Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ...

Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ... Air Traffic Management Concept Baseline Definition - The Boeing ...

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travelers. There are signs that debilitating or fatal diseases which have been eradicated in many countries may be returning and have the potential for spreading through international travel, and thereby causing further processing delays as health-related documentation is reviewed at ports of entry. Also, outmoded and complicated inspections negate the inherent advantage of speed offered by public air transport which may also add to the cost of airline operation in excess of $100,000 per day (Donne (1995), p.149). In addition to ground handling issues, the efficient operation of airports demands increased airport capacity that could handle the projected 57% increase in passenger enplanements between 1993 and 2005. Major investments will be needed to accommodate more passengers and larger aircraft. A substantial increase in aircraft operations at a large hub airport may warrant consideration of additional runways. However, the outlook for new runways at major origin/destination airports is less promising. New runways are being considered at only 5 of 13 large hub airports where more than two-thirds of traffic is locally generated. The engineering and political obstacles are daunting to new runway construction at these airports. It is projected that airfield congestion at major origin/destination airports will continue to be one of the most difficult issues facing civil aviation (U.S. FAA NPIAS (1995), pp. 29-30). Efforts to increase future airspace capacity with Free Flight concepts may be stalled by conflicts of Special Use Airspace issues. Although SUA serves the important safety function of segregating hazardous activity from non-participating aircraft, civil users have voiced concerns about whether SUA is being efficiently managed. By its location SUA can limit air traffic to and from a particular location and thus has become a much more urgent issue because of the aviation community’s movement toward Free Flight. Under a Free Flight operating concept, the users of the system would have more freedom to select preferred routes as long as such routes do not interfere with safety, capacity, and SUA airspace. A key recommendation is the establishment of a real time system to notify commercial users of SUA availability. At least two hours of minimum notice is suggested. Such use of SUA could disrupt the visions of relatively unfettered Free Flight for the NAS in 2015 (U.S. GAO RCED-97-106 (1997), p. 25). Some potential airport safety problems may be anticipated under the emergence of the new NAS. An example is when the acquisition, development, integration, and assimilation of complex systems and technologies (which rarely are ‘off-the-shelf’) produce unexpected outcomes, costs, and delays, such as was the case for the now defunct Advanced Automation System (AAS). Currently being replaced by the Standard Terminal Replacement System (STARS) which provides controllers in TRACONs with new workstations and supporting computer systems, the AAS incurred schedule delays of up to eight years with estimated increase in costs from $2.5 billion to $7.6 billion. FAA’s schedule for STARS can also be jeopardized by scheduling conflicts with other modernization efforts. For example, in September 1996, a study identified 12 potential scheduling conflicts at the first 45 STARS sites. Safety issues surrounding airport operations may also be associated with an unhealthy mix of newer digital and older nondigital systems such as terminal surveillance radars (U.S. GAO RCED-97-51), pp. 3-4). FAA’s organizational culture and workforce issues also may prove to be problematic in the future in terms of safety, schedule delays, and project costs. As may be inferred from 118

above, the agency’s organizational culture has been an underlying cause of the persistent cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls as exhibited, for example, in its acquisition of major ATC systems. FAA officials have rushed into production before completing development, testing, or evaluation of programs. Also, poor oversight has caused acquisition problems in such projects as ODAPS and Mode S where the delivery of the latter was delayed for five years (U.S. GAO RCED-96-159 (1996), pp. 22-29). Moreover, an environment of control has been fostered by the agency’s hierarchical structure where employees are not empowered to make needed management decisions. Fewer than half reported that they had enough authority to make day-to-day decisions about day-to-day problems. Also, poor coordination between FAA’s program offices and field organizations has caused schedule delays as has been the case with the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar, the Airport Surveillance Radar, and the Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ibid, pp. 29-31). Finally, a study in 1994 showed that differences in the organizational culture among FAA’s air traffic controllers, equipment technicians, engineers, and divisional managers made communication difficult and limited coordination efforts (ibid, pp. 32-33). With respect to potential future issues regarding FAA’s workforce, the agency has identified that for 1997 and 1998 their staffing needs will be met. However, it is uncertain whether current sources can provide the controller candidates FAA will need through 2002. FAA officials have identified several impediments that hinder their ability to staff ATC facilities at specified levels. The first is FAA headquarters’ practice of generally not providing funds to relocate controllers until the end of the fiscal year, which causes delayed controller moves and continued staffing imbalances. The second impediment is the limited ability of regional officials to recruit controller candidates locally to fill vacancies at ATC facilities. In addition, FAA regional officials also believe that limited hiring of new controllers in recent years has hindered their ability to fill vacancies. Partly due to these impediments, as of April 1996 about 53% of ATC facilities were not staffed at levels specified by FAA’s staffing standards (U.S. GAO RCED-97-84 (1997), pp. 3-4. 7.2 Implications of Global Scenarios on System Transition Paths The global scenario outlined in Section 7.1 suggests some of the possible ways that the future transitional path of the NAS system in 2015 may be diverted from the generally expected trajectory. The particular unfolding nature of these transitions may affect system capacity, safety, and efficiency. NAS system demand is primarily driven by general market and economic conditions. For example, about 80% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) directly contributes to the Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM). Moreover, political, social, and cultural realities, and concomitant uncertainties, may also play a significant role in shaping the demand for travel, in general, and air travel, in particular. To address future traffic demand, a sufficient NAS system capacity must be provided. How the future NAS system capacity is realized, however, is dependent on a number of parameters including airplane size, the mix of an airline’s fleet, the nature and extent of operating in a hub and spoke configuration, and other relevant issues such as airline deregulation and the impact of technological developments and applications (e.g. ADS-B, CTAS). In terms of NAS capacity, an 119

