20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1

RS Security Force 

Assistance Guide 3.1 

“Functionally oriented SFA will require all advisors to understand the advisor 

network, from Afghan ministries down to the kandaks as well as the Afghan 

functional processes that are critical to sustaining the ANSF.” 

—General Dunford, USMC 

Commander ISAF 

UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO 

This document is not approved for public release


This document is not approved for public release 

HEADQUARTERS 

International Security Assistance Force/ 

United States Forces-Afghanistan 

Kabul, Afghanistan 

APO AE 09356 

HQ ISAF 1 JULY 2014 

RESOLUTE SUPPORT SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE GUIDE 

1. Since taking the lead for their nation’s security a year ago, the Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF) have proven their ability to secure the Afghan people. They emerged from a tough fighting 

season last year not only capable, but also confident and credible in the eyes of the Afghan people. 

They successfully secured the Loya Jirga in November and 300 major election events during the 

winter. During the first half of 2014, they maintained an extraordinarily high operational tempo 

that put the enemy on its heels and shaped the environment for inclusive elections in April and 

June. 

2. While the Afghans no longer need much help fighting the Taliban—they can do that on their 

own—they do need help maturing the systems, processes, and institutions that are required to 

sustain a modern army and police force. Today, the Afghan ministries still have challenges with 

delivering spare parts, ammunition and other essentials. They also need help with critical tasks 

like developing budgets, managing human resources, and sustaining their infrastructure. To help 

them with these tasks, Coalition advisors deployed in support of Resolute Support will conduct 

Functionally Based Security Force Assistance (FBSFA). FBSFA will further develop the Afghan 

Security Institutions’ (ASI) capacity to conduct these tasks and ensure the long-term sustainability 

of the ANSF. 

3. To develop Afghan sustainability, Coalition advisors will conduct FBSFA at the Ministry of 

Defense, the Ministry of Interior, formal training facilities, schoolhouses, army corps headquarters, 

and provincial police headquarters. To ensure success, it is critical that advisors possess extensive 

expertise and experience in the functional area in which they advise, and that they understand 

existing ASI/ANSF processes so they can influence their development. 

4. This guide seeks to help nations and advisors prepare to execute FBSFA during Resolute 

Support. It describes the eight Essential Functions (EFs) that in the aggregate create sustainability. 

It emphasizes the importance of integrating each function both horizontally and vertically 

within the ASI/ANSF. It outlines a framework for advising, and best practices to follow when 

providing technical advice to senior Afghan officials. It outlines organizational constructs and 

functional processes, and guidance for training. Updates to this guide will be available on the SFA 

Collaboration Portal. 

5. All Resolute Support personnel involved with FBSFA must be familiar with the contents of 

this guide. To be successful in our mission, advisors must be both proficient in their duties and 

dedicated to the FBSFA mission. Only by building the ASI and ANSF’s long-term sustainability 

will we cement the gains made to date, and ensure Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven 

for terrorism. 

J. F. DUNFORD, JR. 

General, United States Marine Corps 

Commander 

International Security Assistance Force/ 

United States Forces-Afghanistan 

UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction.........................................................................1 

Chapter 1: Security Force Assistance (SFA)...........................5 

Chapter 2: Resolute Support (RS) Functionally Based SFA...11 

Chapter 3: The Advisor.......................................................17 

Chapter 4: Operational Environment.................................35 

Chapter 5: Afghan Actors...................................................41 

Chapter 6: RS Actors..........................................................55 

Annex A: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)............A1 

Annex B: Process Maps......................................................B1 

Annex C: PDT & Advisor METL........................................C1 

Annex D: SFA Ministry Advisor Tasks...............................D1 

Annex E: ISAF SFA Bibliography........................................E1 

Annex F: Acronyms............................................................F1 

Annex G: Glossary ............................................................G1 

Photo: Lance Cpl. Darien Bjorndal 




INTRODUCTION 

The Journey 

As NATO ISAF transitions to the NATO RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RS) mission, 

we should look back on the journey that has brought us to the 2014 end of ISAF’s 

campaign. Clear physical and cognitive shifts have taken place as NATO and the 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) have transitioned from 

ISAF-led operations, to the current process/systems focusing on the Functionally 

Based Security Force Assistance (FBSFA) construct, which will be the formal mission 

in Resolute Support. ISAF/RS advisors will work with our Afghan counterparts to 

establish and execute processes that will enable sustainable Afghan systems and 

prepare them for an enduring capability. 

Afghan Forces, (Security Institutions (ASI) and Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF)) have reached an important threshold as they have proven capable of leading 

the fight, providing confidence to the Afghan population, and maintaining security 

in key population centers. They have made significant and demonstrable progress 

at the tactical level. In order to achieve sustainability by 2016, ISAF has developed 

an FBSFA framework that shifts the emphasis from unit-based combat advising to 

Functionally Based advising along eight Essential Functions (EFs). The EFs are: 

1) Plan, Program, Budget and Execute (PPBE): generate 

requirements, develop a resource informed budget, and execute a 

spend plan. 

2) Internal controls to assure Transparency, Accountability, and 

Oversight (TAO). 

3) Civilian governance of the ASI, including adherence to the Rule of 

Law. 

4) Force Generate: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop a 

professional ANSF. 

5) Sustain the force through effective facilities management, 

maintenance, medical, and logistics systems. 

6) Plan, resource and execute Effective Security Campaigns (ESC) 

and operations; 

a) Inter-ministerial and joint coordination, and 

b) Command, control and employ Ground, Air and Special 

Operations Forces. 

7) Sufficient Intelligence capabilities and processes. 

8) Maintain internal and external strategic communication 

capabilities. 

The eight EFs focus on Afghan systems with measurable outcomes. These functions 

are interdependent; once habitual, they will result in Afghan sustainability. They 

span across all levels of government and defense, from the tactical warfighter 

to the strategic planning level. Each EF consists of various Afghan systems and 


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processes. Advisors focus on influencing 

these processes, thereby enabling the Afghans 

to solve problems within their own domain. 

Afghan sustainability must evolve in an Afghan 

way, as they know how to fight, now we must 

refine the manner by which they resource and 

sustain that fighting capability. 

ISAF is still performing SFA; the emphasis has simply 

evolved. The new functional framework is designed 

to facilitate a coordinated (Afghan and Coalition) 

problem-solving effort at the Corps level and higher. It is 

about maturing the systems and processes that will enable 

Afghan forces to rely on themselves. 

The Guide 

RS SFA Guide 3.1 provides NATO partners and troop contributing nations (TCNs) 

a common understanding of how ISAF/RS will execute the shift from a unit-based, 

combat-oriented advisory mission to a Functionally Based SFA mission that focuses on 

building sustainable ASI/ANSF systems and processes. It explains COMISAF’s vision 

for FBSFA during RS, and how FBSFA will contribute to Afghan Forces’ sustainability. 

3.1 will be accompanied by an Afghan version providing them the insights into what 

we hope to achieve on their behalf through a partnered endeavor. 

Many aspects of SFA remain the same. We will continue to support GIRoA in its fight 

against the insurgency while Afghan Forces create and maintain the conditions for 

stability and safety. The Afghans are delivering capability; we are delivering advice and 

assistance. 

RS SFA Guide 3.1 acknowledges the gains provided by the counterinsurgency 

campaign and an increasingly SFA-oriented effort over the last decade. The shift 

of focus towards sustainability is already underway. This guide addresses a broad 

spectrum of topics, reflective of the complex nature of the SFA mission. Specifically, it 

defines SFA from a broad perspective, but focuses on ISAF’s Functionally Based SFA 

program. It describes the advisors and the advisor network within which they operate. 

Finally, the guide covers how we will assess our progress. This guide provides advisors 

with the tools that will help them to enable Afghan institutions and security forces to 

become sustainable and able to operate independently. 

How to Use the Guide 

Because of the scope of the advisor network, this guide covers a broad range of 

subjects. It is designed to be portable in order to support ease of use. It is a resource 

document designed to be carried by the advisor on a daily basis. The modular online 

format allows each advisor to customize and print their own guide based upon their 

experience and background, understanding of FBSFA, their location within the advisor 

network, and even the mission of the day. The following is an illustrative example of 

how an advisor may wish to customize the guide. 

For general knowledge of SFA, to include its functional components, advisors should 

review Chapters 1 (“Security Force Assistance”) and 2 (“RS Functionally Based Security 

Force Assistance”) and may select pages that provide the background information 

required. Advisors will likely find Chapter 3 (“The Advisor”) helpful and may want to 

focus on pages from this chapter. Depending on where the advisor is located within the 

2 UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO



overall advisor network, selected portions of Chapter 5 “Afghan Actors” and Chapter 

6 “RS-SFA Actors” are crucial for an understanding of the operational environment, 

and may also inform which process maps within Annex B will be pertinent to their 

day-to-day work. The annexes contain other useful references such as an acronym list, 

glossary, and a recommended reading list. 

COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) will maintain an online and 

updated version of this guide. The guide is a “living” document that advisors can 

influence by providing recommended updates and adjustments as new information is 

revealed. For us to provide the most current and relevant information, advisors in the 

field need to feed recommendations for revisions, particularly those regarding process 

maps, to the CAAT via the portal at this location: http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/ 

CGHQ/CAAT/SFA_Collaboration_Site/default.aspx. 

Photo: Timothy Hrushka 


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The following updates have been made to the Guide: 

Inserted new text has blue Font! 

Guide 3.0 -> 3.1 

Chapter 3 

- par 3.13 Gender and Human Rights, p 31. 

- par 3.14 Children and armed conflict, p 34. 

Chapter 4 

- par 4.10 Women in the ASI/ANSF, p39. 

Chapter 5 

- par 5.18 Gaps, p 46. 

- par 5.31 Gaps, p 51. 

Chapter 6 

- figure 6.1 RS C2 Diagram, p 57. 

Annexes 

- Annex B. ANA Recruit - Train - Assign Pipeline, p B 15. 

- Annex B. ANP Fuel Ordering Process, p B 28. 

- Annex E. ISAF/RS Bibliography, pt. 15 Gender, p E14. 

- Annex F. Acronyms, p F1. 

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Chapter 1 


Chapter 1 






CHAPTER 1 

Security Force Assistance (SFA) 

1.1 Introduction: This chapter defines the SFA environment and describes 

imperatives, tasks, and how ISAF/Resolute Support (RS) has designed SFA for the RS 

mission. ISAF’s primary task has changed from leading a population centric counterinsurgency 

campaign to providing Security Force Assistance (SFA) to the ANSF who 

have now assumed the lead for counter-insurgency and security across the Combined 

Joint Operational Area–Afghanistan (CJOA-A). 

1.2 As we enter the final stages of the ISAF mandate and prepare to execute RS, ANSF 

have reached an important threshold. Evidence increasingly indicates that the years of 

investment in combat-oriented mentoring and advising has paid off. The ANSF still 

have room for improvement, but they have produced capable leaders at every echelon 

who understand the fundamentals of their profession. 

1.3 Readers should understand COMISAF’s intent and expectations for advisors. 

SFA is the main effort for the remainder of the ISAF mandate and through RS. This 

makes our advisor capability all the more critical to mission success. Advisors must 

be intimately aware of the inner workings of the SFA advisor network and the ISAF/ 

RS processes and mechanisms designed to facilitate Functionally Based Security Force 

Assistance (FBSFA). 

1.4 Advisors need to understand the Afghan information flow from the executive 

and strategic (ministerial) level down to the operational (national institutions) levels 

to the operating forces (fielded forces) and back up the chain again. 1 The SFA effort 

will evolve around the principles of FBSFA defined below, and the eight Essential 

Functions (EFs) that will lead to ANSF Sustainability. The eight EFs (EF 1: Plan, 

Program, Budget, and Execute; EF 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight; EF 

3: Civilian Governance of the ASI and adherence to Rule of Law; EF 4: Force Generate; 

EF 5: Sustain the force; EF 6: Plan, resource and execute effective security campaigns; 

EF 7: Sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes; and EF 8: Maintain internal and 

Chapter 1 

1 US Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, dated 29 April 2013, p. III-7. 


Photo: Sgt. Jessica Ostroska 

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external strategic communication capability) are described in chapter 2. 

1.5 Definition of Security Force Assistance (SFA): SFA is unified action to generate, 

employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a 

legitimate authority. In Afghanistan, ISAF/RS employs SFA to develop the ASI/ ANSF in 

support of GIRoA. 

1.6 Functionally Based SFA: FBSFA is an advisory effort focused on functions, 

systems processes and organizational development to achieve sustainable ASI/ANSF 

systems. FBSFA requires an enduring unity of effort and common purpose to align 

advisors at multiple echelons, to Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) vertical processes 

while also achieving horizontal coordination. Unity of effort will require the alignment, 

coordination and synchronization of the advisors within the eight EFs, at the strategic, 

operational and tactical levels. 

1.7 FBSFA Integration: FBSFA integration is the process of combining all FBSFA 

efforts across the eight EFs from the strategic to the tactical levels. This is achieved by 

ensuring advisor efforts are vertically aligned, while also being horizontally coordinated. 

To achieve ASI/ANSF sustainability, this process must be implemented from the ISAF/ 

RS command level down through all Subordinate Headquarters (SHQs). 

1.8 Vertical alignment: The process of ensuring a common message from the advisor 

network and command structure, from the strategic, operational and tactical level 

within each of the eight EFs. Achievement of vertical alignment requires advisors that 

are in proper relative position to execute the principles of TECHCON 2 and FBSFA. 

1.9 Horizontal Coordination: Horizontal coordination involves the eight EFs working 

together to produce desired outputs that contribute to improvements in ASI/ANSF 

systems. Horizontal coordination occurs at all levels informally and formally within the 

SFA Working Group (SFAWG). (See Chapter 2). 

1.10 Horizontal Synchronization: Horizontal Synchronization is command directed 

actions across the eight EFs in time and space in order to achieve improvements in 

ASI/ANSF systems. Horizontal synchronization occurs formally at the SFA Board. (See 

Chapter 2). 

1.11 SFA imperatives: Conducting SFA in Afghanistan requires ISAF/RS to adopt 

a specific mindset of working by, with, and through the ASI/ANSF to support their 

internal security and development. ISAF/RS personnel must understand that GIRoA’s 

legitimacy is vital, and they must increasingly focus their efforts away from enabling the 

ANSF, and towards assisting the ASI to develop and sustain its systems and processes. 

The population must perceive the ASI/ANSF and GIRoA as legitimate in order to set 

the conditions for achieving enduring success. SFA imperatives come from the historical 

record and recent CF experience. 3 The SFA imperatives are: 

a) Understand the Operational Environment. (See Chapter 4). 

b) Ensure Unity of Effort. A clear delineation and understanding of authorities 

is essential to avoid confusion and to ensure that each entity’s strengths are 

maximized. 

2 Technical Control (TECHCON). Defined as the provision of specialist and technical advice by designated 

authorities for the management and operations of forces to influence Afghan systems. TECHCON enables 

essential function coordinators with direct advisor contact vertically and horizontally throughout 

the advisor network for coordination, synchronization, and facilitation of efforts. For specific direction 

on decisions, advisors should use the chain of command. This is analogous to the relationship among 

staff elements in a Corps or Division. (TECHCON is an Australian Doctrine) 

3 Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 Security Force Assistance 29 April 2013. 

6 




c) Provide Effective Leadership. Leaders must be accountable for their actions, 

masters of their functional area, and focus on transitions and decisions that move 

the ANSF toward long-term sustainability. 

d) Build Legitimacy. Develop ASI and an ANSF that contribute to GIRoA’s 

recognition and acceptance as legally, morally, and politically legitimate by 

Afghans and the international community. 

e) Manage Information. Disseminate timely and relevant information, integrate 

it during planning, and leverage it appropriately during execution. Managing 

information encompasses collection, analysis, application, and preparation of 

information. 

f) Sustainability. Maintain the SFA effort throughout all the phases of 

the operation and so that the ASI and ANSF can sustain their capabilities 

independently over the long term. COMISAF has defined sustainability as, “In 

2016, provided with Chicago resources and limited advisory support, Afghan 

Security Institutions and Afghan National Security Forces can execute and 

integrate the eight EFs in order to provide stability and security in Afghanistan 

and serve as an effective counter-terrorism partner.” 

g) Support GIRoA Ownership. Afghanistan’s history, culture, legal framework, 

and institutions must inform the principles, policies, laws, and structures of the 

SFA program in order to secure the continued support of the Afghan people. 

h) Incorporate Principles of Good Governance and Respect for Human Rights. 

Accountability, transparency, public participation, respect for human rights, 

gender equality, and legitimacy must be mainstreamed in ANSF development. 

i) Link Security and the Rule of Law. All security forces must operate within 

the bounds of domestic and international law to retain legitimacy in the eyes of 

Chapter 1 

Photo: Sgt. Tammy Hineline 


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the Afghan people. 

j) Foster Transparency. Encourage open and transparent consultation with other 

ISAF agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international donors, 

and the media to enhance mission development and mission execution. 

k) Do No Harm. Posture the ASI and ANSF so they can sustain themselves while 

remaining on guard against introducing any processes or activities that are not 

consistent with the Afghan approach. The advisor’s job is to help the Afghans 

identify and implement sustainable, Afghan-appropriate processes. 

l) For a more detailed discussion of these imperatives, see Joint Doctrine Note 

1-13 Security Force Assistance 29 April 2013. 

1.12 FBSFA Tasks. In essence, FBSFA is about optimizing the advisor network with 

a focus on the regional and national linkage. Through TAA, the advisor empowers the 

Afghans to take ownership of their own systems and identify critical gaps and friction 

points. The principles of TAA are outlined in SHAPE OPLAN 10312. 4 

a) Train, Advise and Assist: TAA focuses on developing the capacity of the ASI 

and ANSF, while upholding the North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive (NID) 

stipulation of being a non-combat mission, not participating directly in counterterrorism 

tasks, and not engaging directly in counter-narcotics tasks. Specific 

areas of TAA effort include, but are not limited to, professional development, 

logistics, communications, intelligence, medical support, maintenance, aviation, 

tactical air control, and maintaining a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). TAA 

activities will be conducted at the security ministry and national institution 

level (including but not limited to national HQ, Afghan Security Ministries, 

national logistics centers, and training institutions). RS advisory activities will 

be conducted at Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps and Afghan National 

Police (ANP) Type-A Headquarters levels and above. Afghan SOF (ANSF Special 

Operations Forces, Police Special Units, and NDS elements) will be trained, 

advised, and assisted at all levels to develop a full range of Special Operations 

capabilities. The Theatre Commander can, 

within means and capabilities, validate the 

delivery of the Corps level TAA at secure 

locations below corps level. 

b) Definitions: 

1) Train. Training in RS is defined as 

developing ASI programs and institutions 

to educate, instruct and prepare the ANSF; 

enabling them to generate and maintain the 

force, thereby providing and maintaining 

effective and enduring security capabilities. 

Training also includes assessment and 

evaluation by ISAF/RS personnel in 

conjunction with their Afghan counterparts 

in order to focus efforts and resources. The 

training effort will focus on institutional 

training (to include Ministerial Advisory 

Group, ANA, ANP, Afghan National Defense 

University, and Afghan training institutions). 

4 SHAPE OPLAN 10312, Annex A, dated June 2014. 

Photo: Sgt. Martin Downs 

8 




Afghan SOF training may 

be conducted at all levels 

to develop a full range of 

SOF capabilities. Specific 

NATO training mandates 

include respect for the rule 

of law and the protection of 

human rights. Within these 

mandates the focus is on 

avoiding and investigating 

civilian casualties, following 

UNSCR 1325 for protecting 

and respecting women and 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane 

children, and reducing the 

risk of corruption. Additionally, all training will incorporate the performance 

of military or policing duties in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, 

domestic laws and international obligations. 

2) Advise. Advising is defined as facilitating and influencing by means of 

counsel and the improvement of ASI and ANSF through the creation of a 

professional relationship based on trust. Advising also includes observation, 

evaluation and reporting on the performance of ASI/ANSF in order to 

focus efforts and resources. The advisory effort will focus on the Corps and 

Police Type-A Headquarters level and above to refine ASI/ANSF skills and 

capabilities and to develop a mature, professional, and sustainable force that 

is committed to their own professional development. Two specific advisor 

efforts seek to further the ASI capacity within the GIRoA security construct. 

The first effort is furthering their capacity to develop and sustain mechanisms 

for enhanced cross-echelon and cross-military coordination and information 

sharing. The second effort is ensuring that the ANSF recognize that the civilian 

leadership has control and oversight of the ANSF. The advisory effort to 

Afghan SOF may be conducted at all levels. 

3) Assist. Assisting is defined as aiding in the accomplishment of tasks and 

will focus primarily on developing ASI and ANSF systems, processes and 

procedures. This may include activities such as planning and administrative 

support, policies and programming development, and financial management. 

For Afghan Special Operations Forces, this will also include activities necessary 

to aid in the development of a full range of Afghan SOF capabilities. 

1.13 Levels of Advising. This is the degree of advisor training and assistance provided 

to the ANSF element. 

a) Level One (1) TAA. Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANSF counterparts 

on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis from either an embedded 

footprint or in close proximity. 

b) Level Two (2) TAA. Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANSF counterparts 

on a less frequent basis to ensure their continued development. The frequency 

of this interaction varies based on the proximity to, and capability of, the ANSF 

counterpart, threat level to advisors, and CF resources. 

c) Level Three (3) TAA. ISAF provides additional training and advice from 

a centralized location (e.g., at a Regional Training Center or Regional Corps 

Battle School) or during a Battle Field Circulation or Staff Assistance Visit while 

Chapter 1 


9



accompanying ANSF commanders and staff sections. Level 3 advising is not limited 

to SFAATs or advisor teams. For instance, CF HQ staff may coordinate and execute 

training to improve the planning capability of their counterparts in an ANSF 

brigade or corps HQ or Operation Coordination Center–Regional (OCC-R). 

d) As the Coalition reduces its footprint within the operational environment, 

advisors at critical nodes within the corps and Type-A HQs will increase. ISAF/RS 

will maintain situational awareness of the security and governance progress outside 

of the Kabul cluster through regional-level Operational Coordination Centers 

(OCCs). OCC-Rs will be a major focus in the employment of advisors. These 

centers are vital links from the ministerial level to the regions and will require an 

ISAF/RS presence at least through the end of Phase 1 of the RS mission. 

e) While Level 1 advising will continue at the national/institutional level, Corps/ 

Region/Type-A HQs, OCC-Rs and key sustainability nodes, the importance of 

monitoring lagging brigades, kandaks, Mobile Strike Forces, CSS Kandaks and 

specialty Kandaks will not diminish. These lagging units will require less frequent 

visits to provide support for continued progress (i.e., Level 2 advising). Where 

operational reach and security conditions permit, support can also be provided to 

Police Primacy in transitioned areas. 

f) The close proximity of advisors to counterparts should not prohibit a move from 

level 1 to level 2. It is practicable to reduce the number of visits and contact while 

living adjacent to counterparts. This applies to the different nodes of the ANSF. 

Looking at the Afghan systems the advisor will determine when a node is capable. 

The ability to go back to Level 1 remains if a friction point is identified at that node. 

Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) commanders have mission command 

authority, and will determine when to move from Level 1 to level 2, based on the 

recommendation of their advisors. 

Photo: Sgt. Tech. Sgt. Renee Crisostomo 

10 




Chapter 2 


Chapter 2 






CHAPTER 2 

Resolute Support (RS) Functionally Based SFA (FBSFA) 

Our SFA effort is designed to identify the critical paths, the critical 

processes, and critical nodes. We will work those to connect the ministry to 

the lowest tactical level. 

—General Joseph Dunford, COMISAF, December 2013 

Chapter 2 

2.14 Introduction. ISAF/RS has developed a SFA framework that shifts the emphasis 

from unit-based, combat advising to functionally based advising. The new 

functional framework is designed to facilitate a coordinated (Afghan and Coalition) 

problem solving effort and the development of sustainable relationships. FBSFA is 

about maturing the processes that will provide the Afghan forces enduring sustainability. 

2.15 The Advisor Network (ANET) and Technical Control (TECHCON). The 

advisor network utilizes a communication structure defined as TECHCON. TECH- 

CON is defined as the provision of specialist and technical advice by designated 

authorities for the management and operation of forces to influence Afghan systems. 

If the Afghans are unable to solve a particular problem, advisors can seek assistance 

from any other advisors along the functional process—from the lowest tactical level 

up to the ministry. This TECHCON communication network is not a chain of command; 

rather it is a pathway to vertically integrate Afghan systems. Advisors have 

access to process maps and a comprehensive advisor network tool that will aid them 

in understanding how the Afghan processes are designed to work, who and where 

their co-advisors are and to facilitate communication. (See Annex B Process Maps). 

2.16 Afghan Sustainability. The Chicago Summit held in May 2012 delineated that 

the end-state of FBSFA is to achieve Afghan sustainability, defined as: 

In 2016, provided with Chicago resources and limited advisory support, Afghan Security 

Institutions and Afghan National Security Forces can execute and integrate the 

eight essential functions in order to provide stability and security in Afghanistan and 

serve as an effective Counter-Terrorism partner. 

2.17 Integrating ministerial, institutional (national), and fielded force advisors is 

central to the Functionally Based framework. Advisors are focused on headquarters 

(HQ) coordination and sustainability functions to provide ANSF the ability to 

effectively employ and sustain tactical forces. Linking these ANSF functions to the 

responsible agencies and elements within the security ministries is critical to achieving 

the level of security required to sustain growth and governmental development. 

This is accomplished using the eight Essential Functions outlined below. 

2.18 The Eight Essential Functions. The eight EFs provide the framework and 

desired outcomes in target areas to achieve Afghan sustainability. Each EF contains 

a series of Afghan processes with tactical, operational, and strategic characteristics, 

many of which have interactions across other EFs. This multi-echelon level of 

advising and cross-functional coordination allows analysis of Afghan process issues 

through multiple lenses. The eight EFs are: 


11



EF #1 – PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET AND 

EXECUTE; generate requirements, develop a 

recourse informed budget and execute a spend plan: 

PPBE is concerned with generating requirements, 

developing a resource-informed budget, and then 

following through by responsibly executing the spending 

plans. As mentioned earlier, all EFs are interrelated, and 

the success of the whole depends on the success of the 

individual parts. EF 1 is particularly important because 

it directly affects all other EFs. 

EF 1 advising efforts will focus on ANSF’s Resource 

Management and Procurement (RMaP) departments, 

aiding them in developing the experience, leadership, 

and proper objectives prioritization (seeing past shortterm 

advantage into long-term success) that they 

require. 

EF #3 – Rule of Law (RoL) and Governance: 

Civilian Civilian governance of the ASI, including 

adherence to the rule of law. 

The Rule of Law (RoL) and Governance mission promotes 

civilian governance of the Afghan Security Institutions. 

Current ASI/ANSF operation in compliance 

with RoL remains underdeveloped. EF 3 TAA efforts, 

therefore, must emphasize the importance of establishing 

effective and transparent criminal and disciplinary 

systems. 

Two important areas falling under the EF 3 awnings are 

the TAA efforts that will monitor and prevent extra-judicial 

killings and gross violations of human rights. 

TAO 

Force Gen 

PPBE 

RoL/Gov 

EF #2 – INtErnal COntrolS TO ASsurE 

transParEncy, accountaBility, and 

Oversight (TAO): 

Ensuring third-party oversight of the PPBE process may 

be an International Community (IC)-stipulated requirement 

for continued funding, but the only way this is 

accomplished is through enforcing EF 2—TAO. The EF 

2 directorate is designed to ensure transparency, accountability, 

and oversight in ASI/ANSF’s financial and 

non-financial processes; this includes, but is not exclusive 

to, fuel and pay. The overall output of EF 2 will feed 

into the EF 3 lines of operation, to ensure laws are equitably 

enforced. To this end, all levels of civil society 

and government will be leveraged to increase counter/ 

anti-corruption measures in order to boost the IC’s confidence 

and commitment in GIRoA’s fiscal stewardship. 

EF #4 – ForcE gEnEration: REcruit, 

train, rEtain, managE, and dEvEloP 

A PROFESSIONAL ANSF: 

The Force Generation TAA mission is grounded in an 

interconnecting and mutually supportive fivefold effort: 

recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five 

focus areas work together in building a professionalized 

force. 

The Afghan Human Resource Information Management 

System (AHRIMS) will assist in recruiting, training, and 

assigning qualified personnel into needed appointments 

as determined by force requirements. The management 

oversight it will provide will help ease a patronageoriented 

selection process into a more professional 

merit-based selection process. 

12 




Chapter 2 

EF #5 – Force Sustainment: 

EF 5 aims to sustain the Afghan Force through effective 

facilities management, maintenance, and medical and 

logistics systems. Current sustainment processes lack 

uniformity across echelons and between MoI/ANP and 

MoD/ANA. Areas for improvement include capturing demands, 

managing assets, and management reporting 

and decision-making. 

Success for EF 5 is achieved when ASI/ANSF have institutionalized 

a management culture based on proper 

stewardship and husbandry of capability. 

EF #7 – intElligEncE, SUFFICIENT 

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES: 

EF 7 is concerned with the development of sufficient 

intelligence capabilities and processes. The Afghan Intelligence 

Enterprise is making strides in areas of intelligence 

collection, processing, and analyzing as well as 

planning, integrating, producing, and disseminating. 

Despite the progress, several challenges remain; the enduring 

effort will emphasize new capability integration, 

training self-sufficiency. Moreover, while the current system 

is analog—relying heavily on paper products and personal 

contact—EF 7 will prioritize system digitalization. 

ESC 

STRATCOM 

Force Sust 

Intel 

EF #6 – EFFEctivE sEcurity camPaigns 

AND OPERATIONS (Esc): 

EF 6 is concerned with planning, resourcing, and 

ex-ecuting effective security campaigns and operations 

including inter-ministerial and joint coordination, and 

Command, control and employ Ground, Air and Special 

Operating Forces. 

At the tactical level, the ASI/ANSF are already highly 

ca-pable. However, their operational capabilities, 

though improving, require continued advisor efforts. 

Resource allocation must be based on assigned 

priorities and tasks, and cross-functional integration 

must also be improved. 

EF 6 end-state is reached when MoD/MoI coordinate, 

plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives 

while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn 

translated into operational plans supported by effective 

security campaigns. 

EF #8 – STRATCOM 

EF 8 is concerned with maintaining internal and external 

strategic communications capabilities. ASI/ANSF information 

communication proficiency continues to improve, 

but challenges remain, particularly in the development 

of plans, operations, and resource and tashkil management. 

The development of a strategic communications 

capability at MoD and at the Corps level would enable 

effecting support to national-level messaging. 

The end-state for EF 8 is ASI/ANSF capability to develop 

communication plans and ANSF ability to inform and 

communicate with the Afghan people. 


13



2.19 Priorities are critical in fostering 

the ISAF/RS advising efforts and aligning 

Afghan and Coalition resources to tackle 

the functions vital for Afghan sustainability. 

ISAF/RS uses ANSF generated priorities 

combined with COMISAF FBSFA priorities 

to describe short-, mid-, and longer-term 

development objectives aligned with the 

campaign plan. As priorities from both the 

Afghans and COMISAF will change over 

time, further information on the current 

priorities will be made available through ISAF/RS Orders. 

Photo: Cpl. Brian Gabriel Jr. 

Consideration for Advisors Vignette #1: Cross Functional Interdependencies 

During a review of assessment reports it was discovered that the AUP in an urban center were 

“borrowing” (stealing) fuel from the local population. Initial assessment placed this Afghan problem 

in Essential Function 3 for action. Since the Afghan Uniformed police (AUP) are the branch 

of GIRoA with whom the population comes into frequent contact, theft of civilian fuel reflected 

poorly on the central government. However, investigation revealed that the AUP were taking fuel 

from the civilian population because their own organic fuel sources failed to provide adequate 

fuel to continue missions. The AUP was attempting to continue enforcing law and order by taking 

fuel to continue patrols, but in doing so, damaged the civil/government relationship. This issue 

was then shifted from Essential Function 3, Civil Governance, to Essential Function 5, Sustainment, 

for action. 

Lessons Learned: Tactical and operational issues in one Essential Function can affect operational 

and strategic objectives. In this case, a lack of a reliable fuel sustainment system under 

Essential Function 5, Sustainment, had second-order effects for Essential Function 3, Civil 

Governance and Essential Function 8, Strategic Messaging. Each Essential Function Lead then 

had specific actions to take within their specialty to influence the system. 

2.20 ISAF/RS FBSFA Operations. The advisor TECHCON channels are designed 

to resolve the majority of Afghan issues that arise during operations. There are numerous 

instances where advisors cannot resolve Afghan process issues because of the 

numerous cross-functional interactions and/or the problem requiring operational/ 

strategic-level command influence. Past efforts to overcome these obstacles resulted in 

stagnation and frustration due to attempts by advisors to resolve issues at only one level 

of command. Using TECHCON within FBSFA allows issues to be tackled by multiple 

advisors at multiple levels simultaneously. 

2.21 FBSFA requires advisors to know the Afghan processes they are to advise and 

know what happens at every echelon. It requires advisors to understand what and how 

other advisors in their specialty are operating both horizontally and vertically in order 

for them to coordinate and synchronize efforts. The advisor’s goal is to facilitate the 

Afghans finding or developing solutions to the problems they encounter. For example, 

a logistics advisor at one of the Afghan Corps should be able to look at the advisor 

network or a process map on Class IX supply distribution and know who his/her 

advisor counterpart(s) are operating at Ground Forces Command (GFC), the Regional 

Logistics Support Center (RLSC), the Central Supply Depot (CSD), the General Staff 

G4 and who his/her counterparts are at the other corps. The advisor is empowered and 

expected to conduct vigorous coordination both vertically and horizontally to reach 

out to other advisors in the logistics advisory network to discuss any issues and train, 

14 




advise, and assist the Afghans to solve the problems. Advisors must understand the 

ASI/ANSF Process Maps at ANNEX B, and frequently check for updates on the 

ISAF SFA Collaboration Portal. 1 Advisors verify processes, share updated understanding, 

and submit refinements through the Advisor Network (ANET). 

2.22 At times, requirements will surface that need immediate attention up the chain of 

command into the ministries. Advisors must recognize two things: 1) the procedures 

that standardize and simplify ministry operations, and 2) the time sensitive requirements 

emanating from forces engaging in a counterinsurgency and building a force for 

future operations. 

2.23 To address these issues, ISAF/RS initiated a formal method, outside of the advisor 

TECHCON channels, to action operational/strategic level Afghan systems issues. 

This system allows advisors to communicate their concerns to their TAAC Commander 

and nominate FBSFA targets for influence at higher level staffs. 

2.24 ISAF/RS FBSFA Operations Process: 

a) The eight EFs The eight EFs serve to focus advising efforts and to facilitate the 

TAA mission. Each EF has appointed an Essential Function Lead (OF-7/OF-6) 

and an Essential Function Coordinator (OF-5/OF-4) who are responsible for 

vertical integration, horizontal coordination, analysis, and synchronization of 

information process issues within their vertical function. Formal FBSFA Targeting 

is a systems based approach that focuses influencing efforts at key friction points 

in a particular Afghan system. The system is then monitored for both positive and 

negative second order effects. Key personnel within the EF are: 

1) Functional Lead (FL). The Accountable Officer for each EF; responsible 

and accountable to the commander for its management. The Functional Lead 

has TECHCON for advisors within the EF at all levels. 

2) Functional Coordinator (FC). The FL delegate for the EF and subordinate 

echelon. The coordinator supports the FL in executing day to day management 

of the EF and is responsible to the FL. 

b) EF OPT. The EF Operational Planning Team (OPT) serves as the forum for 

vertical alignment within each EF harnessing the principles of TECHCON. 

EF OPTs absorb and coordinate input from all stakeholders both internal and 

external to their respective EF. Where appropriate, problems are referred to the 

SFA-WG for coordination or the SFA Board for synchronization. Each EF OPT 

lead acts as the subject matter expert (SME) for all issues relating to that EF across 

the Strategic, Operational and 

Tactical levels. 

c) SFA Working Group (SFA 

WG). The ISAF SFA Working 

Group serves three purposes. The 

first is to fully coordinate SFA 

activities and other matters at the 

working level (OF-5) from the 

Strategic, down to the Tactical, 

across all eight EFs. This will 

include EF Systems review and 

Target Matrix review. The second, 

Photo: Catherine Threat 

1 http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/CGHQ/CAAT/SFA_Collaboration_Site/pages/Afghan%20Process%20 

Maps.aspx 

Chapter 2 


15



is to formally coordinate and to action targets that could not be resolved by the EF 

OPTs. The third purpose is to prepare targets for consideration by the SFA Board 

that cannot be resolved at the SFA WG. The SFA WG is to be held weekly and is 

chaired by the OF-5 Director of the SFA Center. 

