Handbook of Corporate Communication and Public ... - Blogs Unpad

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Table 18.1 Operational functions of banks Banks Department Functions Abbey National Corporate Affairs Media relations; public relations; internal communication (newsletter, video) Barclays Bank Communications Shareholder communications; employee relations; support for community – young people; the arts and the environment; press relations Co-operative Bank Public Relations Press information; opinion survey; publicity; policy development; community projects; funding for charity works; internal communications Lloyds Bank Corporate Communications Environmental policy; community support; internal communication; information service to the public, in particular students; corporate sponsorship; press information Midland Bank Corporate Communication Monitor corporate identity; corporate brochure; internal communication; media relations, public relations; ethnic and environmental policy Nat West Bank Corporate Affairs and Co-ordinate internal communication; group media relations; Communications develop public and ethical business policies; investor relations; community relations; campaign for plain English; ‘green policy’ – best practice; staff suggestion scheme; school programme – financial literacy, personal money management, opinion formers (politicians, business leaders) relations; advise business unit on advertising Royal Bank of Corporate Communications Community relations; corporate sponsorship of sport and Scotland cultural events; environmental policy – energy conservation; guides to services and products TSB Bank Group Corporate Corporate advertising; press relations; investor relations; Communications corporate identity; internal communication-newsletter and special events British Bankers’ Communications and External Communication strategy; media relations; ‘educating’ the Association Affairs publics; identify target audience; opinion research; banking seminar and conferences professions. Although Liew’s (1997) research indicated that Britons were largely satisfied with the performance of the banks and were less antagonistic than the media indicates, an integrated communication strategy is essential in managing relationships with all stakeholders and that ‘effective relationship management requires corporate action or change. Corporate communication – including the research function – plays a role in shaping a bank’s course of action, how it is structured and its decision making process.’ Banks perhaps more than most have had to address the sheer scale of environmental change brought about by technology, globalization and social change, so although Liew found no significant anti-bank bias in the media, he argued that ‘the weakness in existing bank/media relations in the United Kingdom is a glaring knowledge gap that will © 2004 Sandra Oliver for editorial matter and selection; individual chapters, the contributors

expand as the nature of banking business increases in complexity’ (1982). Thus tactical, empirically derived evidence for communication programme planning and budgeting is no longer good enough. Strategy also informs tactics at both research and evaluation levels to a very high degree, which is why the professional studies programme at Thames Valley University in London is one of the first, if not the first European University to incorporate knowledge and information management as a core learning module in its masters degree programme in addition to the ability to critically analyse best practice models of performance. What the books say Given the limitations of empirical research underpinning the professional era of public relations between the post-war period and the present day, academics have attempted to apply business or corporate strategy models to the management of communication as a value added component of linked organizational mission and goals. However, awareness of the need for companies and investors to maintain relationships with all stakeholders in the interests of corporate performance, puts pressure on companies to reassess levels of influence which could be reliably measured in respect of the bottom line. Gaved (1997) argues that ‘a new model of corporate change and evolution needs to be developed, which enables management teams to be renewed without major discontinuity. This need is quite independent of the issue of takeovers. What we currently have is a system of informal influence, which increases the pressures on companies – which normally means the CEO and chairpersons – in response to deteriorating performance. For most companies, most of the time there is very little of this ‘behind closed doors’ influence, but when it does take place, it is the largest shareholders who get most involved and who have disproportionate influence on the company, board and senior management team. Table 18.2 identifies and distinguishes the difference between routine emergencies and disasters. For an international bank experiencing, say, cyberspace terrorism as a result of systems intervention from a hostile hacker, dependency on a geographical measure to define the scale of such crisis is unlikely to be very helpful. Prior to the mid-1980s, PR practitioners thought in terms of ‘routine emergencies’ and suggested that a crisis has five stages. Fearn-Banks argues that crisis management is strategic planning to prevent and respond during a crisis or negative occurrence, a process that removes some of the risk and uncertainty and allows the organization to be in greater control of its destiny. However, if as she says a crisis has five stages, the banking culture has to create for itself an anticipatory model of crisis management which ‘guides practitioners toward a position in which they can proactively investigate their organization to determine the most likely cause of technological crisis’. With a foundation in anticipation and empowerment, each bank’s model would optimize the precautionary abilities of the organization to prevent and cope with a crisis, ‘routine emergency’, but would they be adequate for a ‘disaster’ Table 18.3 suggests the range of routine emergencies and disasters which might occur. Olaniran and Williams (2001) argue that ‘crisis prevention requires a thorough understanding of the technology and the context in which the technology is being used’. This includes processes of enactment and expectation as well as vigilant decision making and they suggest there are two key issues involved, namely rigidity and control. © 2004 Sandra Oliver for editorial matter and selection; individual chapters, the contributors

