02.01.2015 Views

Debt Equity Choice of Life and Non-Life Insurers: Evidence from ...

Debt Equity Choice of Life and Non-Life Insurers: Evidence from ...

Debt Equity Choice of Life and Non-Life Insurers: Evidence from ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Choice</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Life</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> <strong>Insurers</strong>: <strong>Evidence</strong><br />

<strong>from</strong> Pakistan<br />

Talat Afza* <strong>and</strong>. Naveed Ahmed**<br />

Abstract<br />

Capital structure has attracted scholarly attention in corporate finance<br />

literature over the past decades. However, in the context <strong>of</strong> financial<br />

sector especially in insurance sector, it has received a little attention.<br />

Current study provides the empirical evidence on firm level determinants<br />

<strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan over nine years <strong>from</strong><br />

2001 to 2009. Present study split the data set according to the type <strong>of</strong><br />

insurance companies such as; life, non-life <strong>and</strong> overall insurance sector<br />

<strong>and</strong> accordingly three Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models<br />

are applied to estimate the relationship between the dependant (<strong>Debt</strong><br />

Ratio) <strong>and</strong> independent variables i.e. size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, liquidity<br />

<strong>and</strong> risk. The results revealed that both life <strong>and</strong> non-life insurance<br />

companies in Pakistan followed Pecking Order patterns in case <strong>of</strong><br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> liquidity as both variables negatively <strong>and</strong> significantly<br />

related with leverage in life <strong>and</strong> non-life insurance companies <strong>of</strong><br />

Pakistan. Moreover, positive <strong>and</strong> significant relationship between debt<br />

ratio <strong>and</strong> size in all <strong>of</strong> the three models, support the Static Trade-Off<br />

hypothesis. Furthermore, the results also indicate that pr<strong>of</strong>itable, more<br />

liquid, more tangible <strong>and</strong> risky insurance companies focus on retained<br />

earnings or equity than debt financing.<br />

Keywords: Capital structure, Firm level determinants, Insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

1. Introduction<br />

Over the past several decades, theories on a firm’s capital structure choice have<br />

focused on many directions. Different models have been presented in the literature to<br />

explain a firm’s financing behavior (Harris <strong>and</strong> Raviv, 1991). In 1952, Dur<strong>and</strong> proposed<br />

the concept <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>and</strong> he is considered to be the one <strong>of</strong> the pioneers who<br />

analyzed it theoretically. According to his approach (Net income Approach), any firm<br />

can increase its value <strong>and</strong> decrease the cost <strong>of</strong> capital by using debt financing. Later<br />

on, Dur<strong>and</strong> (1952) proposed another approach (Net Operating Income Approach)<br />

related to capital structure <strong>and</strong> provided evidence that market value <strong>of</strong> the firm is<br />

irrelevant <strong>of</strong> the debt-equity choice. These two approaches were purely definitional <strong>and</strong><br />

no economic <strong>and</strong> behavioral meanings could be derived <strong>from</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> his work. In<br />

order to fill these gaps, Nobel Prize winning finance theorist, Modigliani <strong>and</strong> Miller<br />

(1958), presented behavioral approach <strong>and</strong> the modern concept <strong>of</strong> capital structure in<br />

which they theoretically <strong>and</strong> algebraically analyzed the affect <strong>of</strong> capital structure on<br />

firm’s value <strong>and</strong> concluded under certain assumptions that the firm’s value does not<br />

depend upon the financing choices.<br />

____________________<br />

Corresponding author: Naveedahmed@ciitlahore.edu.pk.<br />

* Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>and</strong> Director Academics, COMSATS Institute <strong>of</strong> Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan.<br />

** PhD Student, COMSATS Institute <strong>of</strong> Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan<br />

1


MM provided path <strong>and</strong> guidelines for researchers to analyze the affects <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>and</strong><br />

later several hypothesis have been put forward by researchers related to the debt-equity choices,<br />

but none <strong>of</strong> them exactly explains as to how much debt <strong>and</strong> equity should be used by any firm to<br />

get the desired results (Zhou, 2008). The rationale <strong>of</strong> target debt-equity depends on many micro<br />

<strong>and</strong> macro factors which are different across industries <strong>and</strong> regions. Therefore, keeping in view<br />

all micro <strong>and</strong> macro factors the firm formulates its capital structure prior to starting its operations<br />

<strong>and</strong> modifying it according to the requirements <strong>of</strong> business. For this purpose, firm requires the<br />

services <strong>of</strong> financial experts or managers <strong>and</strong> board <strong>of</strong> directors for making right decision about<br />

financing choices (debt <strong>and</strong> equity), because wrong decision may lead not only to increase cost<br />

<strong>of</strong> capital but also to insolvency or bankruptcy <strong>of</strong> the firms. Hence, when management plays its<br />

role in the selection <strong>of</strong> financing options, the core objective is to reduce the cost <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>and</strong><br />

equity along with increasing the benefits or value <strong>of</strong> the firm (Baral, 1996).<br />

The measurement <strong>of</strong> Cost <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>and</strong> equity is also essential in determining the capital structure<br />

because it provides link for increasing the value <strong>of</strong> shareholders along with attaining the financial<br />

goals <strong>of</strong> the firm (Agymin, 1998) If a business raises its capital through large portion <strong>of</strong> equity<br />

then it is attractive for the operational activities for two major reasons; first, It plays significant<br />

role for corporate growth <strong>of</strong> every organization because it does not carry any fixed charges <strong>and</strong><br />

maturity period. Second, it enhances the credit worthiness due to reduction in gearing. But, on<br />

the other h<strong>and</strong>, firms with poor prospects merely prefer to issue equity capital in order to bring<br />

new investors to share losses. In addition, when an announcement for issuing new stock is made,<br />

it gives negative signal to investors <strong>and</strong> as a result the market value <strong>of</strong> the stocks will decline.<br />

Moreover, when equity is issued for financing the operational activities, different costs are<br />

attached with it including the agency cost <strong>of</strong> equity. This cost arises in the firm due the conflict<br />

<strong>of</strong> interests between shareholder <strong>and</strong> managers related to firm’s decision. Therefore, equity<br />

should be the last option for raising funds (Aoun, 2006). Consequently, the management finds<br />

right kind <strong>of</strong> solution or source <strong>of</strong> finance which minimizes the costs <strong>and</strong> increases the value <strong>of</strong><br />

firm.<br />

One possible solution is to use debt capital for financing its assets which can be employed as a<br />

tool which not only reduces the cost <strong>of</strong> equity but also enhances the market value <strong>of</strong> the firm.<br />

When the firm shifts its capital structure towards more debt, then this forces managers to be<br />

more disciplined in the operational activities. For the last sixty years, different approaches have<br />

emerged regarding the use <strong>of</strong> debt. <strong>Debt</strong> acts as an engine for the growth <strong>of</strong> the firm <strong>and</strong> it<br />

encourages the managers to get maximum returns that enable them to pay interest. Furthermore,<br />

it minimizes free cash flows which make the manager to work less for their own interest <strong>and</strong> as a<br />

result reduces the wasteful expenditures <strong>of</strong> business. <strong>Debt</strong> financing also provides tax shelter<br />

which makes one to pay less taxes because the interest paid on debt is tax deductibles.<br />