Diagram 2.1. RS FBSFA Operations Process 

d) SFA Board (SFAB). The ISAF SFAB is the arbiter of FBSFA issues requiring ISAF 

Senior Leader attention. The Board provides relevant and effective senior leader 

guidance and direction across the force; re-allocates resources in furtherance of ASI/ 

ANSF development; and ensures that ASI/ANSF objectives and tasks are integrated, 

coordinated, and synchronized. It also provides the opportunity to review EF systems 

and the target matrix. The board is chaired by COMISAF and is held weekly. 

e) Commander’s SFA Update (CSU). The CSU is the Commander’s primary means 

of reviewing the strategic outlook for the eight EFs. It also provides an opportunity 

for the EF leads to brief their EF and receive commander direction and guidance. 

Each EF presents updates to COMISAF/COMRS monthly, over a four week period. 

f) FBSFA Target. A critical gap, friction point, or risk within an ASI/ANSF system 

that prevents the achievement of a sustainable system. Problems are identified and 

analyzed at the lowest level, and if they cannot be resolved, elevated to the next level. 

Based on level of risk, problems may culminate in a decision for targetable action. 

g) TAAC FBSFA Targeting Meeting. The TAAC SFA Targeting meeting is similar to 

the ISAF SFA WG. TAACs conduct FBSFA targeting meetings to coordinate TAAC 

FBSFA activities and other matters across all eight EFs. The meeting collects advisor 

issues, vets those issues for higher level influence, and prepares FBSFA targets for the 

SFA Working Group. 

16 




Chapter 3 


Chapter 3 






CHAPTER 3 

The Advisor 

“The ability to influence in the absence of authority 

is a distinguishing quality of a successful advisor.” 1 

3.1 This chapter provides information about advisor characteristics and considerations, 

Afghan culture and communication, rapport building, insider threats, human rights 

issues, and counter-corruption. The chapter is designed to be an informative concise 

guide for advisors and their commanders. Advisors must have a sound ‘baseline’ of predeployment 

training in accordance with their national guidelines and Annex C. Those 

requiring more detail should utilize the material referenced throughout the document, 

particularly in Annex E, the ISAF SFA Bibliography. 

3.2 Advisors are the ISAF/RS main effort in executing FBSFA. To build and maintain 

relationships with the officers working in the ASI and ANSF, advisors must know the 

processes of the ANSF and ASIs equally as well as the personnel they are advising. 

Advisors may operate at the ministerial level, with the national institutions, or with ANSF 

at the Corps or Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) level. The ministerial level consists of 

the Minister of Defense (MoD) and Minister of Interior (MoI) along with their General 

Staffs and Deputy Ministers (DMs) respectively. National institutions consist of the 

national training centers, academies, recruiting commands, central supply depots, and 

national hospitals (see Chapter 5 for further discussion.) ANA Corps and ANP PCoPs are 

regionally aligned military and police organizations that function at the operational level. 

Chapter 5 and Annex A provide further detail regarding these organizations and units. 

3.3 ISAF/RS advisors are subject matter experts (SMEs) who serve with ANSF to train, 

Chapter 3 

1 Headquarters Department of the Army. TC 31-73 Special Forces Advisor Guide: July 2008. 2008. Reprint: 

Special Operations Press, 2013. 

Photo: Sgt. Margaret Taylor 


17



advise, and assist their counterparts. Advisors observe, evaluate, and report on the 

performance of their assigned functional area. Advisors communicate with their ISAF/ 

RS superiors, functional SMEs, and ANSF counterparts to resolve problems and gain 

confidence. The advisor’s purpose is to create a professional relationship based on 

capability and trust that inspires and influences their Afghan counterparts to effective 

action. Advisors must understand the processes and systems associated with their 

functional area as well as their location in the advisor network. They must know the 

institutions and commands, both Afghan and Coalition, that are part of that network. 

Figure 3.1 provides a pictorial representation of the importance of cultural and 

situational awareness to an advisor’s mission: 

Figure 3.1: Cultural and Situational Awareness 

3.4 ISAF Advisor Network Tool (ANET): The ANET is designed to provide advisors 

and planners with a tool to help simplify the complexity of the advisor network, increase 

advisor knowledge of the essential functions and systems, and ease the task of managing 

FBSFA – all while connecting the advisor horizontally and vertically within the advisor 

construct. The tool demonstrates the linkages 

between advisors and their ASI/ANSF 

counterparts, the advisors’ place within the EF’s 

vertical and horizontal processes, critical nodes 

in the Afghan process, advisor information, and 

a method for sharing information concerning 

advisor interaction. ANET is available on the 

ISAF SFA Collaboration Site. 2 

3.5 Characteristics of the Advisor. Not 

everyone is suited to perform advisor functions. 

2 The ANET is located in ISAF Secret on the ISAF SFA Collaboration Site: http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato. 

int/CGHQ/CAAT/SFA_Collaboration_Site/default.aspx 

18 




As a result, Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) must properly select personnel to 

ensure each individual possesses the required knowledge, skills, and temperament 

required to work closely with ANSF and ASI personnel. Experience suggests that the 

following characteristics significantly enhance an advisor’s ability to adapt and thrive in 

a foreign culture: 

a) Rank, age, and technical expertise. 

b) Empathy, flexibility, and perceptiveness. 

c) Open-mindedness and tolerance for ambiguity; ability to withhold judgment 

and set realistic goals and tasks. 

d) Ability to motivate oneself and others, and a strong sense of self-reliance. 

e) Tolerance for cultural differences, ability to accept and learn from failure, and a 

sense of humor. 

f) The ability to work in a transactional environment. 

g) Patience and knowing when it is right to step away. 

h) Cultural and religious affiliation and understanding. 

3.6 Considerations for the Advisor. Advisors need to be communicators, 

negotiators, and ambassadors. Effective advisors gain their counterparts’ trust and 

then leverage it to influence action. Advisors operating at any level of the ASI or ANSF 

should heed the following consideration and advice: 

a) Networks. Operational success of SFA is directly related to the advisor’s 

knowledge and utilization of established advisor networks (the people). All 

advisors should know and communicate with their counterparts at least two 

levels up, two levels down, and laterally. For example, an advisor to a Corps 

Commander or PCoP should know the advisors to: the General Staff or Deputy 

Minister (2-up); the Corps Support Battalion or District Chief of Police (DCoP) 

(2-down); and the Regional Training Centers, Regional Logistics Centers, and 

other Corps/PCoPs (lateral). 

Chapter 3 

Photo: Petty Officer 3rd Class Sean Weir 


19



Networks 

During a visiting senior advisor’s visit to one of the training institutions, an ANSF 

Commander provided a list of desired classroom equipment and supplies. The 

senior advisor replied, “Those are a lot of items required for a classroom. Have 

you submitted a MOD-14” The Commander provided the senior advisor a long 

answer explaining the challenges with the MOD-14 process. The senior advisor 

replied, “Yes, I agree the process is lengthy, but please correct me if I’m wrong: 

that’s the process to request the items on your list.” Responding to another long 

explanation, the senior advisor explained, “I can assist you in tracking the process 

of your MOD-14 request, but I need to know who you sent it to.” The Commander 

provided the senior advisor the name of the point of contact who received his 

MOD-14 request. Unfortunately, it was the wrong person. 

Lessons Learned: Advisors can use the advisor network to understand who the 

correct point of contact is for the Afghans to resolve their own problems. Using 

the advisor network to ensure the Afghans use the proper process will ensure 

long-term sustainability of the ANSF. Providing assistance to ensure the process 

works provides longer-term benefits and shifts reliance away from the Coalition 

to Afghan systems. 

b) Partnership. Unilateral or even Coalition-led missions are no longer an ISAF/ 

RS mandate. Everything advisors do must be fully integrated and Afghan-led. 

Advisors assist their counterpart in developing ways to overcome obstacles 

and accomplish difficult tasks by making suggestions and recommendations, 

but the mission now must be initiated by Afghans. An indicator of an effective 

advisory effort is the amount of personal ownership the Afghans take in their own 

operations and duties. 

c) Empathy. Empathy can be defined as identifying and understanding another’s 

situation, feelings, and motives. This understanding requires getting to know 

people and the broader culture in which they operate as well as the history of the 

community/communities of which they are a part. 

d) Limitations. Much like empathy, advisors need to understand the limitations 

of their Afghan counterparts. While it is beyond the scope of this guide to describe 

all the limiting factors that may challenge an advisor, a few to consider are: many 

Afghans may struggle with literacy; almost three-and-a-half decades of conflict 

have eroded the trust of many ethnic, tribal, and religious groups in one another 

and in the Afghan government; and patronage and corruption are cultural norms. 

e) Relationships. 

Developing a solid 

relationship based on 

mutual trust and respect 

significantly increases 

the ability of advisors 

to influence their 

counterparts as well as 

to overcome difficult 

periods. Resources and 

expertise will not take the 

place of a personal and 

professional relationship. 

Photo: Sgt. Jessica Ostroska 

20 




Relationships 

An ANA Corps Commander expressed his concerns and challenges during a meeting 

with other ANA senior leaders. Following his comments, he turns to his senior 

advisor and said, “You are my doctor and I’m your patient. I need your help to 

address my concerns and challenges, like a sickness.” The senior advisor replied, “I 

see things a little differently. I see you as the Doctor, your concerns and challenges 

are your patients, and I am your nurse. I am here to assist you, not perform the 

surgery.” 

Lessons Learned: The primary role of the advisor is to assist in the development 

of the ANSF. The advisor’s role is not to solve the problems for the Afghan, 

but to facilitate the development of the Afghans to solve their own problems. 

Advisors need to build a relationship with Afghan leaders and encourage them 

to solve their own problems. 

f) Humility. People who benefit from assistance sometimes feel defensive. In 

accepting assistance, they are, in a sense, admitting their own shortcomings. 

Advisors should not expect gratitude but should instead take satisfaction in the 

progress they make, even as progress tends to occur slowly and is difficult to track 

on a day-to-day basis. 

g) Expertise. Professional competence is critical to personal credibility. Advisors 

do not command Afghan organizations; instead, they provide advice, training, 

and access to Coalition support as needed. Without a high degree of credibility, 

advice is likely to be disregarded. Demonstrated professional competence in 

one area leads to a presumption or expectation of competence in others. That 

said, advisors must be careful not to overstate the applicability of their particular 

expertise; if they do, they will risk losing their hard-earned credibility. 

h) Uncertainty. Advisors must be comfortable operating with little supervision 

and dealing with complex ethical dilemmas. Advisors need to be capable of 

balancing rapport and mission accomplishment with the urge to enforce every 

rule and/or tenet. Dealing with a dishonest counterpart is a prime example of this 

challenge. While Coalition advisors may find corruption abnormal, they must 

assess the impact of improper actions on mission accomplishment. 

i) Rank. Afghan counterparts who 

are senior in grade should be treated 

accordingly. Advisors should refer to 

such individuals by their rank and show 

appropriate respect and deference. While 

Afghan officers have no command authority 

over advisors (nor advisors over their 

Afghan counterpart), effectiveness is greatly 

enhanced when advisors show respect for 

their counterparts and the Afghan chain of 

Photo: Sgt. Kathryn Summerhill 

command. 

j) Expectation Management. As Coalition forces draw down, access to past 

resources and enablers will decrease. Advisors must manage their Afghan 

counterparts’ expectations with respect to resource availability. Another aspect to 

that is communication between advisors. Top down, bottom up, and lateral 

communication are all pivotal to advising the ANSF. Without it there is a risk that 

Afghan partners are left with different perceptions from different advisors, 

Chapter 3 


21



possibly jeopardizing the individual advisor in his or her mission. Advisors, as well 

as other Coalition partners or SMEs who infrequently engage with Afghan partners, 

need to understand this. Miscommunication among advisors and SMEs can create 

different expectations among their Afghan counterparts, and eventually cause 

significant damage to the mission. Prior coordination and planning between 

advising entities can alleviate these problems. 

Expectation management 

During a routine visit to his ANA counterpart(s), an advisor notices a baseline 

shift in their attitude. His Afghan counterparts display noticeable frustration 

and act distant. The advisor asks his linguist to assess the situation. The linguist 

pries information from the soldiers and reports to the advisor, “…according to the 

soldiers, your friends came over and told all the brigades to come to the contracted 

facility directly if they need immediate support.” The frustration stems from the inability 

to follow the processes that work for the ANA. The CF contractors allowed 

the units to circumvent the supporting unit and utilize the contracted facility 

directly vice going through the procedure in accordance with the ANA system. 

Lessons Learned: Conflicting guidance from two CF advisors degrades advising 

objectives and relationships. A keen knowledge of ANA procedures and the 

advisor mission must be grasped and relayed to all CF agencies; the inability 

to understand mission objectives regresses advising efforts. Because missions 

for every advisor team overlap from time to time, it is vital to communicate 

laterally through the ANA and CF advisor chain. It is critical that an advisor is 

able to send his counterpart clear and concise training objectives. As soon as 

someone steps out of their lane to advise a different counterpart, that message 

gets confusing and often contradictory. Communicate with fellow advisors, 

make a plan, and jointly approach your Afghan counterpart to ensure he/she 

receives clear guidance. 

k) Negotiations and Conflict Resolution. The study, development, and honing of 

negotiation skills is critical to advisors. Cross-cultural negotiation brings with it a 

series of unique challenges, such as language and behavior barriers, and unfamiliar 

conflict resolution mechanisms. Cultural differences will complicate negotiations 

with Afghan counterparts. 

l) Working with Interpreters. Interpreters are a critical link between advisors and 

their counterparts. Consider the following when advising through an interpreter: 

1) Try to use two-man interpreter teams to provide a thorough understanding of 

the conversation. 

2) Prepare interpreters for technical terms. They must know the relevant subject 

areas and translate advisors’ meaning as well as their words. 

3) Establish rapport with interpreters through personal contact. Learn their 

background and show genuine concern for their families, aspirations, and 

education. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter, communication will be 

damaged. 

4) Prepare interpreters for specific meetings. Tell them in advance what you 

are going to discuss with your Afghan counterpart to allow them to confirm 

technical terms and your intent. 

5) Double-check that interpreters understand. Some may attempt to save face by 

concealing their lack of understanding. 

22 




6) Avoid looking at interpreters during discussions; remain focused on your 

counterpart. 

7) Use small, logical, translatable segments while communicating. 

8) Instruct interpreters to never hold back anything the source says. Selective 

interpreting, regardless of how insignificant interpreters may find it, will 

adversely affect the conversation and potentially the mission. 

9) When planning meetings or communications, allow additional time for 

interpreters to do their job. A 10-minute conversation may take up to 30 

minutes, depending on the interpreter’s ability. 

Chapter 3 

Photo: Lance Cpl. Darien Bjorndal 

m) Solutions. Encourage Afghan partners to develop solutions to Afghanspecific 

problems. Just because the Coalition solution works well for the advisor’s 

country, does not mean it will work for the Afghans. Solutions must be Afghanachievable 

and sustainable well beyond the Coalition’s presence in the advisory 

role. Advisors must ensure their counterparts seek Afghan solutions for Afghan 

problems. Successive questioning and probing by the advisor until the counterpart 

arrives at a solution is the best methodology. 

Afghan Solutions for Afghan Problems 

During the planning phase for a training event, an ANA Corps logistics planner 

asked the senior advisor, “Can you assist us with MREs (Class I)” The senior 

advisor replied, “I do not have MREs and our process to request culturally appropriate 

MREs is very lengthy. I know the ANA has a process that works and is 

designed to support these types of training activities.” The Corps logistics planner 

replied, “I know, but I thought you could help me get them faster.” 

Lessons Learned: The ANSF needs to learn to be self-reliant and not look 

to advisors and the international community to provide solutions to all their 

problems. To do this, they need to use their own systems and processes. This 

achieves two goals: first, it forces their systems to work, and, secondly, it builds 

confidence in their systems. Afghans must learn to be self-sufficient and use 

their own resources rather than rely on Coalition solutions. 

n) Continuity. The relationship between the advisor, counterpart, and interpreter 

will develop over time. Remember, the friction involved with developing this 


23



bond can be quite normal, but friction can be mitigated by actions such as 

formally capturing lessons learned in a continuity book or similar document to 

improve the transition between advisors. These lessons are critical in the handover 

process to facilitate successors’ relationships with their counterparts. 

o) Problems or issues must be Afghan owned before advisers put any effort in 

enabling ANSF to solve the problem. If advisors identify problems that the ANSF 

do not regard as problems, the issue is not likely to be Afghan owned and will 

therefore not be resolved in due time. 

p) Target audience. Know the (human) environment you are operating in. 

Understand the context of the group dynamic—either that of experienced 

personnel or trainees—whether NCOs, enlisted personnel, officers, civilians, or 

police. 

q) Be inquisitive. Ask probing/shaping questions; open-ended questions can 

often drive counterparts toward Afghan solutions. 

3.7 Afghan Culture and Communication. Understanding the Afghan population 

and culture assists in building rapport and ultimately in accomplishing the mission. 

This section discusses three aspects of the sociocultural environment: society, culture, 

and communications. 

a) Society. People who share 

a common culture, occupy 

a common territory, and are 

subject to the same political 

authority can be identified as a 

society. Societies are not easily 

created or destroyed, nor are 

they homogeneous or static. A 

society usually has a dominant 

culture but can also have 

many secondary cultures, each 

influencing the others. 

b) Culture. Culture influences 

an individual’s range of action 

and ideas, including what to do 

and not do, how to do or not do 

Photo: Cpl. James Clark 

it, and whom to do it with or 

not to do it with. Culture is shaped by history, language, religion, and customs. 

Members of society use these shared beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors to 

cope with their world and with one another. 

c) Communication. Communication is determined by culture; it can be 

either high context or low context. Most NATO and TCNs are high-context 

communicators that emphasize clearly by stating issues and problems and 

working towards resolving them in a straightforward manner. Most Afghans 

are low-context communicators who place a premium on building relationships 

through actions and less on words. 

d) Skills. Advisors require both awareness and knowledge to be effective crosscultural 

communicators. 

1) Awareness is the act of being sensitive to differences. Carefully observing 

actions and reactions can help advisors adjust behavior and modify actions to 

24 




achieve greater influence with counterparts. 

2) Knowledge of the nuances of a specific culture is the next level of crosscultural 

capability. Advisors attain this level through study and immersion. 

Such knowledge is inherently area specific. Developing in-depth regional 

knowledge necessary for effective cross-cultural communications requires 

extensive, time-consuming study. 

3.8 Influence. The vital element for success will be the ability of the FBSFA advisor to 

understand the precepts of advising. 

a) The most important aspect of advising is the degree of influence an advisor 

is able to cultivate with his ANSF counterpart. The more able the advisor is to 

influence his counterpart, the more effective he will be. Influence can be broken 

down into the components of rapport, credibility, and the perceived value that 

an advisor brings to his counterpart. Credibility is gained over time by following 

through on promises, conducting missions alongside counterparts, and adhering 

to standards. Value is equal to all assets that an advisor can bring to bear. It 

includes his personal 

and team knowledge 

and capabilities, access 

to resources, and ability 

to provide lethal and 

non-lethal Coalition 

effects. Culture and 

the operational area 

are the conditions 

under which advisor 

teams must apply the 

influence equation to 

achieve mission success. 

The following sections 

discuss the elements 

of influence and the 

factors that affect 

the FBSFA advisory 

mission. 

Figure 3.2 The Influence Equation 

3.9 Rapport. Rapport is a relationship between people that is based on mutual 

understanding, respect, and trust. Numerous sources dealing with security force 

assistance, often as part of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, emphasize the 

importance for advisors to develop strong positive rapport with their counterparts. 

Effective rapport will allow advisors to more successfully complete their missions. The 

advisor must be able to influence his counterpart to follow a particular course of action 

or behavior pattern. Since the advisor is not in his counterpart’s chain of command, 

he cannot simply order any specific action; rather, he needs the counterpart to follow 

the desired course (which should be an Afghan course) of action by working toward 

a commonly developed goal. The measure of effective rapport is whether the advisor 

can influence his counterpart to take the desired action. The advisor can only hope 

to achieve this through regular face-to-face interactions with the ANSF counterpart. 

Level 1 advising, as defined in Chapter 1, is predicated on this degree of contact. 

a) Understanding. The first component of rapport is understanding, which 

for the advisor begins prior to deployment and may include host-nation 

cultural studies; personality profiles; language training; and ANSF military 

Chapter 3 


25



equipment, doctrine, 

and processes training. 

Once in country he/she 

continues to broaden 

his/her understanding 

by observing and asking 

questions. During an 

effective transition the 

incoming commander 

must pay particular 

attention to the methods 

and relationships his/her 

Photo: Pfc. Dixie Rae Liwanag 

predecessor has developed; predecessor and replacement must seem as one. Since 

all the components of rapport are two-way streets, the advisor must be able and 

willing to share things about his/her culture, language, military experience, and 

personal insights. Practically speaking, interpreters can offer valuable informal 

insights into local customs and mores. Interpreters can be approached more 

informally than counterparts, especially if the counterparts are of significantly 

higher rank. It is important to remember that, in order to be maximally effective, 

personal rapport may—and probably will—require the advisor to establish an 

intimate level of understanding with his counterpart. This will require the advisor 

to get to know his counterpart at a deeper, more personal level than soldiers are 

sometimes used to in a short amount of time. 

b) Respect. Respect is the next step in the rapport process. The advisor can 

start by giving his counterpart a basis to respect him. The counterpart should 

grow to respect who the advisor is (his character), what he/she knows, and 

how he performs. The counterpart will generally follow suit. In any case, the 

advisor should begin to look for those things that he respects in his counterpart. 

Sometimes this is easy, but more often it’s a challenge. The counterpart probably 

will not fit the mold of Coalition officers. He may not have formal military 

training or education; he may even be illiterate. His uniform standards may 

not be the same as the advisor’s. Start with the basics and expand over time. 

The counterpart is probably placing himself, and possibly his family, in mortal 

danger simply by assuming the job he’s in. He may have proven himself as a 

fearless warrior even if he didn’t have formal training. In short, there will be traits 

deserving of respect even before the relationship matures. Mutual respect grows 

through shared experiences and even shared dangers. Advisors should make a 

concerted effort to go through the same demands as their Afghan counterparts, 

this demonstrates commitment to the mission or task at hand and leads to 

respect. The advisor will be on the way to establishing good rapport if he is: 

1) Sincerely interested in his counterpart, his counterpart’s nation, and their 

shared cause. 

2) A competent professional who can help his counterpart achieve his goals, 

therefore demonstrating that the advisor can add VALUE. 

c) Trust. Trust grows only over time and is based on understanding and respect. 

Building trust needs to begin on day one, but it will not mature until later in the 

relationship. The advisor should begin by showing he is reliable. Regardless of 

local customs, the advisor should do everything that he says he will do. He should 

be where he is supposed to be, and be there on time. Always under-promise and 

over-deliver. 

26 




d) Rapport Considerations 

1) Language. In an ideal world, advisors would be able to converse in the local 

dialect of their counterpart. Speaking Dari or Pashtu reasonably well for most 

military and social situations is the next best option. If language proficiency is 

not an option, learn to work with an interpreter. Even in this case, it is helpful 

to learn enough of the language to know “Meet, Greet, and Eat” phrases. 

Initially, this small gesture will work wonders in generating positive rapport 

with the ANSF counterpart. As a minimum, the advisor should attempt to 

learn the counterpart’s language over time; this will generally be a well-received 

gesture of respect. 

2) Local customs. Respecting local customs goes a long way in building 

effective rapport. In virtually every culture, refusing extended invitations 

is viewed as a slight. This is extreme in some cultures. The advisor must be 

prepared to accept all forms of hospitality except the most extreme. Eating 

local food, unless there is a documented medical threat, should be the order 

of the day. Participating in cultural ceremonies also helps build rapport. At 

some point, however, there is a level of activity where it is necessary to draw 

the line. The advisor must be prepared to deal tactfully with issues that are out 

of bounds. 

3) Modified uniform When authorized by higher headquarters, modified 

uniform may enhance rapport. This may take shape in the simplest measure 

by allowing advisors or personnel to wear bi-lingual name tapes or rank. 

Sometimes local scarves or unit insignia can be used to augment uniforms 

without compromising standards. This may also aid in recognizing friendly 

personnel in environments where personnel from multi-national coalitions, 

including civilians, all 

operate in the same battle 

space. For advisors to 

conventional ANSF units, 

however, the counterpart 

will usually expect the 

advisor to adhere to 

his unit’s standards. 

Maintaining high uniform 

and appearance standards 

will establish a level of 

expectation in respect to 

other standards as well, e.g., 

training, maintenance, etc. 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Vito Bryant 

4) Building rapport has its limits. Some academics claim that one must “go 

native” to truly understand the host nation and its challenges. In the military, 

it is appropriate to assume some of the customs of the ANSF to be effective. 

In fact, advisors close to their counterparts can often provide headquarters 

with valuable insights into how things look from a grass-roots level. However, 

once the advisor begins to pursue the ANSF agenda to the detriment of the 

Coalition campaign plan, he has effectively “stepped over the line.” 

3.10 Insider Threats (IT). Afghanistan has many threats—such as IEDs, indirect 

fire, and small arms fire—but insider threats pose the greatest risk to advisors. Insider 

Threats are the potential for an attack by, or facilitated by, anyone who has a position 

of trust within a combined team of Coalition and Afghan partners. An insider attack 

Chapter 3 


27



occurs when someone in such a position initiates an act of violence against the 

Coalition or their own Afghan member. Advisors must fully understand their country’s 

national Insider Threat counter-measures and those of any other Coalition troops with 

whom they work. This section covers the key functions for countering Insider Threats. 

a) The greatest protection against Insider Threat attacks is to build rapport and 

maintain close relationships with our Afghan partners. 

b) A comprehensive review of the Insider Threat and its corresponding 

countermeasures can be found in the ISAF Insider Threat Handbook 2.0, 

which is located on the ISAF Secret Portal. 3 

Proactive 

Reactive 

Level Prepare Deter Detect Respond Recover & Exploit 

Strategic 

- Set counter-measure 

requirements 

- Set force protection 

(FP) & arming policies 

- Conduct Strategic 

Communications 

(STRATCOM) 

- Conduct 

STRATCOM 

- Investigate 

- Report 

- Conduct reactive 

STRATCOM 

- Investigate 

- Warn & report 

- Manage consequences 

- Conduct STRAT- 

COM 

- Exploit lessons 

Operational 

- Apply FP & arming 

policies 

- Set SOPs 

- Engage at senior 

ANSF level 

- Learn lessons 

- Investigate 

- Conduct 

information 

operations 

- Investigate 

- Conduct vetting 

& screening of CT 

personnel 

- Report 

- Warn & report - Investigate 



- Conduct info ops 


Tactical 

Pre-Deployment: - Adopt FP & 

arming policies; 

- Practice TTPs look the part 

- Conduct cultural - Pairs minimum 

training 

- Build & maintain 

rapport 

- Conduct 

close-quarter marksmanship 

training - Enforce access 

procedures 

- Conduct threat 

awareness training - Challenge 

Deployed: 

- Communicate 

- Assess threat & risk 

- Plan each operation 

- Rehearse 

- Learn lessons 

- Recognize adverse 

behavior that is: 

Frequent 

Excessive 

Above/below the 

‘norm’ 

Repetitive 

- React to the presence 

of the abnormal 

or the absence of the 

normal 

- Report 

- Warn 

- Investigate 

- Concentrate 

force rapidly 

- Gain & maintain 

control 

- Contain & 

neutralize the 

threat 


- Conduct a 

joint (with ANSF) 

response 

Recover: 


- Coordinate with 

neighboring units 

- Reinforce morale 

- Resume mission 

Exploit: 

- Investigate 

- Conduct follow-up 

ops 


Figure 3.3: The Counter Insider Threat conceptual functions across the Levels of Conflict 

3.11 Human Rights Violations. All Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) violations 

require attention, but Human Rights Violations (HRVs) and Extra-Judicial Killings 

(EJKs) are particularly important. Individual units, groups, or countries found to 

have committed HRVs or EJKs may be subject to significant sanctions. Examples 

of HRVs include torture; cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment; prolonged and/ 

or clandestine detention without charges or trial; physical or psychological detainee 

3 http://portal.hq.isaf.nato.int/Default.aspx 

28 




abuse; the disappearance 

of persons by abduction; 

rape (politicallymotivated 

or otherwise); 

and other flagrant denials 

of life, liberty, or the 

security of the person. 

Extra-judicial killings 

are defined as deliberate 

killings that lack due 

process of law, and are 

directed, encouraged, or 

committed by a public 

official or security/defense 

force member. Depending on the severity of the HRV or EJK, sanctions can range from 

discipline or criminal prosecution of individuals to withdrawal of financial support for 

specific units or even nations. 

Photo: Pfc. Elizabeth Raney 

Chapter 3 

Extra-Judicial Killing 

During TAA engagements with the regional ANA Corps, the ANA Corps com-mander 

frequently complains that insurgents captured by his soldiers are often released rather 

than prosecuted after they are handed over, due to corruption in the Provincial 

Governor’s office. About a week after this most recent complaint, RS aerial assets 

notice what appears to be a group of five ANA soldiers, wearing the local Corps 

insignia, in an isolated field beating two men with sticks and heavy wires. One of the 

men collapses as he is beaten repeatedly, and then stops moving. He is still lying on the 

ground motionless as the ANA soldiers depart the scene; he appears to be dead. 

Lessons Learned: Due to frustrations with the formal justice system, Afghan security 

forces sometimes commit human rights abuses and extra-judicial kill-ings with the 

direct or tacit support of their senior leadership. Advisors should always promptly 

report knowledge of such abuses or killings. Key leader engage-ments (KLEs) are an 

important tool for reminding Afghan partners of the im-portance of respecting 

human rights standards, and that such respect is essential to a well-disciplined, 

professional force. Furthermore, they should report the alleged corruption in the 

governor’s office via their own chain of command. 

a) Advisors are postured to professionalize Afghan security and defense forces. It 

is important for GIRoA and ANSF officials to abide by internationally recognized 

human rights standards. Failure to do so will adversely impact Afghanistan’s 

relationships with its international partners, and it may jeopardize opportunities 

for training and funding in accordance with U.S. and other International laws. 

Many nations are prohibited by their own laws from providing military assistance 

to foreign military units or governments that engage in a consistent pattern of 

gross violations of human rights. 

b) All advisors assigned to ISAF/RS are subject to LOAC at all times. LOAC 

includes that part of international law regulating the conduct of hostilities, and 

is built upon four principles: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and 

limitation of unnecessary suffering. LOAC imposes an obligation not to commit 

human rights violations and to report suspected violations through the chain of 

command. 


29



c) As one of COMISAF’s Critical Information Requirements (CIR) and a legal 

obligation of LOAC, advisors are required to report suspected HRV in the 

following manner: 

1) When aware of a possible HRV, gather information describing the incident; 

and, 

2) Immediately report that information to the your commander or intelligence 

operations officer. Incident description should include: who (alleged 

perpetrator), which unit, what, where, when, why, how, witnesses, and other 

pertinent information (context). 

3.12 Corruption. Corruption across Afghanistan’s public and private sectors 

represents a threat to the success of ISAF’s/RS’s mission and the legitimacy of the 

Afghan government. It serves as a barrier to Afghanistan’s economic growth by 

robbing the state of revenue and preventing the development of a stable economy. 

Corruption also threatens the process of transition, as institutions weakened by 

corruption are less able to take over responsibility for security and governance. 

a) Corruption, defined by the World Bank as the abuse of public office for private 

gain, undermines the effectiveness of Afghanistan’s government and security 

forces, allows criminal networks to fill power vacuums left by weak governance, 

fuels discontent among the population, and contributes to both active and passive 

support for the insurgency. The impact of corruption includes an increased risk 

of state failure, increased support to the insurgency, decreased support from the 

International Community, and increased negative Afghan views of GIRoA. 

b) ISAF/RS’s Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) (EF 2) mission 

is to support Afghanistan’s development of the security ministries (MoD and 

MoI), which must be viewed as legitimate and credible government institutions to 

set the conditions for self-regulating oversight of the ASI and ANSF. COMISAF 

has three desired effects for the TAO mission across the theater: protecting 

international donor funds while ensuring the Coalition does not fuel corruption, 

ensuring transparency and accountability of funding to the ANSF, and combating 

predatory/egregious corruption. 

c) The advisor may observe corruption, such as the abuse of entrusted power 

for personal gain. Corrupt acts could include an Afghan senior leader showing 

favoritism based 

upon family/ 

tribal affiliation 

(nepotism), 

misusing 

government 

property and 

revenue, theft 

of public assets, 

fraud, and bribery. 

Bribery involving 

promotions, 

assignments, 

contracts, or 

training is the 

most prevalent 

type of corruption 

30 




an advisor will encounter. That said, Afghans might also provide advisors 

information about corrupt individuals or activities. 

d) Advisors will not actively investigate corrupt activities; they should instead 

report them through their chain of command. Furthermore, advisors should work 

to ensure Afghan leaders recognize the nature, scope, and corrosive effects of 

corruption; influence Afghan leaders to support transparency and accountability; 

and work closely with Afghan leaders to operate within established procedures to 

restore accountability. These efforts will help combat corrupt behavior and restore 

confidence in key Afghan institutions. 

Chapter 3 

Relationships 

The Ministry of Interior (MoI) Foreign Relations Director (FRD) and his deputy 

approached the senior advisor to the MoI Chief of Staff with an allegation that 

several officers within Recruiting Training Command manipulate candidate lists 

for international training. They allege that several officers assigned to Recruiting 

Training Command, some of whom are Colonels, take bribes from policemen to 

place them on lists for overseas training. They indicated the latest case involved 

upcoming training in South Korea for female police officers. FRD submitted a list 

of 30 approved and vetted names. Recruiting Training Command sent back a list 

that included 16 substitutions. The FRD stated he knows these 16 substitutes are 

poorly performing police officers. He understands these women paid bribe money 

up front and agreed to pay a percentage of their per diem in order to be added to 

the list for training. A previous case involved 18 approved and vetted police officers 

who missed training in Germany because Recruiting Training Command withheld 

their authorization documents for refusing to pay the bribe. The senior advisor 

passed this information to the Commander of the Recruiting Training Command; 

he, in turn, conducted an investigation into the allegations. Eight senior officers 

were removed and severely disciplined. 

Lessons Learned: Advisors cannot be in all places at all times. The importance 

of good relationships, therefore, cannot be overstated. This information could 

not have been obtained had not Afghan Senior Leaders—based on mutual trust 

and respect—provided advisors with incidents of corruption. The advisor network 

was thus able to bring these incidents to the attention of the Commander. 

This singular incident led to identification and punishment for misconduct. 

3.13 Gender and Human Rights. 

a) The Universal Human 

Rights Declaration as well as 

the Afghan Constitution 

acknowledges equal human 

rights of men and women. 

Discrimination based on 

gender or ethnicity must 

therefore not be accepted, and 

the advisor should encourage 

as little segregation between 

men and women as possible. 

Social norms are not constant; 

they can change, and culture 

Photo: Master Sgt. Kap Kim 

and religion should not be allowed as excuses for discrimination. 


31



b) Women, men, boys, and girls shall benefit from the same rights, responsibilities, 

and opportunities. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is a landmark 

resolution dealing with women, peace, and security. This resolution calls 

for greater participation and incorporation of women’s unique perspectives in: 

participation in conflict prevention, peace-building, and reconstruction; 

protec-tion of women’s and girl’s human rights during conflict; and the 

prevention of gender-based violence (GBV). 

c) The Afghan National Action Plan (NAP) developed by Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs on the UNSCR 1325 acknowledges that women have suffered during 

the conflicts and reiterates the importance of full inclusion of women in the 

peace process and reconciliation. It further marks concrete steps in order to 

protect women and vulnerable groups against violence and to take specific 

actions to stabilize the society and prevent outbreaks of violence. 

d) It is important to keep in mind that women 

in Afghanistan were not always 

restricted as today. Prior to Taliban rule, 

Afghan women enjoyed greater amounts 

of freedom and comprised almost half of 

Afghanistan’s workforce. In fact 70% 

of teachers, 50% of civil servants, 

and 40% of physicians were 

women. During this time women freely 

worked in employment 

fields such as engineering, law, 

and medicine. In the 1970s, 

female students outnumbered 

male students in Afghan 

universities, and women in 

Western-style clothes were 

Photo: Senior Airman Courtney Witt 

32 




a common sight in 

the cities. 

e) Gender does not 

equate to women; it 

equates to the social 

roles of men, women, 

boys, and girls in different 

societies. These 

roles, learned through 

socialization, vary 

significantly across the 

world. In Afghanistan 

the current situation is 

very complex; in 

urban areas there are 

progressive men 

and women from all 

ethnicities willing to accept more gender equality than in some of the rural areas. 

