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ODISHA 

Shift from Syncretism to Communalism 

Pralay Kanungo 

Attempting to analyse how and why Odisha has 

gradually become hostage to the politics of Hindutva, 

this paper traces the evolution of the state’s syncretic 

tradition, which, despite occasional outbursts of 

communal antagonism, ensured peaceful coexistence. It 

points out that Hindutva’s systematic expansion, which 

also made use of Christianity’s contentious legacy in the 

state, has communalised the everyday syncretic space. 

In recent years, the state’s social and caste hierarchy, 

conservative elites, middle class, civil society, media, and 

neo-liberal political class have overtly and covertly 

reinforced Hindu majoritarian politics. 

Odisha’s population is overwhelmingly Hindu (94.35%) 

– Christians and Muslims constitute only 2.44% and 

2.07% respectively of it. Though communal politics 

meanders through multiple trajectories, it is commonly assumed 

that numerically insignificant religious minorities hardly 

pose any serious threat to a preponderant majority. And that 

the majority is therefore likely to be non-hostile towards the 

minorities, thereby ensuring peace, harmony, and coexistence 

among communities. Partly confirming such an assumption 

and partly keeping in tune with its syncretic tradition, Odisha 

represented a model of communal harmony for a long time, 

earning the reputation of being a non-communal and riot-free 

state. However, the situation changed with the entry and 

expansion of the forces of Hindutva. With the Sangh parivar 

mobilising Hindus against Muslims and Christians, the syncretic 

space began to shrink, and there were occasional riots. 

Odisha experienced a few low-intensity anti-Muslim riots, 

barring the 1964 Rourkela riots, but the 2008 anti-Christian 

violence in Kandhamal was gruesome. If Gujarat is seen as the 

Hindutva laboratory against Muslims, Odisha can be seen as 

the Hindutva laboratory against Christians. 

This paper attempts to understand and analyse how and 

why Odisha, setting aside its syncretic tradition of peaceful 

coexistence, gradually became hostage to the politics of 

Hindutva. The first section traces the evolution of the state’s 

syncretic tradition, which, despite occasional outbursts of 

communal antagonism, ensured peaceful coexistence, and 

how Hindutva’s systematic expansion has communalised the 

everyday syncretic space. The second section discusses how 

colonial Christianity, pursuing an aggressive anti-Jagannath 

agenda, alienated the dominant Hindu castes of coastal 

Odisha. It also earned the wrath of the Kandhas, a dominant 

adivasi community of the hinterland, with its support to the 

colonial government’s policy of brutally oppressing them. 

Hindutva made use of Christianity’s contentious legacy in its 

anti-Christian campaign in Odisha, particularly in Kandhamal. 

The third section explains and analyses the communal turn of 

contemporary Odisha, and attempts to assess how the social 

and caste hierarchy, the conservative elites, an aggressive 

middle class, civil society, the media, and a neo-liberal political 

economy and political class have overtly and covertly 

reinforced Hindu majoritarian politics in recent years. 

Pralay Kanungo (pralaykanungo@yahoo.com) is currently with Leiden 

University, the Netherlands. 

48 

1 Odisha’s Religious Traditions 

Odisha, referred to as a “holy land” of the Hindus, is a region 

where Jainism, Buddhism, Saivism, Vaishnavism, Tantrism and 

Shaktism were influential during different periods of history. 

APRIL 5, 2014 vol xlix no 14 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Thus, Hinduism in Odisha, rather than being a monolithic 

discourse and practice, represented a confluence of diverse 

cults and sects, making it a marvellous mosaic. Moreover, the 

diversity among the subregions was quite evident. While 

coastal Odisha assiduously nurtured and preserved brah manical 

traditions, ceremonial purity, religious superstitions, 

and caste prejudices for centuries, a fairly large adivasi 

population living in the forests and highlands worshipped 

their own pantheon of gods and goddesses and followed 

shamanic practices. 

This diversity and plurality were homogenised with the evolution 

and consolidation of the Jagannath cult, which constituted 

the core of the religious, cultural, and political traditions 

of Odisha. However, the complexities of this homogenising 

cult were interesting – though Puri has the distinction of being 

the chief seat of brahmanical power, the iconography of 

Jagannath speaks of an adivasi origin. Thus, Hinduisation in 

Odisha subsumed both brahminism and shamanism, “great” 

traditions and “little” traditions. Second, the decision of a 

Saivite king to build a Jagannath (an incarnation of Vishnu) 

temple at Puri was a pragmatic and political response to the 

growing popularity of Vaishnavism. Since its inception, Jagannath 

has been seen as a legitimising agency for the rulers of 

Odisha. All those who have ruled Odisha – the Mughals, the 

Marathas, the East India Company, and even the leaders of the 

Odisha Unification Movement and the contemporary political 

leadership – have sought legitimacy by acknowledging the 

supra-temporal authority of Jagannath, at least notionally. 

After the Afghan subjugation of Odisha in 1568, Jagannath 

emerged as a key symbol of identity and unity among the 

territorially fragmented Odias. 

Muslims in Odisha’s Syncretic History 

The Afghan occupation of Odisha laid the foundation of a longterm 

Hindu-Muslim relationship. The Mughals replaced the 

Afghans in 1578 and ruled for nearly two centuries. In 1751, 

Odisha was passed on to the Marathas, who finally came under 

the British in 1803. The region’s “Muslim conquest” was not 

only late chronologically, but also failed to attain the strength 

and permanence it did in neighbouring Bengal. Unlike Bengal, 

conversion did not take place on a large scale in this stronghold 

of Hinduism. 

