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Selimović, who were also on the route of the JNA convoy, after which a massive small arms
barrage broke out, followed by the order to return fire.
Witness Budimir Nikolić, who, at the time of the event, was in an office with Jurišić, stated that
he, Ilija Jurišić and Meša Bajrić were watching the convoy leaving Tuzla on TV when he heard
the first call by Ivica Divković over the radio, reporting that they were being shot at, and then
repeating it twice more. After the third call Meša Bajrić told Ilija Jurišić to pass on his order to
return fire. The first and the last calls for help were not more than five minutes apart.
Witness Jasmin Imamović was, at the time of incident, in a car in the JNA convoy, together with
Blagoje Stankić and Benjamin Fišeković. He heard calls for help over the radio and the phrase
“Respond to fire with fire” when gunfire was already underway.
Witness Nikola Slavuljica stated that, immediately before and during the event in question, he
was at the premises of the Tuzla SJB and heard calls from reserve police stations over the radio –
that soldiers were shooting at the police, buildings and civilians. He said that, to the best of his
memory, 20 minutes passed between the first and the last call. He did not hear the phrase
“Respond to fire with fire”.
Witnesses Refik Plavšić, Hamdija Jahić and Mirzet Toromanović were direct participants in the
events at Brčanska malta on 15 May 1992. According to their testimonies, the army convoy
leaving the barracks was the first to open fire. They had no knowledge of other decisive facts
crucial to these criminal proceedings.
Military expert, Professor Mile Stojković gave an interesting testimony regarding the existence of
an “insidious” plan to attack the convoy, at the main hearing, held on 27 September 2012. This
witness testified in line with his findings and opinions given earlier, at the first trial. He stated
that the attack was planned beforehand by one or more persons who had received excellent
military training. In such attacks, said the witness, plans usually include cutting off parts of the
convoy and the use of snipers. Preparations for such an attack usually take three to four hours.
The forces that attacked the convoy might have done so just to clearly demonstrate their military
superiority, in order to deter the JNA forces from engaging with them. Yet, after being asked a
number of questions, he added that he could not rule out the possibility that it had all happened
because the things had got out of control. In his opinion, “it made no sense to sacrifice such
high-ranking officials such as those from the Tuzla Town Hall who were in the convoy in order
to ensure the safe retreat of the army, unless it was the case that some informal group had
launched the attack on its own.”
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