20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1
20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1
20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1
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RS Security Force<br />
Assistance Guide <strong>3.1</strong><br />
“Functionally oriented <strong>SFA</strong> will require all advisors to understand the advisor<br />
network, from Afghan ministries down to the kandaks as well as the Afghan<br />
functional processes that are critical to sustaining the ANSF.”<br />
—General Dunford, USMC<br />
Commander ISAF<br />
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HEADQUARTERS<br />
International Security Assistance Force/<br />
United States Forces-Afghanistan<br />
Kabul, Afghanistan<br />
APO AE 09356<br />
HQ ISAF 1 JULY 2014<br />
RESOLUTE SUPPORT SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE GUIDE<br />
1. Since taking the lead for their nation’s security a year ago, the Afghan National Security Forces<br />
(ANSF) have proven their ability to secure the Afghan people. They emerged from a tough fighting<br />
season last year not only capable, but also confident and credible in the eyes of the Afghan people.<br />
They successfully secured the Loya Jirga in November and 300 major election events during the<br />
winter. During the first half of 2014, they maintained an extraordinarily high operational tempo<br />
that put the enemy on its heels and shaped the environment for inclusive elections in April and<br />
June.<br />
2. While the Afghans no longer need much help fighting the Taliban—they can do that on their<br />
own—they do need help maturing the systems, processes, and institutions that are required to<br />
sustain a modern army and police force. Today, the Afghan ministries still have challenges with<br />
delivering spare parts, ammunition and other essentials. They also need help with critical tasks<br />
like developing budgets, managing human resources, and sustaining their infrastructure. To help<br />
them with these tasks, Coalition advisors deployed in support of Resolute Support will conduct<br />
Functionally Based Security Force Assistance (FB<strong>SFA</strong>). FB<strong>SFA</strong> will further develop the Afghan<br />
Security Institutions’ (ASI) capacity to conduct these tasks and ensure the long-term sustainability<br />
of the ANSF.<br />
3. To develop Afghan sustainability, Coalition advisors will conduct FB<strong>SFA</strong> at the Ministry of<br />
Defense, the Ministry of Interior, formal training facilities, schoolhouses, army corps headquarters,<br />
and provincial police headquarters. To ensure success, it is critical that advisors possess extensive<br />
expertise and experience in the functional area in which they advise, and that they understand<br />
existing ASI/ANSF processes so they can influence their development.<br />
4. This <strong>guide</strong> seeks to help nations and advisors prepare to execute FB<strong>SFA</strong> during Resolute<br />
Support. It describes the eight Essential Functions (EFs) that in the aggregate create sustainability.<br />
It emphasizes the importance of integrating each function both horizontally and vertically<br />
within the ASI/ANSF. It outlines a framework for advising, and best practices to follow when<br />
providing technical advice to senior Afghan officials. It outlines organizational constructs and<br />
functional processes, and guidance for training. Updates to this <strong>guide</strong> will be available on the <strong>SFA</strong><br />
Collaboration Portal.<br />
5. All Resolute Support personnel involved with FB<strong>SFA</strong> must be familiar with the contents of<br />
this <strong>guide</strong>. To be successful in our mission, advisors must be both proficient in their duties and<br />
dedicated to the FB<strong>SFA</strong> mission. Only by building the ASI and ANSF’s long-term sustainability<br />
will we cement the gains made to date, and ensure Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven<br />
for terrorism.<br />
J. F. DUNFORD, JR.<br />
General, United States Marine Corps<br />
Commander<br />
International Security Assistance Force/<br />
United States Forces-Afghanistan<br />
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TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
Introduction.........................................................................1<br />
Chapter 1: Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>)...........................5<br />
Chapter 2: Resolute Support (RS) Functionally Based <strong>SFA</strong>...11<br />
Chapter 3: The Advisor.......................................................17<br />
Chapter 4: Operational Environment.................................35<br />
Chapter 5: Afghan Actors...................................................41<br />
Chapter 6: RS Actors..........................................................55<br />
Annex A: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)............A1<br />
Annex B: Process Maps......................................................B1<br />
Annex C: PDT & Advisor METL........................................C1<br />
Annex D: <strong>SFA</strong> Ministry Advisor Tasks...............................D1<br />
Annex E: ISAF <strong>SFA</strong> Bibliography........................................E1<br />
Annex F: Acronyms............................................................F1<br />
Annex G: Glossary ............................................................G1<br />
Photo: Lance Cpl. Darien Bjorndal<br />
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INTRODUCTION<br />
The Journey<br />
As NATO ISAF transitions to the NATO RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RS) mission,<br />
we should look back on the journey that has brought us to the 2014 end of ISAF’s<br />
campaign. Clear physical and cognitive shifts have taken place as NATO and the<br />
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) have transitioned from<br />
ISAF-led operations, to the current process/systems focusing on the Functionally<br />
Based Security Force Assistance (FB<strong>SFA</strong>) construct, which will be the formal mission<br />
in Resolute Support. ISAF/RS advisors will work with our Afghan counterparts to<br />
establish and execute processes that will enable sustainable Afghan systems and<br />
prepare them for an enduring capability.<br />
Afghan Forces, (Security Institutions (ASI) and Afghan National Security Forces<br />
(ANSF)) have reached an important threshold as they have proven capable of leading<br />
the fight, providing confidence to the Afghan population, and maintaining security<br />
in key population centers. They have made significant and demonstrable progress<br />
at the tactical level. In order to achieve sustainability by 2016, ISAF has developed<br />
an FB<strong>SFA</strong> framework that shifts the emphasis from unit-based combat advising to<br />
Functionally Based advising along eight Essential Functions (EFs). The EFs are:<br />
1) Plan, Program, Budget and Execute (PPBE): generate<br />
requirements, develop a resource informed budget, and execute a<br />
spend plan.<br />
2) Internal controls to assure Transparency, Accountability, and<br />
Oversight (TAO).<br />
3) Civilian governance of the ASI, including adherence to the Rule of<br />
Law.<br />
4) Force Generate: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop a<br />
professional ANSF.<br />
5) Sustain the force through effective facilities management,<br />
maintenance, medical, and logistics systems.<br />
6) Plan, resource and execute Effective Security Campaigns (ESC)<br />
and operations;<br />
a) Inter-ministerial and joint coordination, and<br />
b) Command, control and employ Ground, Air and Special<br />
Operations Forces.<br />
7) Sufficient Intelligence capabilities and processes.<br />
8) Maintain internal and external strategic communication<br />
capabilities.<br />
The eight EFs focus on Afghan systems with measurable outcomes. These functions<br />
are interdependent; once habitual, they will result in Afghan sustainability. They<br />
span across all levels of government and defense, from the tactical warfighter<br />
to the strategic planning level. Each EF consists of various Afghan systems and<br />
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processes. Advisors focus on influencing<br />
these processes, thereby enabling the Afghans<br />
to solve problems within their own domain.<br />
Afghan sustainability must evolve in an Afghan<br />
way, as they know how to fight, now we must<br />
refine the manner by which they resource and<br />
sustain that fighting capability.<br />
ISAF is still performing <strong>SFA</strong>; the emphasis has simply<br />
evolved. The new functional framework is designed<br />
to facilitate a coordinated (Afghan and Coalition)<br />
problem-solving effort at the Corps level and higher. It is<br />
about maturing the systems and processes that will enable<br />
Afghan forces to rely on themselves.<br />
The Guide<br />
RS <strong>SFA</strong> Guide <strong>3.1</strong> provides NATO partners and troop contributing nations (TCNs)<br />
a common understanding of how ISAF/RS will execute the shift from a unit-based,<br />
combat-oriented advisory mission to a Functionally Based <strong>SFA</strong> mission that focuses on<br />
building sustainable ASI/ANSF systems and processes. It explains COMISAF’s vision<br />
for FB<strong>SFA</strong> during RS, and how FB<strong>SFA</strong> will contribute to Afghan Forces’ sustainability.<br />
<strong>3.1</strong> will be accompanied by an Afghan version providing them the insights into what<br />
we hope to achieve on their behalf through a partnered endeavor.<br />
Many aspects of <strong>SFA</strong> remain the same. We will continue to support GIRoA in its fight<br />
against the insurgency while Afghan Forces create and maintain the conditions for<br />
stability and safety. The Afghans are delivering capability; we are delivering advice and<br />
assistance.<br />
RS <strong>SFA</strong> Guide <strong>3.1</strong> acknowledges the gains provided by the counterinsurgency<br />
campaign and an increasingly <strong>SFA</strong>-oriented effort over the last decade. The shift<br />
of focus towards sustainability is already underway. This <strong>guide</strong> addresses a broad<br />
spectrum of topics, reflective of the complex nature of the <strong>SFA</strong> mission. Specifically, it<br />
defines <strong>SFA</strong> from a broad perspective, but focuses on ISAF’s Functionally Based <strong>SFA</strong><br />
program. It describes the advisors and the advisor network within which they operate.<br />
Finally, the <strong>guide</strong> covers how we will assess our progress. This <strong>guide</strong> provides advisors<br />
with the tools that will help them to enable Afghan institutions and security forces to<br />
become sustainable and able to operate independently.<br />
How to Use the Guide<br />
Because of the scope of the advisor network, this <strong>guide</strong> covers a broad range of<br />
subjects. It is designed to be portable in order to support ease of use. It is a resource<br />
document designed to be carried by the advisor on a daily basis. The modular online<br />
format allows each advisor to customize and print their own <strong>guide</strong> based upon their<br />
experience and background, understanding of FB<strong>SFA</strong>, their location within the advisor<br />
network, and even the mission of the day. The following is an illustrative example of<br />
how an advisor may wish to customize the <strong>guide</strong>.<br />
For general knowledge of <strong>SFA</strong>, to include its functional components, advisors should<br />
review Chapters 1 (“Security Force Assistance”) and 2 (“RS Functionally Based Security<br />
Force Assistance”) and may select pages that provide the background information<br />
required. Advisors will likely find Chapter 3 (“The Advisor”) helpful and may want to<br />
focus on pages from this chapter. Depending on where the advisor is located within the<br />
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overall advisor network, selected portions of Chapter 5 “Afghan Actors” and Chapter<br />
6 “RS-<strong>SFA</strong> Actors” are crucial for an understanding of the operational environment,<br />
and may also inform which process maps within Annex B will be pertinent to their<br />
day-to-day work. The annexes contain other useful references such as an acronym list,<br />
glossary, and a recommended reading list.<br />
COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) will maintain an online and<br />
updated version of this <strong>guide</strong>. The <strong>guide</strong> is a “living” document that advisors can<br />
influence by providing recommended updates and adjustments as new information is<br />
revealed. For us to provide the most current and relevant information, advisors in the<br />
field need to feed recommendations for revisions, particularly those regarding process<br />
maps, to the CAAT via the portal at this location: http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/<br />
CGHQ/CAAT/<strong>SFA</strong>_Collaboration_Site/default.aspx.<br />
Photo: Timothy Hrushka<br />
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The following updates have been made to the Guide:<br />
Inserted new text has blue Font!<br />
Guide 3.0 -> <strong>3.1</strong><br />
Chapter 3<br />
- par <strong>3.1</strong>3 Gender and Human Rights, p 31.<br />
- par <strong>3.1</strong>4 Children and armed conflict, p 34.<br />
Chapter 4<br />
- par 4.10 Women in the ASI/ANSF, p39.<br />
Chapter 5<br />
- par 5.18 Gaps, p 46.<br />
- par 5.31 Gaps, p 51.<br />
Chapter 6<br />
- figure 6.1 RS C2 Diagram, p 57.<br />
Annexes<br />
- Annex B. ANA Recruit - Train - Assign Pipeline, p B 15.<br />
- Annex B. ANP Fuel Ordering Process, p B 28.<br />
- Annex E. ISAF/RS Bibliography, pt. 15 Gender, p E14.<br />
- Annex F. Acronyms, p F1.<br />
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Chapter 1<br />
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Chapter 1<br />
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CHAPTER 1<br />
Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>)<br />
1.1 Introduction: This chapter defines the <strong>SFA</strong> environment and describes<br />
imperatives, tasks, and how ISAF/Resolute Support (RS) has designed <strong>SFA</strong> for the RS<br />
mission. ISAF’s primary task has changed from leading a population centric counterinsurgency<br />
campaign to providing Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>) to the ANSF who<br />
have now assumed the lead for counter-insurgency and security across the Combined<br />
Joint Operational Area–Afghanistan (CJOA-A).<br />
1.2 As we enter the final stages of the ISAF mandate and prepare to execute RS, ANSF<br />
have reached an important threshold. Evidence increasingly indicates that the years of<br />
investment in combat-oriented mentoring and advising has paid off. The ANSF still<br />
have room for improvement, but they have produced capable leaders at every echelon<br />
who understand the fundamentals of their profession.<br />
1.3 Readers should understand COMISAF’s intent and expectations for advisors.<br />
<strong>SFA</strong> is the main effort for the remainder of the ISAF mandate and through RS. This<br />
makes our advisor capability all the more critical to mission success. Advisors must<br />
be intimately aware of the inner workings of the <strong>SFA</strong> advisor network and the ISAF/<br />
RS processes and mechanisms designed to facilitate Functionally Based Security Force<br />
Assistance (FB<strong>SFA</strong>).<br />
1.4 Advisors need to understand the Afghan information flow from the executive<br />
and strategic (ministerial) level down to the operational (national institutions) levels<br />
to the operating forces (fielded forces) and back up the chain again. 1 The <strong>SFA</strong> effort<br />
will evolve around the principles of FB<strong>SFA</strong> defined below, and the eight Essential<br />
Functions (EFs) that will lead to ANSF Sustainability. The eight EFs (EF 1: Plan,<br />
Program, Budget, and Execute; EF 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight; EF<br />
3: Civilian Governance of the ASI and adherence to Rule of Law; EF 4: Force Generate;<br />
EF 5: Sustain the force; EF 6: Plan, resource and execute effective security campaigns;<br />
EF 7: Sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes; and EF 8: Maintain internal and<br />
Chapter 1<br />
1 US Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, dated 29 April 2013, p. III-7.<br />
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Photo: Sgt. Jessica Ostroska<br />
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external strategic communication capability) are described in chapter 2.<br />
1.5 Definition of Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>): <strong>SFA</strong> is unified action to generate,<br />
employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a<br />
legitimate authority. In Afghanistan, ISAF/RS employs <strong>SFA</strong> to develop the ASI/ ANSF in<br />
support of GIRoA.<br />
1.6 Functionally Based <strong>SFA</strong>: FB<strong>SFA</strong> is an advisory effort focused on functions,<br />
systems processes and organizational development to achieve sustainable ASI/ANSF<br />
systems. FB<strong>SFA</strong> requires an enduring unity of effort and common purpose to align<br />
advisors at multiple echelons, to Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) vertical processes<br />
while also achieving horizontal coordination. Unity of effort will require the alignment,<br />
coordination and synchronization of the advisors within the eight EFs, at the strategic,<br />
operational and tactical levels.<br />
1.7 FB<strong>SFA</strong> Integration: FB<strong>SFA</strong> integration is the process of combining all FB<strong>SFA</strong><br />
efforts across the eight EFs from the strategic to the tactical levels. This is achieved by<br />
ensuring advisor efforts are vertically aligned, while also being horizontally coordinated.<br />
To achieve ASI/ANSF sustainability, this process must be implemented from the ISAF/<br />
RS command level down through all Subordinate Headquarters (SHQs).<br />
1.8 Vertical alignment: The process of ensuring a common message from the advisor<br />
network and command structure, from the strategic, operational and tactical level<br />
within each of the eight EFs. Achievement of vertical alignment requires advisors that<br />
are in proper relative position to execute the principles of TECHCON 2 and FB<strong>SFA</strong>.<br />
1.9 Horizontal Coordination: Horizontal coordination involves the eight EFs working<br />
together to produce desired outputs that contribute to improvements in ASI/ANSF<br />
systems. Horizontal coordination occurs at all levels informally and formally within the<br />
<strong>SFA</strong> Working Group (<strong>SFA</strong>WG). (See Chapter 2).<br />
1.10 Horizontal Synchronization: Horizontal Synchronization is command directed<br />
actions across the eight EFs in time and space in order to achieve improvements in<br />
ASI/ANSF systems. Horizontal synchronization occurs formally at the <strong>SFA</strong> Board. (See<br />
Chapter 2).<br />
1.11 <strong>SFA</strong> imperatives: Conducting <strong>SFA</strong> in Afghanistan requires ISAF/RS to adopt<br />
a specific mindset of working by, with, and through the ASI/ANSF to support their<br />
internal security and development. ISAF/RS personnel must understand that GIRoA’s<br />
legitimacy is vital, and they must increasingly focus their efforts away from enabling the<br />
ANSF, and towards assisting the ASI to develop and sustain its systems and processes.<br />
The population must perceive the ASI/ANSF and GIRoA as legitimate in order to set<br />
the conditions for achieving enduring success. <strong>SFA</strong> imperatives come from the historical<br />
record and recent CF experience. 3 The <strong>SFA</strong> imperatives are:<br />
a) Understand the Operational Environment. (See Chapter 4).<br />
b) Ensure Unity of Effort. A clear delineation and understanding of authorities<br />
is essential to avoid confusion and to ensure that each entity’s strengths are<br />
maximized.<br />
2 Technical Control (TECHCON). Defined as the provision of specialist and technical advice by designated<br />
authorities for the management and operations of forces to influence Afghan systems. TECHCON enables<br />
essential function coordinators with direct advisor contact vertically and horizontally throughout<br />
the advisor network for coordination, synchronization, and facilitation of efforts. For specific direction<br />
on decisions, advisors should use the chain of command. This is analogous to the relationship among<br />
staff elements in a Corps or Division. (TECHCON is an Australian Doctrine)<br />
3 Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 Security Force Assistance 29 April 2013.<br />
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c) Provide Effective Leadership. Leaders must be accountable for their actions,<br />
masters of their functional area, and focus on transitions and decisions that move<br />
the ANSF toward long-term sustainability.<br />
d) Build Legitimacy. Develop ASI and an ANSF that contribute to GIRoA’s<br />
recognition and acceptance as legally, morally, and politically legitimate by<br />
Afghans and the international community.<br />
e) Manage Information. Disseminate timely and relevant information, integrate<br />
it during planning, and leverage it appropriately during execution. Managing<br />
information encompasses collection, analysis, application, and preparation of<br />
information.<br />
f) Sustainability. Maintain the <strong>SFA</strong> effort throughout all the phases of<br />
the operation and so that the ASI and ANSF can sustain their capabilities<br />
independently over the long term. COMISAF has defined sustainability as, “In<br />
2016, provided with Chicago resources and limited advisory support, Afghan<br />
Security Institutions and Afghan National Security Forces can execute and<br />
integrate the eight EFs in order to provide stability and security in Afghanistan<br />
and serve as an effective counter-terrorism partner.”<br />
g) Support GIRoA Ownership. Afghanistan’s history, culture, legal framework,<br />
and institutions must inform the principles, policies, laws, and structures of the<br />
<strong>SFA</strong> program in order to secure the continued support of the Afghan people.<br />
h) Incorporate Principles of Good Governance and Respect for Human Rights.<br />
Accountability, transparency, public participation, respect for human rights,<br />
gender equality, and legitimacy must be mainstreamed in ANSF development.<br />
i) Link Security and the Rule of Law. All security forces must operate within<br />
the bounds of domestic and international law to retain legitimacy in the eyes of<br />
Chapter 1<br />
Photo: Sgt. Tammy Hineline<br />
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the Afghan people.<br />
j) Foster Transparency. Encourage open and transparent consultation with other<br />
ISAF agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international donors,<br />
and the media to enhance mission development and mission execution.<br />
k) Do No Harm. Posture the ASI and ANSF so they can sustain themselves while<br />
remaining on guard against introducing any processes or activities that are not<br />
consistent with the Afghan approach. The advisor’s job is to help the Afghans<br />
identify and implement sustainable, Afghan-appropriate processes.<br />
l) For a more detailed discussion of these imperatives, see Joint Doctrine Note<br />
1-13 Security Force Assistance 29 April 2013.<br />
1.12 FB<strong>SFA</strong> Tasks. In essence, FB<strong>SFA</strong> is about optimizing the advisor network with<br />
a focus on the regional and national linkage. Through TAA, the advisor empowers the<br />
Afghans to take ownership of their own systems and identify critical gaps and friction<br />
points. The principles of TAA are outlined in SHAPE OPLAN 10312. 4<br />
a) Train, Advise and Assist: TAA focuses on developing the capacity of the ASI<br />
and ANSF, while upholding the North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive (NID)<br />
stipulation of being a non-combat mission, not participating directly in counterterrorism<br />
tasks, and not engaging directly in counter-narcotics tasks. Specific<br />
areas of TAA effort include, but are not limited to, professional development,<br />
logistics, communications, intelligence, medical support, maintenance, aviation,<br />
tactical air control, and maintaining a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). TAA<br />
activities will be conducted at the security ministry and national institution<br />
level (including but not limited to national HQ, Afghan Security Ministries,<br />
national logistics centers, and training institutions). RS advisory activities will<br />
be conducted at Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps and Afghan National<br />
Police (ANP) Type-A Headquarters levels and above. Afghan SOF (ANSF Special<br />
Operations Forces, Police Special Units, and NDS elements) will be trained,<br />
advised, and assisted at all levels to develop a full range of Special Operations<br />
capabilities. The Theatre Commander can,<br />
within means and capabilities, validate the<br />
delivery of the Corps level TAA at secure<br />
locations below corps level.<br />
b) Definitions:<br />
1) Train. Training in RS is defined as<br />
developing ASI programs and institutions<br />
to educate, instruct and prepare the ANSF;<br />
enabling them to generate and maintain the<br />
force, thereby providing and maintaining<br />
effective and enduring security capabilities.<br />
Training also includes assessment and<br />
evaluation by ISAF/RS personnel in<br />
conjunction with their Afghan counterparts<br />
in order to focus efforts and resources. The<br />
training effort will focus on institutional<br />
training (to include Ministerial Advisory<br />
Group, ANA, ANP, Afghan National Defense<br />
University, and Afghan training institutions).<br />
4 SHAPE OPLAN 10312, Annex A, dated June 2014.<br />
Photo: Sgt. Martin Downs<br />
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Afghan SOF training may<br />
be conducted at all levels<br />
to develop a full range of<br />
SOF capabilities. Specific<br />
NATO training mandates<br />
include respect for the rule<br />
of law and the protection of<br />
human rights. Within these<br />
mandates the focus is on<br />
avoiding and investigating<br />
civilian casualties, following<br />
UNSCR 1325 for protecting<br />
and respecting women and<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane<br />
children, and reducing the<br />
risk of corruption. Additionally, all training will incorporate the performance<br />
of military or policing duties in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution,<br />
domestic laws and international obligations.<br />
2) Advise. Advising is defined as facilitating and influencing by means of<br />
counsel and the improvement of ASI and ANSF through the creation of a<br />
professional relationship based on trust. Advising also includes observation,<br />
evaluation and reporting on the performance of ASI/ANSF in order to<br />
focus efforts and resources. The advisory effort will focus on the Corps and<br />
Police Type-A Headquarters level and above to refine ASI/ANSF skills and<br />
capabilities and to develop a mature, professional, and sustainable force that<br />
is committed to their own professional development. Two specific advisor<br />
efforts seek to further the ASI capacity within the GIRoA security construct.<br />
The first effort is furthering their capacity to develop and sustain mechanisms<br />
for enhanced cross-echelon and cross-military coordination and information<br />
sharing. The second effort is ensuring that the ANSF recognize that the civilian<br />
leadership has control and oversight of the ANSF. The advisory effort to<br />
Afghan SOF may be conducted at all levels.<br />
3) Assist. Assisting is defined as aiding in the accomplishment of tasks and<br />
will focus primarily on developing ASI and ANSF systems, processes and<br />
procedures. This may include activities such as planning and administrative<br />
support, policies and programming development, and financial management.<br />
For Afghan Special Operations Forces, this will also include activities necessary<br />
to aid in the development of a full range of Afghan SOF capabilities.<br />
1.13 Levels of Advising. This is the degree of advisor training and assistance provided<br />
to the ANSF element.<br />
a) Level One (1) TAA. Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANSF counterparts<br />
on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis from either an embedded<br />
footprint or in close proximity.<br />
b) Level Two (2) TAA. Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANSF counterparts<br />
on a less frequent basis to ensure their continued development. The frequency<br />
of this interaction varies based on the proximity to, and capability of, the ANSF<br />
counterpart, threat level to advisors, and CF resources.<br />
c) Level Three (3) TAA. ISAF provides additional training and advice from<br />
a centralized location (e.g., at a Regional Training Center or Regional Corps<br />
Battle School) or during a Battle Field Circulation or Staff Assistance Visit while<br />
Chapter 1<br />
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accompanying ANSF commanders and staff sections. Level 3 advising is not limited<br />
to <strong>SFA</strong>ATs or advisor teams. For instance, CF HQ staff may coordinate and execute<br />
training to improve the planning capability of their counterparts in an ANSF<br />
brigade or corps HQ or Operation Coordination Center–Regional (OCC-R).<br />
d) As the Coalition reduces its footprint within the operational environment,<br />
advisors at critical nodes within the corps and Type-A HQs will increase. ISAF/RS<br />
will maintain situational awareness of the security and governance progress outside<br />
of the Kabul cluster through regional-level Operational Coordination Centers<br />
(OCCs). OCC-Rs will be a major focus in the employment of advisors. These<br />
centers are vital links from the ministerial level to the regions and will require an<br />
ISAF/RS presence at least through the end of Phase 1 of the RS mission.<br />
e) While Level 1 advising will continue at the national/institutional level, Corps/<br />
Region/Type-A HQs, OCC-Rs and key sustainability nodes, the importance of<br />
monitoring lagging brigades, kandaks, Mobile Strike Forces, CSS Kandaks and<br />
specialty Kandaks will not diminish. These lagging units will require less frequent<br />
visits to provide support for continued progress (i.e., Level 2 advising). Where<br />
operational reach and security conditions permit, support can also be provided to<br />
Police Primacy in transitioned areas.<br />
f) The close proximity of advisors to counterparts should not prohibit a move from<br />
level 1 to level 2. It is practicable to reduce the number of visits and contact while<br />
living adjacent to counterparts. This applies to the different nodes of the ANSF.<br />
Looking at the Afghan systems the advisor will determine when a node is capable.<br />
The ability to go back to Level 1 remains if a friction point is identified at that node.<br />
Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) commanders have mission command<br />
authority, and will determine when to move from Level 1 to level 2, based on the<br />
recommendation of their advisors.<br />
Photo: Sgt. Tech. Sgt. Renee Crisostomo<br />
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Chapter 2<br />
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CHAPTER 2<br />
Resolute Support (RS) Functionally Based <strong>SFA</strong> (FB<strong>SFA</strong>)<br />
Our <strong>SFA</strong> effort is designed to identify the critical paths, the critical<br />
processes, and critical nodes. We will work those to connect the ministry to<br />
the lowest tactical level.<br />
—General Joseph Dunford, COMISAF, December 2013<br />
Chapter 2<br />
2.14 Introduction. ISAF/RS has developed a <strong>SFA</strong> framework that shifts the emphasis<br />
from unit-based, combat advising to functionally based advising. The new<br />
functional framework is designed to facilitate a coordinated (Afghan and Coalition)<br />
problem solving effort and the development of sustainable relationships. FB<strong>SFA</strong> is<br />
about maturing the processes that will provide the Afghan forces enduring sustainability.<br />
2.15 The Advisor Network (ANET) and Technical Control (TECHCON). The<br />
advisor network utilizes a communication structure defined as TECHCON. TECH-<br />
CON is defined as the provision of specialist and technical advice by designated<br />
authorities for the management and operation of forces to influence Afghan systems.<br />
If the Afghans are unable to solve a particular problem, advisors can seek assistance<br />
from any other advisors along the functional process—from the lowest tactical level<br />
up to the ministry. This TECHCON communication network is not a chain of command;<br />
rather it is a pathway to vertically integrate Afghan systems. Advisors have<br />
access to process maps and a comprehensive advisor network tool that will aid them<br />
in understanding how the Afghan processes are designed to work, who and where<br />
their co-advisors are and to facilitate communication. (See Annex B Process Maps).<br />
2.16 Afghan Sustainability. The Chicago Summit held in May 2012 delineated that<br />
the end-state of FB<strong>SFA</strong> is to achieve Afghan sustainability, defined as:<br />
In 2016, provided with Chicago resources and limited advisory support, Afghan Security<br />
Institutions and Afghan National Security Forces can execute and integrate the<br />
eight essential functions in order to provide stability and security in Afghanistan and<br />
serve as an effective Counter-Terrorism partner.<br />
2.17 Integrating ministerial, institutional (national), and fielded force advisors is<br />
central to the Functionally Based framework. Advisors are focused on headquarters<br />
(HQ) coordination and sustainability functions to provide ANSF the ability to<br />
effectively employ and sustain tactical forces. Linking these ANSF functions to the<br />
responsible agencies and elements within the security ministries is critical to achieving<br />
the level of security required to sustain growth and governmental development.<br />
This is accomplished using the eight Essential Functions outlined below.<br />
2.18 The Eight Essential Functions. The eight EFs provide the framework and<br />
desired outcomes in target areas to achieve Afghan sustainability. Each EF contains<br />
a series of Afghan processes with tactical, operational, and strategic characteristics,<br />
many of which have interactions across other EFs. This multi-echelon level of<br />
advising and cross-functional coordination allows analysis of Afghan process issues<br />
through multiple lenses. The eight EFs are:<br />
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EF #1 – PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET AND<br />
EXECUTE; generate requirements, develop a<br />
recourse informed budget and execute a spend plan:<br />
PPBE is concerned with generating requirements,<br />
developing a resource-informed budget, and then<br />
following through by responsibly executing the spending<br />
plans. As mentioned earlier, all EFs are interrelated, and<br />
the success of the whole depends on the success of the<br />
individual parts. EF 1 is particularly important because<br />
it directly affects all other EFs.<br />
EF 1 advising efforts will focus on ANSF’s Resource<br />
Management and Procurement (RMaP) departments,<br />
aiding them in developing the experience, leadership,<br />
and proper objectives prioritization (seeing past shortterm<br />
advantage into long-term success) that they<br />
require.<br />
EF #3 – Rule of Law (RoL) and Governance:<br />
Civilian Civilian governance of the ASI, including<br />
adherence to the rule of law.<br />
The Rule of Law (RoL) and Governance mission promotes<br />
civilian governance of the Afghan Security Institutions.<br />
Current ASI/ANSF operation in compliance<br />
with RoL remains underdeveloped. EF 3 TAA efforts,<br />
therefore, must emphasize the importance of establishing<br />
effective and transparent criminal and disciplinary<br />
systems.<br />
Two important areas falling under the EF 3 awnings are<br />
the TAA efforts that will monitor and prevent extra-judicial<br />
killings and gross violations of human rights.<br />
TAO<br />
Force Gen<br />
PPBE<br />
RoL/Gov<br />
EF #2 – INtErnal COntrolS TO ASsurE<br />
transParEncy, accountaBility, and<br />
Oversight (TAO):<br />
Ensuring third-party oversight of the PPBE process may<br />
be an International Community (IC)-stipulated requirement<br />
for continued funding, but the only way this is<br />
accomplished is through enforcing EF 2—TAO. The EF<br />
2 directorate is designed to ensure transparency, accountability,<br />
and oversight in ASI/ANSF’s financial and<br />
non-financial processes; this includes, but is not exclusive<br />
to, fuel and pay. The overall output of EF 2 will feed<br />
into the EF 3 lines of operation, to ensure laws are equitably<br />
enforced. To this end, all levels of civil society<br />
and government will be leveraged to increase counter/<br />
anti-corruption measures in order to boost the IC’s confidence<br />
and commitment in GIRoA’s fiscal stewardship.<br />
EF #4 – ForcE gEnEration: REcruit,<br />
train, rEtain, managE, and dEvEloP<br />
A PROFESSIONAL ANSF:<br />
The Force Generation TAA mission is grounded in an<br />
interconnecting and mutually supportive fivefold effort:<br />
recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five<br />
focus areas work together in building a professionalized<br />
force.<br />
The Afghan Human Resource Information Management<br />
System (AHRIMS) will assist in recruiting, training, and<br />
assigning qualified personnel into needed appointments<br />
as determined by force requirements. The management<br />
oversight it will provide will help ease a patronageoriented<br />
selection process into a more professional<br />
merit-based selection process.<br />
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Chapter 2<br />
EF #5 – Force Sustainment:<br />
EF 5 aims to sustain the Afghan Force through effective<br />
facilities management, maintenance, and medical and<br />
logistics systems. Current sustainment processes lack<br />
uniformity across echelons and between MoI/ANP and<br />
MoD/ANA. Areas for improvement include capturing demands,<br />
managing assets, and management reporting<br />
and decision-making.<br />
Success for EF 5 is achieved when ASI/ANSF have institutionalized<br />
a management culture based on proper<br />
stewardship and husbandry of capability.<br />
EF #7 – intElligEncE, SUFFICIENT<br />
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES:<br />
EF 7 is concerned with the development of sufficient<br />
intelligence capabilities and processes. The Afghan Intelligence<br />
Enterprise is making strides in areas of intelligence<br />
collection, processing, and analyzing as well as<br />
planning, integrating, producing, and disseminating.<br />
Despite the progress, several challenges remain; the enduring<br />
effort will emphasize new capability integration,<br />
training self-sufficiency. Moreover, while the current system<br />
is analog—relying heavily on paper products and personal<br />
contact—EF 7 will prioritize system digitalization.<br />
ESC<br />
STRATCOM<br />
Force Sust<br />
Intel<br />
EF #6 – EFFEctivE sEcurity camPaigns<br />
AND OPERATIONS (Esc):<br />
EF 6 is concerned with planning, resourcing, and<br />
ex-ecuting effective security campaigns and operations<br />
including inter-ministerial and joint coordination, and<br />
Command, control and employ Ground, Air and Special<br />
Operating Forces.<br />
At the tactical level, the ASI/ANSF are already highly<br />
ca-pable. However, their operational capabilities,<br />
though improving, require continued advisor efforts.<br />
Resource allocation must be based on assigned<br />
priorities and tasks, and cross-functional integration<br />
must also be improved.<br />
EF 6 end-state is reached when MoD/MoI coordinate,<br />
plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives<br />
while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn<br />
translated into operational plans supported by effective<br />
security campaigns.<br />
EF #8 – STRATCOM<br />
EF 8 is concerned with maintaining internal and external<br />
strategic communications capabilities. ASI/ANSF information<br />
communication proficiency continues to improve,<br />
but challenges remain, particularly in the development<br />
of plans, operations, and resource and tashkil management.<br />
The development of a strategic communications<br />
capability at MoD and at the Corps level would enable<br />
effecting support to national-level messaging.<br />
The end-state for EF 8 is ASI/ANSF capability to develop<br />
communication plans and ANSF ability to inform and<br />
communicate with the Afghan people.<br />
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2.19 Priorities are critical in fostering<br />
the ISAF/RS advising efforts and aligning<br />
Afghan and Coalition resources to tackle<br />
the functions vital for Afghan sustainability.<br />
ISAF/RS uses ANSF generated priorities<br />
combined with COMISAF FB<strong>SFA</strong> priorities<br />
to describe short-, mid-, and longer-term<br />
development objectives aligned with the<br />
campaign plan. As priorities from both the<br />
Afghans and COMISAF will change over<br />
time, further information on the current<br />
priorities will be made available through ISAF/RS Orders.<br />
Photo: Cpl. Brian Gabriel Jr.<br />
Consideration for Advisors Vignette #1: Cross Functional Interdependencies<br />
During a review of assessment reports it was discovered that the AUP in an urban center were<br />
“borrowing” (stealing) fuel from the local population. Initial assessment placed this Afghan problem<br />
in Essential Function 3 for action. Since the Afghan Uniformed police (AUP) are the branch<br />
of GIRoA with whom the population comes into frequent contact, theft of civilian fuel reflected<br />
poorly on the central government. However, investigation revealed that the AUP were taking fuel<br />
from the civilian population because their own organic fuel sources failed to provide adequate<br />
fuel to continue missions. The AUP was attempting to continue enforcing law and order by taking<br />
fuel to continue patrols, but in doing so, damaged the civil/government relationship. This issue<br />
was then shifted from Essential Function 3, Civil Governance, to Essential Function 5, Sustainment,<br />
for action.<br />
Lessons Learned: Tactical and operational issues in one Essential Function can affect operational<br />
and strategic objectives. In this case, a lack of a reliable fuel sustainment system under<br />
Essential Function 5, Sustainment, had second-order effects for Essential Function 3, Civil<br />
Governance and Essential Function 8, Strategic Messaging. Each Essential Function Lead then<br />
had specific actions to take within their specialty to influence the system.<br />
2.20 ISAF/RS FB<strong>SFA</strong> Operations. The advisor TECHCON channels are designed<br />
to resolve the majority of Afghan issues that arise during operations. There are numerous<br />
instances where advisors cannot resolve Afghan process issues because of the<br />
numerous cross-functional interactions and/or the problem requiring operational/<br />
strategic-level command influence. Past efforts to overcome these obstacles resulted in<br />
stagnation and frustration due to attempts by advisors to resolve issues at only one level<br />
of command. Using TECHCON within FB<strong>SFA</strong> allows issues to be tackled by multiple<br />
advisors at multiple levels simultaneously.<br />
2.21 FB<strong>SFA</strong> requires advisors to know the Afghan processes they are to advise and<br />
know what happens at every echelon. It requires advisors to understand what and how<br />
other advisors in their specialty are operating both horizontally and vertically in order<br />
for them to coordinate and synchronize efforts. The advisor’s goal is to facilitate the<br />
Afghans finding or developing solutions to the problems they encounter. For example,<br />
a logistics advisor at one of the Afghan Corps should be able to look at the advisor<br />
network or a process map on Class IX supply distribution and know who his/her<br />
advisor counterpart(s) are operating at Ground Forces Command (GFC), the Regional<br />
Logistics Support Center (RLSC), the Central Supply Depot (CSD), the General Staff<br />
G4 and who his/her counterparts are at the other corps. The advisor is empowered and<br />
expected to conduct vigorous coordination both vertically and horizontally to reach<br />
out to other advisors in the logistics advisory network to discuss any issues and train,<br />
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advise, and assist the Afghans to solve the problems. Advisors must understand the<br />
ASI/ANSF Process Maps at ANNEX B, and frequently check for updates on the<br />
ISAF <strong>SFA</strong> Collaboration Portal. 1 Advisors verify processes, share updated understanding,<br />
and submit refinements through the Advisor Network (ANET).<br />
2.22 At times, requirements will surface that need immediate attention up the chain of<br />
command into the ministries. Advisors must recognize two things: 1) the procedures<br />
that standardize and simplify ministry operations, and 2) the time sensitive requirements<br />
emanating from forces engaging in a counterinsurgency and building a force for<br />
future operations.<br />
2.23 To address these issues, ISAF/RS initiated a formal method, outside of the advisor<br />
TECHCON channels, to action operational/strategic level Afghan systems issues.<br />
This system allows advisors to communicate their concerns to their TAAC Commander<br />
and nominate FB<strong>SFA</strong> targets for influence at higher level staffs.<br />
2.24 ISAF/RS FB<strong>SFA</strong> Operations Process:<br />
a) The eight EFs The eight EFs serve to focus advising efforts and to facilitate the<br />
TAA mission. Each EF has appointed an Essential Function Lead (OF-7/OF-6)<br />
and an Essential Function Coordinator (OF-5/OF-4) who are responsible for<br />
vertical integration, horizontal coordination, analysis, and synchronization of<br />