During the two centuries of Muslim rule, Jagannath and 

Puri were subject to attacks – beginning with Kalapahar, a 

Hindu convert, to Mutquad Khan (during Shah Jahan’s reign) 

and Taki Khan (during Aurangzeb’s reign). However, there 

were also notable exceptions. Akbar’s commander Man Singh 

forced the Afghans to agree to not attack the Jagannath 

temple. Man Singh’s wife built the Mukti Mandap, the seat of 

brahmin authority, inside the temple. Mir Habib, a confidant 

of Murshid Quli Khan, also promoted the cause of the 

Jagannath temple. The raja of Khurda, Ramachandra Deva II 

(18th century), embraced Islam, but tried to protect Jagannath 

from falling into the hands of the invading army of the subedar 

of Bengal, Bihar and Odisha. Interestingly, as the Madalapanji 

records, he was allowed to perform ritual services to Jagannath 

ODISHA 

despite being a convert. These exceptions facilitated the 

evolution of an enduring Hindu-Muslim syncretic tradition. 

Sal Beg, a 17th century Muslim poet, composed a large 

number of devotional songs in Odia dedicated to lord Jagannath. 

Today, he is a household name and his bhajans (devotional 

songs) have become an indispensable part of the temple 

rituals every morning. Hindus and Muslims continued to 

actively participate in each other’s religious festivals. The 

Muslim dalabehera (former military/administrative head) of 

Manikagada village was the hereditary marfatdar (custodian) 

of the village Durga puja for centuries. Muslims were active 

office-bearers in many Dussehra committees in Cuttack city, 

and Muslim singers, musicians, and artists performed in puja 

pandals (venues). A large number of Muslims took part in the 

immersion procession, which was in contrast to many other 

cities where Hindu-Muslim clashes took place during festivals. 

Similarly, Hindus participated in Eid celebrations and the 

Muharram procession. 1 

Worship of Satya Pir has been a shared tradition, and palas 

(a form of balladry) represent the tradition of Hindu-Muslim 

syncretism. Hindus have deep faith in the Sufi and Pir tradition 

and flock to their shrines. At the shrine of Hazrat Bukhari 

Baba in Kaipadar, shirni/prasad (offerings), flowers, and 

sandalwood paste are sold only by Hindu shopkeepers whose 

forefathers were allotted sanands (records) for it. As there is a 

strong Sufi-folk intermingling in Odisha, some conversion to 

Islam perhaps occurred through the Sufi route. Some Muslims 

believe in Hindu astrology and make horoscopes for their 

children. Aminul Islam published an authentic Odia almanac 

in 1935 known as the Orissa Kohinoor Press Panjika. For 

Hindus, this Panjika has been an indispensable guide in their 

everyday rituals. Though published by a Muslim, it has found 

acceptance in the Jagannath temple and the rituals are 

conducted in accordance with its calculations. Over the centuries, 

many Persian and Arabic words were internalised by Odia 

writers and readers. 

Syncretism to Communalism 

These strong syncretic traditions, however, could not deter the 

entry of communal discourses. Soon after the creation of Orissa 

(Odisha) in 1936, the Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League 

opened their branches in the new province and their leaders, 

particularly from Bengal, disseminated communal politics. 

While the Muslim League mobilised some Muslims to observe 

Direct Action Day on 16 August 1946 in Cuttack, the Hindu 

Mahasabha proposed forming a Hindu militia and defence 

committee in each village and distributed leaflets urging 

Hindus to boycott Muslims. While some Hindus protested 

against the Noakhali riots, the Muslim League in Odisha 

decided to raise a “Pakistan Fund”. Thus, it is clear that most of 

the Hindu-Muslim tension was in response to the communal 

situation outside Odisha. Unlike other places, it was neither 

violent nor vicious and hardly harboured any communal 

hatred (Kanungo 2003). Moreover, all Muslims did not support 

Muslim communal politics, and many “nationalist” Muslims 

condemned Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s “communal policy” and 

Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 5, 2014 vol xlix no 14 49

ODISHA 

supported the Congress. Similarly, a large majority of Hindus 

shunned the communal politics of the Hindu Mahasabha. As a 

result, despite occasional eruptions of communal tension, 

no violent incidents occurred. But competitive communal 

mobilisations certainly germinated mistrust between the 

two communities. 

Hindutva’s Entry, Expansion 

and Emergence of Anti-Muslim Violence 

During the late 1940s, a few pracharaks (full-time propagandists) 

from neighbouring states visited the border areas of 

Odisha to begin Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) work. 

However, their activities suffered a setback after Mahatma 

Gandhi’s murder and the subsequent ban on the RSS. Soon 

after the ban was lifted in 1949, M S Golwalkar deputed 

Baburao Paldhikar as the prant (province) pracharak for 

Odisha. Paldhikar arrived in Cuttack and met notables such as 

Nilakantha Das, Godavaris Misra, Jadumani Mangaraj and 

Laxminarayan Sahu. These people, who were Congress dissidents 

and by and large social conservatives, extended support 

to the RSS. Nilakantha allowed the RSS to hold meetings on the 

premises of his printing press and went to Nagpur to preside 

over the Vijaya Dashami Utsav in 1950. It was thus that the RSS 

gained an initial foothold and legitimacy in the state. 

Paldhikar toured extensively and set up new units (shakhas) 

with the help of some dedicated Maharashtrian pracharaks. 

Golwalkar made annual visits and connected with Odia 

intellectuals through Pranakrishna Parija, an eminent educationist. 

