br />
developing rapport with the patient and identifying the problem to creating and<br />
implementing a plan of action. 58<br />
66. As the Review heard with respect to the Metropolitan <strong>Police</strong> Service, when<br />
professionals dealing with people in crisis have no option to use lethal force, they are<br />
more likely to default to verbal de-escalation and develop multiple communications<br />
techniques to resolve a crisis situation.<br />
E. Difficulty in comparing statistics regarding use of force<br />
67. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Context), between 2002 and 2012, TPS use of lethal<br />
force involving members of the public ranged from one to five incidents per year. For<br />
Ontario as a whole, the Special <strong>In</strong>vestigations Unit reports a range of 1 to 10 lethal<br />
incidents per year resulting from police use of firearms against members of the public. 59<br />
68. It is difficult to compare the use of force of Canadian municipal police services<br />
not only because of challenges in obtaining data from those sources, but also because<br />
police services collect and report different information, and code their data differently.<br />
Thus, the Review was not able to compare TPS data regarding police use of force in<br />
encounters with people in crisis with the same information from other cities. Further,<br />
the criteria for assessing mental illness continue to evolve, which may affect how various<br />
police services record calls involving people in crisis at different times.<br />
69. At the same time, some notable comparators stand out, without the need for<br />
detailed statistical analysis. For example, the Review was informed that the<br />
Metropolitan <strong>Police</strong> Service in London has been involved in shooting four people in<br />
crisis in the last 10 years—in a city of 8 million people. This compares with five lethal<br />
shootings of people in crisis in Toronto in the 2002-2012 period, with Toronto having<br />
only a third of the population of London. Although the absence of a “gun culture” in<br />
England is often cited as a relevant factor when considering use of lethal force by<br />
London police more generally, it should be irrelevant when considering encounters with<br />
people in crisis specifically. There is no reason to believe that London has fewer people<br />
in crisis than Toronto, or that people in crisis in London are less dangerous than in<br />
Toronto, yet police in London are involved in substantially fewer lethal shootings of<br />
people in crisis than the TPS.<br />
70. The Rand Corporation, a policy research institution, has issued a report<br />
canvassing best practices in measuring police performance. 60 The Rand Report notes<br />
the importance of comparing performance across police agencies to determine how a<br />
service is performing relative to similar agencies. The Report recommends using data<br />
from multiple agencies to create a standard comparator and “synthetic controls” against<br />
58<br />
See e.g. id. at 25-29.<br />
59<br />
Ontario Special <strong>In</strong>vestigation Unit, “Special <strong>In</strong>vestigations Unit Annual Report, 2011-2012: Shaping Civilian Oversight” (2012),<br />
online: Ontario Special <strong>In</strong>vestigation Unit at 17.<br />
60<br />
Robert C. Davis, “Selected <strong>In</strong>ternational Best Practices in <strong>Police</strong> Performance Measurement” (2012), online: RAND Corporation<br />
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1153.html [Davis, “Best Practices”].<br />
<strong>Police</strong> <strong>Encounters</strong> <strong>With</strong> <strong>People</strong> in <strong>Crisis</strong> |211