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GREEN CROSS RUSSIA
GREEN CROSS SWITZERLAND
GLOBAL GREEN USA
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR
NATIONAL DIALOGUE
ENERGY, SOCIETY, AND SECURITY
Moscow, 18–19 april, 2007
Moscow, 2007

This collection presents research and presentations as well as questions and answers
from the Russian Nuclear National Dialogue “Energy, Society and Security” organized
by Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland, and Global Green USA on
18-19 April 2007 in Moscow.
Participants included representatives of federal and regional organizations, state and
public structures, science and project institutes, leaders and specialists of the Russian
nuclear fuel cycle complex enterprises, and international representatives participating
in the discussion of overcoming the nuclear arms race legacy, nuclear energy development,
and alternative and renewable energy sources.
In their presentations, the conference speakers offered various options of solving key
problems regarding the safe use of nuclear technology. These problems affect state
policy development in terms of the ecological safety of the nuclear energy complex.
They also affect the process of building public consensus on nuclear energy issues.
Organizers: Green Cross International, the Federal Agency for the Atomic
Energy (Rosatom), the Rosatom Public Council.
Co-organizer: The Elektronika Bank Corporated Enterprise.
General Partner: “SOGAZ” Insurance Company.
Sponsors: The organizers wish to express their gratitude to the Federal State Unitary
Enterprise (FSUE), Corporate Group “Rosenergoatom,” Joint Stock Company
(JSC) “TVEL,” FSUE ISK “Rosatomstroy,” the governments of Switzerland,
Canada, France, Sweden and Norway, as well as the Trust for Mutual Understanding
of the USA that provided financial support in conducting this Forum.
Special thanks to the editing and translation team are noted on the last page of the book.
The presentation texts and research papers that are published in this Dialogue’s collection
have been translated and edited into English from original Russian versions, and are the
sole opinion of the authors.
© Green Cross Russia, 2007
© Green Cross Switzerland, 2007
© Global Green USA, 2007

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Preface
In most countries of the world, contemporary economic development leads to a
sharp increase in energy needs. At the same time, the limitations of the existing energy
sources are becoming all the more noticeable. Some of the major petroleum and natural
gas reserves are located in politically unstable regions. Moreover, the growing use of
petroleum and natural gas goes against the Kyoto protocol provisions.
The use of nuclear energy entails a number of challenges in terms of public acceptability.
These challenges include unsolved problems of nuclear waste and the need
to create a new nuclear fuel cycle. There are also many ideas for alternative energy
sources. However, as of today, they do not present opportunities for large-scale energy
production.
At the end of the Cold War, the fifty-year old arms race stopped, and a largescale
nuclear conflict was no longer a threat. Faith and hope for a new multipolar world
replaced the threat of thousands of nuclear warheads destroying our civilization.
The end of this bipolar standoff indeed reduced the risk of a nuclear world war;
yet new challenges became more apparent. Today, Russia faces many issues in the nuclear
field that have both domestic as well as international implications. How to dismantle
nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems What to do with nuclear waste and
how to transport it What to do with fission materials and how to process them How
can nuclear materials be effectively protected in accordance with the nonproliferation
principles What is the role of the atom in the future of energy And, possibly, the most
central question of them all: how safe is current and Cold War nuclear technology
Following the Kyshtym and the Chernobyl accidents, it became apparent that
the right to nuclear and radiation safety and security constitute one of the basic human
rights. The issues of safety provisions for the environment and population are now of
utmost importance given the mass liquidation of delivery systems and nuclear weapons
themselves, and the widespread proliferation of nuclear energy.
None of these problems can be solved without the Russian society’s understanding,
support, and acknowledgement of the national strategy.
On the 18 th and 19 th of April 2007, a National Dialogue took place in Moscow.
It was entitled “Energy, Society and Security.” It was an attempt to reach an agreement
and understanding within our society on the issues of nuclear and radiation safety in the
territory of the Russian Federation. It was also a discussion on overcoming the Cold
War legacy and determining possible methods of safe nuclear energy development.
Green Cross Russia Press-Service

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Opening Remarks
Sergey I. Baranovsky, President, Green Cross Russia
I am very pleased to introduce to you the Green Cross / Global Green’s Nuclear
National Dialogue. Almost ten years ago, in 1998, Green Cross Russia began an initiative that
was completely new to the post-Soviet public: the implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. This is not a simple issue to decipher in both economic and social terms, and
there have been many contradictions and social pressure in this area.
The idea was to bring together representatives from all of the social groups
involved in this process in one place at least once a year. First and foremost, there
are representatives from the communities where chemical weapons are stored and destroyed.
Because of the potential dangers, those living in direct proximity to the arsenals
and future destruction facilities are clearly not indifferent to what and how these
processes will be happening. We have to listen to these people, and make them feel
that they are part of this process, by giving them the opportunity to participate in the
decision making process.
The second group is comprised of the regional and local law-making and influential
powers. This would be a governor or a republic president, as well as the
regional media.
The third sector, which is very important, includes the federal agencies that carry
out the Convention’s provisions. They execute the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction
(CWD) program: the planning, building, and good functioning of the chemical
weapons destruction facilities.
It is also very important to stress that there is a fourth party without which the
successful implementation of the Convention would not be possible. We know about the
meeting at Kananaskis and the creation of the Global Partnership against the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2002. We know that many nation-states are aiding
the Russian Federation with these matters. At this Forum, the states’ representatives
have the opportunity to come together not only with the leaders of our country’s federal
agencies but also, and most importantly, with the people who live near the arsenals and
destruction facilities.
We see our task as prompting civilians into action and presenting opportunities
for the state agencies to be accountable to society, to hear the public’s comments, and
to answer their questions. Our county is transitioning into a civil society, and there
are many different social organizations which also take part in overcoming the effects
of the Cold War. Our Forum has become a dialogue specifically because the state
agencies have responded to the public’s demands and objections. As a result, we see