During the 1966 Goraksha Andolan (cow protection 

movement), the RSS launched a signature campaign and won 

popular support because the cow was venerated across the 

state. Incidentally, the state government had already passed 

the Orissa Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act in 1960. Side by 

side, the RSS laid the foundation of the Sangh parivar in Odisha 

– the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and its Odia mouthpiece 

Rashtradeepa were launched in 1964 and the Akhil Bharatiya 

Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) in 1967. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad 

(VHP) organised its first state conference in 1968, providing a 

platform for sadhus (holy men), feudal chiefs, politicians, businessmen, 

bureaucrats, and other notables. To check Christian 

missionaries, the VHP sent a Hindu missionary, Laxmanananda 

Saraswati, to Kandhamal/Phulbani. Thus, the Sangh 

parivar spread its wings from the coastal to the tribal areas by 

reaching out to various social strata. 

Around the same period, in March 1964, Odisha experienced 

its first communal riots in Rourkela. Special trains 

carrying Hindu refugees from East Pakistan had been stopping 

at Rourkela for food, and the tragic narratives of the refugees 

angered the public. The RSS reportedly instigated Hindus and 

created a communally charged atmosphere, which eventually 

led to communal riots killing 72 people. In November 1968, 

Cuttack experienced a major riot on the question of music 

before a mosque. Unlike the Rourkela riots, there was no killing 

but the rioters looted and set fire to the shops and houses of 

Muslims. Obviously, some Hindu businessmen of the city who 

were patrons of the RSS wanted to destroy Muslim businesses. 

50 

While the Communist Party of India (CPI) denounced the role 

of the RSS, the Swatantra-Jana Congress government did not 

find any substance in the allegation. 

A few communal riots took place during the Ram Janmabhoomi 

agitation in the early 1990s. By this time the Sangh 

parivar had strengthened and consolidated its social and 

political base. Participation in the anti-Emergency agitation 

and the subsequent sharing of political power as an important 

constituent of the Janata Party had raised the credibility of the 

RSS in Odisha. By the time the Sangh parivar launched the 

Ram Janmabhoomi agitation, it had expanded considerably. 

The parivar, as part of its national strategy, organised various 

rituals and yatras (religious processions) to mobilise Hindus in 

the state. Communal mobilisation led to riots in two cities with 

sizeable Muslim populations – Bhadrak in 1991 and Cuttack in 

1992. While a few were killed in Bhadrak, only one person died 

in Cuttack. The secular Biju Patnaik government controlled 

the riots. In Cuttack, leaders of both communities cooperated 

to stop a communal conflagration. 

Muslim leaders in Cuttack think that the communal clashes 

in 1968 and 1992 cannot be classified as full-fledged riots as 

there was hardly any loss of life and effective intervention by 

the state and the close interactions in sahis/mohallas (local 

neighbourhoods) prevented a communal flare up. They believe 

that only a small section of Hindu extremists harbour communal 

feelings and that the overwhelming majority in the city 

still follow the old tradition of Hindu-Muslim bhaichara (fraternity). 

Though the Sangh parivar tried to construct a Muslim 

other on the issues of Kalapahar, cow slaughter, and Pakistan, 

the Muslim elite argues that all these constructions did not 

foster antagonism towards Muslims primarily because, unlike 

Christians, Muslims were not involved in religious conversion. 

While the Muslim perception about conversion may be right to 

some extent, on the issue of cow slaughter, Hindutva projects 

Muslims as the number one enemy in Odisha. 

2 Christianity, Colonialism and Missionaries 

When the British took control of Odisha from the Marathas in 

1803, they took special care not to disrespect lord Jagannath 

and offend the brahmins of Puri. The British were also pragmatic 

enough to take over the “superintendence and management” 

of the Jagannath temple and to continue with the Maratha 

practice of collecting a pilgrim tax. Missionaries criticised the 

government’s decision to become the “church warden” of 

Hindu deities as “un-Christian” and exerted constant pressure 

for it to sever its connection with idolatry. Claudius Buchanan 

and other missionaries sensationalised the “carnage” during 

the rath yatra (car festival) at Puri. Their account of so-called 

“holocausts”, which was hardly based on facts, stirred public 

opinion in England. For Christian missionaries, the Indian 

empire, in fundamental ways, was a “Hindu Raj” and the pilgrimage 

to Jagannath epitomised “suffering, loss of life and 

other evils” and was “the greatest scourge” (Frykenberg 2008). 

Ironically, the same missionaries saw it as a golden opportunity 

to evangelise at Puri – they distributed food, clothes, medicines, 

and the Bible to pilgrims as part of their evangelical mission. 


This religious policy underwent a change when the East 

India Company was forced to admit missionaries to India for 

the first time under the renewed Charter Act of 1813. The General 

Baptist Missionary Society (GBMS) sent William Bampton 

and James Peggs to start the Orissa mission in 1822. Peggs believed 

that Puri was the main seat of Hinduism and Jagannath 

“the stronghold and fountainhead of their idolatry” and assumed 

that “a blow at Idolatry here, will prove a blow at the root” 

(Kulke 2005: 355). Their blow, however, took a long time coming 

and it was several years before they were able to convert a 

follower of Jagannath. The missionaries finally succeeded in 

1856 when the government handed over the superintendence 

and management of the temple to the raja of Khurda. 

While Christian missionaries questioned the colonial government’s 

policy on Jagannath in coastal Odisha, they conveniently 

followed the government’s line in tribal areas. The colonial 

government’s campaign against Kondhs/Kandhas began 

in 1835 and continued till 1865, killing many and burning 

villages in a series of “savage wars”. It used brute force to 

suppress the Kandhas, who were described by Campbell as a 

“degenerate race, with all the ignorance and superstition of 

savages” (1864: 15). During this, the army generals “discovered” 

a practice of human sacrifice called meriah (victim), and 

exaggerated its “savagery” and “cruelty”. The colonial interpretation 

was partly due to ignorance of the Kandha lifeworld 

and partly due to arrogance of their “civilising” mission. 

