Handbook of Corporate Communication and Public ... - Blogs Unpad
Handbook of Corporate Communication and Public ... - Blogs Unpad Handbook of Corporate Communication and Public ... - Blogs Unpad
their time on communication. Argenti (1998) argues that most companies’ CEOs ‘should have a direct link to the corporate communication function. Without this connection, the communication function will be much less effective and far less powerful.’ Van Riel (1995) outlines forms of internal and external communication that might be employed in a company and he demonstrates that communication as a management tool is used in many areas of the organization other than PR marketing. Van Riel (1995) believes that the responsibility of communication stretches across all levels of an organization including senior, middle and junior management who use communication to achieve desired results, and he states that externally, management especially the CEO has to be able to accommodate the vision of the company in order to win support of external stakeholders (Figure 6.4). Emphasizing the importance of communication to the success of an organization, Van Riel (1995) states that ‘communication is too vital for organisational success to leave it solely to managers’ and he argues that experts in communication at various levels and in various areas of expertise may be required and that ‘general managers should never consider hiring communication experts as the panacea of organisational communication’. Van Riel (1995) continues this view by stating that CorpCom is primarily corporate; it only subsequently encompasses communication; that is to say communication specialists must focus initially on the problems of the organisation as a whole (corpus) and only subsequently should they look at implicit and explicit functions of communication with respect to contributions to the realization of the company’s objectives. No academic research could be found that specifically addresses the roles of the board of directors in this important field, especially as all CorpCom writers address the external issues, the impacts on CorpCom strategies, policy, image, identity and reputation (Oliver, Van Riel, Argenti). Listed companies governance structures offer two options of the position of the Chairperson and CEO as being held jointly or separately. Where joint Chairperson/ CEO is concerned we see that Argenti (1998) cites the management reporting structure to the CEO, and where the chairperson is also the CEO (in listed enterprise) there is obviously a governance issue to be addressed – yet there appears to be no literature to examine this. Dolphin (1999) addressing corporate abstention touches on an apparent common approach by companies (listed) in relation to meeting the communication need when he says that some corporations ignore their publics altogether: ‘This approach (clearly stemming from the top) may demonstrate the general perception of the CEO and the executive committee of the communication function. It also demonstrates the corporate view of the level of power of strategic communication’ (Dolphin, 1999). Werther, Kerr and Wright (1995) argue that a key impediment to effective and relevant governance activity may be the CEO who generally controls the information flow to the board and its agenda. Even if board members pursue an activist approach to their responsibilities, their ability to do so is bounded in large measure by the CEO’s control over the amount and type of information they receive. Where the CEO also chairs the board of directors, control extends to the conduct of board meetings. Although the board technically has the ultimate power to sack the CEO or © 2004 Sandra Oliver for editorial matter and selection; individual chapters, the contributors
to facilitate a takeover, these are extreme measures of last resort, more useful in reacting to a crisis than in averting one. (Werther, Kerr and Wright, 1995) Boards, usually in response to environmental complexity or competitive turbulence, have witnessed fundamental restructuring of organizations, and according to Werther, Kerr and Wright (1995) these boards have presided over changes designed to improve information exchange and decision making dramatically at every organizational level: ‘Yet at the board level, the critical apex of strategic and policy concerns, informational and decisionmaking practices remain embedded in the structures and protocols of a simpler age’ (Werther, Kerr and Wright, 1995). This conflict between management’s approach to CorpCom and the potential CorpCom responsibility at governance must be addressed. Surely it is in the interest (competitive advantage, effectiveness, productivity, profitability, growth, success, reputation and recognition) of firms, listed and unquoted, to employ CorpCom strategically, at governance and management function levels Governance offers various definitions and the research exclusively focuses on listed companies with apparently no evidence or academic research material addressing governance in unquoted family enterprise. Tombs (2002) suggests that governance and management are not just about computers and information. They are about attitudes and management culture mixed with information. Taylor (2000) quotes Bohen’s (1995) definition of governance as ‘the responsibility and accountability for the overall operation’ of an organization and he says that ‘boards are always charged with this level of responsibility and accountability’. He further suggests that the managing part is further delegated by the board to the CEO while the board remains responsible for: (1) developing corporate policies and plans, (2) monitoring and measuring organizational performance against these policies and plans and (3) acting as a voice of ownership (Taylor, 2000). Taylor (2000) also argues that it is important that governing bodies: ‘clearly understand what their role is and is not and that their primary responsibility is to oversee and ensure the achievement of their organisational mission and strategic ends, which have been clearly articulated and are shared by all’. Vinten (2000) focuses on recent CorpCom governance concerns including the accountability of those in control of companies (listed) to those with the residual financial interest in corporate success, normally the shareholders, but when the company is approaching insolvency, then also its creditors, as well as widening