The gender roles in Afghan society also differ substantially between different 

ethnicities across the country. A set of proper gender analyses is therefore 

needed to understand the local variations. 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Dave Overson 

f) Although women, especially in remote areas, suffer negative consequences 

during the current armed conflict due to their disadvantaged positions, the 

Taliban abuses are not only limited to women. Thousands of men have been 

taken prisoners, arbitrary detained, tortured, and many have been killed or have 

disap-peared. These human rights violations are also gender related; men are 

suffering from these violations, which must be properly analyzed and addressed. 

g) Gender integration in the ANSF is not a stand-alone goal, but is part of the 

overall effort to advance a stabilized Afghan society. Participation of women in 

the security forces is crucial for a sustainable and stabilized society. Women are, 

for instance, needed in the police for searches and investigations of women. 

Women in Afghanistan are more willing to report abuse and criminal cases to 

women in the police than to men in the police. It is important to keep in mind 

that women’s empowerment and integration in the Afghan security forces often 

requires male buy in, so convincing also Afghan men to accept gender integration 

is imperative. 

h) Gender Advisors have been introduced to support integration of a gender 

perspective in operations. This has both an internal and an external component. 

Internally, commanders and staff, both in Resolute Support and in ASI/ANSF, 

need to conduct gender analyses and integrate gender perspectives in their strategies, 

plans, and procedures, to meet the different needs, experiences, and 

concerns of local women and men in their area of operations. Externally, they 

need to take into account how their operations, actions, and activities can have 

different impact on men, women, boys, and girls. They also need to interact with 

the entire population, not only male leaders. Deliberately engaging female Key 

Leaders and female leaders in Afghanistan will assure that women’s voices are 

heard and it will make these women more influential and empowered. Male buyin 

on gender equality and integration within the ANSF is also a necessity. 

Advising male Afghan leaders in the ANSF about the need to integration women 

in the securi-ty sector is therefore imperative. The ANSF have introduced gender 

advisors at different levels in their chain of command as well. 

Chapter 3 


33



Gender integration is a part of many advisors responsibility 

An advisor from ISAF on logistics got involved in the process of providing new uniforms. 

Women in the ANA and ANP have for a long time complained about problems 

of getting uniforms that are customized for women and boots/shoes in small sizes. 

Uniforms and equipment are often tailored in men’s sizes and profiles and does not fit 

the women. A gender advisor in ISAF read about the process of providing new 

uniforms in an internal report and asked if the advisor on logistics had remembered to 

include female uniforms and boots in the requirements. The advisor was not aware of 

the prob-lem with female uniforms, but got back to the Afghan authorities and asked 

if female uniforms and boots were included. They confirmed it was. 

Lessons Learned: Advisors in all functions need to be aware of gender related 

topics in their essential function. Gender is a cross-cutting issue that implies many 

areas and levels. By sharing information between the gender advisor and the logistic 

advi-sor ISAF was in this case able to verify that women’s requirements would be 

met. 

3.14 Children and armed conflict. The Government of the Islamic state of Afghanistan 

is one of the parties on the UN Secretary-General’s list of shame on Children 

and Armed Conflict by May 2014. The government has signed an Action Plan on 

Under-Age Recruitment in the ANSF and also a detailed Road Map to Compliance, 

with milestones to fulfill the Action Plan. Advisors must be aware of the Children 

and Armed Conflict (CAAC) implications in Afghanistan, which include; killing and 

maiming of children, recruitment and use of children (both by ANSF and 

insurgents), attacks on schools and hospitals, sexual violence against children and 

abduction of children. If they observe violations on children’s rights they need to 

report 

this through their chain of command. The UN has 

the UN Country Task Force from UNAMA and 

UNICEF that will follow up with further investigations 

when they receive notifications from 

ISAF or other parties. The Afghan police are 

also supposed to conduct investigations if 

violations on children’s rights are brought 

to their attention. 


34 




Chapter 4 


Chapter 4 






CHAPTER 4 

Operational Environment 

“An in-depth understanding of the operational environment—including available foreign 

security forces, opposing threat, and civil considerations—is critical to planning and 

conducting effective SFA.” 1 

4.1 Overview. An in-depth understanding of the operational environment is critical to 

ISAF/RS’s and the individual advisor’s ability to successfully plan and conduct SFA operations. 

The operational environment in Afghanistan is particularly fluid and complex. 

The Coalition previously had authorities and permissions derived from the NATO agreement 

that enabled ISAF to conduct military led operations in Afghanistan. RS signifies 

the subordination of the Coalition military mission to Afghan civil authority. ISAF/RS 

forces are guests of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). 

4.2 Strategic Partnership. ISAF/RS forces manifest the International Community’s 

Strategic Partnership with GIRoA. The elements of strategic partnership include mutual 

respect, common goals, effective communications, and trust. Any partnership is based 

on interests of the parties involved. GIRoA’s interests are met through the provision of 

FBSFA, cooperation of regional partners and resources to ensure their sovereignty. Coalition 

interests include preventing terrorist organizations from operating in Afghanistan, 

freedom of movement, force protection, resource transparency and accountability. 

4.3 GIRoA Political Transition. The people of Afghanistan demonstrated their will 

during the April 2014 elections and June 2014 run-off election. The significance of this 

action and the associated successful security environment provided by the ANSF cannot 

be under-stated. The election and peaceful transfer of power indicates GIRoA’s capability 

to endure with the consent of the people. 

4.4 General. Many factors contribute to the complexity of the Afghan operating environment, 

beginning with the country itself, its terrain, its population, and other significant 

actors. The combination of a harsh climate, physical environment, abject poverty, 

illiteracy, poor health, and educations systems, underdeveloped national economy, 

unemployment, corruption, porous borders, organized crime, and a narcotics industry 

have engendered and allowed the insurgency to endure. 

a) Terrain. Terrain is a critical consideration while planning to conduct FBSFA. 

Advisors and their respective headquarters must be cautious to include all variables 

into the planning process or risk sending inadequately prepared teams into 

inhospitable areas. Some major considerations about the 

terrain (in rural areas) include level of support from GI- 

RoA and ANSF headquarters, austere road networks, 

and the local economy. 

b) Population. Advisor interaction with 

the population, while decreasing in 

frequency, is growing increasingly 

complex. In many COIN 

campaigns, the population 

has proven to be the center 

of gravity for security forces. 

Chapter 4 

1 FM 3.07-01, Chapter 2, p. 2-1, dated 01 May 2009. 


Photo: Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane 

35



This dynamic is no different in Afghanistan. The local populace is often caught 

between insurgents and ANSF/CF efforts. Advisors must dedicate time to understand 

the population. They must learn key details concerning ANSF interaction in 

their local environment. Understanding the local culture and history will increase 

advisor effectiveness. 

c) Actors. In addition to the physical characteristics of the country and its people, 

a number of other actors influence and shape the operating environment. For 

example the district political, tribal, and religious leaders are crucial. Complex 

variables (i.e., networks) represented by these personalities demand a nuanced 

understanding by commanders and advisors at all levels. Actors include the ASI 

and ANSF, as well as other influential members of the Afghan community who 

represent various local interests. A profound understanding of the actors in a certain 

region will take time and a thorough hand over – take over is vital to speed 

up this process. 

4.5 ISAF/RS SFA Actors. (See Chapter 6 for more details.) ISAF/RS, through the 

strategic partnership of GIRoA, conducts SFA to enable ASI/ANSF to neutralize the 

insurgency and terrorist networks to affect security and political transition. ISAF’s 

mission will officially conclude on 31 December 2014. For the remainder of 2014 ISAF 

will continue to provide support to the ANSF as it prepares and postures the force for a 

smooth transition to the TAACs that will be supporting RS. CF advisors will focus on 

addressing the ANSF capability gaps previously identified. 

a) Troop Reduction. It is worth noting that the period from now until the end of 

2014 will be characterized by ISAF reducing troop numbers and by ANSF acting 

increasingly autonomously. As the Coalition reduces its footprint and focuses on 

the higher-level processes that sustain the ANSF, advisors at critical nodes within 

the corps and police HQs will become important Coalition links to the regions, 

provinces, and districts. ISAF will maintain situational awareness of the security 

and governance progress outside the Kabul cluster through regional-level Operation 

Coordination Centers (OCCs). OCCs are a major focus in the employment 

of advisors. As CF conducts redeployment 

and retrograde operations, successful execution 

of lead security responsibility by the 

ANSF is paramount. 

b) Security Transition. The ISAF mission 

(and by extention the RS Mission 

as well) is at a critical stage. 

Photo: Spc. Ryan Green 

36 




Unified NATO action to support the development of the ANSF’s capacity and 

capability is essential to the process of security transition. The effective conduct 

of SFA activities is, therefore, central to the campaign plan. Following the elections 

of June ‘14, ISAF will continue to provide SFA at the ANA Corps and ANP 

regional levels, up to and including ministerial level. At the corps and regional 

level, ISAF/RS will focus on the functional areas that allow ANA and ANP to 

develop sustainable command and control, leadership, combined arms integration 

(for the ANA) and integrated layered security (for the ANP) capabilities, training 

and sustainment. At the ministerial level, one of the main priorities will be on 

Essential Function 1 (i.e., planning, programming, budgeting, and execution). All 

EF’s include the processes, systems, and institutions required to sustain the army 

and police forces. ISAF/RS will also focus on the development of the Afghan Air 

Force (AAF). 

4.6 Other Significant Actors. Afghanistan continues to face a considerable threat 

from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist networks. Al-Qaida maintains a 

limited presence in some remote areas of eastern Afghanistan, while groups like the 

Haqqani Network (HQN) remain potent forces with the ability to conduct high profile 

attacks (HPAs), directed at GIRoA, ANSF and CF targets. The Taliban is expected to 

continue to contest GIRoA control over some sparsely populated areas, particularly in 

the south and east, along highway 1 and other main insurgent facilitation routs. 

4.7 Status of Extremist / Terrorist Networks. A number of terror and foreign 

militant groups maintain sanctuary in Afghanistan, some with transnational reach, 

such as AQ and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Others are regionally-focused, including the 

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the 

HQN. HQN maintains areas of political and military influence in Paktika, Paktiya, and 

Khost provinces, and has a significant number of cells in Logar and Wardak where they 

actively plan HPAs against the capital region. While TTP remains a viable threat, they 

remain focused on targeting the Pakistani government. 

4.8 Status of the Insurgency. In recent years, the Taliban have focused on five lines 

of effort: increase violence, weaken the ANSF, limit ANSF/ISAF freedom of movement 

(FOM), conduct media-garnering attacks, and promote insecurity through propaganda 

and influence. The Taliban’s inability to defeat the ANSF has resulted in the insurgents 

shifting attacks to isolated locations and limited many insurgent efforts to maintaining 

existing support areas. 

a) Increase Violence. The 2013 fighting season was the first with ANSF in the 

lead, and security forces 

succeeded in implementing 

layered security and limiting 

violence in and around 

key population centers. 

The ANA and ANP are 

demonstrating the ability 

to hold key and decisive 

terrain. Despite localized 

increases in violence 

and persistent insurgent 

influence in portions of 

Afghanistan the violence 

level in 2014 is well below 

2013. Photo: Pfc. Dixie Rae Liwanag 

Chapter 4 


37



b) Weaken the ANSF. The insurgency has been unsuccessful in weakening the 

ANSF. In addition to kinetic attacks, the Taliban have sought to weaken the ANSF 

through outreach efforts designed to recruit or corrupt officials. The degree of 

insurgent success in these efforts remains unclear. 

c) Limit ANSF/ISAF/RS Freedom of Movement (FOM). The insurgents view 

limiting ISAF/RS and ANSF FOM as critical to achieving their objectives. The 

IED attacks along Highway 1 in the east and the south have so far failed to have 

enduring impacts on FOM for military or civilian traffic, but are disruptive and 

create the perception of insecurity. 

d) Conduct Media-Garnering Events. The insurgents continue to conduct high 

profile attacks against influential individuals, population centers, and remote 

outposts to garner media attention. Insurgent offensive operations and propaganda 

portray insurgents as disproportionately capable, and enhance perceptions 

of insecurity. HPAs, assassinations, kidnappings, and intimidation of influential 

GIRoA officials will continue to be insurgent methodologies. Increasingly, these 

attacks are also focusing on Western civilians such as journalists and NGO employees. 

e) Promote Insecurity Through Propaganda and Influence. The Taliban’s propaganda 

apparatus has struggled to counter the fact the ANSF are in the lead for 

security. The Taliban only holds influence in limited areas and have attempted to 

gain popular support by providing select government services, primarily criminal 

justice and dispute resolution. Despite some level of Afghan citizens “acceptance 

of Taliban justice,” the majority of Afghans continue to hold a negative view of the 

insurgency and do not want the Taliban to return to power. 

4.9 Status of Criminal Networks. The convergence of insurgent, terrorist, and 

criminal networks is pervasive and constitutes a real threat to Afghanistan’s stability. 

Revenue from opium trafficking continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan 

criminal networks. Additionally, some areas of Afghanistan have seen a recent increase 

in extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks. Expanding criminal networks 

undercut security and governance gains. Criminal networks, insurgent groups, 

and corrupt government officials are often interlinked via multi-layered connections, 

making ties between officials and criminal activity unclear. These factors all contribute 

to popular dissatisfaction with the government and create opportunities for the 

insurgency. 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Joshua Brandenburg 

38 




4.10 Women in the ASI/ANSF. 

a) Women are needed 

in the ASI/ANSF to 

provide security to 

the 53% of the Afghan 

population that are 

women. Women are 

required for searches, 

as experienced in the 

2014 elections, but 

there are numerous 

other tasks in the security 

forces for which 

women are needed. In 

Afghanistan’s gender-segregated 

society, 

women serving in the 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Christopher Harper 

ASI/ANSF are crucial 

in fulfilling the security needs of the entire population. Women in Afghanistan 

feel more confident raising their security concerns to females in the security 

forces than to men. The MoD and MoI have announced ambitious strategies to 

include 10% women in the ANA and ANP in a long term perspective. Howev-er, 

women in the ASI/ANSF face many challenges in their work environment. 

Harassment and sexual abuse offences within the ASI/ANSF are rarely brought 

forward for prosecution or disciplinary action. If complaints are reported, women 

in the ANSF are often persuaded to accept mitigation to settle the cases. Other 

challenges ISAF observes include: 

1) Lack of commitment to fulfill strategies to recruit women, 

2) Lack of female facilities like bathrooms, changing rooms, and child care 

centers, 

3) Lack of uniforms, boots, and equipment that fit women, 

4) Training women by the same standards as men are trained, 

5) Jobs according to qualifications (policewomen are often observed in police 

stations making tea and cleaning instead of performing proper policing 

tasks), and 

6) Promotions on equal terms as men; women are not promoted to decision-making 

positions and are kept serving longer in ranks than men. 

b) For Resolute Support, gender integration has been introduced as a cross 

cutting topic, covering all Essential Functions. Gender Focal Points (GFP), a 

dual-hatted position supporting the Commander in implementing directives and 

procedures with gender perspective, has been nominated for all the Essential 

Functions (EFs). GFP maintains functional dialogue with the Gender Advisor, 

but reports within the chain of command. Gender-related essential objectives 

exist for all the Essential Functions: 

1) EF 1. Programing Budgeting & Execution. Will advise that ASI/ANSF 

include gender integration and women’s requirements in planning, 

program-ming, budgeting, and execution. 

Chapter 4 


39



2) EF 2 & 3. TAO & RoL. Will advise that ASI/ANSF have law enforcement 

and disciplinary measures in place to address human rights violations, 

includ-ing gender-based violence. 

3) EF 4. Force Generation. Will advise that ASI/ANSF have female billets 

in Tashkil; recruits both civil and military females; train them to the same 

standards as the men and assigns qualified women in formal decision 

making positions. 

4) EF 5. Force Sustainment. Will advise that ASI/ANSF include adequate 

working facilities and separate protected living facilities for women. This 

includes uniforms customized for women, equipment customized for 

women, protected barracks, exercise facilities, changing rooms, women’s 

bathrooms, and child care facilities. 

5) EF 6. Campaigns & Operations. Will advise that ASI/ANSF implement 

gender-related resolutions, have a gender perspective in relevant planning 

and assessment tools through all phases of military operations and missions, 

and that campaigns and operations include female response capabilities. 

6) EF 7. Intelligence Capabilities & Processes. Will advise 

ASI/ANSF to include female intelligence capabilities and 

inte-grate a gender perspective in relevant intelligence and 

assess-ment tools in order to enhance operational 

effectiveness. 

7) EF 8. Strategic Communication. Will advise ASI/ 

ANSF to conduct awareness and advertising campaigns 

supporting women’s roles in the ASI/ANSF and their 

con-tribution to the security and stability of Afghanistan. 

Photo: Petty Officer 2nd Class John O’Neill Herrera 

40 




Chapter 5 


Chapter 5 






CHAPTER 5 

Afghan Actors 

This chapter describes the ASIs and the national institutions that generate forces; it 

then outlines the ANSF (See Annex A for further discussion). 

5.1 Afghan Security Institutions (ASIs). ASI are the organizations that have primary 

responsibility for securing the country—the Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense 

(MoD), and National Directorate of Security (NDS). Each is headed by a presidentially-appointed, 

parliamentary-approved minister (or director, in NDS’s case). To fulfill 

its role in these endeavors, ASIs must provide strong and effective leadership and create 

the structures, procedures, and plans to build, reform, manage, and sustain the ANSF. 

5.2 Ministry of Defense (MoD). The MoD is the government’s executive department 

responsible for the implementation of defense policies and is the military’s strategic-level 

headquarters. The MoD’s objectives are to defend Afghanistan’s national 

sovereignty, national values, national interests, and to defeat the current insurgency. 

The MoD also manages contingency planning, defense-related logistics and routine 

policy functions of the military. Elements of MoD also develop, refine, and implement 

strategic policies to achieve National Security Policy (NSP) objectives. The majority 

of leaders in the MoD are senior ANA officers; thus, there is a need to civilianize this 

force by creating a balance within the ministry and establishing civilian control (Figure 

A-1, pg A-1). 

Chapter 5 



41



5.3 The four national military objectives in support of ational Security Policy goals 

are: 

1) Defend national sovereignty: safeguard national interests and freedom, territorial 

integrity, independence, and Islamic values of Afghanistan. 

2) Defeat insurgents, Al-Qaeda, terrorism, and terrorist groups in Afghanistan. 

3) Continue MoD reform so as to establish a strong defense sector in support of 

the national interests and security objectives. 

4) Contribute actively to a stable regional and international security environment. 

5.4 Ministry of Interior (MoI). The MoI is the government’s executive department 

responsible for the implementation of security. It is central to the establishment and 

maintenance of the Rule of Law 

and the development of enduring 

police forces that are professional 

and effective. MoI provides oversight 

and direction to the Afghan 

National Police (ANP) pillars—the 

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 

Afghan Border Police (ABP), 

Afghan National Civil Order 

Police (ANCOP), and Afghan 

Anti-Crime Police (AACP)—and 

two sub-pillars—the Afghan Local 

Police (ALP) and the Afghan 

Public Protection Force (APPF) 

(Annex A, pg A-2). 

Photo: Senior Airman Matt Davis 

5.5 National Directorate of Security (NDS). The NDS is GIRoA’s domestic intelligence 

agency. It reports directly to the president and has thirty departments and 

branches across Afghanistan. It has elements serving in each province and is integrated 

into the OCC-Ps and OCC-Rs where it synchronizes its efforts with MoI and MoD 

elements. 

5.6 Gaps. Despite considerable progress, capability gaps remain in the ASIs. These 

gaps include, but are not limited to: unlawful civilian influence, planning, programming, 

multi-year budgeting, and execution. Systemic issues require advisory support 

for sustainment, Inspector General/Transparency Accountability Oversight, human 

resources management, and strategic plans and policy. Tactical gaps include intelligence 

and ISR, fixed wing and rotary wing aviation CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, engineering 

(sustainability, bridging), Combined Arms Route Clearance Operations (CARCO), 

and Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices(C-IED). ASI development may slow down 

without robust advisory support during the anticipated period of high personnel turnover 

associated with the post-election transition of power. 

5.7 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANA, ANA Special Operations 

Command (ANASOC), Mobile Strike Force (MSF), Afghan Air Force (AAF) and ANP, 

all comprise the ANSF and are a growing source of national pride and a strong visual 

symbol of the GIRoA enduring strength. The ANSF have shown significant progress 

and have evolved into confident and capable troops who have assumed lead security 

responsibility for all of Afghanistan. However, the ANSF still face significant challenges 

in many areas including leadership, training, logistics, C-IED, fires, and procurement. 

42 




These and other critical issues are currently being addressed by GIRoA and ISAF, but 

require medium- to long-term solutions, at the ministerial, force generating, and fielded 

force levels within the ANSF. 

5.8 National Institutions (Generating Forces). The Afghan National Institutions 

cover a range of logistics, materiel, and medical institutions. (All are located in Kabul) 

a) Logistics and Materiel: Materiel Management Center-Police (MMC-P) - 

Responsible for the management of MoI ANP logistics documentation tracking 

request and issue of all classes of supply. 

b) MoI Support Center (MSC) - Responsible for receipt, storage and issue of 

material. 

c) Central Supply Depot (CSD) - Issue, ship, receive, store and replenish CLII, 

CLIV, CLVI, CLVII, and CLIX items for national-level logistics. 

d) 25 Bunkers ANP - Receive, inventory, store, and issue weapons, ammunition, 

at the ANP depot. 

e) Army Support Command (ASC) - Receive supply requests (MoD Form 14s) 

from Regional Logistics Support Centers (RLSCs) and Corps (entry point of 

regional requests at national level). 

f) Central Workshop (CWS) - Repairs or rebuilds equipment to a serviceable 

condition; has the ability to update and upgrade equipment systems, and then 

return them to service. 

g) Transportation Brigade - Provide transportation support to MoI. 

h) Regional Logistics Command-Kabul (RLC-Kabul) - Command and Control: 

prepare plans and orders, and execute and assess operations. 

i) Logistics Command - Ensure that Logistics Command HQ and all subordinate 

elements follow established processes. 

j) Materiel Management Center-Army (MMC-A) - Provide quality control and 

validate documentation before it is sent to the CSD. 

5.9 ANSF Medical. 

a) National Military Hospital (NMH) - (Kabul). The NMH is Afghanistan’s 

premiere trauma center and echelon IV medical facility. Serving ANSF personnel 

and their families, the ANA’s multi-disciplinary staff is fully-equipped with modern 

equipment. It is home to 

the ANA’s Medical Residency 

Programs. NMH is a 400-bed 

facility, with an expansion 

capability for up to 550 beds. 

The Kabul NMH provides the 

highest level of medical care in 

the Afghan healthcare system. 

b) Regional Military Hospital 

(RMH) - (West, North, 

East, South, and Southwest). 

Each RMH provides higher 

echelon care for the ANSF and 

their families. 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown 

Chapter 5 


43



c) Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences (AFAMS) - (Kabul). AFAMS is 

a medical academic institution within the MoD. AFAMS provides medical health 

services, professional healthcare technicians, associated healthcare fields and 

dental training and education to the ANSF. It is becoming a center of excellence 

for medical and dental training and education in Afghanistan. 

d) Afghan National Police Hospital (ANPH) - (Kabul). The ANPH is a 200 

bed facility that will expand to 300 beds. It currently provides Role III care for all 

ANP as well as other ANSF personnel and their families. ANPH houses residency 

programs and partners with Ministry of Public Health to support their programs. 

5.10 Afghan National Army: 

5.11 General Staff (GS). The GS reports directly to the Chief of GS and manages the 

strategy, policy and programming requirements for the MoD. The GS provides command 

and control for the ANA National Assets (ANASOC and the MSF). 

5.12 Ground Forces Command (GFC). GFC commands and controls the majority of 

Afghanistan’s ground forces, including all six corps, the 111th Capitol Division, and 

Afghan Detention Operations. The GFC was developed with the assistance of the CF in 

April 2009 and achieved full operational capability in late 2012. 

5.13 ANA Corps Structure. There are currently six ANA corps (Annex A, pg A-3). 

Moving clockwise from the northeastern part of the country, they are: 201 st , 203 rd , 

205 th , 215 th , 207 th , and 209 th . They are typically comprised of a headquarters battalion, 

three to four brigades, and various specialty kandaks (battalions). 

ANA structure below Corps level is presented in Annex 

A. The secession of units is corps, brigade, kandak, and tolay 

(company). 

5.14 Afghan National Army Special Operations Command 

(ANASOC). ANASOC is a division-level organization 

consisting of two Special Operations Brigades 

(SOBs), a Military Intelligence Kandak, a national Strategic 

Reserve Special Operations Kandak (6th SOK), four 

mobile strike force vehicle (MSFV) companies, a General 

Support Kandak (GSK), a Garrison Support Unit 

(GSU), and a School of Excellence (SOE) (Annex 

A, pg A-11). The SOKs are divided into two main 

types of forces: Commandos and Special Forces. 

Commandos are organized into companies 

(three companies per SOK) and are rapidly 

deployable, highly mobile, light infantry 

units trained to conduct expeditionary 

commando operations such as direct action, 

cordon and search, reconnaissance, 

raid, and air assault operations. Special 

Forces are organized into 15-man Operational 

Detachment Alphas (eight ODAs 

per SOK) and specialize in internal 

defense, village stability, localized intelligence 

collection, special reconnaissance, 

direct action, Religious Cultural Affairs 

(RCA), and Special Information Force/ 

Afghan Information Dissemination 


44 




Operations (AIDO). The SOKs are distinguished from their ANA counterparts by 

their capability of and preference for operating at night. At least one SOK operates in 

each Corps area of responsibility with many co-located with the Corps HQ. While the 

Corps are required to provide logistical support to these Commando Kandaks, they 

must request and receive approval from the Chief of General Staff to utilize Commandos 

in support of Corps operations 

5.15 Mobile Strike Force (MSF). The General Staff Operations (GSG3) controls two 

MSF brigades—one based in Kabul and the other based in Kandahar (Annex A, pg 

A-12). While the kandaks assigned to the MSF brigades support the Corps commanders, 

they report to the GSG3. The MSF kandaks provide a rapidly deployable motorized 

infantry capability. The MSF kandak’s mission is to conduct security, maneuver 

support, reconnaissance operations, and other offensive and defensive operations. MSF 

kandaks may function as independent maneuver elements or as part of a corps-level 

operation. Five out of seven MSF kandaks have graduated from the Armor Branch 

School. Training and mentoring for the MSFV supply chain is designed to ensure 

self-sustainability after 2017. The MSF kandaks are equipped with 58 MSFVs (three 

M1117 variants): 

a) MSFV-APC. Armored personnel carrier equipped with a turret including M2- 

M48 .50 caliber machine gun and MK-19 40mm grenade launcher. 

b) MSV-GPK. Gunner protection kit model equipped with a M2 .50 caliber machine 

gun, headed by a gunner under armored protection. 

c) MEDEVAC-MSF. 

5.16 National Engineer Brigade (NEB). The General Staff Operations (GSG3) 

controls the NEB based in Kabul. The brigade consists of two kandaks—one special 

kandak and one construction kandak. 

5.17 Afghan Air Force. The AAF mission is to provide trained and ready airmen to 

execute critical tasks from the air in support of the ANSF, and when directed by the 

MoD and General Staff, to support the GIROA’s civil authorities. In a country largely 

inaccessible by road, the Afghan armed forces depend heavily upon the AAF for airlift 

of soldiers, transportation of supplies between corps operating locations, and casualty 

evacuation, transportation of human remains, air assault, armed overwatch, and aerial 

escort. Other tasks include national taskings for air movement, presidential movement, 

non-traditional ISR, and (projected for 2016), close air attack. 

a) Organization and Units. As of June 2014, the AAF consists of 3 Air Wings, 4 

Air Operations Units, and 14 Detachments. The AAF also has several tenant units 

such as the Air Command and Control Center (ACCC) and Air University, both 

located in Kabul. 

b) The Kabul and Kandahar Air Wings are the primary operational elements of 

the AAF. In general, the Kabul Air Wing is the primary operational unit covering 

north and east Afghanistan, while the Kandahar Air Wing generally handles 

operations in the south and west of the country. The primary flight-training unit 

for the AAF is the Shindand Training Wing in western Afghanistan. 

c) All of the AAF wings contain an operations group, maintenance group, and 

mission support group. Additionally, the training wing at Shindand includes a 

training group for fixed-wing and rotary-wing undergraduate pilots. Below the 

group level, the flying squadrons are broken down into rotary-wing and fixedwing 

squadrons, which include training, standardization and evaluation, and 

flight scheduling. 

Chapter 5 


45



d) Air Command and Control 

Center (ACCC). The ACCC is 

the primary C2 agency for the 

AAF. The ACCC is the operational 

hub of the AAF and 

is responsible for tasking all 

AAF missions and monitoring 

mission execution. The ACCC 

validates unit schedules and consolidates 

all nationally prioritized 

mission requests and regionally 

proposed schedules into a single 

schedule. The ACCC forwards 

approved schedules to all AAF 

units for execution while also sending a copy to the National Military Operation 

Center for distribution to the General Staff, MoD, and GFC. 

5.18 Gaps. Although current trends indicate that by the end of 2014 the ANSF will 

have demonstrated tactical overmatch against the insurgency, they will not yet have 

all the effective systems in place to ensure self-sustainability. Capability gaps will remain 

in areas such as aviation, intelligence, C-IED, combined arms integration, 

and sustainment. Gender integration and female recruitment—necessary to handle 

the security needs of the female population and detect counter-insurgents 

disguised as women—are also slow and deficient. These gaps may potentially 

prevent the ANSF from retaining tactical over-match and expanding their 

operational reach. 

a) The ANA must complete the transition from Regional Training Centers 

to Regional Corps Battle Schools, which supports the professionalization of 

the force. At the same time, more work must be done to develop an effective 

operational deployment cycle, which is critical in managing OPTEMPO and 

leaves (vacation or respite). 

b) The AAF will help ensure an asymmetric advantage over the threat, 

however it will still require assistance to fully mature due to the late fielding 

of equipment and human capital challenges including recruiting, education, 

maintenance, and training. 

c) Like most of the ANSF, the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) will 

be tactically proficient by the end of 2014. However, the Special Operations 

Brigade HQ and the Special Mission Wing will still need focused advising into 

RS. 

5.19 Afghan National Police (ANP) The ANP are primarily responsible for law 

enforcement. They will work for and with the People to actively fight crime, maintain 

civil order, reduce corruption, and prevent the cultivation, production, and 

smuggling of illegal narcotics. The police will protect and extend the sovereignty of 

the State throughout the country and protect its borders while assuming the lead 

role for security (Police Primacy) in the more permissive areas of Afghanistan. 

a) The current police chain of command runs from the MoI to the Deputy 

Minister for security to the provincial chiefs of police to the district chiefs of 

police. Provincial governors do not direct police activities, but they are afforded 

a level of influence by Afghan public law. 

b) The ANP have grown both in size and in capability over the past few years. 

However, they suffer from illiteracy, innumeracy, corruption, logistics inef- 

Photo: Master Sgt. Benjamin Bloker 

46 




ficiencies, and a lack of effective Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). The ANP 

consist of the AUP, ABP, ANCOP, the General Command of Police Special Units 

(GCPSU), and AACP. The AUP, ANCOP, ABP, and AACP are referred to as “Police 

Pillars” while the ALP and APPF are referred to as “Police Sub-Pillars” (see Figure 

5.1 and 5.2.) Annex A provides additional details on the MoI and ANP, to include 

organizational charts for the MoI and ANP subordinate units, andinformation on 

missions, composition, disposition, and uniforms. 

Chapter 5 

Figure 5.1 Afghan Police Pillars 

5.20 Afghan Uniform Police 

(AUP). The AUP is the largest police 

agency in Afghanistan and the 

primary police force the local populace 

will encounter daily. The AUP 

is still largely a para-military force 

focused on fighting insurgents, but 

the long-term intent is for it to conduct 

community or civil policing 

and to assume the lead for security 

and stability in populated areas. 

5.21 Provincial Chief of Police 

(PCoP). A President of Afghanistan 

(POA)-appointed PCoP controls 

all police activities within a given 

province through appointed District 

Chiefs of Police (DCoP). The 

Figure 5.2 Police sub-pillars 

AUP zone headquarters have been 

eliminated and replaced with Type-A police headquarters, usually in the largest or most 

dominant province in the zone/region. In theory the Type-A PCoPs have several other 

Type-B and -C PCoPs reporting to them, but in reality, most PCoPs—regardless of 

type—communicate directly with MoI (Annex A, pg A-24). 


47



5.22 District Chief of Police. The DCoP is the senior law enforcement officer in the 

district. The DCoP is the face of GIRoA for a substantial portion of the population 

and is sometimes the only GIRoA official in a district. He manages all of the AUP 

within district boundaries and interacts with the PCoP for issues affecting his district. 

The DCoP is also a key intermediary with the village elders who work to nominate 

individuals to serve as part of the ALP (see par 5.29 for ALP). Once the ALP 

are vetted, they are trained at AUP training centers and assigned security duties in 

their respective villages. Village and checkpoint-level ALP commanders coordinate 

their activities with the DCoP. The DCoP attempts to utilize the ALP along with his 

assigned AUP as part of an integrated plan to increase the security bubble across the 

district. The DCoP is where responsibilities for the ALP and policing the community 

intersect. For this reason, the DCoP is the critical node in the AUP and arguably for 

the entire MoI. 

5.23 Afghan Border Police (ABP). The ABP are organized into six zones and have 

primary responsibility for the security zone that stretches 50km inland from Afghanistan’s 

international boundaries (Annex A, pg A-26). It also operates at Border 

Crossing Points (BXPs) and airports. The ABP guard against illegal entry of persons, 

weapons, narcotics, and other goods. In some areas, they also perform paramilitary 

functions to suppress insurgent activity. In coordination with customs authorities, 

the ABP provides immigration/visa services, establishes and maintains BXP’s, and 

provides perimeter, building, aircraft, and passenger security at airports. They also 

have augmented judicial sector security in some districts. 

5.24 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The ANCOP are modeled after 

the European gendarmeries and were developed specifically to deal with civil unrest 

and to react to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas. ANCOP provide 

civil order presence patrols and a crisis or counter-terror response capability in urban 

and metropolitan areas and also prevent or respond to violent public incidents. 

ANCOP are organized into brigades and kandaks that are deployable throughout 

Afghanistan (Annex A, pg A-28). ANCOP are often deployed in support of ANA-led 

counterinsurgency operations, and in some areas they man checkpoints like their 

ANSF counterparts. 1 

5.25 Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The CNPA is the lead agency 

for the counter-narcotics 

mission in Afghanistan. 

It is part of MoI and 

operates under the Deputy 

Minister for Counter-Narcotics. 

It consists of a regular 

narcotics police force, 

located throughout the 

34 provinces, and several 

Coalition-mentored specialized 

units. The specialized 

units (the Sensitive 

Investigation Unit (SIU), 

National Interdiction Unit 

(NIU), and Intelligence 

and Investigation Unit 

Photo: Tech. Sgt. Laura Smith 

1 The ANCOP 3 rd BDE in Balkh Province recently reassigned 3 kandaks to provide enough kandaks to 

form a new 4 th ANCOP Brigade in Kunduz. 

48 




(IIU)) are assessed as highly capable. The CNPA supports the goals of Afghanistan’s 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Anti-Drug Trafficking Policy. 

5.26 Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). 

The AACP provides specialist police expertise 

and counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, 

criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, 

and specialized security details. Forensics and 

biometrics are supported by Coalition subject 

matter experts who work side-by-side with 

their Afghan counterparts. The forensic and 

biometric programs support evidence-based 

operations and work with criminal investigators, 

prosecutors, and judges to ensure the 

police are the face of the rule of law. 