Meriahs were “rescued” and sent to orphanages, while the 

matter was reported in newspapers in the UK and India. Baptist 

missionaries got involved in Kandha affairs at around the 

same time. Missionary propaganda played an important role 

in ending the practice of meriah. While the discovery and rescue 

of meriahs legitimised the colonial conquest, the Kandhas 

took it as an affront to their freedom and self-respect – they 

never trusted missionaries and resisted evangelisation. 

Thus, the missionaries carried on with evangelisation, pursuing 

an anti-Jagannath agenda and demonising the adivasi 

cultural universe. Ironically, the anti-Jagannath propaganda 

further popularised the Jagannath cult. Continuous denunciation 

and misrepresentation of Jagannath and the rath yatra 

antagonised not only the brahmins but also other Hindus 

across the region, particularly on the coast. Evangelisation by 

the missionaries invited the ire of adivasis, and stories of their 

underhand methods of conversion became a part of the 

everyday tribal discourse. Thus, a sort of anti-Christian sentiment 

had been brewing in Odisha for long when Hindutva 

made its entry. 

Hindutva Mobilisation against Christianity 

While Christian missionaries made inroads into some adivasi 

districts, Hindutva adopted a long-term strategy. Swami 

Laxmanananda, a militant Hindu monk, was deputed to the 

adivasi-majority district of Phulbani/Kandhamal in 1969. He 

set up his base at Chakapada with two objectives – Hinduising 

the Kandhas and countering the proselytising activities of 

Christian missionaries. Laxmanananda introduced satsangs 

(assemblies) and yagnas (sacrifices), Hindu gods and goddesses, 

ODISHA 

religious scriptures and modes of worship, and organised mega 

religious congregations (ashtaprahara namayagyas) attracting 

the Kandhas to the Hindutva fold (Kanungo 2002). He launched 

an alternative welfare system challenging the Christian 

missionaries in education and healthcare services. Schools, 

colleges, and hostels for adivasi boys and girls were opened, 

creating a pool of permanent cadres for the Sangh parivar. 

While Laxmanananda was preparing the Kandhs of Kandhamal 

as foot-soldiers for a future battle against Christians, 

the parivar pursued an aggressive agenda against conversion 

in the adivasi areas. In December 1998, an adivasi mob broke 

into the jail at R Udaygiri, dragged out Jai Singh, who was a 

scheduled caste covert, and burnt him alive along with his 

associate. In this area, the parivar had been mobilising the 

Saura adivasis against the Christian Panas for quite some time. 

Dara Singh, a migrant from Uttar Pradesh, mobilised a section 

of adivasis of Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar districts and launched 

violent attacks on Muslims and Christians – the former for cow 

trade/slaughter and the latter for conversion. Australian 

missionary Graham Stuart Staines and his two sons were 

burnt alive at Manoharpur in Keonjhar district on the night of 

22 January 1999 by Dara Singh and his associates. Though the 

Wadhwa Commission established Dara Singh’s involvement, it 

ruled out the involvement of any organisation despite Dara 

Singh’s association with a parivar affiliate being commonly 

acknowledged. Dara Singh and his associates also killed 

Sheikh Rehman, a Muslim trader at Padiabeda, and Arul Doss, 

a Christian priest in the Jumoboni jungle of Mayurbhanj 

district. Anti-conversion agitations spread to the coastal 

districts as well. In February 2004, seven dalit Christian 

women of Kilipal village of coastal Jagatsinghpur district were 

tonsured, forcing them to reconvert to Hinduism. 

Kandha-Pana Divide Becomes Communal 

The Kandha-Pana ethnic divide can be traced back to the precolonial 

period. The migrant landless Panas from the plains 

were a sort of serfs of the Kandhas, the original inhabitants of 

Kandhamal. Due to their control over land, the Kandhas perceived 

themselves as rajas (kings) and the Panas as their prajas 

(subjects). This sense of superiority extended to the social 

and cultural spheres as well. However, colonial intervention 

changed the scenario by introducing new land relations and 

depriving the Kandhas of their traditional rights over forestland. 

Moreover, the reluctance of the Kandhas to directly deal 

with the outside world gave the Panas a material and political 

opportunity. When some Panas became a little prosperous due 

to their access to petty jobs, small trade, and even land, the 

Kandhas found it hard to swallow and old stereotypes for the 

Panas such as “thieves”, “cheats” and “liars” were revived. In 

the postcolonial period, the resentment of the Kandhas grew 

when they came to believe that a large number of Panas had 

illegally usurped their rights in two important matters. One, 

that they had trampled over the Kandhas’ legal entitlements to 

land, which was guaranteed under the Orissa Scheduled Areas 

Transfer of Immovable Property by (Scheduled Tribes) Regulations 

(Regulation 2 of 1956); and two, that they had availed 


ODISHA 

themselves of the benefits of reservation, including government 

jobs, by illegally obtaining false scheduled tribe (ST) 

certificates (Kanungo 2008: 16-19). 

Land for the Kandhas is much more than livelihood – it is 

the core of their entire lifeworld. Their social, cultural, economic, 

and religious activities revolve around land and forests. 

Though the Panas have not really usurped substantial portions 

of Kandha land, the Kandhas perceive them as exploiters and 

land grabbers. Hindutva propaganda has contributed to this 

perception. This has further crystallised with the belief that 

the Panas, with the help of the state as well as the church, have 

been cornering the benefits of reservations due to their educational 

and economic advantages. The Kandhas allege that the 

Panas hide their Christian identity and claim to be either STs 

or scheduled castes by producing forged certificates. The 

Panas, they fear, are out to dominate them economically, 

politically and culturally. 

