Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
thought about nothing. This implies that we must first possess the reference. But that reduces Parmenides to taking the backward road. And just like verificationism and intuitionism, Parmenides’ view violates itself. Verificationism is unverifiable, intuitionism is unprovable, and Parmenides’ view cannot be said or thought without saying or thinking something about nothing. The sense-reference distinction is in effect Frege’s reply to all of them. Namely, outside the formal notation with its determinacy requirement, there can be sense (including thought) without proving reference (including truth). References Ayer, Alfred Jules. 1952. Language, Truth and Logic. 2d ed. New York: Dover. 1946. Beaney, Michael. 1997. Introduction to Frege. In Gottlob Frege, The Frege Reader, ed. and trans. Beaney. Oxford: Blackwell. Butchvarov, Panayot. 1970. The Concept of Knowledge. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Carnap, Rudolf. 1959. The Logical Syntax of Language. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Caton, Charles. 1968. “An Apparent Difficulty in Frege’s Ontology.” In Klemke, ed. (1968). 1962. Dejnožka, Jan. 2003. The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins: Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. Reprinted with further corrections. Lanham MD: Littlefield Adams. 1996. ———. 2001. “Origin of Russell’s Early Theory of Logical Truth as Purely General Truth: Bolzano, Peirce, Frege, Venn, or MacColl?” Modern Logic 8/3–4: 21–30. ———. 1999. Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate. ———. 1996. Original printing of (2003). ———. 1982. “Frege: Existence Defined as Identifiability.” International Studies in Philosophy 14: 1– 82
17. ———. 1981. “Frege on Identity.” International Studies in Philosophy 13: 31–41. ———. 1979. Frege: Existence and Identity. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International. Doctoral dissertation, The University of Iowa, Iowa City. Dummett, Michael. 2000. Elements of Intuitionism. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1995. “The Context Principle: Centre of Frege’s Philosophy.” In Ingolf Max and Werner Stelzner, eds., Logik und Mathematik: Frege-Kolloquium Jena 1993. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Presented in 1993. ———. 1993. Origins of Analytical Philosophy. London: Duckworth. ———. 1991. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ———. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ———. 1981a. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ———. 1968. “Frege on Functions: A Reply.” In Klemke, ed. (1968). 1955. ———. 1968a. “Note: Frege on Functions.” In Klemke, ed. (1968). 1956. Frege, Gottlob. 1980. Letter to Bertrand Russell dated November 13, 1904. In (1980f). ———. 1980a. Letter to Bertrand Russell dated May 21, 1903. In (1980f). ———. 1980b. Letter to Bertrand Russell dated October 20, 1902. In (1980f). ———. 1980c. Letter to David Hilbert dated December 27, 1899. In (1980f). ———. 1980d. Letter to Edmund Husserl dated May 24, 1891. In (1980f). ———. 1980e. Letter to Giuseppe Peano, undated. In (1980f). ———. 1980f. Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, eds. Gottfried Gabriel et al, trans. Hans Kaal. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ———. 1979. “A brief Survey of my logical Doctrines.” In (1979i). 1906. 83
- Page 31 and 32: Recalling the forced choice argumen
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thought about nothing. This implies that we must first possess the reference. But that reduces<br />
Parmenides <strong>to</strong> taking the backward road. And just like verificationism <strong>and</strong> intuitionism, Parmenides’<br />
view violates itself. Verificationism is unverifiable, intuitionism is unprovable, <strong>and</strong> Parmenides’ view<br />
cannot be said or thought without saying or thinking something about nothing. The sense-reference<br />
distinction is in effect <strong>Frege</strong>’s reply <strong>to</strong> all of them. Namely, outside the formal notation with its<br />
determinacy requirement, there can be sense (including thought) without proving reference (including<br />
truth).<br />
References<br />
Ayer, Alfred Jules. 1952. Language, Truth <strong>and</strong> Logic. 2d ed. New York: Dover. 1946.<br />
Beaney, Michael. 1997. Introduction <strong>to</strong> <strong>Frege</strong>. In Gottlob <strong>Frege</strong>, The <strong>Frege</strong> Reader, ed. <strong>and</strong> trans.<br />
Beaney. Oxford: Blackwell.<br />
Butchvarov, Panayot. 1970. The Concept of Knowledge. Evans<strong>to</strong>n, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.<br />
Carnap, Rudolf. 1959. The Logical Syntax of Language. Routledge & Kegan Paul.<br />
Ca<strong>to</strong>n, Charles. 1968. “An Apparent Difficulty in <strong>Frege</strong>’s On<strong>to</strong>logy.” In Klemke, ed. (1968). 1962.<br />
Dejnožka, Jan. 2003. The On<strong>to</strong>logy of the Analytic Tradition <strong>and</strong> Its Origins: Realism <strong>and</strong> Identity in<br />
<strong>Frege</strong>, Russell, Wittgenstein, <strong>and</strong> Quine. Reprinted with further corrections. Lanham MD: Littlefield<br />
Adams. 1996.<br />
———. 2001. “Origin of Russell’s Early Theory of Logical Truth as Purely General Truth: Bolzano,<br />
Peirce, <strong>Frege</strong>, Venn, or MacColl?” Modern Logic 8/3–4: 21–30.<br />
———. 1999. Bertr<strong>and</strong> Russell on Modality <strong>and</strong> Logical Relevance. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate.<br />
———. 1996. Original printing of (2003).<br />
———. 1982. “<strong>Frege</strong>: Existence Defined as Identifiability.” International Studies in Philosophy 14: 1–<br />
82
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