All About Mentoring Spring 2011 - SUNY Empire State College

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turn fared better than the poor. Perhaps it
was the PRI that fared worst of all. In many
ways, its credibility never recovered.
In September 1985, the PRI suffered
another major blow following a massive
earthquake that rocked the capital. Damage
was widespread and a great many people
died, yet the PRI, in the following days, was
invisible. Local people seized the initiative
and quickly mobilized to search for victims
and provide services for survivors. When
the PRI belatedly leapt into action,
having initially minimized the damage
and assured international experts that
help was not needed, it sent in the army
to protect private property. The party
was further discredited when post-quake
analysis suggested the pattern of building
collapses revealed one of the many costs
of corruption. Contractors working on
government buildings, including hospitals
and schools had clearly used shoddy
materials and government inspectors had
been paid off.
that national leaders promised would pave
the way for Mexico’s transformation into
a fully developed country. What Mexicans
refer to as the “intellectual authors” of
the assassination was never identified.
That fall, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, an
official of the PRI and a national senator,
was assassinated. During the months that
followed, investigations revealed what
historians Michael C. Meyer, William L.
Sherman and Susan M. Deeds (2007) refer
to as follows:
This long-running scandal, coupled with yet
another economic collapse and a response
from the PRI that was little short of
catastrophic, finally resulted in the PRI’s loss
of power to the conservative Partido Acción
Nacional (PAN) in 2000.
This sketch of major changes in Mexico
between 1975 and 2010 suggests a number
of themes worthy of further investigation.
In the second part of this essay, I will
explore one of them: Governmental
Capacity. Powerfully influenced by their
North American neighbor, Mexican
administrations during the 1980s and
1990s sharply reduced the government’s
role in the economy and opened the
country to foreign private investment.
And, as noted, rapid population growth
and urbanization increased pressure on
natural resources and infrastructure.
Simultaneously, democratization both
raised expectations and created openings
for new approaches to addressing these
issues.
The 1988 presidential election brought
the decline of the PRI into full public
view. The PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas
de Gortari, chosen, as always, by the
outgoing president, was challenged
by a leftist spin-off group that called
itself the Frente Democratico Nacional
(the National Democratic Front). Its
candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, was
widely believed to have won the election,
but the PRI abruptly halted the ballot
count and declared its man the winner.
This period, between 1985 and 1990,
saw the rise of several “civil society”
groups, many of them byproducts
of the popular response to the 1985
earthquake. Civil society has taken on
multiple roles since then and, as we shall
see, may be central to Mexican hopes for
the future.
Things got even worse in 1994, when the
PRI candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, who
promised to open the political process and
demonstrate the PRI’s responsiveness to
the public, was assassinated. This event, in
May, on the heels of the Zapatista uprising
in the southern state of Chiapas on Jan.
1, traumatized the nation, just at the time
when Mexico should have been celebrating
the implementation of NAFTA, the pact
Girl in Sombrero: Watching a World Cup victory
celebration, Cuernavaca, Morelos, June 17, 2010
For at least half a century Mexicans
had awaited revelations of corruption
each time a new administration
replaced an old. But this occasion
was different. The news of intrigue,
corruption, big money, naropolitics
and murder that began to surface in
February 1995 was not the typical
low-grade moral infection. It was a
gothic tale that mesmerized the nation.
(p. 618)
The question I will take up is: how
prepared are Mexican governmental
institutions to respond to the challenges
currently confronting them and those
sure to arise in coming decades One
narrative suggests that this issue need
not concern us: the market will provide.
Another argues that strong and responsive
governments are essential to the vitality
of market economies and flourishing
societies. A look at the Mexican
experience offers some valuable insights.
Note
References included here are texts
referred to in part I. A full bibliography
will be provided in All About Mentoring
fall 2011.
References
Meyer, M.C., Sherman, W.L. and Deeds,
S.M. (2007). The course of Mexican
history (8th ed.). New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Moreno-Brid, J.C and Ros, J. (2009).
Development and growth in the
Mexican economy: A historical
perspective. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
suny empire state college • all about mentoring • issue 39 • spring 2011