While the Kandhas castigate the Panas as usurpers of their 

land and exploiters, they conveniently overlook the role of 

high-caste Hindus, such as brahmins, Kumutis (petty traders) 

and Sundhis (distillers), who have migrated from neighbouring 

districts and have been dominating government services, 

and controlling trade and commerce. High-caste Hindus and 

Sangh parivar leaders, both being outsiders in the district, 

enjoy a symbiotic relationship. The Sangh parivar, in collaboration 

with the upper-caste elite and the middle-caste petty 

bourgeoisie, has been mobilising the Kandhas against the 

Panas who are dalit Christians, thereby creating an ethnocommunal 

cleavage. 

As the Kandha-Pana ethnic divide transformed itself into a 

Hindu-Christian communal confrontation, Kandhamal witnessed 

periodic eruptions of ethno-communal violence, particularly 

after the early 1990s. During the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation, 

yatras were undertaken by the VHP, and churches were 

vandalised though Christians had nothing to do with the Babri 

Masjid. The Ram Janmabhoomi agitation brought many Kandhas 

to the Hindutva fold. In 1992, Kandha-Pana violence continued 

for a long while. In 2004, a Catholic church was vandalised 

in Raikia. In 2006, Laxmanananda organised a massive 

congregation of 4,00,000 to 5,00,000 people at Chakapada to 

commemorate Golwalkar’s birth centenary, and the entire 

parivar and its state machinery were present. In 2007, matters 

worsened when the Panas demanded ST status because they 

spoke the same Kui language as the Kandhas. This infuriated 

the Kandhas. The Sangh parivar began a campaign against 

this demand and mobilised the Kandhas under the Kandhamal 

Kui Samaj. A violent Hindu-Christian confrontation took place 

in 2007, on Christmas day. Christians retaliated for the first 

time by burning some Hindu houses in Brahmanigaon. 

Kandhamal Riots and Fallout 

On 23 August 2008, Laxmanananda and four associates were 

killed by a group of armed assassins. This was followed by the 

worst-ever anti-Christian violence in India – churches were set 

on fire, Christian institutions, orphanages, and hamlets were 

destroyed, and pastors were attacked. A nun was raped and a 

52 

woman caretaker of an orphanage was burnt alive. While 40 

people were killed, thousands of Christians fled their homes to 

take shelter in the forest. The communal terror spread to 

other districts as well, killing, injuring and terrorising 

Christians and rendering thousands of them homeless. This 

continued for a couple of months, and about 40,000 Christians 

lived in camps as refugees for few months before returning to 

their homes. 

Though the state government finally acted, it did so fairly 

late as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was a coalition partner. 

The Biju Janata Dal (BJD), after initial hesitation, severed 

its ties with the BJP and got a free hand to deal with the postriot 

situation. The victims were paid compensation and rehabilitated; 

churches and houses were rebuilt. The camps were 

closed and the refugees returned home, while the state tried to 

instil confidence among them. Many attackers were arrested, 

two fast track courts were set up, and some of the culprits were 

punished. Chief Minister Navin Patnaik stated on the floor of 

the legislative assembly that the members of the RSS, VHP and 

Bajrang Dal were involved in the Kandhamal violence and 85 

workers of the RSS, 321 of the VHP, and 118 of the Bajrang Dal 

had been arrested. Manoj Pradhan, a BJP member of the legislative 

assembly (MLA) and an accused in the killing of Parikshita 

Digal, a dalit Christian, was sentenced to seven years in 

jail by a fast track court. Compared to the Gujarat government, 

the Odisha government handled the post-riot situation in a 

fairly impartial and efficient manner. The break-up with the 

BJP seemed to give it the autonomy to show its commitment to 

secularism. However, the might of Hindutva’s anti-Christian 

fury will be remembered for years to come. 

Laxmanananda’s killing has perhaps led to the emergence 

of a new religio-political collaboration. While the Maoists have 

taken the responsibility for the killing, the Sangh parivar blames 

the church. The church may not have been part of the conspiracy, 

but collaboration between some Christians and Maoists 

cannot be ruled out. Hindutva has been the common enemy of 

both the Maoists and Christians. The Maoists, who were looking 

for a base in this district, could not find it easy as long as 

Laxmanananda was alive. Moreover, the Hinduised Kandhas 

acted as a bulwark against Maoist ideology. Similarly, Christians 

found Laxmanananda a bully and a major obstacle to the 

expansion of Christianity. His violent anti-Christian campaigns 

also angered them. At the level of ideology, progressive 

Christian groups and the Maoists share a commitment to fight 

against poverty and the social hierarchy, and a desire to establish 

a socio-economic order based on equality. Though in 

Christian-majority states such as Nagaland and Mizoram, the 

church has never supported communism, it perhaps opts for a 

tactical collaboration in Christian-minority areas. For the 

Maoists, the church’s resources and support gave them 

leverage in a virgin region. In post-Laxmanananda Kandhamal, 

Maoist activities have increased considerably. It is hard 

to assess how long the Maoist-Christian collaboration will last 

as contradictions and polarities are likely to emerge soon, 

particularly on questions of religiosity and political violence 

(Kanungo 2012b). 


3 Explaining the Communal Shift 

While reflecting on the syncretic tradition of Odisha and the 

success of the Hindutva narrative vis-à-vis Muslims and Christians, 

the question arises as to why the state succumbed to 

communalism despite having such a laudable past. It would be 

naïve to conclude that Hindutva would have succeeded without 

a congenial context. Majoritarian construction is always 

fuelled by a perception of threat, real or imaginary – the fury 

of the Kandhamal riots certainly signalled this. Christianity’s 

contentious past and proactive present in Odisha became 

handy for Hindutva to construct Christians, particularly dalit 

Christians, as the enemy other and unleash unprecedented 

violence against the community. Kandhamal made an unambiguous 

statement – Odisha has turned communal. True, 

Hindutva provides the major communal text, but there are 

many related subtexts that explain the communal shift. 