information process issues within their vertical function. Formal FB<strong>SFA</strong> Targeting<br />
is a systems based approach that focuses influencing efforts at key friction points<br />
in a particular Afghan system. The system is then monitored for both positive and<br />
negative second order effects. Key personnel within the EF are:<br />
1) Functional Lead (FL). The Accountable Officer for each EF; responsible<br />
and accountable to the commander for its management. The Functional Lead<br />
has TECHCON for advisors within the EF at all levels.<br />
2) Functional Coordinator (FC). The FL delegate for the EF and subordinate<br />
echelon. The coordinator supports the FL in executing day to day management<br />
of the EF and is responsible to the FL.<br />
b) EF OPT. The EF Operational Planning Team (OPT) serves as the forum for<br />
vertical alignment within each EF harnessing the principles of TECHCON.<br />
EF OPTs absorb and coordinate input from all stakeholders both internal and<br />
external to their respective EF. Where appropriate, problems are referred to the<br />
<strong>SFA</strong>-WG for coordination or the <strong>SFA</strong> Board for synchronization. Each EF OPT<br />
lead acts as the subject matter expert (SME) for all issues relating to that EF across<br />
the Strategic, Operational and<br />
Tactical levels.<br />
c) <strong>SFA</strong> Working Group (<strong>SFA</strong><br />
WG). The ISAF <strong>SFA</strong> Working<br />
Group serves three purposes. The<br />
first is to fully coordinate <strong>SFA</strong><br />
activities and other matters at the<br />
working level (OF-5) from the<br />
Strategic, down to the Tactical,<br />
across all eight EFs. This will<br />
include EF Systems review and<br />
Target Matrix review. The second,<br />
Photo: Catherine Threat<br />
1 http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/CGHQ/CAAT/<strong>SFA</strong>_Collaboration_Site/pages/Afghan%20Process%20<br />
Maps.aspx<br />
Chapter 2<br />
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is to formally coordinate and to action targets that could not be resolved by the EF<br />
OPTs. The third purpose is to prepare targets for consideration by the <strong>SFA</strong> Board<br />
that cannot be resolved at the <strong>SFA</strong> WG. The <strong>SFA</strong> WG is to be held weekly and is<br />
chaired by the OF-5 Director of the <strong>SFA</strong> Center.<br />
Diagram 2.1. RS FB<strong>SFA</strong> Operations Process<br />
d) <strong>SFA</strong> Board (<strong>SFA</strong>B). The ISAF <strong>SFA</strong>B is the arbiter of FB<strong>SFA</strong> issues requiring ISAF<br />
Senior Leader attention. The Board provides relevant and effective senior leader<br />
guidance and direction across the force; re-allocates resources in furtherance of ASI/<br />
ANSF development; and ensures that ASI/ANSF objectives and tasks are integrated,<br />
coordinated, and synchronized. It also provides the opportunity to review EF systems<br />
and the target matrix. The board is chaired by COMISAF and is held weekly.<br />
e) Commander’s <strong>SFA</strong> Update (CSU). The CSU is the Commander’s primary means<br />
of reviewing the strategic outlook for the eight EFs. It also provides an opportunity<br />
for the EF leads to brief their EF and receive commander direction and guidance.<br />
Each EF presents updates to COMISAF/COMRS monthly, over a four week period.<br />
f) FB<strong>SFA</strong> Target. A critical gap, friction point, or risk within an ASI/ANSF system<br />
that prevents the achievement of a sustainable system. Problems are identified and<br />
analyzed at the lowest level, and if they cannot be resolved, elevated to the next level.<br />
Based on level of risk, problems may culminate in a decision for targetable action.<br />
g) TAAC FB<strong>SFA</strong> Targeting Meeting. The TAAC <strong>SFA</strong> Targeting meeting is similar to<br />
the ISAF <strong>SFA</strong> WG. TAACs conduct FB<strong>SFA</strong> targeting meetings to coordinate TAAC<br />
FB<strong>SFA</strong> activities and other matters across all eight EFs. The meeting collects advisor<br />
issues, vets those issues for higher level influence, and prepares FB<strong>SFA</strong> targets for the<br />
<strong>SFA</strong> Working Group.<br />
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Chapter 3<br />
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Chapter 3<br />
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CHAPTER 3<br />
The Advisor<br />
“The ability to influence in the absence of authority<br />
is a distinguishing quality of a successful advisor.” 1<br />
<strong>3.1</strong> This chapter provides information about advisor characteristics and considerations,<br />
Afghan culture and communication, rapport building, insider threats, human rights<br />
issues, and counter-corruption. The chapter is designed to be an informative concise<br />
<strong>guide</strong> for advisors and their commanders. Advisors must have a sound ‘baseline’ of predeployment<br />
training in accordance with their national <strong>guide</strong>lines and Annex C. Those<br />
requiring more detail should utilize the material referenced throughout the document,<br />
particularly in Annex E, the ISAF <strong>SFA</strong> Bibliography.<br />
3.2 Advisors are the ISAF/RS main effort in executing FB<strong>SFA</strong>. To build and maintain<br />
relationships with the officers working in the ASI and ANSF, advisors must know the<br />
processes of the ANSF and ASIs equally as well as the personnel they are advising.<br />
Advisors may operate at the ministerial level, with the national institutions, or with ANSF<br />
at the Corps or Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) level. The ministerial level consists of<br />
the Minister of Defense (MoD) and Minister of Interior (MoI) along with their General<br />
Staffs and Deputy Ministers (DMs) respectively. National institutions consist of the<br />
national training centers, academies, recruiting commands, central supply depots, and<br />
national hospitals (see Chapter 5 for further discussion.) ANA Corps and ANP PCoPs are<br />
regionally aligned military and police organizations that function at the operational level.<br />
Chapter 5 and Annex A provide further detail regarding these organizations and units.<br />
3.3 ISAF/RS advisors are subject matter experts (SMEs) who serve with ANSF to train,<br />
Chapter 3<br />
1 Headquarters Department of the Army. TC 31-73 Special Forces Advisor Guide: July 2008. 2008. Reprint:<br />
Special Operations Press, 2013.<br />
Photo: Sgt. Margaret Taylor<br />
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advise, and assist their counterparts. Advisors observe, evaluate, and report on the<br />
performance of their assigned functional area. Advisors communicate with their ISAF/<br />
RS superiors, functional SMEs, and ANSF counterparts to resolve problems and gain<br />
confidence. The advisor’s purpose is to create a professional relationship based on<br />
capability and trust that inspires and influences their Afghan counterparts to effective<br />
action. Advisors must understand the processes and systems associated with their<br />
functional area as well as their location in the advisor network. They must know the<br />
institutions and commands, both Afghan and Coalition, that are part of that network.<br />
Figure <strong>3.1</strong> provides a pictorial representation of the importance of cultural and<br />
situational awareness to an advisor’s mission:<br />
Figure <strong>3.1</strong>: Cultural and Situational Awareness<br />
3.4 ISAF Advisor Network Tool (ANET): The ANET is designed to provide advisors<br />
and planners with a tool to help simplify the complexity of the advisor network, increase<br />
advisor knowledge of the essential functions and systems, and ease the task of managing<br />
FB<strong>SFA</strong> – all while connecting the advisor horizontally and vertically within the advisor<br />
construct. The tool demonstrates the linkages<br />
between advisors and their ASI/ANSF<br />
counterparts, the advisors’ place within the EF’s<br />
vertical and horizontal processes, critical nodes<br />
in the Afghan process, advisor information, and<br />
a method for sharing information concerning<br />
advisor interaction. ANET is available on the<br />
ISAF <strong>SFA</strong> Collaboration Site. 2<br />
3.5 Characteristics of the Advisor. Not<br />
everyone is suited to perform advisor functions.<br />
2 The ANET is located in ISAF Secret on the ISAF <strong>SFA</strong> Collaboration Site: http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.<br />
int/CGHQ/CAAT/<strong>SFA</strong>_Collaboration_Site/default.aspx<br />
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As a result, Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) must properly select personnel to<br />
ensure each individual possesses the required knowledge, skills, and temperament<br />
required to work closely with ANSF and ASI personnel. Experience suggests that the<br />
following characteristics significantly enhance an advisor’s ability to adapt and thrive in<br />
a foreign culture:<br />
a) Rank, age, and technical expertise.<br />
b) Empathy, flexibility, and perceptiveness.<br />
c) Open-mindedness and tolerance for ambiguity; ability to withhold judgment<br />
and set realistic goals and tasks.<br />
d) Ability to motivate oneself and others, and a strong sense of self-reliance.<br />
e) Tolerance for cultural differences, ability to accept and learn from failure, and a<br />
sense of humor.<br />
f) The ability to work in a transactional environment.<br />
g) Patience and knowing when it is right to step away.<br />
h) Cultural and religious affiliation and understanding.<br />
3.6 Considerations for the Advisor. Advisors need to be communicators,<br />
negotiators, and ambassadors. Effective advisors gain their counterparts’ trust and<br />
then leverage it to influence action. Advisors operating at any level of the ASI or ANSF<br />
should heed the following consideration and advice:<br />
a) Networks. Operational success of <strong>SFA</strong> is directly related to the advisor’s<br />
knowledge and utilization of established advisor networks (the people). All<br />
advisors should know and communicate with their counterparts at least two<br />
levels up, two levels down, and laterally. For example, an advisor to a Corps<br />
Commander or PCoP should know the advisors to: the General Staff or Deputy<br />
Minister (2-up); the Corps Support Battalion or District Chief of Police (DCoP)<br />
(2-down); and the Regional Training Centers, Regional Logistics Centers, and<br />
other Corps/PCoPs (lateral).<br />
Chapter 3<br />
Photo: Petty Officer 3rd Class Sean Weir<br />
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Networks<br />
During a visiting senior advisor’s visit to one of the training institutions, an ANSF<br />
Commander provided a list of desired classroom equipment and supplies. The<br />
senior advisor replied, “Those are a lot of items required for a classroom. Have<br />
you submitted a MOD-14” The Commander provided the senior advisor a long<br />
answer explaining the challenges with the MOD-14 process. The senior advisor<br />
replied, “Yes, I agree the process is lengthy, but please correct me if I’m wrong:<br />
that’s the process to request the items on your list.” Responding to another long<br />
explanation, the senior advisor explained, “I can assist you in tracking the process<br />
of your MOD-14 request, but I need to know who you sent it to.” The Commander<br />
provided the senior advisor the name of the point of contact who received his<br />
MOD-14 request. Unfortunately, it was the wrong person.<br />
Lessons Learned: Advisors can use the advisor network to understand who the<br />
correct point of contact is for the Afghans to resolve their own problems. Using<br />
the advisor network to ensure the Afghans use the proper process will ensure<br />
long-term sustainability of the ANSF. Providing assistance to ensure the process<br />
works provides longer-term benefits and shifts reliance away from the Coalition<br />
to Afghan systems.<br />
b) Partnership. Unilateral or even Coalition-led missions are no longer an ISAF/<br />
RS mandate. Everything advisors do must be fully integrated and Afghan-led.<br />
Advisors assist their counterpart in developing ways to overcome obstacles<br />
and accomplish difficult tasks by making suggestions and recommendations,<br />
but the mission now must be initiated by Afghans. An indicator of an effective<br />
advisory effort is the amount of personal ownership the Afghans take in their own<br />
operations and duties.<br />
c) Empathy. Empathy can be defined as identifying and understanding another’s<br />
situation, feelings, and motives. This understanding requires getting to know<br />
people and the broader culture in which they operate as well as the history of the<br />
community/communities of which they are a part.<br />
d) Limitations. Much like empathy, advisors need to understand the limitations<br />
of their Afghan counterparts. While it is beyond the scope of this <strong>guide</strong> to describe<br />
all the limiting factors that may challenge an advisor, a few to consider are: many<br />
Afghans may struggle with literacy; almost three-and-a-half decades of conflict<br />
have eroded the trust of many ethnic, tribal, and religious groups in one another<br />
and in the Afghan government; and patronage and corruption are cultural norms.<br />
e) Relationships.<br />
Developing a solid<br />
relationship based on<br />
mutual trust and respect<br />
significantly increases<br />
the ability of advisors<br />
to influence their<br />
counterparts as well as<br />
to overcome difficult<br />
periods. Resources and<br />
expertise will not take the<br />
place of a personal and<br />
professional relationship.<br />
Photo: Sgt. Jessica Ostroska<br />
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Relationships<br />
An ANA Corps Commander expressed his concerns and challenges during a meeting<br />
with other ANA senior leaders. Following his comments, he turns to his senior<br />
advisor and said, “You are my doctor and I’m your patient. I need your help to<br />
address my concerns and challenges, like a sickness.” The senior advisor replied, “I<br />
see things a little differently. I see you as the Doctor, your concerns and challenges<br />
are your patients, and I am your nurse. I am here to assist you, not perform the<br />
surgery.”<br />
Lessons Learned: The primary role of the advisor is to assist in the development<br />
of the ANSF. The advisor’s role is not to solve the problems for the Afghan,<br />
but to facilitate the development of the Afghans to solve their own problems.<br />
Advisors need to build a relationship with Afghan leaders and encourage them<br />
to solve their own problems.<br />
f) Humility. People who benefit from assistance sometimes feel defensive. In<br />
accepting assistance, they are, in a sense, admitting their own shortcomings.<br />
Advisors should not expect gratitude but should instead take satisfaction in the<br />
progress they make, even as progress tends to occur slowly and is difficult to track<br />
on a day-to-day basis.<br />
g) Expertise. Professional competence is critical to personal credibility. Advisors<br />
do not command Afghan organizations; instead, they provide advice, training,<br />
and access to Coalition support as needed. Without a high degree of credibility,<br />
advice is likely to be disregarded. Demonstrated professional competence in<br />
one area leads to a presumption or expectation of competence in others. That<br />
said, advisors must be careful not to overstate the applicability of their particular<br />
expertise; if they do, they will risk losing their hard-earned credibility.<br />
h) Uncertainty. Advisors must be comfortable operating with little supervision<br />
and dealing with complex ethical dilemmas. Advisors need to be capable of<br />
balancing rapport and mission accomplishment with the urge to enforce every<br />
rule and/or tenet. Dealing with a dishonest counterpart is a prime example of this<br />
challenge. While Coalition advisors may find corruption abnormal, they must<br />
assess the impact of improper actions on mission accomplishment.<br />
i) Rank. Afghan counterparts who<br />
are senior in grade should be treated<br />
accordingly. Advisors should refer to<br />
such individuals by their rank and show<br />
appropriate respect and deference. While<br />
Afghan officers have no command authority<br />
over advisors (nor advisors over their<br />
Afghan counterpart), effectiveness is greatly<br />
enhanced when advisors show respect for<br />
their counterparts and the Afghan chain of<br />
Photo: Sgt. Kathryn Summerhill<br />
command.<br />
j) Expectation Management. As Coalition forces draw down, access to past<br />
resources and enablers will decrease. Advisors must manage their Afghan<br />
counterparts’ expectations with respect to resource availability. Another aspect to<br />
that is communication between advisors. Top down, bottom up, and lateral<br />
communication are all pivotal to advising the ANSF. Without it there is a risk that<br />
Afghan partners are left with different perceptions from different advisors,<br />
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possibly jeopardizing the individual advisor in his or her mission. Advisors, as well<br />
as other Coalition partners or SMEs who infrequently engage with Afghan partners,<br />
need to understand this. Miscommunication among advisors and SMEs can create<br />
different expectations among their Afghan counterparts, and eventually cause<br />
significant damage to the mission. Prior coordination and planning between<br />
advising entities can alleviate these problems.<br />
Expectation management<br />
During a routine visit to his ANA counterpart(s), an advisor notices a baseline<br />
shift in their attitude. His Afghan counterparts display noticeable frustration<br />
and act distant. The advisor asks his linguist to assess the situation. The linguist<br />
pries information from the soldiers and reports to the advisor, “…according to the<br />
soldiers, your friends came over and told all the brigades to come to the contracted<br />
facility directly if they need immediate support.” The frustration stems from the inability<br />
to follow the processes that work for the ANA. The CF contractors allowed<br />
the units to circumvent the supporting unit and utilize the contracted facility<br />
directly vice going through the procedure in accordance with the ANA system.<br />
Lessons Learned: Conflicting guidance from two CF advisors degrades advising<br />
objectives and relationships. A keen knowledge of ANA procedures and the<br />
advisor mission must be grasped and relayed to all CF agencies; the inability<br />
to understand mission objectives regresses advising efforts. Because missions<br />
for every advisor team overlap from time to time, it is vital to communicate<br />
laterally through the ANA and CF advisor chain. It is critical that an advisor is<br />
able to send his counterpart clear and concise training objectives. As soon as<br />
someone steps out of their lane to advise a different counterpart, that message<br />
gets confusing and often contradictory. Communicate with fellow advisors,<br />
make a plan, and jointly approach your Afghan counterpart to ensure he/she<br />
receives clear guidance.<br />
k) Negotiations and Conflict Resolution. The study, development, and honing of<br />
negotiation skills is critical to advisors. Cross-cultural negotiation brings with it a<br />
series of unique challenges, such as language and behavior barriers, and unfamiliar<br />
conflict resolution mechanisms. Cultural differences will complicate negotiations<br />
with Afghan counterparts.<br />
l) Working with Interpreters. Interpreters are a critical link between advisors and<br />
their counterparts. Consider the following when advising through an interpreter:<br />
1) Try to use two-man interpreter teams to provide a thorough understanding of<br />
the conversation.<br />
2) Prepare interpreters for technical terms. They must know the relevant subject<br />
areas and translate advisors’ meaning as well as their words.<br />
3) Establish rapport with interpreters through personal contact. Learn their<br />
background and show genuine concern for their families, aspirations, and<br />
education. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter, communication will be<br />
damaged.<br />
4) Prepare interpreters for specific meetings. Tell them in advance what you<br />
are going to discuss with your Afghan counterpart to allow them to confirm<br />
technical terms and your intent.<br />
5) Double-check that interpreters understand. Some may attempt to save face by<br />
concealing their lack of understanding.<br />
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6) Avoid looking at interpreters during discussions; remain focused on your<br />
counterpart.<br />
7) Use small, logical, translatable segments while communicating.<br />
8) Instruct interpreters to never hold back anything the source says. Selective<br />
interpreting, regardless of how insignificant interpreters may find it, will<br />
adversely affect the conversation and potentially the mission.<br />
9) When planning meetings or communications, allow additional time for<br />
interpreters to do their job. A 10-minute conversation may take up to 30<br />
minutes, depending on the interpreter’s ability.<br />
Chapter 3<br />
Photo: Lance Cpl. Darien Bjorndal<br />
m) Solutions. Encourage Afghan partners to develop solutions to Afghanspecific<br />
problems. Just because the Coalition solution works well for the advisor’s<br />
country, does not mean it will work for the Afghans. Solutions must be Afghanachievable<br />
and sustainable well beyond the Coalition’s presence in the advisory<br />
role. Advisors must ensure their counterparts seek Afghan solutions for Afghan<br />
problems. Successive questioning and probing by the advisor until the counterpart<br />
arrives at a solution is the best methodology.<br />
Afghan Solutions for Afghan Problems<br />
During the planning phase for a training event, an ANA Corps logistics planner<br />
asked the senior advisor, “Can you assist us with MREs (Class I)” The senior<br />
advisor replied, “I do not have MREs and our process to request culturally appropriate<br />
MREs is very lengthy. I know the ANA has a process that works and is<br />
designed to support these types of training activities.” The Corps logistics planner<br />
replied, “I know, but I thought you could help me get them faster.”<br />
Lessons Learned: The ANSF needs to learn to be self-reliant and not look<br />
to advisors and the international community to provide solutions to all their<br />
problems. To do this, they need to use their own systems and processes. This<br />
achieves two goals: first, it forces their systems to work, and, secondly, it builds<br />
confidence in their systems. Afghans must learn to be self-sufficient and use<br />
their own resources rather than rely on Coalition solutions.<br />
n) Continuity. The relationship between the advisor, counterpart, and interpreter<br />
will develop over time. Remember, the friction involved with developing this<br />
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bond can be quite normal, but friction can be mitigated by actions such as<br />
formally capturing lessons learned in a continuity book or similar document to<br />
improve the transition between advisors. These lessons are critical in the handover<br />
process to facilitate successors’ relationships with their counterparts.<br />
o) Problems or issues must be Afghan owned before advisers put any effort in<br />
enabling ANSF to solve the problem. If advisors identify problems that the ANSF<br />
do not regard as problems, the issue is not likely to be Afghan owned and will<br />
therefore not be resolved in due time.<br />
p) Target audience. Know the (human) environment you are operating in.<br />
Understand the context of the group dynamic—either that of experienced<br />
personnel or trainees—whether NCOs, enlisted personnel, officers, civilians, or<br />
police.<br />
q) Be inquisitive. Ask probing/shaping questions; open-ended questions can<br />
often drive counterparts toward Afghan solutions.<br />
3.7 Afghan Culture and Communication. Understanding the Afghan population<br />
and culture assists in building rapport and ultimately in accomplishing the mission.<br />
This section discusses three aspects of the sociocultural environment: society, culture,<br />
and communications.<br />
a) Society. People who share<br />
a common culture, occupy<br />
a common territory, and are<br />
subject to the same political<br />
authority can be identified as a<br />
society. Societies are not easily<br />
created or destroyed, nor are<br />
they homogeneous or static. A<br />
society usually has a dominant<br />
culture but can also have<br />
many secondary cultures, each<br />
influencing the others.<br />
b) Culture. Culture influences<br />
an individual’s range of action<br />
and ideas, including what to do<br />
and not do, how to do or not do<br />
Photo: Cpl. James Clark<br />
it, and whom to do it with or<br />
not to do it with. Culture is shaped by history, language, religion, and customs.<br />
Members of society use these shared beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors to<br />
cope with their world and with one another.<br />
c) Communication. Communication is determined by culture; it can be<br />
either high context or low context. Most NATO and TCNs are high-context<br />
communicators that emphasize clearly by stating issues and problems and<br />
working towards resolving them in a straightforward manner. Most Afghans<br />
are low-context communicators who place a premium on building relationships<br />
through actions and less on words.<br />
d) Skills. Advisors require both awareness and knowledge to be effective crosscultural<br />
communicators.<br />
1) Awareness is the act of being sensitive to differences. Carefully observing<br />
actions and reactions can help advisors adjust behavior and modify actions to<br />
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achieve greater influence with counterparts.<br />
2) Knowledge of the nuances of a specific culture is the next level of crosscultural<br />
capability. Advisors attain this level through study and immersion.<br />
Such knowledge is inherently area specific. Developing in-depth regional<br />
knowledge necessary for effective cross-cultural communications requires<br />
extensive, time-consuming study.<br />
3.8 Influence. The vital element for success will be the ability of the FB<strong>SFA</strong> advisor to<br />
understand the precepts of advising.<br />
a) The most important aspect of advising is the degree of influence an advisor<br />
is able to cultivate with his ANSF counterpart. The more able the advisor is to<br />
influence his counterpart, the more effective he will be. Influence can be broken<br />
down into the components of rapport, credibility, and the perceived value that<br />
an advisor brings to his counterpart. Credibility is gained over time by following<br />
through on promises, conducting missions alongside counterparts, and adhering<br />
to standards. Value is equal to all assets that an advisor can bring to bear. It<br />
includes his personal<br />
and team knowledge<br />
and capabilities, access<br />
to resources, and ability<br />
to provide lethal and<br />
non-lethal Coalition<br />
effects. Culture and<br />
the operational area<br />
are the conditions<br />
under which advisor<br />
teams must apply the<br />
influence equation to<br />
achieve mission success.<br />
The following sections<br />
discuss the elements<br />
of influence and the<br />
factors that affect<br />
the FB<strong>SFA</strong> advisory<br />
mission.<br />
Figure 3.2 The Influence Equation<br />
3.9 Rapport. Rapport is a relationship between people that is based on mutual<br />
understanding, respect, and trust. Numerous sources dealing with security force<br />
assistance, often as part of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, emphasize the<br />
importance for advisors to develop strong positive rapport with their counterparts.<br />
Effective rapport will allow advisors to more successfully complete their missions. The<br />
advisor must be able to influence his counterpart to follow a particular course of action<br />
or behavior pattern. Since the advisor is not in his counterpart’s chain of command,<br />
he cannot simply order any specific action; rather, he needs the counterpart to follow<br />
the desired course (which should be an Afghan course) of action by working toward<br />
a commonly developed goal. The measure of effective rapport is whether the advisor<br />
can influence his counterpart to take the desired action. The advisor can only hope<br />
to achieve this through regular face-to-face interactions with the ANSF counterpart.<br />
Level 1 advising, as defined in Chapter 1, is predicated on this degree of contact.<br />
a) Understanding. The first component of rapport is understanding, which<br />
for the advisor begins prior to deployment and may include host-nation<br />
cultural studies; personality profiles; language training; and ANSF military<br />
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equipment, doctrine,<br />
and processes training.<br />
Once in country he/she<br />
continues to broaden<br />
his/her understanding<br />
by observing and asking<br />
questions. During an<br />
effective transition the<br />
incoming commander<br />
must pay particular<br />
attention to the methods<br />
and relationships his/her<br />
Photo: Pfc. Dixie Rae Liwanag<br />
predecessor has developed; predecessor and replacement must seem as one. Since<br />
all the components of rapport are two-way streets, the advisor must be able and<br />
willing to share things about his/her culture, language, military experience, and<br />
personal insights. Practically speaking, interpreters can offer valuable informal<br />
insights into local customs and mores. Interpreters can be approached more<br />
informally than counterparts, especially if the counterparts are of significantly<br />
higher rank. It is important to remember that, in order to be maximally effective,<br />
personal rapport may—and probably will—require the advisor to establish an<br />
intimate level of understanding with his counterpart. This will require the advisor<br />
to get to know his counterpart at a deeper, more personal level than soldiers are<br />
sometimes used to in a short amount of time.<br />
b) Respect. Respect is the next step in the rapport process. The advisor can<br />
start by giving his counterpart a basis to respect him. The counterpart should<br />
grow to respect who the advisor is (his character), what he/she knows, and<br />
how he performs. The counterpart will generally follow suit. In any case, the<br />
advisor should begin to look for those things that he respects in his counterpart.<br />
Sometimes this is easy, but more often it’s a challenge. The counterpart probably<br />
will not fit the mold of Coalition officers. He may not have formal military<br />
training or education; he may even be illiterate. His uniform standards may<br />
not be the same as the advisor’s. Start with the basics and expand over time.<br />
The counterpart is probably placing himself, and possibly his family, in mortal<br />
danger simply by assuming the job he’s in. He may have proven himself as a<br />
fearless warrior even if he didn’t have formal training. In short, there will be traits<br />
deserving of respect even before the relationship matures. Mutual respect grows<br />
through shared experiences and even shared dangers. Advisors should make a<br />
concerted effort to go through the same demands as their Afghan counterparts,<br />
this demonstrates commitment to the mission or task at hand and leads to<br />
respect. The advisor will be on the way to establishing good rapport if he is:<br />
1) Sincerely interested in his counterpart, his counterpart’s nation, and their<br />
shared cause.<br />
2) A competent professional who can help his counterpart achieve his goals,<br />
therefore demonstrating that the advisor can add VALUE.<br />
c) Trust. Trust grows only over time and is based on understanding and respect.<br />
Building trust needs to begin on day one, but it will not mature until later in the<br />
relationship. The advisor should begin by showing he is reliable. Regardless of<br />
local customs, the advisor should do everything that he says he will do. He should<br />
be where he is supposed to be, and be there on time. Always under-promise and<br />
over-deliver.<br />
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d) Rapport Considerations<br />
1) Language. In an ideal world, advisors would be able to converse in the local<br />
dialect of their counterpart. Speaking Dari or Pashtu reasonably well for most<br />
military and social situations is the next best option. If language proficiency is<br />
not an option, learn to work with an interpreter. Even in this case, it is helpful<br />
to learn enough of the language to know “Meet, Greet, and Eat” phrases.<br />
Initially, this small gesture will work wonders in generating positive rapport<br />
with the ANSF counterpart. As a minimum, the advisor should attempt to<br />
learn the counterpart’s language over time; this will generally be a well-received<br />
gesture of respect.<br />
2) Local customs. Respecting local customs goes a long way in building<br />
effective rapport. In virtually every culture, refusing extended invitations<br />
is viewed as a slight. This is extreme in some cultures. The advisor must be<br />
prepared to accept all forms of hospitality except the most extreme. Eating<br />
local food, unless there is a documented medical threat, should be the order<br />
of the day. Participating in cultural ceremonies also helps build rapport. At<br />
some point, however, there is a level of activity where it is necessary to draw<br />
the line. The advisor must be prepared to deal tactfully with issues that are out<br />
of bounds.<br />
3) Modified uniform When authorized by higher headquarters, modified<br />
uniform may enhance rapport. This may take shape in the simplest measure<br />
by allowing advisors or personnel to wear bi-lingual name tapes or rank.<br />
Sometimes local scarves or unit insignia can be used to augment uniforms<br />
without compromising standards. This may also aid in recognizing friendly<br />
personnel in environments where personnel from multi-national coalitions,<br />
including civilians, all<br />
operate in the same battle<br />
space. For advisors to<br />
conventional ANSF units,<br />
however, the counterpart<br />
will usually expect the<br />
advisor to adhere to<br />
his unit’s standards.<br />
Maintaining high uniform<br />
and appearance standards<br />
will establish a level of<br />
expectation in respect to<br />
other standards as well, e.g.,<br />
training, maintenance, etc.<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Vito Bryant<br />
4) Building rapport has its limits. Some academics claim that one must “go<br />
native” to truly understand the host nation and its challenges. In the military,<br />
it is appropriate to assume some of the customs of the ANSF to be effective.<br />
In fact, advisors close to their counterparts can often provide headquarters<br />
with valuable insights into how things look from a grass-roots level. However,<br />
once the advisor begins to pursue the ANSF agenda to the detriment of the<br />
Coalition campaign plan, he has effectively “stepped over the line.”<br />
<strong>3.1</strong>0 Insider Threats (IT). Afghanistan has many threats—such as IEDs, indirect<br />
fire, and small arms fire—but insider threats pose the greatest risk to advisors. Insider<br />
Threats are the potential for an attack by, or facilitated by, anyone who has a position<br />
of trust within a combined team of Coalition and Afghan partners. An insider attack<br />
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occurs when someone in such a position initiates an act of violence against the<br />
Coalition or their own Afghan member. Advisors must fully understand their country’s<br />
national Insider Threat counter-measures and those of any other Coalition troops with<br />
whom they work. This section covers the key functions for countering Insider Threats.<br />
a) The greatest protection against Insider Threat attacks is to build rapport and<br />
maintain close relationships with our Afghan partners.<br />
b) A comprehensive review of the Insider Threat and its corresponding<br />
countermeasures can be found in the ISAF Insider Threat Handbook 2.0,<br />
which is located on the ISAF Secret Portal. 3<br />
Proactive<br />
Reactive<br />
Level Prepare Deter Detect Respond Recover & Exploit<br />
Strategic<br />
- Set counter-measure<br />
requirements<br />
- Set force protection<br />
(FP) & arming policies<br />
- Conduct Strategic<br />
Communications<br />
(STRATCOM)<br />
- Conduct<br />
STRATCOM<br />
- Investigate<br />
- Report<br />
- Conduct reactive<br />
STRATCOM<br />
- Investigate<br />
- Warn & report<br />
- Manage consequences<br />
- Conduct STRAT-<br />
COM<br />
- Exploit lessons<br />
Operational<br />
- Apply FP & arming<br />
policies<br />
- Set SOPs<br />
- Engage at senior<br />
ANSF level<br />
- Learn lessons<br />
- Investigate<br />
- Conduct<br />
information<br />
operations<br />
- Investigate<br />
- Conduct vetting<br />
& screening of CT<br />
personnel<br />
- Report<br />
- Warn & report - Investigate<br />
- Warn & report<br />
- Manage consequences<br />
- Conduct info ops<br />
- Exploit lessons<br />
Tactical<br />
Pre-Deployment: - Adopt FP &<br />
arming policies;<br />
- Practice TTPs look the part<br />
- Conduct cultural - Pairs minimum<br />
training<br />
- Build & maintain<br />
rapport<br />
- Conduct<br />
close-quarter marksmanship<br />
training - Enforce access<br />
procedures<br />
- Conduct threat<br />
awareness training - Challenge<br />
Deployed:<br />
- Communicate<br />
- Assess threat & risk<br />
- Plan each operation<br />
- Rehearse<br />
- Learn lessons<br />
- Recognize adverse<br />
behavior that is:<br />
Frequent<br />
Excessive<br />
Above/below the<br />
‘norm’<br />
Repetitive<br />
- React to the presence<br />
of the abnormal<br />
or the absence of the<br />
normal<br />
- Report<br />
- Warn<br />
- Investigate<br />
- Concentrate<br />
force rapidly<br />
- Gain & maintain<br />
control<br />
- Contain &<br />
neutralize the<br />
threat<br />
- Warn & report<br />
- Conduct a<br />
joint (with ANSF)<br />
response<br />
Recover:<br />
- Manage consequences<br />
- Coordinate with<br />
neighboring units<br />
- Reinforce morale<br />
- Resume mission<br />
Exploit:<br />
- Investigate<br />
- Conduct follow-up<br />
ops<br />
- Exploit lessons<br />
Figure 3.3: The Counter Insider Threat conceptual functions across the Levels of Conflict<br />
<strong>3.1</strong>1 Human Rights Violations. All Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) violations<br />
require attention, but Human Rights Violations (HRVs) and Extra-Judicial Killings<br />
(EJKs) are particularly important. Individual units, groups, or countries found to<br />
have committed HRVs or EJKs may be subject to significant sanctions. Examples<br />
of HRVs include torture; cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment; prolonged and/<br />
or clandestine detention without charges or trial; physical or psychological detainee<br />
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abuse; the disappearance<br />
of persons by abduction;<br />
rape (politicallymotivated<br />
or otherwise);<br />
and other flagrant denials<br />
of life, liberty, or the<br />
security of the person.<br />
Extra-judicial killings<br />
are defined as deliberate<br />
killings that lack due<br />
process of law, and are<br />
directed, encouraged, or<br />
committed by a public<br />
official or security/defense<br />
force member. Depending on the severity of the HRV or EJK, sanctions can range from<br />
discipline or criminal prosecution of individuals to withdrawal of financial support for<br />
specific units or even nations.<br />
Photo: Pfc. Elizabeth Raney<br />
Chapter 3<br />
Extra-Judicial Killing<br />
During TAA engagements with the regional ANA Corps, the ANA Corps com-mander<br />
frequently complains that insurgents captured by his soldiers are often released rather<br />
than prosecuted after they are handed over, due to corruption in the Provincial<br />
Governor’s office. About a week after this most recent complaint, RS aerial assets<br />
notice what appears to be a group of five ANA soldiers, wearing the local Corps<br />
insignia, in an isolated field beating two men with sticks and heavy wires. One of the<br />
men collapses as he is beaten repeatedly, and then stops moving. He is still lying on the<br />
ground motionless as the ANA soldiers depart the scene; he appears to be dead.<br />
Lessons Learned: Due to frustrations with the formal justice system, Afghan security<br />
forces sometimes commit human rights abuses and extra-judicial kill-ings with the<br />
direct or tacit support of their senior leadership. Advisors should always promptly<br />
report knowledge of such abuses or killings. Key leader engage-ments (KLEs) are an<br />
important tool for reminding Afghan partners of the im-portance of respecting<br />
human rights standards, and that such respect is essential to a well-disciplined,<br />
professional force. Furthermore, they should report the alleged corruption in the<br />
governor’s office via their own chain of command.<br />
a) Advisors are postured to professionalize Afghan security and defense forces. It<br />
is important for GIRoA and ANSF officials to abide by internationally recognized<br />
human rights standards. Failure to do so will adversely impact Afghanistan’s<br />
relationships with its international partners, and it may jeopardize opportunities<br />
for training and funding in accordance with U.S. and other International laws.<br />
Many nations are prohibited by their own laws from providing military assistance<br />
to foreign military units or governments that engage in a consistent pattern of<br />
gross violations of human rights.<br />
b) All advisors assigned to ISAF/RS are subject to LOAC at all times. LOAC<br />
includes that part of international law regulating the conduct of hostilities, and<br />
is built upon four principles: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and<br />
limitation of unnecessary suffering. LOAC imposes an obligation not to commit<br />
human rights violations and to report suspected violations through the chain of<br />
command.<br />
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c) As one of COMISAF’s Critical Information Requirements (CIR) and a legal<br />
obligation of LOAC, advisors are required to report suspected HRV in the<br />
following manner:<br />
1) When aware of a possible HRV, gather information describing the incident;<br />
and,<br />
2) Immediately report that information to the your commander or intelligence<br />
operations officer. Incident description should include: who (alleged<br />
perpetrator), which unit, what, where, when, why, how, witnesses, and other<br />
pertinent information (context).<br />
<strong>3.1</strong>2 Corruption. Corruption across Afghanistan’s public and private sectors<br />
represents a threat to the success of ISAF’s/RS’s mission and the legitimacy of the<br />
Afghan government. It serves as a barrier to Afghanistan’s economic growth by<br />
robbing the state of revenue and preventing the development of a stable economy.<br />
Corruption also threatens the process of transition, as institutions weakened by<br />
corruption are less able to take over responsibility for security and governance.<br />
a) Corruption, defined by the World Bank as the abuse of public office for private<br />
gain, undermines the effectiveness of Afghanistan’s government and security<br />
forces, allows criminal networks to fill power vacuums left by weak governance,<br />
fuels discontent among the population, and contributes to both active and passive<br />
support for the insurgency. The impact of corruption includes an increased risk<br />
of state failure, increased support to the insurgency, decreased support from the<br />
International Community, and increased negative Afghan views of GIRoA.<br />
b) ISAF/RS’s Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) (EF 2) mission<br />
is to support Afghanistan’s development of the security ministries (MoD and<br />
MoI), which must be viewed as legitimate and credible government institutions to<br />
set the conditions for self-regulating oversight of the ASI and ANSF. COMISAF<br />
has three desired effects for the TAO mission across the theater: protecting<br />
international donor funds while ensuring the Coalition does not fuel corruption,<br />
ensuring transparency and accountability of funding to the ANSF, and combating<br />
predatory/egregious corruption.<br />
c) The advisor may observe corruption, such as the abuse of entrusted power<br />
for personal gain. Corrupt acts could include an Afghan senior leader showing<br />
favoritism based<br />
upon family/<br />
tribal affiliation<br />
(nepotism),<br />
misusing<br />
government<br />
property and<br />
revenue, theft<br />
of public assets,<br />
fraud, and bribery.<br />
Bribery involving<br />
promotions,<br />
assignments,<br />
contracts, or<br />
training is the<br />
most prevalent<br />
type of corruption<br />
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an advisor will encounter. That said, Afghans might also provide advisors<br />
information about corrupt individuals or activities.<br />
d) Advisors will not actively investigate corrupt activities; they should instead<br />
report them through their chain of command. Furthermore, advisors should work<br />
to ensure Afghan leaders recognize the nature, scope, and corrosive effects of<br />
corruption; influence Afghan leaders to support transparency and accountability;<br />
and work closely with Afghan leaders to operate within established procedures to<br />
restore accountability. These efforts will help combat corrupt behavior and restore<br />
confidence in key Afghan institutions.<br />
Chapter 3<br />
Relationships<br />
The Ministry of Interior (MoI) Foreign Relations Director (FRD) and his deputy<br />
approached the senior advisor to the MoI Chief of Staff with an allegation that<br />
several officers within Recruiting Training Command manipulate candidate lists<br />
for international training. They allege that several officers assigned to Recruiting<br />
Training Command, some of whom are Colonels, take bribes from policemen to<br />
place them on lists for overseas training. They indicated the latest case involved<br />