travelers. <strong>The</strong>re are signs that debilitating or fatal diseases which have been eradicated in<br />

many countries may be returning and have the potential for spreading through<br />

international travel, and thereby causing further processing delays as health-related<br />

documentation is reviewed at ports of entry. Also, outmoded and complicated inspections<br />

negate the inherent advantage of speed offered by public air transport which may also add<br />

to the cost of airline operation in excess of $100,000 per day (Donne (1995), p.149).<br />

In addition to ground handling issues, the efficient operation of airports demands increased<br />

airport capacity that could handle the projected 57% increase in passenger enplanements<br />

between 1993 and 2005. Major investments will be needed to accommodate more<br />

passengers and larger aircraft. A substantial increase in aircraft operations at a large hub<br />

airport may warrant consideration of additional runways. However, the outlook for new<br />

runways at major origin/destination airports is less promising. New runways are being<br />

considered at only 5 of 13 large hub airports where more than two-thirds of traffic is<br />

locally generated. <strong>The</strong> engineering and political obstacles are daunting to new runway<br />

construction at these airports. It is projected that airfield congestion at major<br />

origin/destination airports will continue to be one of the most difficult issues facing civil<br />

aviation (U.S. FAA NPIAS (1995), pp. 29-30).<br />

Efforts to increase future airspace capacity with Free Flight concepts may be stalled by<br />

conflicts of Special Use <strong>Air</strong>space issues. Although SUA serves the important safety<br />

function of segregating hazardous activity from non-participating aircraft, civil users have<br />

voiced concerns about whether SUA is being efficiently managed. By its location SUA can<br />

limit air traffic to and from a particular location and thus has become a much more urgent<br />

issue because of the aviation community’s movement toward Free Flight. Under a Free<br />

Flight operating concept, the users of the system would have more freedom to select<br />

preferred routes as long as such routes do not interfere with safety, capacity, and SUA<br />

airspace. A key recommendation is the establishment of a real time system to notify<br />

commercial users of SUA availability. At least two hours of minimum notice is suggested.<br />

Such use of SUA could disrupt the visions of relatively unfettered Free Flight for the NAS<br />

in 2015 (U.S. GAO RCED-97-106 (1997), p. 25).<br />

Some potential airport safety problems may be anticipated under the emergence of the<br />

new NAS. An example is when the acquisition, development, integration, and assimilation<br />

of complex systems and technologies (which rarely are ‘off-the-shelf’) produce<br />

unexpected outcomes, costs, and delays, such as was the case for the now defunct<br />

Advanced Automation System (AAS). Currently being replaced by the Standard Terminal<br />

Replacement System (STARS) which provides controllers in TRACONs with new<br />

workstations and supporting computer systems, the AAS incurred schedule delays of up<br />

to eight years with estimated increase in costs from $2.5 billion to $7.6 billion. FAA’s<br />

schedule for STARS can also be jeopardized by scheduling conflicts with other<br />

modernization efforts. For example, in September 1996, a study identified 12 potential<br />

scheduling conflicts at the first 45 STARS sites. Safety issues surrounding airport<br />

operations may also be associated with an unhealthy mix of newer digital and older nondigital<br />

systems such as terminal surveillance radars (U.S. GAO RCED-97-51), pp. 3-4).<br />

FAA’s organizational culture and workforce issues also may prove to be problematic in<br />

the future in terms of safety, schedule delays, and project costs. As may be inferred from<br />

118

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