5.27 General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). The GCPSU is comprised 

of an operational-level headquarters, two training centers, national mission 

units (NMUs) and provincial units (Annex A, pg A-30). NMUs have a mandate to 

operate across the entire country and conduct a range of policing functions from 

counter-terrorist operations to high-risk arrests and hostage recovery. The Provincial 

Special Units (PSUs) are special police units that are TACON to the PCoP in 

their assigned province and OPCON to the GCPSU. The PSU provides a relatively 

sophisticated quick-reaction capability and special investigative element for the 

province. They hold broad responsibilities for public order, high-risk arrests, and 

evidence-based policing operations within the rule of law construct. As of June 2014, 

there were 25 PSUs located across Afghanistan, with plans to build an additional 

eight PSUs. The two training centers provide general training for service with PSUs 

and advanced training for NMUs and other capabilities as required. 

5.28 Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The APPF provides fixed site, convoy, 

and personal security as a GIRoA state-owned enterprise. It is assuming security 

missions from private security companies (PSCs) as directed by Afghan Presidential 

Decree #62 in August 2010, which required PSCs to be disbanded. The APPF 

is not a police force, but instead guards critical infrastructure such as power plants, 

dams, and non-governmental facilities such as banks and hotels. In additional, the 

APPF will provide convoy security in many parts of Afghanistan. Some international 

organizations (for example NGOs and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs)) 

contract with the MoI for 

APPF security services (Annex 

A, pg A-32). As of FEB 

2014, the APPF has gone 

through a transition from 

its current state as a stateowned 

enterprise to a pillar 

under the Deputy Minister 

of Security. The transition 

has faced many legal and 

funding challenges with this 

new entity. ISAF MoI advisors 

are working with MoI 

during this transition for a 

legal, sustainable, and timely 

option. The APPF current- 

Photo: Sandra Arnold 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Terri Barriere 

Chapter 5 


49



ly provides base security at five ISAF(RS) locations. APPF convoy operations are 

directed under the MoI Transportation Brigade worked in conjunction with PCoPs 

for route security. 

5.29 Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP began as a Combined Joint Special Operations 

Task Force—Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) initiative to establish local defense 

forces at the village and district level. While the ALP are an official sub-pillar of the 

MoI and can detain insurgents and criminals, they lack arrest authority. There are 

currently 125 districts with ALP. Each district has a senior ALP commander who 

reports directly to the DCoP (Annex A, pg A-34). The DCoP has overall responsiblity 

for the ALP’s administrative and logistical support, to include recruiting, pay, 

equipment, and fuel. The ALP are approximately 25,000 personnel strong (as of fall 

2013), and are scheduled to grow to approximately 30,000 members. In some areas 

ALP are mistakenly referred to as arbakai, the name long-used in Afghanistan to 

describe local militias. Depending on the area and local history, the term may carry 

negative connotations. 

5.30 Special Mission Wing (SMW). The SMW was established out of the MoI’s Air 

Interdiction Unit to conduct multi-functional aviation operations in direct support 

of GIRoA’s ASSF units (e.g., Commandos, ANA Special Forces, Ktah Khas, and GCP- 

SU National Mission Units) for counternarcotics (CN), counter-terrorism (CT), and 

SOF missions throughout Afghanistan (Annex A, pg A-20). The SMW is the only air 

mobility capability in Afghanistan able of project power at night with the required 

precision to support high-risk missions. A Joint Special Operations Advisory Team 

(SOAT) and Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) mentor the development 

of the unit’s operations and maintenance capabilities and standards. A contracted 

logistics support team provides capacity development of SMW leaders, staff and 

aircrew through education, training, and mentoring. The SMW fleet is funded with a 

combination of ASFF and DoD CN funds. 

a) As of June 14, the SMW has 22 Mi-17s available for 

day to day operations. These include two Mi-17v1s 

organic to the unit and eight Mi-17v5s on loan from 

the Afghan Air Force. Additionally, the SMW has 17 

Mi-17v1s in overhaul, with eight expected to return to 

service as part of the SMW before being returned to 

their donors. The primary training focus for the SMW 

is the production of Afghan Mi-17 night-vision goggle 

(NVG) aircrews and maintenance personnel. Currently, 

the SMW has ten fully mission qualified Mi-17 NVG 

crews and maintenance personnel. Currently, the SMW 

has ten fully mission qualified Mi-17 NVG crews and 

its training capacity is limited by the number of Mi-17s 

available for operations and training. Training capacity 

will increase as the SMW continues to receive its 

additional Mi-17v5s between now and October 2014, 

when it will have reached its total end strength to 30 

Mi-17s. Additionally, the SMW has received six of its 18 

expected PC-12 intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance 

(ISR) aircraft. The PC-12 provides the SMW with 

the capability to provide near real-time and post mission 

ISR support to ASSF CN and CT missions. SMW 

expects to mature this capability to FOC by mid-2016. 

U.S. Army courtesy photo 

50 




b) In August 2013, the MoD, MoI, and NDS chiefs signed the initial Air Charter 

which was intended to streamline the SMW’s C2, moving them from under MoI 

to MoD. Unfortunately, neither the language in the initial charter, nor in a subsequent 

charter signed by the same ministries in May 2014, codified clear command 

and control of the unit. This inhibited its development because of limited gains 

in personnel and support. Coalition mentors continue to focus their efforts to 

find an acceptable Afghan solution to this predicament. Despite the C2 issues, 

the SMW continues to advance its capabilities and is preparing for delivery of 

its additional aircraft and its future expansion to Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif. 

SMW is making operational progress, working with Afghan SOF units from both 

MoI and MoD. It requires MoI and MoD cooperation for command and control, 

personnel assignment and equipment delivery. The SMW SOAG advises the SMW 

leadership on both training and operations. 

5.31 Gaps. In the near term, the Afghan 

police will remain a counter-insurgency 

focused force. They will need continued 

development and focused advising in intelligence 

capabilities and evidence-based 

operations. The police will have gained 

credibility in the eyes of the Afghan people, 

but will not yet have all the effective 

systems in place to ensure self-sustainability. 

Gender integration and female 

recruitment necessary to handle the 

security needs of the female population 

and detect counter-insurgents disguised as 

women are also slow and deficient. 

Photo: Cpl. Clay Beyersdorfer 

Capability gaps in areas such as C-IED, integrated layered security, and sustainment will 

prevent them from expanding their operational reach. 

5.32 Operations Coordination Group (OCG) and Ktah Khas Afghan (KKA). The 

OCG is an operational-level organization made up of representatives from the Ministry 

of Defense, Ministry of the Interior, and the National Directorate of Security that 

provide legal validation, battle space owner and governmental de-confliction, and 

post-mission review of KKA operations. The KKA is an Afghan light infantry Special 

Operations Battalion. The KKA consist of three 170-man rifle companies, a 29-man 

reconnaissance unit and several sections that enable and support the Strike Forces. 

The KKA Military Intelligence Company provides target area analysis and supports 

collection efforts on the objective. The KKA headquarters company contains the staff 

sections and command group and the Support Company that provides transportation, 

maintenance, and food services. The KKA 4th Company contains instructors and 50 

student slots for new KKA Soldiers who undergo a Basic Operator Training module to 

provide foundational skills for service in a rifle company. 

KKA platoons and companies are trained to conduct precision raids, tactical callouts, 

and vehicle interdictions against high value targets utilizing both ground and air 

mobility platforms. The KKA C2 relationship places them directly under the MoD G3 

in order to make them rapidly responsive to national-level targets throughout Afghanistan. 

The OCG and KKA’s geographic flexibility, rapid ability to gain mission approval 

and legal justification, and precision in execution distinguish them from their special 

operations counterparts within the MoD and MoI. Developing the KKA’s operational-level 

command, sustainment, intelligence and recruitment structures is the current 

focus of the US KKA SOAG. 

Chapter 5 


51



5.33 Operations Coordination Center (OCC). OCCs were created to help coordinate 

information flow and action between GIRoA entities, and to a lesser extent between CF 

and GIRoA. In most areas, requests for ISAF/RS enabler support (e.g., CASEVAC and 

MEDEVAC) flow from the ANSF to the OCC, and from the OCC to the designated 

ISAF/RS C2 node (often a Regional Command Combined Joint Operations Center). 

OCCs have a secondary task of helping coordinate civil response to events such as natural 

disasters or coordinate security actions for a special event—e.g., elections. In some 

cases, OCC facilities are used for planning major combined operations, such as election 

security with either the Corps or Provincial PHQ representative leads. OCCs exist at the 

regional and provincial levels with staffing from the ANA, AUP, and NDS. Some OCC- 

Rs may see representation from ANASOC, ANCOP, ABP, and other ANSF elements. 

There are a number of district-level OCCs (OCC-Ds) where the Afghans have deemed 

them necessary. 

5.34 Gaps. The ANSF require additional development of the OCCs to help manage 

ANSF capabilities. These additional develompent requirements include effective 

combined arms integration, as well as sustainment the fighting capability of the Corps, 

specialty kandaks, logistics centers, and medical operations. Shortfalls in some OCCs 

include delayed information sharing—which degrades a common operational picture 

that enables timely decision making—and personnel shortages in key staff positions. 

5.35 Integrated Layered Security. Layered Security is the operational approach by 

which ANSF (specifically the police entities) protect the population and secure key terrain 

through mutual support among all the ANSF pillars. This framework is enabled by 

dynamic lateral and vertical coordination and communications and leverage of collective 

intelligence efforts. 

Figure 5.3 Integrated Layered Security 

52 




5.36 Key Tasks. Security of the population is achieved through a balanced mix of offensive 

and area security tasks, each conducted to varying degrees by each of the ANSF 

pillars. These tasks include: 

a) Aggressive patrolling of the population centers and rural areas 

b) Retaining key terrain 

c) Controlling critical highways, routes, and border crossing points 

d) Disrupting movement of illicit material and insurgents across borders 

e) Interdicting illicit material and insurgents outside of population centers 

f) Criminal Intelligence gathering and exploitation 

5.37 Desired Effect. Population protected; stable environment provided for the development 

of GIRoA governance, and denial of enemy and criminal elements freedom to 

operate and access to the population. 

5.38 Summary. Layered Security demands consistent and timely coordination and 

synchronization across all ANSF pillars. ISAF/RS FBSFA TAA, will enable the ANSF to 

improve the operational effectiveness of layered security in support of the Afghan population-centric 

COIN campaign. OCCs play a key role in the coordination of operations 

across formations, facilitate mutual support and increase overall ANSF effectiveness of 

layered security. (See Fig. 5.3 for a representation of the ILS). 

5.39 Overall ASI/ANSF Gaps/Shortfalls. The ANSF and the ASI have made substantial 

progress in fielding and developing capabilities, but these capabilities are not yet sustainable. 

Work remains to be done on the systems, processes, jurisdictional mandates, 

and institutions necessary to make progress enduring. Significant ministerial gaps exist 

in planning, programming and multi-year budgeting and execution; and transparency 

accountability and oversight. Capability development shortfalls were identified in logistics, 

acquisition, and financial management; strategic plans and policy; human resource 

management and gender equality (IAW UNSCR 1325). 

Chapter 5 


Photo: Capt. Craig Bosveld 

53



54 




Chapter 6 


Chapter 6 






CHAPTER 6 

RS Actors 

“Afghans deliver capabilities; we deliver advice and assistance.” 

—General Joseph Dunford, COMISAF December 2013 

This chapter provides a broad overview of the ISAF/RS FBSFA staff processes as of 30 

June 2014. These processes will continue to evolve due to the upcoming transition from 

both a 3-star IJC HQ and a 4-Star ISAF HQ into one strategic level Resolute Support 

Command and Control Headquarters. The processes will also continue to develop 

as FBSFA is operationalized and the eight EFs used to track and measure progress in 

FBSFA are refined. 1 

6.1 Introduction. This chapter is an overview of the ISAF/RS organizations 

conducting FBSFA during the remainder of the ISAF mission and the subsequent RS 

mission. Advisors and advisor teams employ FBSFA to train, advise, and assist the ASI 

and ANSF. 

6.2 Advisors. Advisors must become experts in ASI and ANSF processes and the 

critical nodes and decision points in those processes at every level which they advise. 

Advisors should network with fellow ISAF advisors. This can easily be done by using 

the Advisor Network Tool (ANET) to find colleague advisors and to review related 

functional areas that influence, enhance, or are effected by the work you will do with 

your Afghan partner. Establishing a network enables advisors to vertically integrate 

and horizontally coordinate efforts, as they train, advise, and assist the ASI and ANSF. 

Advisor collaboration helps facilitate the implementation of Afghan-developed 

solutions into the ASI and ANSF. Each advisor is empowered to seek out fellow 

advisors to discuss issues and work with the Afghans to address and resolve problems 

at lower levels. In cases 

in which this may not be 

achieved, important issues 

must be elevated into the 

formal problem resolution 

structure comprised of 

the TAAC SFA Targeting 

Meeting, SFA Working 

Group, and SFA Board 

for decision and action 

(described in Chapter 2). 

6.3 ISAF HQ and 

Subordinate Commands. 

FBSFA is the main effort for 

the remainder of the ISAF 

mission and throughout 

RS. As such, FBSFA is being 

Chapter 6 

1 The ISAF SFA Center manages the FBSFA staffing process. The latest information regarding staff 

processes is available on the ISAF Secret SFAC Portal at: http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/DCOSOPS/ 

CJ3/CJ%2035/SFAFUSION/default.aspx 


55



fully operationalized and mainstreamed into the ISAF/RS staff. Processes, procedures, 

roles, and responsibilities have been defined, and the employment of FBSFA is being 

refined as the eight EFs are developed. Each of ISAF’s/RS’s subordinate commands 

have a unique organizational structure and approach to FBSFA and an important role 

in executing it. Mainstreaming of the eight EFs coincides with the transition to one 

strategic level RS headquarters. This transition will begin in July 2014 and is designed 

to be complete on or before 31 October 2014. 

6.4 Deputy Commanding General Combined Security Transition Command- 

Afghanistan (DCG CSTC-A). DCG CSTC-A provides resources in support of ASI 

and ANSF development and assists ISAF/RS organizations with technical support to 

develop sustainable ASI/ANSF capacity and capabilities. DCG CSTC-A is responsible 

for integrating and synchronizing 

processes related to Afghan 

Security Forces Funding (ASFF) 

to ensure proper planning, 

execution, transparency, 

accountability, and oversight of 

donated resources from the US, 

Coalition, and IC. The office also 

executes USG responsibilities 

for financial management and 

security assistance. 

a) DCG CSTC-A 

Organization: The DCG 

CSTC-A consists of seven directorates: 

1) CJ-8, Contracting Enabler Cell, 

2) NATO Financial Contributions, 

3) Security Assistance Office (SAO), 

4) Engineers (CJ-ENG), 

5) SHAFAFIYAT 

6) Plans and Operations. 

b) DCG CSTC-A’s key tasks and functions. 

1) Justify, account for, and maintain fiscal control of FY08 - F15 ASFF. 

2) Receive, manage, and execute FY15 - FY17 international donations. 

3) Develop GIRoA transparency and anti-corruption. 

4) Provide security assistance and manage Foreign Military Sales. 

5) Manage and provide oversight on US contracts. 

6) Build, maintain, and transition management of ANSF infrastructure to 

GIRoA. 

6.5 Deputy Commander Ministerial Advisor Group (DCOM MAG)/Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). On 1 July 2014, DCOM 

MAG/CSTC-A was disaggregated, and the advisors who were part of the MoI and 

MoD Ministerial Advisory Groups (MAGs) and the Enterprise Advisory Groups 

(EAGs) under DCOM MAG/CSTC-A realigned into the relevant HQ ISAF DCOS 

Photo: Lance Cpl. Robert Reeves 

56 




sections. Under the DCOS sections, they are employed predominantly by the Essential 

Function (EF) leads. 

6.6 Ministerial and Enterprise Advisory Groups. The MoD and MoI MAGs and six 

EAGs were disaggregated on 1 July 2014. The realigned advisors will continue their 

interaction and roles supporting advisors with Afghan ministries. The officers are 

assigned within the ISAF/RS staff and conduct FBSFA via the eight EFs. 

Figure 6.1 RS C2 Diagram 

Chapter 6 

Figure 6.2 Deputy Advisors 


57



6.7 Special Advisors to COMISAF/COMRS. Upon the disaggregation of the MoI and 

MoD MAGs, the directors of the MAGs will become special advisors to COMISAF/ 

COMRS (see figure 6.2). For the remainder of the ISAF mission and throughout RS, 

they will serve as Deputy Advisor MoI and Deputy Advisor MoD to COMISAF/RS. A 

third special advisor position, Deputy Advisor General Support, will function on the 

same level with the other Deputy Advisors. 

6.8 Realignment. Realignment is defined as a change in the chain of command and 

reporting to achieve better vertical alignment. The ISAF staff is being realigned in 

accordance with the eight EFs so that advisors can deliver FBSFA in a manner that will 

create an enduring posture of processes and systems beyond RS. It does not, however, 

require any physical moves. The realignment is divided into three phases and is 

designed to reach Full Operating Capability (FOC) by 31 October 2014. Administration 

Realignment Complete (ARC) will be directed and completed by 01 August 2014. 

a) Phase 1: Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by 01 July 2014. The first phase 

consisted of changing hierarchical relationships, transferring responsibility for 

Ministerial Development Plans, amending reporting streams, and establishing an 

updated HQ Battle Rhythm. 

b) Phase 2: ADMIN Realignment Complete (ARC). By 01 August 2014, EF leads 

within the HQ ISAF DCOS sections will take over command responsibility for 

force protection, equipment and personnel administration issues. Advisors who are 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Terri Barriere 

58 




to be employed by EFs still residing in NKAIA will be administratively realigned 

to the appropriate DCOS section in HQ ISAF in accordance with Annex A. 

c) Phase 3: Full Operating Capability. By 31 October 2014, physical moves of 

ministerial advisors are complete and all EF leads are based at HQ ISAF. All 

other actions and issues concerning the establishment of the new structure are 

complete. 

6.9 MoI advisors remain responsible for SFA within the MoI at the ministerial, 

deputy ministerial, and the ANP Type-A or Zone-level headquarters levels to develop 

GIRoA institutional security force capacity and capability. MoI advisors accomplish 

this mission by developing enduring institutional policies and processes needed 

to sustain the ANP. Emphasis is on comprehensive and integrated approaches to 

foundational capabilities, including sustainment (i.e., procurement, logistics, finance); 

human resource management; strategy, policy, and plans; transparency, accountability, 

and oversight; and enabling capabilities (e.g., intelligence and communications). MoI 

advisors are organized to maintain Level 1 advising with specific offices within the MoI 

where they advise the offices of the MoI and Chief of Staff, Foreign Affairs Directorate, 

Legal Advisor, Legal Affairs Directorate, and the Office of Gender and Human Rights. 

Additional Level 1 advising is provided to Office of the Deputy Minister for Security; 

Office of the Chief of Staff; Office of the Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics; Plans 

and Operations Directorate; and the Headquarters of the AUP, ABP, AACP, GCPSU, 

and ANCOP. The APPF advisors advise the Office of the Deputy Minister for APPF, 

Chapter 6 


59



Operations Directorate, and Business and Finance Directorate. The police Intelligence 

Advisors advise the Director of Police Intelligence (DPI), Office of the Chief of Staff, 

Operations Department, Analysis Department, Investigations Department, Police 

Intelligence Training Center (PITC), and National Targeting and Exploitation Center 

(NTEC). 

6.10 MoD advisors remain responsible for providing SFA to the processes, systems, 

offices, and individuals within the MoD, to include the Offices of the Minister and 

Chief of General Staff, the supporting Assistant Ministers of Defense, and each 

of the General Staff functions. MoD advisor’s mission is to develop the capability 

and capacity of the MoD and General Staff to establish a self-sufficient, enduring 

institution that can direct and sustain security operations. MoD advisors further 

develop the capacity and functionality of the MoD by focusing efforts on the 

development of long-term strategic MoD plans and requirement processes. 

6.11 ISAF Joint Command (IJC). IJC’s mission is to conduct SFA in support of 

the ANSF to secure the people of Afghanistan and defeat the insurgency in order 

to transition full security responsibility to the ANSF (in the interim) and complete 

retrograde and redeployment of non-RS forces NLT 31 DEC 14. It executes this 

mission primarily through three types of SFA Advisor Teams (SFAATs): Military 

Advisor Teams (MATs), Police Advisor Teams (PATs), and Operations Coordination 

Center Advisor Teams (OCCATs). With the shift to FBSFA, ISAF and IJC HQ will 

reorganize and be absorbed into the Four Star Level ISAF/RS HQs in 2014, and 

additionally will reorganize the national and institutional effort to create an adaptive 

advisor network that integrates vertically along Afghan systems and processes using 

the eight EFs as an organizing construct. IJC advisor teams will orient their efforts 

on the national and regional linkages to help the Afghans understand, validate, and 

improve their own systems. RC/TAAC commanders will communicate the new 

relationship with the ANSF and develop relationships between key advisors and 

ANSF leaders at critical nodes. The primary means of accomplishing IJC’s 

FBSFA tasks is through the use of purpose-built SFAATs composed of 

experienced leadership and functional experts, co-located with, or 

U.S. Army courtesy photo 

60 




in close proximity to, 

ANSF units. 

6.12 Throughout the ISAF 

mandate, these advisor 

teams provide ANSF 

access to CF enabler 

support, which can include 

close air support (CAS); air 

weapons teams (AWT); 

indirect fires (IDF); 

intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR); 

C-IED capabilities; and 

MEDEVAC. CF ability to 

provide enabler support 

will decrease as it draws 

down, but the effect will 

be mitigated by ANSF’s 

increasing ability to provide their own enablers. 

6.13 The SFA Corps platforms at ANA corps and AUP Type-A/Zone headquarters 

provide the resources to support FBSFA processes and procedures. (See Figure 6.3 

for ISAF and Figure 6.4 for RS) The Corps Platform provides TAACs the manpower 

to execute FBSFA at the regional level. The Corps Platform consists of personnel 

drawn from a wide range of fields to cover the varying requirements to support the 

ANA and ANP and is comprised of both NATO military and civilian specialists. It is 

a flexible, multi-echelon, cross-functional organization that is divided into teams. 

These teams cover an ANA Corps, ANA Training unit, ANA Regional Logistics unit, 

OCC-R/P, AUP HQ, ABP HQ and ANP regional logistical elements. 

6.14 COMRS guidance for SFAAT in accordance with Levels of Advising: 


a) Level One (1) TAA. Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANSF 

counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis from either 

an embedded footprint or in close proximity. 

b) Level Two (2) TAA. Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANSF 

counterparts on a less frequent basis to ensure their continued development. 

The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to, and 

capability of, the ANSF counterpart, threat level to advisors, and CF resources. 

c) Level Three (3) TAA. ISAF provides additional training and advice from 

a centralized location (e.g., at a Regional Training Center or Regional Corps 

Battle School) or during a Battle Field Circulation or Staff Assistance Visit 

while accompanying ANSF commanders and staff sections. Level 3 advising is 

not limited to SFAATs or advisor teams. For instance, CF HQ staff may 

coordinate and execute training to improve the planning capability of their 

counterparts in an ANSF brigade or corps HQ or Operation Coordination 

Center–Regional (OCC-R). 

6.15 Operational Reach. Operational reach should be a key consideration for SFA. 

Level 1 advising is not possible in areas outside of operational reach. Level 2 

advising is possible, but requires deliberate planning to provide critical support such 

as MEDEVAC, route clearance, and fire support. 

Chapter 6 


61



Figure 6.3 Corps Platform – CJSOR 13.5 

ANA Team 

SFAT Composition: CJ 

• Operate from Corps Platform; des 

• Tailorable to specific functional / s 

• Structured maintained into RSM f 

13.5 Corp 

TAA Focus and Functions 

• Mentors and Advises Corps Cmd and Leadership 

• TAA task organizing Adv from Corps to BDE TM 

• Oversees and serves as the proponent for Corps 

advisor efforts in functional areas (i.e. Sig 

Advisor oversees SIG Kandak TAA) 

` 

42 mil / 6 civ 

48 total pax 

ANP 


• Functional TAA to Corps Staff and Specialty Kandaks 

(i.e. Intel, Fires, C2) 

• Serves as the “reservoir of functional capability” for 

requirements and L2 TAA to ANSF units 

ANA, T 

84 mil 

107 to 

87 mil 

139 to 

ANP 


• Mentor and Advise on RoL issues and concerns 

• Multi-functional Tm w/ reservoir of capacity 

• L1 TAA at Type A HQ, L2 to Type B&C HQs 

• Functional TAA to AUP HQs 

30 mil / 11 civ 

41 total pax 


• Mentors and Advises ABP HQs 

• Multi-functional Tm w/ reservoir of capacity 

• L1 TAA at ABP Reg HQ w/L2 capability to ABP KDK HQs 

• Functional TAA to ABP HQs (i.e. Intel, Log, Facilities) 


39 total pax 

62 


T 

C 

P 

F 

I 



SOR 13.5 – RS 1.0 

igned w/”reservoir of functional capability” 

pecialty TAA requirements (level 2) 

or Corps level advising 

s Platform 

Training Team 

171 mil / 75 civ 

246 total pax 

OCC-R/P Team 

NG, OCC 

/ 23 civ 

tal pax 

/ 52 civ 

tal pax 

, LOG 


• L3 TAA on ANA Indiv/Tm/Co and specialty units 

• TAA collective and combined arms tng (Company) 

• L2 TAA on RCBS cadre (train-the-trainer) 

• L3 TAA on platforms for ANSF enabler capabilities 

(Fires, C-IED, ENG, MED, Infantry / maneuver) 

27 mil / 13 civ 

40 total pax 

Logistical 


• L1 TAA on Ldrshp /Staff; L2 select OCCPS 

• Enable ANSF to plan, integrate, and coord. 

efforts to facilitate a COP with ANSF pillars 

• Coordinate coalition support (in extremis) 

• L3 TAA on OCC-P (travel to OCC-R to conduct tng) 

- 


19 total pax 

Chapter 6 

L 

F 

S 

M 

A 

C 

E 

C 

I 

P 

C 


• L1 TAA at RLSC; link Natl &Corps Level Sust Nodes 

• Provide reservoir of cap. to Sustainment Node 

• L2/L3 TAA to BDE CSSK/GSU 

• L2./L3 TAA for facilities transition and sustainability 

(contracting) 

17 mil / 23 civ 

40 total pax 


• L1 TAA to the Police Logistic Center 

• L2/L3 TAA to Type B/C HQs 

• L2./L3 TAA for facilities transition and sustainability 

(contracting) 


19 total pax 

1 


63



Figure 6.4 RS Corps Platform – CJSOR 1.0 

64 




Chapter 6 


65



6.16 NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). (See Figure 6.5 Organization 

Chart) NTM-A is a currently staff directorate in IJC under the ISAF construct. During 

RS NTM-A will transition to RS DCOS-OPS and become the CJ-7 Directorate of RS. 

NTM-A trains, advises, and assists ANSF training capabilities in order to support 

the creation of a capable and enduring force that protects the Afghan population 

and denies safe havens to the insurgency. NTM-A key tasks: Promote and develop 

sustainable and enduring 

training systems to include 

institutionalizing sustainable 

and enduring training systems 

for the ANP and assisting ANA 

collective training capability. 

Assist with the completion 

of force generation of ANSF 

capabilities. Finally, NTM-A 

promotes the professionalization 

of the force through basic 

Literacy and Train-the-Trainer 

programs. Focus for Literacy and 

Language will be transitioned 

to ANSF lead in 2014. NTM-A 

Institutional Training is a 

component of the national 

strategic campaign providing 

critical enduring capabilities to 

professionalize the ANSF through Figure 6.5 NTM-A Organization 

a network of training systems. 

6.17 The TAA activity undertaken has resulted in institutions moving through a series 

of Capability Milestones (CMs), in accordance with an overall programme called the 

Unified Transition Plan (UTP). NTM-A oversees the transition of ANSF institutions, 

including training establishments and medical facilities. It is assessed that by RS, there 

will still be some institution transitions to complete. 

6.18 Whereas previously there was significant emphasis on initial fielding of the ANSF 

and conducting TAA at the point of training and functional delivery, there has been 

a continuous shift in NTM-A focus, as individual establishments have transitioned 

through CMs to becoming functionally autonomous. NTM-A is now focused on 

advising and assisting institutional HQ leadership and their staff, to increasingly 

professionalize their institutions, ethos, and approach. Having enabled the individual 

institutions (e.g., branch training schools, military and police training centers), the 

emphasis now is to institutionalize a systems approach at the HQ level. In the training 

arena, this includes developing a system of internal and external validation, an 

inspectorate function, a means of continuous improvement including a lessons learned 

process, and engaging with the MAs to enable a Statement of Training Requirement 

which in turn will allow for improved forward planning. 

6.19 In addition to and in conjunction with the MAs, NTM-A has a capability 

development and force generation responsibility; in particular, it has a capability 

integration role. NTM-A is the requirements owner for many new capabilities and 

thus is responsible for ensuring that integration across the DOTMLPF spectrum is in 

place. This will continue under RS when NTM-A is realigned as the DCOS-OPS CJ7 

RS. Examples have included literacy and maneuver (Mobile Strike Force) capability. 

66 




6.20 Specific Army Institutional Advisory Team tasks include: 

a) Complete fielding and support integration of remaining ANA kandaks, in 

accordance with the ANA Fielding Program (known as Annex K). 

b) Support the completion of ANASOF & AAF equipment fielding. 

c) Transition ANA institutions in accordance with the UTP. 

d) Develop commanders and staff of ANDU and ANATEC. 

e) Assist development of an ANA systems approach to training. 

f) Advise on the implementation and development of a unified training, 

education and doctrine dept, to subsume GSG7, ANA Training Command 

(ANATC), and the ANA National Defense University (ANDU). 

g) Advise and assist development of the Afghan National Army Officers Academy 

(ANAOA). 

h) Maintain oversight of Literacy and Language programs. 

i) Assist development of the regional training centers (RCBS/RMTC). 

j) Support ANA capability, force development and capability integration. 

6.21 Specific Police Institutional Advisory Team tasks include: 

a) Maintain responsibility for all requirements directed in the UTP, including 

contract oversight. 

b) Maintain oversight of ANP Literacy and Language programs. 

c) Coordinate SFA efforts with EUPOL-A, German Police Project Team (GPPT), 

International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), and internationally recognized 

police trainers. 

Chapter 6 


Photo: Spc. Ryan Hallgarth 

67



d) Assist with development of Regional Police Training Center (RPTC) programs 

as required. 

e) Encourage and integrate the Rule-of-Law and Evidence Based operations into 

all training/programs at appropriate levels, and provide oversight and guidance. 

f) Provide assistance to Afghan National Police Training General Command 

(ANPTGC) to improve training management and delivery capabilities to include 

Gender Integration. 

6.22 NATO Air Command–Afghanistan (NAC-A). The Commander 9 th Air 

Expeditionary Task Force - Afghanistan (9 th AETF-A) has been designated the 

Commander of NATO Air Command–Afghanistan (NAC-A). This command 

structure offers a significant functional advantage by placing all NATO and US 

operations under the purview of the same senior Airman in theater. Thus, it unifies the 

entire NATO air enterprise but still 

provides the immediate link to overthe-horizon 

air capabilities applied 

by the CFACC. NAC-A is directly 

responsible to the Commander 

of Resolute Support for planning, 

coordination, and monitoring of all 

Air and Space Operations. It also 

performs all institutional training for 

the Afghan Air Force (AFF) and the 

transition of civilian air space and 

airfield control and operations from 

NATO to GIRoA. 

Photo: Staff Sgt. Eric Harris 

6.23 The Civil Aviation Transition Branch (CATB). CATB is responsible for 

providing comprehensive management and planning for the transition of airfields and 

airspace within the Afghanistan Flight Information Region to GIRoA. In doing so, 

CATB provides strategic partnership with GIRoA (Ministry of Transportation / Civil 

Aviation Authority) and other agencies (NAC-A, USFOR-A, NATO, US Embassy, and 

other members of the IC) to progress GIRoA’s aviation sector and set conditions for an 

effective transition to a self-sustainable, Afghan-led aviation structure prior to Resolute 

Support. 

6.24 NATO Air Training Command–Afghanistan (NATC-A). NATC-A’s mission 

is to set the conditions for a professional, fully independent, and sustainable AAF 

that meets present and future security requirements in Afghanistan. The NATC-A 

mission includes supporting the AAF to integrate diverse airpower capabilities that 

are sustainable over the long term. Due to the rapidly changing strategic landscape, 

NATC-A has implemented a holistic system approach that includes an interim strategy 

to set the AAF on a path for sustainability by 31 Dec 2014. The strategy is based on 

four primary Lines of Effort: 1) Strengthen the AAF institution; 2) Build an effective 

AAF resource management and stewardship; 3) Ensure safe and effective aviation, 

maintenance, and support; and 4) Advance AAF-led, -planned, and -coordinated 

mission operations. These Lines of Effort enable the build-up of airpower assets 

by balancing the capacity, capability, and resources of the AAF thereby optimizing 

operational output in support of the Campaign Plan and GIRoA. NATC-A is in the 

process of assessing key issues and capability areas that will form the foundation of the 

AAF endstate as the TAA mission moves into 2015 and 2016. This strategy will include 

additional airpower capabilities to support the ANSF in its mission requirements. 

68 




6.25 NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). 

SOF SFA will align functionally with ASI from the ministerial through tactical 

levels with task-organized advisory units that will focus on sustainable institutional 

development. These advisory units will ensure both the horizontal and vertical 

integration of SFA to the ASSF (see Figure 6.6). While the future SOF SFA model will 

retain the capability to conduct tactical-level advising, the advising effort will shift 

from a primary focus at the unit-based tactical-level elements executing combat, 

combat support, and combat service support operations, to that of developing the 

institutional and functional processes at critical ASSF nodes by functionally based 

advisory entities. 

Chapter 6 

Figure 6.6 NSOCC-A Organization 

6.26 CJIATF-A. CJIATF-A conducts Level 1 and Level 2 advising at the ministerial and 

agency level in support of GIRoA institutional sustainability and security. CJIATF-A 

advising focuses on the MoI and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN). 

a) Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) Team. 

The CJIATF-A MCTF TAA conducts Level 1 advising of MoI and of the NDS’s 

MCTF. The mission of Afghanistan’s MCTF is to conduct criminal investigations 

into senior-level corruption allegations, organized criminal networks, and 

high profile kidnappings or other targeting committed against Afghan persons, 

property, and interests. 

b) Ministerial Advisory Team. CJIATF-A’s Ministerial Advisory Team (MAT) 

conducts Level 2 advising at the MCN on policy, Rule-of-Law, staff management, 

cooperation, and outreach as it relates to counter narcotics, transnational 

organized crime, and other complex cases. A critical task of the MAT is to assist 

in fostering an MCN collaborative working relationship with MoD and MoI. 


69



c) On 16 April 2014, CJIATF-A was directed to assume NTM-A’s responsibility 

of providing mentoring support to CN operations of Afghan units. It was 

assigned lead to synchronize the Coalition’s operational CN efforts and to 

provide enabler and intelligence support to CF and partnered international law 

enforcement action arms supporting CN operations. Accordingly, CJIATF-A 

formed the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) mentoring team. 

The CNPA mentoring team provides Level 1 advising of the deputy minister for 

CN and CNPA and synchronizes Coalition and voluntary national contribution 

support. 

d) Inter-Agency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC). The IOCC 

provides intelligence and analytical and military liaison support to the US Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) and UK National Crime Agency (NCA) 

in their separate missions to train, advise, and assist the specialist units of the 

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) in evidence-based judicial 

investigations. This is in order to disrupt and degrade major Drug Trafficking 

Organizations (DTOs) in Afghanistan and the flow of funds to the insurgency. 

e) Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC). The ATFC conducts Level 

2 advising of MoI’s Financial Investigative Team (FIT), within the National 

Interdiction Unit (NIU), to identify and disrupt Taliban, al-Qaida, Haqqani, 

and other terrorist and insurgent financial networks. The advising line of effort 

assists in identifying illicit financial practices and identifying, arraying and 

applying the whole-of-GIRoA spectrum of tools and authorities available to 

address them. The three 

main lines of operation 

are: 1) investigative and 

analytical support, 2) 

integration of threat 

finance or terrorist 

finance information 

into law enforcement 

operations, and 3) 

host-nation capacity 

development. The desired 

end state is the disruption 

of terrorist and insurgent 

funding and revenue 

streams through all legal 

Afghan authorities and 

Photo: Lance Cpl. Robert Reeves 

capabilities. 