upcoming training in South Korea for female police officers. FRD submitted a list<br />
of 30 approved and vetted names. Recruiting Training Command sent back a list<br />
that included 16 substitutions. The FRD stated he knows these 16 substitutes are<br />
poorly performing police officers. He understands these women paid bribe money<br />
up front and agreed to pay a percentage of their per diem in order to be added to<br />
the list for training. A previous case involved 18 approved and vetted police officers<br />
who missed training in Germany because Recruiting Training Command withheld<br />
their authorization documents for refusing to pay the bribe. The senior advisor<br />
passed this information to the Commander of the Recruiting Training Command;<br />
he, in turn, conducted an investigation into the allegations. Eight senior officers<br />
were removed and severely disciplined.<br />
Lessons Learned: Advisors cannot be in all places at all times. The importance<br />
of good relationships, therefore, cannot be overstated. This information could<br />
not have been obtained had not Afghan Senior Leaders—based on mutual trust<br />
and respect—provided advisors with incidents of corruption. The advisor network<br />
was thus able to bring these incidents to the attention of the Commander.<br />
This singular incident led to identification and punishment for misconduct.<br />
<strong>3.1</strong>3 Gender and Human Rights.<br />
a) The Universal Human<br />
Rights Declaration as well as<br />
the Afghan Constitution<br />
acknowledges equal human<br />
rights of men and women.<br />
Discrimination based on<br />
gender or ethnicity must<br />
therefore not be accepted, and<br />
the advisor should encourage<br />
as little segregation between<br />
men and women as possible.<br />
Social norms are not constant;<br />
they can change, and culture<br />
Photo: Master Sgt. Kap Kim<br />
and religion should not be allowed as excuses for discrimination.<br />
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b) Women, men, boys, and girls shall benefit from the same rights, responsibilities,<br />
and opportunities. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is a landmark<br />
resolution dealing with women, peace, and security. This resolution calls<br />
for greater participation and incorporation of women’s unique perspectives in:<br />
participation in conflict prevention, peace-building, and reconstruction;<br />
protec-tion of women’s and girl’s human rights during conflict; and the<br />
prevention of gender-based violence (GBV).<br />
c) The Afghan National Action Plan (NAP) developed by Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs on the UNSCR 1325 acknowledges that women have suffered during<br />
the conflicts and reiterates the importance of full inclusion of women in the<br />
peace process and reconciliation. It further marks concrete steps in order to<br />
protect women and vulnerable groups against violence and to take specific<br />
actions to stabilize the society and prevent outbreaks of violence.<br />
d) It is important to keep in mind that women<br />
in Afghanistan were not always<br />
restricted as today. Prior to Taliban rule,<br />
Afghan women enjoyed greater amounts<br />
of freedom and comprised almost half of<br />
Afghanistan’s workforce. In fact 70%<br />
of teachers, 50% of civil servants,<br />
and 40% of physicians were<br />
women. During this time women freely<br />
worked in employment<br />
fields such as engineering, law,<br />
and medicine. In the 1970s,<br />
female students outnumbered<br />
male students in Afghan<br />
universities, and women in<br />
Western-style clothes were<br />
Photo: Senior Airman Courtney Witt<br />
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a common sight in<br />
the cities.<br />
e) Gender does not<br />
equate to women; it<br />
equates to the social<br />
roles of men, women,<br />
boys, and girls in different<br />
societies. These<br />
roles, learned through<br />
socialization, vary<br />
significantly across the<br />
world. In Afghanistan<br />
the current situation is<br />
very complex; in<br />
urban areas there are<br />
progressive men<br />
and women from all<br />
ethnicities willing to accept more gender equality than in some of the rural areas.<br />
The gender roles in Afghan society also differ substantially between different<br />
ethnicities across the country. A set of proper gender analyses is therefore<br />
needed to understand the local variations.<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Dave Overson<br />
f) Although women, especially in remote areas, suffer negative consequences<br />
during the current armed conflict due to their disadvantaged positions, the<br />
Taliban abuses are not only limited to women. Thousands of men have been<br />
taken prisoners, arbitrary detained, tortured, and many have been killed or have<br />
disap-peared. These human rights violations are also gender related; men are<br />
suffering from these violations, which must be properly analyzed and addressed.<br />
g) Gender integration in the ANSF is not a stand-alone goal, but is part of the<br />
overall effort to advance a stabilized Afghan society. Participation of women in<br />
the security forces is crucial for a sustainable and stabilized society. Women are,<br />
for instance, needed in the police for searches and investigations of women.<br />
Women in Afghanistan are more willing to report abuse and criminal cases to<br />
women in the police than to men in the police. It is important to keep in mind<br />
that women’s empowerment and integration in the Afghan security forces often<br />
requires male buy in, so convincing also Afghan men to accept gender integration<br />
is imperative.<br />
h) Gender Advisors have been introduced to support integration of a gender<br />
perspective in operations. This has both an internal and an external component.<br />
Internally, commanders and staff, both in Resolute Support and in ASI/ANSF,<br />
need to conduct gender analyses and integrate gender perspectives in their strategies,<br />
plans, and procedures, to meet the different needs, experiences, and<br />
concerns of local women and men in their area of operations. Externally, they<br />
need to take into account how their operations, actions, and activities can have<br />
different impact on men, women, boys, and girls. They also need to interact with<br />
the entire population, not only male leaders. Deliberately engaging female Key<br />
Leaders and female leaders in Afghanistan will assure that women’s voices are<br />
heard and it will make these women more influential and empowered. Male buyin<br />
on gender equality and integration within the ANSF is also a necessity.<br />
Advising male Afghan leaders in the ANSF about the need to integration women<br />
in the securi-ty sector is therefore imperative. The ANSF have introduced gender<br />
advisors at different levels in their chain of command as well.<br />
Chapter 3<br />
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Gender integration is a part of many advisors responsibility<br />
An advisor from ISAF on logistics got involved in the process of providing new uniforms.<br />
Women in the ANA and ANP have for a long time complained about problems<br />
of getting uniforms that are customized for women and boots/shoes in small sizes.<br />
Uniforms and equipment are often tailored in men’s sizes and profiles and does not fit<br />
the women. A gender advisor in ISAF read about the process of providing new<br />
uniforms in an internal report and asked if the advisor on logistics had remembered to<br />
include female uniforms and boots in the requirements. The advisor was not aware of<br />
the prob-lem with female uniforms, but got back to the Afghan authorities and asked<br />
if female uniforms and boots were included. They confirmed it was.<br />
Lessons Learned: Advisors in all functions need to be aware of gender related<br />
topics in their essential function. Gender is a cross-cutting issue that implies many<br />
areas and levels. By sharing information between the gender advisor and the logistic<br />
advi-sor ISAF was in this case able to verify that women’s requirements would be<br />
met.<br />
<strong>3.1</strong>4 Children and armed conflict. The Government of the Islamic state of Afghanistan<br />
is one of the parties on the UN Secretary-General’s list of shame on Children<br />
and Armed Conflict by May 2014. The government has signed an Action Plan on<br />
Under-Age Recruitment in the ANSF and also a detailed Road Map to Compliance,<br />
with milestones to fulfill the Action Plan. Advisors must be aware of the Children<br />
and Armed Conflict (CAAC) implications in Afghanistan, which include; killing and<br />
maiming of children, recruitment and use of children (both by ANSF and<br />
insurgents), attacks on schools and hospitals, sexual violence against children and<br />
abduction of children. If they observe violations on children’s rights they need to<br />
report<br />
this through their chain of command. The UN has<br />
the UN Country Task Force from UNAMA and<br />
UNICEF that will follow up with further investigations<br />
when they receive notifications from<br />
ISAF or other parties. The Afghan police are<br />
also supposed to conduct investigations if<br />
violations on children’s rights are brought<br />
to their attention.<br />
Photo: Timothy Hrushka<br />
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Chapter 4<br />
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Chapter 4<br />
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CHAPTER 4<br />
Operational Environment<br />
“An in-depth understanding of the operational environment—including available foreign<br />
security forces, opposing threat, and civil considerations—is critical to planning and<br />
conducting effective <strong>SFA</strong>.” 1<br />
4.1 Overview. An in-depth understanding of the operational environment is critical to<br />
ISAF/RS’s and the individual advisor’s ability to successfully plan and conduct <strong>SFA</strong> operations.<br />
The operational environment in Afghanistan is particularly fluid and complex.<br />
The Coalition previously had authorities and permissions derived from the NATO agreement<br />
that enabled ISAF to conduct military led operations in Afghanistan. RS signifies<br />
the subordination of the Coalition military mission to Afghan civil authority. ISAF/RS<br />
forces are guests of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).<br />
4.2 Strategic Partnership. ISAF/RS forces manifest the International Community’s<br />
Strategic Partnership with GIRoA. The elements of strategic partnership include mutual<br />
respect, common goals, effective communications, and trust. Any partnership is based<br />
on interests of the parties involved. GIRoA’s interests are met through the provision of<br />
FB<strong>SFA</strong>, cooperation of regional partners and resources to ensure their sovereignty. Coalition<br />
interests include preventing terrorist organizations from operating in Afghanistan,<br />
freedom of movement, force protection, resource transparency and accountability.<br />
4.3 GIRoA Political Transition. The people of Afghanistan demonstrated their will<br />
during the April 2014 elections and June 2014 run-off election. The significance of this<br />
action and the associated successful security environment provided by the ANSF cannot<br />
be under-stated. The election and peaceful transfer of power indicates GIRoA’s capability<br />
to endure with the consent of the people.<br />
4.4 General. Many factors contribute to the complexity of the Afghan operating environment,<br />
beginning with the country itself, its terrain, its population, and other significant<br />
actors. The combination of a harsh climate, physical environment, abject poverty,<br />
illiteracy, poor health, and educations systems, underdeveloped national economy,<br />
unemployment, corruption, porous borders, organized crime, and a narcotics industry<br />
have engendered and allowed the insurgency to endure.<br />
a) Terrain. Terrain is a critical consideration while planning to conduct FB<strong>SFA</strong>.<br />
Advisors and their respective headquarters must be cautious to include all variables<br />
into the planning process or risk sending inadequately prepared teams into<br />
inhospitable areas. Some major considerations about the<br />
terrain (in rural areas) include level of support from GI-<br />
RoA and ANSF headquarters, austere road networks,<br />
and the local economy.<br />
b) Population. Advisor interaction with<br />
the population, while decreasing in<br />
frequency, is growing increasingly<br />
complex. In many COIN<br />
campaigns, the population<br />
has proven to be the center<br />
of gravity for security forces.<br />
Chapter 4<br />
1 FM 3.07-01, Chapter 2, p. 2-1, dated 01 May 2009.<br />
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This dynamic is no different in Afghanistan. The local populace is often caught<br />
between insurgents and ANSF/CF efforts. Advisors must dedicate time to understand<br />
the population. They must learn key details concerning ANSF interaction in<br />
their local environment. Understanding the local culture and history will increase<br />
advisor effectiveness.<br />
c) Actors. In addition to the physical characteristics of the country and its people,<br />
a number of other actors influence and shape the operating environment. For<br />
example the district political, tribal, and religious leaders are crucial. Complex<br />
variables (i.e., networks) represented by these personalities demand a nuanced<br />
understanding by commanders and advisors at all levels. Actors include the ASI<br />
and ANSF, as well as other influential members of the Afghan community who<br />
represent various local interests. A profound understanding of the actors in a certain<br />
region will take time and a thorough hand over – take over is vital to speed<br />
up this process.<br />
4.5 ISAF/RS <strong>SFA</strong> Actors. (See Chapter 6 for more details.) ISAF/RS, through the<br />
strategic partnership of GIRoA, conducts <strong>SFA</strong> to enable ASI/ANSF to neutralize the<br />
insurgency and terrorist networks to affect security and political transition. ISAF’s<br />
mission will officially conclude on 31 December 2014. For the remainder of 2014 ISAF<br />
will continue to provide support to the ANSF as it prepares and postures the force for a<br />
smooth transition to the TAACs that will be supporting RS. CF advisors will focus on<br />
addressing the ANSF capability gaps previously identified.<br />
a) Troop Reduction. It is worth noting that the period from now until the end of<br />
2014 will be characterized by ISAF reducing troop numbers and by ANSF acting<br />
increasingly autonomously. As the Coalition reduces its footprint and focuses on<br />
the higher-level processes that sustain the ANSF, advisors at critical nodes within<br />
the corps and police HQs will become important Coalition links to the regions,<br />
provinces, and districts. ISAF will maintain situational awareness of the security<br />
and governance progress outside the Kabul cluster through regional-level Operation<br />
Coordination Centers (OCCs). OCCs are a major focus in the employment<br />
of advisors. As CF conducts redeployment<br />
and retrograde operations, successful execution<br />
of lead security responsibility by the<br />
ANSF is paramount.<br />
b) Security Transition. The ISAF mission<br />
(and by extention the RS Mission<br />
as well) is at a critical stage.<br />
Photo: Spc. Ryan Green<br />
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Unified NATO action to support the development of the ANSF’s capacity and<br />
capability is essential to the process of security transition. The effective conduct<br />
of <strong>SFA</strong> activities is, therefore, central to the campaign plan. Following the elections<br />
of June ‘14, ISAF will continue to provide <strong>SFA</strong> at the ANA Corps and ANP<br />
regional levels, up to and including ministerial level. At the corps and regional<br />
level, ISAF/RS will focus on the functional areas that allow ANA and ANP to<br />
develop sustainable command and control, leadership, combined arms integration<br />
(for the ANA) and integrated layered security (for the ANP) capabilities, training<br />
and sustainment. At the ministerial level, one of the main priorities will be on<br />
Essential Function 1 (i.e., planning, programming, budgeting, and execution). All<br />
EF’s include the processes, systems, and institutions required to sustain the army<br />
and police forces. ISAF/RS will also focus on the development of the Afghan Air<br />
Force (AAF).<br />
4.6 Other Significant Actors. Afghanistan continues to face a considerable threat<br />
from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist networks. Al-Qaida maintains a<br />
limited presence in some remote areas of eastern Afghanistan, while groups like the<br />
Haqqani Network (HQN) remain potent forces with the ability to conduct high profile<br />
attacks (HPAs), directed at GIRoA, ANSF and CF targets. The Taliban is expected to<br />
continue to contest GIRoA control over some sparsely populated areas, particularly in<br />
the south and east, along highway 1 and other main insurgent facilitation routs.<br />
4.7 Status of Extremist / Terrorist Networks. A number of terror and foreign<br />
militant groups maintain sanctuary in Afghanistan, some with transnational reach,<br />
such as AQ and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Others are regionally-focused, including the<br />
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the<br />
HQN. HQN maintains areas of political and military influence in Paktika, Paktiya, and<br />
Khost provinces, and has a significant number of cells in Logar and Wardak where they<br />
actively plan HPAs against the capital region. While TTP remains a viable threat, they<br />
remain focused on targeting the Pakistani government.<br />
4.8 Status of the Insurgency. In recent years, the Taliban have focused on five lines<br />
of effort: increase violence, weaken the ANSF, limit ANSF/ISAF freedom of movement<br />
(FOM), conduct media-garnering attacks, and promote insecurity through propaganda<br />
and influence. The Taliban’s inability to defeat the ANSF has resulted in the insurgents<br />
shifting attacks to isolated locations and limited many insurgent efforts to maintaining<br />
existing support areas.<br />
a) Increase Violence. The 2013 fighting season was the first with ANSF in the<br />
lead, and security forces<br />
succeeded in implementing<br />
layered security and limiting<br />
violence in and around<br />
key population centers.<br />
The ANA and ANP are<br />
demonstrating the ability<br />
to hold key and decisive<br />
terrain. Despite localized<br />
increases in violence<br />
and persistent insurgent<br />
influence in portions of<br />
Afghanistan the violence<br />
level in 2014 is well below<br />
2013. Photo: Pfc. Dixie Rae Liwanag<br />
Chapter 4<br />
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b) Weaken the ANSF. The insurgency has been unsuccessful in weakening the<br />
ANSF. In addition to kinetic attacks, the Taliban have sought to weaken the ANSF<br />
through outreach efforts designed to recruit or corrupt officials. The degree of<br />
insurgent success in these efforts remains unclear.<br />
c) Limit ANSF/ISAF/RS Freedom of Movement (FOM). The insurgents view<br />
limiting ISAF/RS and ANSF FOM as critical to achieving their objectives. The<br />
IED attacks along Highway 1 in the east and the south have so far failed to have<br />
enduring impacts on FOM for military or civilian traffic, but are disruptive and<br />
create the perception of insecurity.<br />
d) Conduct Media-Garnering Events. The insurgents continue to conduct high<br />
profile attacks against influential individuals, population centers, and remote<br />
outposts to garner media attention. Insurgent offensive operations and propaganda<br />
portray insurgents as disproportionately capable, and enhance perceptions<br />
of insecurity. HPAs, assassinations, kidnappings, and intimidation of influential<br />
GIRoA officials will continue to be insurgent methodologies. Increasingly, these<br />
attacks are also focusing on Western civilians such as journalists and NGO employees.<br />
e) Promote Insecurity Through Propaganda and Influence. The Taliban’s propaganda<br />
apparatus has struggled to counter the fact the ANSF are in the lead for<br />
security. The Taliban only holds influence in limited areas and have attempted to<br />
gain popular support by providing select government services, primarily criminal<br />
justice and dispute resolution. Despite some level of Afghan citizens “acceptance<br />
of Taliban justice,” the majority of Afghans continue to hold a negative view of the<br />
insurgency and do not want the Taliban to return to power.<br />
4.9 Status of Criminal Networks. The convergence of insurgent, terrorist, and<br />
criminal networks is pervasive and constitutes a real threat to Afghanistan’s stability.<br />
Revenue from opium trafficking continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan<br />
criminal networks. Additionally, some areas of Afghanistan have seen a recent increase<br />
in extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks. Expanding criminal networks<br />
undercut security and governance gains. Criminal networks, insurgent groups,<br />
and corrupt government officials are often interlinked via multi-layered connections,<br />
making ties between officials and criminal activity unclear. These factors all contribute<br />
to popular dissatisfaction with the government and create opportunities for the<br />
insurgency.<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Joshua Brandenburg<br />
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4.10 Women in the ASI/ANSF.<br />
a) Women are needed<br />
in the ASI/ANSF to<br />
provide security to<br />
the 53% of the Afghan<br />
population that are<br />
women. Women are<br />
required for searches,<br />
as experienced in the<br />
2014 elections, but<br />
there are numerous<br />
other tasks in the security<br />
forces for which<br />
women are needed. In<br />
Afghanistan’s gender-segregated<br />
society,<br />
women serving in the<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Christopher Harper<br />
ASI/ANSF are crucial<br />
in fulfilling the security needs of the entire population. Women in Afghanistan<br />
feel more confident raising their security concerns to females in the security<br />
forces than to men. The MoD and MoI have announced ambitious strategies to<br />
include 10% women in the ANA and ANP in a long term perspective. Howev-er,<br />
women in the ASI/ANSF face many challenges in their work environment.<br />
Harassment and sexual abuse offences within the ASI/ANSF are rarely brought<br />
forward for prosecution or disciplinary action. If complaints are reported, women<br />
in the ANSF are often persuaded to accept mitigation to settle the cases. Other<br />
challenges ISAF observes include:<br />
1) Lack of commitment to fulfill strategies to recruit women,<br />
2) Lack of female facilities like bathrooms, changing rooms, and child care<br />
centers,<br />
3) Lack of uniforms, boots, and equipment that fit women,<br />
4) Training women by the same standards as men are trained,<br />
5) Jobs according to qualifications (policewomen are often observed in police<br />
stations making tea and cleaning instead of performing proper policing<br />
tasks), and<br />
6) Promotions on equal terms as men; women are not promoted to decision-making<br />
positions and are kept serving longer in ranks than men.<br />
b) For Resolute Support, gender integration has been introduced as a cross<br />
cutting topic, covering all Essential Functions. Gender Focal Points (GFP), a<br />
dual-hatted position supporting the Commander in implementing directives and<br />
procedures with gender perspective, has been nominated for all the Essential<br />
Functions (EFs). GFP maintains functional dialogue with the Gender Advisor,<br />
but reports within the chain of command. Gender-related essential objectives<br />
exist for all the Essential Functions:<br />
1) EF 1. Programing Budgeting & Execution. Will advise that ASI/ANSF<br />
include gender integration and women’s requirements in planning,<br />
program-ming, budgeting, and execution.<br />
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2) EF 2 & 3. TAO & RoL. Will advise that ASI/ANSF have law enforcement<br />
and disciplinary measures in place to address human rights violations,<br />
includ-ing gender-based violence.<br />
3) EF 4. Force Generation. Will advise that ASI/ANSF have female billets<br />
in Tashkil; recruits both civil and military females; train them to the same<br />
standards as the men and assigns qualified women in formal decision<br />
making positions.<br />
4) EF 5. Force Sustainment. Will advise that ASI/ANSF include adequate<br />
working facilities and separate protected living facilities for women. This<br />
includes uniforms customized for women, equipment customized for<br />
women, protected barracks, exercise facilities, changing rooms, women’s<br />
bathrooms, and child care facilities.<br />
5) EF 6. Campaigns & Operations. Will advise that ASI/ANSF implement<br />
gender-related resolutions, have a gender perspective in relevant planning<br />
and assessment tools through all phases of military operations and missions,<br />
and that campaigns and operations include female response capabilities.<br />
6) EF 7. Intelligence Capabilities & Processes. Will advise<br />
ASI/ANSF to include female intelligence capabilities and<br />
inte-grate a gender perspective in relevant intelligence and<br />
assess-ment tools in order to enhance operational<br />
effectiveness.<br />
7) EF 8. Strategic Communication. Will advise ASI/<br />
ANSF to conduct awareness and advertising campaigns<br />
supporting women’s roles in the ASI/ANSF and their<br />
con-tribution to the security and stability of Afghanistan.<br />
Photo: Petty Officer 2nd Class John O’Neill Herrera<br />
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Chapter 5<br />
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CHAPTER 5<br />
Afghan Actors<br />
This chapter describes the ASIs and the national institutions that generate forces; it<br />
then outlines the ANSF (See Annex A for further discussion).<br />
5.1 Afghan Security Institutions (ASIs). ASI are the organizations that have primary<br />
responsibility for securing the country—the Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense<br />
(MoD), and National Directorate of Security (NDS). Each is headed by a presidentially-appointed,<br />
parliamentary-approved minister (or director, in NDS’s case). To fulfill<br />
its role in these endeavors, ASIs must provide strong and effective leadership and create<br />
the structures, procedures, and plans to build, reform, manage, and sustain the ANSF.<br />
5.2 Ministry of Defense (MoD). The MoD is the government’s executive department<br />
responsible for the implementation of defense policies and is the military’s strategic-level<br />
headquarters. The MoD’s objectives are to defend Afghanistan’s national<br />
sovereignty, national values, national interests, and to defeat the current insurgency.<br />
The MoD also manages contingency planning, defense-related logistics and routine<br />
policy functions of the military. Elements of MoD also develop, refine, and implement<br />
strategic policies to achieve National Security Policy (NSP) objectives. The majority<br />
of leaders in the MoD are senior ANA officers; thus, there is a need to civilianize this<br />
force by creating a balance within the ministry and establishing civilian control (Figure<br />
A-1, pg A-1).<br />
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5.3 The four national military objectives in support of ational Security Policy goals<br />
are:<br />
1) Defend national sovereignty: safeguard national interests and freedom, territorial<br />
integrity, independence, and Islamic values of Afghanistan.<br />
2) Defeat insurgents, Al-Qaeda, terrorism, and terrorist groups in Afghanistan.<br />
3) Continue MoD reform so as to establish a strong defense sector in support of<br />
the national interests and security objectives.<br />
4) Contribute actively to a stable regional and international security environment.<br />
5.4 Ministry of Interior (MoI). The MoI is the government’s executive department<br />
responsible for the implementation of security. It is central to the establishment and<br />
maintenance of the Rule of Law<br />
and the development of enduring<br />
police forces that are professional<br />
and effective. MoI provides oversight<br />
and direction to the Afghan<br />
National Police (ANP) pillars—the<br />
Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP),<br />
Afghan Border Police (ABP),<br />
Afghan National Civil Order<br />
Police (ANCOP), and Afghan<br />
Anti-Crime Police (AACP)—and<br />
two sub-pillars—the Afghan Local<br />
Police (ALP) and the Afghan<br />
Public Protection Force (APPF)<br />
(Annex A, pg A-2).<br />
Photo: Senior Airman Matt Davis<br />
5.5 National Directorate of Security (NDS). The NDS is GIRoA’s domestic intelligence<br />
agency. It reports directly to the president and has thirty departments and<br />
branches across Afghanistan. It has elements serving in each province and is integrated<br />
into the OCC-Ps and OCC-Rs where it synchronizes its efforts with MoI and MoD<br />
elements.<br />
5.6 Gaps. Despite considerable progress, capability gaps remain in the ASIs. These<br />
gaps include, but are not limited to: unlawful civilian influence, planning, programming,<br />
multi-year budgeting, and execution. Systemic issues require advisory support<br />
for sustainment, Inspector General/Transparency Accountability Oversight, human<br />
resources management, and strategic plans and policy. Tactical gaps include intelligence<br />
and ISR, fixed wing and rotary wing aviation CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, engineering<br />
(sustainability, bridging), Combined Arms Route Clearance Operations (CARCO),<br />
and Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices(C-IED). ASI development may slow down<br />
without robust advisory support during the anticipated period of high personnel turnover<br />
associated with the post-election transition of power.<br />
5.7 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANA, ANA Special Operations<br />
Command (ANASOC), Mobile Strike Force (MSF), Afghan Air Force (AAF) and ANP,<br />
all comprise the ANSF and are a growing source of national pride and a strong visual<br />
symbol of the GIRoA enduring strength. The ANSF have shown significant progress<br />
and have evolved into confident and capable troops who have assumed lead security<br />
responsibility for all of Afghanistan. However, the ANSF still face significant challenges<br />
in many areas including leadership, training, logistics, C-IED, fires, and procurement.<br />
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These and other critical issues are currently being addressed by GIRoA and ISAF, but<br />
require medium- to long-term solutions, at the ministerial, force generating, and fielded<br />
force levels within the ANSF.<br />
5.8 National Institutions (Generating Forces). The Afghan National Institutions<br />
cover a range of logistics, materiel, and medical institutions. (All are located in Kabul)<br />
a) Logistics and Materiel: Materiel Management Center-Police (MMC-P) -<br />
Responsible for the management of MoI ANP logistics documentation tracking<br />
request and issue of all classes of supply.<br />
b) MoI Support Center (MSC) - Responsible for receipt, storage and issue of<br />
material.<br />
c) Central Supply Depot (CSD) - Issue, ship, receive, store and replenish CLII,<br />
CLIV, CLVI, CLVII, and CLIX items for national-level logistics.<br />
d) 25 Bunkers ANP - Receive, inventory, store, and issue weapons, ammunition,<br />
at the ANP depot.<br />
e) Army Support Command (ASC) - Receive supply requests (MoD Form 14s)<br />
from Regional Logistics Support Centers (RLSCs) and Corps (entry point of<br />
regional requests at national level).<br />
f) Central Workshop (CWS) - Repairs or rebuilds equipment to a serviceable<br />
condition; has the ability to update and upgrade equipment systems, and then<br />
return them to service.<br />
g) Transportation Brigade - Provide transportation support to MoI.<br />
h) Regional Logistics Command-Kabul (RLC-Kabul) - Command and Control:<br />
prepare plans and orders, and execute and assess operations.<br />
i) Logistics Command - Ensure that Logistics Command HQ and all subordinate<br />
elements follow established processes.<br />
j) Materiel Management Center-Army (MMC-A) - Provide quality control and<br />
validate documentation before it is sent to the CSD.<br />
5.9 ANSF Medical.<br />
a) National Military Hospital (NMH) - (Kabul). The NMH is Afghanistan’s<br />
premiere trauma center and echelon IV medical facility. Serving ANSF personnel<br />
and their families, the ANA’s multi-disciplinary staff is fully-equipped with modern<br />
equipment. It is home to<br />
the ANA’s Medical Residency<br />
Programs. NMH is a 400-bed<br />
facility, with an expansion<br />
capability for up to 550 beds.<br />
The Kabul NMH provides the<br />
highest level of medical care in<br />
the Afghan healthcare system.<br />
b) Regional Military Hospital<br />
(RMH) - (West, North,<br />
East, South, and Southwest).<br />
Each RMH provides higher<br />
echelon care for the ANSF and<br />
their families.<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown<br />
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c) Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences (AFAMS) - (Kabul). AFAMS is<br />
a medical academic institution within the MoD. AFAMS provides medical health<br />
services, professional healthcare technicians, associated healthcare fields and<br />
dental training and education to the ANSF. It is becoming a center of excellence<br />
for medical and dental training and education in Afghanistan.<br />
d) Afghan National Police Hospital (ANPH) - (Kabul). The ANPH is a 200<br />
bed facility that will expand to 300 beds. It currently provides Role III care for all<br />
ANP as well as other ANSF personnel and their families. ANPH houses residency<br />
programs and partners with Ministry of Public Health to support their programs.<br />
5.10 Afghan National Army:<br />
5.11 General Staff (GS). The GS reports directly to the Chief of GS and manages the<br />
strategy, policy and programming requirements for the MoD. The GS provides command<br />
and control for the ANA National Assets (ANASOC and the MSF).<br />
5.12 Ground Forces Command (GFC). GFC commands and controls the majority of<br />
Afghanistan’s ground forces, including all six corps, the 111th Capitol Division, and<br />
Afghan Detention Operations. The GFC was developed with the assistance of the CF in<br />
April 2009 and achieved full operational capability in late 2012.<br />
5.13 ANA Corps Structure. There are currently six ANA corps (Annex A, pg A-3).<br />
Moving clockwise from the northeastern part of the country, they are: 201 st , 203 rd ,<br />
205 th , 215 th , 207 th , and 209 th . They are typically comprised of a headquarters battalion,<br />
three to four brigades, and various specialty kandaks (battalions).<br />
ANA structure below Corps level is presented in Annex<br />
A. The secession of units is corps, brigade, kandak, and tolay<br />
(company).<br />
5.14 Afghan National Army Special Operations Command<br />
(ANASOC). ANASOC is a division-level organization<br />
consisting of two Special Operations Brigades<br />
(SOBs), a Military Intelligence Kandak, a national Strategic<br />
Reserve Special Operations Kandak (6th SOK), four<br />
mobile strike force vehicle (MSFV) companies, a General<br />
Support Kandak (GSK), a Garrison Support Unit<br />
(GSU), and a School of Excellence (SOE) (Annex<br />
A, pg A-11). The SOKs are divided into two main<br />
types of forces: Commandos and Special Forces.<br />
Commandos are organized into companies<br />
(three companies per SOK) and are rapidly<br />
deployable, highly mobile, light infantry<br />
units trained to conduct expeditionary<br />
commando operations such as direct action,<br />
cordon and search, reconnaissance,<br />
raid, and air assault operations. Special<br />
Forces are organized into 15-man Operational<br />
Detachment Alphas (eight ODAs<br />
per SOK) and specialize in internal<br />
defense, village stability, localized intelligence<br />
collection, special reconnaissance,<br />
direct action, Religious Cultural Affairs<br />
(RCA), and Special Information Force/<br />
Afghan Information Dissemination<br />
Photo: Timothy Hrushka<br />
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Operations (AIDO). The SOKs are distinguished from their ANA counterparts by<br />
their capability of and preference for operating at night. At least one SOK operates in<br />
each Corps area of responsibility with many co-located with the Corps HQ. While the<br />
Corps are required to provide logistical support to these Commando Kandaks, they<br />
must request and receive approval from the Chief of General Staff to utilize Commandos<br />
in support of Corps operations<br />
5.15 Mobile Strike Force (MSF). The General Staff Operations (GSG3) controls two<br />
MSF brigades—one based in Kabul and the other based in Kandahar (Annex A, pg<br />
A-12). While the kandaks assigned to the MSF brigades support the Corps commanders,<br />
they report to the GSG3. The MSF kandaks provide a rapidly deployable motorized<br />
infantry capability. The MSF kandak’s mission is to conduct security, maneuver<br />
support, reconnaissance operations, and other offensive and defensive operations. MSF<br />
kandaks may function as independent maneuver elements or as part of a corps-level<br />
operation. Five out of seven MSF kandaks have graduated from the Armor Branch<br />
School. Training and mentoring for the MSFV supply chain is designed to ensure<br />
self-sustainability after 2017. The MSF kandaks are equipped with 58 MSFVs (three<br />
M1117 variants):<br />
a) MSFV-APC. Armored personnel carrier equipped with a turret including M2-<br />
M48 .50 caliber machine gun and MK-19 40mm grenade launcher.<br />
b) MSV-GPK. Gunner protection kit model equipped with a M2 .50 caliber machine<br />
gun, headed by a gunner under armored protection.<br />
c) MEDEVAC-MSF.<br />
5.16 National Engineer Brigade (NEB). The General Staff Operations (GSG3)<br />
controls the NEB based in Kabul. The brigade consists of two kandaks—one special<br />
kandak and one construction kandak.<br />
5.17 Afghan Air Force. The AAF mission is to provide trained and ready airmen to<br />
execute critical tasks from the air in support of the ANSF, and when directed by the<br />
MoD and General Staff, to support the GIROA’s civil authorities. In a country largely<br />
inaccessible by road, the Afghan armed forces depend heavily upon the AAF for airlift<br />
of soldiers, transportation of supplies between corps operating locations, and casualty<br />
evacuation, transportation of human remains, air assault, armed overwatch, and aerial<br />
escort. Other tasks include national taskings for air movement, presidential movement,<br />
non-traditional ISR, and (projected for 2016), close air attack.<br />
a) Organization and Units. As of June 2014, the AAF consists of 3 Air Wings, 4<br />
Air Operations Units, and 14 Detachments. The AAF also has several tenant units<br />
such as the Air Command and Control Center (ACCC) and Air University, both<br />
located in Kabul.<br />
b) The Kabul and Kandahar Air Wings are the primary operational elements of<br />
the AAF. In general, the Kabul Air Wing is the primary operational unit covering<br />
north and east Afghanistan, while the Kandahar Air Wing generally handles<br />
operations in the south and west of the country. The primary flight-training unit<br />
for the AAF is the Shindand Training Wing in western Afghanistan.<br />
c) All of the AAF wings contain an operations group, maintenance group, and<br />
mission support group. Additionally, the training wing at Shindand includes a<br />
training group for fixed-wing and rotary-wing undergraduate pilots. Below the<br />
group level, the flying squadrons are broken down into rotary-wing and fixedwing<br />
squadrons, which include training, standardization and evaluation, and<br />
flight scheduling.<br />
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d) Air Command and Control<br />
Center (ACCC). The ACCC is<br />
the primary C2 agency for the<br />
AAF. The ACCC is the operational<br />
hub of the AAF and<br />
is responsible for tasking all<br />
AAF missions and monitoring<br />
mission execution. The ACCC<br />
validates unit schedules and consolidates<br />
all nationally prioritized<br />
mission requests and regionally<br />
proposed schedules into a single<br />
schedule. The ACCC forwards<br />
approved schedules to all AAF<br />
units for execution while also sending a copy to the National Military Operation<br />
Center for distribution to the General Staff, MoD, and GFC.<br />
5.18 Gaps. Although current trends indicate that by the end of 2014 the ANSF will<br />
have demonstrated tactical overmatch against the insurgency, they will not yet have<br />
all the effective systems in place to ensure self-sustainability. Capability gaps will remain<br />
in areas such as aviation, intelligence, C-IED, combined arms integration,<br />
and sustainment. Gender integration and female recruitment—necessary to handle<br />
the security needs of the female population and detect counter-insurgents<br />
disguised as women—are also slow and deficient. These gaps may potentially<br />
prevent the ANSF from retaining tactical over-match and expanding their<br />
operational reach.<br />
a) The ANA must complete the transition from Regional Training Centers<br />
to Regional Corps Battle Schools, which supports the professionalization of<br />
the force. At the same time, more work must be done to develop an effective<br />
operational deployment cycle, which is critical in managing OPTEMPO and<br />
leaves (vacation or respite).<br />
b) The AAF will help ensure an asymmetric advantage over the threat,<br />
however it will still require assistance to fully mature due to the late fielding<br />
of equipment and human capital challenges including recruiting, education,<br />
maintenance, and training.<br />
c) Like most of the ANSF, the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) will<br />
be tactically proficient by the end of 2014. However, the Special Operations<br />
Brigade HQ and the Special Mission Wing will still need focused advising into<br />
RS.<br />
5.19 Afghan National Police (ANP) The ANP are primarily responsible for law<br />
enforcement. They will work for and with the People to actively fight crime, maintain<br />
civil order, reduce corruption, and prevent the cultivation, production, and<br />
smuggling of illegal narcotics. The police will protect and extend the sovereignty of<br />
the State throughout the country and protect its borders while assuming the lead<br />
role for security (Police Primacy) in the more permissive areas of Afghanistan.<br />
a) The current police chain of command runs from the MoI to the Deputy<br />
Minister for security to the provincial chiefs of police to the district chiefs of<br />
police. Provincial governors do not direct police activities, but they are afforded<br />
a level of influence by Afghan public law.<br />
b) The ANP have grown both in size and in capability over the past few years.<br />
However, they suffer from illiteracy, innumeracy, corruption, logistics inef-<br />
Photo: Master Sgt. Benjamin Bloker<br />
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ficiencies, and a lack of effective Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). The ANP<br />
consist of the AUP, ABP, ANCOP, the General Command of Police Special Units<br />
(GCPSU), and AACP. The AUP, ANCOP, ABP, and AACP are referred to as “Police<br />
Pillars” while the ALP and APPF are referred to as “Police Sub-Pillars” (see Figure<br />
5.1 and 5.2.) Annex A provides additional details on the MoI and ANP, to include<br />
organizational charts for the MoI and ANP subordinate units, andinformation on<br />
missions, composition, disposition, and uniforms.<br />
Chapter 5<br />
Figure 5.1 Afghan Police Pillars<br />
5.20 Afghan Uniform Police<br />
(AUP). The AUP is the largest police<br />
agency in Afghanistan and the<br />
primary police force the local populace<br />
will encounter daily. The AUP<br />
is still largely a para-military force<br />
focused on fighting insurgents, but<br />
the long-term intent is for it to conduct<br />
community or civil policing<br />
and to assume the lead for security<br />
and stability in populated areas.<br />
5.21 Provincial Chief of Police<br />
(PCoP). A President of Afghanistan<br />
(POA)-appointed PCoP controls<br />
all police activities within a given<br />
province through appointed District<br />
Chiefs of Police (DCoP). The<br />
Figure 5.2 Police sub-pillars<br />
AUP zone headquarters have been<br />
eliminated and replaced with Type-A police headquarters, usually in the largest or most<br />
dominant province in the zone/region. In theory the Type-A PCoPs have several other<br />
Type-B and -C PCoPs reporting to them, but in reality, most PCoPs—regardless of<br />
type—communicate directly with MoI (Annex A, pg A-24).<br />
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5.22 District Chief of Police. The DCoP is the senior law enforcement officer in the<br />
district. The DCoP is the face of GIRoA for a substantial portion of the population<br />
and is sometimes the only GIRoA official in a district. He manages all of the AUP<br />
within district boundaries and interacts with the PCoP for issues affecting his district.<br />
The DCoP is also a key intermediary with the village elders who work to nominate<br />
individuals to serve as part of the ALP (see par 5.29 for ALP). Once the ALP<br />
are vetted, they are trained at AUP training centers and assigned security duties in<br />
their respective villages. Village and checkpoint-level ALP commanders coordinate<br />
their activities with the DCoP. The DCoP attempts to utilize the ALP along with his<br />
assigned AUP as part of an integrated plan to increase the security bubble across the<br />
district. The DCoP is where responsibilities for the ALP and policing the community<br />
intersect. For this reason, the DCoP is the critical node in the AUP and arguably for<br />
the entire MoI.<br />
5.23 Afghan Border Police (ABP). The ABP are organized into six zones and have<br />