Under certain assumptions MM also proposed that a firm can increase its market value <strong>of</strong> stocks<br />

if it is use 100% debt as a source <strong>of</strong> capital. But in the real world, the firm rarely uses 100% debt<br />

in order to reduce or minimize agency <strong>and</strong> bankruptcy related costs. When a large potion <strong>of</strong> debt<br />

is used by firms in the capital structure, different types <strong>of</strong> costs (agency <strong>and</strong> bankruptcy) are also<br />

attached with it. The bankruptcy cost exists, when the firm feels that it would not be able to pay<br />

interest on debt. As a result, the threat <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy also forces a firm to sell or liquidate its<br />

assets less than their actual market value. In addition, lenders may dem<strong>and</strong> more interest rates,<br />

2


suppliers may refuse to grant credit <strong>and</strong> employees may also jump towards alternative jobs due<br />

to this threat.<br />

Furthermore, the agency cost <strong>of</strong> debt arises; when there is some controversy between the<br />

shareholders <strong>and</strong> debt holder in the firm. Thus, when the management is improperly (against<br />

target ratio) used debt or equity in the formation <strong>of</strong> capital structure, it would be harmful for the<br />

existence <strong>of</strong> the firm. Therefore, researchers have proposed the idea <strong>of</strong> optimal capital structure.<br />

According to Myers (1984) the firm should have optimal capital structure <strong>and</strong> this can be<br />

achieved through keeping a balance between the benefits <strong>and</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> equity <strong>and</strong> debt. It is the<br />

mix <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>and</strong> equity in target proportion which not only maximizes the firm’s value but also<br />

reduces the costs <strong>of</strong> financing choices.<br />

Corporate finance literature reveals that some researchers describe capital structure in narrow<br />

sense so as to include only long term financial instruments in its composition (Passilaki, 2008).<br />

According to Devic <strong>and</strong> krstic (2001) “Capital structure is expressed as ratio <strong>of</strong> long term<br />

liabilities to the sum <strong>of</strong> long term liabilities <strong>and</strong> firms equity”. “Capital structure is described as<br />

long term debt divided by total assets” (P<strong>and</strong>y, 2001; Omet, 2006; Delcour, 2007). But in the<br />

words <strong>of</strong> Nemmers <strong>and</strong> Grunewald (2000) “capital structure refers to all financial resources<br />

marshaled by the firm, it includes short as well as long-term, <strong>and</strong> all forms <strong>of</strong> debt as well as<br />

equity”. It includes all liabilities (Mashharawe,2003; Gaud,2005; Joeveer,2006; Mitton,2007).<br />

Nikolaos (2007) refers that “capital structure <strong>of</strong> firm is actually the relationship between the total<br />

debt <strong>and</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> the firm”.<br />

Insurance Sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan<br />

This paper attempts to investigate the determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong><br />

Pakistan. In 1947, after the creation <strong>of</strong> Pakistan, the first step taken by government to promote<br />

the insurance activities in Pakistan was the establishment <strong>of</strong> Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan<br />

(IAP) on 9 February 1949. The core objective <strong>of</strong> Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan is to protect<br />

the interests <strong>of</strong> its member insurance companies <strong>and</strong> to support their businesses. Another step to<br />

further strengthen the insurance industry was taken in 1953 by establishing Pakistan Insurance<br />

Corporation (now Pakistan Reinsurance Company Ltd) to boost the re-insurance activities. In<br />

1955, when foreign insurers appeared as competitors, National Co-Insurance Scheme (NCIS)<br />

was introduced to enhance the capacity <strong>of</strong> small insurance companies <strong>of</strong> local market. When East<br />

Pakistan broke its links with west Pakistan in 1971, Insurance industry as well as the whole<br />

economy faced financial crises <strong>and</strong> as a result Pakistan lost Rs.180 million in terms <strong>of</strong> premium<br />

revenue <strong>of</strong> non-life insurance sector.<br />

In 1972 all life insurance companies were taken over by the government through the policy <strong>of</strong><br />

nationalization but this process did not track out the growth <strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. For<br />

instance, insurance companies received premiums <strong>of</strong> Rs.290 million in 1973, Rs.335 million in<br />

1976, Rs.820 million in 1980, Rs.3.357 billion, Rs.31.25 billion in 2005 <strong>and</strong> Rs.38.45 billion in<br />

2006 (Insurance Year Book, 2007).<br />

The year 2000 brought many changes in the insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan since Insurance Act<br />

1938 was replaced by Insurance Ordinance 2000. This ordinance enhanced the financial health <strong>of</strong><br />

3


insurance companies by increasing the paid up capital requirements <strong>of</strong> both non-life <strong>and</strong> life<br />

insurance companies. Therefore, the minimum requirement <strong>of</strong> paid-up capital <strong>of</strong> general<br />

insurance companies was enhanced to Rs.80 million <strong>from</strong> Rs.50 million whereas capital<br />

requirement <strong>of</strong> life insurers was increased <strong>from</strong> Rs.100 million to Rs.150 million. Furthermore,<br />

In 2002, Security <strong>and</strong> Exchange Commission <strong>of</strong> Pakistan <strong>and</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Commerce notified <strong>and</strong><br />

implemented the Insurance Rules 2002 in insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan to support the financial<br />

growth <strong>of</strong> insurance industry <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

As a result <strong>of</strong> these financial reforms total assets <strong>and</strong> net premiums <strong>of</strong> life insurance companies<br />

have reached Rs.163.13 billion <strong>and</strong> Rs.36.72 billion respectively in 2006 while assets <strong>and</strong> net<br />

premiums <strong>of</strong> non-life insurers have reached Rs.72.88 billion <strong>and</strong> Rs.20.01 respectively in 2006<br />

(Insurance Year Book, 2007). In addition, the share <strong>of</strong> Pakistani insurance sector in the world<br />

also has reached 0.02% in 2009 while insurance density has touched the level <strong>of</strong> 6.9% in 2009<br />

(World Insurance Report, 2010). Moreover, total market capitalization <strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong><br />

Pakistan has reached Rs.224 billion in 2009. Therefore, statistical figures show that financial<br />

regulations have really contributed in the development <strong>of</strong> the insurance industry in Pakistan.<br />

Objective <strong>and</strong> Significance <strong>of</strong> the Study<br />

The Current study<br />

‣ Identifies the firm level characteristics which have significant impact on capital structure<br />

<strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

‣ Specifies the firm level factors that can affect the financing decisions <strong>of</strong> life insurance<br />

<strong>and</strong> non-life insurance companies.<br />

‣ Also helps to indicate the factors which have less significant or no impact on leverage <strong>of</strong><br />

insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

‣ Assists the regulators <strong>and</strong> management <strong>of</strong> insurance companies that how much debt <strong>and</strong><br />

equity should be used to formulate their capital structure for getting the desired results.<br />

2. Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure<br />

In this section, we provide a review <strong>of</strong> the factors which are considered as important<br />

determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

2.1 Size (SZ)<br />

Size is considered a key factor that can influence the financial structure <strong>of</strong> the firm. It has been<br />

extensively used by the corporate finance researchers as control variable in the empirical analysis<br />

<strong>of</strong> determining the capital structure <strong>of</strong> the firm <strong>and</strong> found that proportion <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>and</strong> equity<br />

formulates according to the size <strong>of</strong> the firm (Scott <strong>and</strong> Martin, 1976; Booth et al., 2001). Various<br />

studies report a positive relationship between size <strong>and</strong> leverage (Hamaifer et al,1994;Al-<br />