6.27 The Afghan Assessments Group (AAG). The AAG leads Resolute Support 

assessments, synthesizes RS commands’ and headquarters staff ’s assessments into 

strategic reports, and provides analysis of the security environment to COMRS. AAG 

conducts the Strategic Campaign Assessment, which is a continual measurement of 

progress toward intermediate and strategic objectives. The RS strategic campaign 

assessment enables COMRS to document campaign process toward achievement 

of RS’s campaign objectives and NATO’s mission goals. This process integrates 

assessments from subordinate commands with assessments from the RS Headquarters 

(HQ) staff. The primary output, the Quarterly Strategic Assessment Report (QSAR), 

provides a comprehensive strategic picture for COMISAF and higher headquarters of 

progress, transition states, opportunities, challenges, and risks to inform commander 

decisions. 

70 




6.28 The COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT). The CAAT conducts 

embeds, supports pre-deployment training, and informs the advisor network in order 

to observe and facilitate the 8EF processes, advisor network, vertical and horizontal 

integration, and TAAC targeting process. CAAT provides mission continuity to the 

command, mentors advisors to help identify and address systemic issues within the 

vertical processes, and serves as a two-way information conduit that complements 

TAAC assessment programs. CAAT members can go where needed in order to validate 

processes, systems and reporting to ensure that enduring functions are in place and 

delivering as reported. CAAT embeds will occur at all levels and will be coordinated 

and in- and out-briefed with the appropriate EF managers and TAAC commanders. 

6.29 CAAT/RS- CJ7 Training Element / Lessons Learned (TE/LL). CAAT RS CJ7 

TE/LL identifies, collects, analyzes, and disseminates Observations, Lessons, and 

Best Practices (OLBPs). Capturing lessons learned saves lives and money, and over 

time it improves overall RS performance by capitalizing on experiences from specific 

operations or recurrent crucial events. OLBPs are initiated by any advisor in theater 

and presented using the observation, discussion, conclusion and recommendation 

format submitted through the CIDNE database. The OLBPs are analyzed through 

RS lessons learned working groups at RS HQ and shared with JFC Brunssum to 

become Lessons Identified (LI). Chief of Staff RS then develops an action plan that 

includes staffing the lesson in the CIDNE and the NATO LL database. Once the lesson 

is validated it becomes a lesson learned. Lessons learned are disseminated via the 

CIDNE, NATO Lessons Learned, and Joint Integrated Lessons Learned databases, 

RS HQ produced Lessons Learned “Top Tip Sheet,” SFActs magazine, and RS special 

reports. 

Chapter 6 


71



72 




Annex A 


Annex A 






Annex A: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

Annex A 

Figure A-1 


A 

1



Figure A-2 

A 

2 




Afghan National Army 

Corps Laydown 

Figure A-3 

Annex A 


A 

3



Corps Organization 

Figure A-4 

A 

4 




Brigade Organization 

Figure A-5 

Annex A 


A 

5



Infantry Kandak Organization 

Figure A-6 

A 

6 




Mechanized Infantry Kandak (Note: the only Mech Inf Kdk is part of 111 th (Capital) Division) 

Figure A-7 

Annex A 


A 

7



Tank Kandak (Note: the only tank kandak is part of 111 th (Capital) Division) 

Figure A-8 

A 

8 




MI Kandak (one per Corps) 

Figure A-9 

Annex A 


A 

9



Signal Kandak (one per Corps) 

Figure A-10 

A 

10 




ANA Special Operations Command 

Mission: To organize, recruit, train, educate, equip, and deploy all ANASOC 

forces in order to conduct operations in support of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan’s national security objectives. 

Figure A-11 

Annex A 


A 11



Mobile Strike Force (MSF) 

MSF Mission: Provide a rapidly deployable mechanized infantry capability to undertake and 

reinforce operations in support of ANA missions. The MSF mission is to conduct security, 

concentration of force, maneuver support, and reconnaissance operations. Within its capabilities 

it also conducts offensive or defensive operations that exploit the unit’s mobility and firepower. 

Its employment covers all possible tactical applications as they apply to the full range of tactical 

actions, to include enabling and stability tasks. MSF kandaks may function as an independent 

maneuver element or as a part of a corps element. Its subordinate coys may support other tactical 

units within its local corps area of operations or other non-tactical units as directed. 

Figure A-12 

A 

12 




Figure A-13 

Annex A 


A 13



Figure A-14 

A 

14 




Figure A-15 

Annex A 


A 15



Figure A-16 

A 

16 




Figure A-17 

Annex A 


A 17



Afghan Air Force (AAF) 

Mission: To provide trained and ready airmen and soldiers to execute critical tasks from the 

air in support of the ANA, and when directed, the civil authorities of Afghanistan. In a country 

largely inaccessible by road, the Afghan armed forces depend heavily upon the AAF to conduct 

airlift of soldiers and supplies between corps operating locations, casualty evacuation, transportation 

of human remains, air assault, armed overwatch, and aerial escort. 

Figure A-18 

A 

18 




Afghan Air Force Aircraft 

Annex A 

Figure A-19 


A 19



Special Mission Wing 

Figure A-20 

Figure A-21 

A 

20 




Figure A-22 

Annex A 


A 21



Deputy Minister 

CNPA 

LTG 

SPIR 

Col 

777 S 

WU 

Administration 

Col 

Training 

Col 

CNTA Col 

General 

Directorate 

MG 

DG - Chief 

of Staff Lt 

Col 

Deputy 

Minister Chief 

of Staff BG 

Guidance & 

Direction Maj 

Logistics Lt 

Col 

ICT 

Maj 

Finance Lt 

Col 

Clinic 

Maj 

Personnel 

Col 

Press & Public 

Information 

Maj 

Monitoring & 

Controlling 

Lt Col 

SGF Col 

TOC Col 

Money 

Laundering Col 

Laboratory 

Lt Col 

Intel Col 

Detention 

Col 

Special Units 

Directorate 

BG 

Radio 

Room 

Major 

Intel 

Analysis 

Major 

CN Justice 

Center Col 

Sensitive 

Investigation 

Unit Col 

Precursor 

Lt Col 

National Intelligence 

Interdiction Investigation 

Unit Col Unit Col 

Scanner 

Unit Maj 

Borders 

& Airport 

Control 

Lt Col 

Provincial 

Directorate 

BG 

K-9 Unit 

Col 

Kabul Gate 

Maj 

A-Provinces 

Col 

B-Provinces 

Col 

C-Provinces 

Col 

Rank Structure 

General - Gen 

Lieutenant general - LTG 

Major General - MG 

Brigadier General - BG 

Colonel - COL 

Lieutenant Colonel - Lt Col 

Major - Maj 

Captain - CPT 

Figure A-23 

A 

22 




Afghan National Police 

Figure A-24 

Annex A 

Figure A-25 


A 23



Afghan Uniform Police 

Figure A-26 

A 

24 




Figure A-27 

Annex A 


A 25



Afghan Border Police 

Figure A-28 

A 

26 




Figure A-29 

Annex A 


A 27



Afghan National Civil Order Police 

Figure A-30 

A 

28 




Figure A-31 

Annex A 


A 29



AGeneral Directorate of Police Special Units 

30 


Figure A-32



Figure A-33 

Annex A 


A 31



Afghan Public Protection Force 

Figure A-34 

A 

32 




Figure A-35 

Annex A 


A 33



ALP – Basic Command Structure 

MoI 

DM-Security 

ALP Commander 

Provincial Chief 

of 

Police (PCoP) 

District Chief 

of Police 

(DCoP) 

Afghan Local 

Police 

District Leader 

Local Elders 

(Shura) 

Afghan Local 

Police 

Village/Checkpoint 

Leaders 

Afghan Local 

Police 

Guardians 

The ALP Commander runs the program, but he only has ADCON (tracking of recruitment, 

training, equipping, logistics, and finance) authority over the tactical formations. 

▶▶ 

▶▶ 

Figure A-36 

ALP – Training 

ALP Undergo training at Regional Training Centers 

(RTC) or Provincial Training Center (PTC) 

28-day Program of Instruction (POI): 

–– 

Common Core Classes: 

• Afghan Constitution 

• Police Policy 

• Ethics, Morals, and Values 

• Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Use of Force 

–– 

Human Rights 

–– 

Marksmanship (AK-47) 

–– 

Medical 

–– 

Logistics 

–– 

MoI Administrative Processes 

–– 

Battle Drill and Movement Techniques 

–– 

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Detection 

–– 

Vehicle Checkpoint Procedures 

–– 

Search 

–– 

Drug Interdiction 

Figure A-37 

A 

34 




Figure A-38 

Annex A 


A 35



Figure A-39 

A 

36 




ANA Ranks 

Annex A 

Figure A-40 


A 37



ANP Officer Ranks 

Figure A-41 

ANP Enlisted Ranks 

Figure A-42 

A 

38 




Annex B 


Annex B 






Annex B: Process Maps 

A process map is a graphical depiction of an Afghan process, such as MoI Procurement 

and the ANA Recruit, Train and Assign pipeline. It shows the actions that take place 

between the organizations involved in a process at all levels. For example, a map may 

depict the flow of a standardized GIRoA form from an ANA Corps all the way up the 

chain of command to the MoD, as well as illustrating the flow of the requested goods 

from the entity that fills the request back down to the kandak, and all the actions in between. 

The map can identify process friction points (areas where the process typically 

does not work well), communications up, down and across the essential function chain, 

critical nodes in the process, and critical actions that must be conducted to keep the 

process flowing. 

The maps were developed by Essential Function (EF) advisors within five ISAF subordinate 

headquarters (IJC, NTM-A, CSTC-A MAG, NSOCC-A, and 9AETF) and 

are sorted by the eight EF construct. The processes depicted represent the advisors’ 

understanding of the Afghan systems they advise. Some of these processes are well-developed 

and have been fully implemented by GIRoA. Others are still being developed 

by GIRoA, often with the help of ISAF and the International Community. There is less 

clarity on processes that are not as well developed, and the maps depicting those will 

undoubtedly change over time. HQ ISAF CAAT provides the function maps on the 

SFA collaboration portal and document handling system (DHS) to enable advisors to 

update their process maps as the systems mature. In general, process maps are intended 

as tools advisors can carry with them and use for quick reference. 

The process maps in the printed guide were chosen because the advisors believe those 

particular processes are critical to ANSF sustainability. The ISAF-S Collaboration portal 

hosts all the process maps submitted for sharing. 

The following process maps are included in the printed guide. 

Strategy, Policy, & Programming 

• MoD Strategy, Policy, & Programming 

Essential Function 1 

• EF 1 MoI Procurement 


• EF 3 ASSF EvBO 


• EF 4 ANA Recruit, Train, Assign Overview 

• EF 4 ANASOC Manning 


• EF 5 ANA Facility Maintenance 

• EF 5ANA Facility Sustainment 

• MoI Strategy, Policy, & Programming 

• EF 1 MoD Procurements 

• EF 4 ANP Recruit Train Assign Overview 

• EF 4 ALP Manning 

• EF 5 ANP Facility Maintenance 

• EF 5 ANP Facility Sustainment 

Annex B 


B 

1



• EF 5 ANP Logistics 

Essential Function 5 (cont.) 

• EF 5 ANA Sustainment 

• EF 5 ANP Equipment Fielding 

• EF 5 ANA Equipment Fielding 

• EF 5 ANP Class III 

• EF 5 ANA Class III 

• EF 5 ANP Class V 

• EF5 ANA Class V 


• EF 6 ANA C2 

• EF 6 ANP C2 

• EF 6 GCPSU C2 


• EF 7 ANA Intel 

• EF 7 ANP Intel 

• EF 5ANP Sustainment 

• EF5 ANP Class VII 

• EF 5 ANA Class VII 

• EF 5 ANP Class VIII 

• EF 5ANA Class VIII 

• EF 5 ANP Class IX 

• EF 5 ANA Class IX 

• EF 5 SMW Class IX 

• EF 6 ANASOC C2 

• EF 6 AAF C2 

• EF 7 ANASOC Intel 

B 

2 




Acronyms 

A2G: Air-to-Ground 

AAF: Afghan Air Force 

ACCC: Air Command and Control 

Center 

Afs: Afghan currency 

AFSAT: Air Force Security Assistance 

Training 

AMOD: Assistant Minister of Defense for 

AT&L: Acquisition, Technology, & 

Logistics 

P&A: Programs and Analysis 

S&P: Strategy and Policy 

ANA: Afghan National Army 

ANAREC: Afghan National Army Recruiting 

Command 

ANASOC: Afghan National Army Special 

Operations Command 

ANDS: Afghan National Development 

Strategy 

ASC: Army Support Command 

ASD: Aviation Support Depot 

ATF: Afghan Territorial Force 

BC: Budget Circular 

BWG: Budget Working Group 

C2: Command and Control 

CDOOQC: Commando Qualification 

Course 

CF: Commando Force 

C-JTSCC: CENTCOM Joint Theater Support 

Contracting Command 

CLS: Contractor Logistics Support 

CMIC: Civil-Military Interoperability 

Cell 

CN: Counter-narcotics 

CNGD: Counter-Narcotics General 

Directorate 

CoGS: Chief of General Staff 

COORD: Coordination 

CRU: Crisis Response Unit 

Dep41: Department 41 

DBAC: Defense Council Budget Committee 

DCPG: Defense Capabilities Planning 

Guidance 

DLI: Defense Language Institute 

DM: Deputy Minister 

DMSEC: Deputy Minister for Security 

DOIU: District Operational Intelligence 

Unit 

DPI: Directorate of Police Intelligence 

DV: Distinguished Visitors 

FW: Fixed Wing 

FOC: Full Operating Capability 

FOO: Fuel Ordering Officer 

GFC: Ground Forces Command or 

Ground Forces Commander 

GOP: Guidance for Operational Planning 

GRC: Ground Regional Commander 

GS: General Staff 

GSK: General Support Kandak 

GSPG: General Staff Planning Guidance 

GSU: Garrison Support Unit 

HAF: Helicopter Assault Force 

HF: High Frequency Radio 

IPCB: International Police Coordination 

Board 

IOC: Initial Operating Capability 

ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 

ISU: Investigative Surveillance Unit 

KACC: Kabul Area Control Center 

KKA: Ktah Khas 

KMTC: Kabul Military Training Center 

LLVI: Low Level Voice Intercept 

LRAFB: Little Rock Air Force Base 

MICO: Military Intelligence Company 

MID: Military Intelligence Detachment 

MIK: Military Intelligence Kandak 

MINDEF: Minister of Defense 

MIPO: Military Intelligence Provincial 

Operations 

MIRO: Military Intelligence Regional 

Operations 

Annex B 


B 

3



MoD: Ministry of Defense 

MoF: Ministry of Finance 

MoFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

MOI: Ministry of Interior 

MMC: Material Management Center 

MSFV: Mobile Strike Force Vehicles 

MSP: Ministry of Interior Supply Point 

Mx: Maintenance 

MUS: Mission Unit Specialty 

NATC-A: NATO Air Training Command 

– Afghanistan 

NIMS: National Information Management 

System 

NIU: National Interdiction Unit 

NMCC: National Military Coordination 

Center 

NMIC: National Military Intelligence 

Center 

NMS: National Military Strategy 

NMU: National Mission Unit (Ministry 

of Interior) 

NSP: National Security Policy 

NTA: National Threat Assessment 

NTEC National Targeting Exploitation 

Center 

OCC-P: Operations Coordination Center 

– Provincial 

OCC-R: Operations Coordination Center 

– Regional 

ONSC: Office of National Security Council 

PBAC: Program Budget Committee 

PCoP: Provincial Chief of Police 

PeH: Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (Afghan Air 

Force Air University) 

PHQ: Provincial Headquarters 

PMO: Program Management Office 

PoA: President of Afghanistan 

POIU: Province Operational Intelligence 

Unit 

PRC: Provincial Response Company 

PWG: Program Working Group 

RHQ: Regional Headquarters 

RLSC: Regional Logistics Supply Center 

RSC: Regional Support Center 

RTCs: Regional Training Centers 

RW: Rotary Wing 

SDPD: Strategic Defense Planning Directive 

SOB: Special Operations Brigade 

SOE: School of Excellence 

SFQC: Special Forces Qualification 

Course 

SOK: Special Operations Kandak 

SOLE: Special Operations Liaison Element 

SMW: Special Mission Wing 

SPO: Support Operations 

SPTC: Special Police Training Center 

SPTW: Special Police Training Wing 

ST&CG: Strategic Targeting & Coordination 

Board 

TAA: Train, Advise, and Assist 

TCoE: Training Center of Excellence 

(Shindand Air Base) 

TGC: Tactical Ground Commander 

TMO: Traffic Management Office 

TT&CG: Tactical Targeting and Coordination 

Board 

UPT: Undergraduate Pilot Training 

USACE: US Army Corps of Engineers 

B 

4 




Current as of: 5 Dec 2013 

POC: CSTC-A, MoD/MAG 

MAGSeniorAdvisor@centcom.isaf.cmil.mil 

Strategic 

NTA 

MoD Strategy/ Policy/ Programming 

“Ends” 

National Security Objectives 

NSP 

ANDS 

National 

Interests 

1 

PoA 

ONSC 

6 

Afghan 

Cabinet 

National 

Assembly 

Approval 

(NOV) 

“Ways” 

(JUN) 

GOP 

“Means” 

National 

Military 

Objectives 

GSPG 

SDPD 

NMS 

(MAY) 

DCPG 

2 

3 

MoD 

MINDEF 

AMoD 

S&P 

AMoD 

P&A 

Ciphers 

5 

MoF 

MoD-F 

4 

Afs 

Budget 

Hearings 

All Ministries 

Program Budget Committee/ 

Defense Council Budget 

Committee 

BC-1 

BC-2 

Program Working Group/ 

Budget Working Group 

SFA 

coverage 

REQUIREMENTS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

1 

(AUG) 

(NOV) (APR) (2006) 

2 

(OCT) 

ONSC defines the “Ends” of National Strategy 

AMoD S&P defines the “Ways” and “Means” 

AMoD develops 3yr Budget Circulars 1 and 2 

MoD-F screens Requirements 

MoF determines 1yr Budget Ceiling 

PoA approves Funding and Budget Limits 

Tactical 

Units 

1 

2 

3 

3 

Friction Points: 

MEETINGS 

MEETINGS 

(MAR-APR) 

(MAY-JUN) 

(OCT) 

The lack of overarching guidance; the NTA and NSP 

has not been updated since 2010. 

Weak operational capability assessment process. 

No process to accurately ensure a Total ANA-wide 

prioritized sustainment requirements’ list for the 

next 3 years (BC1 submission). No procedure to 

evaluate the effects on required capabilities when 

BC2 limits resources available. 

(Weekly) 

To view the detailed information paper that accompanies this process map, please visit the online version of SFA Guide 2.0 at https://ronna.apan.org/SFAGuide 

Annex B 


B 

5



SFA coverage 

MoI Strategy/ Policy/ Programming 

NTA 

Police 

Law 

ANP 

Inherent 

Law 

Combined 

Inter- 

Ministerial 

Security 

Strategy 

NSP 

SPD 

ANDS 

National Security Objectives 

National 

Police 

Objectives 

“Ends” 

10-YR 

Vision 

“Ways” 

National 

Priority 

Program 

PoA 

Minister of 

Interior 

DM 

STRATPOL 

3 Gen. Strat. 

4 

Directorate 

“Means” 

NPS 

1392-7 

MoI 

DMs 

Gen. Pol. 

Directorate 

2-YR 

Support 

Plans 

General 

Directorates 

DM 

BC-1 Support 

Afs BC-2 

Afs 

Police 

Pillars 

National 

Assembly 

Approval 

Afghan 

Cabinet 

P&A 

Directorate 

National 

Priority 

Program 

1392-3 

OPLANs 

Budget 

Hearings 

All Ministries 

Program 

Working Group 

Force Mgt. 

Directorate 

Requirements 


POC: DCOM MAG/MOI MAG 

DSN 318-449-5308 

1 

Inability to publish a 

relevant and current 

National Security Policy 

2 Delay in publication of these 

documents 

3 

4 

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

Difficulty translating 

strategic guidance into 

action plans, policies, and 

budget estimates 

Issues with requirements 

development process , 

Command Plan Review (CPR) 

and Tashkil Review Board 

(TRB) and actual tashkil 

publication 

Delays in receiving budget 

estimates impedes timely and 

accurate submittal of data 

necessary to build future 

programming budgets. 

1 

1 

ONSC 

MoJ 

MoI 

MoD 

NDS 

Office of Nat’l Sec Council issues strategic guidance 

Police-centric guidance issued 

DM, STRATPOL direction and 10 yr vision 

Policy Directorate translates requirements 

Programs & Analysis develops budget circulars 

Tactical unit requirements 

DM Support submit budget requests 

PoA approves funding and guidance 

2 

3 

2 

8 

MoF 

5 

5 


Strategic 

7 

4 

Tashkil 

1393 

6 

34 

PCOPs 

Tactical 

B 

6 





POC: MoI MAG Procurement 

DSN 318-449-0205 

Ministry of Interior Procurement Overview 

Procurement Process 

Requirements 

Owners 

Logistics 

Facilities 

Fire 

Surgeon General 

Finance 

Info/Comm/Tech 

Provincial HQs 

Procurement Plans 

Statements of Need 

Statements of Work 

Funds Verification 

Contract Execution & 

Quality Assurance 

Procurement Plan 

consolidation and 

approval 

Announce Tender 

Special 

Procurement 

Commission 

Stakeholders 

Ministry of Finance 

Ministry of 

Economy 

Ministry of Justice 

Procurement Policy 

Unit (Oversight) 

Approvals 

Produces 

Friction 

Point 

Finance 

Friction 

Point 

Procurement Department 

Produces 

Contracts 

Controller (Funds 

Certifier) 

Done 

by 

*Statement of Needs Friction Point: Requirements require justification and approval prior to procurement initiation 

**Funds Verification Friction Point: Procurements are subject to funds availability 

Annex B 


B 

7




POC: MoD-MAG AT&L 

DSN 318-449-0214 

MoD Central Procurement 

End User 

End User Req’t 

Generation 

2 

4 

User’s Fin 

Officer 

Verifies Funds 

End User 

Commander 

Approves Req’t 

4 

Acq Agency (AA) 

Receives Req’t 

AA 

Req’t 

Analysis 

AA 

Solicitation 

(Request For Proposal) 

Friction Points 

Negotiation occurs at bid 

1 

opening and approval points 

Re-solicitation occurs without 

re-engaging the End User 

Delays in approval impacts 

timely award 

Poor requirement package 

result in poor quality goods and 

services 

2 

4 

NO 

NO 

Procurement Committee 

Bid Recommendation 

Re-solicitation 

(if necessary) 

2 

AA 

Bid Evaluation 

AA 

Bid Opening 

1 

Touch Points 

Awarded contract entered 

1 

into AFMIS 

2 MoD-F enters MoD16 into 

AFMIS for payment 

3 MoF payment entered into 

AFMIS 

Vendor 

Completes 

contract 

YES 

MoF 

Executes Payment 

to Vendor 

MinDef 

Endorsement 

Special Procurement 

Committee (SPC)* 

Approval 

3 

YES 

MoDF 

MoD16 to MoF 

MinDef 

Approval 

YES 

NO 

1 1 

3 3 

2 

AA 

Award 

Administration 

Post Award 

Conf 

1 

Key: 

End User 

Acquisition Agency (AA) 

Other MoD Org 

External Organization 

*SPC: 

Min Justice 

Min Finance 

Min Economy 

Execution 


Last Updated: 22 August 2013 

POC: COL Stoddard 449-0914 

B 

8 




Annex B 


B 9



B 10 




Annex B 


B 11



B 12 




Annex B 


B 13



Current as of: 26 May 14 

POC: NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A 

DSN: 700-787-3953 

4 

NDS 

C2 

Information Exchange 

Coordinating Authority 

ABP 

MOI 

CT 

DPI 

≈CNPA 

Cycle 

2 

6 

NDS 

124 

1 

NTEC 

6 

3 

Court 

1 

5 

ABP 

MOI CT 

Forensic 

Lab 

≈CNPA 

Cycle 

Detention 

Facility 

5 

≈CNPA 

Cycle 

x34 

NDS 

1 

x34 

2 

Prov 

DPI 

ASSF EvBO 

MOI 

3 

HQ 

DPI 

GCPSU 

5 

Saranwal 

2 

2 

ISU 

J3 Tgt 

Mgmt Cell 

6 

NMU 

DPI 

SMW 

PCOP 

222 

444 

x25 

2 3 3 4 

x19 

PSU 

DPI 

PSU 

1 

Prov 

ISU 

2 

2 

2 

2 

4 

2 

5 

5 

≈CNPA 

Cycle 

333 

5 

1 

1 

CNPA 

2 

1 

2 

1 

3 

3 4 

4 

OR 

5 

5 

1 

6 

x34 

CNPA 


- Lack of Trust 

- Not all Units Fielded 

- Poor Interagency Cooperation 

- Not receiving NTEC TIPs 

- Insufficient Saranwal Coverage 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Communication Down 

1 - Collection Tasking Issued 

2 - Target Packet Delivered/Updated 

3 - Saranwal adds Warrant 

4 - Operational Directive Issued 

5 - SSE/Biometrics Analysis 

Delivered 

6 - Intel/Fused Assessment 

Communication Up 

1 

- Intel/Local Assessment 

Provided 

- Info/Tasking Request Sent 

- Target Packet Nominated 

- Target Feasibility Reviewed 

- SSE/Biometrics Results 

Provided 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Partnership Inject 

- Coalition / Contractor 

assistance 

B 14 





POC: Chief of Staff DCOM-A 

318-449-7865 

Critical Functions 

1 

Literacy is tested at 

ANAREC. Officers must be 

literate, NCOs must be able to 

read and write. There are no 

literacy standards for soldiers, 

most of whom cannot read or 

write. Recruitment not against 

Branch requirements. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 


Selected students unable to 

cope with literacy challenges of 

Branch School course. 

Many Officers and NCOs are 

sent straight to Corps to fill posts 

without any related Branch 

School Training. 

Failure to employ personnel as 

they have been trained. 

No established Military 

occupational Skills system and 

Career progress path. 

Unwillingness of Corps to send 

students to Kabul National Branch 

Schools. 

ANARC unwillingness or 

lack of capacity to recruit 

female NCO and officer 

candidates 

1 

6 

6 

Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) 

42 weeks 

Annex B 

1 

4 

5 

2 

2 

3 


B 15




POC: NSOCC-A, J5 

DSN: 700-787-3754 

ANASOC Manning 

MoD 


3 

4 

5 

6 

1 

2 

Communication up and sideways 

Units Input fill requirements to ANASOC 

ANSOC submits request to MoD to Recruit 

Recruiting Teams visit KMTC and SOKs 

Recruits go from KMTC and SOKs to attend SOE 

Personnel is selected to Commando 

Qualification Course (CDOQC) or SFQC 

Graduates distributed to units 

7 

1 

2 

ANASOC 

DIV 

1 

G1 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Projected force fill requirements insufficient 

Ad hoc, untrained, and unfunded recruiting section 

CDOQC not synced with KMTC 

SOKs not supporting recruiting 

Positions filled by Unit Commands unnecessarily 

Unit is filled by duty position and not by MOS 

Female recruitment failure 

2 

1 1 START 

2 

3 3 

KMTC SOE 

SOBs SOKs GSK MIK 

4 

3 2 4 

4 5 6 

GSU 

5 


1 

2 

Critical Function 

Cipher is written 

School of Excellence 

CDOQC 

SFQC 

6 

1 

2 

MoD approves and provide guidance 

to ANASOC 

ANASOC forwards Cipher for recruiting 

specific numbers 

B 16 





POC: NTM-A/DCOM-P 

DSN 314-449-1545 


- 1 Monthly Manpower Working 

Group (MPWG) & Weekly 

RTA Meetings 

- 2 Training Centre effectiveness 


1 

- Inaccurate understanding of 

training requirements 

2 

3 

- Inaccurate planning of training 

- Inaccurate graduation data 

- Women recruitment progress 

too slow compared to plans 

4 

5 - Women not assigned to proper 

posts according to education 

level 

ANP Recruit, Train, Assign 

MoI 

GDoP 

1 2 

1 

1 

GRC TGC 

2 

Pillars 

2 3 

Process 

- 1 MoI id’s recruiting requirements 

1 

- 2 GRC/Pillars id’s training needs 

- 3 TGC develops Training Plan 

- 4 Graduation data sent to General 

Directorate of Personnel (GDoP) 

- 5 GDoP assigns students 

5 

2 

3 4 

4 

Training 

Sites 

GDoP 5 Pillars 

Annex B 


B 17





DSN: 700-787-3754 

ALP Manning 

3 

MoI 

Issues Cipher 

5 

DM 

SEC 

1 

2 

4 

4 

ALP 

CDR 

3 

ANP 

TGC 

3 3 

ANP 

GRC 

1 1 

2 

2 

4 

Unit Requirements: 

•Recruitment 1 ALP 

•Promotion 

•Gap reporting 

3 

1 

UNITS RTCs 

1 

1 

4 

2 

3 


MoI guidance/ciphers to DM SEC 

DM SEC directs ALP CDR, GRC & TGC. 

ALP CDR transmits ciphers /actions to units 

ALP HQ interacts with units, GRCs, TGC and RTCs to 

fill manning requirements IAW tashkil 


1 

ID, recruit, train, and/or fill manning 

requirements 


- 1 Units do not report/ anticipate loss 

- 2 Loss of visibility on district requirements 

- 3 Lack of communications capability within 

chain of command 

- 4 ALP CDR is 1 star and has less influence than 

his colleagues at the same level, who are 

two-star generals 


1 

Units report and ID requirements to ALP CDR 

2 

ALP HQ receives manning reports from ALP 

units 

3 

ALP interacts with GRCs and TGC to cross-talk 

on unit gains, reports/transport of recruits, 

training/trends , and then compiles & 

forwards reports/requests to DM Sec 

4 

DM Sec reviews manning issues/Reqs and 

FWD Recommendations to 

MoI 

5 

MoI receives request and directs GRC to 

increase/ decrease recruiting 

B 18 




ANA Maintenance 

Current as of: 5 June 2014 

POC: DCOS ANSF LOG 

DSN: 318-449-0716 

MoD 

Process Highlights & Friction Points: 

Process Improvements: 

Repair 

Time 

National 

• Requirements generation 

• Human capital management 

• Command emphasis on 

maintenance 

• Enforcement of readiness data 

collection 

• ECOD approval process 

1 2 3 4 

AT&L GS/G4 

National 

Depot Level 

11 

LOG CMD 

5 

CWS ACOP 

CSD 

MMC 

National 

• CWS / ANA Component Overhaul Program (ACOP) provides overhaul 

capabilities 

• MMC provides C2 of logistics enterprise 

• T/I repair and return repairable item to the supply system 

1. Requirements generation/ Human capital management 

2. Accountability/ uneven command emphasis on maintenance 

3. Standardize reporting procedures/ enforcement of readiness data 

collection 

4. Cumbersome ECOD approval process 

5. MoD14 Process impedes the distribution of parts 

6 7 8 11 

RLSC 

Operational/ Regional 

• Performance measurements 

36 hrs 

General 

1 

Contact 

Teams 

CLK 

FSD 

Tactical/ Organizational 

• Performance measurements 

24 hrs 

Organizational 

Operational/ Regional 

• Deploy contact team, evac to RLSC for T/I repair and return or 

complete evac of repairable item to ACOP/ CWS or conduct vehicle 

ECOD through MOD 64 process 

6. Lack of Mechanics due to poor personnel management and 

resistance to off site training due to desertion and higher headquarters 

commandeering students attending the CSS school. 

7. COREIMS available where the infrastructure can support it. 

8. Ineffective distribution system for parts disbursement to lower 

levels 

Tactical/ Organizational 

• T/I repair and return or complete evac to RLSC 

• RLSC utilizes its FSD for CL IX and is Combat Logistics Kandak (CLK) for 

maintenance 

9. Perceived lack of repair parts due to requests for unauthorized ASLs 

11 

9 

6 

5 th CSSK 

Maint 

COY 

HQ COY 

Maint 

PLT 

SPT PLT 

Unit/Kandak 

• Maintenance Cycles 

• Drivers Training/ Maintenance 

Training 

• Reporting accurate OR rates 

12 hrs 

Organizational 

6 9 10 11 

Kandak 

Unit/Kandak 

• T/I repair and return repairable item to the supply system or evac to 

CSSK for repair 

10. Lack of accountability for willful negligence designed to exploit the 

maintenance system for profit 

11. Lack of literacy 

Friction Point COREIMS Mechanics Supply Request Up 

Supply Request Down Equipment Flow 

Annex B 


B 19



2 


POC: CSTC-A MoD MinDev 

DSN 318-449-0284 

Have 

(Basing Reports) 

Construction Property 

Management Dept 

(CPMD) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

A 

B 

XXX 

C D E 

1 

MINDEV = 5/20 

FE = 15x 

Corps 

ANA Requirements and Resourcing 

Need 

(Valid Requirements) 

Ministry of 

Defense 

GSG8 

Basing and facilities report 

Unvalidated Requirements 

Validated Requirements 

Prioritized Requirements 

Budget Validation 

National Security Strategy & Policy 

C 

3 4 

2 

MINDEV = 6/ 6 

5 

6 

Afford 

(Priorities) 

Parliament 

Ministry of 

Defense 

Finance 

MINDEV = 4/4 MINDEV = 4/ 4 

= # Advisor Teams/# Units 

To view the detailed information paper associated with this process map, please visit the 

online version of the SFA Guide at https://ronna.apan.org/SFAGuide 

Critical Advisor Skills 

Strategic 

1. Cross cultural sensitivity 

2. Strategic/Program Management 

3. Systems thinking - stakeholders 

4. Policy development 

5. Acquisition and Financial 

Operational 


2. Project Management 

3. Budget and Financial Management 

4. Communication – written, oral 

5. Process management 

Tactical 


2. Technical - Engineering, construction 

3. Budget and Financial 

4. Communication – written, oral 

5. Process management 


A CPMD does not have a full understanding of all 

bases and facilities being turned over 

B 

C 

D 

E 

No real property inventory exists to help CPMD to 

justify and defend prioritized requirements 

Little historical data exists to develop requirements, 

and estimate projects 

Facility Engineers do not have a documented 

quality assurance/ quality control process 

Dominance of western style construction standards 

1 

B 20 




ANP Maintenance 

Current as of: 15 Jun 2014 


DSN 318-449-9102 

Repair 

AUP ANCOP ABP Log Chain of Command Time 

Process Highlights & Friction Points: Process Improvements: 

MMC-P 

National 

• Receiving accurate maintenance 

issues and Operational Readiness 

Rates from subordinate units 

+ 36 hrs 

NLC Wardak 

ABP 

HQ 

ANCOP 

HQ 

AUP 

HQ 

National 

• CMSF & NLC provide total overhaul 

capabilities 

• Trans Brigade transports contractor repair 

parts from NLC to RLC workshop 

Trans 

BDE 

Regional 

• Getting Recovery Teams to perform 

their mission 

RLC 

24-36 hrs 

BDE 

HQ 

BDE 

HQ 

Regional 

HQ 

Workshop 

Recovery 

Vehicle 

Regional/Brigade HQ 

• HQs coordinate vehicle recovery to RLCs 

• Repairs taking longer than 36 hours are 

evacuated to the CMF or NLC 

• Workshops and Recovery Vehicles are 

centrally located at each RLC 

• Contractor has no recovery responsibility 

Provincial 

• Accurately reporting maintenance 

faults to contractor 

• Accurately reporting operational 

readiness to higher 

• Literacy program 

MSP 

Kandak 

HQ 

Kandak 

HQ 

Provincial 

HQ 

Less Than 24 hrs 

MST 

Provincial/Battalion HQ 

• MSPs provide a hard location for 

maintenance and can store repair parts 

• Repairs taking more than 24 hours are 

evacuated to the RLC via POC 

• Identification of coordinating POC for 

evacuation 

• Reporting accurate OR rates 

Unit/District 

• Establishing maintenance SMEs at 

the unit level to identify and report 

faults to ensure proper parts are 

brought by MST 

• Literacy program 

Coy 

HQ 

Coy 

HQ 

District 

HQ 

MST 

Police 

Station 

Police 

Station 

Police 

Station 

Unit/District HQ 

• Mobile Support Teams support (services, 

diagnosis, minor repairs) for reported 

vehicle maintenance issues 

• Teams come to one central location each 

month 

• Units are not providing an accurate 

picture of maintenance issues 

Organic asset Contractor asset Friction Point Technical Support Reporting Direct/Subordinated Coordination 

Annex B 


B 21




POC: CSTC-A MoI MinDev 

DSN 318-449-3971 

ANP Facility Sustainment 

National 

8 

1/1 

MoI P 

MoI DM Support 

MoI F 

5 

Emergency 

Contract 

4 

A 

Prov. O&M 

Contract 

Provincial 

District 

C 

Special Procurement 

Commission 

6 

7 

MoI Facilities 

Department (FD) 

B C 

PGOV 

Provincial HQ 

1 

2 

UP DHQ 

C 

1/1 

6/63 

1/1 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

1/1 

NLC 

RLC 

3 

1/1 

Deficiency Identified 

Statement of Need 

Supply System 

Maintenance Contract 

Emergency Contract 

MoI DM SPT validation 

MoI FD prepares SOW 

MoI P Awards Contract 

Critical Advisor Skills 

Strategic 

1. Develop O&M Policies & Processes 

2. Improve Communications 

3. Develop Strategic O&M Vision/Goals 

4. Develop Training 

5. Establish a Tracking System 

Operational 

1. Develop Provincial & District Policies 

2. Improve Communication 

3. Implement Prov. & Dist. Training 

4. Utilize Tracking System 

5. Improve Record Keeping 

Tactical 

1. Develop SON Process 

2. Basic O&M Training 

3. Preventive Maintenance Training 

4. Utilize Tracking System 

5. Improve Communication 

A 

B 

C 


6 Week Lag in Finalizing Award Docs 

No Tracking Tools to Monitor Status 

Lack of Written Procedures 

= # Advisor Teams/# Units 

To view the detailed information paper associated with this process map, please visit 

the online version of the SFA Guide at https://ronna.apan.org/SFAGuide 

B 22 






DSN 318-449-9102 

ANP Logistics 


1 - Operational command and 

control functions 

- RLC 

- MMC 

MoI 

MMC 


2 

- 1 AUP District/ANCOP Kandak 

submits requests to Type-B/C 

PHQ/SSK 

- 2 Type-B/C PHQ/SSK validates 

and issues request to Type-A 

PHQ/ANCOP BDE 

- 3 Kandak submits request to 

ABP Zone HQ 

- 4 HQs/Zones/BDEs validates 

and issues requests to RLCs 

- 5 RLC validates and issues 

requests to MMC 

- 6 If items are not in inventory, 

request is sent to MoI for 

approval/ procurement 

1 

4 

Type-A 

PHQ 

Type 

B/C HQ 

1 7 1 3 

District 

6 

5 

1 

2 

RLC 

4 5 1 3 

ABP 

Zone 

NLC 

Trans 

BDE 

ANCOP 

BDE 

2 6 1 3 2 6 1 3 

3 6 1 3 

Kandak 

4 

3 

SSK 

1 7 1 3 

Kandak 

Annex B 

1 


- Limited feedback from MMC 

on request verification 

- Visibility between RLC and 

MMC 

2 

- Compliance to policies issued 

from MoI 

3 

4 - Type-A PHQ/RLC relationship 


- MoI approval/procurement 

1 

guidance to MMC 

- 2 MMC issues MoI14 to NLC 

- 3 NLC generates MoI9 for unit and 

coordinates shipment through 

Trans BDE 

- Trans BDE ships equipment to 

4 

RLC 

- RLC issues equipment to HQs 

5 

- 6 HQs issues equipment to 

subordinates 

- 

7 

Supply Activity issues equipment 

to Districts/Kandaks 


B 23





DSN 318-449-9102 

ANP Sustainment 

Process Highlights & Friction Points 

• MMC forwards requirements to DOL for procurement of 

items not in inventory 

• MMC Item Manager validates MoI 14 and forwards to 

NLC. 