First and foremost, despite the criss-crossing and intermingling 

of various theologies, discourses, and practices within 

Hinduism and the eclecticism of the Jagannath cult, an inviolable 

core of Hinduism runs through the state – Hindus are 

superior and their hegemony should not be challenged. In concrete 

terms, this Hinduism endorses the superiority of brahminical 

values, which are very intolerant of non-Hindus and 

the lower castes. While the culture of Jagannath stands for 

syncretism in one sense, its racial overtone is unambiguously 

exclusionary and discriminatory – yavanas, mlechhas, firangis, 

foreigners (Christian/white), and non-Hindus are not allowed 

to enter the temple. There have been innumerable instances of 

foreigners being humiliated and ill-treated at the two grand 

temples – Jagannath at Puri and Lingaraj at Bhubaneswar. 

The second aspect of Odisha’s Hinduism is its treatment of 

the lower castes – the former untouchables. Even today, social 

conservatism and the caste hierarchy are very entrenched, and 

despite the transformation of caste dynamics, discrimination 

is evident, particularly in coastal Odisha. Purity and pollution 

greatly matter in villages and former untouchables are not 

allowed to enter temples – from Keradagarh to Nuapada. 

Despite Gandhi’s laudable attempt in the 1930s to allow the 

entry of harijans to Hindu temples, their humiliation has continued. 

In the Jagannath temple of Keradagarh, dalits could 

only see the idol from a distance through nau kana (nine 

holes). When they asserted their rights, the caste Hindus 

yielded – not by giving them access to the sanctum sanctorum, 

but by restricting everybody’s entry, including the upper 

castes, by installing an iron gate. This clever move, in connivance 

with the state, enabled continuing with the practice of 

denying entry to the dalits. In the Kali temple of Nuapada, 

even the chairman of the National Commission for the Scheduled 

Castes, a dalit, failed to enter the sanctum sanctorum. 

The Jagannath culture is so hegemonic that these humiliating 

exclusionary practices have been normalised and occasional 

resistance to them has been subsumed. Though a section 

of dalits raise their voice against humiliations by threatening 

to desert Hinduism, following the path of poet Bhima 

Bhoi and B R Ambedkar, many others think they can come 

closer to Jagannath by emulating the legendary devotee Dasia 

ODISHA 

Bauri. Thus, resistance has been feeble and conformity strong. 

A large section of adivasis believe Jagannath to be their own 

deity. Hindutva has been focusing on these integrative aspects 

of the Jagannath culture while carrying forward its Hinduisation 

agenda among adivasis and dalits. Its “reconversion” 

rituals invoke Jagannath and seek the blessings of Shankaracharya 

and other Hindu seers for legitimacy. 

While Laxmanananda’s co-option of the Kandhas became a 

success story, his politics of mobilisation turned the Kandha- 

Pana divide into a Hindu-Christian conflict. When the Panas, 

former untouchables, decided to end their humiliation by embracing 

Christianity, they consciously defied the caste hierarchy 

of Hinduism. Empowered by the state and Christianity, 

they competed for political and economic power, occasionally 

displaying some aggression. The proliferation of new Christian 

sects further complicated the picture. To counter Christianity, 

Laxmanananda built up a cadre among his followers and 

fostered an alliance of the Kandhas and powerful upper-caste 

migrants against the Christian Panas. Laxmanananda’s death 

not only gave his followers an opportunity to avenge it, but 

also retaliate for every act of violation they believed the Panas 

had committed against the Hindu social order. 

A second explanation relates to the changing character of 

Odisha’s civil society, which represents various shades of ideology 

– social conservatism, liberalism, modernism, secularism 

and radicalism. A strong section that is committed to modernity, 

progress, and secularism has always appreciated Christianity’s 

contributions to the formation of modern Odisha, 

acknowledging how Christian missionaries brought the first 

printing press, compiled Odia dictionaries, opened schools, 

hospitals, and orphanages, and tirelessly worked in the most 

inhospitable terrain serving the poor and the destitute for 

more than a century. Christianity was so influential among the 

leading intellectuals that two great literary figures of colonial 

Orissa, Fakirmohan Senapati and Radhanatha Ray, considered 

embracing it. After Radhanatha backed out at the last moment, 

Fakirmohan decided not to go ahead alone. Barrister Madhusudan 

Das, one of the founding fathers of modern Odisha, 

embraced Christianity. Despite being a Christian, he publicly 

asked lord Jagannath to protect Odisha and Odias and fought 

the famous Jagannath case against the British to defend the 

rights of the temple and the king of Puri. Thus, a large section 

of Odisha’s civil society was not hostile to Christianity. 

At the same time, as mentioned earlier, the RSS began its 

journey in Odisha with the active support of some notables, 

whose caste composition reveals an interesting coalition of 

social forces. While Nilakantha Dash and Godavaris Mishra 

belonged to the powerful brahmin community of Puri, Mangaraj 

was a militant Khandayat (kshatriya) and Laxmi Narayan 

Sahu came from a resourceful trading community. These notables 

were influential in politics and they had a powerful presence 

in civil society as well. So another prominent section of 

civil society was, from the very beginning, pro-Hindu in belief 

and practice, if not communal. In the postcolonial period, 

Hindutva worked on this branch of civil society and brought it 

closer to its world view. The RSS focused on the two issues that 


ODISHA 

always bothered this section – cow slaughter (go hatya) and 

religious conversion (dharmantikaran). Thus, a major section 

of literary and cultural figures in Odisha gradually tilted 

towards Hindutva. For instance, Ratnakar Chayani, a respectable 

writer, became the president of an RSS front organisation 

that was created after Laxmanananda’s death, thereby legitimising 

anti-Christian violence. The benign role of Christianity, 

which had once been a part of Odisha’s popular discourse, 

has been systematically erased by the RSS. 

