Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod

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———. 1979a. “A new Attempt at a Foundation for Arithmetic.” In (1979i). 1924/25. ———. 1979b. “Boole’s logical Calculus and the Concept-script.” In (1979i). 1880/81. ———. 1979c. “[Comments on Sense and Meaning].” In (1979i). 1892–1895. ———. 1979d. “Introduction to Logic.” In (1979i). August 1906. ———. 1979e. “Logic.” In (1979i). 1897. ———. 1979f. “Logic in Mathematics.” In (1979i). Spring 1914. ———. 1979g. “[Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter].” In (1979i). July 1919. ———. 1979h. “Numbers and Arithmetic.” In (1979i). 1924/25. ———. 1979i. Posthumous Writings, eds. Hans Hermes et al, trans. Peter Long and Roger White. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press. ———. 1979j. “Sources of Knowledge of Mathematics and the mathematical natural Sciences.” In (1979i). 1924/25. ———. 1974. The Foundations of Arithmetic. (“Grundlagen”), trans. J. L. Austin. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 1884. ———. 1972. “On the Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation.” In Frege, Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, ed. and trans. Terrell Ward Bynum. Oxford: Clarendon. 1882. ———. 1971. “On the Foundations of Geometry.” In (1971b). 1906. ———. 1971a. “On the Foundations of Geometry.” In (1971b). 1903. ———. 1971b. On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic, trans. Eike- Henner W. Kluge. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. ———. 1970. “A Critical Elucidation of some Points in E. Schroeder’s Algebra der Logik,” trans. Peter Geach. In (1970g). 1895. ———. 1970a. “Frege against the Formalists,” Grundgesetze der Arithmetik vol. 2, §§ 86–137, trans. Max Black. In (1970g). 1903. 84
———. 1970b. “Function and Concept,” trans. Peter Geach. In (1970g). 1891. ———. 1970c. Illustrative Extracts from Frege’s Review of Husserl’s Philosophie der Arithmetik, trans. Peter Geach. In (1970g). 1894. ———. 1970d. “On Concept and Object,” trans. Peter Geach. In (1970g). 1892. ———. 1970e. “On Negation,” trans. Peter Geach. In (1970g). 1919. ———. 1970f. “On Sense and Reference,” trans. Max Black. In (1970g). 1892. ———. 1970g. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, eds. Peter Geach and Max Black. 2d ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1960. ———. 1968. “Compound Thoughts,” trans. R. H. Stoothoff. In Klemke, ed. (1968). 1923. ———. 1968a. “The Thought,” trans. A. M. Quinton and Marcelle Quinton. In Klemke, ed. (1968). 1918/19. ———. 1967. Begriffsschrift, a formula language, modeled upon that of arithmetic, for pure thought, trans. Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg. In Jean van Heijenoort, ed., From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1879. ———. 1964. The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. (“Grundgesetze”). ed. and trans. Montgomery Furth. Berkeley: University of California Press. vol. 1, 1893; vol. 2, 1903. ———. 1892. “Über Sinn und Bedeutung.” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25–50. Furth, Montgomery. 1968. “Two Types of Denotation.” In Nicholas Rescher, ed., Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, no. 2. ———. 1967. Editor’s Introduction. In Frege (1967). Gibson, Roger F., Jr. 1987. “Translation, Physics, and Facts of the Matter.” In Hahn and Schilpp, eds., (1987). Haaparanta, Leila. 1985. Frege’s Notion of Being. Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 39. 85
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Dummett’s Backward Road to Frege
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condition for each of its sentences
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is to be any other object namable i
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card packs and of figures subject t
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well-defined as mutual and is there
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eferences in a given sentence. The
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always prior to the object-language
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for identifying senses given the tr
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sentences, and we were only suppose
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why he thinks his program will work
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(I waive the possibility of present
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many more languages L** which lack
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often have problems which more subt
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of “On Denoting” in order to se
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in which the reference is given to
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Recalling the forced choice argumen
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Page 45 and 46: out of senses. We can do so precise
Page 47 and 48: Dummett calls the second problem of
Page 49 and 50: article indicates reference to a co
Page 51 and 52: has to be drawn between the sense a
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Page 57 and 58: eversing the metaphysical order of
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Page 73 and 74: 176-77). Since senses are entities,
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