• NLC issues MoI 9. 

• Trans BDE programs movement to RLC 

• Loss of visibility of MoI 14s at MMC 

• No feedback on request status 

• No Demand Signal/ Inventory visibility / Excess 

Management. 

• Limited sustainment convoys (1 per month if at all) 

30-35 

Days 

14-28 

Days 

DOL 

MMC 

NLC 

Trans 

BDE 

• RLC validates requests 

• RLC checks stocks on hand; issues MoI 9 and 

equipment 

• MoI 14 forwarded to MMC if equipment is not on 

hand 

• HQ units pick up equipment from RLC 

• Signatures required for MoI 14 to leave RLC 

• Limited digital system for MoI 

• Demand history is not tracked 

4-6 

Days 

RLC 

4-7 

Days 

• HQ validates requests 

• MSP checks stocks on hand; if not available MoI 14 is 

sent to the RLC 

• Issues MoI 9 and equipment to requesting units 

• If MoI 14 is denied, no feedback provided 

• Signatures required by HQ leadership 

• Limited MSPs are available 

• Limited stock at MSPs 

• Unit request supply item and fills out MoI 14. 

• Signature required on MoI 14 by unit leadership 

• Lack of formalized catalogue 

2-3 

Days 

2-3 

Days 

HQ 

Unit 

MSP 

2-3 

Days 

58-85 Days Total 

BLUF: 

• The developing ANP Supply System and limited stock at the RLCs creates a slower system than developed systems. 

• ANP are developing their COREIMS capabilities, but are still far behind, causing difficulties with the MoI 14 process. 

• MoI 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback . 

• Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoI Level. 


NLC 

• Develop National Catalog 

• Continue to establish CORE IMS 

capability 

• Increase frequency of ANP convoys 

• Establish demand history of requested 

items to build and refine ASL 

• Utilize contracted convoys to increase 

sustainment frequency 

RLC 

• Establish demand history of requested 

items to build and refine ASL 

• Literacy programs 

• CORE IMS Network Expansion/ 

Implementation to all RLCs 

• Improve MoI14 status requests from 

MMC 

Kandak/ Provincial HQ 

• Approved ASL followed by resourced ASL 


• Improve MoI14 status requests from RLC 

Unit/District 


• Improve MoI14 status requests from HQs 


Critical Node (Down) 

Critical Node (Up) 

Flow of MoI 14 Request 

Flow of MoI 9 and 

equipment 

1 

B 24 






DSN 318-449-9102 


• ASC SPO validates MoD 14 and forwards to GSG4. 

• GSG4 approves via MoD 9. 

•MMC directs subordinate DEPOTs to fulfill request if O/H 

•Depots fill request if on hand. 

• CSD Releases; CMA Delivers 

• GSG4 insertion into the approval process 

• Demand Signal/ Inventory visibility / Excess Management 

• Catalog discrepancies 

• User Training for CORE IMS 

XXX 

• G4 validates request 

• MoD 14 forwarded to RLSC 

• MoD 14 to ASC 

• No appreciable connectivity with CORE IMS at Corps / 

RLSC 

I 

• CSSK check stocks on hand; if not available MoD 14 is 

sent to the RLSC 

• If MoD 14 is denied, no feedback provided 

• Unit request supply item and fills out MoD 14. 

• Signature required on MoD 14 by unit leadership 

X 

ANA Sustainment 

30-35 

Days 

14-28 

Days 

4-6 

Days 

2-3 

Days 

2-3 

Days 

Kandak 

submits 

MOD 14 

XXXX 

ASC 

XXXXX 

GSG4 

XXX 

RLSC 

(FSD) 

XXX 

G4 

S4 

II 

CSS 

II 

XXXX 

MMC 

CSD 

CMA 

4-7 

Days 

2-3 

Days 



EAC 

• Developing National Catalog 

• CORE IMS User Training 

• Increase frequency of CMA convoys 

• Advisors at key nodes 

XXX 

Corps/ RLSC 


• Core-IMS Training and Network 

Expansion Plan includes RLSC 

X 

Unit/Kandak/CSSK/Brigade 

• Approved ASL followed by resourced 

ASL 




Annex B 

MoD 9 fill at 

Kandak 


Flow of MOD 14 

Flow of MOD 9 Fill 

BLUF: 

• Overall, the bureaucracy of the Afghan supply system and low ASL levels at CSSK and RLSC creates an unresponsive system that has a best case response time of 2 – 3 months. 

• Difficulties with the National Catalog (multiple stock /part numbers for the same item) creates difficulties in the completion of the MoD 14. 

• MoD 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback . 

• Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoD Level. 


B 25




POC: IJC ANSF DIR 

DSN 318-449-9524 


• MoI identifies and develops requirements 

• Equipment is procured by DOL 

• MMC tracks equipment and requirements 

• NLC receives /ships equipment to RLC 

• Items are not in inventory 

• Delayed entry into country 

• Equipment shipped to RLC for distribution 

• RLC distributes to MSPs 

• Establishment of distribution plan 

• Establishing New Equipment Training (NET) 

• Limited MSP available 

ANP Equipment Fielding 

2-3 

Weeks 

MoI 

DOL 

MMC 

NLC 

RLC 

MSP 


MoI 


• Strategic planning 

• Bureaucratic issue process 

• Multiple Tashkils 

• Accountability 

• Established ASL determined and procured 

prior to fielding 

• Efficient Push and Movement of Equipment to 

Unit 

RLC 


• New equipment training 

• Cross leveling 

• ASL establishment packages 

• HQs/Units receive equipment 

• Conduct New Equipment Training 

• NET planned but not conducted by all 

2-3 

Weeks 

NET 

2-3 

Days 

New 

Equipment 

Training 

HQs 

HQs/ Units 

• Sustainment package with initial 

fielding 

• New Equipment Training (NET) plan and 

Execution 


Units 


Flow of Equipment 

BLUF: 

• Equipment procured without full sustainment consideration. Results in part shortages and subsequently vehicles awaiting repairs. 

• Push letters not issued in a timely manner delaying fielding often > 30 days. 

• Once Title Transfers are complete vehicle visibility is lost and may be given to different recipients. 

B 26 






DSN 318-449-9524 

EAC 


ANA Equipment Fielding 

XXXX 

GSG4 

• GSG4 develops requirement 

• Equipment is procured and shipped 

• CSD receives /ships equipment to RLSC 

• No ASL Procurement prior to fielding 

• CSD delays of up to 30 days for distribution 

• Multiple Tashkils 

• Bureaucratic issue process 

Corps/ RLSC 

• Equipment shipped to Corps then Bde 

• Modified distribution plan 

• No New Equipment Training (NET) 

XXX 

30-60 

Days 

2-3 

Weeks 

MOD AT&L 

MMC 

CSD 

XXX 

RLSC 

(FSD) 

XXX 

G4 

CMA 

XXX 

CORPS 


• Unit receives equipment 

• New Equipment Training conducted 

X 

• NET planned but not conducted by all 

2-3 

Weeks 

NET 

2-3 

Days 

X 

S4 

New 

Equipment 

Training 

X 

BDE 

II 

CSS 

II 

Comd bypasses 

training / 

changes 

distribution 

BLUF: 

• Equipment procured without full DOTMLPF consideration. Results in part shortages and subsequently vehicles awaiting repairs. 

• Push letters not issued in a timely manner delaying fielding often > 30 days. 

• CDRs decision to bypass new equipment training and to redistribute vehicle differently than the fielding plan. 

• Results in vehicles manned by unqualified soldiers and possible in wrong units. 

Annex B 


EAC 


• Strategic planning 


• Established ASL determined and procured 

prior to fielding 

• Efficient Push and Movement of Equipment 

to Unit 

XXX 

Corps/ RLSC 


• Afghan Commander modifications 

• New equipment training 

• Cross leveling 

• Sustainment packages 

X 

Unit/ Kandak/CSSK/ Brigade 

• Sustainment package with initial 

fielding 

• New Equipment Training (NET) plan and 

Execution 



Flow of 

Equipment 


B 27



Current as of: 20 OCT 14 

POC:MOI/MAG Logistics 

Advisor 

DSN: 318-449-0357 

If DDS can fill, the 

MoI 14 stops here; if 

not, send to MMC-P 

Direct 

Delivery 

Site 

Unit 

CDR 

Unit 

Logistics 

Officer 

Unit Fuel 

Order 

Officer 

MoI 

Form 

14 

ANP Class III Sustainment 

(Fuel Ordering) 

MMC-P Signatures Required 

Customer 

Care Center 

(MMC-P) 

MMC-P 

General 

(MMC-P) 

General 

Supply 

(MMC-P) 

Class III 

Director 

(MMC-P) 

Fuel 

Ordering 

Officer 

Fills order if able 

* Fuel Ordering Officer 

sends fuel request to 

vendor via email 

Vendor 

Unit sends organic 

asset to pick up 

fuel 

•Site POC signs delivery ticket 

or Delivery Inventory F8 

and gives vendor a copy 

Direct 

Delivery 

Site 

* Vendor provides all delivery 

tickets or Delivery Inventory 

MoI7 and invoices to FOO 

Vendor 

Vendor 

Vendor 

MOF 

MOI-F 

Fuel 

Ordering 

Officer 

* DFAS releases funds 

to vendor based on 

funds availability in the 

line of accounting 

* MOI-F process packet and 

submits payment request 

to MOF for funds 

disbursement to vendor 

* After reconciliation process is 

complete, FOO provides all approved 

fuel orders, delivery tickets or Delivery 

Inventory MoI 7, and Invoices to MOI-F 

Logistics Functional Team 

Strategic Level: 

• Colonel/OF-5 

• LtCol/OF-4 

• Sr NCO/OR-8 

• Major/OF-3 

Operational Level: 


• 2XCaptain/OF-2 

• 2X Sr NCO/OR-7 


Unit Inventory 

Management: inability to 

properly manage re-order 

points causes unit to go 

black on fuel 

*Reference: 

MoD Decree 4.6 

B 28 




Current as of: 5 June 2014 


DSN: 318-449-0716 

ANA Class III Sustainment 

(Fuel Ordering Process) 

If RLSC can fill, 

the MoI 14 stops 

here; if not, send 

to MMC-P 

RLSC 

Corps 

G4 

BDE 

S4 

Unit CDR 

Unit 

Supply 

ASC SPO validates request against MoD 32 Consumption 

Report prior to sending request to MMC-A 

Mobility 

Plans 

CLIII 

Manager 

G4 visibility only; request 

automatically goes to RLSC 

MoD 

Form 

14 

* If CSSK cannot fill, it is 

sent to Regional level 

CSSK 

* If CSSK can fill, the 

MoD 14 stops here 

Vendor 

MOF releases funds 

to vendor based on 

availability of funds 

in the line of 

accounting 

ASC 

SPO 

MMC-A 

Current 

Ops 

* MMC-A process prior to sending 

request to Fuel Ordering Officer 

CLIII 

Manager 

Unit sends organic 

asset to pick up 

fuel 

MOF 

MOD-F approves the 

allocation of MOD 

funds to the request 

and submits to 

Ministry of Finance 

(MOF) 

MOD-F 

Chief of 

Supply 

MMC-A/ 

CG 

*Direct Delivery Site POC signs 

Delivery ticket and gives 

vendor a copy 

*Vendor provides all delivery 

tickets or Delivery Inventory 

MoD7 and Invoices to FDO 

AAA processes packet 

and submits payment 

request to Ministry of 

Defense- Dept. of 

Finance (MOD-F) 

AAA 

Fuel 

Ordering 

Officer 

Vendor 

*Vendor delivers 

Fuel to Direct Delivery Site 

Direct 

Delivery 

Site 

Vendor 

Fuel 

Ordering 

Officer 

After reconciliation process is 

complete, FOO provides all approved 

fuel orders, delivery tickets or 

delivery Inventory MoD7, and 

invoices to AAA (Procurement Office) 

Logistics Functional 

Team 











Unit Inventory 

Management: inability to 

properly manage re-order 

points causes unit to go 

black on fuel 

*Reference: 

MoD Decree 4.6 

Annex B 


B 29





DSN: 318-449-9102 

ANP Class V Sustainment 

MoI Process 

• NLC/ MMC-P validates and approves MoI 14 

• DOL Class V Director creates MoI 9 from processing MoI 14 

• DOL Class V Director forwards MoI 9 to National Depots 

• National Depot issues ammo from MoI 9 and arranges 

transportation, pallets and sets up connections w/ local units 

• Transportation Brigade transport to RHQ/ RLC for District 

Police if the P/U is not local. The RHQ/ RLC will then arrange 

with unit to pick up requested ammunition 

• DOL lack of knowledge in ammunition management 

RHQ/ RLC/ MoI Tech Center 

• Reviews requested MoI 14 & expenditure reports 

• Checks RLC stock level and supplies, if on hand 

• Issues if stock O/H 

• Orders by RLC UIC from 22/25 Bunkers 

• When MoI 14 goes directly to MoI Tech, RHQ/ RLC ammo 

authorizations are not being validated , which prolongs 

the process 

• RHQ/ RLC doesn’t have visibility of unit shortages & 

requests 

TRANS 

BRIGADE 

NATIONAL 

DEPOTS 

DOL/ CLASS V 

DIRECTOR 

NLC/ 

MMC-P 

MoI 

TECH CTR 

MHQ/ MSP 

• Validates and approves MoI 14 and sends MoI 14 to 

RHQ/ RLC 

• MHQ/ RLC does not create MoI 14 for unit 

• MHQ consolidates all MoI 14 under the MHQ UIC 

• Push MoI 14 directly to MoI Tech Center instead of 

RHQ/RLC 

• MoI Tech only fill s the MHQ Taskil requirements due 

to the MHQ UIC on the MoI 14. Each unit must submit 

MoI 14 with UIC to get required Taskil ammo 

requirements 

District Police/ District HQ 

• Unit requests ammo, fills out MoI 14 then sends to 

District HQ 

• District HQ reviews MoI 14 & ensures supporting 

documentation (expenditure report) 

District 

Police 

submits 

MoI 14 

RHQ/ 

RLC 

MHQ/ 

MSP 

DISTRICT 

HQ 

DISTRICT 

POLICE 

MoI 9 fill at 

District 

Police 

CHALLENGES: 

1) Overall, the bureaucracy of the Afghan MoI 14 system and low ABL levels at 

District Police and RLC creates an unresponsive system that has a best case 

response time of 2 – 4 months. 

2) MoI 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback. 

Current Process Improvements: 

MoI 

• MMC-P processing MoI 14 w/ minimum 

supervision 

• Increased frequency of CMA convoys 

• Advisors at RLCs 

MHQ/ MSP 













Flow of MoI 9 Fill 


Advisor 


B 30 






DSN: 318-449-9102 

EAC Process 

• ASC SPO validates MoD 14 and forwards to MMC 

• MMC forwards to AT&L for validation 

• GSG4 Class V Command gives final approval 

• Class V Command determines source (22 Bunkers or 

Chimtallah) and produces MoD 9 

• If not local pickup , then CMA convoy transports items to 

Corps 




• MoD 14 flow between GSG4 and MMC not IAW Log Decree 

Corps/ RLSC 




• No appreciable connectivity at Corps / RLSC 

Unit/ Kandak/ CSSK/Brigade 



• If CSSK denies MoD 14 , no feedback provided 

Unit Level/ Process 

• Unit requests supply items, fills out MoD 14, and 

attaches expenditure report 


ANA Class V Sustainment 

XXX 

X 

Kandak 

submits 

MoD 14 

XXXX 

ASC 

XXX 

RLSC 

(FSD) 

XXX 

G4 

X 

S4 

II 

CSS 

II 

XXXXX 

AT&L 

GSG4 

XXXX 

MMC 

Class V 

Command 

CMA 


EAC 


• Advisors at key nodes 

XXX 

Corps/ RLSC 

• Development of RLSC ABL 


Advisor 


Annex B 

I 

MOD 9 fill at 

RLSC 

MOD 9 fill at 

Kandak 











Flow of MoD 14 Request 

CHALLENGES: 

1) Overall, the bureaucracy of the Afghan supply system and low ABL levels at CSSK and RLSC creates an unresponsive system that has a best 

case response time of 2 – 3 months. 

2) Difficulties with the National Catalog (multiple stock /part numbers for the same item) creates difficulties in the completion of the MoD 14. 

3) MoD 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback. 

4) Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver, which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoD Level. 

5) Accurate accountability and use of correct MoDIC’s to identify, track, and account for Class V stocks. 

Flow of MoD 9 Fill 



B 31





DSN: 318-449-9102 

ANP Class VII Sustainment 

NLC-Wardak 

MoI Process 

• MMC-P validates request 

• MSC generates the MoD 9 

• MMC-P generates MoD 1384 to schedule 

convoy 

• Trans Bde loads convoy; LNO signs for items; 

items delivered to RLC 

• Once equipment arrives unit waits up to 30 days 

for distribution 

National/ 

Regional 

MMC-P 

MSC 

Trans 

Bde 

Regional HQ/ RLC 

RLC 

• MoI 14 forwarded to RLC 

• HQs Commander modifies distribution 

plan 

Unit/PHQs 

District/ 

Province 

Regional HQ 

• Unit generates MoI 14 


• Unit sends personnel to training 

• Unit sends maintainers to training 

• PHQ Commander modifies Distribution 

plan 

Unit 

submits 

MoI 14 

PHQ 

Unit 

MoI 9 fill 

CHALLENGES 

• Equipment does not get to needed unit in an expedient manner 

• Modification to distribution plan (at PHQ or Zone level) 


MoI Process 

• Procurement and acquisition process 

Zone HQ/ RLC 

• Contract maintenance 

Logistics Functional Tm- 






• 






Flow of MoI 9 Fill 


Advisor 


B 32 






DSN: 318-449-9102 

EAC Process 

ANA Class VII Sustainment 

I 

XXXXX 

GSG4 


• MMC forwards to GSG4 to generate fielding plan 

• GSG4 directs MMC to generate MoD 9 

• CSD fulfills request if O/H 

• CSD generates MoD 1384 to CMA to schedule 

convoy 

• CMA loads convoy; Corps LNO signs for items; 

items delivered to RLSC 

• Once equipment arrives unit waits up to 30 

days for distribution 

Corps/ RLSC 




XXX 

• Corps Commander modifies distribution plan 

X 


• Unit generates MoD 14 

• BDE sends equipment to unit 


• Unit sends personnel to training 

• Unit sends maintainers to training 

XXXX 

ASC 

XXX 

RLSC 

(FSD) 

XXX 

G4 

X 

S4 

II 

CSS 

II 

XXXX 

MMC 

CSD 

CMA 

• Brigade Commander modifies Distribution plan 

Kandak 

submits 

MoD 14 

CHALLENGES 

• No ASL procured prior to fielding 

• Equipment does not get to needed unit in an expedient manner 

• Modification to distribution plan 

• Poor visibility over on-hand / mission capable fleets at national level 

Annex B 


EAC 

• Procurement and acquisition process 

• Established ASL determined prior to 

fielding 

• CMA Convoy runs once a month 

XXX 

Corps/ RLSC 

• WG Development and resource of ASL 

Flow of MoD 14 Request 

Flow of MoD 9 Fill 



MoD 9 fill at 

Kandak 











Advisor 


B 33




POC: NTM-A CMD Surg 

DSN 319-449-5910 

Critical Functions 



- MoI (Ministry of Interior) 

- OTSG (Office of the Surgeon 

General) 

- Class VIII NSD 

ANP Class VIII Sustainment 

3 

4 

MoI 

1 

1 

3 

2 

OTSG 

2 

1 


- Limited feedback from NSD to 

1 

Med Units on requests status 

- 2 Limited Visibility between Med 

Units and NSD on req’ts and 

what’s available in NSD 

- 3 Inconsistent MoI Log Policies 

1 

2 

3 


All ANP Medical Units submit Class 

VIII supply requests (MoI 14s) to 

NSD 

NSD validates and issues supplies (if 

available) directly to unit 

representative OR to MMC to be 

shipped by Trans BDE to RLC 

If items are not in inventory, request 

is either substituted by NSD, 

coordinated thru OTSG to MoI for 

approval/ procurement, or returned 

as an un-validated requirement 

• 4 If requested items are shipped by 

Trans BDE to RLC, requesting unit 

travels to RLC to receive 

items 

MMC-P/ 

Trans BDE 

4 

RLCs 

5 

4 

Class VIII 

NSD (Kabul) 

3 

1 

2 

3 

1 

All ANP 

Med Units 

- 4 MoI Procurement Process long 

and cumbersome 


- MoI approval/procurement/ 

1 

2 

distribution guidance to MMC and 

OTSG 

OTSG provides finalized Class VIII 

guidance/contracts from MoI to 

NSD for execution/distribution 

- 3 NSD issues supplies or returns 

request to customer in Kabul OR 

- 3 NSD generates MoI Form 9 for unit 

and coordinates shipment through 

MMC & Trans BDE 

- 4 Trans BDE ships supplies to RLC 

- 5 RLC notifies Med Unit(s) to pick up 

Class VIII supplies 

B 34 





POC: NTM-A CMD Surg 

DSN: 318-449-5910 

1 - MEDCOM/ LOGCOM Cross 

Communication 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 


MEDCOM Distribution Plan 

development and dissemination 

LOGCOM status updates 


Unit submits MoD 14 to KDK 

KDK submits MoD 14 to BDE 

BDE and/ or RMH submits 

MoD 14 to Corps FSD 

Corp FSD submits to MoD 14 to ASC 

ASC submits MoD 14 to MMC 

MMC submits MoD 14 to NSD Class 

VIII warehouse for distribution 

NSD contacts MEDCOM for nonstocked 

valid requests 

8 

MEDCOM submits annual 

requirements to AT&L 

ANA Class VIII Sustainment 

3 

LOGCOM 

NSD 

CLVIII 

1 

AT&L 

1 

2 

8 

7 1 

1 

MMC 

ASC 

6 

5 

MEDCOM 

G4 

2 

2 

Corps 

FSD 

4 

3 

P&T 

Committee 

RMH 

3 

2 

BDE 

3 

3 

2 

UNIT 

4 

1 

KDK 

Annex B 

1 


Limited feedback from ASC and 

MMC on request status 

2 

Lack of communication between 

LOGCOM and MEDCOM 

3 

P& T committee subjectively 

changing distribution plan 

quantities 


NSD generates MoD 9 for unit and 

coordinates shipment by the Trans 

BDE to the Corps FSD 

1 

2 

Corps FSD issues equipment to 

supported RMH and BDE 

3 

BDE issues supplies to KDK 

4 

KDK issues to Unit 


B 35





DSN: 318-449-9102 

ANP Class IX Sustainment (Future) 

AUP ANCOP ABP Log Chain of Command 

Process Highlights: MMC-P 

Process Improvements Needed: 

National 

• Contractor procures, distributes and 

maintains a nation ASL based on the 

demand history of the fleet. 

AUP 

HQ 

ANCOP 

HQ 

ABP 

HQ 

NLC Wardak 

Trans 

BDE 

National 

• Update MoI Policy to reflect a 

future organic system. 

• Develop a future organic national 

ASL. 

Regional/Brigade HQ 

• Type A HQs receives Form 63 from 

subordinate HQs or direct from units. 

• RLC POC receives MoI 63. 

Type A 

HQ 

RLC 

Regional 

• Update MoI policy to reflect a 


• Develop a future organic regional 

ASL. 

Provincial/Battalion HQ 

• Provincial HQ receives MoI Form 63 

and submits to RLC POC. 

Provincial 

HQ 

Kandak 

HQ 

Kandak 

HQ 

Provincial 




PLL. 

Unit/District HQ 

• Police Station identifies a vehicle in 

need of maintenance and notifies 

DHQ. 

• DHQ notifies POC at Provincial HQ and 

submits MoI Form 63. 

District 

HQ 

Police 

Station 

Coy 

HQ 

Police 

Station 

Coy 

HQ 

Police 

Station 

Unit/District 




PLL. 

MoI Form 63 Class IX repair parts 

Organic asset 

B 36 




Current as of: 20 OCT 13 

POC: NTM-A DCOM-SPO 

DSN: 318-449-5847 

EAC Process 


• MMC forwards to GSG4 to generate fielding plan 

• GSG4 directs MMC to generate MoD 9 

• CSD fulfills request if O/H 

• CSD generates MoD 1384 to CMA to schedule convoy 

• CMA loads convoy; Corps LNO signs for items; items delivered to 

RLSC 




• MoD 14 flow between GSG4 and MMC not IAW Log Decree 

Corps/ RLSC 




XXX 

• 4 Signatures required for MoD 14 to leave Corps/RLSC 

• No 1098/1099 forms created for items not in stock. 

• CoreIMS only exists at national levels 

• No appreciable connectivity at Corps / RLSC 

Unit/ Kandak/ CSSK/Brigade 



• If MoD 14 is denied, no feedback provided 

Unit Level/ Process 

• Unit requests supply item s and fills out MoD 14 


ANA Class IX Sustainment 

30-35 

Days 

14-28 

Days 

XXXX 

ASC 

X X 

S4 

4-6 

Days 

2-3 

Days 

Kandak 

submits 

MoD 14 

2-3 

Days 

XXX 

RLSC 

(FSD) 

XXXXX 

GSG4 

XXX 

G4 

II 

CSS 

II 

XXXX 

MMC 

CSD 

CMA 

4-7 

Days 

2-3 

Days 

MOD 9 fill at 

Kandak 



EAC 


• Metered parts delivery 

• Command Directed CLIX push 

• CORE IMS User Training 


• Advisors or LTATs at every key node (GSG4, 

ASC, CSD, CMA and MMC) 

XXX 

Corps/ RLSC 

• Development of RLSC ASL 


• Core-IMS Training and Network Expansion 

Plan includes RLSC/RLC 

Annex B 

I 


Strategic Level 









Flow of MOD 14 Request 

1) The bureaucracy of the Afghan supply system and low ASL levels at CSSK and RLSC create an unresponsive system that has a best case 

response time of 2-3 months. 


3) MoD 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback. 

4) Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver, which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoD Level. 

Flow of MOD 9 Fill 


Advisor 



B 37





DSN: 700-787-3754 

SMW Class IX Sustainment (Future) 

(Once Post-RSM/Coalition Sustainment Contract is Complete) 

MMC-A/ OEM Process 

• MMC-A validates MoD 14 

• OEM fulfill procurement , release part to ASD with all 

passport and applicable documentation 

• All distributions to Tech Supply (Squadrons) from the 

ASD will be done via the Air Movement Request (AMR) 

process or coordinated effort between the ASD and the 

SMW based on priority of request 

• User Training for MIS 

30-35 

Days 

14-28 

Days 

X X 

MMC-A* OEM 

Suggested Process Improvements: 

EAC 


• Metered parts delivery 

• Command Directed CLIX push 

• MIS User Training 

• Advisors or LTATs at every key node (GSG4, 

ASC, CSD, CMA and MMC) 

Aviation Support Depot (ASD) 

• ASD validates MoD 14 

• If ASD can fill the entire request, issue a MoD 9 and 

issue requested items 

• If ASD can only fill a portion of the request, issue a 

MoD form 9, adjust the quantity requested and the 

ASD forwards to the MMC-A for acquisition 

4-6 

Days 

X 

ASD 

4-7 

Days 

AAF/SMW HQ 

• Development of Aviation CL IX ASL 


• MIS Training and Network Expansion Plan at 

MeS and KAF 

• Limited demand analysis capabilities 

Squadron Level Process 

• Unit request supply item and fills out MoD 14 

• Signature required on MoD 14 by unit Maintenance 

Management Officer 

• Tech Supply reviews the unit’s authorization. If Tech 

Supply can fill the entire request, issue a MoD form 9 and 

issue requested items. 

• If Tech Supply can only fill a portion of the request, issue a 

MoD form 9 for amount issued, adjust the quantity 

requested, then forward the request to the AAF Aviation 

Support Depot (ASD) 

• Signatures required for MoD 14 to leave squadron 

• If MoD is denied, no feedback provided 

2-3 

Days 

2-3 

Days 

Squadron 

submits 

MOD 14 

X 

Tech 

Supply 

II II 

3RD 4TH 

HQ SMW 

(1 per Sqd) 

II 

1&2 

2-3 

Days 

MOD 9 fill 

at 

Squadron 


Squadron 

• Approved ASL followed by resourced ASL 


Flow of MoD 14 

Request 

Flow of MoD 9 

Fill 


Friction Point 


1) Overall, the bureaucracy of the Afghan supply system and low ASL levels at CSSK and RLSC creates an unresponsive system that has a best case response time of 2 – 3 months. 


3) MOD 14 can be killed at any level w/o feedback . 

4) Immaturity of Afghan contracting takes 6 – 12 months to deliver which necessitates detailed Log planning at the MoD Level. 

* Currently the procurement of CLIX sustainment is provided through the Task Order Requests for Proposals (TORP) 110 contract. Future acquisition of OEM Class IX should be procured through the 

MMC-A IAW the MoD Log Decree 4.0* 

B 38 






DSN 318-449-9524 

ANA C2 


1 

1 - MoD guidance to GS 

2 - GS Guidance to GFC 

3 - GFC Ciphers to Corps 

- Corps 

- Ciphers to subordinates 

- Cross Pillar Coordination 

8 

1 

CoGS 

3 

3 

Corps 

4 

MoD 

3 

1 

GS 

4 

1 - Corps / OCC-R Receives 

- Corps and GS bypass GFC 

- NMCC taskings to Corps 

bypass GFC 

2 

- Limited communications 

between NMCC and GFC 

3 


1 

1 

GFC 

6 

2 

5 

2 

2 

4 

7 

NMCC 

4 

OCC-R 

1 




- NMCC 

- GFC 


information from subordinate 

units 

2 - Cross Coordination between 

Corps and OCC-R 

3 - Corps Reports to GFC 

4 - OCC-R reports to NMCC 

5 - NMCC and GFC Coordination 

6 - GFC reports to GS 

7 - NMCC reports to GS 

8 - GS provides analysis to MoD 

Annex B 


B 39





DSN 318-449-9524 


1 - Lack of required communication systems 

(data / MoI/MoD Net) 

2 - Provincial/KDK/KDK bypasses OCC-P 

3 - Type A/BDE/Zone bypasses OCC-R direct 

to their HQ 


2 

- 1 Operational C2 without 

bypassing the OCCs 

(NPCC, OCC-R, OCC-P) 

9 

AUP/ANCOP/ABP 

3 

3 

8 

Type A/BDE/Zones 

2 

4 

3 

1 

Provincial/KDK/KDK 

1 

7 

5 

2 

ANP C2 

MoI 

1 

10 

DM of 

Security 

Ops / Plans 

NPCC 

1 

6 

OCC-R 

4 

OCC-P 

1 


- 1 MoI guidance to DM Security 

- 2 DM Security directs ANP Pillar HQ 

- 3 ANP Pillar HQ Ciphers to subordinate HQ 

- 4 Type A /BDE/Zones 

- Ciphers to Subordinates 

- Cross Pillar Coordination 


1 - Provincial / KDK / OCC-P receives information 

2 - Cross Coordination with OCC-P 

3 - Provincial/BDE/KDK reports to Type A/BDE/Zone 

4 - OCC-P reports to OCC-R 

5 - Type A/BDE/Zone coordination with OCC-R 

6 - OCC-R to NPCC Coordination 

7 - ANP HQs liaison with NPCC 

8 - A/BDE/Zone reports to Pillar HQs 

9 - ANP HQs report to DM Security 

10 - DM Sec provides analysis to MoI 

B 40 




Current as of: 27 JUN 14 


DSN: 700-787-3754 

1 

CRU 

222 

CF 333 

ATF 

444 

MoI 

DM of 

Security 

1 

GCPSU 

2 

1 

OPCOM 

3 3 

3 

1 

OPCOM 

1 

SPTW 

SPTC 

Annex B 

GCPSU C2 

COORDINATION 

PCOP 

1 

2 

3 

TACON 

PSUs 

ISUs 


- 1 Operational tasking C2 of NMUs 

1 

2 

3 


Misuse of PRC by PCOP 

Tasking ISU not properly coordinated 

Lack of Log Support PCOP to PRC 

1 

2 

3 


MoI provides policy to subordinates 

DMSEC gives direction to GDPSU 

GDPSU distributes ciphers 

1 


ISU PRCs and NMUs all report to 

GDPSU (Current ISU HQ embedded 

will be part of GDPSU HQ staff) 

SPTW/SPTC direct to GDPSU 

NMUs 


B 41





DSN: 700-787-3754 

Ministry 

of Defense 

8 

G3 Plans 

Strategic level 

Operational 

level 

6 

Tactical level 


1 

Communication: Corps with 

SOB/ SOK CDRs 

2 

Intel developed by NDS & 

MoI and shared with MoD 

2 

CoGS 

1 

9 

GSG3 

ANASOC 

3 

3 

SOB 

4 

1 

SOK 

8 

ANASOC C2 

2 

MoI 

1 

NDS 

GFC 

7 

4 

5 

1 

Corps 

2 

1 

2 

OCC-R 

3 

2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 


LNO’s at different commands to overcome potential 

friction points 

1 

Understand relationships (Supported/Supporting) 

2 

Operational support from ANA Corps to SOB/SOK 

3 


MoD CoGs provide guidance to GSG3 

- Directions for GFC/Corps/ANASOC 

MoD Cipher to ANASOC 

- Execution based on CoGS directive 

ANASOC Cipher to SOB 

- RW and MSFV operations 

- Coord with other ministerial organizations 

- Time Sensitive Targeting operations 

SOB Cipher to SOK 

- Time Sensitive Targeting operations 


SOKs to SOB/OCC-R Receives information 

- Low level risk, Recon Patrols, QRF, Shuras, & Councils 

Coordination: SOK/SOB with ANA Corps (direct liaison or 

through OCCR) 

SOBs to ANASOC 

- Med level risk 

- Organic assets and ext support (MSFVs, HAF, Joints OPS) 

- Corps OCC-R 

Coordination: ANASOC with GFC 

- High Risk (Political) 

- Inter-ministry Coordination (MoD, MoI, NDS) 

- Coordination with GFC, MoI(GDPSU HQ), NDS(124) 

Coordination: ANASOC with ANA Corps 

Coordination: ANASOC & G3 Plans 

Corps reports to GFC 

- Seasonal Plan & Major combined OPS, OPLAN 

ANASOC & G3 Plans reports to GSG3 

GSG3 guidance to MOD 

- Recommendations from ANASOC, GFC/Corps, G3 Plans 

B 42 




Current as of: 26 Nov 13 

POC: NATC-A/CAO 

NATC-A438AEWJ5@swa.army.mil 

Critical Activities 

1 - Prioritize national taskings 

1 

2 - Develop daily/weekly flying 

program, monthly resupply 

plan 


C2 doctrine not adhered to 

(mission priority, 7-line, etc.) 

