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This religious policy underwent a change when the East India Company was forced to admit missionaries to India for the first time under the renewed Charter Act of 1813. The General Baptist Missionary Society (GBMS) sent William Bampton and James Peggs to start the Orissa mission in 1822. Peggs believed that Puri was the main seat of Hinduism and Jagannath “the stronghold and fountainhead of their idolatry” and assumed that “a blow at Idolatry here, will prove a blow at the root” (Kulke 2005: 355). Their blow, however, took a long time coming and it was several years before they were able to convert a follower of Jagannath. The missionaries finally succeeded in 1856 when the government handed over the superintendence and management of the temple to the raja of Khurda. While Christian missionaries questioned the colonial government’s policy on Jagannath in coastal Odisha, they conveniently followed the government’s line in tribal areas. The colonial government’s campaign against Kondhs/Kandhas began in 1835 and continued till 1865, killing many and burning villages in a series of “savage wars”. It used brute force to suppress the Kandhas, who were described by Campbell as a “degenerate race, with all the ignorance and superstition of savages” (1864: 15). During this, the army generals “discovered” a practice of human sacrifice called meriah (victim), and exaggerated its “savagery” and “cruelty”. The colonial interpretation was partly due to ignorance of the Kandha lifeworld and partly due to arrogance of their “civilising” mission. Meriahs were “rescued” and sent to orphanages, while the matter was reported in newspapers in the UK and India. Baptist missionaries got involved in Kandha affairs at around the same time. Missionary propaganda played an important role in ending the practice of meriah. While the discovery and rescue of meriahs legitimised the colonial conquest, the Kandhas took it as an affront to their freedom and self-respect – they never trusted missionaries and resisted evangelisation. Thus, the missionaries carried on with evangelisation, pursuing an anti-Jagannath agenda and demonising the adivasi cultural universe. Ironically, the anti-Jagannath propaganda further popularised the Jagannath cult. Continuous denunciation and misrepresentation of Jagannath and the rath yatra antagonised not only the brahmins but also other Hindus across the region, particularly on the coast. Evangelisation by the missionaries invited the ire of adivasis, and stories of their underhand methods of conversion became a part of the everyday tribal discourse. Thus, a sort of anti-Christian sentiment had been brewing in Odisha for long when Hindutva made its entry. Hindutva Mobilisation against Christianity While Christian missionaries made inroads into some adivasi districts, Hindutva adopted a long-term strategy. Swami Laxmanananda, a militant Hindu monk, was deputed to the adivasi-majority district of Phulbani/Kandhamal in 1969. He set up his base at Chakapada with two objectives – Hinduising the Kandhas and countering the proselytising activities of Christian missionaries. Laxmanananda introduced satsangs (assemblies) and yagnas (sacrifices), Hindu gods and goddesses, ODISHA religious scriptures and modes of worship, and organised mega religious congregations (ashtaprahara namayagyas) attracting the Kandhas to the Hindutva fold (Kanungo 2002). He launched an alternative welfare system challenging the Christian missionaries in education and healthcare services. Schools, colleges, and hostels for adivasi boys and girls were opened, creating a pool of permanent cadres for the Sangh parivar. While Laxmanananda was preparing the Kandhs of Kandhamal as foot-soldiers for a future battle against Christians, the parivar pursued an aggressive agenda against conversion in the adivasi areas. In December 1998, an adivasi mob broke into the jail at R Udaygiri, dragged out Jai Singh, who was a scheduled caste covert, and burnt him alive along with his associate. In this area, the parivar had been mobilising the Saura adivasis against the Christian Panas for quite some time. Dara Singh, a migrant from Uttar Pradesh, mobilised a section of adivasis of Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar districts and launched violent attacks on Muslims and Christians – the former for cow trade/slaughter and the latter for conversion. Australian missionary Graham Stuart Staines and his two sons were burnt alive at Manoharpur in Keonjhar district on the night of 22 January 1999 by Dara Singh and his associates. Though the Wadhwa Commission established Dara Singh’s involvement, it ruled out the involvement of any organisation despite Dara Singh’s association with a parivar affiliate being commonly acknowledged. Dara Singh and his associates also killed Sheikh Rehman, a Muslim trader at Padiabeda, and Arul Doss, a Christian priest in the Jumoboni jungle of Mayurbhanj district. Anti-conversion agitations spread to the coastal districts as well. In February 2004, seven dalit Christian women of Kilipal village of coastal Jagatsinghpur district were tonsured, forcing them to reconvert to Hinduism. Kandha-Pana Divide Becomes Communal The Kandha-Pana ethnic divide can be traced back to the precolonial period. The migrant landless Panas from the plains were a sort of serfs of the Kandhas, the original inhabitants of Kandhamal. Due to their control over land, the Kandhas perceived themselves as rajas (kings) and the Panas as their prajas (subjects). This sense of superiority extended to the social and cultural spheres as well. However, colonial intervention changed the scenario by introducing new land relations and depriving the Kandhas of their traditional rights over forestland. Moreover, the reluctance of the Kandhas to directly deal with the outside world gave the Panas a material and political opportunity. When some Panas became a little prosperous due to their access to petty jobs, small trade, and even land, the Kandhas found it hard to swallow and old stereotypes for the Panas such as “thieves”, “cheats” and “liars” were revived. In the postcolonial period, the resentment of the Kandhas grew when they came to believe that a large number of Panas had illegally usurped their rights in two important matters. One, that they had trampled over the Kandhas’ legal entitlements to land, which was guaranteed under the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property by (Scheduled Tribes) Regulations (Regulation 2 of 1956); and two, that they had availed Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 5, 2014 vol xlix no 14 51
