Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
Frege holds that not every sense can be defined. That is precisely why Frege says that primitive names —including both the senses they express and the references they refer to—need explication. And second, since references are given “only via senses” (1979c: 124), the application of this definition in particular cases would always presuppose our grasping some sense, since the reference of “A” can only be given to us via some sense in the first place. And that is circular. On the face of it, Grundgesetze vol. 1, § 32 describes what senses essentially are in terms of how they function in relationship to references, but without trying to define sense in terms of reference, and without suggesting that senses can be derived from references. I think the circularity of the attempted definition of sense is the underlying reason why. Thus, to apply Frege’s threefold distinction among definition (Definition), explanation (Erklärung), and explication (Erläuterung) (see my 2003: 73), § 32 may only be understood as stating Frege’s explanation (not: definition) of what senses are. (An explanation states what a thing is, but without technically being a definition; Frege’s only explicit explanation is of identity as indiscernibility.) And saying that senses are the ways references are given is the explanation underlying the explanation. Thus the difference between what Dummett seems to think § 32 says and what § 32 actually says is as little—and as great—as the difference between definition and explanation. In The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Dummett revisits his Frege: Philosophy of Language rejection of the “no backward road” argument. He admits there is “no backward road” in “Frege’s unamended theory” (1981a: 95). He does not “attempt to examine the details of Russell’s argument” (1981a: 131; see my 2003: 275–77 for the details). He is very clear on the conclusion of the argument: whenever we try to refer to a sense, we succeed only in referring to a reference (1981a: 131). But this is a red herring. The explicit “no backward road” thesis is not a premise of the argument or its conclusion, but a closure clause at the end of the argument. Yet if Dummett rejects it, he is committed to rejecting the argument as futile, since we can then backwardly single out senses after all. 30
Recalling the forced choice argument, Dummett says his saying-showing gloss is merely a “suggested...possible retort to Russell” (1981a: 131, citing 1981: 227). The retort is that even if Russell is right that we cannot refer to a sense, it may still be the case that when we “say” a reference, we thereby “show” the sense we choose to use. Again, Dummett might as well say that Frege introduces references in order to explain how we can identify senses. Surely the opposite is true: when we “say” or express a sense, we thereby “show” how to identify the reference (if any); compare Dummett (1981a: 132). Dummett suggests that Russell’s argument is more plausible if what he really has in mind is not objects of reference but objects of apprehension. Now, Russell does begin and end “On Denoting” with early statements of his distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance (1971: 41, 56). But Russell’s argument against Frege concerns only denoting phrases, and knowledge by denoting phrases is precisely what Russell is distinguishing from acquaintance (1971: 56). Thus the suggestion is not what Russell has in mind. But it does reveal what Russell’s argument is logically most deeply about. It is deeply perceptive of what the argument should have been, but was not. Whether we can single out senses at all is what Russell’s argument is logically most deeply about, though Russell’s focus is on denoting, in keeping with Russell’s linguistic turn in “On Denoting.” I would rewrite Russell’s argument this way. Frege distinguishes his categories of references, senses, forces, and tones in terms of how the entities essentially function, so as to explain basic features of language. It is because modes of presentation do not function as objects of presentation that they, and thereby senses, cannot be customary references. The moment they are treated as objects of presentation, they are no longer functioning to present something else, and in that sense they are no longer modes of presentation (compare Dummett 1981a: 132). Thus whenever we try to single out a sense, we must single out an object instead. Frege would reply that we directly grasp only modes (or senses), but can grasp them only as modes (or senses). It is a subtle issue. My theory of qualified objects goes between 31
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<strong>Frege</strong> holds that not every sense can be defined. That is precisely why <strong>Frege</strong> says that primitive names<br />
—including both the senses they express <strong>and</strong> the references they refer <strong>to</strong>—need explication. And<br />
second, since references are given “only via senses” (1979c: 124), the application of this definition in<br />
particular cases would always presuppose our grasping some sense, since the reference of “A” can only<br />
be given <strong>to</strong> us via some sense in the first place. And that is circular.<br />
On the face of it, Grundgesetze vol. 1, § 32 describes what senses essentially are in terms of<br />
how they function in relationship <strong>to</strong> references, but without trying <strong>to</strong> define sense in terms of reference,<br />
<strong>and</strong> without suggesting that senses can be derived from references. I think the circularity of the<br />
attempted definition of sense is the underlying reason why. Thus, <strong>to</strong> apply <strong>Frege</strong>’s threefold distinction<br />
among definition (Definition), explanation (Erklärung), <strong>and</strong> explication (Erläuterung) (see my 2003:<br />
73), § 32 may only be unders<strong>to</strong>od as stating <strong>Frege</strong>’s explanation (not: definition) of what senses are.<br />
(An explanation states what a thing is, but without technically being a definition; <strong>Frege</strong>’s only explicit<br />
explanation is of identity as indiscernibility.) And saying that senses are the ways references are given<br />
is the explanation underlying the explanation.<br />
Thus the difference between what Dummett seems <strong>to</strong> think § 32 says <strong>and</strong> what § 32 actually<br />
says is as little—<strong>and</strong> as great—as the difference between definition <strong>and</strong> explanation.<br />
In The Interpretation of <strong>Frege</strong>’s Philosophy, Dummett revisits his <strong>Frege</strong>: Philosophy of<br />
Language rejection of the “no backward road” argument. He admits there is “no backward road” in<br />
“<strong>Frege</strong>’s unamended theory” (1981a: 95). He does not “attempt <strong>to</strong> examine the details of Russell’s<br />
argument” (1981a: 131; see my 2003: 275–77 for the details). He is very clear on the conclusion of the<br />
argument: whenever we try <strong>to</strong> refer <strong>to</strong> a sense, we succeed only in referring <strong>to</strong> a reference (1981a: 131).<br />
But this is a red herring. The explicit “no backward road” thesis is not a premise of the argument or its<br />
conclusion, but a closure clause at the end of the argument. Yet if Dummett rejects it, he is committed<br />
<strong>to</strong> rejecting the argument as futile, since we can then backwardly single out senses after all.<br />
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