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
that in the sphere of CWD, the relationship between the federal government and the
regions is becoming less tense, having gone from confrontation to constructive collaboration.
This shift enables Russia to fulfill the CWD program and its international
obligations.
Contemporary economic development leads to a sharp increase in energy demand
in most countries of the world. At the same time, the limitations of the current
energy sources are becoming more and more noticeable, especially when some of the
main petroleum and gas sources are located in politically unstable regions. On the other
hand, the increasing use of petroleum and gas goes against the Kyoto Protocol regulations,
as it can increase global warming.
The fact that many states are directing their attention to nuclear energy sources
is not coincidental. Due to unsolved problems, such as waste and security issues, the
idea of nuclear energy has significant difficulties with public approval. Maybe a new
fuel cycle needs to be created.
There are many suggestions regarding alternative energy sources. However,
they do not provide immediate opportunities for large-scale energy production. On the
other hand, the end of the Cold War stopped the 50-year arms race and eliminated the
threat of a large-scale nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States. Faith in
the new, multi-polar world has altered the idea of thousands of nuclear devices destroying
civilization.
Although the end of the global standoff has truly diminished the risk of widespread
nuclear war, other risks have become more apparent. Today, Russia must solve
many nuclear-related problems that have not only domestic but also global implications:
How to dismantle nuclear weapons and delivery systems Where to store nuclear waste
and how to transport it What to do with radioactive substances and how to process
them How to effectively protect nuclear materials in accordance with the nonproliferation
principles What role to give to the atom in the future of energy
In the aftermath of the Kyshtym and Chernobyl disasters, society understood that
nuclear and radioactive safety is a basic human right. Environmental and public safety
issues are of the utmost importance in the large-scale destruction of nuclear weapons
and delivery systems, as well as the widespread use of nuclear energy.
None of these problems can be resolved without the understanding and support
of Russian society, specifically their comprehension and support of the national nuclear
energy strategy.
This is why Green Cross put forward an initiative to create a forum devoted to
the debates about nuclear energy and the negative legacy of the Cold War and arms race.
We call this Forum the „Nuclear Energy, Society, Safety.” Dialogue.”
The Forum’s goals are to provide basic information and to open dialogue and
collaboration between all sides and social levels regarding the future and safety of nuclear
energy development and the improvement of nuclear and radioactive safety conditions
within the Russian Federation. These two goals are also connected to the legacy
of the Cold War: we want to reduce social tensions and establish acceptable approaches
for solving radioactive safety problems, as well as forming constructive social opinion
regarding these problems.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Future tasks may include the following:
––developing publicly controlled regulations and radio-active monitoring of the
production, storage, reprocessing and transportation facilities for nuclear fission and
radio-active materials;
––developing publicly controlled mechanism to monitor the activities of the military
production complex in terms of the production, exploitation and testing of military
projects and products for nuclear energy;
––involving the public in the decision-making process.
In conclusion, I would like to thank our sponsors and donors. Without their participation,
our Forum-dialogue would have simply been impossible. These sponsors are:
Organizers: Green Cross International, Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy,
the Public council of the Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy.
Co-organizer of the Forum: AK Bank Elektronika.
The Executive Partner of the Forum: Insurance Group „SOGAZ”
Sponsors: Concern/Corporate Group Federal State Unitary „Rosenergoatom”
Company (FGUP), Joint Stock Company (JSC) „TVEL”, Federal state company ISK
„Rosatomstroy”.
I also want to give a big thanks to the governments which helped to conduct our
Forum. First and foremost, it was the Swiss Confederation – a pioneer in international
community – that first assisted in holding the initial public hearings in our country. The
Swiss Confederation was also the first to sponsor our Forum which became a dialogue.
My gratitude and thank for their support also goes to the following entities:
––United Kingdom,
––Canada,
––France,
––Sweden,
––Norway,
––Trust for Mutual Understanding Fund.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Opening Remarks
Yury A. Israel, Academician of RAS
Dear Colleagues,
This present Forum-dialogue is dedicated to discussing several of the most important
issues of today – the use of nuclear energy, the provision for safe and secure energy
development, the conditions of the globalizing world economy, as well as nuclear
and radiation safety on the territory of the Russian Federation. But before discussing the
specific topics of our Forum, I would like to say a couple of words regarding the issue
of energy in general; its size, development and importance.
The current level of economic growth in most countries leads to a sharp increase
in energy use. There have been many reports written on this topic. Recently, a report
came out entitled „Global Energy Evaluation: Energy and Sustainable Development.”
It was issued by the UNDP and a number of other international organizations. As you
understand, on the one hand, energy consumption is growing while, on the other hand,
we are in a very difficult situation. Two billion people rely exclusively on traditional
energy sources and, therefore, are unable to take advantage of the opportunities offered
by the new, contemporary energy sources.
Humanity’s commercial energy consumption is 1,000 times smaller than the energy
flow of the Sun towards the Earth. The consumption of primary energy is based
on organic fuel, petroleum, natural gas and coal, and constitutes about 80% of the total
energy consumption. Nuclear energy covers slightly over 6% of the total. Hydro energy
and renewable energy sources each constitute about 2% of the total. I have specifically
emphasized here that the amount of human energy consumption is quite insignificant
when compared to solar energy. As you all know, one of the most significant issues of
the day is global warming. Everyone talks about it, and scientists make rather concerning
prognoses. In this sense nuclear energy development is quite significant for our
future, because it does not release greenhouse gases that are dangerous for all living
things. Therefore, from this perspective, developing nuclear energy is necessary. Not
only is it in line with today’s technology levels, but it is also a pressing necessity for
humanity and the environment.
At the current stage of our society’s development in this period of civil society
formation, the establishment of a constructive dialogue between state structures and
the public on all levels constitutes a very important step towards our goals. Our goals
are to join forces with the civil society groups that devote themselves to bridging gaps
between the state and the people, to search for truth, as well as to protect society and

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
encourage economic revival. This can facilitate us reaching a consensus and ensuring
mutual accountability on all sides. This will also facilitate reaching a national consensus
in such an important sphere as nuclear energy and the nuclear potential of the country as
a whole. This is why, in order to be effective, it is important to conduct mutual dialogue
between governmental organizations, scientists, and civil society.
At the same time, we should not regard civil society groups as partners only as
the problems arise in forming the system of national security provision and in working
on sustainable development projects. On the contrary, both local and national-level civil
society groups should play their role in the consulting processes of the country, including
those concerning nuclear energy development. It is possible that their specialized
knowledge and profound understanding of the issues could be useful to the government
structures. This is why we should encourage efforts to better define the relationship with
civil society groups put forth by the present dialogue Forum.
It is important to note that the question of safety and security of nuclear energy
development deserves special attention. This point will be discussed very professionally
in today’s Forum. I have mentioned both the issue of energy in general as well as that of
nuclear energy, because both sectors are problematic. As you know, there have not been
many serious accidents, such as the Chernobyl accident. However, even if not numerous,
they have shown to the world that the safety and security of nuclear energy creation
and development is of utmost importance. Here, the partnership with the civil society is
indispensable. I hope that, with the help of this Forum, we will be able to develop fuller
and more concrete strategies for strengthening of partnerships with the civil society in
our common interest of Russia’s safe and secure development.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
To the Participants of the Public National Dialogue
“Energy, Society, and Security”
Sergey V. Kirienko, Director, Federal Agency for the
Atomic Energy
Dear Colleagues!
On behalf of the Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy as well as myself, I am
very happy to welcome to the Participants of the National Dialogue “Energy, Society,
and Security.”
It is of principal importance to discuss the questions of nuclear and radiation
security specifically here, in a dialogue format. Active development of atomic energy
in the world, as well as the guarantee of energy resources availability for current and
future generations, are impossible without society’s understanding of contemporary
technological conditions in this field and without the highest level of its ecological and
production security.
This Forum is yet another step towards transparency in this field. We are very
interested in forming a proper level of knowledge of the contemporary atomic energy,
and, thus, forming trust of the Russian public towards this field. Stability, security, and
the minimal effect on the environment – these are the base characteristics of the 21 st
century energy provision. I am sure that atomic energy fully conforms to each of these
three conditions.
The atomic energy renaissance has already started; we have the age of atomic
energy ahead of us. I think that this Forum-Dialogue can draw it nearer.
I wish a productive work to all the Forum participants!