ODISHA themselves of the benefits of reservation, including government jobs, by illegally obtaining false scheduled tribe (ST) certificates (Kanungo 2008: 16-19). Land for the Kandhas is much more than livelihood – it is the core of their entire lifeworld. Their social, cultural, economic, and religious activities revolve around land and forests. Though the Panas have not really usurped substantial portions of Kandha land, the Kandhas perceive them as exploiters and land grabbers. Hindutva propaganda has contributed to this perception. This has further crystallised with the belief that the Panas, with the help of the state as well as the church, have been cornering the benefits of reservations due to their educational and economic advantages. The Kandhas allege that the Panas hide their Christian identity and claim to be either STs or scheduled castes by producing forged certificates. The Panas, they fear, are out to dominate them economically, politically and culturally. While the Kandhas castigate the Panas as usurpers of their land and exploiters, they conveniently overlook the role of high-caste Hindus, such as brahmins, Kumutis (petty traders) and Sundhis (distillers), who have migrated from neighbouring districts and have been dominating government services, and controlling trade and commerce. High-caste Hindus and Sangh parivar leaders, both being outsiders in the district, enjoy a symbiotic relationship. The Sangh parivar, in collaboration with the upper-caste elite and the middle-caste petty bourgeoisie, has been mobilising the Kandhas against the Panas who are dalit Christians, thereby creating an ethnocommunal cleavage. As the Kandha-Pana ethnic divide transformed itself into a Hindu-Christian communal confrontation, Kandhamal witnessed periodic eruptions of ethno-communal violence, particularly after the early 1990s. During the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation, yatras were undertaken by the VHP, and churches were vandalised though Christians had nothing to do with the Babri Masjid. The Ram Janmabhoomi agitation brought many Kandhas to the Hindutva fold. In 1992, Kandha-Pana violence continued for a long while. In 2004, a Catholic church was vandalised in Raikia. In 2006, Laxmanananda organised a massive congregation of 4,00,000 to 5,00,000 people at Chakapada to commemorate Golwalkar’s birth centenary, and the entire parivar and its state machinery were present. In 2007, matters worsened when the Panas demanded ST status because they spoke the same Kui language as the Kandhas. This infuriated the Kandhas. The Sangh parivar began a campaign against this demand and mobilised the Kandhas under the Kandhamal Kui Samaj. A violent Hindu-Christian confrontation took place in 2007, on Christmas day. Christians retaliated for the first time by burning some Hindu houses in Brahmanigaon. Kandhamal Riots and Fallout On 23 August 2008, Laxmanananda and four associates were killed by a group of armed assassins. This was followed by the worst-ever anti-Christian violence in India – churches were set on fire, Christian institutions, orphanages, and hamlets were destroyed, and pastors were attacked. A nun was raped and a 52 woman caretaker of an orphanage was burnt alive. While 40 people were killed, thousands of Christians fled their homes to take shelter in the forest. The communal terror spread to other districts as well, killing, injuring and terrorising Christians and rendering thousands of them homeless. This continued for a couple of months, and about 40,000 Christians lived in camps as refugees for few months before returning to their homes. Though the state government finally acted, it did so fairly late as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was a coalition partner. The Biju Janata Dal (BJD), after initial hesitation, severed its ties with the BJP and got a free hand to deal with the postriot situation. The victims were paid compensation and rehabilitated; churches and houses were rebuilt. The camps were closed and the refugees returned home, while the state tried to instil confidence among them. Many attackers were arrested, two fast track courts were set up, and some of the culprits were punished. Chief Minister Navin Patnaik stated on the floor of the legislative assembly that the members of the RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal were involved in the Kandhamal violence and 85 workers of the RSS, 321 of the VHP, and 118 of the Bajrang Dal had been arrested. Manoj Pradhan, a BJP member of the legislative assembly (MLA) and an accused in the killing of Parikshita Digal, a dalit Christian, was sentenced to seven years in jail by a fast track court. Compared to the Gujarat government, the Odisha government handled the post-riot situation in a fairly impartial and efficient manner. The break-up with the BJP seemed to give it the autonomy to show its commitment to secularism. However, the might of Hindutva’s anti-Christian fury will be remembered for years to come. Laxmanananda’s killing has perhaps led to the emergence of a new religio-political collaboration. While the Maoists have taken the responsibility for the killing, the Sangh parivar blames the church. The church may not have been part of the conspiracy, but collaboration between some Christians and Maoists cannot be ruled out. Hindutva has been the common enemy of both the Maoists and Christians. The Maoists, who were looking for a base in this district, could not find it easy as long as Laxmanananda was alive. Moreover, the Hinduised Kandhas acted as a bulwark against Maoist ideology. Similarly, Christians found Laxmanananda a bully and a major obstacle to the expansion of Christianity. His violent anti-Christian campaigns also angered them. At the level of ideology, progressive Christian groups and the Maoists share a commitment to fight against poverty and the social hierarchy, and a desire to establish a socio-economic order based on equality. Though in Christian-majority states such as Nagaland and Mizoram, the church has never supported communism, it perhaps opts for a tactical collaboration in Christian-minority areas. For the Maoists, the church’s resources and support gave them leverage in a virgin region. In post-Laxmanananda Kandhamal, Maoist activities have increased considerably. It is hard to assess how long the Maoist-Christian collaboration will last as contradictions and polarities are likely to emerge soon, particularly on questions of religiosity and political violence (Kanungo 2012b). APRIL 5, 2014 vol xlix no 14 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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