Debt Equity Choice of Life and Non-Life Insurers: Evidence from ...
Debt Equity Choice of Life and Non-Life Insurers: Evidence from ...
Debt Equity Choice of Life and Non-Life Insurers: Evidence from ...
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<strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Choice</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Life</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> <strong>Insurers</strong>: <strong>Evidence</strong><br />
<strong>from</strong> Pakistan<br />
Talat Afza* <strong>and</strong>. Naveed Ahmed**<br />
Abstract<br />
Capital structure has attracted scholarly attention in corporate finance<br />
literature over the past decades. However, in the context <strong>of</strong> financial<br />
sector especially in insurance sector, it has received a little attention.<br />
Current study provides the empirical evidence on firm level determinants<br />
<strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan over nine years <strong>from</strong><br />
2001 to 2009. Present study split the data set according to the type <strong>of</strong><br />
insurance companies such as; life, non-life <strong>and</strong> overall insurance sector<br />
<strong>and</strong> accordingly three Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models<br />
are applied to estimate the relationship between the dependant (<strong>Debt</strong><br />
Ratio) <strong>and</strong> independent variables i.e. size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, liquidity<br />
<strong>and</strong> risk. The results revealed that both life <strong>and</strong> non-life insurance<br />
companies in Pakistan followed Pecking Order patterns in case <strong>of</strong><br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> liquidity as both variables negatively <strong>and</strong> significantly<br />
related with leverage in life <strong>and</strong> non-life insurance companies <strong>of</strong><br />
Pakistan. Moreover, positive <strong>and</strong> significant relationship between debt<br />
ratio <strong>and</strong> size in all <strong>of</strong> the three models, support the Static Trade-Off<br />
hypothesis. Furthermore, the results also indicate that pr<strong>of</strong>itable, more<br />
liquid, more tangible <strong>and</strong> risky insurance companies focus on retained<br />
earnings or equity than debt financing.<br />
Keywords: Capital structure, Firm level determinants, Insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />
1. Introduction<br />
Over the past several decades, theories on a firm’s capital structure choice have<br />
focused on many directions. Different models have been presented in the literature to<br />
explain a firm’s financing behavior (Harris <strong>and</strong> Raviv, 1991). In 1952, Dur<strong>and</strong> proposed<br />
the concept <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>and</strong> he is considered to be the one <strong>of</strong> the pioneers who<br />
analyzed it theoretically. According to his approach (Net income Approach), any firm<br />
can increase its value <strong>and</strong> decrease the cost <strong>of</strong> capital by using debt financing. Later<br />
on, Dur<strong>and</strong> (1952) proposed another approach (Net Operating Income Approach)<br />
related to capital structure <strong>and</strong> provided evidence that market value <strong>of</strong> the firm is<br />
irrelevant <strong>of</strong> the debt-equity choice. These two approaches were purely definitional <strong>and</strong><br />
no economic <strong>and</strong> behavioral meanings could be derived <strong>from</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> his work. In<br />
order to fill these gaps, Nobel Prize winning finance theorist, Modigliani <strong>and</strong> Miller<br />
(1958), presented behavioral approach <strong>and</strong> the modern concept <strong>of</strong> capital structure in<br />
which they theoretically <strong>and</strong> algebraically analyzed the affect <strong>of</strong> capital structure on<br />
firm’s value <strong>and</strong> concluded under certain assumptions that the firm’s value does not<br />
depend upon the financing choices.<br />
____________________<br />
Corresponding author: Naveedahmed@ciitlahore.edu.pk.<br />
* Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>and</strong> Director Academics, COMSATS Institute <strong>of</strong> Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan.<br />
** PhD Student, COMSATS Institute <strong>of</strong> Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan<br />
1
MM provided path <strong>and</strong> guidelines for researchers to analyze the affects <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>and</strong><br />
later several hypothesis have been put forward by researchers related to the debt-equity choices,<br />
but none <strong>of</strong> them exactly explains as to how much debt <strong>and</strong> equity should be used by any firm to<br />
get the desired results (Zhou, 2008). The rationale <strong>of</strong> target debt-equity depends on many micro<br />
<strong>and</strong> macro factors which are different across industries <strong>and</strong> regions. Therefore, keeping in view<br />
all micro <strong>and</strong> macro factors the firm formulates its capital structure prior to starting its operations<br />
<strong>and</strong> modifying it according to the requirements <strong>of</strong> business. For this purpose, firm requires the<br />
services <strong>of</strong> financial experts or managers <strong>and</strong> board <strong>of</strong> directors for making right decision about<br />
financing choices (debt <strong>and</strong> equity), because wrong decision may lead not only to increase cost<br />
<strong>of</strong> capital but also to insolvency or bankruptcy <strong>of</strong> the firms. Hence, when management plays its<br />
role in the selection <strong>of</strong> financing options, the core objective is to reduce the cost <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>and</strong><br />
equity along with increasing the benefits or value <strong>of</strong> the firm (Baral, 1996).<br />
The measurement <strong>of</strong> Cost <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>and</strong> equity is also essential in determining the capital structure<br />
because it provides link for increasing the value <strong>of</strong> shareholders along with attaining the financial<br />
goals <strong>of</strong> the firm (Agymin, 1998) If a business raises its capital through large portion <strong>of</strong> equity<br />
then it is attractive for the operational activities for two major reasons; first, It plays significant<br />
role for corporate growth <strong>of</strong> every organization because it does not carry any fixed charges <strong>and</strong><br />
maturity period. Second, it enhances the credit worthiness due to reduction in gearing. But, on<br />
the other h<strong>and</strong>, firms with poor prospects merely prefer to issue equity capital in order to bring<br />
new investors to share losses. In addition, when an announcement for issuing new stock is made,<br />
it gives negative signal to investors <strong>and</strong> as a result the market value <strong>of</strong> the stocks will decline.<br />
Moreover, when equity is issued for financing the operational activities, different costs are<br />
attached with it including the agency cost <strong>of</strong> equity. This cost arises in the firm due the conflict<br />
<strong>of</strong> interests between shareholder <strong>and</strong> managers related to firm’s decision. Therefore, equity<br />