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Priority Programs of the Nuclear-Energetics Complex
Vladimir G. Asmolov, Deputy Director General,
Concern „RosEnergoAtom”
Good morning, dear colleagues! I am going to talk about our current goals. What
does the Russian nuclear power industry look like today This year was very successful.
It is a subsidized year and our output was 155 billion kW-hours. If you look at Russia as
a nuclear producing power, we have an average ranking on the global scale. Our power
level is a little less than 12%, and our generating output is about 16%, which is about
average on a global scale.
Ivan Anatolievich talked about energy consumption; I am talking about generating
electric power only. If you look at the map, you will see that all generating powers
are in the European part of Russia, where percentages are different: 40% in the North-
West and 30–35% in the Central. These numbers correspond with the European levels,
especially for Germany. Today many speakers talked about the resurgence of nuclear
power. I personally do not believe it is a resurgence, but rather the accomplishment
of objective capabilities. Today, when we have all the necessary knowledge for this
promising potential energy source, we should be very serious about it and pay special
attention to the safety issues surrounding it.
Let us talk about limiting conditions. The question is whether there is a demand
for this energy source in our society. What can we do for this source to ensure its acceptance
by society and our government External conditions are clear for all. Some
people think it is a theorem, which needs justification of the following statements:
natural resources are limited; there are many people on earth with poor energy supply,
such as those in China and India, and who should have similar access to energy
as people in Europe and the United States. For me it is not a theorem, it is an axiom.
Secondly, it is about us, people who can offer this energy source and who are builders
of nuclear power.
We have made several goals which determine the consumption qualities of the
power source we offer. Our first and foremost priority is guaranteed safety. I am a member
of the INSAG, a group of advisors for the IAEA Secretary General, which has
developed fundamental safety principles. According to a meeting in India, about eighty
countries would like to have a peaceful nuclear power industry. There is also leasing
as a form of accessing nuclear power source. Safety guarantees are the most important
issue here. I am a physicist and I know that the word „guarantee” is not a guarantee of
perfection. There is always some risk. However, this risk should be so small that I could
promise these guarantees.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The next component is „efficiency.” If this source of energy is completely safe,
but not feasible economically, no one needs it. You remember that there have been many
attempts made to make this energy source safer: built a 100 atmospheres’ protection
around a nuclear power plant (NPP) or bury the plant deep in the ground, which also
allows for leads better safety. We also have to consider human factors.
The third factor in nuclear energy consumption is fuel. We need to show that
nuclear power is a renewable source.
Finally, the most important factor is the management of nuclear fuel, tales, and
radioactive waste. The latter is not a matter of science but engineering. All our activities
are based on these factors.
The Development strategy for till 2020: experience is critical here and accomplishments
should be based on existing technologies. Neutron-based reactors will be key
elements in nuclear power in our country. We have a complex of working NPPs, we need
to take care of them, increase their efficiency, modernize them, and demonstrate their safe
operation. We need to think about the global nuclear energy industry, which is more than
1,000 MW. Smaller energy capacity is another major trend. In Chukotka, we have a small
nuclear station that has been providing energy for the region for thirty years. In Sverdlovsk,
another small power plant (KLT-40) is under construction.
What kind of reactors do we have today Today our base is in water reactors
based on neutrons. These reactors can supply energy and work in a combined cycle
with heat production. I call this program „Regional Atomic Energy Industry.” There are
several high temperature reactors, which exist on paper. These types have demonstrated
their capabilities and have a large potential. However, these reactors need additional
development for safety and economic efficiency. Finally, we have fast-neutron reactors.
These reactors are practically a new stage in heat supply and radioactive waste recycling,
because these reactors can serve as burners of additional nuclear waste.
The first program is an efficiency upgrade of the existing program. We have a
program that has existed for twelve years. This program includes launching four 1,000-
MW units. The major task is to optimize thermodynamics without affecting safety and
generate an additional 25 billion kW-hours in 2012.
We plan to use a power unit that can be stopped for service, reloading, and an
upgrade. The unit’s service length is its efficiency factor. You can see that there is a slow
efficiency growth in Russia, where you have old, first and second generation, reactors.
These reactors have been stopped for upgrades and new safety system installations, but
have an average efficiency factor of 76% today. The latter is a huge reserve, because
the efficiency factor of our new power units is 85–87%. Finland sets global records,
because its reactors are operating at a 97% efficiency factor.
I would like to talk next about the construction of new reactors. Last year we
had two units in construction, one fast reactor and one heat reactor, both at the Rostov
NPP site. This year we have started to work on three new reactors. Additionally we
have a project „NPP-2006” (I will talk about it later) and there are opportunities to
work on a larger capacity reactor. This covers small-scale energy industry needs. Our
requirements for new reactors include an increase in efficiency, fuel cycle improvement,
and shortening of construction. These changes reflect evolutionary develop-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
ment, based on our previous experience. My report radically changes the situation as
these reactors are of the same class as our native, European and American reactors.
Activities to upgrade existing NPP efficiency
Table 1
Activities
Efficiency factor upgrade of NPPs turbo-installations with
RBMK reactors by replacing blades and law pressure cylinder
diagrams (4th and 5th stages) in the turbines.
Efficiency factor upgrade of turbo-installations at HPR and
RBMK power units by upgrading separation-super heaters.
Number of
power units
Additional
power, MW
11 332
19 142
Introduction of large-scale cleaning system for condensers. 4 42
Heat rating increase in the RBMK power units by 5% 10 500
Heat rating increase in the power units of HPR-1000 by 4% 8 320
Heat rating increase in the power units of HPR-440/V-213 by 7% 2 61
Conversion to 18-month heat cycle at NPPs with HPR-1000 8 244
RBMK upgrade by heating construction substitute and conversion
to a two-year service cycle.
11 904
FTP RAPEK indicators
Table 2
Description 2006 2010 2015 2020
Estimated power at a NPP, GW 23.2 24.2 33.0 41.0
Electric energy output TW-hour/year 154.7 170.3 224.0 300.0
NPP share in total electric energy production in Russia, % 16.0 16.0 18.6 20-23
Decrease in operation cost (based on 2006 level), % 100 90 80 70
Decrease in specific investments, % 100 90 85 70
Comparative indicators of NPP with HPR-1000 and NPP-2006
Table 3
Description NPP with HPR-1000 NPP-2006 Change
Electric power, MW 1000 1150 + 15,0
Annual output, billion kW-hour 7,5 9,0 + 20,0
NPP service life (projected), years 30 50 + 67,0
Specific material capacity, relative units 1,00 0,85 - 15,0
Specific investments, relative units 1,00 0,80 - 20,0
Nuclear waste amount (in the form of heat
emitting constructions), t/billion kW-hour
5,5 3,5 - 35,0
„NPP-2006”. The formula for this plant is safety guarantees and economic efficiency.
We invested all our experience, which for today represents absolute evolution-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
ary development. We have not achieved a lot, and I plan to address the issue. We have
increased capacity up to 3,200. We can overcome conservative tradition and optimize
passive and active security systems and equipment unification. All of these factors allow
for the building of a decent, economically efficient, power unit. Note that safety
level does not decrease for such a unit.
Here are more indicators to use in comparison of our latest power unit built in
China. This power unit belongs to a third generation. „NPP-2006” is 3+. You can see
that all the indicators are much better, including the volume of nuclear and radiological
waste, and other specific criteria.
This is our roadmap. The Russian government has allocated serious finances for
nuclear power industry development, which equals 1.5–3 trillion rubles (half of this
money is government sponsored, and the other half comes from Rosenergoatom) After
2015 there will be no money, but by that time, I believe, we will be able to pay for the
program ourselves in a competitive marketplace. Except for one power unit at the Beloyarskaya
plant, all the others belong to „NPP-2006.” You can see the conclusions here.
Picture 1. „Road map” of FTP RAPEK
We have made a step forward. We should come out of our shell. Russia is not doing
anything new. Our colleagues from Westinghouse are doing the same thing. We are talking
about the forth generation power unit, called „NPP-2009.” I will try to show you what
it is. „NPP-2009” can be called an evolutionary trend with some serious innovations. If
you compare this project with the one from Westinghouse and BN-1000 in China, you can
see an attempt to simplify passive systems, radically increase efficiency, decrease material
utilization, and produce plants using large modules. You understand well that using premanufactured
modules is much better than the building one-of-a-kind plants on-site: the
quality is much better; the production time-frame is reduced, and the investment climate
is also more efficient. So, what do I mean Here are the numbers at BN-1000. We have

