Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ...
Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ... Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ...
cargo traffic will average 6.6% per year. The world fleet will be 23,600 passenger and cargo jets in 2016. The composition of the world fleet in 2016 will be: 69.1% single-aisle airplane. 23.5% intermediate-size airplanes. 7.4% 747-size or larger airplanes. The total market potential for new commercial airplanes over the next twenty years is 16,160 airplanes, or an equivalent $1.1 trillion in 1996 us dollrs. Airlines will take delivery of: 11,260 single-aisle airplanes. 3720 intermediate-size airplanes. 1180 747-size or larger airplanes. [Ref. 15, page 3] (E) • Cooperative strategies, such as code sharing, concentrate traffic by serving the customers of two airlines on a single airplane departure. Partners in the alliance can benefit by accommodating the demand for frequency while enjoying the cost advantage of fewer flights. However, cooperative strategies can also let airlines concentrate their traffic at both ends of a city pair that would not warrant nonstop service by either airline alone. This diverts traffic from existing pairs, increasing regional frequencies overall. Even in the same city pair, alliances can increase competition. Large international markets where airlines combine services are usually opened to additional competition as a prerequisite to the alliance being permitted. Thus, traffic may actually end up divided among more competitors or even competing alliances. [Ref. 15, page 25] (S), (E) • Activity in the combined FAA and contract towered airports is projected to grow from 61.8 million operations in 1996 to 72.3 million in 2008, and increase of 1.3% annually. The majority of this growth is expected to be the result of increased commercial aircraft activity, which is forecast to increase from 24.0 million operations in 1996 to 31.5 million in 2008, and increase of 2.3% annually. [Ref. 14, page I-14] (E) • The workload of the air route traffic control centers is forecast to increase at an average annual rate of 1.8% during the 12-year forecast period. in 2008, FAA en-route centers are expected to handle 50.2 million IFR aircraft, up from 40.3 million in 1996. [Ref. 14, page I-14] (O) • U.S. commercial air carriers flew an estimated total of 12.3 million hours in 1996, up from 12.0 million hours in 1995. Two aircraft categories for over three-fourths of total airborne hours: two-engine narrowbody aircraft (65.2%) and three-engine narrowbody (12.0%). In 2008, the number of hours is forecast to increase to 19.3 million, an average annual increase of 3.8%. airborne hours are forecast to increase 2.8% in 1997 to 12.7 million, and 2.7% in 1998, to 13.0 million. [Ref. 14, page III-43] (E), (O) 150
Issue # 2: Some Limitations of Future Air Traffic Management and Concepts • Capacity constraints in free flight systems will be restricted by runway operating time. with the aircraft and runways in place today, it is conceivably possible to land or takeoff at 55 second intervals from a single runway. However, this is constrained by procedures that at most airports, limit an arrival or departure to an interval of 90 to 120 seconds causing a significant portion of the runway resource to be wasted. [Ref. 9, page 2-117] (O) • For automation to be effective and satisfy minimum safety standards, it must meet the needs of all system users. Flight crews have always benefited from HF attention, while much less consideration has been given to HF aspects of ATC. With increased automation, routine functions change from controlling to monitoring the systems. This alters the demands placed on the controller. Monitoring is not the best function for most humans because it tends to become monotonous and boring which leads to difficulties maintaining an adequate state of alertness and awareness. [Ref. 9, page 3-18] (T), (O), (H) • The issue of national and regional security is of fundamental concern to the design of effective dual-use airspace and to policies and procedures that will permit the smooth and instantaneous subjugation of airspace to the military in case of a national security threat. satellite CNS poses some unique and challenging issues to ATC/ATM planners in this regard. While it has been determined that surveillance is accurately performed by satellite navigation augmented by ADS, it is not reasonable to assume that hostile aircraft will cooperate. Some form of radar surveillance will be required and will be present in the modernized ATC/ATM environment of the developed or developing country. During peace time, the issue of special use airspace for training or exclusion zone purposes will also complicate matters. [Ref. 9, page 2-134] (S), (T) • The hundreds of billions of dollars needed for all categories of infrastructure including ATC/ATM systems, airports, and feeder roads will compete largely in capital markets with funds required for new aircraft. If government is a financial contributor to these modernizations, lengthy delays can be expected, as most governments, LDCs or DCs, are cash strapped...the most likely scenario unfolding will be the corporatization or privatization of much of the ATC/ATM infrastructure. Government backed bond funding can occur in a cycle tied to needs, as opposed to political agendas. [Ref. 9, page 2-29] (E) • Internationally, several ICAO member states have been vocal in their reluctance to accept a GPS-based satellite navigation system, primarily because GPS is U.S.