Sakran,2001;Antoniou et al,2002;Gaud, 2005) while several studies intended negative<br />

relationship between debt ratio <strong>and</strong> firms size (Rajan <strong>and</strong> Zingales, 1995; Bevan <strong>and</strong><br />

Danbolt,2002). According to the Rajan <strong>and</strong> Zingales (1995), the relationship between size <strong>and</strong><br />

4


leverage could be negative because larger firms have less asymmetric information that reduces<br />

the chances <strong>of</strong> undervaluation <strong>of</strong> issuing new stock <strong>and</strong> thus they prefer to issue more equity than<br />

debt.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, Static Trade-<strong>of</strong>f hypothesis explores a positive relationship between size <strong>and</strong><br />

firm because larger firms are normally diversified <strong>and</strong> considered less risky, hence, prefer to<br />

utilize more debt. In addition, larger firms prefer to issue more debt because it reduces direct<br />

bankruptcy costs due to market confidence (Warner, 1977). Moreover, smaller firms prefer to<br />

acquire lower debt because, these firms might face the risk <strong>of</strong> liquidation at the time <strong>of</strong> financial<br />

distress. (Ozkan, 1996). Consistent with the results <strong>of</strong> Static Trade-Off theory, current study<br />

expects a positive relationship between size <strong>and</strong> debt ratio.<br />

The natural log <strong>of</strong> sales or the natural log <strong>of</strong> assets is generally used as a proxy to determine the<br />

size <strong>of</strong> the firm. Current study uses natural log <strong>of</strong> sale (premiums) to measure the size <strong>of</strong><br />

insurance industry <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

“Therefore, first hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> size <strong>of</strong><br />

the firm”.<br />

2.2 Pr<strong>of</strong>itability (PF)<br />

Theoretical literature has no consistent relationship between debt ratio <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability. Jensen<br />

(1986) argued that pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms use debt as a tool which enforces managers to invest in more<br />

disciplined way <strong>and</strong> as a result reduces free cash flows, which implies a positive relationship<br />

between leverage <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability. Static Trade-<strong>of</strong>f model also predicts a positive relationship<br />

between pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> debt ratio due to the tax shield benefits. But according to the Pecking<br />

Order Theory (Myers <strong>and</strong> Majluf, 1984), firms prefer to use internal source <strong>of</strong> financing<br />

(retained earnings), then debt <strong>and</strong> finally issue external equity if more funds are required.<br />

Therefore, the more pr<strong>of</strong>itable the firms are the more retained earnings they will have, which<br />

exhibit a lower debt may utilized in the capital structure. This shows a negative relationship<br />

between pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> leverage <strong>of</strong> the firm. In addition, pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms avoid to get loan in<br />

inefficient markets due to disciplinary role <strong>of</strong> debt ( Agency Theory).Various studies (Gonedes et<br />

al, 1988; Friend <strong>and</strong> Hasbrouck,1989; Shah <strong>and</strong> Khan, 2007) also reported a negative<br />

relationship between pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> debt ratio. Present study also expects a negative<br />

relationship between pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> leverage.<br />

“Thus, second hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> the firm”.<br />

2.3 Tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets (TG)<br />

Tangible assets are considered to have an impact on borrowing decisions because they have<br />

greater value in case <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy .A firm with large portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets can easily raise debt<br />

5


at relatively lower rates by providing the collateral <strong>of</strong> these assets to the creditors. Having the<br />

incentive <strong>of</strong> getting the loan at nominal rates, these types <strong>of</strong> firms are expected to borrow more<br />

as compared to those firms where cost <strong>of</strong> borrowing is higher due to less proportion <strong>of</strong> fixed<br />

assets (Suto, 1990). Hence, firms with large proportion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets prefer to employ more<br />

debt for getting the advantage <strong>of</strong> this opportunity. On the contrary, negative relationship have<br />

been reported between leverage <strong>and</strong> fixed assets in small <strong>and</strong> medium firms (Daskalakis <strong>and</strong><br />

Psillaki,2007) <strong>and</strong> in less developed economies ( Joever,2006 ). Therefore, according to the<br />

nature <strong>of</strong> insurance industry, current study is expected to have negative relationship between<br />

leverage <strong>and</strong> tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>and</strong> use ratio <strong>of</strong> net fixed assets to total assets for measuring the<br />

tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> insurance industry. The amount <strong>of</strong> net fixed assets indicates the cost <strong>of</strong><br />

fixed assets less depreciation.<br />

“Therefore, fourth hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />

tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> the firm”.<br />

2.4 Liquidity (LQ)<br />

Liquidity ratio not only specifies the ability <strong>of</strong> the firm to cover its short term liabilities but also<br />

shows the liquidity position <strong>of</strong> the firm. Liquidity ratio has a mixed impact on the leverage<br />

decision. Firms with higher liquidity ratio prefer to acquire more debt because <strong>of</strong> their ability to<br />

meet short term obligations (Ozkan, 2001). This shows a positive relationship between the debt<br />

ratio <strong>and</strong> firms liquidity position. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, when firms have high liquidity ratios or<br />

have more liquid assets then then may prefer to use these assets to finance their investments <strong>and</strong><br />

discourage to raise external funds (Pecking Order Theory). Therefore, the firm’s liquidity<br />

position shows a negative relationship with capital structure <strong>of</strong> the firm. Current study is expects<br />

to have a negative relationship between liquidly <strong>and</strong> leverage because insurance companies in<br />

Pakistan seem to utilize only premium funds for paying claims. Current ratio (which is calculated<br />

as current assets over current liabilities) is used as a proxy to measure the liquidity. It is given by,<br />

“Therefore, fifth hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />

liquidity <strong>of</strong> the firm”.<br />

2.5 Risk (RK)<br />

Risk is another key explanatory variable that may affect the capital structure <strong>of</strong> the firm. It is<br />

considered to be either the inherent business risk or it may arise in the firm as a result <strong>of</strong><br />

inefficient management practices. Firms with high volatility in earnings might face higher risk<br />

that forces the management to reduce the debt level because higher risk increases the chances <strong>of</strong><br />

bankruptcy (P<strong>and</strong>y, 2001). This predicts a negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> risk <strong>and</strong><br />

this result is also consistent with trade-<strong>of</strong>f <strong>and</strong> pecking order hypothesis. Consistent with the<br />

results <strong>of</strong> Pecking Order Theory <strong>and</strong> Static Trade-<strong>of</strong>f Theory, present study is expected to have a<br />

negative relationship between risk <strong>and</strong> leverage. Several proxies have used in empirical studies<br />

to measure the risk <strong>of</strong> the firm such as st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> the difference in operating cash<br />

flows to total assets, st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> returns on net income, <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong><br />

percentage change in net income (Xiaoyan, 2008). According to the nature <strong>of</strong> business <strong>of</strong><br />

6


insurance companies, current study use st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> total insurance claims to<br />

total premiums as a proxy to measure the risk.<br />

“Therefore, seventh hypothesis is that there is negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> risk <strong>of</strong><br />

the firm.<br />

3. Methodology<br />

Regression Model<br />

Leverage = β0 + β1 (Size) + β2 (Pr<strong>of</strong>itability) + β3 (Tangibility) + β4 (Liquidity) + β5 (Risk)<br />