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
those indicators as our goal (for example, 70% reduction in cable utilization). The Japanese
Advanced PWR has achieved outstanding results in shortening production time. For
example, our best results are 54 months, and they need only 37. You can see our Russian
plant, the British Sizewell-Be and the Westinghouse AP 1000. The amount of land needed
for the units is smaller.
Looking further into the future, we move to a new technology base – new reactors,
fast reactors, bringing together the nuclear fuel cycle. The first stage of development
includes new requirements for the production process, external fuel cycle, safety,
and economic efficiency. We already have the BN-600 reactor and the BN-800 under
construction, but they are not commercial reactors yet. These reactors are not as efficient
as thermal ones. Our goal is to develop economically efficient commercial units
by 2020, possibly with a sodium thermal unit. Due to the fact that sodium has its own
shortcomings, we do not want to waste our resources. Therefore, we are looking for
another heat-carrier such as gas, lead, or lead-bismuth. This first technology is still important
and remains a leading one.
Here is a development roadmap. You can see that we need to improve efficiency
for reactors with heavy heat-carriers. With other reactors, the development process is
quite clear. There is a lot of work to be done. A long-term strategy does no require
large financing, but is extremely important. The strategy includes nuclear power industry
development, development modeling, and time frame, scale, and technical requirements.
This integration process is very important and needs serious evaluation. We need
neutron efficiency evaluation, because neutrons are our product. The thorium cycle is
another project to work on.
A special Federal program allows us to have our projects. The program passed
all the discussions and currently accounts for 140 billion rubles. This program should
resolve the challenges coming from the civilian and military sectors. The program includes
infrastructure development, new technologies and facilities for radiological and
nuclear waste, contaminated territories treatment, nuclear and radiological safety control
system, and support equipment for personnel and population. The program is well
developed and discussed, which includes general public discussions.
The atomic energy industry is the daughter of the atomic bomb, and that is why
it has all the features of the bomb. People think it is an uncontrolled, unmanageable
creature that will eventually explode. We have already outgrown the bomb. The atomic
bomb is different from the atomic power industry. It is very positive that we are reducing
nuclear weapons programs, because we do not have those outside threats anymore.
Therefore, we need to use the potential of those who work in nuclear centers. We talked
about it in Penza recently. We have intellectual, nuclear, energy industry basis, including
programs, skills, and experimental experience. We have everything from within the
nuclear weapons industry. Our actions – to transfer everything we have to the nuclear
power industry, all our potential, expertise, new ideas, fresh perspective. In the end we
get together and produce the new products I just discussed.
The Russian atomic power industry must be the leader and respond to new challenges.
It is like a steam-locomotive for other industries and is a blessing for everyone involved.
Thank you.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Questions and answers
– Y.A. Izrael: Vladimir Grigorievich, thank you for your thorough report. It was
a technically complicated, conceptual presentation, aimed for politicians, bureaucrats,
and nuclear scientists. In the room today, there are citizens from various regions of our
country, foreign representatives, environmental activities who are concerned with human
life and the environment and I want to ask you as a citizen and a member of society:
was everything possible done by the builders and designers for our safe future
– V.G. Asmolov: There is no one answer to this question. One cannot do everything
possible. We have an atomic energy industry, with researchers, engineers and designers.
Russia cooperated well with foreign colleagues, many new programs originated,
our knowledge consolidated, and now Russia and the rest of the world share the same
knowledge base. Our engineering and safety approaches are absolutely consolidated. If
someone tries to breach them, this individual would have to be an insider. Our legislators
on technical regulations have tried to prioritize market over safety, but we are doing
our best to stop it. I believe our science has prepared well. The balance between efficiency
and safety is needed, but in order to achieve this balance we need brains. Our builders
are ready, and they have all the needed systems, but their work did not cost much in the
past. I believe that the process is evolutionary and it is going in the right direction.
U.A. Izrael: In your presentation you did not mention NPP decommissioning,
its timeframe, cycles, and cost. When we think about the decommissioning process, the
costs are very different. What is your take on that
V.G. Asmolov: Our colleagues in the West have already estimated the price of
decommissioning. For example, in Finland, they are building burial shafts for the waste,
which are not ready yet. The companies are ready for decommissioning to start.
To what extent can we take NPP from their operational condition to „green lawn”
or further These plants, after being taken out of operation, continue to hold licenses
to operate. These plants have stored fuel, they have shifts, and ventilation continues to
work. A number of legal and economic questions need to be resolved. We need to have
enough investment in tariffs. In England, NPP decommissioning to the „green lawn”
level cost 50% of the original price.
Currently we have several power units stopped: Voronezh NPP, 1–2 units; Beloyarskaya
NPP, 1–2 units and etc. It is a financial problem and we are, most likely, to
be responsible for it. We will have the funds. We will conduct all necessary works on
our pilot reactors. We have such a serious field of work, that in the past four month we
reviewed these questions three times with respect to Beloyarskaya NPP AMB reactors,
Bilibnskaya NPP and others. These are all serious matters, and economically it
decreases our profit indicators, but not by a large extent.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
International efforts for protection of Nuclear and
Radioactive materials in Russia and CIS
Troy Lulashnyk, General Director of the G8 Global
Partnership Programme, Canadian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade
Good morning!
It is a pleasure for me to speak with you today. I would first like to thank the
conference organizers for this First National Nuclear Forum-Dialogue. Canada has been
a strong supporter of Green Cross, particularly on issues appertaining to chemical weapons
destruction. Canada’s global partnership program is pleased to sponsor the publication
of this dialogue.
Nuclear issues are once again at the forefront of the international agenda. I recall
over a decade ago when it seemed there were very few of us working on these issues,
and it was unclear what direction nuclear would take. Today, it is an entirely different
environment, at least in a couple of ways: first, many countries, including Canada, are
speaking about a nuclear renaissance, fuelled by new technologies, and second, the security
concerns associated with nuclear, particularly related to nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism, have been significantly amplified in the past few years.
With respect to the nuclear resurgence, it is clear that several countries are looking at
nuclear power to occupy a greater proportion of their energy mix in order to meet an increasing
demand. Higher costs of non-nuclear energy sources, coupled with new nuclear research
and development in terms of more efficient reactor designs and new fuel configurations, have
led many to conclude that the nuclear energy option can be competitive. Canada for example,
is examining a variety of different nuclear energy options for the future. There is also a
significant increase in the use of nuclear and other radioactive material in medical, industrial
and research applications. Canada, along with other countries represented here are leading
producers of medical radioisotopes. So the current picture seems to be one of expansion and
exploration of new technologies paving the way for the long term future.
This expansion does present significant security and safety challenges, nonetheless.
From the nuclear non-proliferation perspective, it is imperative that this nuclear resurgence
does not increase the risks that states will acquire nuclear weapons. We have a very well developed
network of laws, rules and norms comprising the nuclear non-proliferation regime
grounded in the npt and the IAEA safeguards system, which has been strengthened significantly
with the model additional protocol. But much more work needs to be done.
There are also a number of proposals which seek to address both the energy
demand issues and the non-proliferation issues at the same time, including through as-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
surances of supply and enrichment centres, where we are collectively going to have to
decide on how to move forward.
The other major change affecting the nuclear question is the increase in terrorism.
In the past few years, we have seen a rise in incidence of mass terrorism, including
in North America, Europe and Asia, where the intention is not to negotiate but to inflict
damage and mass suffering.
The nuclear threat presents particular challenges – whether it refers to acquisition
of plutonium or highly enriched uranium or sabotage of a nuclear facility or use
of radioactive material in a dispersal device or „dirty bomb”. Clearly, any of these scenarios
could have profound human, environmental and economic consequences. Then
UN secretary general Annan said that a nuclear terrorist attack could create a worldwide
recession thrusting up to half of our population into dire poverty. Not to mention the
impact any major incident would have on the future of nuclear energy.
There have been significant improvements made by states in this area. First, in
terms of instruments, the convention on physical protection of nuclear material (CPPNN)
was strengthened, the nuclear terrorism convention was put in place, the sources code of
conduct was operationalized and UN resolution 1540 and a few other resolutions came
into being. Because the non-proliferation regime had a nearly-exclusive focus on state
actors, it had to be and continues to be amplified to account for non-state actors.
In addition to changing our laws and norms, we have made some impressive
progress in addressing the nuclear terrorist threat in pragmatic ways. In this regard, i know
that this meeting will be discussing the global partnership against the spread of weapons
and materials of mass destruction. This is an initiative very important to me personally,
as we launched it in Canada in 2002. It set forth a strategy to combat the nuclear threat by
strengthening, for example, the aforementioned instruments and then securing the nuclear
materials and facilities, strengthening border and export controls and law enforcement
cooperation to deter, detect and interdict the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and
to reduce overall the qualities, stockpiles of materials in existence, the thought being the
less that exists, the less chance of terrorist acquisition. The HEU down blending is one
example of this, as is the US-Russia agreement to each dispose of 34 metric tonnes of
weapon-grade plutonium. Canada has pledged approximately US$ 55 million to Russia’s
plutonium disposition Program and we are hopeful it will commence soon.
While I do not want to pre-empt tomorrow’s discussion on the partnership, I
would say that practical work is being done and all 23 partners are very committed to its
goals. Special mention of Russia and the us is deserved, as both have significantly increased
their funding since 2002. Canada spends the majority of its pledge of C$ 1 billion
on nuclear issues, by securing nuclear material and facilities through fences, cameras,
barriers and access controls, by dismantling 12 nuclear submarines, and by retraining
nuclear scientists through the international science and technology centre.
This work is significantly reducing the nuclear terrorist threat, the funding represents
a small fraction of the cost for clean up and remediation after an attack.
I should also mention the Russia-US led global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism.
I have had the privilege to represent Canada at these meetings. It is an excellent,

