Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
that are indirect references. He might say that in all the works in which it looks for all the world that Frege is introducing senses as a unique category to do a job objects cannot do, Frege is really distinguishing objects which are not senses from other objects which are, but without ever telling us his secret meaning. He might even say that while a truth-value is not a sense but an object, a sense is both a sense and an object. But all this is curiouser and curiouser. Frege’s plain meaning is that senses and objects are different categories. A sense is not an object but a sense. An object is not a sense but an object. And Frege is most naturally read in all these texts as arguing for the even more general thesis that no customary references are senses. Frege rarely argues that concrete objects in particular cannot be senses. He says “one can see Etna, but one cannot see the thought that Etna is higher than Vesuvius” (1979f: 225). He says “the sense of the word ‘sun’ is not somewhere in space, nor does it have mass” (1980e: 128). We can see why he has little interest in giving such arguments: they are shallow and overkill. “On Sense and Reference” and “[Comments on Sense and Meaning]” read so much more easily when we think of senses as a unique category that we can see how badly Dummett is bewitched by his belief that Frege says every entity is a function or an object. For example, Frege explains objects as the customary references of proper names. Frege says, discussing only the customary reference of a proper name, “I call such a meaning [i.e. customary reference] an object” (1979c: 119). Is that the role of any senses? Quite the opposite. Senses are introduced precisely because the category of objects is inadequate to explain the possibility of informative identity statements. Frege says “it is via a sense, and only via a sense that a proper name is related to an object” (1979c: 124); the word “object” is used without qualification. This implies that if senses are objects, they are named only via senses. If then senses are objects, is there not a vicious regress of objects? Or is the category of objects then adequate to explain the possibility of informative identity statements after all? This is not to mention the diagram in Frege’s letter to Husserl with all the senses on one line 52
and all the references on another. Frege says: The following schema should make my view clear: Proposition proper name concept word ↓ ↓ ↓ sense of the sense of thesense of the proposition proper name concept word (thought) ↓ ↓ ↓ meaning of the meaning of the meaning of the → object falling proposition proper name concept word under the concept (truth value) (object) (concept) (Frege 1980d: 63, brackets omitted) Frege places objects on only one line, the line of references. 29 Dummett is placing objects on both lines. If senses are objects, why does Frege not write “object” for the three senses on the line of senses? Or if only complete senses are objects, why does Frege not write “object” for the two complete senses? The answer is in “On Sense and Reference”: for they are not objects but senses. 30 This pulls the realm of senses out of the realm of customary references, pace Dummett (1981: 680). In fact, as we saw, Frege’s distinction between senses in general and references in general already does that. This answers the question, Just how tightly does Frege tie linguistic function to ontological category (Dummett, 1981a: 384)? Namely, tightly enough to pull the whole category of senses out of the category of customary references. And by parity of reason, tightly enough to pull tones and forces out of that realm. For if anything, they function even less like customary references than senses do. I 53
- Page 1 and 2: Dummett’s Backward Road to Frege
- Page 3 and 4: condition for each of its sentences
- Page 5 and 6: is to be any other object namable i
- Page 7 and 8: card packs and of figures subject t
- Page 9 and 10: well-defined as mutual and is there
- Page 11 and 12: eferences in a given sentence. The
- Page 13 and 14: always prior to the object-language
- Page 15 and 16: for identifying senses given the tr
- Page 17 and 18: sentences, and we were only suppose
- Page 19 and 20: why he thinks his program will work
- Page 21 and 22: (I waive the possibility of present
- Page 23 and 24: many more languages L** which lack
- Page 25 and 26: often have problems which more subt
- Page 27 and 28: of “On Denoting” in order to se
- Page 29 and 30: in which the reference is given to
- Page 31 and 32: Recalling the forced choice argumen
- Page 33 and 34: If we remain within the realm of se
- Page 35 and 36: sometimes he has references more in
- Page 37 and 38: only senses can guide us on how to
- Page 39 and 40: epresents the thought. But Frege ru
- Page 41 and 42: gap needing completion. In language
- Page 43 and 44: objects....” (1981a: 132, my emph
- Page 45 and 46: out of senses. We can do so precise
- Page 47 and 48: Dummett calls the second problem of
- Page 49 and 50: article indicates reference to a co
- Page 51: has to be drawn between the sense a
- Page 55 and 56: or tones when we customarily indica
- Page 57 and 58: eversing the metaphysical order of
- Page 59 and 60: entities in different categories, w
- Page 61 and 62: (3) convey forces (such as assertio
- Page 63 and 64: We cannot need to be guaranteed to
- Page 65 and 66: It seems, then, that intuitionism c
- Page 67 and 68: 7. Frege (1979j: 271; see 1980c: 37
- Page 69 and 70: not even bothering to check for tha
- Page 71 and 72: third suggestions are principled in
- Page 73 and 74: 176-77). Since senses are entities,
- Page 75 and 76: of imperceptible senses in Grundges
- Page 77 and 78: mathematical functions are themselv
- Page 79 and 80: logical does not matter to this poi
- Page 81 and 82: in the sense in which philosophers
- Page 83 and 84: 17. ———. 1981. “Frege on Id
- Page 85 and 86: ———. 1970b. “Function and C
<strong>and</strong> all the references on another. <strong>Frege</strong> says:<br />
The following schema should make my view clear:<br />
Proposition proper name concept word<br />
↓ ↓ ↓<br />
sense of the sense of thesense of the<br />
proposition proper name concept word<br />
(thought)<br />
↓ ↓ ↓<br />
meaning of the meaning of the meaning of the → object falling<br />
proposition proper name concept word under the concept<br />
(truth value) (object) (concept)<br />
(<strong>Frege</strong> 1980d: 63, brackets omitted)<br />
<strong>Frege</strong> places objects on only one line, the line of references. 29 Dummett is placing objects on both lines.<br />
If senses are objects, why does <strong>Frege</strong> not write “object” for the three senses on the line of senses? Or if<br />
only complete senses are objects, why does <strong>Frege</strong> not write “object” for the two complete senses? The<br />
answer is in “On Sense <strong>and</strong> Reference”: for they are not objects but senses. 30<br />
This pulls the realm of senses out of the realm of cus<strong>to</strong>mary references, pace Dummett (1981:<br />
680). In fact, as we saw, <strong>Frege</strong>’s distinction between senses in general <strong>and</strong> references in general already<br />
does that. This answers the question, Just how tightly does <strong>Frege</strong> tie linguistic function <strong>to</strong> on<strong>to</strong>logical<br />
category (Dummett, 1981a: 384)? Namely, tightly enough <strong>to</strong> pull the whole category of senses out of<br />
the category of cus<strong>to</strong>mary references. And by parity of reason, tightly enough <strong>to</strong> pull <strong>to</strong>nes <strong>and</strong> forces<br />
out of that realm. For if anything, they function even less like cus<strong>to</strong>mary references than senses do. I<br />
53
Change language