2 - Demand exceeds supply 

(limited number of aircraft), 

impacting fleet health and 

aircraft availability 

3 - Ops/training balance not 

adhered to (impacts FOC) 

Last Updated: 27 Sep 13 Version 20130927A 

POC: NATC-A/J5S, DSN 237-5824 

1 

1 

2 

1 3 

1 

GFC 

1 

Corps HQ 

2 

2 

2 

AAF C2 

1 

MoD 

1 

1 

MoD/GSG3 Air 

1 

HQ AAF/ACCC 

1 

AAF Wings/Dets 

Annex B 

3 

Downward Flows 

1 - Issue taskings 

Upward Flows 

1 - Up-channel support requests 

- Coordinate national requests 

1 

Internal Activities 

2 

Coordinate regional requests 

4 

6 

45 

= # NATC-A Air Advisors (estimated based on 

current manning) 

(2015 unconstrained NATC-A requirement is 600 

Coalition/contract personnel) 

Chain of command (tasks, status reports, etc.) 

Coordination 


B 43





DSN 318-449-9524 

ANA Tactical Intelligence Architecture 

(with Advisor Support) 

OCC-R 

OCC-P 

CI 

Corps 

BDE Tactical 

Operations Center 

MI Company 

Analysis 

LLVI 

HUMINT 

MIRO 

HF HF (or internet) 

HF 

HF 

HF 

HF 

HF (or internet) 


Military Advisors 

ANA Kandak 

COORD COORD 

HF (or internet) 

COORD COORD 

HF 

HF 

HF 

MIPO 

ANA Kandak 


Military / Contractor Advisors 

Military / Contractor Advisors 

Legend 

Orders 

Coordination 

Communication 

Legend 

Collection 

ADVISOR SUPPORT: 

Intelligence support varies among the 

ANSF Corps to include military and 

civilian contractor advisors 

B 44 





POC: MoI MAG, Police Intelligence 

DSN 318-449-5110 

By IPCB sub-working group 2-Year 

plan Security, Intelligence & 

Terrorism PROPOSED Afghan Police 

Information Model (APIM) 

Critical Nodes 

Decision making by TT&CG and 

ST&CG 

ANP Intelligence Dissemination/Fusion 

TT&CG 

NIMS 

Incl 

forensic/biometric 

1 

1 

MoI 

DM of 

Security 

1 Policy dev and implementation 

4 

1 

DMSec chairs 

2 Training 

ST&CG 

2 

3 Oversight 

4 5 

4 3 

1 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 


Deliberately not forwarding data 

to the NIMS (all contributors) 

Sustainment connectivity NIMS 

Not enough qualified personnel 

Nepotism 

Lack of cross-pillar cooperation 

Limited analytical capabilities 

personnel 

1 

2 

4 

NDS 

ST&CG 

4 

1 CN 

1 

Police 

2 

2 

3 

4 

Members 

T&CG: 

DPI, AUP, 

ANCOP, AACP, 

ABP, CN pol 

1 

6 

2 

DPI 

NTEC/Dep41 

3 

ANP 

Pillars 

3 

3 

1 

2 

3 


Control Strategy/Environmental Scan 

Priority Intelligence Requirements 

Recommend for further investigation 

Target and problem packages, 

authorized for police action 

2 

3 


Data push through the NIMS 

Proposed Target and Problem Packages 

Strategic Intelligence Assessment 

Activities (strategic & tactical) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Collect 

Collate 

Analyze by Dep41/Assess by NTEC 

Disseminate 

Review (continuous) 

Annex B 


B 45





DSN: 700-787-3754 

ANASOC Intelligence 

CoGS 

GS 

1 

NMCC 

GS G2 

ANASOC 

4 4 

5 

1 

2 

NMIC 

2 

ANASOC 

G2 

2 

4 3 ANASOC 

MIK 4 

1 5 

2 

4 

3 

SOB 

2 

SOK 

1 

1 

MID 1 

1 

2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

1 

2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 


Intel Collection assets 

Intel Analysis capability 


MIDs not FOC until SEP 14 

NMIC IOC until JAN 14 

ANASOC MIK does not receive source funds 

from division 

Limited comms between ANASOC to intel 

and collection capability 


MoD collection priorities, intel and source 

funds pushed via Ciphers to subordinates 

ANASOC submits RFIs to subordinate units 


Intel staff facilitates intel push from MIDs to 

MIK and SOK S2 

Intel staff facilitates intel push from SOK to 

SOB 

SOB Intel partner pushes intel to ANASOCG2 

ANASOC facilitates intel sharing with G2 

and MIK; then given to the ANASOC CDR 

Intel pushed from ANASOC to NMIC, NMCC, 

and GSG2 

B 46 




Annex C 


Annex C 






Annex C: SFA Training Standards & SFA METL 

The aim of this Annex is to provide advisors with common training directions and 

standards for SFA and RS leaders with a recommended FBSFA Advisor Mission Essential 

Task List (METL). Commander Joint Forces Command BRUNSSUM (JFCB) 

Resolute Support Training Directive 1 and US Guidance on Common Training Standard 

for Security Forces Assistance 2 provide the guidance needed to meet the requirements 

in a changing environment. The FBSFA advisor METL is derived from Security Force 

Assistance Teams’ best practices. 

I. Common Training Directions and Standards for Security 

Force Assistance (SFA) 

C.1 Introduction. The ISAF/RS mission is rapidly evolving and the NATO ISAF PDT 

community must also evolve to meet current and future requirements. As the ISAF 

footprint in Afghanistan is reducing, it is even more important that Pre-Deployment 

Training (PDT) produce the best personnel possible. Training requirements have been 

generated using the experience gathered over several years and are designed to assist 

advisors in developing the capability to perform the FBSFA mission. 

C.2 Advisor Selection and Training. In accordance with NATO policy, Troop Contributing 

Nations (TCNs) provide properly trained and equipped forces for operations. 

It is essential to operational success that nominated advisors meet the requirements 

of the job description and mission, including experience, background, qualifications 

and language proficiency. The very nature of SFA is so reliant upon personality, that 

the decisive point of an SFA mission may well be the selection, training and education 

of advisors in preparation for that mission. Advisors should therefore attend designated 

national and NATO-led ISAF PDT prior to deployment. Deploying Units should 

equally meet standards and requirements. 

C.3 Advisor Identification/Nomination. Nations should identify and nominate 

advisors in time to enable individuals to benefit from NATO-led PDT. With a substantial 

number of Individual Augmentees (IAs) filling CE positions, early nomination is 

particularly critical in both enabling the individual to take part in NATO-led PDT and 

the tailoring of that PDT. TCNs are responsible for conducting national training prior 

to deployment and thus meeting Allied Command Operations (ACO) Force Standards 

criteria. Advisors are the most prominent group of personnel that serve with ANSF. 

The relationship between advisors and ANSF is vital. Rigorous vetting and selection 

of advisor personnel by the TCN is therefore critical to ensuring that those personnel 

directly engaged in SFA possess not only the required knowledge, skills, and abilities, 

but also the right temperament and attitude required to work closely with ASI/ANSF 

personnel. 

C.4 JFCB RS Training Concept. The primary focus of RS is to Train, Advise and 

Assist (TAA) GIRoA. ISAF PDT will focus on TAA and HQ staff training as is required 

to support the TAA mission. It is built to ensure preparation of key staffs and leaders 

Annex C 

1 Commander JFC BRUNSSUM Resolute Support Training Directive 75-9, dated 10 April 2014 and available 

on ISAF-S Portal at: http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/DCOSOPS/CJ7/TE/LISTS/Training%20Docs/ 

AllItems.aspx 

2 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Guidance on Common Training 

Standards for Security Forces Assistance (SFA), dated 14 January 2014 and available on Ronna Net (UN- 

CLASSIFIED) https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/FBSFA_Rollout_Jul14/SitePages/Home.aspx 


C 

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as well as TCNs personnel for service in ISAF. COM JFC Brunssum has identified four 

overarching PDT objectives that apply to each level of Command in ISAF. 

a) Promote continuity and common standards. 

b) Establish mission awareness in individuals. 

c) Ensure functional area competence. 

d) Facilitate staff integration and coordination. 

C.5 ISAF PDT is executed in 4 phases. The overall concept is described in Figure 

1. The JFCB Training Directive provides detailed requirements for all 4 Phases. The 

directive describes details for the NATO-led training, covering all levels and entities. 

Theater Specific Training Recommendations are covered in annexes A – C. 

Figure 1: JFCB PDT Concept 

C.6 Phase 0 – Personnel Selection. Appropriate selection is a prerequisite for training. 

Characteristics include appropriate background, education, rank, age, and personal 

attitude are fundamental to successful advising of high ranking and experienced 

Afghan counterparts. Discriminate vetting by TCNs is critical to ensuring advisors 

posses required knowledge, skills and abilities; and the right temperament and attitude 

necessary to TAA Afghan officials. 

C.7 Phase 1 – National/SHQ Training. Training required during this initial phase includes 

completion of all Nationally-mandated PDT requirements. Personnel deploying 

for a NATO operation are required to meet the ACO Force Standards as delineated in 

the ACO Force Requirements Volumes II and VII and associated addenda. Personnel 

must also meet the requirements as delineated in the individual job description of the 

position that they will deploy to. Additionally, personnel must be prepared to meet the 

specific challenges unique to specific theaters. 

C.8 Phase 2 – NATO Training. This training aims at preparing the personnel for their 

mission by providing one-source knowledge, increasing situational awareness and 

ensuring standardization. 

C.9 Phase 3 – In-Theater Training (ITT). Upon arrival in theater personnel will 

complete an induction course, Commanders at all levels arrange and coordinate ITT 

for their respective commands. However, COM ISAF has the authority to direct subordinate 

commanders to plan and conduct ITT to his specification. ITT helps to ensure 

that staff efficiency and operational ability remain high throughout the rotation period. 

C.10 To increase effectiveness, interoperability and management of skills US Office of 

the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has developed a Guidance 

on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance. The guidance provides 

C 

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a menu of tasks with associated common training standards determined as necessary 

to effectively execute a wide range of SFA activities. Training standards include: 

a) Individual-enabling knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes (KSAAs). 

b) Collective- enabling KSSAs. 

c) Security Force Assistance Developmental Tasks. 

II. FBSFA METL (Starting Next Page) 

METL 1: Organize Afghan Forces 

METL 2: Train Afghan Forces 

METL 3: Equip Afghan Forces 

METL 4: Rebuild/Build Afghan Forces 

METL 5: Advise and Assist the Afghan Forces 

METL 6: Redeploy 

Annex C 


C 

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METL 1: Organize Afghan Forces 

C 

4 




METL 2: Train Afghan Forces 

Annex C 


C 

5



METL 2: Train Afghan Forces (Cont.) 

C 

6 




METL 3: Equip Afghan Forces 

Annex C 


C 

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METL 3: Equip Afghan Forces (Cont.) 

C 

8 




METL 4: Rebuild/Build Afghan Forces 

Annex C 


C 

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METL 5: Advise and Assist the Afghan Forces 

C 10 




Annex C 


C 11



METL 6: Redeploy 

C 12 




Annex D 


Annex D 






Annex D: SFA Advisor Team and Ministerial Invidual 

Tasks 

Annex D 


D 

1



D 2 




Annex D 


D 

3



D 4 




Annex D 


D 

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D 6 




Annex D 


D 

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D 8 




Annex D 


D 

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D 10 




Annex D 


D 11



D 12 




Annex D 


D 13



D 14 




Ministerial advisors operate in support of the MoD and the MoI. A variety of TCNs provide senior uniformed and civilian 

personnel, including contractors, to help the ministries reach a sustainable level of development. Once selected, these individuals 

must bring forward executive-level talent and capacity to meet the needs of their Afghan [executive] counterparts. 

Annex D 


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D 16 




Annex E 


Annex E 






Annex E: ISAF/RS FB-SFA Bibliography 

This bibliography is a summary of the wide range of thousands of documents available. 

In such an overwhelming range of data, it is easy to get lost. This bibliography 

provides the reader a selection of the most relevant and interesting articles. Grouped 

into 14 categories, it will be updated on the CAAT homepage and available on unclass 

internet. Additional references are available at: https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Pages/ 

SFA-Guide.aspx 

Bibliography Organization 

1. Mission Orientation 

2. SFA Papers, Publications, and References 

3. Functional Security Force Assistance 

4. Advisor Selection and Training 

5. Afghan Culture 

6. Afghan Language Resources 

7. Insider Threat 

8. Ministerial Advising 

9. Afghan National Army (ANA) 

10. Afghan National Police 

11. Air Advising and Afghan Air Force/Special Mission Wing 

12. Understanding Insurgency 

13. Counterinsurgency 

14. Rule of Law 

15. Gender 

1 Mission Orientation 

1.1 Mission Introduction 

The following websites, reports, documents, publications, and references will provide 

contextual understanding to the current status of the mission in Afghanistan. They will 

also provide the reader with a better understanding of how the mission will progress 

through SFA. 

1.2 Understanding the Mission - Web Sites 

International Security Force Afghanistan (ISAF). 

http://www.isaf.nato.int 

NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A). 

http://ntm-a.com 

ISAF Joint Command (IJC) 

www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/isaf-joint-command/index.php 

NATO e-ISAF 

https://e-isaf.act.nato.int 

1.3 Understanding the Mission - Reports, Papers, Books, and Publications 

Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Regional Stabilization Strategy. US Department of State. 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf 

Annex E 


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Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance. Congressional 

Research Service. November 30, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 

RS21922.pdf 

Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. Congressional 

Research Service. October 31, 2012. 

http://www.hsdl.org/view&did=725570 

The Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan From Transition to Transformation. 

July 8, 2012. The Tokyo Declaration is more commonly referred to as the Tokyo 

Mutual Accountability Framework (TMPF). http://www.usaid.gov/tokyoconference/declaration 

NATO. ISAF Mission Evolution. October 2012. 

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_10/20121008_media-backgrounder_isaf_mission_evolution_en.pdf 

1.4 Understanding Afghanistan – Websites and Books 

The Afghanistan Analyst 

http://afghanistan-analyst.org 

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 

http://www.areu.org.af/Default.aspxLang=en-US 

Afghan War News 

www.afghanwarnews.info 

Giustozzi, Antonio. Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. 

New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. An anthology of 14 articles by various authors. 

Giustozzi, Antonio, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban 

Insurgency. 2009. Analysis of the Neo-Taliban insurgency in the post-2001 era, including 

the neo-Taliban’s approaches to recruiting, their organization, tactics, and strategy. 

2 SFA Papers, Publications, and References 

2.1 Websites with Information on SFA 

COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) on Ronna-Afghanistan: 

https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Pages/Public-Portal.aspx 

U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Proponency Office, Combined Arms Center: 

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/sfa/ 

U.S. Army Training Network (ATN) Security Force Assistance: 

https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspxdplD=248 

USMC Advisor Training Group (ATG) 

http://www.29palms.marines.mil/Units/AdvisorTrainingGroup.aspx 

Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCAST) 

http://www.mcast.navy.mil 

Air Advisor Academy – 37 th Training Wing 

http://www.37trw.af.mil 

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U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). 

https://www.pksoi.org 

Fifteen Principles of Security Force Assistance. Videos. 

https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Lists/SFA%20Videos/AllItems.aspx 

2.2 JCISFA Handbooks, Guides, and References about SFA 

JCISFA Website: https://jcisfa.jcs.mil 

JCISFA. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Advisor Guide. Version 3, May 2013. 

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. 

https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Authentication/Login.aspxReturnUrl=%2fMembers%2fPortal%2fViewInsight.aspx%3finsight%3d1145&insight=1145 

JCISFA, Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance, July 14, 2008. Provides 

doctrinal view, best practices, and lessons learned on Security Force Assistance (SFA) 

operations at brigade level. 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/Materials/SFA.pdf 

JCISFA, Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors Guide. (FOUO) February 2012. https:// 

jcisfa.jcs.mil/Authentication/Login.aspxReturnUrl=%2fMembers%2fPortal%2fView- 

Insight.aspx%3finsight%3d1042&insight=1042 

JCISFA, Security Force Assistance Handbook, June 2012. 

https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Authentication/Login.aspxReturnUrl=%2fMembers%2fPortal%2fViewInsight.aspx%3finsight%3d1165&insight=1165 

JCISFA, SFA Planner’s Guide: FSF Force Development. December 1, 2009. This guide provides 

an orientation on describing the logical process in FSF capability development. 

https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/JCISFA_Publications.aspx 

2.3 Military Publications and Field Manuals Related to SFA 

Department of the Army. Stability Operations, FM 3-07. May 1, 2009. 

http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_07.pdf 

Department of the Army. Security Force Assistance,FM 3-07.1, 1 May 2009. 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/fm/fm3_07x1. 

pdf 

Department of Defense. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign 

Forces, FM 3-07.10 (MCRP 3-33.8A), September 10, 2009. 

https://itsweb.us.army.mil/armypubs.aspdoctrine/DR_pubs/dr_d/pdf/fm3_07x10.pdf 

Department of the Army. The Brigade Combat Team. FM 3-90.6, September 14, 2010. 

http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/Active_FM.html 

Department of the Navy. Advise, Train, and Assist Partner Nation Forces Training and 

Readiness Manual, (short title: ATA T&R Manual), January 5, 2009. 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Guidance on 

Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (SFA), January 14, 2014. 

2.4 Papers, Reports, and Publications about Security Force Assistance 

Alford, COL Julian Dale and MAJ Daniel Zappa. “Afghan Advise and Assist Group.” 

Small Wars Journal, June 1, 2011. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghan-advise-and-assist-group 

Annex E 


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3 Functional Security Force Assistance. 

3.1 Functional SFA. Unit-based Security Force Assistance is now transitioning to 

“Functional Security Force Assistance” with the intent of ensuring the ANSF can sustain 

itself post-2014. The five broad areas of “Functional SFA” consist of Command and 

Control, Leadership, Combat Arms Integration, Training, and Sustainment. Functional 

Security Force Assistance or Functional SFA is sometimes referred to as Functionally 

Oriented SFA or Functionally Based SFA (all phrases have the same meaning). 

SHAPE OPLAN 10312, Annex A, June 2014. 

3.2 Command and Control (C2). Command and Control is more clearly defined in 

the Afghanistan SFA context as Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 

(C3I). 

DoDIG, Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Security Forces 

Command, Control, and Coordination System, Inspector General of the United States 

Department of Defense, Report No. DoDIG-2013-058, March 22, 2013. 

www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-058.pdf 

MoD, Organizations and Functions Manual, Decree 5001, Ministry of Defense, March 

29, 2011. This decree is not available online. 

3.21 Intelligence Resources for the SFA Intelligence Advisor 

Calvin, Matt. People, Partnerships and Collaboration: Understanding and Improving Intelligence 

in Counterinsurgency. Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies, 

Volume I. Summer 2009. p. 53-73. 

http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume1/volume1_calvin.pdf 

Flynn, MG M. T., CPT M. Pottinger, and P.D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making 

Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan. Center for a New American Security. January 2010. 

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_ 

code507_voices.pdf 

Gomez, Jimmy A. “The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD.” Small Wars Journal. July 

16, 2011. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-targeting-process-d3a-and-f3ead 

Kress, Moshe and Roberto Szechtman. Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of 

Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations. Operations Research, Vol 57, No. 3. May- 

June 2009. p. 578-585. 

http://faculty.nps.edu/rszechtm/KressSzechtman.pdf 

Perry, Walter L and John Gordon IV. Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies. 

RAND Corporation prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2008. 

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG682.pdf 

Reamer, Kevin. “The Importance of Intelligence in Combating a Modern Insurgency.” Journal 

of Strategic Security, Volume 2, 2009. p. 73-90. 

http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/3/ 

3.3 Leadership. 

3.31 DoDIG, Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan 

National Army, DoD Inspector General, Report No. DoDIG-2013-094, June 24, 2013. 


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3.4 Combined Arms Integration 

162 nd Infantry Brigade, Afghan National Army Systems by Warfighting Function, Fort 

Polk, LA, May 13, 2013. 

3.5 Training. 

DoDIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise 

the Afghan Border Police, Report No. DODIG-2013-081, May 24, 2013. 


3.6 Sustainment - Logistics, Supply and Maintenance Advising 

Armstrong, Nicolas J. “Afghanistan 2014-2024: Advising for Sustainability,” Small Wars 

Journal, May 4, 2012. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghanistan-2014-2024-advising-for-sustainability 

Department of Defense. Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: 

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces. April 2012. 

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf 

Valeski, LTC Steven. “ANA Logistics System: Getting to Afghan Right.” Military Review, 

May-June 2012. 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20120630_art006.pdf 

4 Advisor Selection and Training 

4.1 Advisor Selection 

Department of the Army. “The Advisor,” Chapter 7, Security Force Assistance, FM 

3-07.1, 1 May 2009, pages 7-1 to 7-6. This chapter provides information on advisor 

roles, considerations, required skills and traits. 

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM3071.pdf 

JCISFA. “Selection and Training of U.S. Personnel for SFA,” Chapter V, Security Force 

Assistance Handbook, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, June 

2012. 

https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/JCISFA_Publications.aspx 

Axelberg, COL Marc D. Enhancing Security Force Assistance: Advisor Selection, Training 

and Employment, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2011. 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a553121.pdf 

Clark, Todd J. Selection of Military Advisors, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 

December 2007. 

http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/3060/07Dec_Clark.pdf 

Hetherton, Richard H. Foreign Military Advisor Proficiency: The Need for Screening, 

Selection and Qualification, Master’s Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2009. 

www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA510940 

Phelps, Major Christopher E., Selecting and Training U.S. Advisors: Interpersonal 

Skills and the Advisor-Counterpart Relationship, MA Thesis for University of Kansas, 

April 24, 2009. http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/5657/1/Phelps_ 

ku_0099M_10318_DATA_1.pdf 

Annex E 


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4.2 Advisor Training 

ISAF HQ, Revised Minimum Training Requirements for Security Force Assistance (SFA) 

Advisors and SFA-Advisor Teams (SFA-ATs), 11 June 2013. Letter from ISAF HQs to 

Cdr, Joint Force Command Brunssum. Included are Enclosure 1: ISAF Minimum 

Training Requirements for Security Force Assistance (SFA) Advisors and SFA-Advisor 

Teams (SFA-ATs) and Enclosure 2: Minimum Training Requirements of Security Force 

Assistance Advisors and Advisor Teams. Documents are not available online. 

4.3 Recommended Books about Advising 

Joint Force Command Brunssum, JFCB Directive 75-9, Resolute Support Training Directive, 

10 April 2014. 

Beemer, Michael et al. The Human Dimension of Advising: An Analysis of Interpersonal, 

Linguistic, Cultural, and Advisory Aspects of the Advisor Role. Technical Report 1248, June 

2009. U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral Science. 

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA507713 

Dockery, Martin J. Lost in Translation: A Combat Advisor’s Story. Presidio Press, 2004. 

A young, idealistic, and determined 23-year-old infantry 1LT is sent to Vietnam to be 

the only American assigned as a combat advisor to a South Vietnamese Infantry Battalion. 

He relates his story of living and fighting with an Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

(South Vietnam) battalion and performing duties as an advisor to a 45-year old South 

Vietnamese Infantry Battalion commander with 25 years of combat experience. 

Tupper, Benjamin, Greetings from Afghanistan, Send More Ammo: Dispatches from Taliban 

Country. 2011. Tupper writes a heartfelt and thoughtful memoir about his time in Afghanistan 

on a training team embedded with the Afghan National Army. 

5 Afghan Culture 

5.1 Websites on Afghan Culture 

Cultural Knowledge Consortium 

https://ckc.army.mil 

Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning. U.S. Marine Corps 

www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/SitePages/Home.aspx 

Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Program for Culture & Conflict Studies 

www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/ExecSumm.html 

Culture & Foreign Language Program – Army Logistics University 

www.alu.army.mil/ALU_CULTURE/aluculture.htm 

3C – Cross Cultural Competence – Department of Defense 

www.defenseculture.org/Home/index.cfm 

Cross-Cultural Guide. United States Peace Corps 

http://www.peacecorps.gov/library/culture/ 

Center for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) of University of Nebraska 

http://world.unomaha.edu/cas/ 

Afghan Net / Culture 

www.afghan-network.net/Culture/ 

University of the Pacific online Culture Training 

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http://www2.pacific.edu/sis/culture/ 

Skill Level Descriptions for Competence in Intercultural Communication 

http://www.govtilr.org/Skills/Competence.htm 

5.2 References about Afghan Culture 

Barfield, Thomas J. Afghanistan: A Cultural & Political History. Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 2012. 

Gardner, Lenore. Cultural Awareness Bibliography, U.S. Army War College, August 2009. 

www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/culture2009.pdf 

Metcalf, Kimberly et al. Cross-Cultural Strategies for Improving the Teaching, Training, and 

Mentoring Skills of Military Transition Team Advisors. Technical Report 1264, April 2010. 

U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral Science. 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a507715.pdf 

Zbylut, Michelle Ramsden. Advisor Influence Strategies: 10 Cross-Cultural Scenarios for 

Discussion and Self-Assessment (Instructor’s Manual). U.S. Army Research Institute, 

September 2010. 

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA531634 

5.3 Books and Articles about Afghan Culture 

HTS, Local Governance in Rural Afghanistan. Human Terrain System, 2010. Baseline 

guide for working in rural Afghanistan at the sub-provincial level (primarily districts in 

the Pashtun Belt) with intros to concepts such as the role of Pashtun tribes. 

http://info.publicintelligence.net/HTS-LocalGovernance.pdf 

FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, 1 May 2009. See Chapter 8 “Culture and Communication.” 

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Respository/FM3071.pdf 

NPS, Understanding Afghan Culture: Operational Pashtunwali. Program for Culture & 

Conflict Studies (CCS) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), June 15, 2009. A guide to 

utilizing the Pashtun tribal code (Pashtunwali) to improve force protection (via defensive 

Pashtunwali) and to achieve unit objectives (via offensive Pashtunwali). 

http://modatraining.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/operational-pashtunwali.pdf 

6 Afghan Language Resources 

Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). A variety of free language 

training products are available at the link below to include RAPPORT, Cultural 

Orientation, Headstart, Familiarization Modules, Countries in Perspective, Legends 

and Folktales, Area Studies, Cultural Awareness Assessment, and Online Diagnostic 

Assessment. 

http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html 

DLI Headstart 2. This program teaches a “military-focused vocabulary” designed for 

the military, operating on the tactical and operational level. For an average user, the language 

program takes between 80 and 100 hours of self-directed study. The software can 

be downloaded to computer or iPod, used online, or requested on DVDs. Headstart2 

is available for 16 languages, including Dari and Pashtu. 

http://hs2.lingnet.org 

DLI Rapport. This program of six to eight hours of training consist of military language 

Annex E 


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modules and cultural awareness lessons that cover history, religion, geography, and basic 

social exchanges in the target language. 

http://rapport.lingent.org 

DLI Language Survival Kits (LSKs). LSKs are designed as pocket-sized, quick reference 

booklets with an audio CD available in 10 different topics per language for deploying 

service members. The LSKs contain mission-specific vocabulary and simple phrases in 

topics such as medical terminology, Civil Affairs, Force Protection, and Military Police. 

http://www.dliflc.edu/lmdsemail.aspx. 

Inter-agency Language Roundtable (ILR). The ILR serves as an organization that 

assists U.S. government agencies and organizations to keep abreast of the progress and 

implementation of techniques and technologies for language learning, language use, 

language testing, and other language-related activities. 

www.govtilr.org 

Outzen, Richard. “Language, Culture, and Army Culture: Failing Transformation,” 

Small Wars Journal, March 20, 2012. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/language-culture-and-army-culture-failingtransformation 

USO website offers a “free Afghan language program” at 

http://www.uso.org/Free-Afghan-Language-Program.aspx 

7 Insider Threat 

Bordin, Jeffrey, Ph.D., A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatability, N2KL Red Team 

Study, May 12, 2011. 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB370/docs/Document%2011.pdf 

CALL, Green-on-Blue Smartcard, GTA 90-01-033, (FOUO), Center for Army Lessons 

Learned (CALL), February 2012. 

https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspxdocument=6911 

CALL, Insider Threats – Afghanistan, GTA 90-01-044, June 2013. (FOUO / REL NATO, 

ISAF, FVEY). 

https://call2.army.mil/rfi 

CAAT, “Fighting the Insider Threat,” COIN Common Sense, Volume 4, Issue 1, February 

2013. COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team. 

https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Coin%20Common%20Sense/20130220_NIU_REL_ 

Public_COIN_Common_Sense_Insider_Threat_Special_Edition.pdf 

Escamilla, Pete and Eric Lopez. “Securing the Security Force Assistance Advisors in 

Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, September 20, 2013. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-the-security-force-assistance-advisorsin-afghanistan 

ISAF, ISAF Insider Threat Handbook: COMISAF’s Guidance on Combating Insider 

Threats, 2013. Available on SIPR and ISAF-S / Centrix at the links below. 

SIPR: http://jcisaf.js.smil.mil 

ISAF-S /Centrix: 

http://portal.hq.ms.isaf.nato.int/CGHQ/CAAT 

Roggio, Bill and Lisa Lindquist, Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” The 

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Long War. A data summary and timeline of insider attacks in Afghanistan. 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue-attack.php 

8 Ministerial Advising 

8.1 Web Pages Related to Ministerial Advising 

Ministry of Interior Affairs Afghanistan (MoI) 

http://moi.gov.af/en 

Ministry of Defense Afghanistan (MoD) 

http://mod.gov.af/en 

Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program 

www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0211_moda/ 

Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Training Program 

http://modatraining.com 

Ministry Level Advisors Community of Interest (CoI) on JCISFA Portal 

https://143.84.167.180/Members/Portal/MODA.aspx 

Security Assistance Team Training Orientation Course (SATTOC) 

https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrscc/ 

8.2 References on Ministerial Advising 

Boyer, Keith M. and Robert R. Allardice. Building Ministerial Capacity in Host Nations, 

Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 71, 4 th Quarter 2013, pages 69-73. 

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-71.pdf 

Gillette, John M. “Afghanistan: What Went Wrong,” Small Wars Journal, February 5, 

2013. The author completed a two-year tour as an advisor at ministry level deployed as 

a member of the Minister of Defense Advisors (MODA) program. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghanistan-what-went-wrong 

JCISFA. Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors: Perspectives on Institutional Level Advising. 

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. February 2012. 

https://143.84.167.180/Members/Portal/SupportingDocument.aspxdocId=1021 

JCISFA. Ministerial-level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study 2010. Joint Center for International 

Security Force Assistance, 2010. 

https://jcisfa.jcs.mil 

Lubold, Gordon. Training U.S. Advisors, Building Afghan Ministries. United States Institute 

of Peace (USIP), April 7, 2011. 

www.usip.org/publications/training-us-advisors-building-afghan-ministries 

Metrinko, Michael J. The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials 

in the IslamicWorld. PKSOI, August 2008. 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub869.pdf 

9 Afghan National Army (ANA) 

Ministry of Defense – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

www.mod.gov.af.en 

Afghan National Army by Wikipedia 

Annex E 


E 

9



www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army 

Krug, Captain Colby K. When Combat Advising = Company Command. Paper by a SFA- 

AT team leader who advised an ANA kandak. October 2012. 

http://www.afghanwarnews.info/documents/WhenCbtAdvisingEqualsCompanyCmd- 

KrugOct12.pdf 

Team Renegade. How We Advise: An Afghan National Army Kandak. (FOUO), August 

2012. An SFA-AT from 2/101 st Airborne Division chronicles their pre-deployment training 

and advisory effort with an ANA kandak and provide observations and lessons 

learned. 


Younossi, Obaid et al. The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army, RAND 

Corporation (MG 845), 2009. 

www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG845.html 

10 Afghan National Police (ANP) 

10.1 Websites on ANP 

MoI. Afghan National Police Strategy (ANPS). General Bismullah Khan Mohammadi 

(former Minister of Interior Affairs and now Minister of Defense). 

http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5076. 

MoI. Brief Information on Borders and Police Border. 


MoI. Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). 


10.2 Reports, Papers and Publications on ANP 

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Security Force Assistance, Shaping and Mentoring 

Afghan Police. Newsletter 11-18, March 2011. 

https://call2.army.mil 

Rosenau, William. Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors & Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. 

Joint Publication of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and Marine Corps 

University Press, 2011. An in-depth review of the experiences of individual American 

and British soldiers and Marines who served as police mentors in Afghanistan during 

the 2007–2009 period. http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Police%20Mentor_Layout%204.pdf 

Wells, G. Damon. “Conducting Security Force Assistance in a Rural District: Understanding 

the Operational Environment. Small Wars Journal. December 20, 2012. Lessons 

learned of an SFA-AT advising a DCoP, AUP, and ALP during a 2012 deployment. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/conducting-security-force-assistance-in-a-rural-districtunderstanding-the-operational-envi 

10.3 Afghan Local Police (ALP) 

“Village Stability Operations – 101: Understanding USSOCOM’s Role in VSO and ALP in 

Afghanistan and Beyond,” The Donovan Review, 2 nd Edition, January 2012. 

www.stabilityinstitute.com 

JCISFA. Handbook: Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police. Joint Center for 

International Security Force Assistance, 2012. 

E 10 





11 Air Advising and AAF / SMW 

Afghan Air Force by Wikipedia 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_Air_Force 

Air Force, Air Advising, AFTTP 3-4.5 AA, July 20, 2012 

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/ 

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, September 15, 

2007. 

www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd3-22.pdf 

Air Force Warfare Center. Air Advisor Handbook, Coalition and Irregular Warfare 

Center of Excellence, April 27, 2009. 

www.nshq.nato.int/NSHQ/GetFile/File_ID=31 

Cairney, John T., Considerations in Working with Partner Air Forces – Context and Culture, 

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 2010. 

www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA519920 

DoD IG SPO Report, Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Field 

the Afghan Air Force, Inspector General, March 22, 2013. 


Ingrum, Richard L. Aviation Security Force Assistance: A 21 st Century Imperative, Army 

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 22, 2012. 

www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA561351 

Moroney, Jennifer D.P. et al, International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces, RAND 

Corporation, 2009. 