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
focussed endeavour which permits states to exchange best practices across the full range
of nuclear issues. Again, I must congratulate Russia and the us for their initiative.
However, we cannot be complacent. Terrorist groups are not necessarily defined
with any one state, there is an abundance of radioactive materials through the world and,
with an increasingly globalized economy, goods can move quite freely and swiftly. We
are only as strong, therefore, as our best protected facility and our weakest border point.
These threats are amplified by the fact that the nuclear energy market is not constricting
but expanding and we are at a unique period in history where decisions taken now can
lead us to safety and prosperity, provided we work together to also combat the threats. I
think this meeting is a step in that direction.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The Vienna „Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage” Convention:
Key problems
Dmitry V. Malyshev, Deputy Director, Department for
Corporate Clients, Insurance Group „SOGAZ ”
The Vienna Convention adoption
The Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage (or Vienna Convention),
dated May 12, 1963, was ratified by the Russian Federal Law №23-FL, dated
March 21, 2005. On August 13, 2005 the Vienna Convention entered into force in the
Russian Federation.
The Vienna Convention:
1. Once the Low enters into force, the Vienna Convention becomes a part of the
Russian Federation’s legislation and has priority over national legislation, including the
„Atomic energy use” and the „Civil liability for causing nuclear damage and its financial
security” Laws.
2. Applies to any nuclear incidents, regardless of where they occurred. The Vienna
Convention applies to nuclear incidents that take place:
––during transportation on Russian Federation territory in the absence of a nuclear
installation operator;
––during transportation on Russian Federation territory;
––during international transportation.
3. Establishes an accountable person: the nuclear installation operator. According
to the Vienna Convention, a nuclear installation operator is considered a person, and
is appointed or recognized as responsible for this installation by the state in the capacity
of an operator for this installation (Article 1, part 1, provision „C”). The state’s legislation
establishes a nuclear material carrier, or other individual, which is involved in the
Russian Atomic Industry and is recognizable as the accountable party.
According to the Vienna Convention, a nuclear material receiving party will
be considered as an operator in the case that the party is a legal operating organization
where the material processing will take place. If at the receiving party’s facility
reprocessing does not take place, an operator becomes the final receiver of the material,
according to the Vienna Convention.
4. Anticipates the possibility to establish a maximum limit of an operator’s liability
by national law (the amount of compensation for damages). When such limit is established,
it cannot be less than the amount established by Article V of the Vienna Convention.
In Russia, legislation establishing liability limits has not yet been adopted.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
5. Operator’s liability limits, indicated above, are the maximum limit of the
state’s responsibility.
6. Defines the requirement to provide for financial security in the form of liability
insurance, or in other forms, which is the operator’s duty, in case there exists national
legislation in that country which provides for certain conditions and amount.
7. Defines nuclear material as nuclear fuel, radioactive products and waste.
8. Establishes liability distribution between the nuclear installations’ operators,
including transportation and participation of countries – non-participants of the Vienna
Convention.
Matters of nuclear damage liability are also regulated by the „Atomic energy
use” Federal Law.
The operating organization – nuclear installation operators, according to the Vienna
Convention – must maintain nuclear insurance or some other form of financial
security, which cover nuclear installations and fall under the Vienna Convention.
According to the study’s results, there are twenty six operating organizations in
the industry as part of Rosatom, which act as nuclear installations operators and are thus
under Vienna Convention jurisdiction.
Liability limits for a nuclear installation operator
There is the opinion that liability limits must stay in the amount range of five
million USD, because of the U.S. unilateral rejection in 1971 to maintain support for the
gold standard (requirements denial of the Breton-Wood system).
The USD, as indicated in Article V of the Vienna Convention, is the payment
unit which is equal to the USD price of its gold parity on 29 April 1963, which is thirty
five USD for one troy ounce of pure gold. According to the Vienna Convention, the
USD rejection of the USD golden parity does not influence liability limit calculation on
a certain date.
In order to calculate the minimum threshold of an operator’s liability to the current
date, one must use the price of one troy ounce of pure gold on the indicated date
according to the New York Mercantile Exchange („NYMEX”), which is published by
RIA „PosBusinessConsulting.” The calculation formula for the minimum threshold of
liability is the following:
Cmin ($) = NYMEX / $35 x $5,000 000
Where: NYMEX – is the price of the troy ounce of pure gold on the current date
(http://stock.rbc.ru/demo/nymex.6/), (USD/Gold).
Example: The minimum threshold of liability dated 12 April 2007 makes up
$81,057
142.86 (NYMEX = $679.7).
Cmin ($) = $679.7/$35 x $5,000 000 = $97,057,142.86.
The insurance amount on 3 February 2006 in rubles is 2,573,150,963.00 rubles
(NYMEX – $576.4; Rusd = 26,501 rubles/$).
CC – $679.7/$35 x $5,000 000 x 26, 501 rubles/$ = 2,573,150,936.00 rubles.
According to Article 55 of the Federal Law „Atomic energy use” , liability types
and limits of the operating organization must be determined by Russian Federation legis-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
lation. Up until now, legislation which determines liability limits has not yet been adopted,
and that is why the liability of a Russian nuclear installation operator is not limited.
The law project „On civil liability for causing nuclear damage and its financial
support” anticipates the operating organization threshold of civil liability for nuclear
damage as a result of one nuclear incident by an amount equal to five million units, as
defined by Article V of the Vienna Convention „On civil liability for nuclear damage,”
21 May 1963.
Financial security of a nuclear installation operator’s liability
According to clause 1, Article 7 of the Vienna Convention, the operator is required
to maintain insurance (additional nuclear insurance) or other financial security,
which covers his liability for nuclear damage with regard to the amount, type and conditions,
as defined by the Installation state.
Article 56 of the „Atomic Energy Utilization” Act determines that the operator
must have financial security for liability limits.
Therefore, the legislator formulates common rule on financial security coordination
with established legislation.
Article 5 of the Vienna Convention places the operator’s liability limits in the
amount of no less than five million USD for every nuclear incident. As a result, because
the minimum liability limit cannot be less than five million dollars, the minimum insurance
amount (or alternative financial security) must comply with this amount.
The country of operation provides for compensation according to satisfied claims
presented for nuclear damage. It will only cover non covered amounts by other forms of
insurance and only up to the amount of damage.
Legislation Initiative „On civil liability for causing nuclear damage and its financial
security” anticipates three forms of such security:
––the operating organization’s civil liability insurance for causing nuclear damage
(nuclear insurance);
––financial resources of the operating organization;
––a combination of the indicated financial security forms for the operating organization’s
civil liability for causing nuclear damage.
Acknowledgment of insurance fees according to the nuclear insurance
agreements as expenses for profit taxation
Article 263 of the Russian Federation Internal Revenue Code establishes the
amount of taxpayer insurance expenses as a percentage of the operator’s expenses,
which reduces the base profit tax. According to this Article, mandatory and voluntary
property insurance expenses include insurance fees for all mandatory insurance types,
and on certain types of voluntary insurance.
According to existing legislation, nuclear damage liability insurance is not mandatory
insurance. Clause 4, Article 3 of the Russia Law „Insurance matters in the Russian
Federation” dated 27 November 1992 №4015-1 provides for mandatory insurance
conditions and order of payment, as defined by federal legislation on particular mandatory
insurance types.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The federal law on particular types of mandatory insurance must include regulations
which define:
a) subjects of insurance;
b) objects of insurance;
c) the list of insured cases;
d) the minimum insurance payment and determination of categories;
e) the amount, structure and type for insurance tariff determination;
f) the time frame and type of insurance fee payments;
g) validity of the insurance contract term;
h) insurance payment determination categories;
i) control over insurance execution;
j) consequences, in case insurance subjects show non-performance or poor performance
of prescribed obligations;
k) other matters.
The federal law on mandatory civil liability insurance for operating organizations
in the case of radiation-caused damage has not yet, and most likely will not be,
adopted. The Federal Law „Atomic energy utilization” № 170-FL, 21 November 1995,
does not comply with the features, indicated above. That is why it cannot be viewed as
legislation establishing mandatory insurance.
The information stated above allows us to make a conclusion that civil liability
insurance for loss and damage caused by the effect of radiation is more of a voluntary
insurance.
According to subparagraph 8, clause 1, Article 263 of the Russian Federation Internal
Revenue Code, insurance expenses include insurance fees on voluntary insurance
for liability resulting from incurring damage, in case such insurance is a condition of
tax-payer activities in compliance with the Russian Federation’s general or international
obligations.
According to Article 7 of the Vienna Convention 1963, the operator is required to
maintain insurance or other financial security, which covers their liability for nuclear damage
due to the amount, type and conditions defined by the Installation State. Therefore, the
Russian Federation’s international agreements have established the requirement for the
operator to perform financial security for nuclear damage liability due to the amount, type
and conditions that should be determined by Russian Federation legislation.
Currently there is no provision in the federal legislation that establishes the
amount, size, or conditions of financial security for the operator’s liability. Article 55 of
the Federal Law „Atomic energy utilization” establishes that the types and limits for the
operator’s liability for material loss and damage caused by radiation effects, depend on
the atomic energy use and are defined by federal legislation. According to Article 56 of
the indicated federal legislation, the operating organization must have financial security
for liability limits in compliance with Article 55. The operator’s financial security, in
case of loss or damage compensation caused by radiation, consists of the state guarantee
or other assurance, the operator’s financial resources and insurance contract.
However, the indicated legislation does not establish the amount, types or conditions
of financial security for nuclear damage liability. Articles 55 and 56 contain

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
referrals to specific legislation, which will establish the operator’s liability types and
limits, and also specific categories, amounts and conditions of insurance security made
for liability limits.
The conclusion, based on the above description, is as follows: in the absence of
special legislation, financial security is not a mandatory condition for the operator’s activities.
The operator’s civil liability insurance, as one of the financial security liability
types, is not a mandatory condition for the operator’s activity. In addition, insurance
fees for voluntary nuclear accident insurance cannot be considered as an expense on the
tax form, and it reduces the operator’s tax amount.
At the same time, one cannot but note that there is another position on the matter.
It is based on the formal interpretation of the Convention and Russian legislation. According
to this position, the operator’s liability for having financial security for nuclear
damage liability, is directly provided in Article 7 of the Vienna Convention, 1963, and
as well as in clause 1 Article 56 of the Federal Law „Atomic energy use”. Currently
the size, types and conditions for financial security liability are not identified in special
federal legislation, but this does not mean that the presence of financial security is
not mandatory for the operating organizations. Based on the above statement, one can
conclude that because international agreements of the Russian Federation established
the operators’ responsibility for maintaining nuclear damage insurance or alternative
financial security for nuclear damage, the presence of such a security is viewable as a
mandatory condition for these activities.
Voluntary civil liability insurance, in this case, can be viewed as a mandatory
condition for operating organization activities. Therefore, insurance fees for civil liability
insurance for nuclear damage can be classified as expenses, which reduce the
profit tax base. According to provision 3, Article 263 of the Russian Federation Internal
Revenue Code, voluntary insurance expenses can be included in the production costs
category.
With regard to the statement above, one can draw a conclusion: in order to resolve
all the described issues, it is necessary to immediately prepare a second discussion
round of the Federal Law „Civil liability for causing nuclear damage and its financial
security” in light of the ratified Convention.
At present, a Rosatom group is preparing such legislation initiative for the second
round. This legislation takes into consideration the Vienna Convention requirements
(without the 1997 Proceedings).

