Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ...
Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ... Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ...
deterministic sensor errors such as azimuth bias errors, and enables dynamic blending of the most appropriate data for aircraft state estimation. (A surveillance ‘server’ concept is advocated in NAS Architecture Versions 2.0-3.0, which would network multiple terminal and en route sensors into common data fusion nodes, and distribute the global track data to appropriate ATM facilities, requesting users, and to external fusion nodes.) 5.1.4.4 Surveillance System Performance Metrics Within the regions where surveillance coverage is available, the primary metrics for the surveillance function are accuracy, availability, integrity and latency. (Continuity of function and reception probability are also of interest, but are usually treated within the scope of the above metrics.) Although individual sensors or subsystems may have individual or characteristic performance, it is the end system performance metrics which are of significance for the users of surveillance data. For path prediction analysis, for example, both position and velocity performance is significant for determining the overall prediction errors for a given lookahead period. We summarize these metrics and future requirements in this section. Accuracy Metrics The accuracy metrics in the current system are most often driven by user requirements for separation assurance. In the terminal area, where this function involves vectoring and altitude level-off controls, the greatest need is for relative accuracy measures, i.e. monitoring the current aircraft states versus the currently active clearance. Typical relative position accuracy of modern radars in the terminal area is under 0.1 nm and is adequate for current means of separation assurance. The future use of RNP routings on the order of RNP-0.3 for SIDs, STARs, and non-precision approach, and the potential use of operational concepts to increase throughput may lead to requirements for substantially higher accuracy and dynamic reporting of path intent. Part of this requirement will be for absolute accuracy, since bias errors between the flight navigation system and the surveillance system may appear as path conformance violations to ground controllers, and part of this requirement will be for more precise velocity states for faster detection and resolution of route conformance and clearance errors. The accuracy metrics for surveillance performance in transition and en route airspace are driven by several needs including conflict detection, separation assurance and sector load planning. Operational concepts such as the use of medium term conflict probe will require much better tracking than is available with current legacy systems. Earlier studies (Warren, 1996) have shown the need for much reduced lags in tracking of maneuvering aircraft, and in achieving steady state velocity errors on the order of 5 knots rms. Similarly, the use of operational concepts to achieve reduced separation standards, and the future use of RNP-1 routings may lead to requirements for substantially better tracking accuracy than is achievable with currently fielded systems. Availability Metrics Since active surveillance is essential for safely separating aircraft at the separation standards currently used in the NAS, the desired levels of system availability are on the order of 0.99999 or better (RTCA, 1997, MASPS on Automatic Dependent Surveillance- 62
Broadcast (ADS-B), V6.0). Individual radar sensors can support availability on the order of 0.999. However, to achieve the overall system level availability, dual surveillance coverage is usually required. This is currently not a problem at high altitudes since dual radar coverage or better is available throughout the NAS. At low altitudes, and in the terminal maneuvering areas this requirement is difficult to achieve and an availability of 0.999 is currently considered acceptable, except at the major hub airports. This level of availability is probably adequate for future systems, except that traffic growth may extend the need for higher availability in more terminal areas. Continuity of function is often included in the availability metrics and in future system planning considerations. Integrity Metrics Integrity is usually measured in terms of undetected errors in surveillance system outputs. Desired system level integrity is on the order of one undetected error in 10 7 scans/output reports. At the sensor level, clutter detections and fruit replies can lead to large spontaneous errors at much higher rates. The tracking and data fusion software typically provides the added integrity to achieve the desired system level performance. Future systems will probably require equivalent integrity, although the use of multi-sensor processing and integrity checking could yield higher integrity than current systems. Latency Metrics Latency is a measure of the acceptable delay between successive surveillance reports on the average or at a specified probability level. (For example, with en route radars the probability of reception per scan is on the order of 98%, and the latency between successive scans is 12 seconds at the 98% probability level.) This metric is typically specified by a stressing application such as separation assurance at a typical range between