primary responsibility for the security zone that stretches 50km inland from Afghanistan’s<br />
international boundaries (Annex A, pg A-26). It also operates at Border<br />
Crossing Points (BXPs) and airports. The ABP guard against illegal entry of persons,<br />
weapons, narcotics, and other goods. In some areas, they also perform paramilitary<br />
functions to suppress insurgent activity. In coordination with customs authorities,<br />
the ABP provides immigration/visa services, establishes and maintains BXP’s, and<br />
provides perimeter, building, aircraft, and passenger security at airports. They also<br />
have augmented judicial sector security in some districts.<br />
5.24 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The ANCOP are modeled after<br />
the European gendarmeries and were developed specifically to deal with civil unrest<br />
and to react to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas. ANCOP provide<br />
civil order presence patrols and a crisis or counter-terror response capability in urban<br />
and metropolitan areas and also prevent or respond to violent public incidents.<br />
ANCOP are organized into brigades and kandaks that are deployable throughout<br />
Afghanistan (Annex A, pg A-28). ANCOP are often deployed in support of ANA-led<br />
counterinsurgency operations, and in some areas they man checkpoints like their<br />
ANSF counterparts. 1<br />
5.25 Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The CNPA is the lead agency<br />
for the counter-narcotics<br />
mission in Afghanistan.<br />
It is part of MoI and<br />
operates under the Deputy<br />
Minister for Counter-Narcotics.<br />
It consists of a regular<br />
narcotics police force,<br />
located throughout the<br />
34 provinces, and several<br />
Coalition-mentored specialized<br />
units. The specialized<br />
units (the Sensitive<br />
Investigation Unit (SIU),<br />
National Interdiction Unit<br />
(<strong>NIU</strong>), and Intelligence<br />
and Investigation Unit<br />
Photo: Tech. Sgt. Laura Smith<br />
1 The ANCOP 3 rd BDE in Balkh Province recently reassigned 3 kandaks to provide enough kandaks to<br />
form a new 4 th ANCOP Brigade in Kunduz.<br />
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(IIU)) are assessed as highly capable. The CNPA supports the goals of Afghanistan’s<br />
Ministry of Counter Narcotics Anti-Drug Trafficking Policy.<br />
5.26 Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP).<br />
The AACP provides specialist police expertise<br />
and counter-terrorism, anti-corruption,<br />
criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics,<br />
and specialized security details. Forensics and<br />
biometrics are supported by Coalition subject<br />
matter experts who work side-by-side with<br />
their Afghan counterparts. The forensic and<br />
biometric programs support evidence-based<br />
operations and work with criminal investigators,<br />
prosecutors, and judges to ensure the<br />
police are the face of the rule of law.<br />
5.27 General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). The GCPSU is comprised<br />
of an operational-level headquarters, two training centers, national mission<br />
units (NMUs) and provincial units (Annex A, pg A-30). NMUs have a mandate to<br />
operate across the entire country and conduct a range of policing functions from<br />
counter-terrorist operations to high-risk arrests and hostage recovery. The Provincial<br />
Special Units (PSUs) are special police units that are TACON to the PCoP in<br />
their assigned province and OPCON to the GCPSU. The PSU provides a relatively<br />
sophisticated quick-reaction capability and special investigative element for the<br />
province. They hold broad responsibilities for public order, high-risk arrests, and<br />
evidence-based policing operations within the rule of law construct. As of June 2014,<br />
there were 25 PSUs located across Afghanistan, with plans to build an additional<br />
eight PSUs. The two training centers provide general training for service with PSUs<br />
and advanced training for NMUs and other capabilities as required.<br />
5.28 Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The APPF provides fixed site, convoy,<br />
and personal security as a GIRoA state-owned enterprise. It is assuming security<br />
missions from private security companies (PSCs) as directed by Afghan Presidential<br />
Decree #62 in August 2010, which required PSCs to be disbanded. The APPF<br />
is not a police force, but instead guards critical infrastructure such as power plants,<br />
dams, and non-governmental facilities such as banks and hotels. In additional, the<br />
APPF will provide convoy security in many parts of Afghanistan. Some international<br />
organizations (for example NGOs and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs))<br />
contract with the MoI for<br />
APPF security services (Annex<br />
A, pg A-32). As of FEB<br />
2014, the APPF has gone<br />
through a transition from<br />
its current state as a stateowned<br />
enterprise to a pillar<br />
under the Deputy Minister<br />
of Security. The transition<br />
has faced many legal and<br />
funding challenges with this<br />
new entity. ISAF MoI advisors<br />
are working with MoI<br />
during this transition for a<br />
legal, sustainable, and timely<br />
option. The APPF current-<br />
Photo: Sandra Arnold<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Terri Barriere<br />
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ly provides base security at five ISAF(RS) locations. APPF convoy operations are<br />
directed under the MoI Transportation Brigade worked in conjunction with PCoPs<br />
for route security.<br />
5.29 Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP began as a Combined Joint Special Operations<br />
Task Force—Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) initiative to establish local defense<br />
forces at the village and district level. While the ALP are an official sub-pillar of the<br />
MoI and can detain insurgents and criminals, they lack arrest authority. There are<br />
currently 125 districts with ALP. Each district has a senior ALP commander who<br />
reports directly to the DCoP (Annex A, pg A-34). The DCoP has overall responsiblity<br />
for the ALP’s administrative and logistical support, to include recruiting, pay,<br />
equipment, and fuel. The ALP are approximately 25,000 personnel strong (as of fall<br />
2013), and are scheduled to grow to approximately 30,000 members. In some areas<br />
ALP are mistakenly referred to as arbakai, the name long-used in Afghanistan to<br />
describe local militias. Depending on the area and local history, the term may carry<br />
negative connotations.<br />
5.30 Special Mission Wing (SMW). The SMW was established out of the MoI’s Air<br />
Interdiction Unit to conduct multi-functional aviation operations in direct support<br />
of GIRoA’s ASSF units (e.g., Commandos, ANA Special Forces, Ktah Khas, and GCP-<br />
SU National Mission Units) for counternarcotics (CN), counter-terrorism (CT), and<br />
SOF missions throughout Afghanistan (Annex A, pg A-20). The SMW is the only air<br />
mobility capability in Afghanistan able of project power at night with the required<br />
precision to support high-risk missions. A Joint Special Operations Advisory Team<br />
(SOAT) and Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) mentor the development<br />
of the unit’s operations and maintenance capabilities and standards. A contracted<br />
logistics support team provides capacity development of SMW leaders, staff and<br />
aircrew through education, training, and mentoring. The SMW fleet is funded with a<br />
combination of ASFF and DoD CN funds.<br />
a) As of June 14, the SMW has 22 Mi-17s available for<br />
day to day operations. These include two Mi-17v1s<br />
organic to the unit and eight Mi-17v5s on loan from<br />
the Afghan Air Force. Additionally, the SMW has 17<br />
Mi-17v1s in overhaul, with eight expected to return to<br />
service as part of the SMW before being returned to<br />
their donors. The primary training focus for the SMW<br />
is the production of Afghan Mi-17 night-vision goggle<br />
(NVG) aircrews and maintenance personnel. Currently,<br />
the SMW has ten fully mission qualified Mi-17 NVG<br />
crews and maintenance personnel. Currently, the SMW<br />
has ten fully mission qualified Mi-17 NVG crews and<br />
its training capacity is limited by the number of Mi-17s<br />
available for operations and training. Training capacity<br />
will increase as the SMW continues to receive its<br />
additional Mi-17v5s between now and October 2014,<br />
when it will have reached its total end strength to 30<br />
Mi-17s. Additionally, the SMW has received six of its 18<br />
expected PC-12 intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance<br />
(ISR) aircraft. The PC-12 provides the SMW with<br />
the capability to provide near real-time and post mission<br />
ISR support to ASSF CN and CT missions. SMW<br />
expects to mature this capability to FOC by mid-2016.<br />
U.S. Army courtesy photo<br />
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b) In August 2013, the MoD, MoI, and NDS chiefs signed the initial Air Charter<br />
which was intended to streamline the SMW’s C2, moving them from under MoI<br />
to MoD. Unfortunately, neither the language in the initial charter, nor in a subsequent<br />
charter signed by the same ministries in May 2014, codified clear command<br />
and control of the unit. This inhibited its development because of limited gains<br />
in personnel and support. Coalition mentors continue to focus their efforts to<br />
find an acceptable Afghan solution to this predicament. Despite the C2 issues,<br />
the SMW continues to advance its capabilities and is preparing for delivery of<br />
its additional aircraft and its future expansion to Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif.<br />
SMW is making operational progress, working with Afghan SOF units from both<br />
MoI and MoD. It requires MoI and MoD cooperation for command and control,<br />
personnel assignment and equipment delivery. The SMW SOAG advises the SMW<br />
leadership on both training and operations.<br />
5.31 Gaps. In the near term, the Afghan<br />
police will remain a counter-insurgency<br />
focused force. They will need continued<br />
development and focused advising in intelligence<br />
capabilities and evidence-based<br />
operations. The police will have gained<br />
credibility in the eyes of the Afghan people,<br />
but will not yet have all the effective<br />
systems in place to ensure self-sustainability.<br />
Gender integration and female<br />
recruitment necessary to handle the<br />
security needs of the female population<br />
and detect counter-insurgents disguised as<br />
women are also slow and deficient.<br />
Photo: Cpl. Clay Beyersdorfer<br />
Capability gaps in areas such as C-IED, integrated layered security, and sustainment will<br />
prevent them from expanding their operational reach.<br />
5.32 Operations Coordination Group (OCG) and Ktah Khas Afghan (KKA). The<br />
OCG is an operational-level organization made up of representatives from the Ministry<br />
of Defense, Ministry of the Interior, and the National Directorate of Security that<br />
provide legal validation, battle space owner and governmental de-confliction, and<br />
post-mission review of KKA operations. The KKA is an Afghan light infantry Special<br />
Operations Battalion. The KKA consist of three 170-man rifle companies, a 29-man<br />
reconnaissance unit and several sections that enable and support the Strike Forces.<br />
The KKA Military Intelligence Company provides target area analysis and supports<br />
collection efforts on the objective. The KKA headquarters company contains the staff<br />
sections and command group and the Support Company that provides transportation,<br />
maintenance, and food services. The KKA 4th Company contains instructors and 50<br />
student slots for new KKA Soldiers who undergo a Basic Operator Training module to<br />
provide foundational skills for service in a rifle company.<br />
KKA platoons and companies are trained to conduct precision raids, tactical callouts,<br />
and vehicle interdictions against high value targets utilizing both ground and air<br />
mobility platforms. The KKA C2 relationship places them directly under the MoD G3<br />
in order to make them rapidly responsive to national-level targets throughout Afghanistan.<br />
The OCG and KKA’s geographic flexibility, rapid ability to gain mission approval<br />
and legal justification, and precision in execution distinguish them from their special<br />
operations counterparts within the MoD and MoI. Developing the KKA’s operational-level<br />
command, sustainment, intelligence and recruitment structures is the current<br />
focus of the US KKA SOAG.<br />
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5.33 Operations Coordination Center (OCC). OCCs were created to help coordinate<br />
information flow and action between GIRoA entities, and to a lesser extent between CF<br />
and GIRoA. In most areas, requests for ISAF/RS enabler support (e.g., CASEVAC and<br />
MEDEVAC) flow from the ANSF to the OCC, and from the OCC to the designated<br />
ISAF/RS C2 node (often a Regional Command Combined Joint Operations Center).<br />
OCCs have a secondary task of helping coordinate civil response to events such as natural<br />
disasters or coordinate security actions for a special event—e.g., elections. In some<br />
cases, OCC facilities are used for planning major combined operations, such as election<br />
security with either the Corps or Provincial PHQ representative leads. OCCs exist at the<br />
regional and provincial levels with staffing from the ANA, AUP, and NDS. Some OCC-<br />
Rs may see representation from ANASOC, ANCOP, ABP, and other ANSF elements.<br />
There are a number of district-level OCCs (OCC-Ds) where the Afghans have deemed<br />
them necessary.<br />
5.34 Gaps. The ANSF require additional development of the OCCs to help manage<br />
ANSF capabilities. These additional develompent requirements include effective<br />
combined arms integration, as well as sustainment the fighting capability of the Corps,<br />
specialty kandaks, logistics centers, and medical operations. Shortfalls in some OCCs<br />
include delayed information sharing—which degrades a common operational picture<br />
that enables timely decision making—and personnel shortages in key staff positions.<br />
5.35 Integrated Layered Security. Layered Security is the operational approach by<br />
which ANSF (specifically the police entities) protect the population and secure key terrain<br />
through mutual support among all the ANSF pillars. This framework is enabled by<br />
dynamic lateral and vertical coordination and communications and leverage of collective<br />
intelligence efforts.<br />
Figure 5.3 Integrated Layered Security<br />
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5.36 Key Tasks. Security of the population is achieved through a balanced mix of offensive<br />
and area security tasks, each conducted to varying degrees by each of the ANSF<br />
pillars. These tasks include:<br />
a) Aggressive patrolling of the population centers and rural areas<br />
b) Retaining key terrain<br />
c) Controlling critical highways, routes, and border crossing points<br />
d) Disrupting movement of illicit material and insurgents across borders<br />
e) Interdicting illicit material and insurgents outside of population centers<br />
f) Criminal Intelligence gathering and exploitation<br />
5.37 Desired Effect. Population protected; stable environment provided for the development<br />
of GIRoA governance, and denial of enemy and criminal elements freedom to<br />
operate and access to the population.<br />
5.38 Summary. Layered Security demands consistent and timely coordination and<br />
synchronization across all ANSF pillars. ISAF/RS FB<strong>SFA</strong> TAA, will enable the ANSF to<br />
improve the operational effectiveness of layered security in support of the Afghan population-centric<br />
COIN campaign. OCCs play a key role in the coordination of operations<br />
across formations, facilitate mutual support and increase overall ANSF effectiveness of<br />
layered security. (See Fig. 5.3 for a representation of the ILS).<br />
5.39 Overall ASI/ANSF Gaps/Shortfalls. The ANSF and the ASI have made substantial<br />
progress in fielding and developing capabilities, but these capabilities are not yet sustainable.<br />
Work remains to be done on the systems, processes, jurisdictional mandates,<br />
and institutions necessary to make progress enduring. Significant ministerial gaps exist<br />
in planning, programming and multi-year budgeting and execution; and transparency<br />
accountability and oversight. Capability development shortfalls were identified in logistics,<br />
acquisition, and financial management; strategic plans and policy; human resource<br />
management and gender equality (IAW UNSCR 1325).<br />
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Photo: Capt. Craig Bosveld<br />
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Chapter 6<br />
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CHAPTER 6<br />
RS Actors<br />
“Afghans deliver capabilities; we deliver advice and assistance.”<br />
—General Joseph Dunford, COMISAF December 2013<br />
This chapter provides a broad overview of the ISAF/RS FB<strong>SFA</strong> staff processes as of 30<br />
June 2014. These processes will continue to evolve due to the upcoming transition from<br />
both a 3-star IJC HQ and a 4-Star ISAF HQ into one strategic level Resolute Support<br />
Command and Control Headquarters. The processes will also continue to develop<br />
as FB<strong>SFA</strong> is operationalized and the eight EFs used to track and measure progress in<br />
FB<strong>SFA</strong> are refined. 1<br />
6.1 Introduction. This chapter is an overview of the ISAF/RS organizations<br />
conducting FB<strong>SFA</strong> during the remainder of the ISAF mission and the subsequent RS<br />
mission. Advisors and advisor teams employ FB<strong>SFA</strong> to train, advise, and assist the ASI<br />
and ANSF.<br />
6.2 Advisors. Advisors must become experts in ASI and ANSF processes and the<br />
critical nodes and decision points in those processes at every level which they advise.<br />
Advisors should network with fellow ISAF advisors. This can easily be done by using<br />
the Advisor Network Tool (ANET) to find colleague advisors and to review related<br />
functional areas that influence, enhance, or are effected by the work you will do with<br />
your Afghan partner. Establishing a network enables advisors to vertically integrate<br />
and horizontally coordinate efforts, as they train, advise, and assist the ASI and ANSF.<br />
Advisor collaboration helps facilitate the implementation of Afghan-developed<br />
solutions into the ASI and ANSF. Each advisor is empowered to seek out fellow<br />
advisors to discuss issues and work with the Afghans to address and resolve problems<br />
at lower levels. In cases<br />
in which this may not be<br />
achieved, important issues<br />
must be elevated into the<br />
formal problem resolution<br />
structure comprised of<br />
the TAAC <strong>SFA</strong> Targeting<br />
Meeting, <strong>SFA</strong> Working<br />
Group, and <strong>SFA</strong> Board<br />
for decision and action<br />
(described in Chapter 2).<br />
6.3 ISAF HQ and<br />
Subordinate Commands.<br />
FB<strong>SFA</strong> is the main effort for<br />
the remainder of the ISAF<br />
mission and throughout<br />
RS. As such, FB<strong>SFA</strong> is being<br />
Chapter 6<br />
1 The ISAF <strong>SFA</strong> Center manages the FB<strong>SFA</strong> staffing process. The latest information regarding staff<br />
processes is available on the ISAF Secret <strong>SFA</strong>C Portal at: http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/DCOSOPS/<br />
CJ3/CJ%2035/<strong>SFA</strong>FUSION/default.aspx<br />
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fully operationalized and mainstreamed into the ISAF/RS staff. Processes, procedures,<br />
roles, and responsibilities have been defined, and the employment of FB<strong>SFA</strong> is being<br />
refined as the eight EFs are developed. Each of ISAF’s/RS’s subordinate commands<br />
have a unique organizational structure and approach to FB<strong>SFA</strong> and an important role<br />
in executing it. Mainstreaming of the eight EFs coincides with the transition to one<br />
strategic level RS headquarters. This transition will begin in July 2014 and is designed<br />
to be complete on or before 31 October 2014.<br />
6.4 Deputy Commanding General Combined Security Transition Command-<br />
Afghanistan (DCG CSTC-A). DCG CSTC-A provides resources in support of ASI<br />
and ANSF development and assists ISAF/RS organizations with technical support to<br />
develop sustainable ASI/ANSF capacity and capabilities. DCG CSTC-A is responsible<br />
for integrating and synchronizing<br />
processes related to Afghan<br />
Security Forces Funding (ASFF)<br />
to ensure proper planning,<br />
execution, transparency,<br />
accountability, and oversight of<br />
donated resources from the US,<br />
Coalition, and IC. The office also<br />
executes USG responsibilities<br />
for financial management and<br />
security assistance.<br />
a) DCG CSTC-A<br />
Organization: The DCG<br />
CSTC-A consists of seven directorates:<br />
1) CJ-8, Contracting Enabler Cell,<br />
2) NATO Financial Contributions,<br />
3) Security Assistance Office (SAO),<br />
4) Engineers (CJ-ENG),<br />
5) SHAFAFIYAT<br />
6) Plans and Operations.<br />
b) DCG CSTC-A’s key tasks and functions.<br />
1) Justify, account for, and maintain fiscal control of FY08 - F15 ASFF.<br />
2) Receive, manage, and execute FY15 - FY17 international donations.<br />
3) Develop GIRoA transparency and anti-corruption.<br />
4) Provide security assistance and manage Foreign Military Sales.<br />
5) Manage and provide oversight on US contracts.<br />
6) Build, maintain, and transition management of ANSF infrastructure to<br />
GIRoA.<br />
6.5 Deputy Commander Ministerial Advisor Group (DCOM MAG)/Combined<br />
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). On 1 July 2014, DCOM<br />
MAG/CSTC-A was disaggregated, and the advisors who were part of the MoI and<br />
MoD Ministerial Advisory Groups (MAGs) and the Enterprise Advisory Groups<br />
(EAGs) under DCOM MAG/CSTC-A realigned into the relevant HQ ISAF DCOS<br />
Photo: Lance Cpl. Robert Reeves<br />
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sections. Under the DCOS sections, they are employed predominantly by the Essential<br />
Function (EF) leads.<br />
6.6 Ministerial and Enterprise Advisory Groups. The MoD and MoI MAGs and six<br />
EAGs were disaggregated on 1 July 2014. The realigned advisors will continue their<br />
interaction and roles supporting advisors with Afghan ministries. The officers are<br />
assigned within the ISAF/RS staff and conduct FB<strong>SFA</strong> via the eight EFs.<br />
Figure 6.1 RS C2 Diagram<br />
Chapter 6<br />
Figure 6.2 Deputy Advisors<br />
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6.7 Special Advisors to COMISAF/COMRS. Upon the disaggregation of the MoI and<br />
MoD MAGs, the directors of the MAGs will become special advisors to COMISAF/<br />
COMRS (see figure 6.2). For the remainder of the ISAF mission and throughout RS,<br />
they will serve as Deputy Advisor MoI and Deputy Advisor MoD to COMISAF/RS. A<br />
third special advisor position, Deputy Advisor General Support, will function on the<br />
same level with the other Deputy Advisors.<br />
6.8 Realignment. Realignment is defined as a change in the chain of command and<br />
reporting to achieve better vertical alignment. The ISAF staff is being realigned in<br />
accordance with the eight EFs so that advisors can deliver FB<strong>SFA</strong> in a manner that will<br />
create an enduring posture of processes and systems beyond RS. It does not, however,<br />
require any physical moves. The realignment is divided into three phases and is<br />
designed to reach Full Operating Capability (FOC) by 31 October 2014. Administration<br />
Realignment Complete (ARC) will be directed and completed by 01 August 2014.<br />
a) Phase 1: Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by 01 July 2014. The first phase<br />
consisted of changing hierarchical relationships, transferring responsibility for<br />
Ministerial Development Plans, amending reporting streams, and establishing an<br />
updated HQ Battle Rhythm.<br />
b) Phase 2: ADMIN Realignment Complete (ARC). By 01 August 2014, EF leads<br />
within the HQ ISAF DCOS sections will take over command responsibility for<br />
force protection, equipment and personnel administration issues. Advisors who are<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Terri Barriere<br />
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to be employed by EFs still residing in NKAIA will be administratively realigned<br />
to the appropriate DCOS section in HQ ISAF in accordance with Annex A.<br />
c) Phase 3: Full Operating Capability. By 31 October 2014, physical moves of<br />
ministerial advisors are complete and all EF leads are based at HQ ISAF. All<br />
other actions and issues concerning the establishment of the new structure are<br />
complete.<br />
6.9 MoI advisors remain responsible for <strong>SFA</strong> within the MoI at the ministerial,<br />
deputy ministerial, and the ANP Type-A or Zone-level headquarters levels to develop<br />
GIRoA institutional security force capacity and capability. MoI advisors accomplish<br />
this mission by developing enduring institutional policies and processes needed<br />
to sustain the ANP. Emphasis is on comprehensive and integrated approaches to<br />
foundational capabilities, including sustainment (i.e., procurement, logistics, finance);<br />
human resource management; strategy, policy, and plans; transparency, accountability,<br />
and oversight; and enabling capabilities (e.g., intelligence and communications). MoI<br />
advisors are organized to maintain Level 1 advising with specific offices within the MoI<br />
where they advise the offices of the MoI and Chief of Staff, Foreign Affairs Directorate,<br />
Legal Advisor, Legal Affairs Directorate, and the Office of Gender and Human Rights.<br />
Additional Level 1 advising is provided to Office of the Deputy Minister for Security;<br />
Office of the Chief of Staff; Office of the Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics; Plans<br />
and Operations Directorate; and the Headquarters of the AUP, ABP, AACP, GCPSU,<br />
and ANCOP. The APPF advisors advise the Office of the Deputy Minister for APPF,<br />
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Operations Directorate, and Business and Finance Directorate. The police Intelligence<br />
Advisors advise the Director of Police Intelligence (DPI), Office of the Chief of Staff,<br />
Operations Department, Analysis Department, Investigations Department, Police<br />
Intelligence Training Center (PITC), and National Targeting and Exploitation Center<br />
(NTEC).<br />
6.10 MoD advisors remain responsible for providing <strong>SFA</strong> to the processes, systems,<br />
offices, and individuals within the MoD, to include the Offices of the Minister and<br />
Chief of General Staff, the supporting Assistant Ministers of Defense, and each<br />
of the General Staff functions. MoD advisor’s mission is to develop the capability<br />
and capacity of the MoD and General Staff to establish a self-sufficient, enduring<br />
institution that can direct and sustain security operations. MoD advisors further<br />
develop the capacity and functionality of the MoD by focusing efforts on the<br />
development of long-term strategic MoD plans and requirement processes.<br />
6.11 ISAF Joint Command (IJC). IJC’s mission is to conduct <strong>SFA</strong> in support of<br />
the ANSF to secure the people of Afghanistan and defeat the insurgency in order<br />
to transition full security responsibility to the ANSF (in the interim) and complete<br />
retrograde and redeployment of non-RS forces NLT 31 DEC 14. It executes this<br />
mission primarily through three types of <strong>SFA</strong> Advisor Teams (<strong>SFA</strong>ATs): Military<br />
Advisor Teams (MATs), Police Advisor Teams (PATs), and Operations Coordination<br />
Center Advisor Teams (OCCATs). With the shift to FB<strong>SFA</strong>, ISAF and IJC HQ will<br />
reorganize and be absorbed into the Four Star Level ISAF/RS HQs in 2014, and<br />
additionally will reorganize the national and institutional effort to create an adaptive<br />
advisor network that integrates vertically along Afghan systems and processes using<br />
the eight EFs as an organizing construct. IJC advisor teams will orient their efforts<br />
on the national and regional linkages to help the Afghans understand, validate, and<br />
improve their own systems. RC/TAAC commanders will communicate the new<br />
relationship with the ANSF and develop relationships between key advisors and<br />
ANSF leaders at critical nodes. The primary means of accomplishing IJC’s<br />
FB<strong>SFA</strong> tasks is through the use of purpose-built <strong>SFA</strong>ATs composed of<br />
experienced leadership and functional experts, co-located with, or<br />
U.S. Army courtesy photo<br />
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in close proximity to,<br />
ANSF units.<br />
6.12 Throughout the ISAF<br />
mandate, these advisor<br />
teams provide ANSF<br />
access to CF enabler<br />
support, which can include<br />
close air support (CAS); air<br />
weapons teams (AWT);<br />
indirect fires (IDF);<br />
intelligence, surveillance,<br />
and reconnaissance (ISR);<br />
C-IED capabilities; and<br />
MEDEVAC. CF ability to<br />
provide enabler support<br />
will decrease as it draws<br />
down, but the effect will<br />
be mitigated by ANSF’s<br />
increasing ability to provide their own enablers.<br />
6.13 The <strong>SFA</strong> Corps platforms at ANA corps and AUP Type-A/Zone headquarters<br />
provide the resources to support FB<strong>SFA</strong> processes and procedures. (See Figure 6.3<br />
for ISAF and Figure 6.4 for RS) The Corps Platform provides TAACs the manpower<br />
to execute FB<strong>SFA</strong> at the regional level. The Corps Platform consists of personnel<br />
drawn from a wide range of fields to cover the varying requirements to support the<br />
ANA and ANP and is comprised of both NATO military and civilian specialists. It is<br />
a flexible, multi-echelon, cross-functional organization that is divided into teams.<br />
These teams cover an ANA Corps, ANA Training unit, ANA Regional Logistics unit,<br />
OCC-R/P, AUP HQ, ABP HQ and ANP regional logistical elements.<br />
6.14 COMRS guidance for <strong>SFA</strong>AT in accordance with Levels of Advising:<br />
Photo: Pfc. Dixie Rae Liwanag<br />
a) Level One (1) TAA. Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANSF<br />
counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis from either<br />
an embedded footprint or in close proximity.<br />
b) Level Two (2) TAA. Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANSF<br />
counterparts on a less frequent basis to ensure their continued development.<br />
The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to, and<br />
capability of, the ANSF counterpart, threat level to advisors, and CF resources.<br />
c) Level Three (3) TAA. ISAF provides additional training and advice from<br />
a centralized location (e.g., at a Regional Training Center or Regional Corps<br />
Battle School) or during a Battle Field Circulation or Staff Assistance Visit<br />
while accompanying ANSF commanders and staff sections. Level 3 advising is<br />
not limited to <strong>SFA</strong>ATs or advisor teams. For instance, CF HQ staff may<br />
coordinate and execute training to improve the planning capability of their<br />
counterparts in an ANSF brigade or corps HQ or Operation Coordination<br />
Center–Regional (OCC-R).<br />
6.15 Operational Reach. Operational reach should be a key consideration for <strong>SFA</strong>.<br />
Level 1 advising is not possible in areas outside of operational reach. Level 2<br />
advising is possible, but requires deliberate planning to provide critical support such<br />
as MEDEVAC, route clearance, and fire support.<br />
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Figure 6.3 Corps Platform – CJSOR 13.5<br />
ANA Team<br />
<strong>SFA</strong>T Composition: CJ<br />
• Operate from Corps Platform; des<br />
• Tailorable to specific functional / s<br />
• Structured maintained into RSM f<br />
13.5 Corp<br />
TAA Focus and Functions<br />
• Mentors and Advises Corps Cmd and Leadership<br />
• TAA task organizing Adv from Corps to BDE TM<br />
• Oversees and serves as the proponent for Corps<br />
advisor efforts in functional areas (i.e. Sig<br />
Advisor oversees SIG Kandak TAA)<br />
`<br />
42 mil / 6 civ<br />
48 total pax<br />
ANP<br />
TAA Focus and Functions<br />
• Functional TAA to Corps Staff and Specialty Kandaks<br />
(i.e. Intel, Fires, C2)<br />
• Serves as the “reservoir of functional capability” for<br />
requirements and L2 TAA to ANSF units<br />
ANA, T<br />
84 mil<br />
107 to<br />
87 mil<br />
139 to<br />
ANP<br />
TAA Focus and Functions<br />
• Mentor and Advise on RoL issues and concerns<br />
• Multi-functional Tm w/ reservoir of capacity<br />
• L1 TAA at Type A HQ, L2 to Type B&C HQs<br />
• Functional TAA to AUP HQs<br />
30 mil / 11 civ<br />
41 total pax<br />
TAA Focus and Functions<br />
• Mentors and Advises ABP HQs<br />
• Multi-functional Tm w/ reservoir of capacity<br />
• L1 TAA at ABP Reg HQ w/L2 capability to ABP KDK HQs<br />
• Functional TAA to ABP HQs (i.e. Intel, Log, Facilities)<br />
30 mil / 9 civ<br />
39 total pax<br />
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SOR 13.5 – RS 1.0<br />
igned w/”reservoir of functional capability”<br />
pecialty TAA requirements (level 2)<br />
or Corps level advising<br />
s Platform<br />
Training Team<br />
171 mil / 75 civ<br />
246 total pax<br />
OCC-R/P Team<br />
NG, OCC<br />
/ 23 civ<br />
tal pax<br />
/ 52 civ<br />
tal pax<br />
, LOG<br />
TAA Focus and Functions<br />
• L3 TAA on ANA Indiv/Tm/Co and specialty units<br />
• TAA collective and combined arms tng (Company)<br />
• L2 TAA on RCBS cadre (train-the-trainer)<br />
• L3 TAA on platforms for ANSF enabler capabilities<br />
(Fires, C-IED, ENG, MED, Infantry / maneuver)<br />
27 mil / 13 civ<br />
40 total pax<br />
Logistical<br />
TAA Focus and Functions<br />
• L1 TAA on Ldrshp /Staff; L2 select OCCPS<br />
• Enable ANSF to plan, integrate, and coord.<br />
efforts to facilitate a COP with ANSF pillars<br />
• Coordinate coalition support (in extremis)<br />
• L3 TAA on OCC-P (travel to OCC-R to conduct tng)<br />
-<br />
15 mil / 4 civ<br />
19 total pax<br />
Chapter 6<br />
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F<br />
S<br />
M<br />
A<br />
C<br />
E<br />
C<br />
I<br />
P<br />
C<br />
TAA Focus and Functions<br />
• L1 TAA at RLSC; link Natl &Corps Level Sust Nodes<br />
• Provide reservoir of cap. to Sustainment Node<br />
• L2/L3 TAA to BDE CSSK/GSU<br />
• L2./L3 TAA for facilities transition and sustainability<br />
(contracting)<br />
17 mil / 23 civ<br />
40 total pax<br />
TAA Focus and Functions<br />
• L1 TAA to the Police Logistic Center<br />
• L2/L3 TAA to Type B/C HQs<br />
• L2./L3 TAA for facilities transition and sustainability<br />
(contracting)<br />
10 mil / 9 civ<br />
19 total pax<br />
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Figure 6.4 RS Corps Platform – CJSOR 1.0<br />
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Chapter 6<br />
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6.16 NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). (See Figure 6.5 Organization<br />
Chart) NTM-A is a currently staff directorate in IJC under the ISAF construct. During<br />
RS NTM-A will transition to RS DCOS-OPS and become the CJ-7 Directorate of RS.<br />
NTM-A trains, advises, and assists ANSF training capabilities in order to support<br />
the creation of a capable and enduring force that protects the Afghan population<br />
and denies safe havens to the insurgency. NTM-A key tasks: Promote and develop<br />
sustainable and enduring<br />
training systems to include<br />
institutionalizing sustainable<br />
and enduring training systems<br />
for the ANP and assisting ANA<br />
collective training capability.<br />
Assist with the completion<br />
of force generation of ANSF<br />
capabilities. Finally, NTM-A<br />
promotes the professionalization<br />
of the force through basic<br />
Literacy and Train-the-Trainer<br />
programs. Focus for Literacy and<br />
Language will be transitioned<br />
to ANSF lead in 2014. NTM-A<br />
Institutional Training is a<br />
component of the national<br />
strategic campaign providing<br />
critical enduring capabilities to<br />
professionalize the ANSF through Figure 6.5 NTM-A Organization<br />
a network of training systems.<br />
6.17 The TAA activity undertaken has resulted in institutions moving through a series<br />
of Capability Milestones (CMs), in accordance with an overall programme called the<br />
Unified Transition Plan (UTP). NTM-A oversees the transition of ANSF institutions,<br />
including training establishments and medical facilities. It is assessed that by RS, there<br />
will still be some institution transitions to complete.<br />
6.18 Whereas previously there was significant emphasis on initial fielding of the ANSF<br />
and conducting TAA at the point of training and functional delivery, there has been<br />
a continuous shift in NTM-A focus, as individual establishments have transitioned<br />
through CMs to becoming functionally autonomous. NTM-A is now focused on<br />
advising and assisting institutional HQ leadership and their staff, to increasingly<br />
professionalize their institutions, ethos, and approach. Having enabled the individual<br />
institutions (e.g., branch training schools, military and police training centers), the<br />
emphasis now is to institutionalize a systems approach at the HQ level. In the training<br />
arena, this includes developing a system of internal and external validation, an<br />
inspectorate function, a means of continuous improvement including a lessons learned<br />
process, and engaging with the MAs to enable a Statement of Training Requirement<br />
which in turn will allow for improved forward planning.<br />
6.19 In addition to and in conjunction with the MAs, NTM-A has a capability<br />
development and force generation responsibility; in particular, it has a capability<br />
integration role. NTM-A is the requirements owner for many new capabilities and<br />
thus is responsible for ensuring that integration across the DOTMLPF spectrum is in<br />
place. This will continue under RS when NTM-A is realigned as the DCOS-OPS <strong>CJ7</strong><br />
RS. Examples have included literacy and maneuver (Mobile Strike Force) capability.<br />
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6.20 Specific Army Institutional Advisory Team tasks include:<br />
a) Complete fielding and support integration of remaining ANA kandaks, in<br />
accordance with the ANA Fielding Program (known as Annex K).<br />
b) Support the completion of ANASOF & AAF equipment fielding.<br />
c) Transition ANA institutions in accordance with the UTP.<br />
d) Develop commanders and staff of ANDU and ANATEC.<br />
e) Assist development of an ANA systems approach to training.<br />
f) Advise on the implementation and development of a unified training,<br />
education and doctrine dept, to subsume GSG7, ANA Training Command<br />
(ANATC), and the ANA National Defense University (ANDU).<br />
g) Advise and assist development of the Afghan National Army Officers Academy<br />
(ANAOA).<br />
h) Maintain oversight of Literacy and Language programs.<br />
i) Assist development of the regional training centers (RCBS/RMTC).<br />
j) Support ANA capability, force development and capability integration.<br />
6.21 Specific Police Institutional Advisory Team tasks include:<br />
a) Maintain responsibility for all requirements directed in the UTP, including<br />
contract oversight.<br />
b) Maintain oversight of ANP Literacy and Language programs.<br />
c) Coordinate <strong>SFA</strong> efforts with EUPOL-A, German Police Project Team (GPPT),<br />
International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), and internationally recognized<br />
police trainers.<br />
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d) Assist with development of Regional Police Training Center (RPTC) programs<br />
as required.<br />
e) Encourage and integrate the Rule-of-Law and Evidence Based operations into<br />
all training/programs at appropriate levels, and provide oversight and guidance.<br />
f) Provide assistance to Afghan National Police Training General Command<br />
(ANPTGC) to improve training management and delivery capabilities to include<br />
Gender Integration.<br />
6.22 NATO Air Command–Afghanistan (NAC-A). The Commander 9 th Air<br />
Expeditionary Task Force - Afghanistan (9 th AETF-A) has been designated the<br />
Commander of NATO Air Command–Afghanistan (NAC-A). This command<br />
structure offers a significant functional advantage by placing all NATO and US<br />
operations under the purview of the same senior Airman in theater. Thus, it unifies the<br />
entire NATO air enterprise but still<br />
provides the immediate link to overthe-horizon<br />
air capabilities applied<br />
by the CFACC. NAC-A is directly<br />
responsible to the Commander<br />
of Resolute Support for planning,<br />
coordination, and monitoring of all<br />
Air and Space Operations. It also<br />
performs all institutional training for<br />
the Afghan Air Force (AFF) and the<br />
transition of civilian air space and<br />
airfield control and operations from<br />
NATO to GIRoA.<br />
Photo: Staff Sgt. Eric Harris<br />
6.23 The Civil Aviation Transition Branch (CATB). CATB is responsible for<br />
providing comprehensive management and planning for the transition of airfields and<br />
airspace within the Afghanistan Flight Information Region to GIRoA. In doing so,<br />
CATB provides strategic partnership with GIRoA (Ministry of Transportation / Civil<br />
Aviation Authority) and other agencies (NAC-A, USFOR-A, NATO, US Embassy, and<br />
other members of the IC) to progress GIRoA’s aviation sector and set conditions for an<br />
effective transition to a self-sustainable, Afghan-led aviation structure prior to Resolute<br />
Support.<br />
6.24 NATO Air Training Command–Afghanistan (NATC-A). NATC-A’s mission<br />
is to set the conditions for a professional, fully independent, and sustainable AAF<br />
that meets present and future security requirements in Afghanistan. The NATC-A<br />
mission includes supporting the AAF to integrate diverse airpower capabilities that<br />
are sustainable over the long term. Due to the rapidly changing strategic landscape,<br />
NATC-A has implemented a holistic system approach that includes an interim strategy<br />
to set the AAF on a path for sustainability by 31 Dec 2014. The strategy is based on<br />
four primary Lines of Effort: 1) Strengthen the AAF institution; 2) Build an effective<br />
AAF resource management and stewardship; 3) Ensure safe and effective aviation,<br />
maintenance, and support; and 4) Advance AAF-led, -planned, and -coordinated<br />
mission operations. These Lines of Effort enable the build-up of airpower assets<br />
by balancing the capacity, capability, and resources of the AAF thereby optimizing<br />
operational output in support of the Campaign Plan and GIRoA. NATC-A is in the<br />
process of assessing key issues and capability areas that will form the foundation of the<br />
AAF endstate as the TAA mission moves into 2015 and 2016. This strategy will include<br />
additional airpower capabilities to support the ANSF in its mission requirements.<br />
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6.25 NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A).<br />
SOF <strong>SFA</strong> will align functionally with ASI from the ministerial through tactical<br />
levels with task-organized advisory units that will focus on sustainable institutional<br />
development. These advisory units will ensure both the horizontal and vertical<br />
integration of <strong>SFA</strong> to the ASSF (see Figure 6.6). While the future SOF <strong>SFA</strong> model will<br />
retain the capability to conduct tactical-level advising, the advising effort will shift<br />
from a primary focus at the unit-based tactical-level elements executing combat,<br />
combat support, and combat service support operations, to that of developing the<br />
institutional and functional processes at critical ASSF nodes by functionally based<br />
advisory entities.<br />
Chapter 6<br />
Figure 6.6 NSOCC-A Organization<br />
6.26 CJIATF-A. CJIATF-A conducts Level 1 and Level 2 advising at the ministerial and<br />
agency level in support of GIRoA institutional sustainability and security. CJIATF-A<br />
advising focuses on the MoI and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN).<br />
a) Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) Team.<br />
The CJIATF-A MCTF TAA conducts Level 1 advising of MoI and of the NDS’s<br />
MCTF. The mission of Afghanistan’s MCTF is to conduct criminal investigations<br />
into senior-level corruption allegations, organized criminal networks, and<br />
high profile kidnappings or other targeting committed against Afghan persons,<br />
property, and interests.<br />
b) Ministerial Advisory Team. CJIATF-A’s Ministerial Advisory Team (MAT)<br />
conducts Level 2 advising at the MCN on policy, Rule-of-Law, staff management,<br />
cooperation, and outreach as it relates to counter narcotics, transnational<br />
organized crime, and other complex cases. A critical task of the MAT is to assist<br />
in fostering an MCN collaborative working relationship with MoD and MoI.<br />
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c) On 16 April 2014, CJIATF-A was directed to assume NTM-A’s responsibility<br />
of providing mentoring support to CN operations of Afghan units. It was<br />
assigned lead to synchronize the Coalition’s operational CN efforts and to<br />
provide enabler and intelligence support to CF and partnered international law<br />
enforcement action arms supporting CN operations. Accordingly, CJIATF-A<br />
formed the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) mentoring team.<br />
The CNPA mentoring team provides Level 1 advising of the deputy minister for<br />
CN and CNPA and synchronizes Coalition and voluntary national contribution<br />
support.<br />
d) Inter-Agency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC). The IOCC<br />
provides intelligence and analytical and military liaison support to the US Drug<br />
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and UK National Crime Agency (NCA)<br />