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Current Safety Conditions at Russian Nuclear Installations
Vladimir M. Kuznetsov, PhD, Director, “Nuclear and
Radiation Safety” Programme, Green Cross Russia
Introduction
As of 1 July 2006, the Russian Federation Nuclear Energy Complex included
the following installations: 214 nuclear installations (industrial reactors, power units,
and nuclear research installations, both civil and military); 1,226 transportation packaging
containers; 454 nuclear material and radioactive waste facilities; 16,675 radiation
sources in agriculture; and 1,508 radioactive material and agricultural waste facilities.
Nuclear power plant safety
Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) provide 11.5% of Russian energy production; in
2003 the nuclear-produced energy quantity reached its peak at 16.7%. Nuclear energy
production in Russia’s European region is 21%, the North-Western region – 42%, in the
Central region and Privolgie region – 30%, and the Northern Caucasus – 16%. 50% of
Russian energy demand growth during 1999–2003 (averaging 14 billion kW-hour annually)
was covered by nuclear energy growth, totaling 7 billion kW-hour per year, or
4–5% per year. 2005 energy production reached 148 billion kW-hour.
Today in Russia there are ten NPPs with 31 power units, four power plants under
construction, while other four are being closed. From the total amount – 15 power units
are with reactors type HPR (6 power units with reactors HPR-440 and 9 power units are
with reactors HPR-1000), 11 power units with RBMK reactors, four power units with
EGP type (Bilibinskaya plant) and one power unit with a fast neutron reactor BN-600
(Beloyarskaya plant) with total electric power generation of 23.242 GW.
NPP energy units with all types of reactors work at a regular schedule, but the
Bilibinskaya Plant works at a flexible schedule for covering particular power and heating
demands of the Chukotka Autonomus Region. Table 1 indicates the nuclear power unit
type and energy generation.
In Russia, the nuclear power units in utilization are built on the basis of three generation’
designs – the 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s and became operational from 1970
to 2004. Average rates in Russian NPP are 0.76 GW/year. The lifespan of nuclear energy
unit operation in the former Soviet Union is shown below in Picture 1.
Existing NPP safety is the key nuclear energy industry factor. Units of the same
power, built in different times and based on different designs, do not completely meet
current safety rules and norms. Each time period had its own safety requirements (at

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
present the requirements are defined in the norms and rules of nuclear energy utilization
safety and other documents, included in the Inspection Documentation (R-1-1-2003) of
the Russian Technical Inspection (the Russian State Nuclear Inspection). Additionally, the
requirements became much stricter over time.
Table 1
Typology of the existing NPP with regard to nuclear installation type and project
generation
First generation
Novovoronezhskaya (units 1,2)
Novovoronezhskaya (units 3,4)
Kol’skaya (units 1,2)
Leningradskaya (units 1,2)
Kurskaya (units 1,2)
Bilibinskaya (units 1–4)
Beloyarskaya (units 1,2)
Second generation
Novovoronezhskaya (unit 5)
Kol’skaya (units 3,4)
Kalininskaya (units 1–3)
Smolenskaya (units 1,2)
Leningradskaya (units 3,4)
Beloyarskaya (unit 3)
Balakovskaya (units 1–3)
Third generation
Balakovskaya (unit 4)
Volgodonskaya (unit 1)
NPP Units amount Type of reactor installation
2
2
2
2
2
4
2
1
2
3
2
2
1
3
1
1
HPR-1; V-3М
HPR-440 (V-179)
HPR-440 (V-230)
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
EGP-6
АМB-100,200
HPR-1000 (V-187)
HPR-440 (V-213)
HPR-1000 (V-338,320)
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
BN-600
HPR-1000 (V-320)
HPR-1000 (V-320)
HPR-1000 (V-320)
Picture 1. Operating lifespan of nuclear power units at former Soviet Union plants
The existing power units can be divided into three categories.
First generation power units – 16 power units with different types of nuclear
reactors (power units 1–4 Novovoronezhzkaya NPP, 1,2 Kol’skaya plant, 1,2 Leningradskaya
plant, 1,2 Kurskaya plant, 4 power units Bilibinskaya nuclear thermal power
complex, 1,2 Beloyarskaya plant) with the total amount of 6,537 MW. The units were

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
designed and built before the major Safety Acts were introduced to the nuclear energy
industry.
Second generation power units – 17 power units with different reactor types (power
units 1–3, Balakovskaya plant, 1–3 Kalininsakaya plant, 3–4 Kol’skaya plant, 3–4 Kurskaya
plant, 3–4 Leningradskaya plant, 5 Novovoronezhskaya plant, 1–3 Smolenskaya
plant, 3 Beloyarskaya plant) with a total power capacity of 16,480 MW. The units were
designed and built with regard to norms based on the Inspection Documentation (ОPB-
73-82/88, PBY-04-74).
Third generation power units – 2 (power units 4 Balakovskaya plant and 1 Rostovskaya
plant) with 1,000 MW capacity each. The units were modified with the requirements
due to (ОRV-88/97, PBY RU AS-89).
First generation power units comply with a number of requirements. In general,
second generation power units comply with the safety requirements established in the
1980s. In order to comply with the modern requirements (based on ORB-88), these power
units need upgrading. It is critical to solve a number of safety issues, such as shell containment
improvement, management system efficiency, control and energy supply, steamgenerator
resources improvement, sufficient diagnostic equipment.
Modern requirements are based on a multilayer security system (a gradual barrier
system in the way radiological materials disperse into the environment and a system
of technical and organizational measures to secure these barriers). NPPs with the first
generation power units of the following types do not comply with the modern safety requirements:
HPR-440 (3,4 Novovoronezhskaya and 1,2 Kol’skaya plant power units);
RBMK-1000 (1,2 Leningradskaya and Kurskaya plants), Bilibinskaya power units; and
the second generation BN-600 Beloyarskaya power unit.
Nuclear energy development in the next decade is aimed at constructing modern third
generation power units, which are to replace the outdated ones. The construction concept of
the third generation power units is based on the evolutionary development of HPR reactor
technology. This concept also includes higher safety standards, with a reduction of predicted
active zone and accidental emissions cases to numbers which are better than the current standard.
Factors in the new safety standards include various safety systems (active and passive);
direct action elements in the security system; an optimized combination of security elements
and direct action technologies; and security systems with localized functions.
Technical and economic indicators improvements in third generation power units
are based on the following factors: efficient fuel use, capital investment construction
costs reduction, longer operational timeframe for NPPs from 40 to 50 years, major tasks
reduction, and scheme design simplification and rational space utilization solutions.
The prime tasks for the nuclear energy future are: safe operation of the existing power
units, a safe and economically reasonable increase in power units’ operational lifespan, and
gradual substitution of existing analysis power units to third generation ones.
Analysis of disruptive elements at Russian NPPs in 2004 has reached the following
conclusions: the disruption magnitude remains relatively high and is caused by inappropriate
personnel actions. In 2004, 15 disruptions were due to personnel factors, which comprised
34% of the total failures (36% in 2003); 11 cases had construction failure as key cause, which
constitutes 25% of total violations; in 17 cases (39%) the violation causes were mechanical in

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
nature. Among the key reasons for such disruptions are construction failures, poor technical
maintenance and reconstruction, and plant control program failures involving metal items and
pipes. In 2004, there were 15 repeated disruptions due to similar abnormal events. The analysis
of the key reasons for unplanned power unit disruption in 2004 revealed NPP management
and operation failures, and in particular: operational, repair and management personnel training
quality and leadership; technical support and repair work organization; operational papers
review; and analysis of programs on indicating and eliminating failed mechanisms and procedures.
The dynamics of disruptions at NPPs during 1991–2006 is presented in Picture 2.
180
155
130
105
80
55
30
200
164
171
126
99 102 88 79 90
69
59
39
51
46
40 43
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Picture 2. Disruption dynamics at NPP
Violation dynamics at NPPs with various nuclear installation types is presented
in Picture 3 (% of total failures).
Picture 3. Disruption dynamics at NPP of various nuclear installation types (% of total failures)
In 2003, Russian NPPs achieved a maximum power capacity utilization factor of
76.3% (at the best foreign power plants the power capacity utilization factor is approximately
90%). Disruption magnitude increased by 12 comparable to 2002. Therefore, the
„price” rises in the case of higher Russian NPP utilization.
Picture 4 presents the power capacity utilization factor at Russian NPP (with
respect to the nuclear installation type and average utilization factor of all the plants).
Table 2 includes failure data with respect to equipment during 01.01.91–31.12.03.
The key disruption reasons in the nuclear plants operation during 01.01.91–12.31.03 are
presented in Table 3.
Spent Fuel Management

