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ODISHA
the Sangh parivar had close tie-ups with small and medium
Indian traders and business houses, especially in the Marwari
community, and received donations to run its projects in
Odisha, particularly in the adivasi areas. In return, it gave
them local support to run their businesses smoothly. However,
its rhetoric of swadeshi (self-sufficiency), which favoured
Indian capitalists vis-à-vis multinational corporations (MNCs),
soon fizzled out after it gave its nod to the neo-liberal order.
This shift was in line with the aspirations of its new middleclass
followers. Moreover, as a partner in the Odisha government,
its political affiliate got dividends when the state’s
economy was opened up to corporate houses.
The entry of corporates gave a sense of economic empowerment
to a section of the new middle class, which joined the
bandwagon of social conservatism, actively participated in
Hindu religiosity, and showed its aggressive character. More
importantly, it subscribed to the neo-liberal discourse on development
and opposed different social movements that championed
the livelihood issues of the poor and dispossessed.
Thus, this new middle class has emerged both as a saviour of
Hindutva politics and a defender of the neo-liberal economic
order. It is not just Hindutva that has compromised with corporates,
a church-corporate nexus was evident when the Church
of England had to withdraw its investment in Vedanta under
public pressure. In any case, MNCs gain immensely when communities
are divided.
The final explanation for Odisha’s communal turn brings
out the role of the political class. It was the Karana-Brahman-
Khandayat caste configuration that dominated Odisha’s politics
for long. Again, it was coastal Odisha politicians who were
at the helm of affairs in the state. Both in terms of social conservatism
and religious propensity, the dominant political
class, barring a few exceptions such as socialists and communists,
was not hostile to Hindutva politics. The Ganatantra
Parishad/Swatantra Party, which was supported by erstwhile
princes and feudal landlords and had a formidable presence in
western Odisha and other feudatory areas, challenged the
Congress. When the RSS was consolidating its base, the
Swatantra-Jana Congress government facilitated its expansion
by exonerating it of charges of that it had instigated communal
riots. Veteran Congress leader Harekrushna Mahatab was a
major patron of the Sangh parivar for decades. The 1977, the
Janata Party government gave important ministries and government
positions to RSS men in Odisha, affording them public
visibility and legitimacy. Biju Patnaik, an ardent secularist,
virtually finished the BJP by engineering a large-scale defection
and did not allow communal riots to spread during the Ram
Janmabhoomi agitation. However, soon after he failed to win
the 1995 assembly election, the defectors went back to their
old party. Sharing power with Biju Patnaik enhanced their
credibility and benefited the parivar in later years.
While the Jana Sangh has hardly any presence in Odisha,
the BJP grew impressively in the late 1990s. In 1998, the BJP
won seven of the 21 Lok Sabha seats in Odisha with 21.19% of
the vote. In 1999, it won nine Lok Sabha seats with 24.63% of
the vote, and in 2004 it won seven seats with 19.3% of the vote.
The alliance with the BJD certainly helped the BJP. In 2000,
the BJP won 38 of the 147 seats in the Odisha legislative assembly,
and 32 in 2004. When the alliance broke down, the BJP’s
electoral performance took a nosedive. In 2009, it could not
win any Lok Sabha seat and won only six assembly seats. The
alliance enabled the parivar to go ahead with its agenda with
all the state’s resources at its command. When the parivar was
expanding its ideology and politics, Navin Patnaik, a secularist,
chose to ignore its activities because of political compulsions.
Even during the Kandhamal riots, he was tentative and not
sure of breaking his ties with the BJP. He finally decided to do
so when he became confident that he could win on his own,
and he was proved right. Patnaik’s firm handling of Kandhamal
after the riot dented the political clout once enjoyed by
the parivar. The BJP’s present political marginalisation has
been a setback to Hindutva politics, but this may be temporary.
The ideological penetration of the Sangh parivar cannot
be written off so easily.
Conclusions
Hindutva alone should not be blamed for Odisha’s communal
turn though it has been the prime carrier of communal politics,
systematically shrinking the syncretic space and promoting
intolerance and violence against the minorities. The ideology
and politics of Hindutva found a favourable climate as the
syncretic space left room for arrogance, exclusion, and discrimination
not just towards non-Hindus, but also towards
lower-caste Hindus. Large sections of civil society, the media,
and the middle class share this world view, thereby creating a
communal public sphere. While poor Muslims in Odisha are
primarily preoccupied with livelihood issues and have shown
little inclination to mobilise and contest, the Christian minorities,
particularly the Panas of Kandhamal, empowered by religion
and the state, have asserted their rights and transgressed
the boundary drawn by the Hindu social hierarchy, inviting
Hindutva’s fury.
Note
1 For details on the syncretic traditions in
Cuttack city and Hindu-Muslim bhaichara, see
Kanungo (2012a).
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 5, 2014 vol xlix no 14 55