should be the last option for raising funds (Aoun, 2006). Consequently, the management finds<br />
right kind <strong>of</strong> solution or source <strong>of</strong> finance which minimizes the costs <strong>and</strong> increases the value <strong>of</strong><br />
firm.<br />
One possible solution is to use debt capital for financing its assets which can be employed as a<br />
tool which not only reduces the cost <strong>of</strong> equity but also enhances the market value <strong>of</strong> the firm.<br />
When the firm shifts its capital structure towards more debt, then this forces managers to be<br />
more disciplined in the operational activities. For the last sixty years, different approaches have<br />
emerged regarding the use <strong>of</strong> debt. <strong>Debt</strong> acts as an engine for the growth <strong>of</strong> the firm <strong>and</strong> it<br />
encourages the managers to get maximum returns that enable them to pay interest. Furthermore,<br />
it minimizes free cash flows which make the manager to work less for their own interest <strong>and</strong> as a<br />
result reduces the wasteful expenditures <strong>of</strong> business. <strong>Debt</strong> financing also provides tax shelter<br />
which makes one to pay less taxes because the interest paid on debt is tax deductibles.<br />
Under certain assumptions MM also proposed that a firm can increase its market value <strong>of</strong> stocks<br />
if it is use 100% debt as a source <strong>of</strong> capital. But in the real world, the firm rarely uses 100% debt<br />
in order to reduce or minimize agency <strong>and</strong> bankruptcy related costs. When a large potion <strong>of</strong> debt<br />
is used by firms in the capital structure, different types <strong>of</strong> costs (agency <strong>and</strong> bankruptcy) are also<br />
attached with it. The bankruptcy cost exists, when the firm feels that it would not be able to pay<br />
interest on debt. As a result, the threat <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy also forces a firm to sell or liquidate its<br />
assets less than their actual market value. In addition, lenders may dem<strong>and</strong> more interest rates,<br />
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suppliers may refuse to grant credit <strong>and</strong> employees may also jump towards alternative jobs due<br />
to this threat.<br />
Furthermore, the agency cost <strong>of</strong> debt arises; when there is some controversy between the<br />
shareholders <strong>and</strong> debt holder in the firm. Thus, when the management is improperly (against<br />
target ratio) used debt or equity in the formation <strong>of</strong> capital structure, it would be harmful for the<br />
existence <strong>of</strong> the firm. Therefore, researchers have proposed the idea <strong>of</strong> optimal capital structure.<br />
According to Myers (1984) the firm should have optimal capital structure <strong>and</strong> this can be<br />
achieved through keeping a balance between the benefits <strong>and</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> equity <strong>and</strong> debt. It is the<br />
mix <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>and</strong> equity in target proportion which not only maximizes the firm’s value but also<br />
reduces the costs <strong>of</strong> financing choices.<br />
Corporate finance literature reveals that some researchers describe capital structure in narrow<br />
sense so as to include only long term financial instruments in its composition (Passilaki, 2008).<br />
According to Devic <strong>and</strong> krstic (2001) “Capital structure is expressed as ratio <strong>of</strong> long term<br />
liabilities to the sum <strong>of</strong> long term liabilities <strong>and</strong> firms equity”. “Capital structure is described as<br />
long term debt divided by total assets” (P<strong>and</strong>y, 2001; Omet, 2006; Delcour, 2007). But in the<br />
words <strong>of</strong> Nemmers <strong>and</strong> Grunewald (2000) “capital structure refers to all financial resources<br />
marshaled by the firm, it includes short as well as long-term, <strong>and</strong> all forms <strong>of</strong> debt as well as<br />
equity”. It includes all liabilities (Mashharawe,2003; Gaud,2005; Joeveer,2006; Mitton,2007).<br />
Nikolaos (2007) refers that “capital structure <strong>of</strong> firm is actually the relationship between the total<br />
debt <strong>and</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> the firm”.<br />
Insurance Sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan<br />
This paper attempts to investigate the determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong><br />
Pakistan. In 1947, after the creation <strong>of</strong> Pakistan, the first step taken by government to promote<br />
the insurance activities in Pakistan was the establishment <strong>of</strong> Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan<br />
(IAP) on 9 February 1949. The core objective <strong>of</strong> Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan is to protect<br />
the interests <strong>of</strong> its member insurance companies <strong>and</strong> to support their businesses. Another step to<br />
further strengthen the insurance industry was taken in 1953 by establishing Pakistan Insurance<br />
Corporation (now Pakistan Reinsurance Company Ltd) to boost the re-insurance activities. In<br />
1955, when foreign insurers appeared as competitors, National Co-Insurance Scheme (NCIS)<br />
was introduced to enhance the capacity <strong>of</strong> small insurance companies <strong>of</strong> local market. When East<br />
Pakistan broke its links with west Pakistan in 1971, Insurance industry as well as the whole<br />
economy faced financial crises <strong>and</strong> as a result Pakistan lost Rs.180 million in terms <strong>of</strong> premium<br />
revenue <strong>of</strong> non-life insurance sector.<br />
In 1972 all life insurance companies were taken over by the government through the policy <strong>of</strong><br />
nationalization but this process did not track out the growth <strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. For<br />
instance, insurance companies received premiums <strong>of</strong> Rs.290 million in 1973, Rs.335 million in<br />
1976, Rs.820 million in 1980, Rs.3.357 billion, Rs.31.25 billion in 2005 <strong>and</strong> Rs.38.45 billion in<br />
2006 (Insurance Year Book, 2007).<br />
The year 2000 brought many changes in the insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan since Insurance Act<br />
1938 was replaced by Insurance Ordinance 2000. This ordinance enhanced the financial health <strong>of</strong><br />
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insurance companies by increasing the paid up capital requirements <strong>of</strong> both non-life <strong>and</strong> life<br />
insurance companies. Therefore, the minimum requirement <strong>of</strong> paid-up capital <strong>of</strong> general<br />
insurance companies was enhanced to Rs.80 million <strong>from</strong> Rs.50 million whereas capital<br />
requirement <strong>of</strong> life insurers was increased <strong>from</strong> Rs.100 million to Rs.150 million. Furthermore,<br />
In 2002, Security <strong>and</strong> Exchange Commission <strong>of</strong> Pakistan <strong>and</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Commerce notified <strong>and</strong><br />
implemented the Insurance Rules 2002 in insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan to support the financial<br />
growth <strong>of</strong> insurance industry <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />
As a result <strong>of</strong> these financial reforms total assets <strong>and</strong> net premiums <strong>of</strong> life insurance companies<br />
have reached Rs.163.13 billion <strong>and</strong> Rs.36.72 billion respectively in 2006 while assets <strong>and</strong> net<br />
premiums <strong>of</strong> non-life insurers have reached Rs.72.88 billion <strong>and</strong> Rs.20.01 respectively in 2006<br />
(Insurance Year Book, 2007). In addition, the share <strong>of</strong> Pakistani insurance sector in the world<br />
also has reached 0.02% in 2009 while insurance density has touched the level <strong>of</strong> 6.9% in 2009<br />
(World Insurance Report, 2010). Moreover, total market capitalization <strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong><br />
Pakistan has reached Rs.224 billion in 2009. Therefore, statistical figures show that financial<br />
regulations have really contributed in the development <strong>of</strong> the insurance industry in Pakistan.<br />
Objective <strong>and</strong> Significance <strong>of</strong> the Study<br />
The Current study<br />
‣ Identifies the firm level characteristics which have significant impact on capital structure<br />
<strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />
‣ Specifies the firm level factors that can affect the financing decisions <strong>of</strong> life insurance<br />
<strong>and</strong> non-life insurance companies.<br />
‣ Also helps to indicate the factors which have less significant or no impact on leverage <strong>of</strong><br />
insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />
‣ Assists the regulators <strong>and</strong> management <strong>of</strong> insurance companies that how much debt <strong>and</strong><br />
equity should be used to formulate their capital structure for getting the desired results.<br />
2. Determinants <strong>of</strong> Capital Structure<br />
In this section, we provide a review <strong>of</strong> the factors which are considered as important<br />
determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />
2.1 Size (SZ)<br />
Size is considered a key factor that can influence the financial structure <strong>of</strong> the firm. It has been<br />
extensively used by the corporate finance researchers as control variable in the empirical analysis<br />
<strong>of</strong> determining the capital structure <strong>of</strong> the firm <strong>and</strong> found that proportion <strong>of</strong> debt <strong>and</strong> equity<br />
formulates according to the size <strong>of</strong> the firm (Scott <strong>and</strong> Martin, 1976; Booth et al., 2001). Various<br />
studies report a positive relationship between size <strong>and</strong> leverage (Hamaifer et al,1994;Al-<br />
Sakran,2001;Antoniou et al,2002;Gaud, 2005) while several studies intended negative<br />
relationship between debt ratio <strong>and</strong> firms size (Rajan <strong>and</strong> Zingales, 1995; Bevan <strong>and</strong><br />
Danbolt,2002). According to the Rajan <strong>and</strong> Zingales (1995), the relationship between size <strong>and</strong><br />
4
leverage could be negative because larger firms have less asymmetric information that reduces<br />
the chances <strong>of</strong> undervaluation <strong>of</strong> issuing new stock <strong>and</strong> thus they prefer to issue more equity than<br />
debt.<br />
On the other h<strong>and</strong>, Static Trade-<strong>of</strong>f hypothesis explores a positive relationship between size <strong>and</strong><br />
firm because larger firms are normally diversified <strong>and</strong> considered less risky, hence, prefer to<br />
utilize more debt. In addition, larger firms prefer to issue more debt because it reduces direct<br />
bankruptcy costs due to market confidence (Warner, 1977). Moreover, smaller firms prefer to<br />
acquire lower debt because, these firms might face the risk <strong>of</strong> liquidation at the time <strong>of</strong> financial<br />
distress. (Ozkan, 1996). Consistent with the results <strong>of</strong> Static Trade-Off theory, current study<br />
expects a positive relationship between size <strong>and</strong> debt ratio.<br />
The natural log <strong>of</strong> sales or the natural log <strong>of</strong> assets is generally used as a proxy to determine the<br />
size <strong>of</strong> the firm. Current study uses natural log <strong>of</strong> sale (premiums) to measure the size <strong>of</strong><br />
insurance industry <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />
“Therefore, first hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> size <strong>of</strong><br />
the firm”.<br />
2.2 Pr<strong>of</strong>itability (PF)<br />
Theoretical literature has no consistent relationship between debt ratio <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability. Jensen<br />
(1986) argued that pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms use debt as a tool which enforces managers to invest in more<br />
disciplined way <strong>and</strong> as a result reduces free cash flows, which implies a positive relationship<br />
between leverage <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability. Static Trade-<strong>of</strong>f model also predicts a positive relationship<br />
between pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> debt ratio due to the tax shield benefits. But according to the Pecking<br />
Order Theory (Myers <strong>and</strong> Majluf, 1984), firms prefer to use internal source <strong>of</strong> financing<br />
(retained earnings), then debt <strong>and</strong> finally issue external equity if more funds are required.<br />
Therefore, the more pr<strong>of</strong>itable the firms are the more retained earnings they will have, which<br />
exhibit a lower debt may utilized in the capital structure. This shows a negative relationship<br />
between pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> leverage <strong>of</strong> the firm. In addition, pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms avoid to get loan in<br />
inefficient markets due to disciplinary role <strong>of</strong> debt ( Agency Theory).Various studies (Gonedes et<br />
al, 1988; Friend <strong>and</strong> Hasbrouck,1989; Shah <strong>and</strong> Khan, 2007) also reported a negative<br />
relationship between pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> debt ratio. Present study also expects a negative<br />
relationship between pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> leverage.<br />
“Thus, second hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> the firm”.<br />
2.3 Tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets (TG)<br />
Tangible assets are considered to have an impact on borrowing decisions because they have<br />
greater value in case <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy .A firm with large portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets can easily raise debt<br />
5
at relatively lower rates by providing the collateral <strong>of</strong> these assets to the creditors. Having the<br />
incentive <strong>of</strong> getting the loan at nominal rates, these types <strong>of</strong> firms are expected to borrow more<br />
as compared to those firms where cost <strong>of</strong> borrowing is higher due to less proportion <strong>of</strong> fixed<br />
assets (Suto, 1990). Hence, firms with large proportion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets prefer to employ more<br />
debt for getting the advantage <strong>of</strong> this opportunity. On the contrary, negative relationship have<br />
been reported between leverage <strong>and</strong> fixed assets in small <strong>and</strong> medium firms (Daskalakis <strong>and</strong><br />