+ ε<br />

Where<br />

Size = Natural Log <strong>of</strong> Premiums<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>itability = Net Income before Interest <strong>and</strong> Tax divided by Total Assets<br />

Tangibility = Fixed Assets Divided by Total Assets<br />

Liquidity = Current Assets Divided by Current Liabilities<br />

Risk = St<strong>and</strong>ard Deviation <strong>of</strong> Total Claims Divided by Total Premiums<br />

3.1 Sample <strong>and</strong> Sources <strong>of</strong> Data<br />

The study uses various sources have been used for data collection. The book value based yearly<br />

financial data <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009 has been collected <strong>from</strong> the financial statements (Balance Sheet<br />

& Pr<strong>of</strong>it <strong>and</strong> Loss A/c) <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>and</strong> various “Insurance Year Books” published<br />

by Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. Currently only 5 companies are providing the services <strong>of</strong><br />

life insurance in Pakistan, including; two domestic owned, two foreign <strong>and</strong> one government<br />

owned. The life insurance companies comprising 59% <strong>of</strong> entire insurance sector in terms <strong>of</strong> total<br />

assets in 2009 whereas total premium revenue <strong>of</strong> life insurance companies has also reached<br />

Rs.35.59 billion in 2009(IAP, 2007). <strong>Non</strong>-life insurance industry in Pakistan comprises 45<br />

private companies, out <strong>of</strong> which only 32 are currently operating while the remaining 13 non-life<br />

insurance companies have closed their operations due to the limit <strong>of</strong> paid-up capital<br />

requirements.<br />

4. Empirical Results<br />

4.1 Descriptive Statistics<br />

Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics <strong>of</strong> leverage, size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, liquidity <strong>and</strong><br />

risk <strong>of</strong> <strong>Life</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009. On average all life insurers are<br />

highly leveraged over nine years with ratios <strong>of</strong> not less than 0.79. In 2006 leverage reaches at<br />

maximum level i.e. 0.84 which shows the aggressive behavior <strong>of</strong> life insurers about utilization <strong>of</strong><br />

large portion <strong>of</strong> debt. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, variation in selection <strong>of</strong> debt capital also seems to be at<br />

7


maximum level in 2007 i.e. 0.30. Size is explanatory variable which is proxied by log <strong>of</strong> total<br />

premiums. Statistics shows that on average size <strong>of</strong> life insurance companies are continuously<br />

increasing <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009 which predicts that in Pakistan, people prefer to transfer their risk<br />

by getting insurance policy. Terrorism aftermaths might be one <strong>of</strong> the key reasons <strong>of</strong> increasing<br />

the life insurance policy premium revenues. Statistics also predict that with the enhancement <strong>of</strong><br />

size debt ratio <strong>of</strong> life insurers is also increases throughout nine years. On the other h<strong>and</strong>,<br />

variation in size approximately same in all seven years i.e. around 2.06.<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> life insurers is reported in third column <strong>of</strong> Table 4.1. <strong>Life</strong> insurers exhibit<br />

uniformity with respect to the pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2006.i.e.approximately 0.02. But in<br />

2007, average ratio jump into 0.07 which shows a healthy change in the pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> life<br />

insurance sector. In the same manner variation in pr<strong>of</strong>itability is considerably lesser <strong>and</strong> shows a<br />

consistency <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2006 except 2007. The average values <strong>of</strong> tangibility in Table 4.1 also<br />

shows minor or small portion <strong>of</strong> tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> life insurers <strong>and</strong> depicts consistency in<br />

mean values <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009 approximately 0.03. The st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> fixed<br />

assets to total assets is slightly lesser i.e. around 0.02 <strong>and</strong> is not varied over nine years. Table 4.1<br />

also indicated all life insurance companies, on average, continuously improving their liquidity<br />

position through out nine years. This trend shows that life insurers keep large portion <strong>of</strong> funds in<br />

liquid form for settlement <strong>of</strong> claims. The highest mean value <strong>of</strong> liquidity is observed in 2007<br />

which is 6.36. But in the same year the value <strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation is at maximum level i.e. 8.63<br />

among all the years which also predicts inconsistency in liquidity position.<br />

Table 4.1 also describes that insurers seem to be risky <strong>from</strong> 2004 to 2009 with respect to the<br />

settlement <strong>of</strong> claims. In 2003, the mean value <strong>of</strong> risk seems at minimum level with the ratio <strong>of</strong><br />

0.58 which reached at 7.23 in 2009. This continuously increasing trend over nine years predicts<br />

that life insurance companies become more risky.Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics <strong>of</strong><br />

variables leverage, size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, liquidity <strong>and</strong> risk for the same study period <strong>of</strong><br />

2001 to 2009 for non life insurance industry. The average value <strong>of</strong> leverage is approximately<br />

0.50 over nine years which is quite lower than the mean values <strong>of</strong> life insurance industry. The<br />

highest mean value <strong>of</strong> leverage is 0.54 in 2003 <strong>and</strong> lowest mean value is 0.45 in 2007.The inter<br />

industry variation in selection <strong>of</strong> leverage is minimum in 2005 at 0.17 <strong>and</strong> maximum in 2001-02<br />

at 0.22. The variation <strong>of</strong> non-life insurers is around 0.20 over nine years which is almost the<br />

same as the life insurance industry.<br />

Although the size <strong>of</strong> non life insurance industries is slightly lower than life insurance industry<br />

but variable size is having the same growing trend throughout the study period. The maximum<br />

mean value <strong>of</strong> size for non life insurers is 5.24 in 2007 which is almost 26% above than the size<br />

in 2001. The variation in size <strong>of</strong> non-life insurers is slightly lower than the life insurance<br />

companies over seven years i.e. 1.75. An increasing trend can be seen in the mean values <strong>of</strong><br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>from</strong> the minimum <strong>of</strong> 0.05 in 2001 to a maximum <strong>of</strong> 0.22 in 2009. These values<br />

show continuously improvement in pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> non-life insurance companies. Table 2 also<br />

indicates that the average values <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> non life insurance sector are much higher than<br />

life insurance sector along with inter industry variability which is at its minimum level in 2004 at<br />

0.06 <strong>and</strong> maximum in 2007 at 0.19.<br />

8


Consistent with the descriptive statistics <strong>of</strong> life insurers, table 4.2 shows that non-life insurance<br />

companies also have less portions <strong>of</strong> fixed assets i.e. around 0.12 during nine years. On the other<br />

h<strong>and</strong>, inter industry variability is on average 0.20 <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009 which is also consistent<br />

with the st<strong>and</strong>ard deviations <strong>of</strong> life insurance industry. The maximum average value <strong>of</strong> liquidity<br />

<strong>of</strong> non-life insurers is 6.10 found in year 2007 while on average, other eight years show<br />

relatively lower level <strong>of</strong> liquidity i.e. around 2.25. In addition, average liquidity values <strong>of</strong> both<br />

life <strong>and</strong> non-life insurers are approximately the same in all the years. Table 4.2 also depicts that<br />

non-life insurance companies face higher risk (8.21) in 2004 as compare to other eight years.<br />