With the support of this section of civil society, the Sangh 

parivar’s anti-Christian campaign has harped on the largescale 

conversion of adivasis, creating communal tension in the 

state. Along with this, there is a widespread belief that Christian 

organisations receive funds from abroad. For instance, 

when World Vision’s premises were ransacked during the 2008 

riots, the Odia intelligentsia did not sympathise with this 

“dubious” non-governmental organisation (NGO). It is true that 

Christian institutions are among the highest recipients of foreign 

donations, but Sangh parivar organisations in Odisha like 

the Utkal Bipanna Sahayata Samiti (UBSS) have also received 

donations from overseas organisations like the India Development 

Relief Fund (IDRF) and Sewa International, UK, for postcyclone 

reconstruction and other welfare activities. Besides 

funds, the emergence of new churches in the coastal areas in 

the post-1999 super-cyclone period has raised the fear of conversion 

and created resentment among the middle class. Their 

anger was manifested at Kilipal where converted dalit members 

were forcibly tonsured. Finally, the cow still has great 

symbolic and emotional value for Odias in general. Incidentally, 

the present Gajapati King, the representative of lord 

Jagannath, takes a strident anti-Christian stand on conversion 

and cow slaughter, conveniently forgetting the role played 

by Madhusudan Das, a Christian, in defending the rights of 

Jagannath and the Puri king. 

Another explanation pertains to the role of the middle class 

and the media. Along with the communalisation of civil 

society, there has also been a steady communalisation of the 

middle class and the media. While the old middle class came 

primarily from the upper castes, a new middle class has 

emerged from the middle and backward castes, who are well 

disposed to Hindutva. While the old middle class was mainly 

educated by secular state institutions, a large section of the 

new middle class is the product of the RSS educational network. 

Around 750 Saraswati Shishu Vidya Mandirs in Odisha impart 

education to 1,80,000 students from kindergarten to Class XII, 

and 11,000 dedicated teachers, steeped in the Sangh ideology, 

teach these students as a mission. These schools are very popular 

among middle and lower-middle-class parents as they 

provide “quality and value education” for a moderate fee. In 

2010, of the first 100 rank holders in the Class X examination, 

55 were from Saraswati Shishu Vidya Mandirs. Moreover, the 

BJP, which was a partner in the state government for about a 

decade, had access to both material and cultural resources. 

For instance, it strategically retained the education portfolio to 

carry out its indoctrination in educational institutions. 

The print media, which was once secular, has by and large 

internalised the Sangh discourse. Leading newspapers like 

Samaj, which played a historic role in the freedom struggle, 

now give generous space to Hindu communal writings and 

even black out secular articles. There has been a proliferation 

of Odia vernacular newspapers and many owners and journalists 

are Sangh parivar sympathisers. A similar trend is seen in 

the electronic media. Besides, the RSS has a strong publication 

wing, which disseminates Sangh literature across the state. 

Neo-liberalism, Communalism and the New Middle Class 

Yet another explanation makes a connection between the neoliberal 

economy, communalism, and the new middle class. 

Odisha’s new middle class, consisting of engineers, computer 

and banking professionals, financial managers, doctors, lawyers, 

entrepreneurs, contractors and middle men, by and large 

welcomes corporates and multinationals, hoping to get generous 

employment packages and business opportunities. They 

believe that while Hindutva will give them social recognition, 

neo-liberalism will empower them economically. Before the 

coming of a neo-liberal economy and the entry of corporates, 

REVIEW OF URBAN AFFAIRS 

March 30, 2013 

(Un)Settling the City: Analysing Displacement in Delhi from 1990 to 2007 

Revitalising Economies of Disassembly: Informal Recyclers, Development Experts 

and E-Waste Reforms in Bangalore 

Biometric Marginality: UID and the Shaping of Homeless Identities in the City 

Protest, Politics, and the Middle Class in Varanasi 

Revisiting the 74th Constitutional Amendment for Better Metropolitan Governance 

Urban Multiplicities: Governing India’s Megacities 

–Gautam Bhan, Swathi Shivanand 

–Rajyashree N Reddy 

–Ursula Rao 

–Jolie M F Wood 

–K C Sivaramakrishnan 

–Ashima Sood 

For copies write to: Circulation Manager, 

Economic and Political Weekly, 

320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013. 

email: circulation@epw.in 

54 


ODISHA 

the Sangh parivar had close tie-ups with small and medium 

Indian traders and business houses, especially in the Marwari 

community, and received donations to run its projects in 

Odisha, particularly in the adivasi areas. In return, it gave 

them local support to run their businesses smoothly. However, 

its rhetoric of swadeshi (self-sufficiency), which favoured 

Indian capitalists vis-à-vis multinational corporations (MNCs), 

soon fizzled out after it gave its nod to the neo-liberal order. 

This shift was in line with the aspirations of its new middleclass 

followers. Moreover, as a partner in the Odisha government, 

its political affiliate got dividends when the state’s 

economy was opened up to corporate houses. 

The entry of corporates gave a sense of economic empowerment 

to a section of the new middle class, which joined the 

bandwagon of social conservatism, actively participated in 

Hindu religiosity, and showed its aggressive character. More 

importantly, it subscribed to the neo-liberal discourse on development 

and opposed different social movements that championed 

the livelihood issues of the poor and dispossessed. 