exp<strong>and</strong> as the nature <strong>of</strong> banking business<br />

increases in complexity’ (1982).<br />

Thus tactical, empirically derived evidence<br />

for communication programme planning <strong>and</strong><br />

budgeting is no longer good enough. Strategy<br />

also informs tactics at both research <strong>and</strong> evaluation<br />

levels to a very high degree, which is<br />

why the pr<strong>of</strong>essional studies programme at<br />

Thames Valley University in London is one <strong>of</strong><br />

the first, if not the first European University to<br />

incorporate knowledge <strong>and</strong> information<br />

management as a core learning module in its<br />

masters degree programme in addition to the<br />

ability to critically analyse best practice<br />

models <strong>of</strong> performance.<br />

What the books say<br />

Given the limitations <strong>of</strong> empirical research<br />

underpinning the pr<strong>of</strong>essional era <strong>of</strong> public<br />

relations between the post-war period <strong>and</strong><br />

the present day, academics have attempted to<br />

apply business or corporate strategy models<br />

to the management <strong>of</strong> communication as a<br />

value added component <strong>of</strong> linked organizational<br />

mission <strong>and</strong> goals. However, awareness<br />

<strong>of</strong> the need for companies <strong>and</strong> investors to<br />

maintain relationships with all stakeholders in<br />

the interests <strong>of</strong> corporate performance, puts<br />

pressure on companies to reassess levels <strong>of</strong><br />

influence which could be reliably measured in<br />

respect <strong>of</strong> the bottom line. Gaved (1997)<br />

argues that ‘a new model <strong>of</strong> corporate change<br />

<strong>and</strong> evolution needs to be developed, which<br />

enables management teams to be renewed<br />

without major discontinuity. This need is quite<br />

independent <strong>of</strong> the issue <strong>of</strong> takeovers. What<br />

we currently have is a system <strong>of</strong> informal<br />

influence, which increases the pressures on<br />

companies – which normally means the CEO<br />

<strong>and</strong> chairpersons – in response to deteriorating<br />

performance. For most companies, most<br />

<strong>of</strong> the time there is very little <strong>of</strong> this ‘behind<br />

closed doors’ influence, but when it does take<br />

place, it is the largest shareholders who get<br />

most involved <strong>and</strong> who have disproportionate<br />

influence on the company, board <strong>and</strong> senior<br />

management team.<br />

Table 18.2 identifies <strong>and</strong> distinguishes the<br />

difference between routine emergencies <strong>and</strong><br />

disasters. For an international bank experiencing,<br />

say, cyberspace terrorism as a result <strong>of</strong><br />

systems intervention from a hostile hacker,<br />

dependency on a geographical measure to<br />

define the scale <strong>of</strong> such crisis is unlikely to be<br />

very helpful. Prior to the mid-1980s, PR practitioners<br />

thought in terms <strong>of</strong> ‘routine emergencies’<br />

<strong>and</strong> suggested that a crisis has five<br />

stages. Fearn-Banks argues that crisis management<br />

is strategic planning to prevent <strong>and</strong><br />

respond during a crisis or negative occurrence,<br />

a process that removes some <strong>of</strong> the risk <strong>and</strong><br />

uncertainty <strong>and</strong> allows the organization to be<br />

in greater control <strong>of</strong> its destiny. However, if as<br />

she says a crisis has five stages, the banking<br />

culture has to create for itself an anticipatory<br />

model <strong>of</strong> crisis management which ‘guides<br />

practitioners toward a position in which they<br />

can proactively investigate their organization<br />

to determine the most likely cause <strong>of</strong> technological<br />

crisis’. With a foundation in anticipation<br />

<strong>and</strong> empowerment, each bank’s model<br />

would optimize the precautionary abilities <strong>of</strong><br />

the organization to prevent <strong>and</strong> cope with a<br />

crisis, ‘routine emergency’, but would they be<br />

adequate for a ‘disaster’ Table 18.3 suggests<br />

the range <strong>of</strong> routine emergencies <strong>and</strong> disasters<br />

which might occur.<br />

Olaniran <strong>and</strong> Williams (2001) argue that<br />

‘crisis prevention requires a thorough underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

<strong>of</strong> the technology <strong>and</strong> the context in<br />

which the technology is being used’. This<br />

includes processes <strong>of</strong> enactment <strong>and</strong> expectation<br />

as well as vigilant decision making <strong>and</strong><br />

they suggest there are two key issues involved,<br />

namely rigidity <strong>and</strong> control.<br />

© 2004 S<strong>and</strong>ra Oliver for editorial matter <strong>and</strong> selection;<br />

individual chapters, the contributors

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