in their separate missions to train, advise, and assist the specialist units of the<br />
Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) in evidence-based judicial<br />
investigations. This is in order to disrupt and degrade major Drug Trafficking<br />
Organizations (DTOs) in Afghanistan and the flow of funds to the insurgency.<br />
e) Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC). The ATFC conducts Level<br />
2 advising of MoI’s Financial Investigative Team (FIT), within the National<br />
Interdiction Unit (<strong>NIU</strong>), to identify and disrupt Taliban, al-Qaida, Haqqani,<br />
and other terrorist and insurgent financial networks. The advising line of effort<br />
assists in identifying illicit financial practices and identifying, arraying and<br />
applying the whole-of-GIRoA spectrum of tools and authorities available to<br />
address them. The three<br />
main lines of operation<br />
are: 1) investigative and<br />
analytical support, 2)<br />
integration of threat<br />
finance or terrorist<br />
finance information<br />
into law enforcement<br />
operations, and 3)<br />
host-nation capacity<br />
development. The desired<br />
end state is the disruption<br />
of terrorist and insurgent<br />
funding and revenue<br />
streams through all legal<br />
Afghan authorities and<br />
Photo: Lance Cpl. Robert Reeves<br />
capabilities.<br />
6.27 The Afghan Assessments Group (AAG). The AAG leads Resolute Support<br />
assessments, synthesizes RS commands’ and headquarters staff ’s assessments into<br />
strategic reports, and provides analysis of the security environment to COMRS. AAG<br />
conducts the Strategic Campaign Assessment, which is a continual measurement of<br />
progress toward intermediate and strategic objectives. The RS strategic campaign<br />
assessment enables COMRS to document campaign process toward achievement<br />
of RS’s campaign objectives and NATO’s mission goals. This process integrates<br />
assessments from subordinate commands with assessments from the RS Headquarters<br />
(HQ) staff. The primary output, the Quarterly Strategic Assessment Report (QSAR),<br />
provides a comprehensive strategic picture for COMISAF and higher headquarters of<br />
progress, transition states, opportunities, challenges, and risks to inform commander<br />
decisions.<br />
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6.28 The COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT). The CAAT conducts<br />
embeds, supports pre-deployment training, and informs the advisor network in order<br />
to observe and facilitate the 8EF processes, advisor network, vertical and horizontal<br />
integration, and TAAC targeting process. CAAT provides mission continuity to the<br />
command, mentors advisors to help identify and address systemic issues within the<br />
vertical processes, and serves as a two-way information conduit that complements<br />
TAAC assessment programs. CAAT members can go where needed in order to validate<br />
processes, systems and reporting to ensure that enduring functions are in place and<br />
delivering as reported. CAAT embeds will occur at all levels and will be coordinated<br />
and in- and out-briefed with the appropriate EF managers and TAAC commanders.<br />
6.29 CAAT/RS- <strong>CJ7</strong> Training Element / Lessons Learned (TE/LL). CAAT RS <strong>CJ7</strong><br />
TE/LL identifies, collects, analyzes, and disseminates Observations, Lessons, and<br />
Best Practices (OLBPs). Capturing lessons learned saves lives and money, and over<br />
time it improves overall RS performance by capitalizing on experiences from specific<br />
operations or recurrent crucial events. OLBPs are initiated by any advisor in theater<br />
and presented using the observation, discussion, conclusion and recommendation<br />
format submitted through the CIDNE database. The OLBPs are analyzed through<br />
RS lessons learned working groups at RS HQ and shared with JFC Brunssum to<br />
become Lessons Identified (LI). Chief of Staff RS then develops an action plan that<br />
includes staffing the lesson in the CIDNE and the NATO LL database. Once the lesson<br />
is validated it becomes a lesson learned. Lessons learned are disseminated via the<br />
CIDNE, NATO Lessons Learned, and Joint Integrated Lessons Learned databases,<br />
RS HQ produced Lessons Learned “Top Tip Sheet,” <strong>SFA</strong>cts magazine, and RS special<br />
reports.<br />
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Annex A<br />
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Annex A<br />
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Annex A: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)<br />
Annex A<br />
Figure A-1<br />
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Figure A-2<br />
A<br />
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Afghan National Army<br />
Corps Laydown<br />
Figure A-3<br />
Annex A<br />
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Corps Organization<br />
Figure A-4<br />
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Brigade Organization<br />
Figure A-5<br />
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Infantry Kandak Organization<br />
Figure A-6<br />
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Mechanized Infantry Kandak (Note: the only Mech Inf Kdk is part of 111 th (Capital) Division)<br />
Figure A-7<br />
Annex A<br />
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Tank Kandak (Note: the only tank kandak is part of 111 th (Capital) Division)<br />
Figure A-8<br />
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MI Kandak (one per Corps)<br />
Figure A-9<br />
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Signal Kandak (one per Corps)<br />
Figure A-10<br />
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ANA Special Operations Command<br />
Mission: To organize, recruit, train, educate, equip, and deploy all ANASOC<br />
forces in order to conduct operations in support of the Islamic Republic of<br />
Afghanistan’s national security objectives.<br />
Figure A-11<br />
Annex A<br />
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Mobile Strike Force (MSF)<br />
MSF Mission: Provide a rapidly deployable mechanized infantry capability to undertake and<br />
reinforce operations in support of ANA missions. The MSF mission is to conduct security,<br />
concentration of force, maneuver support, and reconnaissance operations. Within its capabilities<br />
it also conducts offensive or defensive operations that exploit the unit’s mobility and firepower.<br />
Its employment covers all possible tactical applications as they apply to the full range of tactical<br />
actions, to include enabling and stability tasks. MSF kandaks may function as an independent<br />
maneuver element or as a part of a corps element. Its subordinate coys may support other tactical<br />
units within its local corps area of operations or other non-tactical units as directed.<br />
Figure A-12<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-13<br />
Annex A<br />
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Figure A-14<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-15<br />
Annex A<br />
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Figure A-16<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-17<br />
Annex A<br />
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Afghan Air Force (AAF)<br />
Mission: To provide trained and ready airmen and soldiers to execute critical tasks from the<br />
air in support of the ANA, and when directed, the civil authorities of Afghanistan. In a country<br />
largely inaccessible by road, the Afghan armed forces depend heavily upon the AAF to conduct<br />
airlift of soldiers and supplies between corps operating locations, casualty evacuation, transportation<br />
of human remains, air assault, armed overwatch, and aerial escort.<br />
Figure A-18<br />
A<br />
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Afghan Air Force Aircraft<br />
Annex A<br />
Figure A-19<br />
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Special Mission Wing<br />
Figure A-20<br />
Figure A-21<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-22<br />
Annex A<br />
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Deputy Minister<br />
CNPA<br />
LTG<br />
SPIR<br />
Col<br />
777 S<br />
WU<br />
Administration<br />
Col<br />
Training<br />
Col<br />
CNTA Col<br />
General<br />
Directorate<br />
MG<br />
DG - Chief<br />
of Staff Lt<br />
Col<br />
Deputy<br />
Minister Chief<br />
of Staff BG<br />
Guidance &<br />
Direction Maj<br />
Logistics Lt<br />
Col<br />
ICT<br />
Maj<br />
Finance Lt<br />
Col<br />
Clinic<br />
Maj<br />
Personnel<br />
Col<br />
Press & Public<br />
Information<br />
Maj<br />
Monitoring &<br />
Controlling<br />
Lt Col<br />
SGF Col<br />
TOC Col<br />
Money<br />
Laundering Col<br />
Laboratory<br />
Lt Col<br />
Intel Col<br />
Detention<br />
Col<br />
Special Units<br />
Directorate<br />
BG<br />
Radio<br />
Room<br />
Major<br />
Intel<br />
Analysis<br />
Major<br />
CN Justice<br />
Center Col<br />
Sensitive<br />
Investigation<br />
Unit Col<br />
Precursor<br />
Lt Col<br />
National Intelligence<br />
Interdiction Investigation<br />
Unit Col Unit Col<br />
Scanner<br />
Unit Maj<br />
Borders<br />
& Airport<br />
Control<br />
Lt Col<br />
Provincial<br />
Directorate<br />
BG<br />
K-9 Unit<br />
Col<br />
Kabul Gate<br />
Maj<br />
A-Provinces<br />
Col<br />
B-Provinces<br />
Col<br />
C-Provinces<br />
Col<br />
Rank Structure<br />
General - Gen<br />
Lieutenant general - LTG<br />
Major General - MG<br />
Brigadier General - BG<br />
Colonel - COL<br />
Lieutenant Colonel - Lt Col<br />
Major - Maj<br />
Captain - CPT<br />
Figure A-23<br />
A<br />
22<br />
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Afghan National Police<br />
Figure A-24<br />
Annex A<br />
Figure A-25<br />
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Afghan Uniform Police<br />
Figure A-26<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-27<br />
Annex A<br />
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Afghan Border Police<br />
Figure A-28<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-29<br />
Annex A<br />
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Afghan National Civil Order Police<br />
Figure A-30<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-31<br />
Annex A<br />
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AGeneral Directorate of Police Special Units<br />
30<br />
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Figure A-32
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Figure A-33<br />
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Afghan Public Protection Force<br />
Figure A-34<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-35<br />
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ALP – Basic Command Structure<br />
MoI<br />
DM-Security<br />
ALP Commander<br />
Provincial Chief<br />
of<br />
Police (PCoP)<br />
District Chief<br />
of Police<br />
(DCoP)<br />
Afghan Local<br />
Police<br />
District Leader<br />
Local Elders<br />
(Shura)<br />
Afghan Local<br />
Police<br />
Village/Checkpoint<br />
Leaders<br />
Afghan Local<br />
Police<br />
Guardians<br />
The ALP Commander runs the program, but he only has ADCON (tracking of recruitment,<br />
training, equipping, logistics, and finance) authority over the tactical formations.<br />
▶▶<br />
▶▶<br />
Figure A-36<br />
ALP – Training<br />
ALP Undergo training at Regional Training Centers<br />
(RTC) or Provincial Training Center (PTC)<br />
28-day Program of Instruction (POI):<br />
––<br />
Common Core Classes:<br />
• Afghan Constitution<br />
• Police Policy<br />
• Ethics, Morals, and Values<br />
• Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Use of Force<br />
––<br />
Human Rights<br />
––<br />
Marksmanship (AK-47)<br />
––<br />
Medical<br />
––<br />
Logistics<br />
––<br />
MoI Administrative Processes<br />
––<br />
Battle Drill and Movement Techniques<br />
––<br />
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Detection<br />
––<br />
Vehicle Checkpoint Procedures<br />
––<br />
Search<br />
––<br />
Drug Interdiction<br />
Figure A-37<br />
A<br />
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Figure A-38<br />
Annex A<br />
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Figure A-39<br />
A<br />
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ANA Ranks<br />
Annex A<br />
Figure A-40<br />
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ANP Officer Ranks<br />
Figure A-41<br />
ANP Enlisted Ranks<br />
Figure A-42<br />
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Annex B<br />
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Annex B<br />
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Annex B: Process Maps<br />
A process map is a graphical depiction of an Afghan process, such as MoI Procurement<br />
and the ANA Recruit, Train and Assign pipeline. It shows the actions that take place<br />
between the organizations involved in a process at all levels. For example, a map may<br />
depict the flow of a standardized GIRoA form from an ANA Corps all the way up the<br />
chain of command to the MoD, as well as illustrating the flow of the requested goods<br />
from the entity that fills the request back down to the kandak, and all the actions in between.<br />
The map can identify process friction points (areas where the process typically<br />
does not work well), communications up, down and across the essential function chain,<br />
critical nodes in the process, and critical actions that must be conducted to keep the<br />
process flowing.<br />
The maps were developed by Essential Function (EF) advisors within five ISAF subordinate<br />
headquarters (IJC, NTM-A, CSTC-A MAG, NSOCC-A, and 9AETF) and<br />
are sorted by the eight EF construct. The processes depicted represent the advisors’<br />
understanding of the Afghan systems they advise. Some of these processes are well-developed<br />
and have been fully implemented by GIRoA. Others are still being developed<br />
by GIRoA, often with the help of ISAF and the International Community. There is less<br />
clarity on processes that are not as well developed, and the maps depicting those will<br />
undoubtedly change over time. HQ ISAF CAAT provides the function maps on the<br />
<strong>SFA</strong> collaboration portal and document handling system (DHS) to enable advisors to<br />
update their process maps as the systems mature. In general, process maps are intended<br />
as tools advisors can carry with them and use for quick reference.<br />
The process maps in the printed <strong>guide</strong> were chosen because the advisors believe those<br />
particular processes are critical to ANSF sustainability. The ISAF-S Collaboration portal<br />
hosts all the process maps submitted for sharing.<br />
The following process maps are included in the printed <strong>guide</strong>.<br />
Strategy, Policy, & Programming<br />
• MoD Strategy, Policy, & Programming<br />
Essential Function 1<br />
• EF 1 MoI Procurement<br />
Essential Function 3<br />
• EF 3 ASSF EvBO<br />
Essential Function 4<br />
• EF 4 ANA Recruit, Train, Assign Overview<br />
• EF 4 ANASOC Manning<br />
Essential Function 5<br />
• EF 5 ANA Facility Maintenance<br />
• EF 5ANA Facility Sustainment<br />
• MoI Strategy, Policy, & Programming<br />
• EF 1 MoD Procurements<br />
• EF 4 ANP Recruit Train Assign Overview<br />
• EF 4 ALP Manning<br />
• EF 5 ANP Facility Maintenance<br />
• EF 5 ANP Facility Sustainment<br />
Annex B<br />
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• EF 5 ANP Logistics<br />
Essential Function 5 (cont.)<br />
• EF 5 ANA Sustainment<br />
• EF 5 ANP Equipment Fielding<br />
• EF 5 ANA Equipment Fielding<br />
• EF 5 ANP Class III<br />
• EF 5 ANA Class III<br />
• EF 5 ANP Class V<br />
• EF5 ANA Class V<br />
Essential Function 6<br />
• EF 6 ANA C2<br />
• EF 6 ANP C2<br />
• EF 6 GCPSU C2<br />
Essential Function 7<br />
• EF 7 ANA Intel<br />
• EF 7 ANP Intel<br />
• EF 5ANP Sustainment<br />
• EF5 ANP Class VII<br />
• EF 5 ANA Class VII<br />
• EF 5 ANP Class VIII<br />
• EF 5ANA Class VIII<br />
• EF 5 ANP Class IX<br />
• EF 5 ANA Class IX<br />
• EF 5 SMW Class IX<br />
• EF 6 ANASOC C2<br />
• EF 6 AAF C2<br />
• EF 7 ANASOC Intel<br />
B<br />
2<br />
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Acronyms<br />
A2G: Air-to-Ground<br />
AAF: Afghan Air Force<br />
ACCC: Air Command and Control<br />
Center<br />
Afs: Afghan currency<br />
AFSAT: Air Force Security Assistance<br />
Training<br />
AMOD: Assistant Minister of Defense for<br />
AT&L: Acquisition, Technology, &<br />
Logistics<br />
P&A: Programs and Analysis<br />
S&P: Strategy and Policy<br />
ANA: Afghan National Army<br />
ANAREC: Afghan National Army Recruiting<br />
Command<br />
ANASOC: Afghan National Army Special<br />
Operations Command<br />
ANDS: Afghan National Development<br />
Strategy<br />
ASC: Army Support Command<br />
ASD: Aviation Support Depot<br />
ATF: Afghan Territorial Force<br />
BC: Budget Circular<br />
BWG: Budget Working Group<br />
C2: Command and Control<br />
CDOOQC: Commando Qualification<br />
Course<br />
CF: Commando Force<br />
C-JTSCC: CENTCOM Joint Theater Support<br />
Contracting Command<br />
CLS: Contractor Logistics Support<br />
CMIC: Civil-Military Interoperability<br />
Cell<br />
CN: Counter-narcotics<br />
CNGD: Counter-Narcotics General<br />
Directorate<br />
CoGS: Chief of General Staff<br />
COORD: Coordination<br />
CRU: Crisis Response Unit<br />
Dep41: Department 41<br />
DBAC: Defense Council Budget Committee<br />
DCPG: Defense Capabilities Planning<br />
Guidance<br />
DLI: Defense Language Institute<br />
DM: Deputy Minister<br />
DMSEC: Deputy Minister for Security<br />
DOIU: District Operational Intelligence<br />
Unit<br />
DPI: Directorate of Police Intelligence<br />
DV: Distinguished Visitors<br />
FW: Fixed Wing<br />
FOC: Full Operating Capability<br />
FOO: Fuel Ordering Officer<br />
GFC: Ground Forces Command or<br />
Ground Forces Commander<br />
GOP: Guidance for Operational Planning<br />
GRC: Ground Regional Commander<br />
GS: General Staff<br />
GSK: General Support Kandak<br />
GSPG: General Staff Planning Guidance<br />
GSU: Garrison Support Unit<br />
HAF: Helicopter Assault Force<br />
HF: High Frequency Radio<br />
IPCB: International Police Coordination<br />
Board<br />
IOC: Initial Operating Capability<br />
ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance<br />
ISU: Investigative Surveillance Unit<br />
KACC: Kabul Area Control Center<br />
KKA: Ktah Khas<br />
KMTC: Kabul Military Training Center<br />
LLVI: Low Level Voice Intercept<br />
LRAFB: Little Rock Air Force Base<br />
MICO: Military Intelligence Company<br />
MID: Military Intelligence Detachment<br />
MIK: Military Intelligence Kandak<br />
MINDEF: Minister of Defense<br />
MIPO: Military Intelligence Provincial<br />
Operations<br />
MIRO: Military Intelligence Regional<br />
Operations<br />
Annex B<br />
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MoD: Ministry of Defense<br />
MoF: Ministry of Finance<br />
MoFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
MOI: Ministry of Interior<br />
MMC: Material Management Center<br />
MSFV: Mobile Strike Force Vehicles<br />
MSP: Ministry of Interior Supply Point<br />
Mx: Maintenance<br />
MUS: Mission Unit Specialty<br />
NATC-A: NATO Air Training Command<br />
– Afghanistan<br />
NIMS: National Information Management<br />
System<br />
<strong>NIU</strong>: National Interdiction Unit<br />
NMCC: National Military Coordination<br />
Center<br />
NMIC: National Military Intelligence<br />
Center<br />
NMS: National Military Strategy<br />
NMU: National Mission Unit (Ministry<br />
of Interior)<br />
NSP: National Security Policy<br />
NTA: National Threat Assessment<br />
NTEC National Targeting Exploitation<br />
Center<br />
OCC-P: Operations Coordination Center<br />
– Provincial<br />
OCC-R: Operations Coordination Center<br />
– Regional<br />
ONSC: Office of National Security Council<br />
PBAC: Program Budget Committee<br />
PCoP: Provincial Chief of Police<br />
PeH: Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (Afghan Air<br />
Force Air University)<br />
PHQ: Provincial Headquarters<br />
PMO: Program Management Office<br />
PoA: President of Afghanistan<br />
POIU: Province Operational Intelligence<br />
Unit<br />
PRC: Provincial Response Company<br />
PWG: Program Working Group<br />
RHQ: Regional Headquarters<br />
RLSC: Regional Logistics Supply Center<br />
RSC: Regional Support Center<br />
RTCs: Regional Training Centers<br />
RW: Rotary Wing<br />
SDPD: Strategic Defense Planning Directive<br />
SOB: Special Operations Brigade<br />
SOE: School of Excellence<br />
SFQC: Special Forces Qualification<br />
Course<br />
SOK: Special Operations Kandak<br />
SOLE: Special Operations Liaison Element<br />
SMW: Special Mission Wing<br />
SPO: Support Operations<br />
SPTC: Special Police Training Center<br />
SPTW: Special Police Training Wing<br />
ST&CG: Strategic Targeting & Coordination<br />
Board<br />
TAA: Train, Advise, and Assist<br />
TCoE: Training Center of Excellence<br />
(Shindand Air Base)<br />
TGC: Tactical Ground Commander<br />
TMO: Traffic Management Office<br />
TT&CG: Tactical Targeting and Coordination<br />
Board<br />
UPT: Undergraduate Pilot Training<br />
USACE: US Army Corps of Engineers<br />
B<br />
4<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 5 Dec 2013<br />
POC: CSTC-A, MoD/MAG<br />
MAGSeniorAdvisor@centcom.isaf.cmil.mil<br />
Strategic<br />
NTA<br />
MoD Strategy/ Policy/ Programming<br />
“Ends”<br />
National Security Objectives<br />
NSP<br />
ANDS<br />
National<br />
Interests<br />
1<br />
PoA<br />
ONSC<br />
6<br />
Afghan<br />
Cabinet<br />
National<br />
Assembly<br />
Approval<br />
(NOV)<br />
“Ways”<br />
(JUN)<br />
GOP<br />
“Means”<br />
National<br />
Military<br />
Objectives<br />
GSPG<br />
SDPD<br />
NMS<br />
(MAY)<br />
DCPG<br />
2<br />
3<br />
MoD<br />
MINDEF<br />
AMoD<br />
S&P<br />
AMoD<br />
P&A<br />
Ciphers<br />
5<br />
MoF<br />
MoD-F<br />
4<br />
Afs<br />
Budget<br />
Hearings<br />
All Ministries<br />
Program Budget Committee/<br />
Defense Council Budget<br />
Committee<br />
BC-1<br />
BC-2<br />
Program Working Group/<br />
Budget Working Group<br />
<strong>SFA</strong><br />
coverage<br />
REQUIREMENTS<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
1<br />
(AUG)<br />
(NOV) (APR) (2006)<br />
2<br />
(OCT)<br />
ONSC defines the “Ends” of National Strategy<br />
AMoD S&P defines the “Ways” and “Means”<br />
AMoD develops 3yr Budget Circulars 1 and 2<br />
MoD-F screens Requirements<br />
MoF determines 1yr Budget Ceiling<br />
PoA approves Funding and Budget Limits<br />
Tactical<br />
Units<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
3<br />
Friction Points:<br />
MEETINGS<br />
MEETINGS<br />
(MAR-APR)<br />
(MAY-JUN)<br />
(OCT)<br />
The lack of overarching guidance; the NTA and NSP<br />
has not been updated since 2010.<br />
Weak operational capability assessment process.<br />
No process to accurately ensure a Total ANA-wide<br />
prioritized sustainment requirements’ list for the<br />
next 3 years (BC1 submission). No procedure to<br />
evaluate the effects on required capabilities when<br />
BC2 limits resources available.<br />
(Weekly)<br />
To view the detailed information paper that accompanies this process map, please visit the online version of <strong>SFA</strong> Guide 2.0 at https://ronna.apan.org/<strong>SFA</strong>Guide<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B<br />
5
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
<strong>SFA</strong> coverage<br />
MoI Strategy/ Policy/ Programming<br />
NTA<br />
Police<br />
Law<br />
ANP<br />
Inherent<br />
Law<br />
Combined<br />
Inter-<br />
Ministerial<br />
Security<br />
Strategy<br />
NSP<br />
SPD<br />
ANDS<br />
National Security Objectives<br />
National<br />
Police<br />
Objectives<br />
“Ends”<br />
10-YR<br />
Vision<br />
“Ways”<br />
National<br />
Priority<br />
Program<br />
PoA<br />
Minister of<br />
Interior<br />
DM<br />
STRATPOL<br />
3 Gen. Strat.<br />
4<br />
Directorate<br />
“Means”<br />
NPS<br />
1392-7<br />
MoI<br />
DMs<br />
Gen. Pol.<br />
Directorate<br />
2-YR<br />
Support<br />
Plans<br />
General<br />
Directorates<br />
DM<br />
BC-1 Support<br />
Afs BC-2<br />
Afs<br />
Police<br />
Pillars<br />
National<br />
Assembly<br />
Approval<br />
Afghan<br />
Cabinet<br />
P&A<br />
Directorate<br />
National<br />
Priority<br />
Program<br />
1392-3<br />
OPLANs<br />
Budget<br />
Hearings<br />
All Ministries<br />
Program<br />
Working Group<br />
Force Mgt.<br />
Directorate<br />
Requirements<br />
Current as of: 3 Dec 2013<br />
POC: DCOM MAG/MOI MAG<br />
DSN 318-449-5308<br />
1<br />
Inability to publish a<br />
relevant and current<br />
National Security Policy<br />
2 Delay in publication of these<br />
documents<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
Difficulty translating<br />
strategic guidance into<br />
action plans, policies, and<br />
budget estimates<br />
Issues with requirements<br />
development process ,<br />
Command Plan Review (CPR)<br />
and Tashkil Review Board<br />
(TRB) and actual tashkil<br />
publication<br />
Delays in receiving budget<br />
estimates impedes timely and<br />
accurate submittal of data<br />
necessary to build future<br />
programming budgets.<br />
1<br />
1<br />
ONSC<br />
MoJ<br />
MoI<br />
MoD<br />
NDS<br />
Office of Nat’l Sec Council issues strategic guidance<br />
Police-centric guidance issued<br />
DM, STRATPOL direction and 10 yr vision<br />
Policy Directorate translates requirements<br />
Programs & Analysis develops budget circulars<br />
Tactical unit requirements<br />
DM Support submit budget requests<br />
PoA approves funding and guidance<br />
2<br />
3<br />
2<br />
8<br />
MoF<br />
5<br />
5<br />
To view the detailed information paper that accompanies this process map, please visit the online version of <strong>SFA</strong> Guide 2.0 at https://ronna.apan.org/<strong>SFA</strong>Guide<br />
Strategic<br />
7<br />
4<br />
Tashkil<br />
1393<br />
6<br />
34<br />
PCOPs<br />
Tactical<br />
B<br />
6<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 7 Dec 2013<br />
POC: MoI MAG Procurement<br />
DSN 318-449-0205<br />
Ministry of Interior Procurement Overview<br />
Procurement Process<br />
Requirements<br />
Owners<br />
Logistics<br />
Facilities<br />
Fire<br />
Surgeon General<br />
Finance<br />
Info/Comm/Tech<br />
Provincial HQs<br />
Procurement Plans<br />
Statements of Need<br />
Statements of Work<br />
Funds Verification<br />
Contract Execution &<br />
Quality Assurance<br />
Procurement Plan<br />
consolidation and<br />
approval<br />
Announce Tender<br />
Special<br />
Procurement<br />
Commission<br />
Stakeholders<br />
Ministry of Finance<br />
Ministry of<br />
Economy<br />
Ministry of Justice<br />
Procurement Policy<br />
Unit (Oversight)<br />
Approvals<br />
Produces<br />
Friction<br />
Point<br />
Finance<br />
Friction<br />
Point<br />
Procurement Department<br />
Produces<br />
Contracts<br />
Controller (Funds<br />
Certifier)<br />
Done<br />
by<br />
*Statement of Needs Friction Point: Requirements require justification and approval prior to procurement initiation<br />
**Funds Verification Friction Point: Procurements are subject to funds availability<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B<br />
7
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 2 Dec 2013<br />
POC: MoD-MAG AT&L<br />
DSN 318-449-0214<br />
MoD Central Procurement<br />
End User<br />
End User Req’t<br />
Generation<br />
2<br />
4<br />
User’s Fin<br />
Officer<br />
Verifies Funds<br />
End User<br />
Commander<br />
Approves Req’t<br />
4<br />
Acq Agency (AA)<br />
Receives Req’t<br />
AA<br />
Req’t<br />
Analysis<br />
AA<br />
Solicitation<br />
(Request For Proposal)<br />
Friction Points<br />
Negotiation occurs at bid<br />
1<br />
opening and approval points<br />
Re-solicitation occurs without<br />
re-engaging the End User<br />
Delays in approval impacts<br />
timely award<br />
Poor requirement package<br />
result in poor quality goods and<br />
services<br />
2<br />
4<br />
NO<br />
NO<br />
Procurement Committee<br />
Bid Recommendation<br />
Re-solicitation<br />
(if necessary)<br />
2<br />
AA<br />
Bid Evaluation<br />
AA<br />
Bid Opening<br />
1<br />
Touch Points<br />
Awarded contract entered<br />
1<br />
into AFMIS<br />
2 MoD-F enters MoD16 into<br />
AFMIS for payment<br />
3 MoF payment entered into<br />
AFMIS<br />
Vendor<br />
Completes<br />
contract<br />
YES<br />
MoF<br />
Executes Payment<br />
to Vendor<br />
MinDef<br />
Endorsement<br />
Special Procurement<br />
Committee (SPC)*<br />
Approval<br />
3<br />
YES<br />
MoDF<br />
MoD16 to MoF<br />
MinDef<br />
Approval<br />
YES<br />
NO<br />
1 1<br />
3 3<br />
2<br />
AA<br />
Award<br />
Administration<br />
Post Award<br />
Conf<br />
1<br />
Key:<br />
End User<br />
Acquisition Agency (AA)<br />
Other MoD Org<br />
External Organization<br />
*SPC:<br />
Min Justice<br />
Min Finance<br />
Min Economy<br />
Execution<br />
To view the detailed information paper that accompanies this process map, please visit the online version of <strong>SFA</strong> Guide 2.0 at https://ronna.apan.org/<strong>SFA</strong>Guide<br />
Last Updated: 22 August 2013<br />
POC: COL Stoddard 449-0914<br />
B<br />
8<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 9
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
B 10<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 11
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
B 12<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 13
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 26 May 14<br />
POC: NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A<br />
DSN: 700-787-3953<br />
4<br />
NDS<br />
C2<br />
Information Exchange<br />
Coordinating Authority<br />
ABP<br />
MOI<br />
CT<br />
DPI<br />
≈CNPA<br />
Cycle<br />
2<br />
6<br />
NDS<br />
124<br />
1<br />
NTEC<br />
6<br />
3<br />
Court<br />
1<br />
5<br />
ABP<br />
MOI CT<br />
Forensic<br />
Lab<br />
≈CNPA<br />
Cycle<br />
Detention<br />
Facility<br />
5<br />
≈CNPA<br />
Cycle<br />
x34<br />
NDS<br />
1<br />
x34<br />
2<br />
Prov<br />
DPI<br />
ASSF EvBO<br />
MOI<br />
3<br />
HQ<br />
DPI<br />
GCPSU<br />
5<br />
Saranwal<br />
2<br />
2<br />
ISU<br />
J3 Tgt<br />
Mgmt Cell<br />
6<br />
NMU<br />
DPI<br />
SMW<br />
PCOP<br />
222<br />
444<br />
x25<br />
2 3 3 4<br />
x19<br />
PSU<br />
DPI<br />
PSU<br />
1<br />
Prov<br />
ISU<br />
2<br />
2<br />
2<br />
2<br />
4<br />
2<br />
5<br />
5<br />
≈CNPA<br />
Cycle<br />
333<br />
5<br />
1<br />
1<br />
CNPA<br />
2<br />
1<br />
2<br />
1<br />
3<br />
3 4<br />
4<br />
OR<br />
5<br />
5<br />
1<br />
6<br />
x34<br />
CNPA<br />
Friction Points<br />
- Lack of Trust<br />
- Not all Units Fielded<br />
- Poor Interagency Cooperation<br />
- Not receiving NTEC TIPs<br />
- Insufficient Saranwal Coverage<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
Communication Down<br />
1 - Collection Tasking Issued<br />
2 - Target Packet Delivered/Updated<br />
3 - Saranwal adds Warrant<br />
4 - Operational Directive Issued<br />
5 - SSE/Biometrics Analysis<br />
Delivered<br />
6 - Intel/Fused Assessment<br />
Communication Up<br />
1<br />
- Intel/Local Assessment<br />
Provided<br />
- Info/Tasking Request Sent<br />
- Target Packet Nominated<br />
- Target Feasibility Reviewed<br />
- SSE/Biometrics Results<br />
Provided<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
Partnership Inject<br />
- Coalition / Contractor<br />
assistance<br />
B 14<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 2 Dec 2013<br />
POC: Chief of Staff DCOM-A<br />
318-449-7865<br />
Critical Functions<br />
1<br />
Literacy is tested at<br />
ANAREC. Officers must be<br />
literate, NCOs must be able to<br />
read and write. There are no<br />
literacy standards for soldiers,<br />
most of whom cannot read or<br />
write. Recruitment not against<br />
Branch requirements.<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
Friction Points<br />
Selected students unable to<br />
cope with literacy challenges of<br />
Branch School course.<br />
Many Officers and NCOs are<br />
sent straight to Corps to fill posts<br />
without any related Branch<br />
School Training.<br />
Failure to employ personnel as<br />
they have been trained.<br />
No established Military<br />
occupational Skills system and<br />
Career progress path.<br />
Unwillingness of Corps to send<br />
students to Kabul National Branch<br />
Schools.<br />
ANARC unwillingness or<br />
lack of capacity to recruit<br />
female NCO and officer<br />
candidates<br />
1<br />
6<br />
6<br />
Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA)<br />
42 weeks<br />
Annex B<br />
1<br />
4<br />
5<br />
2<br />
2<br />
3<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 15
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 4 Dec 13<br />
POC: NSOCC-A, J5<br />
DSN: 700-787-3754<br />
ANASOC Manning<br />
MoD<br />
Friction Points<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
1<br />
2<br />
Communication up and sideways<br />
Units Input fill requirements to ANASOC<br />
ANSOC submits request to MoD to Recruit<br />
Recruiting Teams visit KMTC and SOKs<br />
Recruits go from KMTC and SOKs to attend SOE<br />
Personnel is selected to Commando<br />
Qualification Course (CDOQC) or SFQC<br />
Graduates distributed to units<br />
7<br />
1<br />
2<br />
ANASOC<br />
DIV<br />
1<br />
G1<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
Projected force fill requirements insufficient<br />
Ad hoc, untrained, and unfunded recruiting section<br />
CDOQC not synced with KMTC<br />
SOKs not supporting recruiting<br />
Positions filled by Unit Commands unnecessarily<br />
Unit is filled by duty position and not by MOS<br />
Female recruitment failure<br />
2<br />
1 1 START<br />
2<br />
3 3<br />
KMTC SOE<br />
SOBs SOKs GSK MIK<br />
4<br />
3 2 4<br />
4 5 6<br />
GSU<br />
5<br />
Communication Down<br />
1<br />
2<br />
Critical Function<br />
Cipher is written<br />
School of Excellence<br />
CDOQC<br />
SFQC<br />
6<br />
1<br />
2<br />
MoD approves and provide guidance<br />
to ANASOC<br />
ANASOC forwards Cipher for recruiting<br />
specific numbers<br />
B 16<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 1 Dec 2013<br />
POC: NTM-A/DCOM-P<br />
DSN 314-449-1545<br />
Critical Function<br />
- 1 Monthly Manpower Working<br />
Group (MPWG) & Weekly<br />
RTA Meetings<br />
- 2 Training Centre effectiveness<br />
Friction Points<br />
1<br />
- Inaccurate understanding of<br />
training requirements<br />
2<br />
3<br />
- Inaccurate planning of training<br />
- Inaccurate graduation data<br />
- Women recruitment progress<br />
too slow compared to plans<br />
4<br />
5 - Women not assigned to proper<br />
posts according to education<br />
level<br />
ANP Recruit, Train, Assign<br />
MoI<br />
GDoP<br />
1 2<br />
1<br />
1<br />
GRC TGC<br />
2<br />
Pillars<br />
2 3<br />
Process<br />
- 1 MoI id’s recruiting requirements<br />
1<br />
- 2 GRC/Pillars id’s training needs<br />
- 3 TGC develops Training Plan<br />
- 4 Graduation data sent to General<br />
Directorate of Personnel (GDoP)<br />
- 5 GDoP assigns students<br />
5<br />
2<br />
3 4<br />
4<br />
Training<br />
Sites<br />
GDoP 5 Pillars<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 17
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 4 Dec 13<br />
POC: NSOCC-A, J5<br />
DSN: 700-787-3754<br />
ALP Manning<br />
3<br />
MoI<br />
Issues Cipher<br />
5<br />
DM<br />
SEC<br />
1<br />
2<br />
4<br />
4<br />
ALP<br />
CDR<br />
3<br />
ANP<br />
TGC<br />
3 3<br />
ANP<br />
GRC<br />
1 1<br />
2<br />
2<br />
4<br />
Unit Requirements:<br />
•Recruitment 1 ALP<br />
•Promotion<br />
•Gap reporting<br />
3<br />
1<br />
UNITS RTCs<br />
1<br />
1<br />
4<br />
2<br />
3<br />
Communication Down<br />
MoI guidance/ciphers to DM SEC<br />
DM SEC directs ALP CDR, GRC & TGC.<br />
ALP CDR transmits ciphers /actions to units<br />
ALP HQ interacts with units, GRCs, TGC and RTCs to<br />
fill manning requirements IAW tashkil<br />
Critical Function<br />
1<br />
ID, recruit, train, and/or fill manning<br />
requirements<br />
Friction Points<br />
- 1 Units do not report/ anticipate loss<br />
- 2 Loss of visibility on district requirements<br />
- 3 Lack of communications capability within<br />
chain of command<br />
- 4 ALP CDR is 1 star and has less influence than<br />
his colleagues at the same level, who are<br />
two-star generals<br />
Communication Up<br />
1<br />
Units report and ID requirements to ALP CDR<br />
2<br />
ALP HQ receives manning reports from ALP<br />
units<br />
3<br />
ALP interacts with GRCs and TGC to cross-talk<br />
on unit gains, reports/transport of recruits,<br />
training/trends , and then compiles &<br />
forwards reports/requests to DM Sec<br />
4<br />
DM Sec reviews manning issues/Reqs and<br />
FWD Recommendations to<br />
MoI<br />
5<br />
MoI receives request and directs GRC to<br />
increase/ decrease recruiting<br />
B 18<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
ANA Maintenance<br />
Current as of: 5 June 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN: 318-449-0716<br />
MoD<br />
Process Highlights & Friction Points:<br />
Process Improvements:<br />
Repair<br />
Time<br />
National<br />
• Requirements generation<br />
• Human capital management<br />
• Command emphasis on<br />
maintenance<br />
• Enforcement of readiness data<br />
collection<br />
• ECOD approval process<br />
1 2 3 4<br />
AT&L GS/G4<br />
National<br />
Depot Level<br />
11<br />
LOG CMD<br />
5<br />
CWS ACOP<br />
CSD<br />
MMC<br />
National<br />
• CWS / ANA Component Overhaul Program (ACOP) provides overhaul<br />
capabilities<br />
• MMC provides C2 of logistics enterprise<br />
• T/I repair and return repairable item to the supply system<br />
1. Requirements generation/ Human capital management<br />
2. Accountability/ uneven command emphasis on maintenance<br />
3. Standardize reporting procedures/ enforcement of readiness data<br />
collection<br />
4. Cumbersome ECOD approval process<br />
5. MoD14 Process impedes the distribution of parts<br />
6 7 8 11<br />
RLSC<br />
Operational/ Regional<br />
• Performance measurements<br />
36 hrs<br />
General<br />
1<br />
Contact<br />
Teams<br />
CLK<br />
FSD<br />
Tactical/ Organizational<br />
• Performance measurements<br />
24 hrs<br />
Organizational<br />
Operational/ Regional<br />
• Deploy contact team, evac to RLSC for T/I repair and return or<br />
complete evac of repairable item to ACOP/ CWS or conduct vehicle<br />
ECOD through MOD 64 process<br />
6. Lack of Mechanics due to poor personnel management and<br />
resistance to off site training due to desertion and higher headquarters<br />
commandeering students attending the CSS school.<br />
7. COREIMS available where the infrastructure can support it.<br />
8. Ineffective distribution system for parts disbursement to lower<br />
levels<br />
Tactical/ Organizational<br />
• T/I repair and return or complete evac to RLSC<br />
• RLSC utilizes its FSD for CL IX and is Combat Logistics Kandak (CLK) for<br />
maintenance<br />
9. Perceived lack of repair parts due to requests for unauthorized ASLs<br />
11<br />
9<br />
6<br />
5 th CSSK<br />
Maint<br />
COY<br />
HQ COY<br />
Maint<br />
PLT<br />
SPT PLT<br />
Unit/Kandak<br />
• Maintenance Cycles<br />
• Drivers Training/ Maintenance<br />
Training<br />
• Reporting accurate OR rates<br />
12 hrs<br />
Organizational<br />
6 9 10 11<br />
Kandak<br />
Unit/Kandak<br />
• T/I repair and return repairable item to the supply system or evac to<br />
CSSK for repair<br />
10. Lack of accountability for willful negligence designed to exploit the<br />
maintenance system for profit<br />
11. Lack of literacy<br />
Friction Point COREIMS Mechanics Supply Request Up<br />
Supply Request Down Equipment Flow<br />
Annex B<br />
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2<br />
Current as of: 7 Dec 2013<br />
POC: CSTC-A MoD MinDev<br />
DSN 318-449-0284<br />
Have<br />
(Basing Reports)<br />
Construction Property<br />
Management Dept<br />
(CPMD)<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
A<br />
B<br />
XXX<br />
C D E<br />
1<br />
MINDEV = 5/20<br />
FE = 15x<br />
Corps<br />
ANA Requirements and Resourcing<br />
Need<br />
(Valid Requirements)<br />
Ministry of<br />
Defense<br />
GSG8<br />
Basing and facilities report<br />
Unvalidated Requirements<br />
Validated Requirements<br />
Prioritized Requirements<br />
Budget Validation<br />
National Security Strategy & Policy<br />
C<br />
3 4<br />
2<br />
MINDEV = 6/ 6<br />
5<br />
6<br />
Afford<br />
(Priorities)<br />
Parliament<br />
Ministry of<br />
Defense<br />
Finance<br />
MINDEV = 4/4 MINDEV = 4/ 4<br />
= # Advisor Teams/# Units<br />
To view the detailed information paper associated with this process map, please visit the<br />
online version of the <strong>SFA</strong> Guide at https://ronna.apan.org/<strong>SFA</strong>Guide<br />
Critical Advisor Skills<br />
Strategic<br />
1. Cross cultural sensitivity<br />
2. Strategic/Program Management<br />
3. Systems thinking - stakeholders<br />
4. Policy development<br />
5. Acquisition and Financial<br />
Operational<br />
1. Cross cultural sensitivity<br />
2. Project Management<br />
3. Budget and Financial Management<br />
4. Communication – written, oral<br />
5. Process management<br />
Tactical<br />
1. Cross cultural sensitivity<br />
2. Technical - Engineering, construction<br />
3. Budget and Financial<br />
4. Communication – written, oral<br />
5. Process management<br />
Friction Points<br />
A CPMD does not have a full understanding of all<br />
bases and facilities being turned over<br />
B<br />
C<br />
D<br />
E<br />
No real property inventory exists to help CPMD to<br />
justify and defend prioritized requirements<br />
Little historical data exists to develop requirements,<br />
and estimate projects<br />
Facility Engineers do not have a documented<br />
quality assurance/ quality control process<br />
Dominance of western style construction standards<br />
1<br />
B 20<br />
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UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
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ANP Maintenance<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN 318-449-9102<br />
Repair<br />
AUP ANCOP ABP Log Chain of Command Time<br />
Process Highlights & Friction Points: Process Improvements:<br />
MMC-P<br />
National<br />
• Receiving accurate maintenance<br />
issues and Operational Readiness<br />
Rates from subordinate units<br />
+ 36 hrs<br />
NLC Wardak<br />
ABP<br />
HQ<br />
ANCOP<br />
HQ<br />
AUP<br />
HQ<br />
National<br />
• CMSF & NLC provide total overhaul<br />
capabilities<br />
• Trans Brigade transports contractor repair<br />
parts from NLC to RLC workshop<br />
Trans<br />
BDE<br />
Regional<br />
• Getting Recovery Teams to perform<br />
their mission<br />
RLC<br />
24-36 hrs<br />
BDE<br />
HQ<br />
BDE<br />
HQ<br />
Regional<br />
HQ<br />
Workshop<br />
Recovery<br />
Vehicle<br />
Regional/Brigade HQ<br />
• HQs coordinate vehicle recovery to RLCs<br />
• Repairs taking longer than 36 hours are<br />
evacuated to the CMF or NLC<br />
• Workshops and Recovery Vehicles are<br />
centrally located at each RLC<br />
• Contractor has no recovery responsibility<br />
Provincial<br />
• Accurately reporting maintenance<br />
faults to contractor<br />
• Accurately reporting operational<br />
readiness to higher<br />
• Literacy program<br />
MSP<br />
Kandak<br />
HQ<br />
Kandak<br />
HQ<br />
Provincial<br />
HQ<br />
Less Than 24 hrs<br />
MST<br />
Provincial/Battalion HQ<br />
• MSPs provide a hard location for<br />
maintenance and can store repair parts<br />
• Repairs taking more than 24 hours are<br />
evacuated to the RLC via POC<br />
• Identification of coordinating POC for<br />
evacuation<br />
• Reporting accurate OR rates<br />
Unit/District<br />
• Establishing maintenance SMEs at<br />
the unit level to identify and report<br />
faults to ensure proper parts are<br />
brought by MST<br />
• Literacy program<br />
Coy<br />
HQ<br />
Coy<br />
HQ<br />
District<br />
HQ<br />
MST<br />
Police<br />
Station<br />
Police<br />
Station<br />
Police<br />
Station<br />
Unit/District HQ<br />
• Mobile Support Teams support (services,<br />
diagnosis, minor repairs) for reported<br />
vehicle maintenance issues<br />
• Teams come to one central location each<br />
month<br />
• Units are not providing an accurate<br />
picture of maintenance issues<br />
Organic asset Contractor asset Friction Point Technical Support Reporting Direct/Subordinated Coordination<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 21
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This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 7 Dec 2013<br />
POC: CSTC-A MoI MinDev<br />
DSN 318-449-3971<br />
ANP Facility Sustainment<br />
National<br />
8<br />
1/1<br />
MoI P<br />
MoI DM Support<br />
MoI F<br />
5<br />
Emergency<br />
Contract<br />
4<br />
A<br />
Prov. O&M<br />
Contract<br />
Provincial<br />
District<br />
C<br />
Special Procurement<br />
Commission<br />
6<br />
7<br />
MoI Facilities<br />
Department (FD)<br />
B C<br />
PGOV<br />
Provincial HQ<br />
1<br />
2<br />
UP DHQ<br />
C<br />
1/1<br />
6/63<br />
1/1<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
1/1<br />
NLC<br />
RLC<br />
3<br />
1/1<br />
Deficiency Identified<br />
Statement of Need<br />
Supply System<br />
Maintenance Contract<br />
Emergency Contract<br />
MoI DM SPT validation<br />
MoI FD prepares SOW<br />
MoI P Awards Contract<br />
Critical Advisor Skills<br />
Strategic<br />
1. Develop O&M Policies & Processes<br />
2. Improve Communications<br />
3. Develop Strategic O&M Vision/Goals<br />
4. Develop Training<br />
5. Establish a Tracking System<br />
Operational<br />
1. Develop Provincial & District Policies<br />
2. Improve Communication<br />
3. Implement Prov. & Dist. Training<br />
4. Utilize Tracking System<br />
5. Improve Record Keeping<br />
Tactical<br />
1. Develop SON Process<br />
2. Basic O&M Training<br />
3. Preventive Maintenance Training<br />
4. Utilize Tracking System<br />
5. Improve Communication<br />
A<br />
B<br />
C<br />
Friction Points<br />
6 Week Lag in Finalizing Award Docs<br />
No Tracking Tools to Monitor Status<br />
Lack of Written Procedures<br />
= # Advisor Teams/# Units<br />
To view the detailed information paper associated with this process map, please visit<br />
the online version of the <strong>SFA</strong> Guide at https://ronna.apan.org/<strong>SFA</strong>Guide<br />
B 22<br />
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This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN 318-449-9102<br />
ANP Logistics<br />
Critical Function<br />
1 - Operational command and<br />
control functions<br />
- RLC<br />