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
By the end of 2006, Russian NPPs and radiochemical facilities stockpiles had
accumulated 18,500 tons of spent nuclear fuel. The volume of spent fuel is growing.
In Russia, annual growth totals 850 tons (from a global growth of 11,000–12,000 tons.
Russian spent fuel stockpiles contain 175 tons of plutonium.)
Picture 4. Power capacity utilization factor at Russian NPP with different installations
Failures due to equipment 01.01.91–12.31.03
Table 2
Equipment 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Electrotechnical 48 50 33 24 23 22 25 31 8 11 14 19
Heat-mechanic 75 92 46 45 84 34 53 46 33 17 10 15
Electronics 55 15 23 8 11 8 2 11 10 5 5 -
Control-measuring 17 8 19 12 8 1 4 5 2 10 5 9
Other 11 4 19 10 8 4 7 9 16 16 3 8
Reasons for disruptions in the NPP operation during 01.01.91–12.31.03
Table 3
Violation sources 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Management 64 64 32 32 43 8 7 45 29 28 16 22
Equipment production 23 20 21 8 9 5 7 6 10 4 3 9
Design and construction 43 44 22 17 19 9 11 19 24 11 14 12
Repair 14 9 8 3 3 2 3 4 5 3 0 0
Other 56 34 43 40 23 4 7 16 1 3 2 3
At Russian NPP spent fuel is mostly present in the European part of Russia,
where the majority of nuclear plants are located. Spent fuel removal from NPP is not
satisfactory (total absence of the spent fuel removal from the RBMK, EGP and AMB
reactor types). The future of spent fuel from RBMK-1000 is not decided, because such
fuel recycling is not economically profitable until 2010 at the earliest. Additionally,
spent fuel removal from HPR and BN reactors is insufficient and this is caused by the
absence of a plan for strategic fuel. Spent fuel stockpile growth at NPP decreases nuclear

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safety and requires special security measure storage justifications in emergency cases.
This problem is especially critical at the plants with RBMK reactors. Packed spent fuel
storage is only a temporary solution for the stockpiling and operations at NPP.
At the Kurskaya plant the average spent fuel storage capacity is 42%. The
maximum storage capacity at facility 4 is 59.4%. The storage capacity at such facilities
is 95.6% of the allowed amount. At the Leningradskaya plant the average
accumulation is 71%. The maximum storage capacity at facility 4 is 79.3%. And
the complete storage is 95.9% of the allowed amount. At the Smolenskaya plant the
average storage capacity is 30%, and the maximum amount of waste storage is 72%
of the designed volume. Spent fuel storage from Beloyarskaya plant’s 1 and 2 units
is located at facilities where nuclear safety is maintained. The water cleaning system
introduction to these facilities allowed lowering water activity and overall personnel
radiation effects.
Spent fuel treatment
The Russian Federation government secured financing for the federal program
„Nuclear and Radiological Safety in 2001–2006” only for 12.5% of the original plan. The
level of spent fuel accumulation at NPPs in average makes up for 67%. The facilities in
the Kol’skaya and Leningradskaya plants are filled up to 80 and 95% respectfully. The
amount of spent fuel with medium radiation level averages 90.3% (not including spent
fuel accumulation at the Rostovskaya plant); spent highly radioactive fuel level is 37.1%,
at Kurskaya plant it is 95.4% filled, and in Smolenskaya up to 84.4%.
Nuclear research installations and their safety
Research nuclear installations are critical in nuclear energy development and nuclear
installation safety supply. It is impossible to provide safety for nuclear facilities without a
wide range of fundamental and applied research at nuclear research installations.
As at all facilities utilizing nuclear energy, nuclear research installations are a
source of nuclear and radiological threat. Despite their low capacity, and, therefore,
lower amount of radioactive materials resulting from research installation operation,
the overall danger for the environment and population remains high. Among the factors
critical for the safety of such installations are: high frequency of working regime
changes (launches, switch-offs, power variation in a wide range of dynamic experiments)
and this causes most failures in research installations’ operation; constant active
area overloads and constant replacement of radiated instruments (for the research, into
the temporary pools, prolonged storage, operation); permanent high loads on the major
installation of activity areas and first layer as a result of short and long-term tasks; high
density of neutron flow in active research reactor zones, which lead to accumulation of
fluency limit on elements of active zones and increase of probability of their failures;
the presence of highly enriched fuel, which complicates nuclear nonproliferation and
requires efficient systems for materials security and accounting; experiment equipment
and related operation issues; comparable to power reactors, a fewer number of physical
barriers to special materials proliferation, in particular near pool research reactors and

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
critical installations; nuclear research installations and their presence in large cities with
dense city infrastructure and large populations.
There are 93 nuclear research installations in operation on the former Soviet
Union’s territory, particularly in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. Table 4 represents all
nuclear research installations in Russia.
Nuclear research installations in Russia
Table 4
Title Total In operation
Under reconstruction
Frozen
Being taken
out of operation
In construction
Research Reactors 38 23 1 2 10 2
Critical Installations 39 29 1 2 7 0
Sub-critical Installations 16 6 0 5 4 1
Total: 93 58 2 9 21 3
The majority of nuclear research installations operated by Rosatom, the Scientific
Research Center (RSC) „The Kurchatov Institute,” the Russian State Research Center
(RSRC) Physics-Energy Institute, the RSRC Nuclear Research Institute of Atomic Reactors
and other organizations were designed and built in the 1950–1960s, when the
norms and standards for nuclear and radiation safety were not developed to the extent
existing today. As a result, the reactors in one way or another do not comply with the
requirements and standards for nuclear safety today. The analysis of existing Russian
nuclear research installation conditions reveals the necessity to use such reactors for
the future tasks of fuel cycle development and for research of nuclear energy industry’s
safety and efficiency. The continuing aging and reduction of existing nuclear research
installations is closely tied to the fact that in order to accomplish future experiments, we
will have to increase the intensity of existing installations’ operation, and it will require
meeting current safety and operation norms.
The key problem of safety maintenance of the operating nuclear research installations
is linked to the physical and obsolescence of their technical capacities. First of
all, one relates to the installations set to operate in the 1950–1970s, and their renovations
over the past decade are insufficient. Among the reasons for such conditions are
objective and subjective factors: terminating production at the Russian equipment, basic
systems and installation plants, which are required for installations’ design thirty-fifty
years ago; significant lack of communication with equipment suppliers, which are currently
outside Russia. In addition, the initial timeframe for the revision of replacing
outdated equipment with new technologies or correction of existing schemes with their
replacement is too long. Pictures 5 and 6 represents the operation timeframe of research
reactors, critical installations and sub-critical stands.
In 2003, 38% of violations were the result of external electricity systems distortions
(1999 – 31%, 2000 – 31%, 2001 – 22%, 2002 – 39%), 8% of violations in research
installations operation were the result of personnel (1999 – 8.5%, 2000 – 17%, 2001
– 20%, 2002 – 18%).

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
In 2004, there were 33 violations in the organizations’ operation, which utilize
nuclear research installations. Rosatom facilities had 16 of those failures (RSRC „Nuclear
Research Institute of Atomic Reactors” – 14; The RSRC „Physics-Energy Institute”
– 1; The Rosatom Radiological Materials Institute – 1), the rest happened at the facilities
of other agencies (Dubna Nuclear Research Institute – 6; The Obninsk Research
facility – 2; Tomsk – 5; Gatchina – 4). Picture 7 indicates the violation dynamics at the
nuclear research installations during 1994–2004.
Picture 5. Existing research reactors and their operation timeframe
Picture 6. Critical installations and Sub-critical installations and their operation timeframe
The human factor at nuclear research installations is significant for security maintenance.
The personnel generation changes, some resign for to various reasons, and in
some cases there is lack of personnel at the nuclear research installations (The RSRC
„Nuclear Research Institute of Atomic Reactors”, the RSC „The Kurchatov Institute”, the
Moscow Institute of Physics Research and other operating organizations). Prestige is lacking,
the absence of young specialists, and personnel flow make the situation even more