-owned system currently managed by the DOD. The international community has repeatedly expressed concern that the United States may unilaterally decode to intentionally degrade the current GPS-SPS accuracy or “dither” the SA signal at such a high rate so as to preclude adequate precision guidance. This issue takes on additional significance when member states begin to maintain transportation infrastructures that rely completely on satellite-based navigation. From a European perspective, this apprehension has understandably diminished a willingness to implement a GPS-based satellite navigation system for critical safety and life operations. [Ref. 9, page 3-94-95] (S), (T) • Although ATC is in principal an exercise in safety, it is also a means by which states can control the sovereignty of their airspace as well as access to their economies. In recent 151
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Issue # 2: Some Limitations of Future <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Traffic</strong> <strong>Management</strong> and <strong>Concept</strong>s<br />
• Capacity constraints in free flight systems will be restricted by runway operating time.<br />
with the aircraft and runways in place today, it is conceivably possible to land or takeoff at<br />
55 second intervals from a single runway. However, this is constrained by procedures that<br />
at most airports, limit an arrival or departure to an interval of 90 to 120 seconds causing a<br />
significant portion of the runway resource to be wasted. [Ref. 9, page 2-117] (O)<br />
• For automation to be effective and satisfy minimum safety standards, it must meet the<br />
needs of all system users. Flight crews have always benefited from HF attention, while<br />
much less consideration has been given to HF aspects of ATC. With increased automation,<br />
routine functions change from controlling to monitoring the systems. This alters the<br />
demands placed on the controller. Monitoring is not the best function for most humans<br />
because it tends to become monotonous and boring which leads to difficulties maintaining<br />
an adequate state of alertness and awareness. [Ref. 9, page 3-18] (T), (O), (H)<br />
• <strong>The</strong> issue of national and regional security is of fundamental concern to the design of<br />
effective dual-use airspace and to policies and procedures that will permit the smooth and<br />
instantaneous subjugation of airspace to the military in case of a national security threat.<br />
satellite CNS poses some unique and challenging issues to ATC/ATM planners in this<br />
regard. While it has been determined that surveillance is accurately performed by satellite<br />
navigation augmented by ADS, it is not reasonable to assume that hostile aircraft will<br />
cooperate. Some form of radar surveillance will be required and will be present in the<br />
modernized ATC/ATM environment of the developed or developing country. During<br />
peace time, the issue of special use airspace for training or exclusion zone purposes will<br />
also complicate matters. [Ref. 9, page 2-134] (S), (T)<br />
• <strong>The</strong> hundreds of billions of dollars needed for all categories of infrastructure including<br />
ATC/ATM systems, airports, and feeder roads will compete largely in capital markets with<br />
funds required for new aircraft. If government is a financial contributor to these<br />
modernizations, lengthy delays can be expected, as most governments, LDCs or DCs, are<br />
cash strapped...the most likely scenario unfolding will be the corporatization or<br />
privatization of much of the ATC/ATM infrastructure. Government backed bond funding<br />
can occur in a cycle tied to needs, as opposed to political agendas. [Ref. 9, page 2-29] (E)<br />
• Internationally, several ICAO member states have been vocal in their reluctance to<br />
accept a GPS-based satellite navigation system, primarily because GPS is U.S.-owned<br />
system currently managed by the DOD. <strong>The</strong> international community has repeatedly<br />
expressed concern that the United States may unilaterally decode to intentionally degrade<br />
the current GPS-SPS accuracy or “dither” the SA signal at such a high rate so as to<br />
preclude adequate precision guidance. This issue takes on additional significance when<br />
member states begin to maintain transportation infrastructures that rely completely on<br />
satellite-based navigation. From a European perspective, this apprehension has<br />
understandably diminished a willingness to implement a GPS-based satellite navigation<br />
system for critical safety and life operations. [Ref. 9, page 3-94-95] (S), (T)<br />
• Although ATC is in principal an exercise in safety, it is also a means by which states can<br />
control the sovereignty of their airspace as well as access to their economies. In recent<br />
151