discussion to consider stakeholders. Among a number of contemporary developments, Vinten (2000) identifies the redistribution of tasks between the public and private sectors, and between public and charitable sectors in the economy in the way companies are run and security markets are organized. Vinten (2000) also suggests as another contemporary development that issues of public confidence can be assessed in terms of the level of managerial remuneration and the effectiveness with which boards of major companies carry out the task of monitoring executive management. Werther, Kerr and Wright (1995) refer to the attacks on the board’s role in Corporate governance and include cronyism, inappropriate remuneration and executive compensation schemes. All these issues fall into reputation, and are directly within the field of CorpCom, which is inherent in the functions of corporate governance yet there is no evidence nor academic research to demonstrate, © 2004 Sandra Oliver for editorial matter and selection; individual chapters, the contributors
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to facilitate a takeover, these are extreme<br />
measures <strong>of</strong> last resort, more useful in<br />
reacting to a crisis than in averting one.<br />
(Werther, Kerr <strong>and</strong> Wright, 1995)<br />
Boards, usually in response to environmental<br />
complexity or competitive turbulence, have<br />
witnessed fundamental restructuring <strong>of</strong> organizations,<br />
<strong>and</strong> according to Werther, Kerr <strong>and</strong><br />
Wright (1995) these boards have presided<br />
over changes designed to improve information<br />
exchange <strong>and</strong> decision making dramatically<br />
at every organizational level: ‘Yet at the<br />
board level, the critical apex <strong>of</strong> strategic <strong>and</strong><br />
policy concerns, informational <strong>and</strong> decisionmaking<br />
practices remain embedded in the<br />
structures <strong>and</strong> protocols <strong>of</strong> a simpler age’<br />
(Werther, Kerr <strong>and</strong> Wright, 1995).<br />
This conflict between management’s<br />
approach to CorpCom <strong>and</strong> the potential<br />
CorpCom responsibility at governance must<br />
be addressed. Surely it is in the interest (competitive<br />
advantage, effectiveness, productivity,<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itability, growth, success, reputation <strong>and</strong><br />
recognition) <strong>of</strong> firms, listed <strong>and</strong> unquoted, to<br />
employ CorpCom strategically, at governance<br />
<strong>and</strong> management function levels<br />
Governance <strong>of</strong>fers various definitions <strong>and</strong><br />
the research exclusively focuses on listed<br />
companies with apparently no evidence or<br />
academic research material addressing<br />
governance in unquoted family enterprise.<br />
Tombs (2002) suggests that governance <strong>and</strong><br />
management are not just about computers<br />
<strong>and</strong> information. They are about attitudes <strong>and</strong><br />
management culture mixed with information.<br />
Taylor (2000) quotes Bohen’s (1995) definition<br />
<strong>of</strong> governance as ‘the responsibility<br />
<strong>and</strong> accountability for the overall operation’<br />
<strong>of</strong> an organization <strong>and</strong> he says that ‘boards are<br />
always charged with this level <strong>of</strong> responsibility<br />
<strong>and</strong> accountability’. He further suggests that<br />
the managing part is further delegated<br />
by the board to the CEO while the board<br />
remains responsible for: (1) developing<br />
corporate policies <strong>and</strong> plans, (2) monitoring<br />
<strong>and</strong> measuring organizational performance<br />
against these policies <strong>and</strong> plans <strong>and</strong> (3) acting<br />
as a voice <strong>of</strong> ownership (Taylor, 2000).<br />
Taylor (2000) also argues that it is important<br />
that governing bodies: ‘clearly underst<strong>and</strong><br />
what their role is <strong>and</strong> is not <strong>and</strong> that their<br />
primary responsibility is to oversee <strong>and</strong><br />
ensure the achievement <strong>of</strong> their organisational<br />
mission <strong>and</strong> strategic ends, which have<br />
been clearly articulated <strong>and</strong> are shared by all’.<br />
Vinten (2000) focuses on recent CorpCom<br />
governance concerns including the accountability<br />
<strong>of</strong> those in control <strong>of</strong> companies (listed)<br />
to those with the residual financial interest in<br />
corporate success, normally the shareholders,<br />
but when the company is approaching insolvency,<br />
then also its creditors, as well as<br />
widening discussion to consider stakeholders.<br />
Among a number <strong>of</strong> contemporary developments,<br />
Vinten (2000) identifies the redistribution<br />
<strong>of</strong> tasks between the public <strong>and</strong> private<br />
sectors, <strong>and</strong> between public <strong>and</strong> charitable<br />
sectors in the economy in the way companies<br />
are run <strong>and</strong> security markets are organized.<br />
Vinten (2000) also suggests as another contemporary<br />
development that issues <strong>of</strong> public<br />
confidence can be assessed in terms <strong>of</strong> the<br />
level <strong>of</strong> managerial remuneration <strong>and</strong> the<br />
effectiveness with which boards <strong>of</strong> major<br />
companies carry out the task <strong>of</strong> monitoring<br />
executive management.<br />
Werther, Kerr <strong>and</strong> Wright (1995) refer to<br />
the attacks on the board’s role in <strong>Corporate</strong><br />
governance <strong>and</strong> include cronyism, inappropriate<br />
remuneration <strong>and</strong> executive compensation<br />
schemes. All these issues fall into<br />
reputation, <strong>and</strong> are directly within the field <strong>of</strong><br />
CorpCom, which is inherent in the functions<br />
<strong>of</strong> corporate governance yet there is no evidence<br />
nor academic research to demonstrate,<br />
© 2004 S<strong>and</strong>ra Oliver for editorial matter <strong>and</strong> selection;<br />
individual chapters, the contributors