Thus, this new middle class has emerged both as a saviour of 

Hindutva politics and a defender of the neo-liberal economic 

order. It is not just Hindutva that has compromised with corporates, 

a church-corporate nexus was evident when the Church 

of England had to withdraw its investment in Vedanta under 

public pressure. In any case, MNCs gain immensely when communities 

are divided. 

The final explanation for Odisha’s communal turn brings 

out the role of the political class. It was the Karana-Brahman- 

Khandayat caste configuration that dominated Odisha’s politics 

for long. Again, it was coastal Odisha politicians who were 

at the helm of affairs in the state. Both in terms of social conservatism 

and religious propensity, the dominant political 

class, barring a few exceptions such as socialists and communists, 

was not hostile to Hindutva politics. The Ganatantra 

Parishad/Swatantra Party, which was supported by erstwhile 

princes and feudal landlords and had a formidable presence in 

western Odisha and other feudatory areas, challenged the 

Congress. When the RSS was consolidating its base, the 

Swatantra-Jana Congress government facilitated its expansion 

by exonerating it of charges of that it had instigated communal 

riots. Veteran Congress leader Harekrushna Mahatab was a 

major patron of the Sangh parivar for decades. The 1977, the 

Janata Party government gave important ministries and government 

positions to RSS men in Odisha, affording them public 

visibility and legitimacy. Biju Patnaik, an ardent secularist, 

virtually finished the BJP by engineering a large-scale defection 

and did not allow communal riots to spread during the Ram 

Janmabhoomi agitation. However, soon after he failed to win 

the 1995 assembly election, the defectors went back to their 

old party. Sharing power with Biju Patnaik enhanced their 

credibility and benefited the parivar in later years. 

While the Jana Sangh has hardly any presence in Odisha, 

the BJP grew impressively in the late 1990s. In 1998, the BJP 

won seven of the 21 Lok Sabha seats in Odisha with 21.19% of 

the vote. In 1999, it won nine Lok Sabha seats with 24.63% of 

the vote, and in 2004 it won seven seats with 19.3% of the vote. 

The alliance with the BJD certainly helped the BJP. In 2000, 

the BJP won 38 of the 147 seats in the Odisha legislative assembly, 

and 32 in 2004. When the alliance broke down, the BJP’s 

electoral performance took a nosedive. In 2009, it could not 

win any Lok Sabha seat and won only six assembly seats. The 

alliance enabled the parivar to go ahead with its agenda with 

all the state’s resources at its command. When the parivar was 

expanding its ideology and politics, Navin Patnaik, a secularist, 

chose to ignore its activities because of political compulsions. 

Even during the Kandhamal riots, he was tentative and not 

sure of breaking his ties with the BJP. He finally decided to do 

so when he became confident that he could win on his own, 

and he was proved right. Patnaik’s firm handling of Kandhamal 

after the riot dented the political clout once enjoyed by 

the parivar. The BJP’s present political marginalisation has 

been a setback to Hindutva politics, but this may be temporary. 

The ideological penetration of the Sangh parivar cannot 

be written off so easily. 

Conclusions 

Hindutva alone should not be blamed for Odisha’s communal 

turn though it has been the prime carrier of communal politics, 

systematically shrinking the syncretic space and promoting 

intolerance and violence against the minorities. The ideology 

and politics of Hindutva found a favourable climate as the 

syncretic space left room for arrogance, exclusion, and discrimination 

not just towards non-Hindus, but also towards 

lower-caste Hindus. Large sections of civil society, the media, 

and the middle class share this world view, thereby creating a 

communal public sphere. While poor Muslims in Odisha are 

primarily preoccupied with livelihood issues and have shown 

little inclination to mobilise and contest, the Christian minorities, 

particularly the Panas of Kandhamal, empowered by religion 

and the state, have asserted their rights and transgressed 

the boundary drawn by the Hindu social hierarchy, inviting 

Hindutva’s fury. 

Note 

1 For details on the syncretic traditions in 

Cuttack city and Hindu-Muslim bhaichara, see 

Kanungo (2012a). 

References 

Campbell, J (1864): A Personal Narrative of Thirteen 

Years Service amongst the Wild Tribes of 

Khondistan for the Suppression of Human Sacrifice 

(London: Hurst and Blackett). 

Frykenberg, Robert Eric (2008): Christianity in 

India: From Beginnings to the Present (New 

York: Oxford University Press). 

Kanungo, Pralay (2002): RSS’s Tryst with Politics: 

From Hedgewar to Sudarshan (New Delhi: 

Manohar). 

– (2003): “Hindutva’s Entry into a ‘Hindu Province’: 

Early Years of RSS in Orissa”, Economic 

& Political Weekly, 38 (31). 

– (2008): “Hindutva’s Fury against Christians in 

Orissa”, Economic & Political Weekly, 43 (37), 

pp 16-19. 

– (2012a): “Marginalised in a Syncretic City: 

Muslims in Cuttack” in Laurent Gayer and 

Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Muslims in Indian 

Cities: Trajectories of Marginalisation (London: 

Hurst and Company), pp 237-61. 

– (2012b): “Hindutva Combats Christianity in 

Orissa”, Purusartha, 30, pp 215-39. 

Kulke, Hermann (2005): “‘Juggernaut’ under 

British Supremacy and the Resurgence of the 

Khurda Rajas as Rajas of Puri” in A Eschmann, 

H Kulke and G C Tripathi (ed.), The Cult of 

Jagannath and the Regional Traditions of Orissa 

(New Delhi: Manohar).

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