Descriptive statistics also predicts that on average risk <strong>of</strong> non-life insurers is relatively higher<br />

than the life insurers.<br />

Table 4.3 provides the descriptive statistics <strong>of</strong> leverage, size, risk, tangibility, liquidity <strong>and</strong><br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> entire insurance sector (life plus non-life) <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. The average value <strong>of</strong><br />

leverage is approximately 0.55 over nine years <strong>of</strong> all insurance companies in Pakistan. In 2005<br />

leverage reaches at maximum level i.e. 0.58 which shows the aggressive behavior <strong>of</strong> insurers<br />

about utilization <strong>of</strong> large portion <strong>of</strong> debt. On the other h<strong>and</strong> variation in selection <strong>of</strong> debt capital<br />

also seems to be at minimum level in 2005 i.e. 0.21 as compare to other years. The mean value<br />

<strong>of</strong> size is at maximum level in 2009 i.e. 6.07 which shows around 73 % increase in premium<br />

revenues <strong>from</strong> 2001. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, variation in size approximately same in all nine years i.e.<br />

around 1.90. An increasing trend can be seen in mean values <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>from</strong> the minimum<br />

value 0.04 in 2001 to a maximum value 0.23 in 2009. In the same manner variation in<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability is having increasing trend <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009.<br />

As insurance companies face uncertainty for settlements <strong>of</strong> claims, therefore companies prefer to<br />

keep large portion <strong>of</strong> current assets than fixed assets. The average values <strong>of</strong> Table 4.3 also shows<br />

minor portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets <strong>of</strong> insurers <strong>and</strong> depicts consistency in mean values <strong>from</strong> 2001 to<br />

2009 approximately 0.11. The st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> tangibility is around 0.19 over nine years.<br />

Table 4.3 also shows insurance companies, on average, continuously improving their liquidity<br />

position through out nine years. This trend shows that life <strong>and</strong> non-life insurers keep large<br />

portion <strong>of</strong> funds in liquid form for settlement <strong>of</strong> claims. The highest mean value <strong>of</strong> liquidity is<br />

observed in 2007 which is 6.13. But in the same year the value <strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation is at<br />

maximum level i.e. 16.38 among all the years which also predicts inconsistency in liquidity<br />

position. Statistics <strong>of</strong> Table 4.3 describes that in 2003, the mean value <strong>of</strong> risk seems at minimum<br />

level with the ratio <strong>of</strong> 4.24 which reaches at 7.06 in 2007. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, in 2004, the value<br />

<strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation is 10.91 which is the highest value over nine years.<br />

4.3 Regression Analysis<br />

Finally the impact <strong>of</strong> five explanatory variables size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, liquidity, risk <strong>and</strong> tangibility<br />

on capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan has been examined by using three<br />

ordinary least square regression models. These three regression models employ different data<br />

sets according to the type <strong>of</strong> insurers. Model A uses the financial data <strong>of</strong> life insurance sector<br />

while Model B <strong>and</strong> Model C are regress the data <strong>of</strong> five explanatory variables on capital<br />

9


structure <strong>of</strong> non-life insurance companies <strong>and</strong> entire insurance sector respectively over nine years<br />

<strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009. Table 4.4 <strong>of</strong> Model A reports the value <strong>of</strong> adjusted R square (0.768) indicates<br />

that debt ratio is nearly 77% dependant on variables i.e. size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, risk <strong>and</strong><br />

liquidity. Therefore, leverage is mainly defined by these five variables <strong>of</strong> life insurers in Pakistan<br />

over nine years.<br />

Table 4.4 <strong>of</strong> Model A shows that coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable size is positive <strong>and</strong> statistically<br />

significant at 1% level. This predicts that large size life insurance companies in Pakistan prefer to<br />

utilize more debt in their capital structure. These results also confirm the notion that large firms<br />

employ more debt because these are less risky <strong>and</strong> diversified in nature (Static trade- <strong>of</strong>f<br />

Theory). In addition, larger firms are prefer to issue more debt because it reduces direct<br />

bankruptcy costs due to market confidence (Warner, 1977). Moreover, smaller firms prefer to<br />

acquire lower debt because, these firms might face the risk <strong>of</strong> liquidation at the time <strong>of</strong> financial<br />

distress (Ozkan, 1996).<br />

The coefficient <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability is found to be negative <strong>and</strong> statistically significant at 5% level.<br />

This negative sign indicates the negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong><br />

predicts that, in Pakistan, pr<strong>of</strong>itable life insurance companies prefer to utilize small portion <strong>of</strong><br />

debt. This result confirms the notion that Pakistani life insurance companies follow the Pecking<br />

Order pattern i.e. prefer to employ internal financing than debt. In addition, negative relationship<br />

also confirms the implication <strong>of</strong> Agency Theory which predicts that pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms avoid to get<br />

loan <strong>from</strong> inefficient markets due to the disciplinary role <strong>of</strong> debt. Table 4.4 depicts that the beta<br />

value <strong>of</strong> explanatory variable tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets is 0.553 with the positive coefficient sign.<br />

However, tangibility is not statistically significant with the large p-value. Although positive<br />

relationship shows that a firm with the large portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets can easily raise debt or<br />

obtains more debt at relatively lower rates by providing collaterals <strong>of</strong> these assets to creditor but<br />

due to the insignificant relationship <strong>of</strong> tangibility <strong>and</strong> leverage is not considered a powerful<br />

explanatory variable to define the debt ratio <strong>of</strong> life insurance companies in Pakistan over nine<br />

years. Results <strong>of</strong> regression model A indicate that the control variable liquidity with the negative<br />

coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. Therefore, Pakistani life insurance companies<br />

with high liquidity ratios or more liquid assets are preferred to utilize these assets to finance their<br />

investments <strong>and</strong> discourage to raise external funds.<br />

Table 4.4 also shows that the coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable risk is positive <strong>and</strong> statistically significant at<br />

5% level. This indicates that in order to fulfill the claims <strong>of</strong> the life insurance policyholder at the<br />

time <strong>of</strong> death or expiry <strong>of</strong> the policy, companies acquire external funds. Table 4.5 <strong>of</strong> Model B<br />

depicts the results <strong>of</strong> regression analysis <strong>of</strong> Pakistani non-life insurance companies <strong>from</strong> 2001 to<br />

2009. The value <strong>of</strong> adjusted R square (0.713) indicates that debt ratio is nearly 72% dependant<br />

on explanatory variables i.e. size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, risk <strong>and</strong> liquidity. Consistent with the<br />

results <strong>of</strong> Model A, Table 4.5 <strong>of</strong> Model B shows that coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable size is positive <strong>and</strong><br />

statistically significant at 1% level. This predicts that large size non-life insurance companies in<br />

Pakistan prefer to employ more debt in their capital structure. These results consistent with the<br />

hypothesis that large firms employ more debt because these firms are less risky <strong>and</strong> diversified in<br />

nature (Static Trade-<strong>of</strong>f Theory).<br />

10


The coefficient <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability is found to be negative <strong>and</strong> statistically significant at 1% level.<br />

This negative sign indicates the negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong><br />

predicts that, in Pakistan, pr<strong>of</strong>itable non-life insurance companies prefer to utilize small portion<br />

<strong>of</strong> debt. This result confirms the notion that Pakistani non-life insurance companies follow<br />

Pecking Order pattern i.e. preferred to employ internal financing than debt. The results <strong>of</strong><br />

regression model B indicate that the coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable liquidity with the negative coefficient<br />

is statistically significant at 1% level. This negative sign shows the inverse relationship between<br />

the liquidity <strong>and</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> non-life insurance sector. Therefore, results predict that<br />

