Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod

mathematical functions are themselves instances of the functions to be explicated. What literal
incompleteness of mathematical functions would be the basis of the metaphor illuminating the literal
incompleteness of Frege’s functions in general? What would be metaphorical about it?
27. Frege (1970f, 64, my emphasis); quoted twice in my (2003: 65, 68). “Ein Wahrheitswerth kann
nicht ein Theil eines Gedankens sein, sowenig wie etwa die Sonne, weil er kein Sinn ist, sondern ein
Gegenstand” (Frege 1892: 35). Literally, “A truth-value cannot be a part of a thought, as little as for
example the Sun, because it is no sense, but rather an object.” Or according to Cassell’s, “it is no sense,
but on the contrary, an object.”
28. Thus I was wrong to suggest that senses should be assimilated to the first model, with “the sense of
‘A’” referring to an object which represents the sense (my 1996: 68–73; 1982: 13; 1981: 36–37). For
Frege openly says it refers to the sense (my 1996: 69; 1981: 36). My earlier idea was feasible by
“converting” senses to objects, but the representation would not be mutual, i.e., one-one, due to sensial
underdetermination, pace my (1996: 118; 1982: 13). My (2003) corrects my mistake. Of course, we
could arbitrarily posit a representative object that corresponds one-one to the sense, but Frege clearly
does no such thing, since he says we refer to the sense.
29. In the schema, “meaning” means reference. Truth-values, of course, are objects.
30. Nor does Frege write “concept” for the incomplete sense, for it is not a concept but a sense.
If senses are objects, why does Frege fail to say so in his schema of his view? Frege says,
“The...schema should make my view clear.” If senses are objects, how could the schema possibly make
his view clear?
Does Frege, perhaps, fear confusing Husserl by explaining the additional complexity that the
senses too are objects, though none is the object the proposition in question is about? I would think that
if senses were objects, not saying so would be confusing. Indeed, the schema should eliminate any such
confusions. Otherwise it would not be making Frege’s view clear. This is exactly the sort of thing
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