- MMC<br />
MoI<br />
MMC<br />
Communication Up<br />
2<br />
- 1 AUP District/ANCOP Kandak<br />
submits requests to Type-B/C<br />
PHQ/SSK<br />
- 2 Type-B/C PHQ/SSK validates<br />
and issues request to Type-A<br />
PHQ/ANCOP BDE<br />
- 3 Kandak submits request to<br />
ABP Zone HQ<br />
- 4 HQs/Zones/BDEs validates<br />
and issues requests to RLCs<br />
- 5 RLC validates and issues<br />
requests to MMC<br />
- 6 If items are not in inventory,<br />
request is sent to MoI for<br />
approval/ procurement<br />
1<br />
4<br />
Type-A<br />
PHQ<br />
Type<br />
B/C HQ<br />
1 7 1 3<br />
District<br />
6<br />
5<br />
1<br />
2<br />
RLC<br />
4 5 1 3<br />
ABP<br />
Zone<br />
NLC<br />
Trans<br />
BDE<br />
ANCOP<br />
BDE<br />
2 6 1 3 2 6 1 3<br />
3 6 1 3<br />
Kandak<br />
4<br />
3<br />
SSK<br />
1 7 1 3<br />
Kandak<br />
Annex B<br />
1<br />
Friction Points<br />
- Limited feedback from MMC<br />
on request verification<br />
- Visibility between RLC and<br />
MMC<br />
2<br />
- Compliance to policies issued<br />
from MoI<br />
3<br />
4 - Type-A PHQ/RLC relationship<br />
Communication Down<br />
- MoI approval/procurement<br />
1<br />
guidance to MMC<br />
- 2 MMC issues MoI14 to NLC<br />
- 3 NLC generates MoI9 for unit and<br />
coordinates shipment through<br />
Trans BDE<br />
- Trans BDE ships equipment to<br />
4<br />
RLC<br />
- RLC issues equipment to HQs<br />
5<br />
- 6 HQs issues equipment to<br />
subordinates<br />
-<br />
7<br />
Supply Activity issues equipment<br />
to Districts/Kandaks<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 23
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN 318-449-9102<br />
ANP Sustainment<br />
Process Highlights & Friction Points<br />
• MMC forwards requirements to DOL for procurement of<br />
items not in inventory<br />
• MMC Item Manager validates MoI 14 and forwards to<br />
NLC.<br />
• NLC issues MoI 9.<br />
• Trans BDE programs movement to RLC<br />
• Loss of visibility of MoI 14s at MMC<br />
• No feedback on request status<br />
• No Demand Signal/ Inventory visibility / Excess<br />
Management.<br />
• Limited sustainment convoys (1 per month if at all)<br />
30-35<br />
Days<br />
14-28<br />
Days<br />
DOL<br />
MMC<br />
NLC<br />
Trans<br />
BDE<br />
• RLC validates requests<br />
• RLC checks stocks on hand; issues MoI 9 and<br />
equipment<br />
• MoI 14 forwarded to MMC if equipment is not on<br />
hand<br />
• HQ units pick up equipment from RLC<br />
• Signatures required for MoI 14 to leave RLC<br />
• Limited digital system for MoI<br />
• Demand history is not tracked<br />
4-6<br />
Days<br />
RLC<br />
4-7<br />
Days<br />
• HQ validates requests<br />
• MSP checks stocks on hand; if not available MoI 14 is<br />
sent to the RLC<br />
• Issues MoI 9 and equipment to requesting units<br />
• If MoI 14 is denied, no feedback provided<br />
• Signatures required by HQ leadership<br />
• Limited MSPs are available<br />
• Limited stock at MSPs<br />
• Unit request supply item and fills out MoI 14.<br />
• Signature required on MoI 14 by unit leadership<br />
• Lack of formalized catalogue<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
HQ<br />
Unit<br />
MSP<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
58-85 Days Total<br />
BLUF:<br />
• The developing ANP Supply System and limited stock at the RLCs creates a slower system than developed systems.<br />
• ANP are developing their COREIMS capabilities, but are still far behind, causing difficulties with the MoI 14 process.<br />
• MoI 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback .<br />
• Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoI Level.<br />
Process Improvements:<br />
NLC<br />
• Develop National Catalog<br />
• Continue to establish CORE IMS<br />
capability<br />
• Increase frequency of ANP convoys<br />
• Establish demand history of requested<br />
items to build and refine ASL<br />
• Utilize contracted convoys to increase<br />
sustainment frequency<br />
RLC<br />
• Establish demand history of requested<br />
items to build and refine ASL<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
• CORE IMS Network Expansion/<br />
Implementation to all RLCs<br />
• Improve MoI14 status requests from<br />
MMC<br />
Kandak/ Provincial HQ<br />
• Approved ASL followed by resourced ASL<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
• Improve MoI14 status requests from RLC<br />
Unit/District<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
• Improve MoI14 status requests from HQs<br />
Friction Points<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
Critical Node (Up)<br />
Flow of MoI 14 Request<br />
Flow of MoI 9 and<br />
equipment<br />
1<br />
B 24<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN 318-449-9102<br />
Process Highlights & Friction Points<br />
• ASC SPO validates MoD 14 and forwards to GSG4.<br />
• GSG4 approves via MoD 9.<br />
•MMC directs subordinate DEPOTs to fulfill request if O/H<br />
•Depots fill request if on hand.<br />
• CSD Releases; CMA Delivers<br />
• GSG4 insertion into the approval process<br />
• Demand Signal/ Inventory visibility / Excess Management<br />
• Catalog discrepancies<br />
• User Training for CORE IMS<br />
XXX<br />
• G4 validates request<br />
• MoD 14 forwarded to RLSC<br />
• MoD 14 to ASC<br />
• No appreciable connectivity with CORE IMS at Corps /<br />
RLSC<br />
I<br />
• CSSK check stocks on hand; if not available MoD 14 is<br />
sent to the RLSC<br />
• If MoD 14 is denied, no feedback provided<br />
• Unit request supply item and fills out MoD 14.<br />
• Signature required on MoD 14 by unit leadership<br />
X<br />
ANA Sustainment<br />
30-35<br />
Days<br />
14-28<br />
Days<br />
4-6<br />
Days<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
Kandak<br />
submits<br />
MOD 14<br />
XXXX<br />
ASC<br />
XXXXX<br />
GSG4<br />
XXX<br />
RLSC<br />
(FSD)<br />
XXX<br />
G4<br />
S4<br />
II<br />
CSS<br />
II<br />
XXXX<br />
MMC<br />
CSD<br />
CMA<br />
4-7<br />
Days<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
58-85 Days Total<br />
Process Improvements:<br />
EAC<br />
• Developing National Catalog<br />
• CORE IMS User Training<br />
• Increase frequency of CMA convoys<br />
• Advisors at key nodes<br />
XXX<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
• Core-IMS Training and Network<br />
Expansion Plan includes RLSC<br />
X<br />
Unit/Kandak/CSSK/Brigade<br />
• Approved ASL followed by resourced<br />
ASL<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
Critical Node (Up)<br />
Annex B<br />
MoD 9 fill at<br />
Kandak<br />
Friction Points<br />
Flow of MOD 14<br />
Flow of MOD 9 Fill<br />
BLUF:<br />
• Overall, the bureaucracy of the Afghan supply system and low ASL levels at CSSK and RLSC creates an unresponsive system that has a best case response time of 2 – 3 months.<br />
• Difficulties with the National Catalog (multiple stock /part numbers for the same item) creates difficulties in the completion of the MoD 14.<br />
• MoD 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback .<br />
• Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoD Level.<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 25
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 2 Dec 2013<br />
POC: IJC ANSF DIR<br />
DSN 318-449-9524<br />
Process Highlights & Friction Points<br />
• MoI identifies and develops requirements<br />
• Equipment is procured by DOL<br />
• MMC tracks equipment and requirements<br />
• NLC receives /ships equipment to RLC<br />
• Items are not in inventory<br />
• Delayed entry into country<br />
• Equipment shipped to RLC for distribution<br />
• RLC distributes to MSPs<br />
• Establishment of distribution plan<br />
• Establishing New Equipment Training (NET)<br />
• Limited MSP available<br />
ANP Equipment Fielding<br />
2-3<br />
Weeks<br />
MoI<br />
DOL<br />
MMC<br />
NLC<br />
RLC<br />
MSP<br />
Process Improvements:<br />
MoI<br />
• Requirements generation<br />
• Strategic planning<br />
• Bureaucratic issue process<br />
• Multiple Tashkils<br />
• Accountability<br />
• Established ASL determined and procured<br />
prior to fielding<br />
• Efficient Push and Movement of Equipment to<br />
Unit<br />
RLC<br />
• Accountability<br />
• New equipment training<br />
• Cross leveling<br />
• ASL establishment packages<br />
• HQs/Units receive equipment<br />
• Conduct New Equipment Training<br />
• NET planned but not conducted by all<br />
2-3<br />
Weeks<br />
NET<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
New<br />
Equipment<br />
Training<br />
HQs<br />
HQs/ Units<br />
• Sustainment package with initial<br />
fielding<br />
• New Equipment Training (NET) plan and<br />
Execution<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
Units<br />
Friction Points<br />
Flow of Equipment<br />
BLUF:<br />
• Equipment procured without full sustainment consideration. Results in part shortages and subsequently vehicles awaiting repairs.<br />
• Push letters not issued in a timely manner delaying fielding often > 30 days.<br />
• Once Title Transfers are complete vehicle visibility is lost and may be given to different recipients.<br />
B 26<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 2 Dec 2013<br />
POC: IJC ANSF DIR<br />
DSN 318-449-9524<br />
EAC<br />
Process Highlights & Friction Points<br />
ANA Equipment Fielding<br />
XXXX<br />
GSG4<br />
• GSG4 develops requirement<br />
• Equipment is procured and shipped<br />
• CSD receives /ships equipment to RLSC<br />
• No ASL Procurement prior to fielding<br />
• CSD delays of up to 30 days for distribution<br />
• Multiple Tashkils<br />
• Bureaucratic issue process<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• Equipment shipped to Corps then Bde<br />
• Modified distribution plan<br />
• No New Equipment Training (NET)<br />
XXX<br />
30-60<br />
Days<br />
2-3<br />
Weeks<br />
MOD AT&L<br />
MMC<br />
CSD<br />
XXX<br />
RLSC<br />
(FSD)<br />
XXX<br />
G4<br />
CMA<br />
XXX<br />
CORPS<br />
Unit/Kandak/CSSK/Brigade<br />
• Unit receives equipment<br />
• New Equipment Training conducted<br />
X<br />
• NET planned but not conducted by all<br />
2-3<br />
Weeks<br />
NET<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
X<br />
S4<br />
New<br />
Equipment<br />
Training<br />
X<br />
BDE<br />
II<br />
CSS<br />
II<br />
Comd bypasses<br />
training /<br />
changes<br />
distribution<br />
BLUF:<br />
• Equipment procured without full DOTMLPF consideration. Results in part shortages and subsequently vehicles awaiting repairs.<br />
• Push letters not issued in a timely manner delaying fielding often > 30 days.<br />
• CDRs decision to bypass new equipment training and to redistribute vehicle differently than the fielding plan.<br />
• Results in vehicles manned by unqualified soldiers and possible in wrong units.<br />
Annex B<br />
Process Improvements:<br />
EAC<br />
• Requirements generation<br />
• Strategic planning<br />
• Accountability<br />
• Established ASL determined and procured<br />
prior to fielding<br />
• Efficient Push and Movement of Equipment<br />
to Unit<br />
XXX<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• Accountability<br />
• Afghan Commander modifications<br />
• New equipment training<br />
• Cross leveling<br />
• Sustainment packages<br />
X<br />
Unit/ Kandak/CSSK/ Brigade<br />
• Sustainment package with initial<br />
fielding<br />
• New Equipment Training (NET) plan and<br />
Execution<br />
Friction Points<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
Flow of<br />
Equipment<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 27
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 20 OCT 14<br />
POC:MOI/MAG Logistics<br />
Advisor<br />
DSN: 318-449-0357<br />
If DDS can fill, the<br />
MoI 14 stops here; if<br />
not, send to MMC-P<br />
Direct<br />
Delivery<br />
Site<br />
Unit<br />
CDR<br />
Unit<br />
Logistics<br />
Officer<br />
Unit Fuel<br />
Order<br />
Officer<br />
MoI<br />
Form<br />
14<br />
ANP Class III Sustainment<br />
(Fuel Ordering)<br />
MMC-P Signatures Required<br />
Customer<br />
Care Center<br />
(MMC-P)<br />
MMC-P<br />
General<br />
(MMC-P)<br />
General<br />
Supply<br />
(MMC-P)<br />
Class III<br />
Director<br />
(MMC-P)<br />
Fuel<br />
Ordering<br />
Officer<br />
Fills order if able<br />
* Fuel Ordering Officer<br />
sends fuel request to<br />
vendor via email<br />
Vendor<br />
Unit sends organic<br />
asset to pick up<br />
fuel<br />
•Site POC signs delivery ticket<br />
or Delivery Inventory F8<br />
and gives vendor a copy<br />
Direct<br />
Delivery<br />
Site<br />
* Vendor provides all delivery<br />
tickets or Delivery Inventory<br />
MoI7 and invoices to FOO<br />
Vendor<br />
Vendor<br />
Vendor<br />
MOF<br />
MOI-F<br />
Fuel<br />
Ordering<br />
Officer<br />
* DFAS releases funds<br />
to vendor based on<br />
funds availability in the<br />
line of accounting<br />
* MOI-F process packet and<br />
submits payment request<br />
to MOF for funds<br />
disbursement to vendor<br />
* After reconciliation process is<br />
complete, FOO provides all approved<br />
fuel orders, delivery tickets or Delivery<br />
Inventory MoI 7, and Invoices to MOI-F<br />
Logistics Functional Team<br />
Strategic Level:<br />
• Colonel/OF-5<br />
• LtCol/OF-4<br />
• Sr NCO/OR-8<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
Operational Level:<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
• 2XCaptain/OF-2<br />
• 2X Sr NCO/OR-7<br />
Friction Points<br />
Unit Inventory<br />
Management: inability to<br />
properly manage re-order<br />
points causes unit to go<br />
black on fuel<br />
*Reference:<br />
MoD Decree 4.6<br />
B 28<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 5 June 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN: 318-449-0716<br />
ANA Class III Sustainment<br />
(Fuel Ordering Process)<br />
If RLSC can fill,<br />
the MoI 14 stops<br />
here; if not, send<br />
to MMC-P<br />
RLSC<br />
Corps<br />
G4<br />
BDE<br />
S4<br />
Unit CDR<br />
Unit<br />
Supply<br />
ASC SPO validates request against MoD 32 Consumption<br />
Report prior to sending request to MMC-A<br />
Mobility<br />
Plans<br />
CLIII<br />
Manager<br />
G4 visibility only; request<br />
automatically goes to RLSC<br />
MoD<br />
Form<br />
14<br />
* If CSSK cannot fill, it is<br />
sent to Regional level<br />
CSSK<br />
* If CSSK can fill, the<br />
MoD 14 stops here<br />
Vendor<br />
MOF releases funds<br />
to vendor based on<br />
availability of funds<br />
in the line of<br />
accounting<br />
ASC<br />
SPO<br />
MMC-A<br />
Current<br />
Ops<br />
* MMC-A process prior to sending<br />
request to Fuel Ordering Officer<br />
CLIII<br />
Manager<br />
Unit sends organic<br />
asset to pick up<br />
fuel<br />
MOF<br />
MOD-F approves the<br />
allocation of MOD<br />
funds to the request<br />
and submits to<br />
Ministry of Finance<br />
(MOF)<br />
MOD-F<br />
Chief of<br />
Supply<br />
MMC-A/<br />
CG<br />
*Direct Delivery Site POC signs<br />
Delivery ticket and gives<br />
vendor a copy<br />
*Vendor provides all delivery<br />
tickets or Delivery Inventory<br />
MoD7 and Invoices to FDO<br />
AAA processes packet<br />
and submits payment<br />
request to Ministry of<br />
Defense- Dept. of<br />
Finance (MOD-F)<br />
AAA<br />
Fuel<br />
Ordering<br />
Officer<br />
Vendor<br />
*Vendor delivers<br />
Fuel to Direct Delivery Site<br />
Direct<br />
Delivery<br />
Site<br />
Vendor<br />
Fuel<br />
Ordering<br />
Officer<br />
After reconciliation process is<br />
complete, FOO provides all approved<br />
fuel orders, delivery tickets or<br />
delivery Inventory MoD7, and<br />
invoices to AAA (Procurement Office)<br />
Logistics Functional<br />
Team<br />
Strategic Level:<br />
• Colonel/OF-5<br />
• LtCol/OF-4<br />
• Sr NCO/OR-8<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
Operational Level:<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
• 2XCaptain/OF-2<br />
• 2X Sr NCO/OR-7<br />
Friction Points<br />
Unit Inventory<br />
Management: inability to<br />
properly manage re-order<br />
points causes unit to go<br />
black on fuel<br />
*Reference:<br />
MoD Decree 4.6<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 29
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN: 318-449-9102<br />
ANP Class V Sustainment<br />
MoI Process<br />
• NLC/ MMC-P validates and approves MoI 14<br />
• DOL Class V Director creates MoI 9 from processing MoI 14<br />
• DOL Class V Director forwards MoI 9 to National Depots<br />
• National Depot issues ammo from MoI 9 and arranges<br />
transportation, pallets and sets up connections w/ local units<br />
• Transportation Brigade transport to RHQ/ RLC for District<br />
Police if the P/U is not local. The RHQ/ RLC will then arrange<br />
with unit to pick up requested ammunition<br />
• DOL lack of knowledge in ammunition management<br />
RHQ/ RLC/ MoI Tech Center<br />
• Reviews requested MoI 14 & expenditure reports<br />
• Checks RLC stock level and supplies, if on hand<br />
• Issues if stock O/H<br />
• Orders by RLC UIC from 22/25 Bunkers<br />
• When MoI 14 goes directly to MoI Tech, RHQ/ RLC ammo<br />
authorizations are not being validated , which prolongs<br />
the process<br />
• RHQ/ RLC doesn’t have visibility of unit shortages &<br />
requests<br />
TRANS<br />
BRIGADE<br />
NATIONAL<br />
DEPOTS<br />
DOL/ CLASS V<br />
DIRECTOR<br />
NLC/<br />
MMC-P<br />
MoI<br />
TECH CTR<br />
MHQ/ MSP<br />
• Validates and approves MoI 14 and sends MoI 14 to<br />
RHQ/ RLC<br />
• MHQ/ RLC does not create MoI 14 for unit<br />
• MHQ consolidates all MoI 14 under the MHQ UIC<br />
• Push MoI 14 directly to MoI Tech Center instead of<br />
RHQ/RLC<br />
• MoI Tech only fill s the MHQ Taskil requirements due<br />
to the MHQ UIC on the MoI 14. Each unit must submit<br />
MoI 14 with UIC to get required Taskil ammo<br />
requirements<br />
District Police/ District HQ<br />
• Unit requests ammo, fills out MoI 14 then sends to<br />
District HQ<br />
• District HQ reviews MoI 14 & ensures supporting<br />
documentation (expenditure report)<br />
District<br />
Police<br />
submits<br />
MoI 14<br />
RHQ/<br />
RLC<br />
MHQ/<br />
MSP<br />
DISTRICT<br />
HQ<br />
DISTRICT<br />
POLICE<br />
MoI 9 fill at<br />
District<br />
Police<br />
CHALLENGES:<br />
1) Overall, the bureaucracy of the Afghan MoI 14 system and low ABL levels at<br />
District Police and RLC creates an unresponsive system that has a best case<br />
response time of 2 – 4 months.<br />
2) MoI 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback.<br />
Current Process Improvements:<br />
MoI<br />
• MMC-P processing MoI 14 w/ minimum<br />
supervision<br />
• Increased frequency of CMA convoys<br />
• Advisors at RLCs<br />
MHQ/ MSP<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
Logistics Functional Team<br />
Strategic Level:<br />
• Colonel/OF-5<br />
• LtCol/OF-4<br />
• Sr NCO/OR-8<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
Operational Level:<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
• 2XCaptain/OF-2<br />
• 2X Sr NCO/OR-7<br />
Flow of MoI 14 Request<br />
Flow of MoI 9 Fill<br />
Friction Points<br />
Advisor<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
B 30<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN: 318-449-9102<br />
EAC Process<br />
• ASC SPO validates MoD 14 and forwards to MMC<br />
• MMC forwards to AT&L for validation<br />
• GSG4 Class V Command gives final approval<br />
• Class V Command determines source (22 Bunkers or<br />
Chimtallah) and produces MoD 9<br />
• If not local pickup , then CMA convoy transports items to<br />
Corps<br />
• GSG4 insertion into the approval process<br />
• Demand Signal/ Inventory visibility / Excess Management<br />
• Catalog discrepancies<br />
• MoD 14 flow between GSG4 and MMC not IAW Log Decree<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• G4 validates request<br />
• MoD 14 forwarded to RLSC<br />
• MoD 14 to ASC<br />
• No appreciable connectivity at Corps / RLSC<br />
Unit/ Kandak/ CSSK/Brigade<br />
• CSSK check stocks on hand; if not available MoD 14 is<br />
sent to the RLSC<br />
• If CSSK denies MoD 14 , no feedback provided<br />
Unit Level/ Process<br />
• Unit requests supply items, fills out MoD 14, and<br />
attaches expenditure report<br />
• Signature required on MoD 14 by unit leadership<br />
ANA Class V Sustainment<br />
XXX<br />
X<br />
Kandak<br />
submits<br />
MoD 14<br />
XXXX<br />
ASC<br />
XXX<br />
RLSC<br />
(FSD)<br />
XXX<br />
G4<br />
X<br />
S4<br />
II<br />
CSS<br />
II<br />
XXXXX<br />
AT&L<br />
GSG4<br />
XXXX<br />
MMC<br />
Class V<br />
Command<br />
CMA<br />
Current Process Improvements:<br />
EAC<br />
• Increased frequency of CMA convoys<br />
• Advisors at key nodes<br />
XXX<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• Development of RLSC ABL<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
Advisor<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
Annex B<br />
I<br />
MOD 9 fill at<br />
RLSC<br />
MOD 9 fill at<br />
Kandak<br />
Logistics Functional Team<br />
Strategic Level:<br />
• Colonel/OF-5<br />
• LtCol/OF-4<br />
• Sr NCO/OR-8<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
Operational Level:<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
• 2XCaptain/OF-2<br />
• 2X Sr NCO/OR-7<br />
Flow of MoD 14 Request<br />
CHALLENGES:<br />
1) Overall, the bureaucracy of the Afghan supply system and low ABL levels at CSSK and RLSC creates an unresponsive system that has a best<br />
case response time of 2 – 3 months.<br />
2) Difficulties with the National Catalog (multiple stock /part numbers for the same item) creates difficulties in the completion of the MoD 14.<br />
3) MoD 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback.<br />
4) Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver, which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoD Level.<br />
5) Accurate accountability and use of correct MoDIC’s to identify, track, and account for Class V stocks.<br />
Flow of MoD 9 Fill<br />
Friction Points<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 31
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN: 318-449-9102<br />
ANP Class VII Sustainment<br />
NLC-Wardak<br />
MoI Process<br />
• MMC-P validates request<br />
• MSC generates the MoD 9<br />
• MMC-P generates MoD 1384 to schedule<br />
convoy<br />
• Trans Bde loads convoy; LNO signs for items;<br />
items delivered to RLC<br />
• Once equipment arrives unit waits up to 30 days<br />
for distribution<br />
National/<br />
Regional<br />
MMC-P<br />
MSC<br />
Trans<br />
Bde<br />
Regional HQ/ RLC<br />
RLC<br />
• MoI 14 forwarded to RLC<br />
• HQs Commander modifies distribution<br />
plan<br />
Unit/PHQs<br />
District/<br />
Province<br />
Regional HQ<br />
• Unit generates MoI 14<br />
• Unit receives equipment<br />
• Unit sends personnel to training<br />
• Unit sends maintainers to training<br />
• PHQ Commander modifies Distribution<br />
plan<br />
Unit<br />
submits<br />
MoI 14<br />
PHQ<br />
Unit<br />
MoI 9 fill<br />
CHALLENGES<br />
• Equipment does not get to needed unit in an expedient manner<br />
• Modification to distribution plan (at PHQ or Zone level)<br />
Current Process Improvements:<br />
MoI Process<br />
• Procurement and acquisition process<br />
Zone HQ/ RLC<br />
• Contract maintenance<br />
Logistics Functional Tm-<br />
Strategic Level:<br />
• Colonel/OF-5<br />
• LtCol/OF-4<br />
• Sr NCO/OR-8<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
•<br />
Operational Level:<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
• 2XCaptain/OF-2<br />
• 2X Sr NCO/OR-7<br />
Flow of MoI 14 Request<br />
Flow of MoI 9 Fill<br />
Friction Points<br />
Advisor<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
B 32<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN: 318-449-9102<br />
EAC Process<br />
ANA Class VII Sustainment<br />
I<br />
XXXXX<br />
GSG4<br />
• ASC SPO validates MoD 14 and forwards to MMC<br />
• MMC forwards to GSG4 to generate fielding plan<br />
• GSG4 directs MMC to generate MoD 9<br />
• CSD fulfills request if O/H<br />
• CSD generates MoD 1384 to CMA to schedule<br />
convoy<br />
• CMA loads convoy; Corps LNO signs for items;<br />
items delivered to RLSC<br />
• Once equipment arrives unit waits up to 30<br />
days for distribution<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• G4 validates request<br />
• MoD 14 forwarded to RLSC<br />
• MoD 14 to ASC<br />
XXX<br />
• Corps Commander modifies distribution plan<br />
X<br />
Unit/Kandak/CSSK/Brigade<br />
• Unit generates MoD 14<br />
• BDE sends equipment to unit<br />
• Unit receives equipment<br />
• Unit sends personnel to training<br />
• Unit sends maintainers to training<br />
XXXX<br />
ASC<br />
XXX<br />
RLSC<br />
(FSD)<br />
XXX<br />
G4<br />
X<br />
S4<br />
II<br />
CSS<br />
II<br />
XXXX<br />
MMC<br />
CSD<br />
CMA<br />
• Brigade Commander modifies Distribution plan<br />
Kandak<br />
submits<br />
MoD 14<br />
CHALLENGES<br />
• No ASL procured prior to fielding<br />
• Equipment does not get to needed unit in an expedient manner<br />
• Modification to distribution plan<br />
• Poor visibility over on-hand / mission capable fleets at national level<br />
Annex B<br />
Current Process Improvements:<br />
EAC<br />
• Procurement and acquisition process<br />
• Established ASL determined prior to<br />
fielding<br />
• CMA Convoy runs once a month<br />
XXX<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• WG Development and resource of ASL<br />
Flow of MoD 14 Request<br />
Flow of MoD 9 Fill<br />
Friction Points<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
MoD 9 fill at<br />
Kandak<br />
Logistics Functional Team<br />
Strategic Level:<br />
• Colonel/OF-5<br />
• LtCol/OF-4<br />
• Sr NCO/OR-8<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
Operational Level:<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
• 2XCaptain/OF-2<br />
• 2X Sr NCO/OR-7<br />
Advisor<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 33
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 4 Dec 2013<br />
POC: NTM-A CMD Surg<br />
DSN 319-449-5910<br />
Critical Functions<br />
1 - Operational command and<br />
control functions<br />
- MoI (Ministry of Interior)<br />
- OTSG (Office of the Surgeon<br />
General)<br />
- Class VIII NSD<br />
ANP Class VIII Sustainment<br />
3<br />
4<br />
MoI<br />
1<br />
1<br />
3<br />
2<br />
OTSG<br />
2<br />
1<br />
Friction Points<br />
- Limited feedback from NSD to<br />
1<br />
Med Units on requests status<br />
- 2 Limited Visibility between Med<br />
Units and NSD on req’ts and<br />
what’s available in NSD<br />
- 3 Inconsistent MoI Log Policies<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
Communication Up<br />
All ANP Medical Units submit Class<br />
VIII supply requests (MoI 14s) to<br />
NSD<br />
NSD validates and issues supplies (if<br />
available) directly to unit<br />
representative OR to MMC to be<br />
shipped by Trans BDE to RLC<br />
If items are not in inventory, request<br />
is either substituted by NSD,<br />
coordinated thru OTSG to MoI for<br />
approval/ procurement, or returned<br />
as an un-validated requirement<br />
• 4 If requested items are shipped by<br />
Trans BDE to RLC, requesting unit<br />
travels to RLC to receive<br />
items<br />
MMC-P/<br />
Trans BDE<br />
4<br />
RLCs<br />
5<br />
4<br />
Class VIII<br />
NSD (Kabul)<br />
3<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
1<br />
All ANP<br />
Med Units<br />
- 4 MoI Procurement Process long<br />
and cumbersome<br />
Communication Down<br />
- MoI approval/procurement/<br />
1<br />
2<br />
distribution guidance to MMC and<br />
OTSG<br />
OTSG provides finalized Class VIII<br />
guidance/contracts from MoI to<br />
NSD for execution/distribution<br />
- 3 NSD issues supplies or returns<br />
request to customer in Kabul OR<br />
- 3 NSD generates MoI Form 9 for unit<br />
and coordinates shipment through<br />
MMC & Trans BDE<br />
- 4 Trans BDE ships supplies to RLC<br />
- 5 RLC notifies Med Unit(s) to pick up<br />
Class VIII supplies<br />
B 34<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 1 Dec 2013<br />
POC: NTM-A CMD Surg<br />
DSN: 318-449-5910<br />
1 - MEDCOM/ LOGCOM Cross<br />
Communication<br />
2<br />
3<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
Critical Function<br />
MEDCOM Distribution Plan<br />
development and dissemination<br />
LOGCOM status updates<br />
Communication Up<br />
Unit submits MoD 14 to KDK<br />
KDK submits MoD 14 to BDE<br />
BDE and/ or RMH submits<br />
MoD 14 to Corps FSD<br />
Corp FSD submits to MoD 14 to ASC<br />
ASC submits MoD 14 to MMC<br />
MMC submits MoD 14 to NSD Class<br />
VIII warehouse for distribution<br />
NSD contacts MEDCOM for nonstocked<br />
valid requests<br />
8<br />
MEDCOM submits annual<br />
requirements to AT&L<br />
ANA Class VIII Sustainment<br />
3<br />
LOGCOM<br />
NSD<br />
CLVIII<br />
1<br />
AT&L<br />
1<br />
2<br />
8<br />
7 1<br />
1<br />
MMC<br />
ASC<br />
6<br />
5<br />
MEDCOM<br />
G4<br />
2<br />
2<br />
Corps<br />
FSD<br />
4<br />
3<br />
P&T<br />
Committee<br />
RMH<br />
3<br />
2<br />
BDE<br />
3<br />
3<br />
2<br />
UNIT<br />
4<br />
1<br />
KDK<br />
Annex B<br />
1<br />
Friction Points<br />
Limited feedback from ASC and<br />
MMC on request status<br />
2<br />
Lack of communication between<br />
LOGCOM and MEDCOM<br />
3<br />
P& T committee subjectively<br />
changing distribution plan<br />
quantities<br />
Communication Down<br />
NSD generates MoD 9 for unit and<br />
coordinates shipment by the Trans<br />
BDE to the Corps FSD<br />
1<br />
2<br />
Corps FSD issues equipment to<br />
supported RMH and BDE<br />
3<br />
BDE issues supplies to KDK<br />
4<br />
KDK issues to Unit<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 35
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 15 Jun 2014<br />
POC: DCOS ANSF LOG<br />
DSN: 318-449-9102<br />
ANP Class IX Sustainment (Future)<br />
AUP ANCOP ABP Log Chain of Command<br />
Process Highlights: MMC-P<br />
Process Improvements Needed:<br />
National<br />
• Contractor procures, distributes and<br />
maintains a nation ASL based on the<br />
demand history of the fleet.<br />
AUP<br />
HQ<br />
ANCOP<br />
HQ<br />
ABP<br />
HQ<br />
NLC Wardak<br />
Trans<br />
BDE<br />
National<br />
• Update MoI Policy to reflect a<br />
future organic system.<br />
• Develop a future organic national<br />
ASL.<br />
Regional/Brigade HQ<br />
• Type A HQs receives Form 63 from<br />
subordinate HQs or direct from units.<br />
• RLC POC receives MoI 63.<br />
Type A<br />
HQ<br />
RLC<br />
Regional<br />
• Update MoI policy to reflect a<br />
future organic system.<br />
• Develop a future organic regional<br />
ASL.<br />
Provincial/Battalion HQ<br />
• Provincial HQ receives MoI Form 63<br />
and submits to RLC POC.<br />
Provincial<br />
HQ<br />
Kandak<br />
HQ<br />
Kandak<br />
HQ<br />
Provincial<br />
• Update MoI policy to reflect a<br />
future organic system.<br />
• Develop a future organic regional<br />
PLL.<br />
Unit/District HQ<br />
• Police Station identifies a vehicle in<br />
need of maintenance and notifies<br />
DHQ.<br />
• DHQ notifies POC at Provincial HQ and<br />
submits MoI Form 63.<br />
District<br />
HQ<br />
Police<br />
Station<br />
Coy<br />
HQ<br />
Police<br />
Station<br />
Coy<br />
HQ<br />
Police<br />
Station<br />
Unit/District<br />
• Update MoI policy to reflect a<br />
future organic system.<br />
• Develop a future organic regional<br />
PLL.<br />
MoI Form 63 Class IX repair parts<br />
Organic asset<br />
B 36<br />
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UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 20 OCT 13<br />
POC: NTM-A DCOM-SPO<br />
DSN: 318-449-5847<br />
EAC Process<br />
• ASC SPO validates MoD 14 and forwards to MMC<br />
• MMC forwards to GSG4 to generate fielding plan<br />
• GSG4 directs MMC to generate MoD 9<br />
• CSD fulfills request if O/H<br />
• CSD generates MoD 1384 to CMA to schedule convoy<br />
• CMA loads convoy; Corps LNO signs for items; items delivered to<br />
RLSC<br />
• GSG4 insertion into the approval process<br />
• Demand Signal/ Inventory visibility / Excess Management<br />
• Catalog discrepancies<br />
• MoD 14 flow between GSG4 and MMC not IAW Log Decree<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• G4 validates request<br />
• MoD 14 forwarded to RLSC<br />
• MoD 14 to ASC<br />
XXX<br />
• 4 Signatures required for MoD 14 to leave Corps/RLSC<br />
• No 1098/1099 forms created for items not in stock.<br />
• CoreIMS only exists at national levels<br />
• No appreciable connectivity at Corps / RLSC<br />
Unit/ Kandak/ CSSK/Brigade<br />
• CSSK check stocks on hand; if not available MoD 14 is<br />
sent to the RLSC<br />
• If MoD 14 is denied, no feedback provided<br />
Unit Level/ Process<br />
• Unit requests supply item s and fills out MoD 14<br />
• Signature required on MoD 14 by unit leadership<br />
ANA Class IX Sustainment<br />
30-35<br />
Days<br />
14-28<br />
Days<br />
XXXX<br />
ASC<br />
X X<br />
S4<br />
4-6<br />
Days<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
Kandak<br />
submits<br />
MoD 14<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
XXX<br />
RLSC<br />
(FSD)<br />
XXXXX<br />
GSG4<br />
XXX<br />
G4<br />
II<br />
CSS<br />
II<br />
XXXX<br />
MMC<br />
CSD<br />
CMA<br />
4-7<br />
Days<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
MOD 9 fill at<br />
Kandak<br />
58-85 Days Total<br />
Current Process Improvements:<br />
EAC<br />
• Developing National Catalog<br />
• Metered parts delivery<br />
• Command Directed CLIX push<br />
• CORE IMS User Training<br />
• Increased frequency of CMA convoys<br />
• Advisors or LTATs at every key node (GSG4,<br />
ASC, CSD, CMA and MMC)<br />
XXX<br />
Corps/ RLSC<br />
• Development of RLSC ASL<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
• Core-IMS Training and Network Expansion<br />
Plan includes RLSC/RLC<br />
Annex B<br />
I<br />
Logistics Functional Team<br />
Strategic Level<br />
• Colonel/OF-5<br />
• LtCol/OF-4<br />
• Sr NCO/OR-8<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
Operational Level:<br />
• Major/OF-3<br />
• 2XCaptain/OF-2<br />
• 2X Sr NCO/OR-7<br />
Flow of MOD 14 Request<br />
1) The bureaucracy of the Afghan supply system and low ASL levels at CSSK and RLSC create an unresponsive system that has a best case<br />
response time of 2-3 months.<br />
2) Difficulties with the National Catalog (multiple stock /part numbers for the same item) creates difficulties in the completion of the MoD 14.<br />
3) MoD 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback.<br />
4) Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver, which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoD Level.<br />
Flow of MOD 9 Fill<br />
Friction Points<br />
Advisor<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
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This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 4 Dec 13<br />
POC: NSOCC-A, J5<br />
DSN: 700-787-3754<br />
SMW Class IX Sustainment (Future)<br />
(Once Post-RSM/Coalition Sustainment Contract is Complete)<br />
MMC-A/ OEM Process<br />
• MMC-A validates MoD 14<br />
• OEM fulfill procurement , release part to ASD with all<br />
passport and applicable documentation<br />
• All distributions to Tech Supply (Squadrons) from the<br />
ASD will be done via the Air Movement Request (AMR)<br />
process or coordinated effort between the ASD and the<br />
SMW based on priority of request<br />
• User Training for MIS<br />
30-35<br />
Days<br />
14-28<br />
Days<br />
X X<br />
MMC-A* OEM<br />
Suggested Process Improvements:<br />
EAC<br />
• Developing National Catalog<br />
• Metered parts delivery<br />
• Command Directed CLIX push<br />
• MIS User Training<br />
• Advisors or LTATs at every key node (GSG4,<br />
ASC, CSD, CMA and MMC)<br />
Aviation Support Depot (ASD)<br />
• ASD validates MoD 14<br />
• If ASD can fill the entire request, issue a MoD 9 and<br />
issue requested items<br />
• If ASD can only fill a portion of the request, issue a<br />
MoD form 9, adjust the quantity requested and the<br />
ASD forwards to the MMC-A for acquisition<br />
4-6<br />
Days<br />
X<br />
ASD<br />
4-7<br />
Days<br />
AAF/SMW HQ<br />
• Development of Aviation CL IX ASL<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
• MIS Training and Network Expansion Plan at<br />
MeS and KAF<br />
• Limited demand analysis capabilities<br />
Squadron Level Process<br />
• Unit request supply item and fills out MoD 14<br />
• Signature required on MoD 14 by unit Maintenance<br />
Management Officer<br />
• Tech Supply reviews the unit’s authorization. If Tech<br />
Supply can fill the entire request, issue a MoD form 9 and<br />
issue requested items.<br />
• If Tech Supply can only fill a portion of the request, issue a<br />
MoD form 9 for amount issued, adjust the quantity<br />
requested, then forward the request to the AAF Aviation<br />
Support Depot (ASD)<br />
• Signatures required for MoD 14 to leave squadron<br />
• If MoD is denied, no feedback provided<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
Squadron<br />
submits<br />
MOD 14<br />
X<br />
Tech<br />
Supply<br />
II II<br />
3RD 4TH<br />
HQ SMW<br />
(1 per Sqd)<br />
II<br />
1&2<br />
2-3<br />
Days<br />
MOD 9 fill<br />
at<br />
Squadron<br />
58-85 Days Total<br />
Squadron<br />
• Approved ASL followed by resourced ASL<br />
• Literacy programs<br />
Flow of MoD 14<br />
Request<br />
Flow of MoD 9<br />
Fill<br />
Critical Node (Up)<br />
Friction Point<br />
Critical Node (Down)<br />
1) Overall, the bureaucracy of the Afghan supply system and low ASL levels at CSSK and RLSC creates an unresponsive system that has a best case response time of 2 – 3 months.<br />
2) Difficulties with the National Catalog (multiple stock /part numbers for the same item) creates difficulties in the completion of the MoD 14.<br />
3) MOD 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback .<br />
4) Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoD Level.<br />
* Currently the procurement of CLIX sustainment is provided through the Task Order Requests for Proposals (TORP) 110 contract. Future acquisition of OEM Class IX should be procured through the<br />
MMC-A IAW the MoD Log Decree 4.0*<br />
B 38<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 2 Dec 2013<br />
POC: IJC ANSF DIR<br />
DSN 318-449-9524<br />
ANA C2<br />
Communication Down<br />
1<br />
1 - MoD guidance to GS<br />
2 - GS Guidance to GFC<br />
3 - GFC Ciphers to Corps<br />
- Corps<br />
- Ciphers to subordinates<br />
- Cross Pillar Coordination<br />
8<br />
1<br />
CoGS<br />
3<br />
3<br />
Corps<br />
4<br />
MoD<br />
3<br />
1<br />
GS<br />
4<br />
1 - Corps / OCC-R Receives<br />
- Corps and GS bypass GFC<br />
- NMCC taskings to Corps<br />
bypass GFC<br />
2<br />
- Limited communications<br />
between NMCC and GFC<br />
3<br />
Friction Points<br />
1<br />
1<br />
GFC<br />
6<br />
2<br />
5<br />
2<br />
2<br />
4<br />
7<br />
NMCC<br />
4<br />
OCC-R<br />
1<br />
Critical Function<br />
1 - Operational command and<br />
control functions<br />
- NMCC<br />
- GFC<br />
Communication Up<br />
information from subordinate<br />
units<br />
2 - Cross Coordination between<br />
Corps and OCC-R<br />
3 - Corps Reports to GFC<br />
4 - OCC-R reports to NMCC<br />
5 - NMCC and GFC Coordination<br />
6 - GFC reports to GS<br />
7 - NMCC reports to GS<br />
8 - GS provides analysis to MoD<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
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This document is not approved for public release<br />
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POC: IJC ANSF DIR<br />
DSN 318-449-9524<br />
Friction Points<br />
1 - Lack of required communication systems<br />
(data / MoI/MoD Net)<br />
2 - Provincial/KDK/KDK bypasses OCC-P<br />
3 - Type A/BDE/Zone bypasses OCC-R direct<br />
to their HQ<br />
Critical Function<br />
2<br />
- 1 Operational C2 without<br />
bypassing the OCCs<br />
(NPCC, OCC-R, OCC-P)<br />
9<br />
AUP/ANCOP/ABP<br />
3<br />
3<br />
8<br />
Type A/BDE/Zones<br />
2<br />
4<br />
3<br />
1<br />
Provincial/KDK/KDK<br />
1<br />
7<br />
5<br />
2<br />
ANP C2<br />
MoI<br />
1<br />
10<br />
DM of<br />
Security<br />
Ops / Plans<br />
NPCC<br />
1<br />
6<br />
OCC-R<br />
4<br />
OCC-P<br />
1<br />
Communication Down<br />
- 1 MoI guidance to DM Security<br />
- 2 DM Security directs ANP Pillar HQ<br />
- 3 ANP Pillar HQ Ciphers to subordinate HQ<br />
- 4 Type A /BDE/Zones<br />
- Ciphers to Subordinates<br />
- Cross Pillar Coordination<br />
Communication Up<br />
1 - Provincial / KDK / OCC-P receives information<br />
2 - Cross Coordination with OCC-P<br />
3 - Provincial/BDE/KDK reports to Type A/BDE/Zone<br />
4 - OCC-P reports to OCC-R<br />
5 - Type A/BDE/Zone coordination with OCC-R<br />
6 - OCC-R to NPCC Coordination<br />
7 - ANP HQs liaison with NPCC<br />
8 - A/BDE/Zone reports to Pillar HQs<br />
9 - ANP HQs report to DM Security<br />
10 - DM Sec provides analysis to MoI<br />
B 40<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 27 JUN 14<br />
POC: NSOCC-A, J5<br />
DSN: 700-787-3754<br />
1<br />
CRU<br />
222<br />
CF 333<br />
ATF<br />
444<br />
MoI<br />
DM of<br />
Security<br />
1<br />
GCPSU<br />
2<br />
1<br />
OPCOM<br />
3 3<br />
3<br />
1<br />
OPCOM<br />
1<br />
SPTW<br />
SPTC<br />
Annex B<br />
GCPSU C2<br />
COORDINATION<br />
PCOP<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
TACON<br />
PSUs<br />
ISUs<br />
Critical Function<br />
- 1 Operational tasking C2 of NMUs<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
Friction Points<br />
Misuse of PRC by PCOP<br />
Tasking ISU not properly coordinated<br />
Lack of Log Support PCOP to PRC<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
Communication Down<br />
MoI provides policy to subordinates<br />
DMSEC gives direction to GDPSU<br />
GDPSU distributes ciphers<br />
1<br />
Communication Up<br />
ISU PRCs and NMUs all report to<br />
GDPSU (Current ISU HQ embedded<br />
will be part of GDPSU HQ staff)<br />
SPTW/SPTC direct to GDPSU<br />
NMUs<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 41
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 4 Dec 13<br />
POC: NSOCC-A, J5<br />
DSN: 700-787-3754<br />
Ministry<br />
of Defense<br />
8<br />
G3 Plans<br />
Strategic level<br />
Operational<br />
level<br />
6<br />
Tactical level<br />
Friction Points<br />
1<br />
Communication: Corps with<br />
SOB/ SOK CDRs<br />
2<br />
Intel developed by NDS &<br />
MoI and shared with MoD<br />
2<br />
CoGS<br />
1<br />
9<br />
GSG3<br />
ANASOC<br />
3<br />
3<br />
SOB<br />
4<br />
1<br />
SOK<br />
8<br />
ANASOC C2<br />
2<br />
MoI<br />
1<br />
NDS<br />
GFC<br />
7<br />
4<br />
5<br />
1<br />
Corps<br />
2<br />
1<br />
2<br />
OCC-R<br />
3<br />
2<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
Critical Function<br />
LNO’s at different commands to overcome potential<br />
friction points<br />
1<br />
Understand relationships (Supported/Supporting)<br />
2<br />
Operational support from ANA Corps to SOB/SOK<br />
3<br />
Communication Down<br />
MoD CoGs provide guidance to GSG3<br />
- Directions for GFC/Corps/ANASOC<br />
MoD Cipher to ANASOC<br />
- Execution based on CoGS directive<br />
ANASOC Cipher to SOB<br />
- RW and MSFV operations<br />
- Coord with other ministerial organizations<br />
- Time Sensitive Targeting operations<br />
SOB Cipher to SOK<br />
- Time Sensitive Targeting operations<br />
Communication Up<br />
SOKs to SOB/OCC-R Receives information<br />
- Low level risk, Recon Patrols, QRF, Shuras, & Councils<br />
Coordination: SOK/SOB with ANA Corps (direct liaison or<br />
through OCCR)<br />
SOBs to ANASOC<br />
- Med level risk<br />
- Organic assets and ext support (MSFVs, HAF, Joints OPS)<br />
- Corps OCC-R<br />
Coordination: ANASOC with GFC<br />
- High Risk (Political)<br />
- Inter-ministry Coordination (MoD, MoI, NDS)<br />
- Coordination with GFC, MoI(GDPSU HQ), NDS(124)<br />
Coordination: ANASOC with ANA Corps<br />
Coordination: ANASOC & G3 Plans<br />
Corps reports to GFC<br />
- Seasonal Plan & Major combined OPS, OPLAN<br />
ANASOC & G3 Plans reports to GSG3<br />
GSG3 guidance to MOD<br />
- Recommendations from ANASOC, GFC/Corps, G3 Plans<br />
B 42<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 26 Nov 13<br />
POC: NATC-A/CAO<br />
NATC-A438AEWJ5@swa.army.mil<br />
Critical Activities<br />
1 - Prioritize national taskings<br />
1<br />
2 - Develop daily/weekly flying<br />
program, monthly resupply<br />
plan<br />
Friction Points<br />
C2 doctrine not adhered to<br />
(mission priority, 7-line, etc.)<br />
2 - Demand exceeds supply<br />
(limited number of aircraft),<br />
impacting fleet health and<br />
aircraft availability<br />
3 - Ops/training balance not<br />
adhered to (impacts FOC)<br />
Last Updated: 27 Sep 13 Version 20130927A<br />
POC: NATC-A/J5S, DSN 237-5824<br />
1<br />
1<br />
2<br />
1 3<br />
1<br />
GFC<br />
1<br />
Corps HQ<br />
2<br />
2<br />
2<br />
AAF C2<br />
1<br />
MoD<br />
1<br />
1<br />
MoD/GSG3 Air<br />
1<br />
HQ AAF/ACCC<br />
1<br />
AAF Wings/Dets<br />
Annex B<br />
3<br />
Downward Flows<br />
1 - Issue taskings<br />
Upward Flows<br />
1 - Up-channel support requests<br />
- Coordinate national requests<br />
1<br />
Internal Activities<br />
2<br />
Coordinate regional requests<br />
4<br />
6<br />
45<br />
= # NATC-A Air Advisors (estimated based on<br />
current manning)<br />
(2015 unconstrained NATC-A requirement is 600<br />
Coalition/contract personnel)<br />
Chain of command (tasks, status reports, etc.)<br />
Coordination<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 43
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 2 Dec 2013<br />
POC: IJC ANSF DIR<br />
DSN 318-449-9524<br />
ANA Tactical Intelligence Architecture<br />
(with Advisor Support)<br />
OCC-R<br />
OCC-P<br />
CI<br />
Corps<br />
BDE Tactical<br />
Operations Center<br />
MI Company<br />
Analysis<br />
LLVI<br />
HUMINT<br />
MIRO<br />
HF HF (or internet)<br />
HF<br />
HF<br />
HF<br />
HF<br />
HF (or internet)<br />
Friction Point<br />
Military Advisors<br />
ANA Kandak<br />
COORD COORD<br />
HF (or internet)<br />
COORD COORD<br />
HF<br />
HF<br />
HF<br />
MIPO<br />
ANA Kandak<br />
Friction Point<br />
Military / Contractor Advisors<br />
Military / Contractor Advisors<br />
Legend<br />
Orders<br />
Coordination<br />
Communication<br />
Legend<br />
Collection<br />
ADVISOR SUPPORT:<br />
Intelligence support varies among the<br />
ANSF Corps to include military and<br />
civilian contractor advisors<br />
B 44<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 3 Dec 2013<br />
POC: MoI MAG, Police Intelligence<br />
DSN 318-449-5110<br />
By IPCB sub-working group 2-Year<br />
plan Security, Intelligence &<br />
Terrorism PROPOSED Afghan Police<br />
Information Model (APIM)<br />
Critical Nodes<br />
Decision making by TT&CG and<br />
ST&CG<br />
ANP Intelligence Dissemination/Fusion<br />
TT&CG<br />
NIMS<br />
Incl<br />
forensic/biometric<br />
1<br />
1<br />
MoI<br />
DM of<br />
Security<br />
1 Policy dev and implementation<br />