Psillaki,2007) <strong>and</strong> in less developed economies ( Joever,2006 ). Therefore, according to the<br />
nature <strong>of</strong> insurance industry, current study is expected to have negative relationship between<br />
leverage <strong>and</strong> tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>and</strong> use ratio <strong>of</strong> net fixed assets to total assets for measuring the<br />
tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> insurance industry. The amount <strong>of</strong> net fixed assets indicates the cost <strong>of</strong><br />
fixed assets less depreciation.<br />
“Therefore, fourth hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />
tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> the firm”.<br />
2.4 Liquidity (LQ)<br />
Liquidity ratio not only specifies the ability <strong>of</strong> the firm to cover its short term liabilities but also<br />
shows the liquidity position <strong>of</strong> the firm. Liquidity ratio has a mixed impact on the leverage<br />
decision. Firms with higher liquidity ratio prefer to acquire more debt because <strong>of</strong> their ability to<br />
meet short term obligations (Ozkan, 2001). This shows a positive relationship between the debt<br />
ratio <strong>and</strong> firms liquidity position. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, when firms have high liquidity ratios or<br />
have more liquid assets then then may prefer to use these assets to finance their investments <strong>and</strong><br />
discourage to raise external funds (Pecking Order Theory). Therefore, the firm’s liquidity<br />
position shows a negative relationship with capital structure <strong>of</strong> the firm. Current study is expects<br />
to have a negative relationship between liquidly <strong>and</strong> leverage because insurance companies in<br />
Pakistan seem to utilize only premium funds for paying claims. Current ratio (which is calculated<br />
as current assets over current liabilities) is used as a proxy to measure the liquidity. It is given by,<br />
“Therefore, fifth hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />
liquidity <strong>of</strong> the firm”.<br />
2.5 Risk (RK)<br />
Risk is another key explanatory variable that may affect the capital structure <strong>of</strong> the firm. It is<br />
considered to be either the inherent business risk or it may arise in the firm as a result <strong>of</strong><br />
inefficient management practices. Firms with high volatility in earnings might face higher risk<br />
that forces the management to reduce the debt level because higher risk increases the chances <strong>of</strong><br />
bankruptcy (P<strong>and</strong>y, 2001). This predicts a negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> risk <strong>and</strong><br />
this result is also consistent with trade-<strong>of</strong>f <strong>and</strong> pecking order hypothesis. Consistent with the<br />
results <strong>of</strong> Pecking Order Theory <strong>and</strong> Static Trade-<strong>of</strong>f Theory, present study is expected to have a<br />
negative relationship between risk <strong>and</strong> leverage. Several proxies have used in empirical studies<br />
to measure the risk <strong>of</strong> the firm such as st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> the difference in operating cash<br />
flows to total assets, st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> returns on net income, <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong><br />
percentage change in net income (Xiaoyan, 2008). According to the nature <strong>of</strong> business <strong>of</strong><br />
6
insurance companies, current study use st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> total insurance claims to<br />
total premiums as a proxy to measure the risk.<br />
“Therefore, seventh hypothesis is that there is negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> risk <strong>of</strong><br />
the firm.<br />
3. Methodology<br />
Regression Model<br />
Leverage = β0 + β1 (Size) + β2 (Pr<strong>of</strong>itability) + β3 (Tangibility) + β4 (Liquidity) + β5 (Risk)<br />
+ ε<br />
Where<br />
Size = Natural Log <strong>of</strong> Premiums<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>itability = Net Income before Interest <strong>and</strong> Tax divided by Total Assets<br />
Tangibility = Fixed Assets Divided by Total Assets<br />
Liquidity = Current Assets Divided by Current Liabilities<br />
Risk = St<strong>and</strong>ard Deviation <strong>of</strong> Total Claims Divided by Total Premiums<br />
3.1 Sample <strong>and</strong> Sources <strong>of</strong> Data<br />
The study uses various sources have been used for data collection. The book value based yearly<br />
financial data <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009 has been collected <strong>from</strong> the financial statements (Balance Sheet<br />
& Pr<strong>of</strong>it <strong>and</strong> Loss A/c) <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>and</strong> various “Insurance Year Books” published<br />
by Insurance Association <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. Currently only 5 companies are providing the services <strong>of</strong><br />
life insurance in Pakistan, including; two domestic owned, two foreign <strong>and</strong> one government<br />
owned. The life insurance companies comprising 59% <strong>of</strong> entire insurance sector in terms <strong>of</strong> total<br />
assets in 2009 whereas total premium revenue <strong>of</strong> life insurance companies has also reached<br />
Rs.35.59 billion in 2009(IAP, 2007). <strong>Non</strong>-life insurance industry in Pakistan comprises 45<br />
private companies, out <strong>of</strong> which only 32 are currently operating while the remaining 13 non-life<br />
insurance companies have closed their operations due to the limit <strong>of</strong> paid-up capital<br />
requirements.<br />
4. Empirical Results<br />
4.1 Descriptive Statistics<br />
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics <strong>of</strong> leverage, size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, liquidity <strong>and</strong><br />
risk <strong>of</strong> <strong>Life</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009. On average all life insurers are<br />
highly leveraged over nine years with ratios <strong>of</strong> not less than 0.79. In 2006 leverage reaches at<br />
maximum level i.e. 0.84 which shows the aggressive behavior <strong>of</strong> life insurers about utilization <strong>of</strong><br />
large portion <strong>of</strong> debt. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, variation in selection <strong>of</strong> debt capital also seems to be at<br />
7
maximum level in 2007 i.e. 0.30. Size is explanatory variable which is proxied by log <strong>of</strong> total<br />
premiums. Statistics shows that on average size <strong>of</strong> life insurance companies are continuously<br />
increasing <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009 which predicts that in Pakistan, people prefer to transfer their risk<br />
by getting insurance policy. Terrorism aftermaths might be one <strong>of</strong> the key reasons <strong>of</strong> increasing<br />
the life insurance policy premium revenues. Statistics also predict that with the enhancement <strong>of</strong><br />
size debt ratio <strong>of</strong> life insurers is also increases throughout nine years. On the other h<strong>and</strong>,<br />