Pakistani non-life insurance companies with high liquidity ratios or more liquid assets prefer to<br />

utilize internal source <strong>of</strong> financing than debt. Negative coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable tangibility<br />

specifies the negative relationship between tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>and</strong> debt ratio <strong>of</strong> non-life<br />

insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. This inverse relationship indicates that in Pakistan non-life<br />

insurance companies with large portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets are preferred to utilize small portion <strong>of</strong><br />

debt in their capital structure. Negative relationship has also been reported between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />

tangibility in small <strong>and</strong> medium firms (Daskalakis <strong>and</strong> Psillaki,2007) <strong>and</strong> in less developed<br />

economies ( Joever,2006 ).<br />

The variable risk is negative <strong>and</strong> statistically significant at 5% level. Negative sign indicates that<br />

at the time <strong>of</strong> the destruction or loss <strong>of</strong> the subject matter, non-life insurance companies prefer to<br />

employ their internal source <strong>of</strong> financing for settlement <strong>of</strong> claims than external financing. This<br />

negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> risk is also consistent with the results <strong>of</strong> trade-<strong>of</strong>f <strong>and</strong><br />

pecking order hypothesis. Table 4.6 <strong>of</strong> Model C reports the results <strong>of</strong> regression analysis <strong>of</strong><br />

entire insurance sector (life plus non-life) <strong>of</strong> Pakistan <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009. The value <strong>of</strong> adjusted<br />

R square (0.823) indicates that capital structure <strong>of</strong> Pakistani insurance sector is nearly 82%<br />

dependant on control variables (size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, risk <strong>and</strong> liquidity). Therefore,<br />

leverage is mainly defined by these five control variables <strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan over<br />

nine years. Table 4.6 <strong>of</strong> Model C shows that coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable size is positive <strong>and</strong><br />

statistically significant at 1% level. This predicts that large size insurance companies (life plus<br />

non-life) in Pakistan prefer to utilize more debt in formation <strong>of</strong> capital structure.<br />

The coefficient sign <strong>of</strong> explanatory variable pr<strong>of</strong>itability is found to be negative <strong>and</strong> statistically<br />

significant at 5% level. This negative sign shows the negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> predicts that, in Pakistan, pr<strong>of</strong>itable insurance companies (both life <strong>and</strong> non-life)<br />

discourage to employ debt capital over seven years. This result confirms the notion that Pakistani<br />

insurance companies follow the Pecking Order pattern i.e. preferred to employ internal source <strong>of</strong><br />

financing than debt. The negative relationship between the tangibility <strong>and</strong> debt ratio shows that<br />

Pakistani insurance companies (both life <strong>and</strong> non-life) with large portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets<br />

discourage to employ debt capital. Al-Bahsh <strong>and</strong> Sentis (2008) also found the negative<br />

relationship between tangibility <strong>and</strong> leverage by taking the sample <strong>of</strong> less developed economies.<br />

Various studies like Joeveer (2006) <strong>and</strong> Daskalakis <strong>and</strong> Psillaki (2007) also predict the same<br />

negative relationship between debt ratio <strong>and</strong> tangibility. The negative <strong>and</strong> statistically significant<br />

relationship between liquidity <strong>and</strong> leverage ) indicates that Pakistani insurance companies (both<br />

life <strong>and</strong> non-life with high liquidity ratios or more liquid assets prefer to utilize these assets to<br />

finance their investments <strong>and</strong> discourage to raise external funds over nine years. Ozkan (2001)<br />

<strong>and</strong> Mashharawe (2003) also show the inverse relationship between liquidity <strong>and</strong> debt ratio. In<br />

11


addition, the relationship between risk <strong>and</strong> debt ratio illustrates statistically insignificant results<br />

<strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

Conclusion<br />

This study investigates the determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan<br />

over the period <strong>of</strong> nine years <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009. Empirical results indicate that size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability,<br />

liquidity tangibility <strong>and</strong> risk are important determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance<br />

companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. In addition, Pakistani insurers follow Pecking Order pattern in terms <strong>of</strong><br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability, risk, tangibility <strong>and</strong> liquidity as leverage has a negative relationship with<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability, risk, tangibility <strong>and</strong> liquidity while positive relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> size<br />

shows consistency with the Trade-<strong>of</strong>f theory. Moreover, the results also indicate that the<br />

management <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itable, more liquid, more tangible <strong>and</strong> risky non-life insurance companies<br />

emphasize on retained earnings or equity rather than debt financing.<br />

Limitations <strong>and</strong> Future Implications<br />

This study considers only one financial sector i.e. insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. Other financial<br />

institutions <strong>of</strong> Pakistan like banks, mutual funds, modaraba companies etc. could be selected for<br />

future research. In addition, present study selected only five explanatory variables (size,<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability, risk, tangibility <strong>and</strong> liquidity), therefore, academicians may choose other<br />

determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure for future research.<br />

References<br />

Afza, T. <strong>and</strong> Ahmed, N. (2010), “Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure: A Case <strong>of</strong> <strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> Insurance Sector<br />

<strong>of</strong> Pakistan”, Interdisciplinary Journal <strong>of</strong> Contemporary Research in Business, Vol. 02, No.08.pp. 133-<br />

142<br />

Al-Bashs, R. <strong>and</strong> P. Sentic, (2008) “Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure in Gulf region States <strong>and</strong> Egypt.<br />

Working paper, University <strong>of</strong> Montpellier.<br />

Baral (1996), “Capital Structure <strong>and</strong> Cost <strong>of</strong> Capital in Public Sector Enterprisesin Nepal”. Ph.D thesis.<br />

Delhi University.<br />

Delcoure N. (2007), “The determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure in transitional economies” International<br />

Review <strong>of</strong> Economics <strong>and</strong> Finance, 16, 400–415.<br />

Devic, B. <strong>and</strong> Krstic, B. (2001), “Comparatible Analysis <strong>of</strong> the Capital Structure in Polish <strong>and</strong> Hungarian<br />

Enterprises- empirical Study”, journal <strong>of</strong> economics <strong>and</strong> Organization Vol. 1, 85 – 100.<br />

Girard E., M. Omran (2007), “What are the Risks When Investing in Thin Emerging <strong>Equity</strong> Markets:<br />

<strong>Evidence</strong> <strong>from</strong> the Arab World”. Int. Fin. Markets, Inst. <strong>and</strong> Money Vol. 17:102–123.<br />

Glen J., Atkin M. (1992), “Comparing Corporate Capital Structures Around the Globe”. The International<br />

Executive, (1986-1998); Sep/Oct; 34, 5; ABI/INFORM Global,P: 369.<br />

12


Grinblatt M., Titman S. (1998), “Financial Markets <strong>and</strong> Corporate Strategy”, International edition<br />

(Boston: McGrawHill).<br />

Harris, M <strong>and</strong> A Raviv (1991), “Capital Structure <strong>and</strong> the Informational Role <strong>of</strong> <strong>Debt</strong>,” Journal <strong>of</strong><br />

Finance, 45, 321-348.<br />

Insurance Year Book (2004), Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

Insurance Year Book (2005), Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

Insurance Year Book (2007), Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />

Jensen M. C., Meckling W.H., (1976), “Theory <strong>of</strong> the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, <strong>and</strong><br />

Ownership Structure”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Financial Economics V. 3, No. 4, 305– 360.<br />

Jensen, M.C., (1986), “Agency Costs <strong>of</strong> Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance <strong>and</strong> Takeovers”, American<br />

Economic Review, Vol. 76, 323–329.<br />

Mitton T. (2007), “Why Have <strong>Debt</strong> Ratios Increased for Firms in Emerging Markets”, European<br />

Financial Management, Vol. 14, n° 1, 127–151.<br />

Modigliani, F, <strong>and</strong> Miller, M.H. (1958), "The Cost <strong>of</strong> Capital, Corporation Finance <strong>and</strong> the Theory <strong>of</strong><br />

Investment,”, The American Economic Review 48 (3), 261-297.<br />

Modigliani, F. <strong>and</strong> Miller, M.H. (1963), "Corporate Income Taxes <strong>and</strong> the Cost <strong>of</strong> Capital; A Correction”,<br />

The American Economic Review 53 (3), 433-443.<br />

Mitton, U.R. <strong>and</strong> Zhang, Z. (2008), “Capital Structure <strong>of</strong> Multinational Corporations: Canadian versus<br />

U.S. <strong>Evidence</strong>”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Corporate Finance 14, 706–720.<br />

Morocco. Miller H. M. (1977), “<strong>Debt</strong> <strong>and</strong> Taxes”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Finance, Vol. 32, n° 2, 261-275.<br />

Myers, S.C. (1977), "Determinants <strong>of</strong> Corporate Borrowing,” Journal <strong>of</strong> Financial Economics 5, 147-<br />

175.<br />

Myers S. C. (1984), “The Capital Structure Puzzle”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Finance, Vol. 34, 575–592.<br />

Myers, S., <strong>and</strong> N. Majluf (1984), “Corporate Financing <strong>and</strong> Investment Decisions When<br />

Information Investors Do not Have”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Financial Economics 13, 187-222.<br />

Firms Have<br />

Nivorozhkin, E. (2005) Capital Structure in Emerging Stock Market: The Case <strong>of</strong> Hungry, The<br />

Developing Economies, XL-2, 166–87.<br />

Ozkan, A., (2001), “Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure <strong>and</strong> Adjustment to Long Run Target: <strong>Evidence</strong><br />

<strong>from</strong> UK Company Panel Data”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Business Finance & Accounting, 28(1) & (2).<br />

P<strong>and</strong>ey I. (2001), “Capital Structure <strong>and</strong> the Firm Characteristics: <strong>Evidence</strong> From an Emerging Market”<br />

Indian Institute <strong>of</strong> Management Ahmedabad. Working Paper No. (2001) 10-04.<br />

Psillaki, M. <strong>and</strong> Daskalakis, D. (2008), “Are the Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure Country or Firm<br />

Specific <strong>Evidence</strong> <strong>from</strong> SMEs”, Working Paper, University <strong>of</strong> Nice-Sophia Antipolis.<br />

13


Rafiq, M., Iqbal, A., Atiq, M. (2008), “The Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure <strong>of</strong> the Chemical Industry in<br />

Pakistan”, The Lahore Journal <strong>of</strong> Economics, 13: 1, 139-158.<br />

Rajan, R. <strong>and</strong> Zingales, L (1995), "What Do We Know about Capital Structure Some <strong>Evidence</strong> <strong>from</strong><br />

International Data”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Finance, 50: 1421-1460.<br />

Ross, S.A. (1977), “The Determination <strong>of</strong> Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach”, Bell<br />

Journal <strong>of</strong> Economics, 8(1): 23-40.<br />

Shah, Atta, <strong>and</strong> Hijazi S. (2004), "The Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure in Pakistani Listed <strong>Non</strong>-<br />

Financial Firms”, The Pakistan Development Review, 43.<br />

Shah, A. <strong>and</strong> Khan, S. (2007), “Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure: <strong>Evidence</strong> <strong>from</strong> Pakistani Panel Data”,<br />

International Review <strong>of</strong> Business Research Papers Vol. 3 No.4, 265-282<br />

Smith, C. W., <strong>and</strong> Warner, J. B. (1979), “On Financial Contracting: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Bond Covenants”,<br />

Journal <strong>of</strong> Financial Economics, Vol. 7, (1979) 117–116.<br />

State Bank <strong>of</strong> Pakistan (2001), “Balance Sheet Analysis <strong>of</strong> Joint Stock Companies Listed on the Karachi<br />

Stock Exchange,” Karachi, Pakistan.<br />

State Bank <strong>of</strong> Pakistan (2007), “Balance Sheet Analysis <strong>of</strong> Joint Stock Companies Listed on the Karachi<br />

Stock Exchange,” Karachi, Pakistan.<br />

Tariq, B. Yasir, <strong>and</strong> Hijazi S. (2006), “Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure: A Case for Pakistani Cement<br />

Industry”, The Lahore Journal <strong>of</strong> Economics, 11(1): 63-80<br />

Wald, J.K. (1999), “How Firms Characteristics Affect Capital Structure: An International Comparison”,<br />

Journal <strong>of</strong> Financial Research, 22: 161-187.<br />

Wiwattanakantang, Y. (1999), “An Empirical Study on the Determinants <strong>of</strong> the Capital Structure <strong>of</strong> Thai<br />

Firms”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 7, 371–403.<br />

Yu, H. (2000), “Banks Capital Structure <strong>and</strong> Liquid Asset- Policy Implication <strong>of</strong> Taiwan”, Journal <strong>of</strong><br />

Pacific Economic Review, 5:1, 109-114.<br />

14


TABLE 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />

Years Leverage Size Pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />

2001 0.80 0.21 0.45 0.99 6.02 2.12 3.06 8.93 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03<br />

2002 0.81 0.20 0.47 0.99 6.21 2.11 3.29 9.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03<br />

2003 0.82 0.19 0.51 0.99 6.50 2.08 3.57 9.20 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03<br />

2004 0.79 0.24 0.38 0.99 6.68 2.09 3.56 9.31 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05<br />

2005 0.83 0.21 0.47 0.99 6.95 2.03 3.96 9.53 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05<br />

2006 0.84 0.20 0.49 0.99 7.21 2.02 4.24 9.68 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06<br />

2007 0.79 0.30 0.26 1.00 7.51 2.06 4.50 10.03 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.17<br />

2008 0.81 0.22 0.43 0.99 6.73 2.07 3.74 9.39 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06<br />

2009 0.80 0.27 0.39 0.96 6.84 2.09 3.85 9.47 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.07<br />

15


TABLE 4.1 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />

Years Tangibility Liquidity Risk<br />

Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />

2001 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 1.70 0.76 1.07 2.65 1.92 1.33 0.70 3.94<br />

2002 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 1.73 0.86 1.14 3.01 0.83 0.47 0.40 1.34<br />

2003 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05 2.18 1.11 1.22 3.72 0.58 0.45 0.18 1.34<br />

2004 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 2.24 1.77 1.09 4.85 3.34 3.08 0.00 7.23<br />

2005 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 3.02 2.26 1.15 5.94 4.70 2.15 1.23 6.36<br />

2006 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 3.98 2.72 1.36 7.37 3.60 3.86 0.51 9.72<br />

