Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
that even appears to resemble Dummett’s program is the option—I say again, option—of defining “F( )” extensionally. But even this would be impossible unless the senses of the object-names were explicated first. How could a language come into being at all? Could it be by our first collecting the truth- conditions for all or some of the statements and grasping the two truth-values, and then deriving the references and thereby the senses expressed by subsentential expressions? I think Frege would hold that children learn the senses of subsentential expressions of their language not by being handed two truth-values plus the bundle of truth-conditions for all or some sentences of that language and being told to go figure out all the subsentential references and thereby the subsentential senses (they would not even understand what they were handed, much less the instruction), but by being given pre-linguistic explications of names of perceived objects, followed by a process of comparing those objects and abstracting imperceptible concept-senses and concepts. 14 And sense-perception is intensional in sense (2). Of course, the children would not use these senses as linguistic senses at first, and in that functional sense, these senses would not yet be linguistic senses, i.e., they would not yet be expressed by any names. They would still be mere modes of cognitive presentation, and would become linguistic senses containing modes of presentation only when used in language according to the context principle. I think that is the essential role of the principle, and the difference which Frege is concerned to distinguish between a sense and the mode of presentation it contains, pace Dummett (1981: 227). 15 The problems with Dummett’s program seem so obvious and so many that it is natural to wonder if I understood it correctly. In particular, I am criticizing what might be called the pure, ideal, or radical backward road, and insisting that Dummett adhere rigorously to it. But Dummett does not take the pure backward road. He says we are to take that road only “[a]s far as possible” (1995: 16). He assumes knowledge of the truth-values. I concede that this objection is a fair one. Pure or ideal theories 24
often have problems which more subtle “compromise” programs avoid. Nonetheless, I am criticizing what is surely Dummett’s ideal theory, which he is trying to approach as best as he thinks we logically can. And criticizing ideal theories can be illuminating of radical problems. 4. The backward road Russell says “there is no backward road” from reference to sense (1971: 50). There has been no consensus on exactly what Russell’s main argument against a meaning-denotation distinction is. 16 Only its conclusion is clear: generally speaking, whenever we try to refer to a sense, we succeed only in referring to a reference. 17 But the “no backward road” closure clause Russell adds at the end of the argument is also clear. Dummett beautifully states what I call Russell’s explicit “no backward road” thesis as having two conjuncts: Russell points out that, on Frege’s own principles, ‘there is no backward road’ from reference to sense: sense determines reference, but reference does not determine sense. (1981: 267; see 159) But surely Russell is implicitly raising a many-one problem in his “no backward road” thesis. Namely, the backward road requires a one-one sense-reference correspondence; but there are many ways a reference can be given. That seems the most natural reason for his thesis. In fact, it is the only reason I can think of. Why else would he hold it? Indeed, he is well aware that Frege’s many-one sense- reference correlation is precisely how Frege explains true informative identity statements (Russell 1971: 46). Thus I shall also call the thesis of sensial underdetermination Russell’s implicit “no backward road” thesis. 25
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often have problems which more subtle “compromise” programs avoid. Nonetheless, I am criticizing<br />
what is surely Dummett’s ideal theory, which he is trying <strong>to</strong> approach as best as he thinks we logically<br />
can. And criticizing ideal theories can be illuminating of radical problems.<br />
4. The backward road<br />
Russell says “there is no backward road” from reference <strong>to</strong> sense (1971: 50). There has been no<br />
consensus on exactly what Russell’s main argument against a meaning-denotation distinction is. 16 Only<br />
its conclusion is clear: generally speaking, whenever we try <strong>to</strong> refer <strong>to</strong> a sense, we succeed only in<br />
referring <strong>to</strong> a reference. 17 But the “no backward road” closure clause Russell adds at the end of the<br />
argument is also clear. Dummett beautifully states what I call Russell’s explicit “no backward road”<br />
thesis as having two conjuncts:<br />
Russell points out that, on <strong>Frege</strong>’s own principles, ‘there is no backward road’ from<br />
reference <strong>to</strong> sense: sense determines reference, but reference does not determine sense.<br />
(1981: 267; see 159)<br />
But surely Russell is implicitly raising a many-one problem in his “no backward road” thesis. Namely,<br />
the backward road requires a one-one sense-reference correspondence; but there are many ways a<br />
reference can be given. That seems the most natural reason for his thesis. In fact, it is the only reason I<br />
can think of. Why else would he hold it? Indeed, he is well aware that <strong>Frege</strong>’s many-one sense-<br />
reference correlation is precisely how <strong>Frege</strong> explains true informative identity statements (Russell<br />
1971: 46). Thus I shall also call the thesis of sensial underdetermination Russell’s implicit “no<br />
backward road” thesis.<br />
25
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