the aircraft being tracked and the tracking sensor. For close range applications such as parallel approach monitoring and collision avoidance, a typical latency requirement is a one second report updating at a 95 to 99 percent probability of reception. For other applications latency requirements increase with separation range and size of minimum separation standards, e.g. latency may be 15 minutes with ~95% reception probability for an oceanic ADS system supporting horizontal separation standards on the order of 30 miles. This does not include transmission latency, which is a measure of the time delay in actually receiving the report at the data fusion center, or latency error, which is a measure of the time stamping error associated with a surveillance report. These metrics are also useful in quantifying system performance. 5.1.5 Aviation Weather Performance Weather has a major impact on the safety, efficiency, and capacity of aviation operations. Accidents and incidents continue to be caused by adverse weather. Runway acceptance rates and other capacity metrics are reduced in IMC. According to some studies, 40-65 percent of delays that affect U.S. domestic airlines are caused by adverse weather, at annual direct costs ranging from $4-5B per year (Evans, 1995). In addition, passengers are inconvenienced by flight delays and cancellations or diversions due to weather, and are uncomfortable when turbulence is encountered during a flight. The expected future growth in air traffic will only exacerbate all these conditions, imposing constraints on the 63
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Broadcast (ADS-B), V6.0). Individual radar sensors can support availability on the order<br />
of 0.999. However, to achieve the overall system level availability, dual surveillance<br />
coverage is usually required. This is currently not a problem at high altitudes since dual<br />
radar coverage or better is available throughout the NAS. At low altitudes, and in the<br />
terminal maneuvering areas this requirement is difficult to achieve and an availability of<br />
0.999 is currently considered acceptable, except at the major hub airports. This level of<br />
availability is probably adequate for future systems, except that traffic growth may extend<br />
the need for higher availability in more terminal areas. Continuity of function is often<br />
included in the availability metrics and in future system planning considerations.<br />
Integrity Metrics<br />
Integrity is usually measured in terms of undetected errors in surveillance system outputs.<br />
Desired system level integrity is on the order of one undetected error in 10 7 scans/output<br />
reports. At the sensor level, clutter detections and fruit replies can lead to large<br />
spontaneous errors at much higher rates. <strong>The</strong> tracking and data fusion software typically<br />
provides the added integrity to achieve the desired system level performance. Future<br />
systems will probably require equivalent integrity, although the use of multi-sensor<br />
processing and integrity checking could yield higher integrity than current systems.<br />
Latency Metrics<br />
Latency is a measure of the acceptable delay between successive surveillance reports on<br />
the average or at a specified probability level. (For example, with en route radars the<br />
probability of reception per scan is on the order of 98%, and the latency between<br />
successive scans is 12 seconds at the 98% probability level.) This metric is typically<br />
specified by a stressing application such as separation assurance at a typical range between<br />
the aircraft being tracked and the tracking sensor. For close range applications such as<br />
parallel approach monitoring and collision avoidance, a typical latency requirement is a<br />
one second report updating at a 95 to 99 percent probability of reception. For other<br />
applications latency requirements increase with separation range and size of minimum<br />
separation standards, e.g. latency may be 15 minutes with ~95% reception probability for<br />
an oceanic ADS system supporting horizontal separation standards on the order of 30<br />
miles. This does not include transmission latency, which is a measure of the time delay in<br />
actually receiving the report at the data fusion center, or latency error, which is a measure<br />
of the time stamping error associated with a surveillance report. <strong>The</strong>se metrics are also<br />
useful in quantifying system performance.<br />
5.1.5 Aviation Weather Performance<br />
Weather has a major impact on the safety, efficiency, and capacity of aviation operations.<br />
Accidents and incidents continue to be caused by adverse weather. Runway acceptance<br />
rates and other capacity metrics are reduced in IMC. According to some studies, 40-65<br />
percent of delays that affect U.S. domestic airlines are caused by adverse weather, at<br />
annual direct costs ranging from $4-5B per year (Evans, 1995). In addition, passengers<br />
are inconvenienced by flight delays and cancellations or diversions due to weather, and are<br />
uncomfortable when turbulence is encountered during a flight. <strong>The</strong> expected future<br />
growth in air traffic will only exacerbate all these conditions, imposing constraints on the<br />
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