variation in size approximately same in all seven years i.e. around 2.06.<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> life insurers is reported in third column <strong>of</strong> Table 4.1. <strong>Life</strong> insurers exhibit<br />
uniformity with respect to the pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2006.i.e.approximately 0.02. But in<br />
2007, average ratio jump into 0.07 which shows a healthy change in the pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> life<br />
insurance sector. In the same manner variation in pr<strong>of</strong>itability is considerably lesser <strong>and</strong> shows a<br />
consistency <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2006 except 2007. The average values <strong>of</strong> tangibility in Table 4.1 also<br />
shows minor or small portion <strong>of</strong> tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> life insurers <strong>and</strong> depicts consistency in<br />
mean values <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009 approximately 0.03. The st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> fixed<br />
assets to total assets is slightly lesser i.e. around 0.02 <strong>and</strong> is not varied over nine years. Table 4.1<br />
also indicated all life insurance companies, on average, continuously improving their liquidity<br />
position through out nine years. This trend shows that life insurers keep large portion <strong>of</strong> funds in<br />
liquid form for settlement <strong>of</strong> claims. The highest mean value <strong>of</strong> liquidity is observed in 2007<br />
which is 6.36. But in the same year the value <strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation is at maximum level i.e. 8.63<br />
among all the years which also predicts inconsistency in liquidity position.<br />
Table 4.1 also describes that insurers seem to be risky <strong>from</strong> 2004 to 2009 with respect to the<br />
settlement <strong>of</strong> claims. In 2003, the mean value <strong>of</strong> risk seems at minimum level with the ratio <strong>of</strong><br />
0.58 which reached at 7.23 in 2009. This continuously increasing trend over nine years predicts<br />
that life insurance companies become more risky.Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics <strong>of</strong><br />
variables leverage, size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, liquidity <strong>and</strong> risk for the same study period <strong>of</strong><br />
2001 to 2009 for non life insurance industry. The average value <strong>of</strong> leverage is approximately<br />
0.50 over nine years which is quite lower than the mean values <strong>of</strong> life insurance industry. The<br />
highest mean value <strong>of</strong> leverage is 0.54 in 2003 <strong>and</strong> lowest mean value is 0.45 in 2007.The inter<br />
industry variation in selection <strong>of</strong> leverage is minimum in 2005 at 0.17 <strong>and</strong> maximum in 2001-02<br />
at 0.22. The variation <strong>of</strong> non-life insurers is around 0.20 over nine years which is almost the<br />
same as the life insurance industry.<br />
Although the size <strong>of</strong> non life insurance industries is slightly lower than life insurance industry<br />
but variable size is having the same growing trend throughout the study period. The maximum<br />
mean value <strong>of</strong> size for non life insurers is 5.24 in 2007 which is almost 26% above than the size<br />
in 2001. The variation in size <strong>of</strong> non-life insurers is slightly lower than the life insurance<br />
companies over seven years i.e. 1.75. An increasing trend can be seen in the mean values <strong>of</strong><br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>from</strong> the minimum <strong>of</strong> 0.05 in 2001 to a maximum <strong>of</strong> 0.22 in 2009. These values<br />
show continuously improvement in pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> non-life insurance companies. Table 2 also<br />
indicates that the average values <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> non life insurance sector are much higher than<br />
life insurance sector along with inter industry variability which is at its minimum level in 2004 at<br />
0.06 <strong>and</strong> maximum in 2007 at 0.19.<br />
8
Consistent with the descriptive statistics <strong>of</strong> life insurers, table 4.2 shows that non-life insurance<br />
companies also have less portions <strong>of</strong> fixed assets i.e. around 0.12 during nine years. On the other<br />
h<strong>and</strong>, inter industry variability is on average 0.20 <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009 which is also consistent<br />
with the st<strong>and</strong>ard deviations <strong>of</strong> life insurance industry. The maximum average value <strong>of</strong> liquidity<br />
<strong>of</strong> non-life insurers is 6.10 found in year 2007 while on average, other eight years show<br />
relatively lower level <strong>of</strong> liquidity i.e. around 2.25. In addition, average liquidity values <strong>of</strong> both<br />
life <strong>and</strong> non-life insurers are approximately the same in all the years. Table 4.2 also depicts that<br />
non-life insurance companies face higher risk (8.21) in 2004 as compare to other eight years.<br />
Descriptive statistics also predicts that on average risk <strong>of</strong> non-life insurers is relatively higher<br />
than the life insurers.<br />
Table 4.3 provides the descriptive statistics <strong>of</strong> leverage, size, risk, tangibility, liquidity <strong>and</strong><br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> entire insurance sector (life plus non-life) <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. The average value <strong>of</strong><br />
leverage is approximately 0.55 over nine years <strong>of</strong> all insurance companies in Pakistan. In 2005<br />
leverage reaches at maximum level i.e. 0.58 which shows the aggressive behavior <strong>of</strong> insurers<br />
about utilization <strong>of</strong> large portion <strong>of</strong> debt. On the other h<strong>and</strong> variation in selection <strong>of</strong> debt capital<br />
also seems to be at minimum level in 2005 i.e. 0.21 as compare to other years. The mean value<br />
<strong>of</strong> size is at maximum level in 2009 i.e. 6.07 which shows around 73 % increase in premium<br />
revenues <strong>from</strong> 2001. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, variation in size approximately same in all nine years i.e.<br />
around 1.90. An increasing trend can be seen in mean values <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>from</strong> the minimum<br />
value 0.04 in 2001 to a maximum value 0.23 in 2009. In the same manner variation in<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability is having increasing trend <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009.<br />
As insurance companies face uncertainty for settlements <strong>of</strong> claims, therefore companies prefer to<br />
keep large portion <strong>of</strong> current assets than fixed assets. The average values <strong>of</strong> Table 4.3 also shows<br />
minor portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets <strong>of</strong> insurers <strong>and</strong> depicts consistency in mean values <strong>from</strong> 2001 to<br />
2009 approximately 0.11. The st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation <strong>of</strong> tangibility is around 0.19 over nine years.<br />
Table 4.3 also shows insurance companies, on average, continuously improving their liquidity<br />
position through out nine years. This trend shows that life <strong>and</strong> non-life insurers keep large<br />