2007 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 6.36 8.63 1.33 16.33 6.35 6.51 1.78 16.00<br />

2008 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.06 3.03 2.59 1.19 6.27 6.85 2.55 0.69 6.56<br />

2009 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 4.25 2.89 1.22 6.87 7.23 4.75 0.68 7.00<br />

16


TABLE 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (<strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />

Years Leverage Size Pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />

2001 0.50 0.22 0.03 0.86 4.15 1.75 1.36 7.98 0.05 0.09 -0.21 0.20<br />

2002 0.49 0.22 0.04 0.87 4.26 1.67 1.73 7.97 0.06 0.08 -0.14 0.24<br />

2003 0.54 0.21 0.04 0.88 4.41 1.73 1.22 8.03 0.07 0.07 -0.14 0.26<br />

2004 0.52 0.21 0.09 0.86 4.68 1.72 1.24 8.21 0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.21<br />

2005 0.53 0.17 0.11 0.82 5.03 1.73 1.89 8.29 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.36<br />

2006 0.49 0.20 0.08 0.91 5.23 1.72 2.37 8.60 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.71<br />

2007 0.45 0.21 0.01 0.83 5.24 1.98 -0.20 8.72 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.86<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

0.50 0.21 0.06 0.86 4.71 1.76 1.37 8.26 0.21 0.10<br />

0.49 0.20 0.05 0.87 4.81 1.76 1.38 8.30 0.22 0.11<br />

-<br />

0.07 0.41<br />

-<br />

0.05 0.44<br />

17


TABLE 4.2 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (<strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />

Years Tangibility Liquidity Risk<br />

Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />

2001 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.94 2.50 2.04 0.51 8.63 5.32 5.63 0.25 22.51<br />

2002 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.94 2.71 2.06 0.65 8.37 5.84 7.16 0.01 32.34<br />

2003 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.93 2.00 0.71 0.59 3.79 4.90 4.97 0.07 21.44<br />

2004 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.92 2.28 1.11 0.33 5.11 8.21 11.66 0.22 61.04<br />

2005 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.89 2.23 1.52 -0.84 7.15 7.55 9.93 0.00 53.47<br />

2006 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.97 2.96 2.08 0.30 9.85 4.38 3.62 0.28 15.18<br />

2007 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.98 6.10 17.16 0.35 89.76 7.16 6.59 0.33 28.21<br />

2008 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.94 2.97 3.81 0.27 18.95 6.19 7.08 0.17 33.46<br />

2009 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.92 3.05 4.11 0.23 20.67 6.34 7.32 0.15 35.28<br />

18


TABLE 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (Entire Insurance Sector)<br />

Years Leverage Size Pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />

2001 0.55 0.24 0.03 0.99 4.43 1.90 1.36 8.93 0.04 0.08 -0.21 0.20<br />

2002 0.54 0.25 0.04 0.99 4.56 1.85 1.73 9.07 0.05 0.08 -0.14 0.24<br />

2003 0.58 0.23 0.04 0.99 4.73 1.91 1.22 9.20 0.06 0.07 -0.14 0.26<br />

2004 0.56 0.24 0.09 0.99 4.99 1.89 1.24 9.31 0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.21<br />

2005 0.58 0.21 0.11 0.99 5.32 1.88 1.89 9.53 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.36<br />

2006 0.54 0.24 0.08 0.99 5.53 1.88 2.37 9.68 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.71<br />

2007 0.50 0.26 0.01 1.00 5.58 2.13 -0.20 10.03 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.86<br />

2008 0.53 0.24 0.06 0.99 5.97 1.92 1.37 9.39 0.19 0.10 -0.07 0.41<br />

2009 0.52 0.22 0.04 0.89 6.07 1.82 1.38 9.47 0.23 0.11 -0.05 0.44<br />

19


TABLE 4.3 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (Entire Insurance Sector)<br />

Years Tangibility Liquidity Risk<br />

Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />

2001 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.94 2.39 1.92 0.51 8.63 4.77 5.31 0.25 22.51<br />

2002 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.94 2.57 1.96 0.65 8.37 5.03 6.80 0.01 32.34<br />

2003 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.93 2.02 0.76 0.59 3.79 4.24 4.83 0.07 21.44<br />

2004 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.92 2.28 1.17 0.33 5.11 7.48 10.91 0.00 61.04<br />

2005<br />

0.10 0.18 0.00 0.89 2.34 1.61<br />

-<br />

0.84 7.15 7.12 9.21 0.00 53.47<br />

2006 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.97 3.10 2.15 0.30 9.85 4.26 3.61 0.28 15.18<br />

2007 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.98 6.13 16.38 0.35 89.76 7.06 6.48 0.33 28.21<br />

2008 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.94 2.98 3.71 0.27 18.95 5.71 6.74 0.13 33.46<br />

2009 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.93 3.07 4.01 0.23 20.67 5.87 6.97 0.12 35.28<br />

20


Table: 4.4 Regression Coefficients & Significance level <strong>of</strong> Model A<br />

(<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />

Variables<br />

Unst<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />

t-value<br />

Sig.<br />

Coefficients<br />

Coefficients<br />

B Std. Error Beta<br />

(Constant) .321 .079 4.053 .001<br />

Size .121 .009 .828 12.538 .000*<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>itability -1.132 .402 -.168 -2.940 .007**<br />

Tangibility .553 .804 .041 .637 .481<br />

Liquidity -.036 .005 -.262 -3.092 .008**<br />

Risk .020 .004 .178 2.566 .012**<br />

R Square 0.773<br />

Adjusted R Square 0.768<br />

F statistics 115.101<br />

*Significant at 1% level<br />

** Significant at 5% level<br />

21


Table: 4.5 Regression Coefficients & Significance level <strong>of</strong> Model B<br />

(<strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />

Variables<br />

Unst<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />

t<br />

Sig.<br />

Coefficients<br />

Coefficients<br />

B Std. Error Beta<br />

(Constant) .375 .036 10.392 .000<br />

Size .075 .006 .625 13.075 .000*<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>itability -.735 .072 -.444 -10.890 .000*<br />

Tangibility -.170 .048 -.150 -3.345 .002**<br />

Liquidity -.043 .005 -.235 -6.390 .000*<br />

Risk -.043 .001 -.141 -3.056 .004**<br />

R Square 0.720<br />

Adjusted R Square 0.713<br />

F statistics 85.101<br />

* Significant at 1% level<br />

** Significant at 5% level<br />

22


Table: 4.5 Regression Coefficients & Significance level <strong>of</strong> Model B<br />

(Entire Insurance Sector)<br />

Model<br />

Unst<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />

t<br />

Sig.<br />

Coefficients<br />

Coefficients<br />

B Std. Error Beta<br />

(Constant) .341 .033 10.388 .000<br />

Size .069 .005 .539 16.098 .000*<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>itability -.747 .068 -.431 -12.499 .004**<br />

Tangibility -.265 .047 -.147 -3.556 .017***<br />

Liquidity -.036 .004 -.229 -6.526 .011***<br />

Risk -.007 .001 -.127 -3.156 0.22<br />

R Square 0.823<br />

Adjusted R Square 0.818<br />

F statistics 125.101<br />

*Significant at 1% level<br />

** Significant at 5% level<br />

*** Significant at 10% level<br />

23

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!