Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod
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<strong>and</strong> are thus scientifically certain. Namely, they are stipulations! This is very different from<br />
explications.<br />
<strong>Frege</strong>’s view in Grundgesetze is that we cannot figure out subsentential references unless we<br />
already grasp as primitive the apparatus of identity <strong>and</strong> quantification, much as in Quine, <strong>and</strong> also<br />
negation, material implication, <strong>and</strong> some other functions. In particular, <strong>Frege</strong>’s stipulation of logical<br />
determinacy for the identity relation in vol. 1, § 7 is not a definition, since <strong>Frege</strong> lists “ξ = ζ“ as a<br />
primitive name in vol. 1, § 31, <strong>and</strong> argues elsewhere that identity is indefinable because every<br />
definition is an identity (1970c: 80). Thus § 7 can only be a regimentation of identity merely <strong>to</strong> ensure<br />
its logical determinacy. <strong>Frege</strong> says he has been talking about identity all along, i.e., prior <strong>to</strong> its<br />
regimentation (Grundgesetze vol. 1, § 7; compare 1979f: 210).<br />
Some terms need less regimentation than others, since some explications are more determinate<br />
than others <strong>to</strong> begin with. It is a short jump from the ordinary sense of “gleich” <strong>to</strong> the regimented sense<br />
of the formal identity sign. Similarly for negation. But no<strong>to</strong>riously, truth-functional “or” is a big<br />
regimentation. And the horizontal stroke is a big regimentation that prevents any well-formed sentence<br />
from lacking a truth-value for categorial reasons. E.g., “5 is pink” is arguably an indeterminate<br />
statement, but prefixing the horizontal stroke imposes falsehood on it.<br />
For <strong>Frege</strong>, explications (Erläuterungen) are not stipulative definitions, or even stipulated<br />
regimentations. Explications are hints. <strong>Frege</strong> says right in Grundgesetze vol. 1, § 0 (last para.) that he<br />
must indicate what he intends by his primitive names by “hints,” since not everything can be defined.<br />
For <strong>Frege</strong>, communication always begins with hints, metaphors, or suggestions, <strong>and</strong> thus with an<br />
element of uncertainty. 6 Thus explications logically can fail. This is essentially different from<br />
regimentations <strong>and</strong> definitions. This is why <strong>Frege</strong> requires explications <strong>to</strong> occur in a propaedeutic,<br />
while definitions, <strong>and</strong> perhaps also regimentations, occur within the scientific notation. Before we can<br />
start a formal notation at all, “we must be able <strong>to</strong> count on a meeting of minds.”Thus explications are<br />
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