portion <strong>of</strong> funds in liquid form for settlement <strong>of</strong> claims. The highest mean value <strong>of</strong> liquidity is<br />
observed in 2007 which is 6.13. But in the same year the value <strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation is at<br />
maximum level i.e. 16.38 among all the years which also predicts inconsistency in liquidity<br />
position. Statistics <strong>of</strong> Table 4.3 describes that in 2003, the mean value <strong>of</strong> risk seems at minimum<br />
level with the ratio <strong>of</strong> 4.24 which reaches at 7.06 in 2007. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, in 2004, the value<br />
<strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation is 10.91 which is the highest value over nine years.<br />
4.3 Regression Analysis<br />
Finally the impact <strong>of</strong> five explanatory variables size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, liquidity, risk <strong>and</strong> tangibility<br />
on capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan has been examined by using three<br />
ordinary least square regression models. These three regression models employ different data<br />
sets according to the type <strong>of</strong> insurers. Model A uses the financial data <strong>of</strong> life insurance sector<br />
while Model B <strong>and</strong> Model C are regress the data <strong>of</strong> five explanatory variables on capital<br />
9
structure <strong>of</strong> non-life insurance companies <strong>and</strong> entire insurance sector respectively over nine years<br />
<strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009. Table 4.4 <strong>of</strong> Model A reports the value <strong>of</strong> adjusted R square (0.768) indicates<br />
that debt ratio is nearly 77% dependant on variables i.e. size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, risk <strong>and</strong><br />
liquidity. Therefore, leverage is mainly defined by these five variables <strong>of</strong> life insurers in Pakistan<br />
over nine years.<br />
Table 4.4 <strong>of</strong> Model A shows that coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable size is positive <strong>and</strong> statistically<br />
significant at 1% level. This predicts that large size life insurance companies in Pakistan prefer to<br />
utilize more debt in their capital structure. These results also confirm the notion that large firms<br />
employ more debt because these are less risky <strong>and</strong> diversified in nature (Static trade- <strong>of</strong>f<br />
Theory). In addition, larger firms are prefer to issue more debt because it reduces direct<br />
bankruptcy costs due to market confidence (Warner, 1977). Moreover, smaller firms prefer to<br />
acquire lower debt because, these firms might face the risk <strong>of</strong> liquidation at the time <strong>of</strong> financial<br />
distress (Ozkan, 1996).<br />
The coefficient <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability is found to be negative <strong>and</strong> statistically significant at 5% level.<br />
This negative sign indicates the negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong><br />
predicts that, in Pakistan, pr<strong>of</strong>itable life insurance companies prefer to utilize small portion <strong>of</strong><br />
debt. This result confirms the notion that Pakistani life insurance companies follow the Pecking<br />
Order pattern i.e. prefer to employ internal financing than debt. In addition, negative relationship<br />
also confirms the implication <strong>of</strong> Agency Theory which predicts that pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms avoid to get<br />
loan <strong>from</strong> inefficient markets due to the disciplinary role <strong>of</strong> debt. Table 4.4 depicts that the beta<br />
value <strong>of</strong> explanatory variable tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets is 0.553 with the positive coefficient sign.<br />
However, tangibility is not statistically significant with the large p-value. Although positive<br />
relationship shows that a firm with the large portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets can easily raise debt or<br />
obtains more debt at relatively lower rates by providing collaterals <strong>of</strong> these assets to creditor but<br />
due to the insignificant relationship <strong>of</strong> tangibility <strong>and</strong> leverage is not considered a powerful<br />
explanatory variable to define the debt ratio <strong>of</strong> life insurance companies in Pakistan over nine<br />
years. Results <strong>of</strong> regression model A indicate that the control variable liquidity with the negative<br />
coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. Therefore, Pakistani life insurance companies<br />
with high liquidity ratios or more liquid assets are preferred to utilize these assets to finance their<br />
investments <strong>and</strong> discourage to raise external funds.<br />
Table 4.4 also shows that the coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable risk is positive <strong>and</strong> statistically significant at<br />
5% level. This indicates that in order to fulfill the claims <strong>of</strong> the life insurance policyholder at the<br />
time <strong>of</strong> death or expiry <strong>of</strong> the policy, companies acquire external funds. Table 4.5 <strong>of</strong> Model B<br />
depicts the results <strong>of</strong> regression analysis <strong>of</strong> Pakistani non-life insurance companies <strong>from</strong> 2001 to<br />
2009. The value <strong>of</strong> adjusted R square (0.713) indicates that debt ratio is nearly 72% dependant<br />
on explanatory variables i.e. size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, risk <strong>and</strong> liquidity. Consistent with the<br />
results <strong>of</strong> Model A, Table 4.5 <strong>of</strong> Model B shows that coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable size is positive <strong>and</strong><br />
statistically significant at 1% level. This predicts that large size non-life insurance companies in<br />
Pakistan prefer to employ more debt in their capital structure. These results consistent with the<br />
hypothesis that large firms employ more debt because these firms are less risky <strong>and</strong> diversified in<br />
nature (Static Trade-<strong>of</strong>f Theory).<br />
10
The coefficient <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability is found to be negative <strong>and</strong> statistically significant at 1% level.<br />
This negative sign indicates the negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong><br />
predicts that, in Pakistan, pr<strong>of</strong>itable non-life insurance companies prefer to utilize small portion<br />
<strong>of</strong> debt. This result confirms the notion that Pakistani non-life insurance companies follow<br />
Pecking Order pattern i.e. preferred to employ internal financing than debt. The results <strong>of</strong><br />
regression model B indicate that the coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable liquidity with the negative coefficient<br />
is statistically significant at 1% level. This negative sign shows the inverse relationship between<br />
the liquidity <strong>and</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> non-life insurance sector. Therefore, results predict that<br />
Pakistani non-life insurance companies with high liquidity ratios or more liquid assets prefer to<br />
utilize internal source <strong>of</strong> financing than debt. Negative coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable tangibility<br />
