Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod

Ideas never were in the realm of customary references. Frege’s private language arguments
require that all references, customary and indirect alike, be objective, i.e., mind-independent. (As
indirect references, senses do belong to the realm of all references. Thus when Frege distinguishes
senses from references, he can only be distinguishing them from the realm of customary, i.e., direct,
references.)
How can we refer to the tone T or the force F, if they are not objects? Assimilating reference to
tones or forces to direct quotation of names or other expressions seems too implausible to consider. But
there are three other models of reference in Frege: reference to functions, to ideas, and to senses.
First, “the function F” refers to an object, a course-of-values, which technically represents the
function. We might say that in saying something about the object, we show something about the
function it represents. Can objects represent tones or forces?
Second, we can “take” an idea “as” an object. We might say that in saying something about the
ostensible object, we show something about the idea. Can we “take” a tone or force “as” an object?
Third, we talk about the sense of expression “A” as an indirect reference in indirect quotation.
Here we say an indirect sense, showing the indirect reference. Indirect references are presented only via
indirect senses. Is reference to tones or forces part of indirect speech?
All three models anticipate the early Wittgenstein on saying and showing; I think the first
model might have influenced him.
I think the first model is inappropriate. Granted, tones and forces need something to apply to.
But if Frege thought they were incomplete, then his notation would have argument-places for their
arguments. That is, if they were incomplete, I think Frege would have said or at least shown so. Of
course, there is the innocuous sense in which items in any two or more related categories can map each
other onto something. Sad tones can map utterances onto sad utterances, and assertive force can map
utterances onto assertions. But in that innocuous sense, truth-values can map functions onto objects,
56