4<br />
1<br />
DMSec chairs<br />
2 Training<br />
ST&CG<br />
2<br />
3 Oversight<br />
4 5<br />
4 3<br />
1<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
Friction Points<br />
Deliberately not forwarding data<br />
to the NIMS (all contributors)<br />
Sustainment connectivity NIMS<br />
Not enough qualified personnel<br />
Nepotism<br />
Lack of cross-pillar cooperation<br />
Limited analytical capabilities<br />
personnel<br />
1<br />
2<br />
4<br />
NDS<br />
ST&CG<br />
4<br />
1 CN<br />
1<br />
Police<br />
2<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
Members<br />
T&CG:<br />
DPI, AUP,<br />
ANCOP, AACP,<br />
ABP, CN pol<br />
1<br />
6<br />
2<br />
DPI<br />
NTEC/Dep41<br />
3<br />
ANP<br />
Pillars<br />
3<br />
3<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
Communication Down<br />
Control Strategy/Environmental Scan<br />
Priority Intelligence Requirements<br />
Recommend for further investigation<br />
Target and problem packages,<br />
authorized for police action<br />
2<br />
3<br />
Communication Up<br />
Data push through the NIMS<br />
Proposed Target and Problem Packages<br />
Strategic Intelligence Assessment<br />
Activities (strategic & tactical)<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
Collect<br />
Collate<br />
Analyze by Dep41/Assess by NTEC<br />
Disseminate<br />
Review (continuous)<br />
Annex B<br />
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
B 45
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO<br />
This document is not approved for public release<br />
Current as of: 4 Dec 13<br />
POC: NSOCC-A, J5<br />
DSN: 700-787-3754<br />
ANASOC Intelligence<br />
CoGS<br />
GS<br />
1<br />
NMCC<br />
GS G2<br />
ANASOC<br />
4 4<br />
5<br />
1<br />
2<br />
NMIC<br />
2<br />
ANASOC<br />
G2<br />
2<br />
4 3 ANASOC<br />
MIK 4<br />
1 5<br />
2<br />
4<br />
3<br />
SOB<br />
2<br />
SOK<br />
1<br />
1<br />
MID 1<br />
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2<br />
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2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
1<br />
2<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
Critical Function<br />
Intel Collection assets<br />
Intel Analysis capability<br />
Friction Points<br />
MIDs not FOC until SEP 14<br />
NMIC IOC until JAN 14<br />
ANASOC MIK does not receive source funds<br />
from division<br />
Limited comms between ANASOC to intel<br />
and collection capability<br />
Communication Down<br />
MoD collection priorities, intel and source<br />
funds pushed via Ciphers to subordinates<br />
ANASOC submits RFIs to subordinate units<br />
Communication Up<br />
Intel staff facilitates intel push from MIDs to<br />
MIK and SOK S2<br />
Intel staff facilitates intel push from SOK to<br />
SOB<br />
SOB Intel partner pushes intel to ANASOCG2<br />
ANASOC facilitates intel sharing with G2<br />
and MIK; then given to the ANASOC CDR<br />
Intel pushed from ANASOC to NMIC, NMCC,<br />
and GSG2<br />
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Annex C<br />
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Annex C: <strong>SFA</strong> Training Standards & <strong>SFA</strong> METL<br />
The aim of this Annex is to provide advisors with common training directions and<br />
standards for <strong>SFA</strong> and RS leaders with a recommended FB<strong>SFA</strong> Advisor Mission Essential<br />
Task List (METL). Commander Joint Forces Command BRUNSSUM (JFCB)<br />
Resolute Support Training Directive 1 and US Guidance on Common Training Standard<br />
for Security Forces Assistance 2 provide the guidance needed to meet the requirements<br />
in a changing environment. The FB<strong>SFA</strong> advisor METL is derived from Security Force<br />
Assistance Teams’ best practices.<br />
I. Common Training Directions and Standards for Security<br />
Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>)<br />
C.1 Introduction. The ISAF/RS mission is rapidly evolving and the NATO ISAF PDT<br />
community must also evolve to meet current and future requirements. As the ISAF<br />
footprint in Afghanistan is reducing, it is even more important that Pre-Deployment<br />
Training (PDT) produce the best personnel possible. Training requirements have been<br />
generated using the experience gathered over several years and are designed to assist<br />
advisors in developing the capability to perform the FB<strong>SFA</strong> mission.<br />
C.2 Advisor Selection and Training. In accordance with NATO policy, Troop Contributing<br />
Nations (TCNs) provide properly trained and equipped forces for operations.<br />
It is essential to operational success that nominated advisors meet the requirements<br />
of the job description and mission, including experience, background, qualifications<br />
and language proficiency. The very nature of <strong>SFA</strong> is so reliant upon personality, that<br />
the decisive point of an <strong>SFA</strong> mission may well be the selection, training and education<br />
of advisors in preparation for that mission. Advisors should therefore attend designated<br />
national and NATO-led ISAF PDT prior to deployment. Deploying Units should<br />
equally meet standards and requirements.<br />
C.3 Advisor Identification/Nomination. Nations should identify and nominate<br />
advisors in time to enable individuals to benefit from NATO-led PDT. With a substantial<br />
number of Individual Augmentees (IAs) filling CE positions, early nomination is<br />
particularly critical in both enabling the individual to take part in NATO-led PDT and<br />
the tailoring of that PDT. TCNs are responsible for conducting national training prior<br />
to deployment and thus meeting Allied Command Operations (ACO) Force Standards<br />
criteria. Advisors are the most prominent group of personnel that serve with ANSF.<br />
The relationship between advisors and ANSF is vital. Rigorous vetting and selection<br />
of advisor personnel by the TCN is therefore critical to ensuring that those personnel<br />
directly engaged in <strong>SFA</strong> possess not only the required knowledge, skills, and abilities,<br />
but also the right temperament and attitude required to work closely with ASI/ANSF<br />
personnel.<br />
C.4 JFCB RS Training Concept. The primary focus of RS is to Train, Advise and<br />
Assist (TAA) GIRoA. ISAF PDT will focus on TAA and HQ staff training as is required<br />
to support the TAA mission. It is built to ensure preparation of key staffs and leaders<br />
Annex C<br />
1 Commander JFC BRUNSSUM Resolute Support Training Directive 75-9, dated 10 April 2014 and available<br />
on ISAF-S Portal at: http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/DCOSOPS/<strong>CJ7</strong>/TE/LISTS/Training%20Docs/<br />
AllItems.aspx<br />
2 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Guidance on Common Training<br />
Standards for Security Forces Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>), dated 14 January 2014 and available on Ronna Net (UN-<br />
CLASSIFIED) https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/FB<strong>SFA</strong>_Rollout_Jul14/SitePages/Home.aspx<br />
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as well as TCNs personnel for service in ISAF. COM JFC Brunssum has identified four<br />
overarching PDT objectives that apply to each level of Command in ISAF.<br />
a) Promote continuity and common standards.<br />
b) Establish mission awareness in individuals.<br />
c) Ensure functional area competence.<br />
d) Facilitate staff integration and coordination.<br />
C.5 ISAF PDT is executed in 4 phases. The overall concept is described in Figure<br />
1. The JFCB Training Directive provides detailed requirements for all 4 Phases. The<br />
directive describes details for the NATO-led training, covering all levels and entities.<br />
Theater Specific Training Recommendations are covered in annexes A – C.<br />
Figure 1: JFCB PDT Concept<br />
C.6 Phase 0 – Personnel Selection. Appropriate selection is a prerequisite for training.<br />
Characteristics include appropriate background, education, rank, age, and personal<br />
attitude are fundamental to successful advising of high ranking and experienced<br />
Afghan counterparts. Discriminate vetting by TCNs is critical to ensuring advisors<br />
posses required knowledge, skills and abilities; and the right temperament and attitude<br />
necessary to TAA Afghan officials.<br />
C.7 Phase 1 – National/SHQ Training. Training required during this initial phase includes<br />
completion of all Nationally-mandated PDT requirements. Personnel deploying<br />
for a NATO operation are required to meet the ACO Force Standards as delineated in<br />
the ACO Force Requirements Volumes II and VII and associated addenda. Personnel<br />
must also meet the requirements as delineated in the individual job description of the<br />
position that they will deploy to. Additionally, personnel must be prepared to meet the<br />
specific challenges unique to specific theaters.<br />
C.8 Phase 2 – NATO Training. This training aims at preparing the personnel for their<br />
mission by providing one-source knowledge, increasing situational awareness and<br />
ensuring standardization.<br />
C.9 Phase 3 – In-Theater Training (ITT). Upon arrival in theater personnel will<br />
complete an induction course, Commanders at all levels arrange and coordinate ITT<br />
for their respective commands. However, COM ISAF has the authority to direct subordinate<br />
commanders to plan and conduct ITT to his specification. ITT helps to ensure<br />
that staff efficiency and operational ability remain high throughout the rotation period.<br />
C.10 To increase effectiveness, interoperability and management of skills US Office of<br />
the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has developed a Guidance<br />
on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance. The guidance provides<br />
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a menu of tasks with associated common training standards determined as necessary<br />
to effectively execute a wide range of <strong>SFA</strong> activities. Training standards include:<br />
a) Individual-enabling knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes (KSAAs).<br />
b) Collective- enabling KSSAs.<br />
c) Security Force Assistance Developmental Tasks.<br />
II. FB<strong>SFA</strong> METL (Starting Next Page)<br />
METL 1: Organize Afghan Forces<br />
METL 2: Train Afghan Forces<br />
METL 3: Equip Afghan Forces<br />
METL 4: Rebuild/Build Afghan Forces<br />
METL 5: Advise and Assist the Afghan Forces<br />
METL 6: Redeploy<br />
Annex C<br />
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METL 1: Organize Afghan Forces<br />
C<br />
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METL 2: Train Afghan Forces<br />
Annex C<br />
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METL 2: Train Afghan Forces (Cont.)<br />
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METL 3: Equip Afghan Forces<br />
Annex C<br />
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METL 3: Equip Afghan Forces (Cont.)<br />
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METL 4: Rebuild/Build Afghan Forces<br />
Annex C<br />
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METL 5: Advise and Assist the Afghan Forces<br />
C 10<br />
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Annex C<br />
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METL 6: Redeploy<br />
C 12<br />
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Annex D<br />
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Annex D<br />
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Annex D: <strong>SFA</strong> Advisor Team and Ministerial Invidual<br />
Tasks<br />
Annex D<br />
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Annex D<br />
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D 4<br />
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Annex D<br />
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D 6<br />
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Annex D<br />
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D 8<br />
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Annex D<br />
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D<br />
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Ministerial advisors operate in support of the MoD and the MoI. A variety of TCNs provide senior uniformed and civilian<br />
personnel, including contractors, to help the ministries reach a sustainable level of development. Once selected, these individuals<br />
must bring forward executive-level talent and capacity to meet the needs of their Afghan [executive] counterparts.<br />
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Annex E<br />
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Annex E<br />
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Annex E: ISAF/RS FB-<strong>SFA</strong> Bibliography<br />
This bibliography is a summary of the wide range of thousands of documents available.<br />
In such an overwhelming range of data, it is easy to get lost. This bibliography<br />
provides the reader a selection of the most relevant and interesting articles. Grouped<br />
into 14 categories, it will be updated on the CAAT homepage and available on unclass<br />
internet. Additional references are available at: https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Pages/<br />
<strong>SFA</strong>-Guide.aspx<br />
Bibliography Organization<br />
1. Mission Orientation<br />
2. <strong>SFA</strong> Papers, Publications, and References<br />
3. Functional Security Force Assistance<br />
4. Advisor Selection and Training<br />
5. Afghan Culture<br />
6. Afghan Language Resources<br />
7. Insider Threat<br />
8. Ministerial Advising<br />
9. Afghan National Army (ANA)<br />
10. Afghan National Police<br />
11. Air Advising and Afghan Air Force/Special Mission Wing<br />
12. Understanding Insurgency<br />
13. Counterinsurgency<br />
14. Rule of Law<br />
15. Gender<br />
1 Mission Orientation<br />
1.1 Mission Introduction<br />
The following websites, reports, documents, publications, and references will provide<br />
contextual understanding to the current status of the mission in Afghanistan. They will<br />
also provide the reader with a better understanding of how the mission will progress<br />
through <strong>SFA</strong>.<br />
1.2 Understanding the Mission - Web Sites<br />
International Security Force Afghanistan (ISAF).<br />
http://www.isaf.nato.int<br />
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A).<br />
http://ntm-a.com<br />
ISAF Joint Command (IJC)<br />
www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/isaf-joint-command/index.php<br />
NATO e-ISAF<br />
https://e-isaf.act.nato.int<br />
1.3 Understanding the Mission - Reports, Papers, Books, and Publications<br />
Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan<br />
Regional Stabilization Strategy. US Department of State.<br />
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf<br />
Annex E<br />
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Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance. Congressional<br />
Research Service. November 30, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/<br />
RS21922.pdf<br />
Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. Congressional<br />
Research Service. October 31, 2012.<br />
http://www.hsdl.org/view&did=725570<br />
The Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan From Transition to Transformation.<br />
July 8, 2012. The Tokyo Declaration is more commonly referred to as the Tokyo<br />
Mutual Accountability Framework (TMPF). http://www.usaid.gov/tokyoconference/declaration<br />
NATO. ISAF Mission Evolution. October 2012.<br />
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_10/20121008_media-backgrounder_isaf_mission_evolution_en.pdf<br />
1.4 Understanding Afghanistan – Websites and Books<br />
The Afghanistan Analyst<br />
http://afghanistan-analyst.org<br />
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)<br />
http://www.areu.org.af/Default.aspxLang=en-US<br />
Afghan War News<br />
www.afghanwarnews.info<br />
Giustozzi, Antonio. Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field.<br />
New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. An anthology of 14 articles by various authors.<br />
Giustozzi, Antonio, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban<br />
Insurgency. 2009. Analysis of the Neo-Taliban insurgency in the post-2001 era, including<br />
the neo-Taliban’s approaches to recruiting, their organization, tactics, and strategy.<br />
2 <strong>SFA</strong> Papers, Publications, and References<br />
2.1 Websites with Information on <strong>SFA</strong><br />
COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) on Ronna-Afghanistan:<br />
https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Pages/Public-Portal.aspx<br />
U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Proponency Office, Combined Arms Center:<br />
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/sfa/<br />
U.S. Army Training Network (ATN) Security Force Assistance:<br />
https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspxdplD=248<br />
USMC Advisor Training Group (ATG)<br />
http://www.29palms.marines.mil/Units/AdvisorTrainingGroup.aspx<br />
Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCAST)<br />
http://www.mcast.navy.mil<br />
Air Advisor Academy – 37 th Training Wing<br />
http://www.37trw.af.mil<br />
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U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI).<br />
https://www.pksoi.org<br />
Fifteen Principles of Security Force Assistance. Videos.<br />
https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Lists/<strong>SFA</strong>%20Videos/AllItems.aspx<br />
2.2 JCI<strong>SFA</strong> Handbooks, Guides, and References about <strong>SFA</strong><br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong> Website: https://jcisfa.jcs.mil<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Advisor Guide. Version 3, May 2013.<br />
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance.<br />
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Authentication/Login.aspxReturnUrl=%2fMembers%2fPortal%2fViewInsight.aspx%3finsight%3d1145&insight=1145<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>, Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance, July 14, 2008. Provides<br />
doctrinal view, best practices, and lessons learned on Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>)<br />
operations at brigade level.<br />
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/Materials/<strong>SFA</strong>.pdf<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>, Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors Guide. (FOUO) February 2012. https://<br />
jcisfa.jcs.mil/Authentication/Login.aspxReturnUrl=%2fMembers%2fPortal%2fView-<br />
Insight.aspx%3finsight%3d1042&insight=1042<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>, Security Force Assistance Handbook, June 2012.<br />
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Authentication/Login.aspxReturnUrl=%2fMembers%2fPortal%2fViewInsight.aspx%3finsight%3d1165&insight=1165<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>, <strong>SFA</strong> Planner’s Guide: FSF Force Development. December 1, 2009. This <strong>guide</strong> provides<br />
an orientation on describing the logical process in FSF capability development.<br />
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/JCI<strong>SFA</strong>_Publications.aspx<br />
2.3 Military Publications and Field Manuals Related to <strong>SFA</strong><br />
Department of the Army. Stability Operations, FM 3-07. May 1, 2009.<br />
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_07.pdf<br />
Department of the Army. Security Force Assistance,FM 3-07.1, 1 May 2009.<br />
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/fm/fm3_07x1.<br />
pdf<br />
Department of Defense. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign<br />
Forces, FM 3-07.10 (MCRP 3-33.8A), September 10, 2009.<br />
https://itsweb.us.army.mil/armypubs.aspdoctrine/DR_pubs/dr_d/pdf/fm3_07x10.pdf<br />
Department of the Army. The Brigade Combat Team. FM 3-90.6, September 14, 2010.<br />
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/Active_FM.html<br />
Department of the Navy. Advise, Train, and Assist Partner Nation Forces Training and<br />
Readiness Manual, (short title: ATA T&R Manual), January 5, 2009.<br />
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Guidance on<br />
Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>), January 14, 2014.<br />
2.4 Papers, Reports, and Publications about Security Force Assistance<br />
Alford, COL Julian Dale and MAJ Daniel Zappa. “Afghan Advise and Assist Group.”<br />
Small Wars Journal, June 1, 2011.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghan-advise-and-assist-group<br />
Annex E<br />
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3 Functional Security Force Assistance.<br />
<strong>3.1</strong> Functional <strong>SFA</strong>. Unit-based Security Force Assistance is now transitioning to<br />
“Functional Security Force Assistance” with the intent of ensuring the ANSF can sustain<br />
itself post-2014. The five broad areas of “Functional <strong>SFA</strong>” consist of Command and<br />
Control, Leadership, Combat Arms Integration, Training, and Sustainment. Functional<br />
Security Force Assistance or Functional <strong>SFA</strong> is sometimes referred to as Functionally<br />
Oriented <strong>SFA</strong> or Functionally Based <strong>SFA</strong> (all phrases have the same meaning).<br />
SHAPE OPLAN 10312, Annex A, June 2014.<br />
3.2 Command and Control (C2). Command and Control is more clearly defined in<br />
the Afghanistan <strong>SFA</strong> context as Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence<br />
(C3I).<br />
DoDIG, Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Security Forces<br />
Command, Control, and Coordination System, Inspector General of the United States<br />
Department of Defense, Report No. DoDIG-2013-058, March 22, 2013.<br />
www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-058.pdf<br />
MoD, Organizations and Functions Manual, Decree 5001, Ministry of Defense, March<br />
29, 2011. This decree is not available online.<br />
3.21 Intelligence Resources for the <strong>SFA</strong> Intelligence Advisor<br />
Calvin, Matt. People, Partnerships and Collaboration: Understanding and Improving Intelligence<br />
in Counterinsurgency. Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies,<br />
Volume I. Summer 2009. p. 53-73.<br />
http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume1/volume1_calvin.pdf<br />
Flynn, MG M. T., CPT M. Pottinger, and P.D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making<br />
Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan. Center for a New American Security. January 2010.<br />
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_<br />
code507_voices.pdf<br />
Gomez, Jimmy A. “The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD.” Small Wars Journal. July<br />
16, 2011.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-targeting-process-d3a-and-f3ead<br />
Kress, Moshe and Roberto Szechtman. Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of<br />
Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations. Operations Research, Vol 57, No. 3. May-<br />
June 2009. p. 578-585.<br />
http://faculty.nps.edu/rszechtm/KressSzechtman.pdf<br />
Perry, Walter L and John Gordon IV. Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies.<br />
RAND Corporation prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2008.<br />
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG682.pdf<br />
Reamer, Kevin. “The Importance of Intelligence in Combating a Modern Insurgency.” Journal<br />
of Strategic Security, Volume 2, 2009. p. 73-90.<br />
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/3/<br />
3.3 Leadership.<br />
3.31 DoDIG, Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan<br />
National Army, DoD Inspector General, Report No. DoDIG-2013-094, June 24, 2013.<br />
www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-094.pdf<br />
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3.4 Combined Arms Integration<br />
162 nd Infantry Brigade, Afghan National Army Systems by Warfighting Function, Fort<br />
Polk, LA, May 13, 2013.<br />
3.5 Training.<br />
DoDIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise<br />
the Afghan Border Police, Report No. DODIG-2013-081, May 24, 2013.<br />
www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-081.pdf<br />
3.6 Sustainment - Logistics, Supply and Maintenance Advising<br />
Armstrong, Nicolas J. “Afghanistan 2014-2024: Advising for Sustainability,” Small Wars<br />
Journal, May 4, 2012.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghanistan-2014-2024-advising-for-sustainability<br />
Department of Defense. Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan:<br />
United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces. April 2012.<br />
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf<br />
Valeski, LTC Steven. “ANA Logistics System: Getting to Afghan Right.” Military Review,<br />
May-June 2012.<br />
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20120630_art006.pdf<br />
4 Advisor Selection and Training<br />
4.1 Advisor Selection<br />
Department of the Army. “The Advisor,” Chapter 7, Security Force Assistance, FM<br />
3-07.1, 1 May 2009, pages 7-1 to 7-6. This chapter provides information on advisor<br />
roles, considerations, required skills and traits.<br />
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM3071.pdf<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>. “Selection and Training of U.S. Personnel for <strong>SFA</strong>,” Chapter V, Security Force<br />
Assistance Handbook, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, June<br />
2012.<br />
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/JCI<strong>SFA</strong>_Publications.aspx<br />
Axelberg, COL Marc D. Enhancing Security Force Assistance: Advisor Selection, Training<br />
and Employment, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2011.<br />
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a553121.pdf<br />
Clark, Todd J. Selection of Military Advisors, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,<br />
December 2007.<br />
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/3060/07Dec_Clark.pdf<br />
Hetherton, Richard H. Foreign Military Advisor Proficiency: The Need for Screening,<br />
Selection and Qualification, Master’s Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General<br />
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2009.<br />
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA510940<br />
Phelps, Major Christopher E., Selecting and Training U.S. Advisors: Interpersonal<br />
Skills and the Advisor-Counterpart Relationship, MA Thesis for University of Kansas,<br />
April 24, 2009. http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/5657/1/Phelps_<br />
ku_0099M_10318_DATA_1.pdf<br />
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4.2 Advisor Training<br />
ISAF HQ, Revised Minimum Training Requirements for Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>)<br />
Advisors and <strong>SFA</strong>-Advisor Teams (<strong>SFA</strong>-ATs), 11 June 2013. Letter from ISAF HQs to<br />
Cdr, Joint Force Command Brunssum. Included are Enclosure 1: ISAF Minimum<br />
Training Requirements for Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>) Advisors and <strong>SFA</strong>-Advisor<br />
Teams (<strong>SFA</strong>-ATs) and Enclosure 2: Minimum Training Requirements of Security Force<br />
Assistance Advisors and Advisor Teams. Documents are not available online.<br />
4.3 Recommended Books about Advising<br />
Joint Force Command Brunssum, JFCB Directive 75-9, Resolute Support Training Directive,<br />
10 April 2014.<br />
Beemer, Michael et al. The Human Dimension of Advising: An Analysis of Interpersonal,<br />
Linguistic, Cultural, and Advisory Aspects of the Advisor Role. Technical Report 1248, June<br />
2009. U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral Science.<br />
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA507713<br />
Dockery, Martin J. Lost in Translation: A Combat Advisor’s Story. Presidio Press, 2004.<br />
A young, idealistic, and determined 23-year-old infantry 1LT is sent to Vietnam to be<br />
the only American assigned as a combat advisor to a South Vietnamese Infantry Battalion.<br />
He relates his story of living and fighting with an Army of the Republic of Vietnam<br />
(South Vietnam) battalion and performing duties as an advisor to a 45-year old South<br />
Vietnamese Infantry Battalion commander with 25 years of combat experience.<br />
Tupper, Benjamin, Greetings from Afghanistan, Send More Ammo: Dispatches from Taliban<br />
Country. 2011. Tupper writes a heartfelt and thoughtful memoir about his time in Afghanistan<br />
on a training team embedded with the Afghan National Army.<br />
5 Afghan Culture<br />
5.1 Websites on Afghan Culture<br />
Cultural Knowledge Consortium<br />
https://ckc.army.mil<br />
Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning. U.S. Marine Corps<br />
www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/SitePages/Home.aspx<br />
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Program for Culture & Conflict Studies<br />
www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/ExecSumm.html<br />
Culture & Foreign Language Program – Army Logistics University<br />
www.alu.army.mil/ALU_CULTURE/aluculture.htm<br />
3C – Cross Cultural Competence – Department of Defense<br />
www.defenseculture.org/Home/index.cfm<br />
Cross-Cultural Guide. United States Peace Corps<br />
http://www.peacecorps.gov/library/culture/<br />
Center for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) of University of Nebraska<br />
http://world.unomaha.edu/cas/<br />
Afghan Net / Culture<br />
www.afghan-network.net/Culture/<br />
University of the Pacific online Culture Training<br />
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http://www2.pacific.edu/sis/culture/<br />
Skill Level Descriptions for Competence in Intercultural Communication<br />
http://www.govtilr.org/Skills/Competence.htm<br />
5.2 References about Afghan Culture<br />
Barfield, Thomas J. Afghanistan: A Cultural & Political History. Princeton: Princeton University<br />
Press, 2012.<br />
Gardner, Lenore. Cultural Awareness Bibliography, U.S. Army War College, August 2009.<br />
www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/culture2009.pdf<br />
Metcalf, Kimberly et al. Cross-Cultural Strategies for Improving the Teaching, Training, and<br />
Mentoring Skills of Military Transition Team Advisors. Technical Report 1264, April 2010.<br />
U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral Science.<br />
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a507715.pdf<br />
Zbylut, Michelle Ramsden. Advisor Influence Strategies: 10 Cross-Cultural Scenarios for<br />
Discussion and Self-Assessment (Instructor’s Manual). U.S. Army Research Institute,<br />
September 2010.<br />
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA531634<br />
5.3 Books and Articles about Afghan Culture<br />
HTS, Local Governance in Rural Afghanistan. Human Terrain System, 2010. Baseline<br />
<strong>guide</strong> for working in rural Afghanistan at the sub-provincial level (primarily districts in<br />
the Pashtun Belt) with intros to concepts such as the role of Pashtun tribes.<br />
http://info.publicintelligence.net/HTS-LocalGovernance.pdf<br />
FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, 1 May 2009. See Chapter 8 “Culture and Communication.”<br />
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Respository/FM3071.pdf<br />
NPS, Understanding Afghan Culture: Operational Pashtunwali. Program for Culture &<br />
Conflict Studies (CCS) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), June 15, 2009. A <strong>guide</strong> to<br />
utilizing the Pashtun tribal code (Pashtunwali) to improve force protection (via defensive<br />
Pashtunwali) and to achieve unit objectives (via offensive Pashtunwali).<br />
http://modatraining.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/operational-pashtunwali.pdf<br />
6 Afghan Language Resources<br />
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). A variety of free language<br />
training products are available at the link below to include RAPPORT, Cultural<br />
Orientation, Headstart, Familiarization Modules, Countries in Perspective, Legends<br />
and Folktales, Area Studies, Cultural Awareness Assessment, and Online Diagnostic<br />
Assessment.<br />
http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html<br />
DLI Headstart 2. This program teaches a “military-focused vocabulary” designed for<br />
the military, operating on the tactical and operational level. For an average user, the language<br />
program takes between 80 and 100 hours of self-directed study. The software can<br />
be downloaded to computer or iPod, used online, or requested on DVDs. Headstart2<br />
is available for 16 languages, including Dari and Pashtu.<br />
http://hs2.lingnet.org<br />
DLI Rapport. This program of six to eight hours of training consist of military language<br />
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modules and cultural awareness lessons that cover history, religion, geography, and basic<br />
social exchanges in the target language.<br />
http://rapport.lingent.org<br />
DLI Language Survival Kits (LSKs). LSKs are designed as pocket-sized, quick reference<br />
booklets with an audio CD available in 10 different topics per language for deploying<br />
service members. The LSKs contain mission-specific vocabulary and simple phrases in<br />
topics such as medical terminology, Civil Affairs, Force Protection, and Military Police.<br />
http://www.dliflc.edu/lmdsemail.aspx.<br />
Inter-agency Language Roundtable (ILR). The ILR serves as an organization that<br />
assists U.S. government agencies and organizations to keep abreast of the progress and<br />
implementation of techniques and technologies for language learning, language use,<br />
language testing, and other language-related activities.<br />
www.govtilr.org<br />
Outzen, Richard. “Language, Culture, and Army Culture: Failing Transformation,”<br />
Small Wars Journal, March 20, 2012.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/language-culture-and-army-culture-failingtransformation<br />
USO website offers a “free Afghan language program” at<br />
http://www.uso.org/Free-Afghan-Language-Program.aspx<br />
7 Insider Threat<br />
Bordin, Jeffrey, Ph.D., A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatability, N2KL Red Team<br />
Study, May 12, 2011.<br />
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB370/docs/Document%2011.pdf<br />
CALL, Green-on-Blue Smartcard, GTA 90-01-033, (FOUO), Center for Army Lessons<br />
Learned (CALL), February 2012.<br />
https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspxdocument=6911<br />
CALL, Insider Threats – Afghanistan, GTA 90-01-044, June 2013. (FOUO / REL NATO,<br />
ISAF, FVEY).<br />
https://call2.army.mil/rfi<br />
CAAT, “Fighting the Insider Threat,” COIN Common Sense, Volume 4, Issue 1, February<br />
2013. COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team.<br />
https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Coin%20Common%20Sense/20130220_<strong>NIU</strong>_REL_<br />
Public_COIN_Common_Sense_Insider_Threat_Special_Edition.pdf<br />
Escamilla, Pete and Eric Lopez. “Securing the Security Force Assistance Advisors in<br />
Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, September 20, 2013.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-the-security-force-assistance-advisorsin-afghanistan<br />
ISAF, ISAF Insider Threat Handbook: COMISAF’s Guidance on Combating Insider<br />
Threats, 2013. Available on SIPR and ISAF-S / Centrix at the links below.<br />
SIPR: http://jcisaf.js.smil.mil<br />
ISAF-S /Centrix:<br />
http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/CGHQ/CAAT<br />
Roggio, Bill and Lisa Lindquist, Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” The<br />
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Long War. A data summary and timeline of insider attacks in Afghanistan.<br />
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue-attack.php<br />
8 Ministerial Advising<br />
8.1 Web Pages Related to Ministerial Advising<br />
Ministry of Interior Affairs Afghanistan (MoI)<br />
http://moi.gov.af/en<br />
Ministry of Defense Afghanistan (MoD)<br />
http://mod.gov.af/en<br />
Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program<br />
www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0211_moda/<br />
Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Training Program<br />
http://modatraining.com<br />
Ministry Level Advisors Community of Interest (CoI) on JCI<strong>SFA</strong> Portal<br />
https://143.84.167.180/Members/Portal/MODA.aspx<br />
Security Assistance Team Training Orientation Course (SATTOC)<br />
https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrscc/<br />
8.2 References on Ministerial Advising<br />
Boyer, Keith M. and Robert R. Allardice. Building Ministerial Capacity in Host Nations,<br />
Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 71, 4 th Quarter 2013, pages 69-73.<br />
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-71.pdf<br />
Gillette, John M. “Afghanistan: What Went Wrong,” Small Wars Journal, February 5,<br />
2013. The author completed a two-year tour as an advisor at ministry level deployed as<br />
a member of the Minister of Defense Advisors (MODA) program.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghanistan-what-went-wrong<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>. Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors: Perspectives on Institutional Level Advising.<br />
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. February 2012.<br />
https://143.84.167.180/Members/Portal/SupportingDocument.aspxdocId=1021<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>. Ministerial-level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study 2010. Joint Center for International<br />
Security Force Assistance, 2010.<br />
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil<br />
Lubold, Gordon. Training U.S. Advisors, Building Afghan Ministries. United States Institute<br />
of Peace (USIP), April 7, 2011.<br />
www.usip.org/publications/training-us-advisors-building-afghan-ministries<br />
Metrinko, Michael J. The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials<br />
in the IslamicWorld. PKSOI, August 2008.<br />
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub869.pdf<br />
9 Afghan National Army (ANA)<br />
Ministry of Defense – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan<br />
www.mod.gov.af.en<br />
Afghan National Army by Wikipedia<br />
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www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army<br />
Krug, Captain Colby K. When Combat Advising = Company Command. Paper by a <strong>SFA</strong>-<br />
AT team leader who advised an ANA kandak. October 2012.<br />
http://www.afghanwarnews.info/documents/WhenCbtAdvisingEqualsCompanyCmd-<br />
KrugOct12.pdf<br />
Team Renegade. How We Advise: An Afghan National Army Kandak. (FOUO), August<br />
2012. An <strong>SFA</strong>-AT from 2/101 st Airborne Division chronicles their pre-deployment training<br />
and advisory effort with an ANA kandak and provide observations and lessons<br />
learned.<br />
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil<br />
Younossi, Obaid et al. The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army, RAND<br />
Corporation (MG 845), 2009.<br />
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG845.html<br />
10 Afghan National Police (ANP)<br />
10.1 Websites on ANP<br />
MoI. Afghan National Police Strategy (ANPS). General Bismullah Khan Mohammadi<br />
(former Minister of Interior Affairs and now Minister of Defense).<br />
http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5076.<br />
MoI. Brief Information on Borders and Police Border.<br />
http://moi.gov.af/en/page/3122.<br />
MoI. Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).<br />
http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5728.<br />
10.2 Reports, Papers and Publications on ANP<br />
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Security Force Assistance, Shaping and Mentoring<br />
Afghan Police. Newsletter 11-18, March 2011.<br />
https://call2.army.mil<br />
Rosenau, William. Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors & Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.<br />
Joint Publication of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and Marine Corps<br />
University Press, 2011. An in-depth review of the experiences of individual American<br />
and British soldiers and Marines who served as police mentors in Afghanistan during<br />
the 2007–2009 period. http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Police%20Mentor_Layout%204.pdf<br />
Wells, G. Damon. “Conducting Security Force Assistance in a Rural District: Understanding<br />
the Operational Environment. Small Wars Journal. December 20, 2012. Lessons<br />
learned of an <strong>SFA</strong>-AT advising a DCoP, AUP, and ALP during a 2012 deployment.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/conducting-security-force-assistance-in-a-rural-districtunderstanding-the-operational-envi<br />
10.3 Afghan Local Police (ALP)<br />
“Village Stability Operations – 101: Understanding USSOCOM’s Role in VSO and ALP in<br />
Afghanistan and Beyond,” The Donovan Review, 2 nd Edition, January 2012.<br />
www.stabilityinstitute.com<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong>. Handbook: Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police. Joint Center for<br />
International Security Force Assistance, 2012.<br />
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https://jcisfa.jcs.mil<br />
11 Air Advising and AAF / SMW<br />
Afghan Air Force by Wikipedia<br />
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_Air_Force<br />
Air Force, Air Advising, AFTTP 3-4.5 AA, July 20, 2012<br />
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/<br />
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-<strong>3.1</strong>, Foreign Internal Defense, September 15,<br />
2007.<br />
www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd3-22.pdf<br />
Air Force Warfare Center. Air Advisor Handbook, Coalition and Irregular Warfare<br />
Center of Excellence, April 27, 2009.<br />
www.nshq.nato.int/NSHQ/GetFile/File_ID=31<br />
Cairney, John T., Considerations in Working with Partner Air Forces – Context and Culture,<br />
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 2010.<br />
www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA519920<br />
DoD IG SPO Report, Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Field<br />
the Afghan Air Force, Inspector General, March 22, 2013.<br />
www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-058.pdf<br />
Ingrum, Richard L. Aviation Security Force Assistance: A 21 st Century Imperative, Army<br />
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 22, 2012.<br />
www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA561351<br />
Moroney, Jennifer D.P. et al, International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces, RAND<br />
Corporation, 2009.<br />
www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a499273.pdf<br />
Peck, Allen G., “Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air & Space Power Journal,<br />
Summer 2007.<br />
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/peck.html<br />
Vick, Alan J. et al. Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance<br />
of USAF Advisory and Assistance Mission, RAND Corporation, 2006.<br />
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.pdf<br />
12 Understanding Insurgencies<br />
Insurgency Publications and Articles on Small Wars Journal.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/search/node/insurgency<br />
Connable, Ben and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End, RAND, 2010.<br />
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html<br />
Kress, Moshe and Roberto Szechtman.”Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of<br />
Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations.” Operations Research, Vol. 57, No. 3, May-<br />
June 2009, pp. 578-585.<br />
http://faculty.nps.edu/rszechtm/KressSzechtman.pdf<br />
Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory: Les-<br />
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sons from Modern Insurgencies, RAND Corporation, 2013.<br />
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html<br />
Stoker, Dr. Donald, “Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose.” Small Wars Journal, July 4,<br />
2009.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/six-reasons-insurgencies-lose<br />
Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. et al. Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance<br />
Warfare, Second Edition, United States Army Special Operations Command and John<br />
Hopkins University, 25 January 2013.<br />
www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html<br />
Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. et al. Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies,<br />
Second Edition, United States Army Special Operations Command and John<br />
Hopkins University, 25 January 2013.<br />
www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html<br />
Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. et al. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. 1:<br />
1933-1962, Revised Edition, United States Special Operations Command and John<br />
Hopkins University, 25 January 2013.<br />
www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html<br />
Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. et al. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol.<br />
2: 1962-2009, United States Army Special Operations Command and John Hopkins<br />
University, 27 April 2012.<br />
www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html<br />
13 Counterinsurgency<br />
1<strong>3.1</strong> Counterinsurgency – Websites<br />
COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) Counterinsurgency Resources<br />
https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/SiteAssets/COIN_Information.aspx<br />
13.2 Counterinsurgency – Manuals and Publications<br />
AJP 3.4.4. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN). Feb2011.<br />
http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Counterinsurgency.pdf<br />
COMISAF, ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, ISAF.<br />
www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf<br />
Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) December 15,<br />
2006.<br />
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf<br />