specifies the negative relationship between tangibility <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>and</strong> debt ratio <strong>of</strong> non-life<br />
insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. This inverse relationship indicates that in Pakistan non-life<br />
insurance companies with large portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets are preferred to utilize small portion <strong>of</strong><br />
debt in their capital structure. Negative relationship has also been reported between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />
tangibility in small <strong>and</strong> medium firms (Daskalakis <strong>and</strong> Psillaki,2007) <strong>and</strong> in less developed<br />
economies ( Joever,2006 ).<br />
The variable risk is negative <strong>and</strong> statistically significant at 5% level. Negative sign indicates that<br />
at the time <strong>of</strong> the destruction or loss <strong>of</strong> the subject matter, non-life insurance companies prefer to<br />
employ their internal source <strong>of</strong> financing for settlement <strong>of</strong> claims than external financing. This<br />
negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> risk is also consistent with the results <strong>of</strong> trade-<strong>of</strong>f <strong>and</strong><br />
pecking order hypothesis. Table 4.6 <strong>of</strong> Model C reports the results <strong>of</strong> regression analysis <strong>of</strong><br />
entire insurance sector (life plus non-life) <strong>of</strong> Pakistan <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009. The value <strong>of</strong> adjusted<br />
R square (0.823) indicates that capital structure <strong>of</strong> Pakistani insurance sector is nearly 82%<br />
dependant on control variables (size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability, tangibility, risk <strong>and</strong> liquidity). Therefore,<br />
leverage is mainly defined by these five control variables <strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan over<br />
nine years. Table 4.6 <strong>of</strong> Model C shows that coefficient <strong>of</strong> variable size is positive <strong>and</strong><br />
statistically significant at 1% level. This predicts that large size insurance companies (life plus<br />
non-life) in Pakistan prefer to utilize more debt in formation <strong>of</strong> capital structure.<br />
The coefficient sign <strong>of</strong> explanatory variable pr<strong>of</strong>itability is found to be negative <strong>and</strong> statistically<br />
significant at 5% level. This negative sign shows the negative relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong><br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>and</strong> predicts that, in Pakistan, pr<strong>of</strong>itable insurance companies (both life <strong>and</strong> non-life)<br />
discourage to employ debt capital over seven years. This result confirms the notion that Pakistani<br />
insurance companies follow the Pecking Order pattern i.e. preferred to employ internal source <strong>of</strong><br />
financing than debt. The negative relationship between the tangibility <strong>and</strong> debt ratio shows that<br />
Pakistani insurance companies (both life <strong>and</strong> non-life) with large portion <strong>of</strong> fixed assets<br />
discourage to employ debt capital. Al-Bahsh <strong>and</strong> Sentis (2008) also found the negative<br />
relationship between tangibility <strong>and</strong> leverage by taking the sample <strong>of</strong> less developed economies.<br />
Various studies like Joeveer (2006) <strong>and</strong> Daskalakis <strong>and</strong> Psillaki (2007) also predict the same<br />
negative relationship between debt ratio <strong>and</strong> tangibility. The negative <strong>and</strong> statistically significant<br />
relationship between liquidity <strong>and</strong> leverage ) indicates that Pakistani insurance companies (both<br />
life <strong>and</strong> non-life with high liquidity ratios or more liquid assets prefer to utilize these assets to<br />
finance their investments <strong>and</strong> discourage to raise external funds over nine years. Ozkan (2001)<br />
<strong>and</strong> Mashharawe (2003) also show the inverse relationship between liquidity <strong>and</strong> debt ratio. In<br />
11
addition, the relationship between risk <strong>and</strong> debt ratio illustrates statistically insignificant results<br />
<strong>of</strong> insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan.<br />
Conclusion<br />
This study investigates the determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan<br />
over the period <strong>of</strong> nine years <strong>from</strong> 2001 to 2009. Empirical results indicate that size, pr<strong>of</strong>itability,<br />
liquidity tangibility <strong>and</strong> risk are important determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> insurance<br />
companies <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. In addition, Pakistani insurers follow Pecking Order pattern in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability, risk, tangibility <strong>and</strong> liquidity as leverage has a negative relationship with<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability, risk, tangibility <strong>and</strong> liquidity while positive relationship between leverage <strong>and</strong> size<br />
shows consistency with the Trade-<strong>of</strong>f theory. Moreover, the results also indicate that the<br />
management <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itable, more liquid, more tangible <strong>and</strong> risky non-life insurance companies<br />
emphasize on retained earnings or equity rather than debt financing.<br />
Limitations <strong>and</strong> Future Implications<br />
This study considers only one financial sector i.e. insurance sector <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. Other financial<br />
institutions <strong>of</strong> Pakistan like banks, mutual funds, modaraba companies etc. could be selected for<br />
future research. In addition, present study selected only five explanatory variables (size,<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability, risk, tangibility <strong>and</strong> liquidity), therefore, academicians may choose other<br />
determinants <strong>of</strong> capital structure for future research.<br />
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14
TABLE 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />
Years Leverage Size Pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />
2001 0.80 0.21 0.45 0.99 6.02 2.12 3.06 8.93 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03<br />
2002 0.81 0.20 0.47 0.99 6.21 2.11 3.29 9.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03<br />
2003 0.82 0.19 0.51 0.99 6.50 2.08 3.57 9.20 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03<br />
2004 0.79 0.24 0.38 0.99 6.68 2.09 3.56 9.31 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05<br />
2005 0.83 0.21 0.47 0.99 6.95 2.03 3.96 9.53 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05<br />
2006 0.84 0.20 0.49 0.99 7.21 2.02 4.24 9.68 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06<br />
2007 0.79 0.30 0.26 1.00 7.51 2.06 4.50 10.03 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.17<br />
2008 0.81 0.22 0.43 0.99 6.73 2.07 3.74 9.39 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06<br />
2009 0.80 0.27 0.39 0.96 6.84 2.09 3.85 9.47 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.07<br />
15
TABLE 4.1 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />
Years Tangibility Liquidity Risk<br />
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />
2001 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 1.70 0.76 1.07 2.65 1.92 1.33 0.70 3.94<br />
2002 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 1.73 0.86 1.14 3.01 0.83 0.47 0.40 1.34<br />
2003 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05 2.18 1.11 1.22 3.72 0.58 0.45 0.18 1.34<br />
2004 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 2.24 1.77 1.09 4.85 3.34 3.08 0.00 7.23<br />
2005 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 3.02 2.26 1.15 5.94 4.70 2.15 1.23 6.36<br />
2006 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 3.98 2.72 1.36 7.37 3.60 3.86 0.51 9.72<br />
2007 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 6.36 8.63 1.33 16.33 6.35 6.51 1.78 16.00<br />
2008 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.06 3.03 2.59 1.19 6.27 6.85 2.55 0.69 6.56<br />
2009 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 4.25 2.89 1.22 6.87 7.23 4.75 0.68 7.00<br />
16
TABLE 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (<strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />
Years Leverage Size Pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />
2001 0.50 0.22 0.03 0.86 4.15 1.75 1.36 7.98 0.05 0.09 -0.21 0.20<br />
2002 0.49 0.22 0.04 0.87 4.26 1.67 1.73 7.97 0.06 0.08 -0.14 0.24<br />
2003 0.54 0.21 0.04 0.88 4.41 1.73 1.22 8.03 0.07 0.07 -0.14 0.26<br />
2004 0.52 0.21 0.09 0.86 4.68 1.72 1.24 8.21 0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.21<br />
2005 0.53 0.17 0.11 0.82 5.03 1.73 1.89 8.29 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.36<br />
2006 0.49 0.20 0.08 0.91 5.23 1.72 2.37 8.60 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.71<br />
2007 0.45 0.21 0.01 0.83 5.24 1.98 -0.20 8.72 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.86<br />
2008<br />
2009<br />
0.50 0.21 0.06 0.86 4.71 1.76 1.37 8.26 0.21 0.10<br />
0.49 0.20 0.05 0.87 4.81 1.76 1.38 8.30 0.22 0.11<br />
-<br />
0.07 0.41<br />
-<br />
0.05 0.44<br />
17
TABLE 4.2 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (<strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />
Years Tangibility Liquidity Risk<br />
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />
2001 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.94 2.50 2.04 0.51 8.63 5.32 5.63 0.25 22.51<br />
2002 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.94 2.71 2.06 0.65 8.37 5.84 7.16 0.01 32.34<br />
2003 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.93 2.00 0.71 0.59 3.79 4.90 4.97 0.07 21.44<br />
2004 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.92 2.28 1.11 0.33 5.11 8.21 11.66 0.22 61.04<br />
2005 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.89 2.23 1.52 -0.84 7.15 7.55 9.93 0.00 53.47<br />
2006 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.97 2.96 2.08 0.30 9.85 4.38 3.62 0.28 15.18<br />
2007 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.98 6.10 17.16 0.35 89.76 7.16 6.59 0.33 28.21<br />
2008 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.94 2.97 3.81 0.27 18.95 6.19 7.08 0.17 33.46<br />
2009 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.92 3.05 4.11 0.23 20.67 6.34 7.32 0.15 35.28<br />
18
TABLE 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (Entire Insurance Sector)<br />
Years Leverage Size Pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />
2001 0.55 0.24 0.03 0.99 4.43 1.90 1.36 8.93 0.04 0.08 -0.21 0.20<br />
2002 0.54 0.25 0.04 0.99 4.56 1.85 1.73 9.07 0.05 0.08 -0.14 0.24<br />
2003 0.58 0.23 0.04 0.99 4.73 1.91 1.22 9.20 0.06 0.07 -0.14 0.26<br />
2004 0.56 0.24 0.09 0.99 4.99 1.89 1.24 9.31 0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.21<br />
2005 0.58 0.21 0.11 0.99 5.32 1.88 1.89 9.53 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.36<br />
2006 0.54 0.24 0.08 0.99 5.53 1.88 2.37 9.68 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.71<br />
2007 0.50 0.26 0.01 1.00 5.58 2.13 -0.20 10.03 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.86<br />
2008 0.53 0.24 0.06 0.99 5.97 1.92 1.37 9.39 0.19 0.10 -0.07 0.41<br />
2009 0.52 0.22 0.04 0.89 6.07 1.82 1.38 9.47 0.23 0.11 -0.05 0.44<br />
19
TABLE 4.3 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (Entire Insurance Sector)<br />
Years Tangibility Liquidity Risk<br />
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max<br />
2001 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.94 2.39 1.92 0.51 8.63 4.77 5.31 0.25 22.51<br />
2002 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.94 2.57 1.96 0.65 8.37 5.03 6.80 0.01 32.34<br />
2003 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.93 2.02 0.76 0.59 3.79 4.24 4.83 0.07 21.44<br />
2004 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.92 2.28 1.17 0.33 5.11 7.48 10.91 0.00 61.04<br />
2005<br />
0.10 0.18 0.00 0.89 2.34 1.61<br />
-<br />
0.84 7.15 7.12 9.21 0.00 53.47<br />
2006 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.97 3.10 2.15 0.30 9.85 4.26 3.61 0.28 15.18<br />
2007 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.98 6.13 16.38 0.35 89.76 7.06 6.48 0.33 28.21<br />
2008 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.94 2.98 3.71 0.27 18.95 5.71 6.74 0.13 33.46<br />
2009 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.93 3.07 4.01 0.23 20.67 5.87 6.97 0.12 35.28<br />
20
Table: 4.4 Regression Coefficients & Significance level <strong>of</strong> Model A<br />
(<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />
Variables<br />
Unst<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />
t-value<br />
Sig.<br />
Coefficients<br />
Coefficients<br />
B Std. Error Beta<br />
(Constant) .321 .079 4.053 .001<br />
Size .121 .009 .828 12.538 .000*<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>itability -1.132 .402 -.168 -2.940 .007**<br />
Tangibility .553 .804 .041 .637 .481<br />
Liquidity -.036 .005 -.262 -3.092 .008**<br />
Risk .020 .004 .178 2.566 .012**<br />
R Square 0.773<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.768<br />
F statistics 115.101<br />
*Significant at 1% level<br />
** Significant at 5% level<br />
21
Table: 4.5 Regression Coefficients & Significance level <strong>of</strong> Model B<br />
(<strong>Non</strong>-<strong>Life</strong> Insurance)<br />
Variables<br />
Unst<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />
t<br />
Sig.<br />
Coefficients<br />
Coefficients<br />
B Std. Error Beta<br />
(Constant) .375 .036 10.392 .000<br />
Size .075 .006 .625 13.075 .000*<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>itability -.735 .072 -.444 -10.890 .000*<br />
Tangibility -.170 .048 -.150 -3.345 .002**<br />
Liquidity -.043 .005 -.235 -6.390 .000*<br />
Risk -.043 .001 -.141 -3.056 .004**<br />
R Square 0.720<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.713<br />
F statistics 85.101<br />
* Significant at 1% level<br />
** Significant at 5% level<br />
22
Table: 4.5 Regression Coefficients & Significance level <strong>of</strong> Model B<br />
(Entire Insurance Sector)<br />
Model<br />
Unst<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />
t<br />
Sig.<br />
Coefficients<br />
Coefficients<br />
B Std. Error Beta<br />
(Constant) .341 .033 10.388 .000<br />
Size .069 .005 .539 16.098 .000*<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>itability -.747 .068 -.431 -12.499 .004**<br />
Tangibility -.265 .047 -.147 -3.556 .017***<br />
Liquidity -.036 .004 -.229 -6.526 .011***<br />
Risk -.007 .001 -.127 -3.156 0.22<br />
R Square 0.823<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.818<br />
F statistics 125.101<br />
*Significant at 1% level<br />
** Significant at 5% level<br />
*** Significant at 10% level<br />
23