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a499273.pdf 

Peck, Allen G., “Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air & Space Power Journal, 

Summer 2007. 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/peck.html 

Vick, Alan J. et al. Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance 

of USAF Advisory and Assistance Mission, RAND Corporation, 2006. 

www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.pdf 

12 Understanding Insurgencies 

Insurgency Publications and Articles on Small Wars Journal. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/search/node/insurgency 

Connable, Ben and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End, RAND, 2010. 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html 

Kress, Moshe and Roberto Szechtman.”Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of 

Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations.” Operations Research, Vol. 57, No. 3, May- 

June 2009, pp. 578-585. 

http://faculty.nps.edu/rszechtm/KressSzechtman.pdf 

Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory: Les- 

Annex E 


E 11



sons from Modern Insurgencies, RAND Corporation, 2013. 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html 

Stoker, Dr. Donald, “Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose.” Small Wars Journal, July 4, 

2009. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/six-reasons-insurgencies-lose 

Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. et al. Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance 

Warfare, Second Edition, United States Army Special Operations Command and John 

Hopkins University, 25 January 2013. 

www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html 

Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. et al. Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies, 

Second Edition, United States Army Special Operations Command and John 



Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. et al. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. 1: 

1933-1962, Revised Edition, United States Special Operations Command and John 



Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. et al. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. 

2: 1962-2009, United States Army Special Operations Command and John Hopkins 

University, 27 April 2012. 


13 Counterinsurgency 

13.1 Counterinsurgency – Websites 

COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) Counterinsurgency Resources 

https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/SiteAssets/COIN_Information.aspx 

13.2 Counterinsurgency – Manuals and Publications 

AJP 3.4.4. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN). Feb2011. 

http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Counterinsurgency.pdf 

COMISAF, ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, ISAF. 

www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf 

Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) December 15, 

2006. 

http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf 

Department of the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2. 

http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24x2.pdf 

United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual. FMFRP 12-15, 1941. 

www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-15%20%20Small%20 

Wars%20Manual.pdf 

U.S. Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency 

Guide, January 2009. 

www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf 

13.3 Counterinsurgency – Papers and Publications 

E 12 




Jones, Seth G. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. RAND MG 595. 2008. 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595.html 

Kilcullen, David. 28 Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency. March 2006. 

www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf 

Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill. Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: 

Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, RAND Corporation, 2010. 

www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964.html 

Ulrich, Mark. Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Counter-Guerrilla’s Guide to Defeating Insurgencies 

and Conducting Populist Centric Operations. Access at JCISFA 

https://143.84.167.180/Members/Portal/ViewInsight.aspxFocus=OIL&Insight=329 

14 Rule of Law 

Combined Joint Interagency Task Force – 435. United States Central Command. 

www.centcom.mil/cjiatf435 

Rule of Law Component – European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) 

www.eupol-afg.eu/q=rule-of-law 

Rule of Law in Afghanistan – United States Institute of Peace 

http://www.usip.org/category/countries/afghanistan 

Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan – U.S. Department of State 

www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm 

The Afghan Constitution. 

http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf 

Gant, MAJ Jim and William McCallister, “Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shura,” 

Small Wars Journal. June 6, 2010. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tribal-engagement-the-jirga-and-the-shura 

Giustozzi, Antonio. “Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban’s Shadow 

Government,” PRISM, Journal of the Center for Complex Operations, 2012. Analysis of 

the Taliban’s “shadow” government and their efforts to challenge the legitimacy of the 

central government through civil means rather than military means. 

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e- 

2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=139230 

Afghan Legal Documents Exchange Center 

http://afghantranslation.checchiconsulting.com/ 


http://moj.gov.af/en 

Attorney General’s Office 

http://ago.gov.af/en 

Supreme Court 

http://supremecourt.gov.af/en 

Annex E 


E 13



15 Gender 

RONNA - Gender Awareness in Afghanistan 

https://ronna.apan.org/Pages/GenderAwareness.aspx 

NATO: Women, peace and security 

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_91091.htmselectedLocale=en 

Afghan Research and Evaluation unit; search for “Gender” 

www.areu.org.af/Default.aspx 

UN Women 

www.unwomen.org 

Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations 

www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/sewdint/nordic-centre-for-gender-in-military-operations/ 

DCAF – Democratic Control of Armed Forces’; Gender and security. 

www.dcaf.ch/Programmes/Gender-and-Security 

Gender in Operations Course; European Security and Defence College 

www.defensa.gob.es/areasTematicas/observatorio/actuaciones/seminarios-cursos/ 

GenderOpsCourse/ 

NATO e-learning courses on Gender and Children in Armed Conflict 

https://jadl.act.nato.int/ 

U.S. Army Commanders Guide to Female Engagement teams 

http://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-u-s-army-commanders-guide-to-femaleengagement-teams/ 

Female Engagement Teams; The Need to Standardize Training and Employment 

www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/MilitaryReview_Female%20Engagement% 

20Teams.pdf 

Gender Equality in the Military 

www.seesac.org/project.phpI1=135&I2=150 

E 14 




Annex F 


Annex F 






Annex F: Acronyms 

AACP 

AAF 

AAR 

ABP 

ACP 

AFAMS 

AFG 

AGO 

AHRIMS 

ALP 

ANA 

ANASOC 

ANCOP 

ANP 

ANPH 

ANSF 

AO 

AOC 

AOR 

AOSC 

APPF 

APRP 

AREU 

Afghan Anti-Crime Police 

Afghanistan Air Forces 

After Action Review 

Afghan Border Police 

Afghan Customs Police 

Armed Forces Academy of 

Medical Sciences 

Afghanistan 

Attorney General’s Office 

Afghan Human Resources 

Information Management 

System 

Afghan Local Police 

Afghan National Army 

Afghanistan National 

Army Special Operations 

Command 

Afghan National Civil 

Order Police 



Hospital 

Afghan National Security 

Forces 

Area of Operations 

Area of Operations Commander 

Area of Responsibility 

Area of Operations Support 

Commander 

Afghan Public Protection 

Forces 

Afghanistan Peace and 

Reintegration Program 

Afghanistan Research and 

Evaluation Unit 

ASA (FM&C) Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Financial Management 

and Comptroller) 

ASC Army Support Command 

ASI 

AT 

ATAC 

ATFC 

ATG 

AT&L 

ATN 

ATP 

AUP 

AWT 

BAF 

BATNA 

BCT 

BDE 

BPC 

BSO 

BXP 

C-IED 

C2 

C3I 

CAAC 

CAAT 

CALL 

CAS 

CF 

CI 

CIP 

CIVCAS 

Afghan Security Institution 

Advisor Team 

Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators 

Afghanistan Threat Finance 

Cell 

Advisor Training Group 

Acquisition, Technology, & 

Logistics 

Army Training Network 

Advanced Tactical Practitioner 

Afghan Uniformed Police 

Air Weapons Team 

Bagram Airfield 

Best Alternative To A 

Negotiated Agreement 

Brigade Combat Team 

Brigade 

Building Partner Capacity 

Battle Space Owner 

Border Crossing Points 

Counter-Improvised Explosive 

Device 

Command and Control 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Intelligence 

Children and the Armed 

Conflicts 

COMISAF Advisory and 

Assistance Team 

Center for Army Lessons 

Learned 

Close Air Support 

Coalition Forces 

Counterintelligence 

Critical Infrastructure 

Protection 

Civilian Casualties 

Annex F 


F 

1



CJIATF-A Combined Joint Interagency 

Task Force-Afghanistan 

CJOA-A Combined Joined Operations 

Area-Afghanistan 

CJSOR Combined Joint Statement 

of Requirements 

CLS Combat Lifesaver Course 

CM Capability Milestone 

CMAAT Civil Military Advise and 

Assist Team 

CN Counter Narcotics 

CNPA Counternarcotics Police of 

Afghanistan 

COA Course of Action 

COIN Counterinsurgency 

CQB Close Quarters Battle 

CRM Composite Risk Management 

CSD Central Supply Depot 

CSDF Civilian Self-Defense Forces 

CSS Combat Service Support 

CSSK Combat Service Support 

Kandak 

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition 

Command - AFG 

(former OSC-A) 

CT 

Combined Team 

CTAP Civilian Technical Assistance 

Program 

CTC Combat Training Center 

CWS Central Workshop 

DCOM MAG Deputy Commander Ministerial 

Advisory Group 

DCoP Districts Chief of Police 

DIRLAUTH Direct Liaison Authority 

DLIFLC Defense Language Institute 

Foreign Language Center 

DOTMLPF Doctrine, Training, 

Organization, Materiel, 

Leadership, Personnel, and 

Facilities 

DRMO 

E&R 

EAG 

EF 

EJK 

EOC 

EOD 

EOT 

EPM 

ERP 

ESC 

ETT 

EUPOL 

EvBO 

EXSUM 

FID 

FIT 

FOB 

FOC 

FOM 

FP 

GA 

GCPSU 

GENAD 

GFC 

GFP 

GIRoA 

GSU 

GVHR 

HA/DR 

Defense Reutilization and 

Marketing Office 

Evasion and Recovery 

Enterprise Advisory Group 

Essential Function 

Extra-Judicial Killing 

Emergency Operations Center 

Explosive Ordnance Dis-posal 

End of Tour 

Embedded Police Mentor 

Expeditionary Reach Pack-age 

Effective Security Campaigns 

Embedded Training Team - 

Non-Afghan Trainers/Advisors 

Attached To ANA Unit 

(Usually USA) 

European Union Police Mission 

Evidence Based Operations 

Executive Summary 

Foreign Internal Defense 

Financial Investigative Team 

Forward Operating Base 

Full Operating Capability 

Freedom of Movement 

Force Protection 

Guardian Angel 

General Command Police 

Special Units 

Gender Advisor 

Ground Force Command 

Gender Focal Point 

Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan 

General Support Unit 

Gross Violations of Human 

Rights 

Humanitarian Assistance/ 

Disaster Relief 

F 

2 




HN 

HOTO 

HPA 

HR 

HRC 

HRI 

HSSB 

HTT 

HVT 

IC 

ICT 

IDAD 

IDF 

IED 

IG 

IGTAO 

IIU 

IJC 

INS 

IPCB 

IPOE 

ISAF 

ISR 

ISTAR 

IT 

ITPM 

Host Nation 

Hand Over Take Over 

High-Profile Attacks 

Human Remains 

High Risk of Capture 

High Risk of Isolation 

Headquarters Security and 

Support Brigade 

Human Terrain Team 

High Value Target 

International Community 

Information Communication 

Technology 

Internal Defense and Development 

Indirect Fires 

Improvised Explosive 

Device 

Inspector General 

Inspector General/Transparency, 

Accountability, 

and Oversight 

Intelligence and Investigation 

Unit 

ISAF Joint Command 

Insurgent(s) 

International Police Coordination 

Board 

Intelligence Preparation of 

the Operational Environment 

International Security Assistance 

Force In Afghanistan 

Intelligence, Surveillance, 

Reconnaissance 

Intelligence, Surveillance, 

Target, Acquisition, and 

Reconnaissance 

Insider Threat 

Insider Threat Prevention 

Model 

ITT 

JADL 

JALLC 

JCB 

JCISFA 

JFCBS 

JRSOI 

KAF 

KAIA 

KLE 

KSA 

LI 

LL 

LOAC 

LOTFA 

MAG 

MAT 

MCN 

MCTF 

MDP 

MEDEVAC 

METL 

METT-TC 

MFAT 

MMC-A 

In-Theater Training 

Joint Advanced Distributed 

Learning 

Joint Analysis Lessons 

Learned Center 

Joint Coordination Board 

Joint Center for International 

Security Force 

Assistance 

Joint Forces Command 

Brunssum 

Joint Reception, Staging, 

Onward-movement, and 

Integration 

Kandahar Airfield 

Kabul Afghanistan International 

Airport 

Key Leader Engagement 

Knowledge, Skills, and 

Abilities 

Lessons Identified 

Lessons Learned 

Law of Armed Conflict 

Law and Order Trust Fund 

for Afghanistan 

Ministerial Advisor Group 

Military Advisor Team 

Ministry of Counternarcotics 

Major Crimes Task Force 

Ministerial Development 

Plan 

Medical Evacuation 

Mission Essential Task List 

Mission, Enemy, Terrain 

and weather, Troops and 

support available, Time 

available, Civil considerations 

Multi-Function Assistance 

Team 

Materiel Management 

Center-Army 

Annex F 


F 

3



MoD 

MoDA 

MOE 

MoI 

MoJ 

MOP 

MOS 

MRX 

MSC 

MSF 

MSF-AT 

MTR 

NAC 

NAC-A 

NATC-A 

NCO 

NDS 

NEB 

NEPS 

NIU 

NMCC 

NMH 

NSM 

NSOCC-A 

NSP 

NTISR 

NTM-A 

OBLP 

Ministry of Defense 

Minister of Defense Advisors 

Measures of Effectiveness 

Ministry of Interior 


Measures of Performance 

Military Occupational 

Specialty 

Mission Rehearsal Exercise 

MoI Support Center 

Mobile Strike Force 

Mobile Strike Force Advisor 

Team 

Minimum Training Requirement 

North Atlantic Council 

NATO Air Command- 

Afghanistan 

NATO Air Training 

Command-Afghanistan 

Non-Commissioned Officer 

National Directorate of 

Security 

National Engineer Brigade 

North East Power Supply 

National Interdiction Unit 

National Military Coordination 

Center 

National Military Hospital 

Non-Security Ministries 

NATO Special Operations 

Component Command- 

Afghanistan 

National Security Policy 

Non-Traditional ISR 

NATO Training Mission- 

Afghanistan 

Observations, Lessons, and 

Best Practices 

OCC Operations Coordination 

Center 

OCC-AT Operations Coordination 

Center Advisor Teams 

OCC-D Operations Coordination 

Center-District 

OCC-P Operations Coordination 

Center-Provincial 

OCC-R Operations Coordination 

Center-Regional 

ODA or ODB Operational Detachment, 

Alpha (Bravo) (SOF unit) 

OE 

Operational Environment 

OEF Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM 

OMA Operations and Maintenance, 

Army 

ONSC Office of National Security 

Council 

OPCOM Operational Command 

OPCON Operational Control 

OPORD Operation Orders 

OTERA Organizing, Training, 

Equipping, Rebuilding, 

and Advising 

PA 

Physician’s Assistant 

PAK Pakistan 

PAKMIL Pakistan Military 

PAT Police Advisor Team 

PCoP Provincial Chief of Police 

PDSS Pre-Deployment Site Survey 

PDT Pre-Deployment Training 

PMESII-PT Political, Military, Economic, 

Social, Information, 

Infrastructure, 

People, and Time 

PN 

Partner Nations 

POI Program of Instruction 

PPE Personal Protection Equipment 

F 

4 




PRT 

PSC 

PSD 

PSU 

PU 

PVO 

QRD 

QRF 

RASR 

RC 

RCBS 

RC-IED 

RDL 

RFI 

RIP/TOA 

RLC 

RLSC 

RMH 

ROE 

RRS 

RS 

RSC 

RSOI 

SA 

SACT 

SAV 

SBIED 

Provincial Reconstruction 

Team 

Private Security Companies 

Personal Security Detail 

Provincial Special Unit 

Partnered Unit 

Private Volunteer Organization 

Quick Reaction Drill 

Quick Reaction Force 

Regional ANSF Status 

Report 

Regional Command 

Regional Combat Battle 

School 

Radio Controlled Improvised 

Explosive Device 

Rating Definition Levels 

Request for Information 

Relief in Place/Transfer of 

Authority 

Regional Logistics Command 

Regional Logistics Support 

Center 

Regional Military Hospital 

Rules of Engagement 

Readiness Reporting System 

RESOLUTE SUPPORT 

Regional Support Command 

Reception, Staging, 

Onward Movement, and 

Integration 

Situational Awareness 

Supreme Allied Commander 

Transition 

Staff Assistance Visit 

Suicide Borne Improvised 

Explosive Device 

SCO 

SERE 

SFA 

SFAAT 

SFAB 

SHAPE 

SIU 

SLP 

SME 

SMW 

SOFA 

SOJTF-A 

SOP 

SSA 

SSR 

SVTC 

SWAT 

TAA 

TAAC 

TACOM 

TACON 

TAO 

TCCC/T3C 

TCN 

TDY 

Security Cooperation Officer 

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, 

Escape (and Extraction) 

Security Force Assistance 


Advisor Team 


Brigade 

Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers Europe 

Sensitive Investigation 

Unit 

Speech-Language Pathology 

Subject Matter Expert 

Special Mission Wing 

Status-of-Forces Agreement 

Special Operations Joint 

Task Force-Afghanistan 

Standard Operating Procedure 

Security Sector Assistance 

Security Sector Reform 

Secure Video Teleconference 

Special Weapons and Tactics 

Train, Advise, and Assist 

Train, Advise, and Assist 

Command 

Tactical Command 

Tactical Control 

Transparency, Accountability, 

and Oversight 

Tactical Combat Casualty 

Care 

Troop Contributing Nation 

Temporary Duty 

Annex F 


F 

5



TLSR 

TMAF 

TSU 

TTP 

UIP 

UNAMA 

UTP 

VSO 

Transfer of Lead Security 

Responsibility 

Tokyo Mutual Accountability 

Framework 

Transition Support Unit 

Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures 

Unified Implementation 

Plan 

United Nations Assistance 

Mission Afghanistan 

Unified Transition Plan 

Village Stability Operations 

F 

6 





Annex G



Annex G 




Annex G: Glossary 

DEFINITIONS: 

1 Advise. All activities concerning providing subject matter expertise, guidance, 

advice, and counsel to a foreign security force (FSF) while carrying out the missions 

assigned to the unit/organization. Advising will occur under combat or administrative 

conditions at tactical, operational, and strategic levels in support of individuals or 

groups. 

2 Advisor. A subject matter expert (SME) who serves with ANSF to advise, assist, 

and counsel counterparts. Additionally, SMEs observe, evaluate, and report on the 

performance of their assigned unit. While not liaison officers, they communicate with 

their ISAF superiors, functional SMEs and ANSF counterparts to resolve problems 

and gain confidence. Advisors’ primary purpose is to create professional relationships 

based on trust that will inspire and influence their counterparts to effective action. 

3 Afghan Units. 

d) Kandak. Afghan name for ANA battalion-equivalent unit. 

e) Tolay. Afghan name for ANA company-equivalent unit. 

4 Area of Operations Commander (AOC). The designated ANSF commander with 

lead responsibility—in close coordination with the ISAF Area of Operations Support 

Commander (AOSC)—for management of security and terrain within defined military, 

district, and provincial boundaries. 

5 Area of Operations Support Commander (AOSC). The designated ISAF 

commander within defined ANSF boundaries who is responsible for unilateral ISAF 

activity; providing training, advice, and assistance; and coordinating support forces to 

the ANSF AOC. 

6 Assist. Providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities to the ANSF so 

they can meet objectives and reach the desired end-state. 

7 Assistance Platform. Selected locations on GIRoA bases used by Coalition units that 

can accommodate advisor teams for temporary periods of time, i.e., temporary bases 

for specific missions. 

8 Autonomous Units. Any ANSF unit without an assigned CF unit providing 

partnering or advising assistance. An autonomous unit should not be mistaken as a 

unit assessed as “independent with without advisors” or capable of Phase IV transition 

in accordance with the IJC OPS/TAC directive. 

9 Battle Space Owner (BSO). The military commander who has authority for 

dimension management and ultimate responsibility for the conduct of operations 

within the CJOA-A. The authority of a BSO is delegated from the higher commander. 

Commander ISAF (COMISAF) is the overall BSO for the CJOA-A until 31 December 

2014. 

10 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). US brigade formation commanded by an Army 

colonel. Brigade Combat Teams have been deploying to Afghanistan as Security Force 

Assistance Brigades (SFABs) since early 2013. 

11 Civil Military Advise and Assist Team (CMAAT). A Civil Affairs Team tasked to 

develop Civil-Military Operations capacity across the full ANSF spectrum. 

12 Coaching. Helping a counterpart reach the next level of knowledge or skill by 


G 1 

Annex G



practicing those skills with the counterpart and building on previous teaching. 

13 Command and Control Relationships. 

a) NATO Tactical Command (TACOM). The authority delegated to a 

commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment 

of the mission assigned by higher authority. 

b) NATO Tactical Control (TACON). The detailed and usually local direction 

and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or 

tasks assigned. 

c) NATO Operational Command (OPCOM). The authority granted to 

a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to 

deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or 

tactical control as deemed necessary. This does not include responsibility for 

administration. 

d) NATO Operational Control (OPCON). The authority delegated to a 

commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish 

specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time, or location. 

This also includes the authority to deploy units and to retain or assign tactical 

control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment 

of components of the units concerned. Neither does it include administrative or 

logistic control. 

e) US Tactical Control (TACON). Command authority over assigned or attached 

forces or command, or military capability or forces made available for tasking 

(limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers 

within the operational area and necessary to accomplish missions or tasks 

assigned). Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control 

may be delegated to and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant 

command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and 

directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within 

the assigned mission or task. 

f) US Operational Control (OPCON). Command authority that may be 

exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant 

command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command 

authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control 

is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate 

forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning 

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects 

of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions 

assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the 

commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised 

through subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or functional 

component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority 

to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander 

in operational control sees necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does 

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of 

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. 

14 Corruption. The abuse of public office for private gain. State institutions normally 

manage and contain corruption through effective law enforcement and oversight, in 

conjunction with a vibrant, functioning civil society. Two variations of the term relate 

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to defensive and offensive measures to confront this challenge. 

a) Anti-corruption: defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of 

individuals and organizations to acts of corruption, to include limited response by 

military and law enforcement entities. 

b) Counter-corruption: offensive measures taken to deter, preempt, and eradicate 

acts of corruption—real or imputed. 

15 Counterinsurgency (COIN). A comprehensive civilian and military effort 

undertaken to defeat an insurgency and to address the population’s core grievances. 

SFA activities conducted during US COIN operations in an HN should support HN 

COIN objectives. Currently, the Coalition is conducting SFA in support of GIRoA 

COIN efforts. 

16 Dimension Management. Dimension management describes the function of 

integration, coordination, and synchronization of all operational activities within the 

designated AO. The dimensions of air, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and 

information cannot be considered in isolation and must acknowledge the challenge of 

forces operating across environmental boundaries. Good command and control across 

all dimensions is essential for the safe conduct of operations. 

17 Educating. Teaching concepts and knowledge that can be applied over a broad 

range of applications. The advisor has to be ready to teach and coach concepts and 

knowledge as necessary. 

18 Embedded SFA-ATs. SFA-ATs that will live within or adjacent to an ANSF 

compound, even in remote areas, and interact with the ANSF unit on a persistent 

basis. Force Protection and support is paramount for these teams, and the ATs must 

have specifically designed local solutions. A “COP within a COP” (COP is a combat 

outpost) may be constructed for each team that is embedded. A “COP within a 

COP” is a construct of a Coalition life-support area either within existing Tactical 

Infrastructure (TI) or adjacent to TI. 

19 Enable. Providing support to the ANSF in critical areas such as air support, 

CASEVAC, intelligence, logistics, etc. 

20 Foreign Internal Defense (FID). The participation by civilian and military agencies 

of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other 

designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. 

21 Functionally based SFA. SFA focused on functional process development. It 

requires a stronger unity of effort to align advisors at multiple echelons to advise along 

a vertical process. It does not replace the need for Afghans to develop solutions to 

process challenges. Functionally based SFA has a unit-based aspect to it where rapport 

and assessments are still critical. Unity of effort will require the integration of the five 

functional pillars and the four functional enterprises. 

22 ISAF Battlespace Owner (BSO). The military commander, and associated 

headquarters, with authority in battle space management and ultimate responsibility 

for the conduct of operations within a designated area (OPS/TAC directive). The 

authority of a battlespace owner is delegated from the higher commander. The ISAF 

BSO is normally the RC or brigade commander, but the position may be delegated 

to as low as battalion level. BSO held primary responsibility for ensuring that ANSF 

transitioned into the lead. (Since June 2013, the ANSF have been in the lead for 

security.) 


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23 Key Leader Engagement (KLE). The deliberate, planned, and focused interaction 

with an Afghan key leader to achieve a desired effect or outcome. Above all, successful 

KLEs are a prerequisite to successful strategic partnering, which is ISAF’s principle tool 

for building capacity and capability within GIRoA and the ANSF. 

24 Levels of SFA Advising. Refers to the degree of advisor training and assistance 

provided to the ANSF element. 

a) Level 1 SFA. Refers to when Coalition units train, advise, and assist ANSF 

unit(s) on a continuous, persistent basis from either an embedded footprint or 

in close proximity. Level 1 advising is seen as the most desirable approach and 

provides the best conditions for ANSF development. 

b) Level 2 SFA. Coalition units that train, advise, and assist ANSF(s) on a 

less frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure the continued 

development of ANSF units. The frequency of this interaction varies based on 

the proximity to the ANSF unit, the capability of the ANSF unit, threat level to 

advisors, and Coalition resources. SFA-ATs that provide Level 2 contact will likely 

be supporting more than one ANSF unit. Level 2 advising will become the more 

common approach as Coalition forces thin out and ANSF kandaks and brigades 

become more capable. 

c) Level 3 SFA. Coalition forces that provide additional training and advice from a 

centralized location such as a Regional Training Center (RTC) or Regional Corps 

Battle School (RCBS) while accompanying ANSF commanders and staff sections 

during a Battle Field Circulation (BFC) or Staff Assistance Visit (SAV). Level 

3 advising is not limited to SFA-ATs or advisor teams. For instance, Coalition 

headquarters staff may coordinate and execute training to improve the planning 

capability of their counterparts in an ANSF brigade or corps headquarters. 

25 Local Forces—Terms and Definitions. 

a) Local Defense Forces (LDF). Host nation (HN) personnel armed and 

organized as protective forces. This overarching category includes Civilian Self- 

Defense Security Forces (CSDF), Local Security Forces (LSF), and all elements 

from ALP to militia. 

b) Civilian Self-Defense Forces (CSDF). Armed host-nation personnel 

sanctioned by GIRoA and/or ISAF and organized as part of counterinsurgency 

(COIN) or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) efforts. CSDF is a sub-set of LDF. 

This term is from US FID doctrine for Special Forces. Some examples in 

Afghanistan were the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in RC-North and 

the Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) in RC-East. 

c) Local Security Forces (LSF). Armed, non-insurgent, host nation personnel 

organized as protective forces. LSF are not sanctioned by GIRoA and/or ISAF, 

but are not necessarily anti-GIRoA. LSF are a sub-set of LDF. Some examples in 

Afghanistan are militia and unlicensed private security companies (PSC). 

d) Arbakai. Village- or tribe-based community policing groups comprised 

of volunteers vetted by elders. They are formed to remedy temporary, specific 

problems and then dissolved until another issue must be dealt with. These groups 

can be any size, but are generally relatively small. Their members retain their 

original livelihoods or are supported by their communities temporarily. Should 

they lack the capability to solve the problem, they are able to call upon a larger 

force known as a lashkar, which is comprised of men from the village or groups 

of villages in pursuit of a common interest. Some Afghans and members of the 

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International Community often refer to the Afghan Local Police (ALP) as arbakai. 

e) Militias. An irregular armed group (often illegal) loyal to a leader and 

not necessarily indigenous to the villages they protect. Most militias are not 

sanctioned by GIRoA or ISAF (although they may be loyal to individual 

GIRoA officials). Some militias, including Anti-Taliban Movements (ATM), 

are supported by GIRoA. Some militia groups may have origins in the Soviet 

occupation and have sustained their identity ever since. Militias vary in size to up 

to thousands of members. Militia members are full or part-time fighters; many 

need income to survive. Unless the militia has a patron/leader who can fund 

them, they may evolve into criminal organizations to satisfy the need to generate 

income. If a militia group is not indigenous, the militias may have no stake in 

local security and may engage in extortion and harassment of local villagers. Some 

militias also receive support and funding from foreign countries. 

f) Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP is an official GIRoA program established 

through an Afghan Presidential Decree signed 16 August 2010. The program 

empowers Afghan locals to protect their villages through ISAF partnering and 

with formal command and control through the GIRoA Ministry of Interior 

(MoI) with the oversight of Districts Chiefs of Police (DCoPs). The ALP program 

follows the Afghan traditional system of justice and security in communities by 

formalizing the empowerment of villagers into an organized community watch 

model. ALP Guardians are equipped with distinctive uniforms and marked 

vehicles. 

g) Village Stability Operation (VSO). Used to describe the placement of a 

special operations team in a village to conduct operations to enhance security, 

development, and governance. The teams live in a house or compound in or 

near the village and provide a persistent presence that gives the population 

nearly continuous access to the team and vice versa. Not all VSO will result in 

the establishment of ALP, and not all ALP have VSO. Most of the VSO sites have 

transitioned to GIRoA. 

h) Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF). A state-owned security service 

provider intended to protect people, infrastructure, facilities, and construction 

projects. The APPF does not have a police mandate to investigate crime or arrest 

suspects. APPF personnel receive pay and funding through MoI and from the 

entity that contracts for the security. 

i) Private Security Companies (PSC). A legal entity that is established by an 

Afghan citizen or in partnership with a foreign natural person or legal entity 

and is a registered business licensed in accordance with the laws of Afghanistan 

to provide security services. (MoI has the licensing authority.) Licensed PSCs 

are examples of GIROA-approved LDFs, while unlicensed PSCs are examples of 

LSF. Training for PSCs is determined by the terms of the various contracts based 

on the nature of the security mission. In August 2010, President Karzai issued 

Presidential Decree 62 ordering PSCs operating in Afghanistan to be phased out 

and replaced by the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). 

26 Mentoring. An action between individuals by which the mentor teaches, guides, 

and advises the other, with the shared goal of building capacity and capability. 

27 Military Advisor Team (MAT). MATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise and assist 

the ANA, provide the conduit for liaison and C2, and when required, support the 

operational planning and employment of the ANA unit to which they are aligned 

so they can operate autonomously. MATs are one of the various kinds of SFA-ATs 


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deployed to Afghanistan. 

28 Operational Environment (OE). The OE is the composite of the conditions, 

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on 

the decision of the commander. 

29 Operations Coordination Center (OCC). The Regional and Provincial OCCs 

(OCC-R/P) are responsible for the coordination of both security operations and civil 

response to developing situations in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). 

For the foreseeable future, the primary focus of OCC activities will be directed toward 

coordination of security operations. 

30 Operations Coordination Center - Advisor Teams (OCC-ATs). OCC-ATs deploy 

to the CJOA-A to advise and assist the OCC-R and OCC-P, provide the conduit 

for liaison and command and control, and when required, support the operational 

coordination in the area of operations to facilitate development of a coherent security 

coordination structure. OCC-ATs are one of the various kinds of SFA-ATs deployed to 

Afghanistan. 

31 Operational Reach. The distance and duration across which a joint force can 

successfully employ military capabilities. Operational reach is a tether; it is a function 

of intelligence, protection, sustainment, endurance, and relative combat power. 

32 Partner. Partnering attaches units at various levels to leverage the strengths of 

both NATO and HN security forces. As an HN security force’s capabilities mature, the 

echelon and degree of partnering decrease. As the HN security force conducts more 

autonomous operations, NATO forces still provide quick reaction forces and other 

assistance as appropriate. 

33 Partnering. Partnering involves a relationship between a Coalition unit and an 

Afghan unit that spans combined training, planning, and operations. 

34 Partner Unit (PU). A partner unit is a maneuver/combat support unit co-located 

with or in close proximity to its Afghan counterpart for planning and conducting 

operations. PUs are the cornerstone of the SFA effort. Unit partnerships do not replace 

advisor roles or functions. If partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms 

a three-part relationship amongst ANSF, advisors and the partner unit. Partner units 

should look to the advisor to identify, shape, and facilitate operational partnering 

objectives and training events. Advisors support US, Coalition, and partner unit 

objectives, but, depending on the operational phase, the partner unit may support 

advisors or advisors may support the partner unit. Therefore, some level of advisor 

skills training should be included in the partner unit training program if those units 

will be conducting SFA activities. Advising requires relationship-building and candid 

discourse to influence development of a professional security force. Partnering 

incorporates training with combined operations to achieve the same SFA goals. 

35 Police Advisor Team (PAT). PATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise the ANP, 

provide the conduit for liaison and command and control, and when required, support 

the operational planning and employment of the ANP unit to which they are aligned 

in order to support the development of a self-sufficient, competent, and professional 

ANP capable of maintaining public order, security, and rule of law. A PAT is one of the 

various types of SFA-ATs deployed to Afghanistan. 

36 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs are national entities provided 

by various nations of the Coalition. PRTs assist in reconstruction, development, 

governance, and security sector reform efforts. Most PRTs were closed down as each 

province transitioned or Coalition forces retrograded. PRTs varied in composition and 

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size. Some were led by civilians and others by the military. Most PRTs were phased out 

prior to or during the transition of the provinces. PRTs and their nations interacted 

with Afghan sub-national officials, UNAMA, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative 

(SCR) office, European Union Police (EUPOL), NGOs, international organizations, 

and civil society organizations. Most PRTs reported directly to their embassies 

and national capitals. In many cases, the military and civilian components of PRTs 

coordinated with regional commanders and regional SCRs. At the theater-strategic 

level, the NATO SCR coordinated with the embassies in Kabul and with HQ ISAF to 

ensure the civil-military integration of the PRT effort. Most PRTs have closed down. As 

of the fall of 2013, there were only three PRTs remaining, and by the end of 2014 they 

all likely will have shut down. 

37 Readiness Reporting System (RRS). The RRS is the operational readiness reporting 

tool within the MoD. This report is collected on a monthly basis from the Afghan 

National Army (ANA), Afghan Air Force (AAF), Commando Brigades, and the 

Headquarters Support and Security Brigades (HSSB). 

38 Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR). The Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) 

replaced the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) in mid-2013. The monthly 

report is a compilation of ANSF unit assessments from RC commanders, SFAATs, 

IJC CJ2, NTM-A, and CTAG. ANASOC and AAF units are not assessed by the RASR 

system. 

39 RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RS). The international community will refer to the post- 

2014 operation in Afghanistan as Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT. 

40 Rule of Law (RoL). The principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, 

and entities—public and private, including the state itself—are accountable to publicly 

promulgated laws, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with 

international human rights principles. 

41 Security Force Assistance (SFA). Unified action to generate, employ, and sustain 

local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. 

Military forces conduct SFA to facilitate a host nation’s ability to deter and defend 

against transnational and internal threats to stability. SFA developmental tasks are to 

organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA). 

42 SFA Advisor Team (SFAAT). Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs) 

provide training, advice, and assistance to ANSF units and functional areas. Other 

terms for SFAATs include Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAATs), Police Advisor 

Teams (PATs), Military Advisor Teams (MATs), Operations Coordination Centers 

Advisor Teams (OCCATs), and ministry advisors in context to Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF), their supporting institutions, and the ISAF Headquarters. 

Advisor teams operate under the C2 of the Coalition battle space owner and have the 

capability to provide direct access to Coalition capabilities such as air support, artillery, 

medical evacuation, and intelligence. 

43 SFA Brigade (SFAB). A brigade specifically tailored to provide SFA and enabling 

support in a given environment—influenced by the threat, ANSF capability and 

capacity, and degree of governance. SFABs provide formation-level command and 

control (C2) and support functions, discharge AOSC responsibilities, and provide SFA 

Advisor Teams (SFAATs) to train, advise, and assist ANSF units and functional areas. 

44 Stability Operations. An overarching term encompassing various US Armed 

Forces missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with 

other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure 


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environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure 

reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. SFA supports the stability tasks of establishing 

civil security and civil control. 

45 Sustainability. The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat 

power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. Sustainability consists of two 

major components: the ability to sustain the SFA effort throughout all the phases of the 

operation and the ability of the ANSF to sustain their capabilities independently over 

the long term. These capabilities consist of processes described by the five functional 

pillars: command and control, combined arms integration/integrated layered security, 

sustainment, training, and leadership. 

46 Sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain 

and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. 

47 Teaching. Providing instruction and/or education to develop skills or knowledge 

necessary to do a particular job. 

48 Train. All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader 

development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This 

may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training 

events, and leader development activities. 

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Knowledge is power. Join the SFA knowledge base at secret networks: SFA NET 2.0 

http://usfora.oneteam.centcom.cmil.mil/sites/sfa_net/sitepages/home.aspx and on restricted access 

unclassified networks: https://jcisfa.jsc.mil/Public/Index.aspx and NATO ACT: http://e-isaf.act.nato.int 

and NATO ACT: 

http://e-isaf.act.nato.int 

“The entire HQ ISAF is the Ministerial Advisory Group. A great part of this HQ’s 

focus should be assisting the Afghan ministries in developing the processes that lead 

to sustaining the ANSF who own the responsibility to provide for a safe and secure 

Afghanistan.” 

GENERAL J.F. DUNFORD, JR. USMC 

Commander ISAF 

Kabul, Afghanistan 

Photo: Sgt. 1st Class JoAnn Moravac 


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