Department of the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2.<br />
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24x2.pdf<br />
United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual. FMFRP 12-15, 1941.<br />
www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-15%20%20Small%20<br />
Wars%20Manual.pdf<br />
U.S. Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency<br />
Guide, January 2009.<br />
www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf<br />
13.3 Counterinsurgency – Papers and Publications<br />
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Jones, Seth G. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. RAND MG 595. 2008.<br />
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595.html<br />
Kilcullen, David. 28 Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency. March 2006.<br />
www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf<br />
Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill. Victory Has a Thousand Fathers:<br />
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, RAND Corporation, 2010.<br />
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964.html<br />
Ulrich, Mark. Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Counter-Guerrilla’s Guide to Defeating Insurgencies<br />
and Conducting Populist Centric Operations. Access at JCI<strong>SFA</strong><br />
https://143.84.167.180/Members/Portal/ViewInsight.aspxFocus=OIL&Insight=329<br />
14 Rule of Law<br />
Combined Joint Interagency Task Force – 435. United States Central Command.<br />
www.centcom.mil/cjiatf435<br />
Rule of Law Component – European Union Police Mission (EUPOL)<br />
www.eupol-afg.eu/q=rule-of-law<br />
Rule of Law in Afghanistan – United States Institute of Peace<br />
http://www.usip.org/category/countries/afghanistan<br />
Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan – U.S. Department of State<br />
www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm<br />
The Afghan Constitution.<br />
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf<br />
Gant, MAJ Jim and William McCallister, “Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shura,”<br />
Small Wars Journal. June 6, 2010.<br />
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tribal-engagement-the-jirga-and-the-shura<br />
Giustozzi, Antonio. “Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban’s Shadow<br />
Government,” PRISM, Journal of the Center for Complex Operations, 2012. Analysis of<br />
the Taliban’s “shadow” government and their efforts to challenge the legitimacy of the<br />
central government through civil means rather than military means.<br />
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-<br />
2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=139230<br />
Afghan Legal Documents Exchange Center<br />
http://afghantranslation.checchiconsulting.com/<br />
Ministry of Justice<br />
http://moj.gov.af/en<br />
Attorney General’s Office<br />
http://ago.gov.af/en<br />
Supreme Court<br />
http://supremecourt.gov.af/en<br />
Annex E<br />
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15 Gender<br />
RONNA - Gender Awareness in Afghanistan<br />
https://ronna.apan.org/Pages/GenderAwareness.aspx<br />
NATO: Women, peace and security<br />
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_91091.htmselectedLocale=en<br />
Afghan Research and Evaluation unit; search for “Gender”<br />
www.areu.org.af/Default.aspx<br />
UN Women<br />
www.unwomen.org<br />
Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations<br />
www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/sewdint/nordic-centre-for-gender-in-military-operations/<br />
DCAF – Democratic Control of Armed Forces’; Gender and security.<br />
www.dcaf.ch/Programmes/Gender-and-Security<br />
Gender in Operations Course; European Security and Defence College<br />
www.defensa.gob.es/areasTematicas/observatorio/actuaciones/seminarios-cursos/<br />
GenderOpsCourse/<br />
NATO e-learning courses on Gender and Children in Armed Conflict<br />
https://jadl.act.nato.int/<br />
U.S. Army Commanders Guide to Female Engagement teams<br />
http://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-u-s-army-commanders-<strong>guide</strong>-to-femaleengagement-teams/<br />
Female Engagement Teams; The Need to Standardize Training and Employment<br />
www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/MilitaryReview_Female%20Engagement%<br />
20Teams.pdf<br />
Gender Equality in the Military<br />
www.seesac.org/project.phpI1=135&I2=150<br />
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Annex F<br />
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Annex F<br />
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Annex F: Acronyms<br />
AACP<br />
AAF<br />
AAR<br />
ABP<br />
ACP<br />
AFAMS<br />
AFG<br />
AGO<br />
AHRIMS<br />
ALP<br />
ANA<br />
ANASOC<br />
ANCOP<br />
ANP<br />
ANPH<br />
ANSF<br />
AO<br />
AOC<br />
AOR<br />
AOSC<br />
APPF<br />
APRP<br />
AREU<br />
Afghan Anti-Crime Police<br />
Afghanistan Air Forces<br />
After Action Review<br />
Afghan Border Police<br />
Afghan Customs Police<br />
Armed Forces Academy of<br />
Medical Sciences<br />
Afghanistan<br />
Attorney General’s Office<br />
Afghan Human Resources<br />
Information Management<br />
System<br />
Afghan Local Police<br />
Afghan National Army<br />
Afghanistan National<br />
Army Special Operations<br />
Command<br />
Afghan National Civil<br />
Order Police<br />
Afghan National Police<br />
Afghan National Police<br />
Hospital<br />
Afghan National Security<br />
Forces<br />
Area of Operations<br />
Area of Operations Commander<br />
Area of Responsibility<br />
Area of Operations Support<br />
Commander<br />
Afghan Public Protection<br />
Forces<br />
Afghanistan Peace and<br />
Reintegration Program<br />
Afghanistan Research and<br />
Evaluation Unit<br />
ASA (FM&C) Assistant Secretary of the<br />
Army (Financial Management<br />
and Comptroller)<br />
ASC Army Support Command<br />
ASI<br />
AT<br />
ATAC<br />
ATFC<br />
ATG<br />
AT&L<br />
ATN<br />
ATP<br />
AUP<br />
AWT<br />
BAF<br />
BATNA<br />
BCT<br />
BDE<br />
BPC<br />
BSO<br />
BXP<br />
C-IED<br />
C2<br />
C3I<br />
CAAC<br />
CAAT<br />
CALL<br />
CAS<br />
CF<br />
CI<br />
CIP<br />
CIVCAS<br />
Afghan Security Institution<br />
Advisor Team<br />
Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators<br />
Afghanistan Threat Finance<br />
Cell<br />
Advisor Training Group<br />
Acquisition, Technology, &<br />
Logistics<br />
Army Training Network<br />
Advanced Tactical Practitioner<br />
Afghan Uniformed Police<br />
Air Weapons Team<br />
Bagram Airfield<br />
Best Alternative To A<br />
Negotiated Agreement<br />
Brigade Combat Team<br />
Brigade<br />
Building Partner Capacity<br />
Battle Space Owner<br />
Border Crossing Points<br />
Counter-Improvised Explosive<br />
Device<br />
Command and Control<br />
Command, Control, Communications,<br />
and Intelligence<br />
Children and the Armed<br />
Conflicts<br />
COMISAF Advisory and<br />
Assistance Team<br />
Center for Army Lessons<br />
Learned<br />
Close Air Support<br />
Coalition Forces<br />
Counterintelligence<br />
Critical Infrastructure<br />
Protection<br />
Civilian Casualties<br />
Annex F<br />
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CJIATF-A Combined Joint Interagency<br />
Task Force-Afghanistan<br />
CJOA-A Combined Joined Operations<br />
Area-Afghanistan<br />
CJSOR Combined Joint Statement<br />
of Requirements<br />
CLS Combat Lifesaver Course<br />
CM Capability Milestone<br />
CMAAT Civil Military Advise and<br />
Assist Team<br />
CN Counter Narcotics<br />
CNPA Counternarcotics Police of<br />
Afghanistan<br />
COA Course of Action<br />
COIN Counterinsurgency<br />
CQB Close Quarters Battle<br />
CRM Composite Risk Management<br />
CSD Central Supply Depot<br />
CSDF Civilian Self-Defense Forces<br />
CSS Combat Service Support<br />
CSSK Combat Service Support<br />
Kandak<br />
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition<br />
Command - AFG<br />
(former OSC-A)<br />
CT<br />
Combined Team<br />
CTAP Civilian Technical Assistance<br />
Program<br />
CTC Combat Training Center<br />
CWS Central Workshop<br />
DCOM MAG Deputy Commander Ministerial<br />
Advisory Group<br />
DCoP Districts Chief of Police<br />
DIRLAUTH Direct Liaison Authority<br />
DLIFLC Defense Language Institute<br />
Foreign Language Center<br />
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Training,<br />
Organization, Materiel,<br />
Leadership, Personnel, and<br />
Facilities<br />
DRMO<br />
E&R<br />
EAG<br />
EF<br />
EJK<br />
EOC<br />
EOD<br />
EOT<br />
EPM<br />
ERP<br />
ESC<br />
ETT<br />
EUPOL<br />
EvBO<br />
EXSUM<br />
FID<br />
FIT<br />
FOB<br />
FOC<br />
FOM<br />
FP<br />
GA<br />
GCPSU<br />
GENAD<br />
GFC<br />
GFP<br />
GIRoA<br />
GSU<br />
GVHR<br />
HA/DR<br />
Defense Reutilization and<br />
Marketing Office<br />
Evasion and Recovery<br />
Enterprise Advisory Group<br />
Essential Function<br />
Extra-Judicial Killing<br />
Emergency Operations Center<br />
Explosive Ordnance Dis-posal<br />
End of Tour<br />
Embedded Police Mentor<br />
Expeditionary Reach Pack-age<br />
Effective Security Campaigns<br />
Embedded Training Team -<br />
Non-Afghan Trainers/Advisors<br />
Attached To ANA Unit<br />
(Usually USA)<br />
European Union Police Mission<br />
Evidence Based Operations<br />
Executive Summary<br />
Foreign Internal Defense<br />
Financial Investigative Team<br />
Forward Operating Base<br />
Full Operating Capability<br />
Freedom of Movement<br />
Force Protection<br />
Guardian Angel<br />
General Command Police<br />
Special Units<br />
Gender Advisor<br />
Ground Force Command<br />
Gender Focal Point<br />
Government of the Islamic<br />
Republic of Afghanistan<br />
General Support Unit<br />
Gross Violations of Human<br />
Rights<br />
Humanitarian Assistance/<br />
Disaster Relief<br />
F<br />
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HN<br />
HOTO<br />
HPA<br />
HR<br />
HRC<br />
HRI<br />
HSSB<br />
HTT<br />
HVT<br />
IC<br />
ICT<br />
IDAD<br />
IDF<br />
IED<br />
IG<br />
IGTAO<br />
IIU<br />
IJC<br />
INS<br />
IPCB<br />
IPOE<br />
ISAF<br />
ISR<br />
ISTAR<br />
IT<br />
ITPM<br />
Host Nation<br />
Hand Over Take Over<br />
High-Profile Attacks<br />
Human Remains<br />
High Risk of Capture<br />
High Risk of Isolation<br />
Headquarters Security and<br />
Support Brigade<br />
Human Terrain Team<br />
High Value Target<br />
International Community<br />
Information Communication<br />
Technology<br />
Internal Defense and Development<br />
Indirect Fires<br />
Improvised Explosive<br />
Device<br />
Inspector General<br />
Inspector General/Transparency,<br />
Accountability,<br />
and Oversight<br />
Intelligence and Investigation<br />
Unit<br />
ISAF Joint Command<br />
Insurgent(s)<br />
International Police Coordination<br />
Board<br />
Intelligence Preparation of<br />
the Operational Environment<br />
International Security Assistance<br />
Force In Afghanistan<br />
Intelligence, Surveillance,<br />
Reconnaissance<br />
Intelligence, Surveillance,<br />
Target, Acquisition, and<br />
Reconnaissance<br />
Insider Threat<br />
Insider Threat Prevention<br />
Model<br />
ITT<br />
JADL<br />
JALLC<br />
JCB<br />
JCI<strong>SFA</strong><br />
JFCBS<br />
JRSOI<br />
KAF<br />
KAIA<br />
KLE<br />
KSA<br />
LI<br />
LL<br />
LOAC<br />
LOTFA<br />
MAG<br />
MAT<br />
MCN<br />
MCTF<br />
MDP<br />
MEDEVAC<br />
METL<br />
METT-TC<br />
MFAT<br />
MMC-A<br />
In-Theater Training<br />
Joint Advanced Distributed<br />
Learning<br />
Joint Analysis Lessons<br />
Learned Center<br />
Joint Coordination Board<br />
Joint Center for International<br />
Security Force<br />
Assistance<br />
Joint Forces Command<br />
Brunssum<br />
Joint Reception, Staging,<br />
Onward-movement, and<br />
Integration<br />
Kandahar Airfield<br />
Kabul Afghanistan International<br />
Airport<br />
Key Leader Engagement<br />
Knowledge, Skills, and<br />
Abilities<br />
Lessons Identified<br />
Lessons Learned<br />
Law of Armed Conflict<br />
Law and Order Trust Fund<br />
for Afghanistan<br />
Ministerial Advisor Group<br />
Military Advisor Team<br />
Ministry of Counternarcotics<br />
Major Crimes Task Force<br />
Ministerial Development<br />
Plan<br />
Medical Evacuation<br />
Mission Essential Task List<br />
Mission, Enemy, Terrain<br />
and weather, Troops and<br />
support available, Time<br />
available, Civil considerations<br />
Multi-Function Assistance<br />
Team<br />
Materiel Management<br />
Center-Army<br />
Annex F<br />
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MoD<br />
MoDA<br />
MOE<br />
MoI<br />
MoJ<br />
MOP<br />
MOS<br />
MRX<br />
MSC<br />
MSF<br />
MSF-AT<br />
MTR<br />
NAC<br />
NAC-A<br />
NATC-A<br />
NCO<br />
NDS<br />
NEB<br />
NEPS<br />
<strong>NIU</strong><br />
NMCC<br />
NMH<br />
NSM<br />
NSOCC-A<br />
NSP<br />
NTISR<br />
NTM-A<br />
OBLP<br />
Ministry of Defense<br />
Minister of Defense Advisors<br />
Measures of Effectiveness<br />
Ministry of Interior<br />
Ministry of Justice<br />
Measures of Performance<br />
Military Occupational<br />
Specialty<br />
Mission Rehearsal Exercise<br />
MoI Support Center<br />
Mobile Strike Force<br />
Mobile Strike Force Advisor<br />
Team<br />
Minimum Training Requirement<br />
North Atlantic Council<br />
NATO Air Command-<br />
Afghanistan<br />
NATO Air Training<br />
Command-Afghanistan<br />
Non-Commissioned Officer<br />
National Directorate of<br />
Security<br />
National Engineer Brigade<br />
North East Power Supply<br />
National Interdiction Unit<br />
National Military Coordination<br />
Center<br />
National Military Hospital<br />
Non-Security Ministries<br />
NATO Special Operations<br />
Component Command-<br />
Afghanistan<br />
National Security Policy<br />
Non-Traditional ISR<br />
NATO Training Mission-<br />
Afghanistan<br />
Observations, Lessons, and<br />
Best Practices<br />
OCC Operations Coordination<br />
Center<br />
OCC-AT Operations Coordination<br />
Center Advisor Teams<br />
OCC-D Operations Coordination<br />
Center-District<br />
OCC-P Operations Coordination<br />
Center-Provincial<br />
OCC-R Operations Coordination<br />
Center-Regional<br />
ODA or ODB Operational Detachment,<br />
Alpha (Bravo) (SOF unit)<br />
OE<br />
Operational Environment<br />
OEF Operation ENDURING<br />
FREEDOM<br />
OMA Operations and Maintenance,<br />
Army<br />
ONSC Office of National Security<br />
Council<br />
OPCOM Operational Command<br />
OPCON Operational Control<br />
OPORD Operation Orders<br />
OTERA Organizing, Training,<br />
Equipping, Rebuilding,<br />
and Advising<br />
PA<br />
Physician’s Assistant<br />
PAK Pakistan<br />
PAKMIL Pakistan Military<br />
PAT Police Advisor Team<br />
PCoP Provincial Chief of Police<br />
PDSS Pre-Deployment Site Survey<br />
PDT Pre-Deployment Training<br />
PMESII-PT Political, Military, Economic,<br />
Social, Information,<br />
Infrastructure,<br />
People, and Time<br />
PN<br />
Partner Nations<br />
POI Program of Instruction<br />
PPE Personal Protection Equipment<br />
F<br />
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PRT<br />
PSC<br />
PSD<br />
PSU<br />
PU<br />
PVO<br />
QRD<br />
QRF<br />
RASR<br />
RC<br />
RCBS<br />
RC-IED<br />
RDL<br />
RFI<br />
RIP/TOA<br />
RLC<br />
RLSC<br />
RMH<br />
ROE<br />
RRS<br />
RS<br />
RSC<br />
RSOI<br />
SA<br />
SACT<br />
SAV<br />
SBIED<br />
Provincial Reconstruction<br />
Team<br />
Private Security Companies<br />
Personal Security Detail<br />
Provincial Special Unit<br />
Partnered Unit<br />
Private Volunteer Organization<br />
Quick Reaction Drill<br />
Quick Reaction Force<br />
Regional ANSF Status<br />
Report<br />
Regional Command<br />
Regional Combat Battle<br />
School<br />
Radio Controlled Improvised<br />
Explosive Device<br />
Rating Definition Levels<br />
Request for Information<br />
Relief in Place/Transfer of<br />
Authority<br />
Regional Logistics Command<br />
Regional Logistics Support<br />
Center<br />
Regional Military Hospital<br />
Rules of Engagement<br />
Readiness Reporting System<br />
RESOLUTE SUPPORT<br />
Regional Support Command<br />
Reception, Staging,<br />
Onward Movement, and<br />
Integration<br />
Situational Awareness<br />
Supreme Allied Commander<br />
Transition<br />
Staff Assistance Visit<br />
Suicide Borne Improvised<br />
Explosive Device<br />
SCO<br />
SERE<br />
<strong>SFA</strong><br />
<strong>SFA</strong>AT<br />
<strong>SFA</strong>B<br />
SHAPE<br />
SIU<br />
SLP<br />
SME<br />
SMW<br />
SOFA<br />
SOJTF-A<br />
SOP<br />
SSA<br />
SSR<br />
SVTC<br />
SWAT<br />
TAA<br />
TAAC<br />
TACOM<br />
TACON<br />
TAO<br />
TCCC/T3C<br />
TCN<br />
TDY<br />
Security Cooperation Officer<br />
Survival, Evasion, Resistance,<br />
Escape (and Extraction)<br />
Security Force Assistance<br />
Security Force Assistance<br />
Advisor Team<br />
Security Force Assistance<br />
Brigade<br />
Supreme Headquarters Allied<br />
Powers Europe<br />
Sensitive Investigation<br />
Unit<br />
Speech-Language Pathology<br />
Subject Matter Expert<br />
Special Mission Wing<br />
Status-of-Forces Agreement<br />
Special Operations Joint<br />
Task Force-Afghanistan<br />
Standard Operating Procedure<br />
Security Sector Assistance<br />
Security Sector Reform<br />
Secure Video Teleconference<br />
Special Weapons and Tactics<br />
Train, Advise, and Assist<br />
Train, Advise, and Assist<br />
Command<br />
Tactical Command<br />
Tactical Control<br />
Transparency, Accountability,<br />
and Oversight<br />
Tactical Combat Casualty<br />
Care<br />
Troop Contributing Nation<br />
Temporary Duty<br />
Annex F<br />
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TLSR<br />
TMAF<br />
TSU<br />
TTP<br />
UIP<br />
UNAMA<br />
UTP<br />
VSO<br />
Transfer of Lead Security<br />
Responsibility<br />
Tokyo Mutual Accountability<br />
Framework<br />
Transition Support Unit<br />
Tactics, Techniques, and<br />
Procedures<br />
Unified Implementation<br />
Plan<br />
United Nations Assistance<br />
Mission Afghanistan<br />
Unified Transition Plan<br />
Village Stability Operations<br />
F<br />
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Annex G
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Annex G<br />
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Annex G: Glossary<br />
DEFINITIONS:<br />
1 Advise. All activities concerning providing subject matter expertise, guidance,<br />
advice, and counsel to a foreign security force (FSF) while carrying out the missions<br />
assigned to the unit/organization. Advising will occur under combat or administrative<br />
conditions at tactical, operational, and strategic levels in support of individuals or<br />
groups.<br />
2 Advisor. A subject matter expert (SME) who serves with ANSF to advise, assist,<br />
and counsel counterparts. Additionally, SMEs observe, evaluate, and report on the<br />
performance of their assigned unit. While not liaison officers, they communicate with<br />
their ISAF superiors, functional SMEs and ANSF counterparts to resolve problems<br />
and gain confidence. Advisors’ primary purpose is to create professional relationships<br />
based on trust that will inspire and influence their counterparts to effective action.<br />
3 Afghan Units.<br />
d) Kandak. Afghan name for ANA battalion-equivalent unit.<br />
e) Tolay. Afghan name for ANA company-equivalent unit.<br />
4 Area of Operations Commander (AOC). The designated ANSF commander with<br />
lead responsibility—in close coordination with the ISAF Area of Operations Support<br />
Commander (AOSC)—for management of security and terrain within defined military,<br />
district, and provincial boundaries.<br />
5 Area of Operations Support Commander (AOSC). The designated ISAF<br />
commander within defined ANSF boundaries who is responsible for unilateral ISAF<br />
activity; providing training, advice, and assistance; and coordinating support forces to<br />
the ANSF AOC.<br />
6 Assist. Providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities to the ANSF so<br />
they can meet objectives and reach the desired end-state.<br />
7 Assistance Platform. Selected locations on GIRoA bases used by Coalition units that<br />
can accommodate advisor teams for temporary periods of time, i.e., temporary bases<br />
for specific missions.<br />
8 Autonomous Units. Any ANSF unit without an assigned CF unit providing<br />
partnering or advising assistance. An autonomous unit should not be mistaken as a<br />
unit assessed as “independent with without advisors” or capable of Phase IV transition<br />
in accordance with the IJC OPS/TAC directive.<br />
9 Battle Space Owner (BSO). The military commander who has authority for<br />
dimension management and ultimate responsibility for the conduct of operations<br />
within the CJOA-A. The authority of a BSO is delegated from the higher commander.<br />
Commander ISAF (COMISAF) is the overall BSO for the CJOA-A until 31 December<br />
2014.<br />
10 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). US brigade formation commanded by an Army<br />
colonel. Brigade Combat Teams have been deploying to Afghanistan as Security Force<br />
Assistance Brigades (<strong>SFA</strong>Bs) since early 2013.<br />
11 Civil Military Advise and Assist Team (CMAAT). A Civil Affairs Team tasked to<br />
develop Civil-Military Operations capacity across the full ANSF spectrum.<br />
12 Coaching. Helping a counterpart reach the next level of knowledge or skill by<br />
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practicing those skills with the counterpart and building on previous teaching.<br />
13 Command and Control Relationships.<br />
a) NATO Tactical Command (TACOM). The authority delegated to a<br />
commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment<br />
of the mission assigned by higher authority.<br />
b) NATO Tactical Control (TACON). The detailed and usually local direction<br />
and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or<br />
tasks assigned.<br />
c) NATO Operational Command (OPCOM). The authority granted to<br />
a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to<br />
deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or<br />
tactical control as deemed necessary. This does not include responsibility for<br />
administration.<br />
d) NATO Operational Control (OPCON). The authority delegated to a<br />
commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish<br />
specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time, or location.<br />
This also includes the authority to deploy units and to retain or assign tactical<br />
control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment<br />
of components of the units concerned. Neither does it include administrative or<br />
logistic control.<br />
e) US Tactical Control (TACON). Command authority over assigned or attached<br />
forces or command, or military capability or forces made available for tasking<br />
(limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers<br />
within the operational area and necessary to accomplish missions or tasks<br />
assigned). Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control<br />
may be delegated to and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant<br />
command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and<br />
directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within<br />
the assigned mission or task.<br />
f) US Operational Control (OPCON). Command authority that may be<br />
exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant<br />
command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command<br />
authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control<br />
is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate<br />
forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning<br />
tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects<br />
of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions<br />
assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the<br />
commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised<br />
through subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or functional<br />
component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority<br />
to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander<br />
in operational control sees necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does<br />
not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of<br />
administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.<br />
14 Corruption. The abuse of public office for private gain. State institutions normally<br />
manage and contain corruption through effective law enforcement and oversight, in<br />
conjunction with a vibrant, functioning civil society. Two variations of the term relate<br />
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to defensive and offensive measures to confront this challenge.<br />
a) Anti-corruption: defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of<br />
individuals and organizations to acts of corruption, to include limited response by<br />
military and law enforcement entities.<br />
b) Counter-corruption: offensive measures taken to deter, preempt, and eradicate<br />
acts of corruption—real or imputed.<br />
15 Counterinsurgency (COIN). A comprehensive civilian and military effort<br />
undertaken to defeat an insurgency and to address the population’s core grievances.<br />
<strong>SFA</strong> activities conducted during US COIN operations in an HN should support HN<br />
COIN objectives. Currently, the Coalition is conducting <strong>SFA</strong> in support of GIRoA<br />
COIN efforts.<br />
16 Dimension Management. Dimension management describes the function of<br />
integration, coordination, and synchronization of all operational activities within the<br />
designated AO. The dimensions of air, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and<br />
information cannot be considered in isolation and must acknowledge the challenge of<br />
forces operating across environmental boundaries. Good command and control across<br />
all dimensions is essential for the safe conduct of operations.<br />
17 Educating. Teaching concepts and knowledge that can be applied over a broad<br />
range of applications. The advisor has to be ready to teach and coach concepts and<br />
knowledge as necessary.<br />
18 Embedded <strong>SFA</strong>-ATs. <strong>SFA</strong>-ATs that will live within or adjacent to an ANSF<br />
compound, even in remote areas, and interact with the ANSF unit on a persistent<br />
basis. Force Protection and support is paramount for these teams, and the ATs must<br />
have specifically designed local solutions. A “COP within a COP” (COP is a combat<br />
outpost) may be constructed for each team that is embedded. A “COP within a<br />
COP” is a construct of a Coalition life-support area either within existing Tactical<br />
Infrastructure (TI) or adjacent to TI.<br />
19 Enable. Providing support to the ANSF in critical areas such as air support,<br />
CASEVAC, intelligence, logistics, etc.<br />
20 Foreign Internal Defense (FID). The participation by civilian and military agencies<br />
of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other<br />
designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,<br />
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.<br />
21 Functionally based <strong>SFA</strong>. <strong>SFA</strong> focused on functional process development. It<br />
requires a stronger unity of effort to align advisors at multiple echelons to advise along<br />
a vertical process. It does not replace the need for Afghans to develop solutions to<br />
process challenges. Functionally based <strong>SFA</strong> has a unit-based aspect to it where rapport<br />
and assessments are still critical. Unity of effort will require the integration of the five<br />
functional pillars and the four functional enterprises.<br />
22 ISAF Battlespace Owner (BSO). The military commander, and associated<br />
headquarters, with authority in battle space management and ultimate responsibility<br />
for the conduct of operations within a designated area (OPS/TAC directive). The<br />
authority of a battlespace owner is delegated from the higher commander. The ISAF<br />
BSO is normally the RC or brigade commander, but the position may be delegated<br />
to as low as battalion level. BSO held primary responsibility for ensuring that ANSF<br />
transitioned into the lead. (Since June 2013, the ANSF have been in the lead for<br />
security.)<br />
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23 Key Leader Engagement (KLE). The deliberate, planned, and focused interaction<br />
with an Afghan key leader to achieve a desired effect or outcome. Above all, successful<br />
KLEs are a prerequisite to successful strategic partnering, which is ISAF’s principle tool<br />
for building capacity and capability within GIRoA and the ANSF.<br />
24 Levels of <strong>SFA</strong> Advising. Refers to the degree of advisor training and assistance<br />
provided to the ANSF element.<br />
a) Level 1 <strong>SFA</strong>. Refers to when Coalition units train, advise, and assist ANSF<br />
unit(s) on a continuous, persistent basis from either an embedded footprint or<br />
in close proximity. Level 1 advising is seen as the most desirable approach and<br />
provides the best conditions for ANSF development.<br />
b) Level 2 <strong>SFA</strong>. Coalition units that train, advise, and assist ANSF(s) on a<br />
less frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure the continued<br />
development of ANSF units. The frequency of this interaction varies based on<br />
the proximity to the ANSF unit, the capability of the ANSF unit, threat level to<br />
advisors, and Coalition resources. <strong>SFA</strong>-ATs that provide Level 2 contact will likely<br />
be supporting more than one ANSF unit. Level 2 advising will become the more<br />
common approach as Coalition forces thin out and ANSF kandaks and brigades<br />
become more capable.<br />
c) Level 3 <strong>SFA</strong>. Coalition forces that provide additional training and advice from a<br />
centralized location such as a Regional Training Center (RTC) or Regional Corps<br />
Battle School (RCBS) while accompanying ANSF commanders and staff sections<br />
during a Battle Field Circulation (BFC) or Staff Assistance Visit (SAV). Level<br />
3 advising is not limited to <strong>SFA</strong>-ATs or advisor teams. For instance, Coalition<br />
headquarters staff may coordinate and execute training to improve the planning<br />
capability of their counterparts in an ANSF brigade or corps headquarters.<br />
25 Local Forces—Terms and Definitions.<br />
a) Local Defense Forces (LDF). Host nation (HN) personnel armed and<br />
organized as protective forces. This overarching category includes Civilian Self-<br />
Defense Security Forces (CSDF), Local Security Forces (LSF), and all elements<br />
from ALP to militia.<br />
b) Civilian Self-Defense Forces (CSDF). Armed host-nation personnel<br />
sanctioned by GIRoA and/or ISAF and organized as part of counterinsurgency<br />
(COIN) or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) efforts. CSDF is a sub-set of LDF.<br />
This term is from US FID doctrine for Special Forces. Some examples in<br />
Afghanistan were the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in RC-North and<br />
the Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) in RC-East.<br />
c) Local Security Forces (LSF). Armed, non-insurgent, host nation personnel<br />
organized as protective forces. LSF are not sanctioned by GIRoA and/or ISAF,<br />
but are not necessarily anti-GIRoA. LSF are a sub-set of LDF. Some examples in<br />
Afghanistan are militia and unlicensed private security companies (PSC).<br />
d) Arbakai. Village- or tribe-based community policing groups comprised<br />
of volunteers vetted by elders. They are formed to remedy temporary, specific<br />
problems and then dissolved until another issue must be dealt with. These groups<br />
can be any size, but are generally relatively small. Their members retain their<br />
original livelihoods or are supported by their communities temporarily. Should<br />
they lack the capability to solve the problem, they are able to call upon a larger<br />
force known as a lashkar, which is comprised of men from the village or groups<br />
of villages in pursuit of a common interest. Some Afghans and members of the<br />
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International Community often refer to the Afghan Local Police (ALP) as arbakai.<br />
e) Militias. An irregular armed group (often illegal) loyal to a leader and<br />
not necessarily indigenous to the villages they protect. Most militias are not<br />
sanctioned by GIRoA or ISAF (although they may be loyal to individual<br />
GIRoA officials). Some militias, including Anti-Taliban Movements (ATM),<br />
are supported by GIRoA. Some militia groups may have origins in the Soviet<br />
occupation and have sustained their identity ever since. Militias vary in size to up<br />
to thousands of members. Militia members are full or part-time fighters; many<br />
need income to survive. Unless the militia has a patron/leader who can fund<br />
them, they may evolve into criminal organizations to satisfy the need to generate<br />
income. If a militia group is not indigenous, the militias may have no stake in<br />
local security and may engage in extortion and harassment of local villagers. Some<br />
militias also receive support and funding from foreign countries.<br />
f) Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP is an official GIRoA program established<br />
through an Afghan Presidential Decree signed 16 August 2010. The program<br />
empowers Afghan locals to protect their villages through ISAF partnering and<br />
with formal command and control through the GIRoA Ministry of Interior<br />
(MoI) with the oversight of Districts Chiefs of Police (DCoPs). The ALP program<br />
follows the Afghan traditional system of justice and security in communities by<br />
formalizing the empowerment of villagers into an organized community watch<br />
model. ALP Guardians are equipped with distinctive uniforms and marked<br />
vehicles.<br />
g) Village Stability Operation (VSO). Used to describe the placement of a<br />
special operations team in a village to conduct operations to enhance security,<br />
development, and governance. The teams live in a house or compound in or<br />
near the village and provide a persistent presence that gives the population<br />
nearly continuous access to the team and vice versa. Not all VSO will result in<br />
the establishment of ALP, and not all ALP have VSO. Most of the VSO sites have<br />
transitioned to GIRoA.<br />
h) Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF). A state-owned security service<br />
provider intended to protect people, infrastructure, facilities, and construction<br />
projects. The APPF does not have a police mandate to investigate crime or arrest<br />
suspects. APPF personnel receive pay and funding through MoI and from the<br />
entity that contracts for the security.<br />
i) Private Security Companies (PSC). A legal entity that is established by an<br />
Afghan citizen or in partnership with a foreign natural person or legal entity<br />
and is a registered business licensed in accordance with the laws of Afghanistan<br />
to provide security services. (MoI has the licensing authority.) Licensed PSCs<br />
are examples of GIROA-approved LDFs, while unlicensed PSCs are examples of<br />
LSF. Training for PSCs is determined by the terms of the various contracts based<br />
on the nature of the security mission. In August 2010, President Karzai issued<br />
Presidential Decree 62 ordering PSCs operating in Afghanistan to be phased out<br />
and replaced by the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).<br />
26 Mentoring. An action between individuals by which the mentor teaches, <strong>guide</strong>s,<br />
and advises the other, with the shared goal of building capacity and capability.<br />
27 Military Advisor Team (MAT). MATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise and assist<br />
the ANA, provide the conduit for liaison and C2, and when required, support the<br />
operational planning and employment of the ANA unit to which they are aligned<br />
so they can operate autonomously. MATs are one of the various kinds of <strong>SFA</strong>-ATs<br />
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deployed to Afghanistan.<br />
28 Operational Environment (OE). The OE is the composite of the conditions,<br />
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on<br />
the decision of the commander.<br />
29 Operations Coordination Center (OCC). The Regional and Provincial OCCs<br />
(OCC-R/P) are responsible for the coordination of both security operations and civil<br />
response to developing situations in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs).<br />
For the foreseeable future, the primary focus of OCC activities will be directed toward<br />
coordination of security operations.<br />
30 Operations Coordination Center - Advisor Teams (OCC-ATs). OCC-ATs deploy<br />
to the CJOA-A to advise and assist the OCC-R and OCC-P, provide the conduit<br />
for liaison and command and control, and when required, support the operational<br />
coordination in the area of operations to facilitate development of a coherent security<br />
coordination structure. OCC-ATs are one of the various kinds of <strong>SFA</strong>-ATs deployed to<br />
Afghanistan.<br />
31 Operational Reach. The distance and duration across which a joint force can<br />
successfully employ military capabilities. Operational reach is a tether; it is a function<br />
of intelligence, protection, sustainment, endurance, and relative combat power.<br />
32 Partner. Partnering attaches units at various levels to leverage the strengths of<br />
both NATO and HN security forces. As an HN security force’s capabilities mature, the<br />
echelon and degree of partnering decrease. As the HN security force conducts more<br />
autonomous operations, NATO forces still provide quick reaction forces and other<br />
assistance as appropriate.<br />
33 Partnering. Partnering involves a relationship between a Coalition unit and an<br />
Afghan unit that spans combined training, planning, and operations.<br />
34 Partner Unit (PU). A partner unit is a maneuver/combat support unit co-located<br />
with or in close proximity to its Afghan counterpart for planning and conducting<br />
operations. PUs are the cornerstone of the <strong>SFA</strong> effort. Unit partnerships do not replace<br />
advisor roles or functions. If partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms<br />
a three-part relationship amongst ANSF, advisors and the partner unit. Partner units<br />
should look to the advisor to identify, shape, and facilitate operational partnering<br />
objectives and training events. Advisors support US, Coalition, and partner unit<br />
objectives, but, depending on the operational phase, the partner unit may support<br />
advisors or advisors may support the partner unit. Therefore, some level of advisor<br />
skills training should be included in the partner unit training program if those units<br />
will be conducting <strong>SFA</strong> activities. Advising requires relationship-building and candid<br />
discourse to influence development of a professional security force. Partnering<br />
incorporates training with combined operations to achieve the same <strong>SFA</strong> goals.<br />
35 Police Advisor Team (PAT). PATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise the ANP,<br />
provide the conduit for liaison and command and control, and when required, support<br />
the operational planning and employment of the ANP unit to which they are aligned<br />
in order to support the development of a self-sufficient, competent, and professional<br />
ANP capable of maintaining public order, security, and rule of law. A PAT is one of the<br />
various types of <strong>SFA</strong>-ATs deployed to Afghanistan.<br />
36 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs are national entities provided<br />
by various nations of the Coalition. PRTs assist in reconstruction, development,<br />
governance, and security sector reform efforts. Most PRTs were closed down as each<br />
province transitioned or Coalition forces retrograded. PRTs varied in composition and<br />
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size. Some were led by civilians and others by the military. Most PRTs were phased out<br />
prior to or during the transition of the provinces. PRTs and their nations interacted<br />
with Afghan sub-national officials, UNAMA, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative<br />
(SCR) office, European Union Police (EUPOL), NGOs, international organizations,<br />
and civil society organizations. Most PRTs reported directly to their embassies<br />
and national capitals. In many cases, the military and civilian components of PRTs<br />
coordinated with regional commanders and regional SCRs. At the theater-strategic<br />
level, the NATO SCR coordinated with the embassies in Kabul and with HQ ISAF to<br />
ensure the civil-military integration of the PRT effort. Most PRTs have closed down. As<br />
of the fall of 2013, there were only three PRTs remaining, and by the end of 2014 they<br />
all likely will have shut down.<br />
37 Readiness Reporting System (RRS). The RRS is the operational readiness reporting<br />
tool within the MoD. This report is collected on a monthly basis from the Afghan<br />
National Army (ANA), Afghan Air Force (AAF), Commando Brigades, and the<br />
Headquarters Support and Security Brigades (HSSB).<br />
38 Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR). The Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR)<br />
replaced the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) in mid-2013. The monthly<br />
report is a compilation of ANSF unit assessments from RC commanders, <strong>SFA</strong>ATs,<br />
IJC CJ2, NTM-A, and CTAG. ANASOC and AAF units are not assessed by the RASR<br />
system.<br />
39 RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RS). The international community will refer to the post-<br />
2014 operation in Afghanistan as Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT.<br />
40 Rule of Law (RoL). The principle of governance in which all persons, institutions,<br />
and entities—public and private, including the state itself—are accountable to publicly<br />
promulgated laws, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with<br />
international human rights principles.<br />
41 Security Force Assistance (<strong>SFA</strong>). Unified action to generate, employ, and sustain<br />
local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.<br />
Military forces conduct <strong>SFA</strong> to facilitate a host nation’s ability to deter and defend<br />
against transnational and internal threats to stability. <strong>SFA</strong> developmental tasks are to<br />
organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA).<br />
42 <strong>SFA</strong> Advisor Team (<strong>SFA</strong>AT). Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (<strong>SFA</strong>ATs)<br />
provide training, advice, and assistance to ANSF units and functional areas. Other<br />
terms for <strong>SFA</strong>ATs include Security Force Assistance Teams (<strong>SFA</strong>ATs), Police Advisor<br />
Teams (PATs), Military Advisor Teams (MATs), Operations Coordination Centers<br />
Advisor Teams (OCCATs), and ministry advisors in context to Afghan National<br />
Security Forces (ANSF), their supporting institutions, and the ISAF Headquarters.<br />
Advisor teams operate under the C2 of the Coalition battle space owner and have the<br />
capability to provide direct access to Coalition capabilities such as air support, artillery,<br />
medical evacuation, and intelligence.<br />
43 <strong>SFA</strong> Brigade (<strong>SFA</strong>B). A brigade specifically tailored to provide <strong>SFA</strong> and enabling<br />
support in a given environment—influenced by the threat, ANSF capability and<br />
capacity, and degree of governance. <strong>SFA</strong>Bs provide formation-level command and<br />
control (C2) and support functions, discharge AOSC responsibilities, and provide <strong>SFA</strong><br />
Advisor Teams (<strong>SFA</strong>ATs) to train, advise, and assist ANSF units and functional areas.<br />
44 Stability Operations. An overarching term encompassing various US Armed<br />
Forces missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with<br />
other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure<br />
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environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure<br />
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. <strong>SFA</strong> supports the stability tasks of establishing<br />
civil security and civil control.<br />
45 Sustainability. The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat<br />
power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. Sustainability consists of two<br />
major components: the ability to sustain the <strong>SFA</strong> effort throughout all the phases of the<br />
operation and the ability of the ANSF to sustain their capabilities independently over<br />
the long term. These capabilities consist of processes described by the five functional<br />
pillars: command and control, combined arms integration/integrated layered security,<br />
sustainment, training, and leadership.<br />
46 Sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain<br />
and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment.<br />
47 Teaching. Providing instruction and/or education to develop skills or knowledge<br />
necessary to do a particular job.<br />
48 Train. All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader<br />
development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This<br />
may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training<br />
events, and leader development activities.<br />
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Knowledge is power. Join the <strong>SFA</strong> knowledge base at secret networks: <strong>SFA</strong> NET 2.0<br />
http://usfora.oneteam.centcom.cmil.mil/sites/sfa_net/sitepages/home.aspx and on restricted access<br />
unclassified networks: https://jcisfa.jsc.mil/Public/Index.aspx and NATO ACT: http://e-isaf.act.nato.int<br />
and NATO ACT:<br />
http://e-isaf.act.nato.int<br />
“The entire HQ ISAF is the Ministerial Advisory Group. A great part of this HQ’s<br />
focus should be assisting the Afghan ministries in developing the processes that lead<br />
to sustaining the ANSF who own the responsibility to provide for a safe and secure<br />
Afghanistan.”<br />
GENERAL J.F. DUNFORD, JR. USMC<br />
Commander ISAF<br />
Kabul, Afghanistan<br />
Photo: Sgt. 1st Class JoAnn Moravac<br />
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