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
complicated. A majority of the mistakes are made as a result of renovation or substitution
of control and measuring equipment.
100
96
80
67
60
40
41
58
34
47
47
39
38
26
33
50
47
20
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Picture 7. Violation dynamics at nuclear research installations operations between 1994–2006
Spent fuel and radiological waste at nuclear research installations
Spent nuclear fuel is concentrated mainly at the following facilities: the RSC
„Kurchatov Institute,” the RSRC „Physics-Energy Institute,” the RSRC „Nuclear Research
Institute of Atomic Reactors,” and Sverdlovsk Facility of „the Research and
Construction Institute of Energy Technics.” The decision on spent fuel removal from the
Kurchatov Institute to the specialized facility for further storage has not yet been made.
In the RSRC „Nuclear Research Institute of Atomic Reactors” a large number of highly
radioactive metal waste from VK-50 has accumulated. The 30 tons accumulated from
Rosatom Device Research Institute (Lytkarino, Moscow oblast) radiological waste have
not been sent to storage, and additionally an upgrade for nuclear units that are currently
closed needs further deconstruction processing. As a result of financial support, the radioactive
metal fuel neutralization process (900 kg) has been terminated.
Fluid radioactive waste of medium and low radioactivity levels removed from
reactor installations and radio-chemical and material research labs of the Research
Center in Dimitrovgrad are stored in absorbing container layers at 1,000 meters depth
in the existing facility’s area. Their radioactivity volume does not exceed 10 -5 Ku/liter.
For the long-term storage of medium and high activity of solutions and fulfilled ionchanging
pitches with specific activity up to 2 Ku/liter, two radiological waste facilities
are utilized with the capacity of 13,780 м 3. The waste is collected in the underground
system, which is designed from non-corrosive pipes, located in ferroconcrete boxes,
with hermetic cover from non-corrosive steel.
The following installations are being decommissioned: a small reactor at the RSC
„The Kurchatov Institute,” IVR-30 (United Institute for Nuclear Research), FG-5, SGO (the
RSC, the Institute of Physics and Energy), TVR (the RSRC „The Physics-Energy Institute”),
KS N2 („TVEL”), Bars-2, Tibr-1М (Research Center on Equipment Design); АSТ-1 (The
RSRC „Nuclear Research Institute of Atomic Reactors”), FS-4, FS-5 (The Research and
Construction Institute for Energy Technology), RG-1М (The Nadezhinsk State Metal Production
Plant). In 2003, the following installations were taken out of operation: KS ST-659L
(Experimental Machine Construction Bureau), IR IRV-1М (The Federal State Management
of the Research Institute for Industry Construction), КOBR (The RSRC „The Physics-Energy

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Institute”), KS N7 („TVEL”). The installations’ decommissioning process is very slow due
to a lack of financing. The industry’s program on decommissioning a number of facilities in
2001–2010 is based on federal financing. It does not cover, however, all the nuclear research
installations and the spent fuel storage facilities on their territory.
Nuclear fuel cycle facilities and their safety
The key elements of the modern fuel cycle were designed and implemented at
the very beginning during a time when the basic issues and goals were different from
today. Many decisions, adopted then, continue to function nowadays or influence industry
operations. Table 5 indicates the list of nuclear cycle facilities.
The list of nuclear fuel cycle facilities
Table 5
Facility title, its abbreviation,
location
Founded
Key production
Siberia Chemical Center, Seversk 1953 Industry reactors, Radio-chemical production,
Chemical and metal production, Hexafluoride
uranium production, Uranium isotope separation
production
„Mayak”, Ozersk 1948 Industry reactors, Radio-chemical production,
Chemical and metal production, Isotope
materials production
Mining-Chemical Center, Zheleznogorsk
Angarsk Electrolyze Chemical
Center
Urals Electrochemical Center,
Novo Uralsk
Machine Production Factory,
Electrostal
Novosibirsk Factory of Chemical
Concentrates
Chemical-Metallurgy Facility,
Krasnoyarsk
1950 Industry reactors, Radio-chemical production,
Spent fuel storage from reactors HPR-1000
1954 Hexafluoride uranium production, Uranium
isotope separation production
1945 Chemical and metal production, Uranium
isotope separation production
1945 Nuclear fuel production
1949 Nuclear fuel production
1948 Chemical and metal production
Electro-Chemical Plant, Zelenogrsk 1955 Uranium isotope separation production
Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Center 1949 Uranium isotope separation production
Production Facility „Chepetsk
Mechanical Factory”, Glazov
Research and Production Union
„Khlopin Radium Institute”
1951 Chemical and metal production
1922 Scientific and materials study research with
nuclear materials utilization.
The RRI of Chemical Technology 1951 Scientific and materials study research with
nuclear materials utilization.
The State Center „The Bocharov
Russian Research Institute of Nonorganic
materials”
1945 Scientific and materials study research with
nuclear materials utilization.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The RSC „The Kurchatov Institute”
1943 Scientific and materials study research with
nuclear materials utilization
There have been more than 250 accidents at the nuclear fuel cycle facilities since
1949. The total violations amount in the facilities’ operation exceeds 100 during the last
decade. Picture 8 indicates the incidents by year.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
26
21
23
14
13
10
14
8
4
4
3
2 1 1
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Picture 8. Number of violation accidents per year in the operation of Russian nuclear
fuel cycle facilities during 1993–2006
Transportation safety of nuclear energy industry
Currently in Russia there are 8 vessels in operation with nuclear power installations
aboard (5 ice-breakers – „Arktika”, „Siberia”, „Russia”, „The Soviet Union” and
„Yamal”, two small ice-breakers – „Tajmyr” and „Vajgach”, and the light weight ship
„Sevmorput’”). These vessels use 13 water reactors with pressure. Five ships require
additional maintenance vessels, which include the two floating installations for charging
and storing fresh and spent fuel („Imandra” and „Lotta”), floating storage („Volodarksy”),
a special tanker „Serbrjanka” and a floating control-dosimeter installation
„Rosta-1.” Table 6 includes the data of the nuclear fleet.
Picture 9 indicates a sharp increase in operation incidents during the past decade.
For example, 16 of 29 incidents in 2002 were caused by steam-generator leaks. One of
the most critical issues is prolonging nuclear vessels service and keeping their equipment
operational. The nuclear energy equipment (ОK-900А type), for the nuclear icebreakers
„Arktika”, „Russia”, „The Soviet Union” and „Yamal,” with a general lifespan
of 50,000–60,000 hours and 10–12 years service for the equipment resource and technical
conditions, have been in operation for a period two or three times longer. The icebreakers
„Russia,” „The Soviet Union,” and „Yamal” (design 10521) have therefore a
longer operational period than normal. The same applies for „Tajmyr,” „Vajgach” and
„Sevmorput.”
Safety of the sources of ionizing radiation
Currently in the agriculture sector there are 2,500 plants, organizations and facilities
which utilize nuclear energy and possess 7,731 radioactively dangerous units –
facilities, labs, technical units and other. Table 7 includes data on radiological accidents
and related incidents, and their classification, according to „The rules of investigation

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
and accounting of violations in handling radiological sources and materials, utilized in
agriculture.”
Civil Nuclear Fleet
Table 6
Title of the
ship
Nuclear icebreaker
(NIB)
„Lenin”
NIB
„Arktika”
NIB
„Siberia”
Design
Construction
year
92М 1959 ОК-150
ОК-900
Nuclear
power installation
Reactors
number
3
2
Installation
Generation
1
2
Technical condition
Is being prepared
to be removed
from operation.
Active zones are
removed. The
ship is categorized
as „nuclear
safe.”
1052-1 1975 ОК-900А 2 2 Operation
reserve
1052-2 1977 ОК-900А 2 2 Operation
reserve
NIB „Russia” 10521-1 1985 ОК-900А 2 2 In operation. Functions
properly
NIB „The Soviet
Union”
10521-2 1989 ОК-900А 2 2 In operation. Functions
properly
NIB „Yamal” 10521-3 1992 ОК-900А 2 2 In operation. Functions
properly
NIB
„Tajmyr”
NIB
„Vajgach”
Nuclear
lighteraboard
ship
„Sevmorput”
10580-1 1989 КLТ-40М 1 3 In operation. Functions
properly.
10580-2 1990 КLТ-40М 1 3 In operation. Functions
properly.
10081 1988 КLТ-40 1 3 In operation. Functions
properly
30
25
20
15
10
5
8
6
19
14
18
16
29
21
22
21
01 1
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Picture 9. Operational incidents during 1994–2005 on nuclear ice-breakersв

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The special production units system „Rodon”, established in the 1960s for radiological
waste collection and storage of medium radioactivity, outside the nuclear
weapon complex, proved its necessity and efficiency. At the 16 special facilities in Russia,
there is an accumulated ~2.0x10 5 м 3 of radiological waste with a radioactive level
– 2.0x10 6 Ku. The storage reserve for such waste at various special facilities is 10–60
years if the existing waste accumulation rate holds. Among the exceptions are facilities
in Moscow, Kazan, Yekaterinburg, Murmansk, Chelyabinsk, Ufa and Leningrad Districts,
where storage has reached the accumulation limits.
Data on radiological accidents and related incidents
Table 7
Indicator / year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of accidents and related 34 29 40 55 38 30 40
incidents
Type of violation
А 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
(NP-014-2000)
P-1 14 9 4 4 1 2 5
P-2 20 20 35 50 36 28 35
Conclusions
Safety maintenance at the Nuclear Research Installations is the priority task for
the state, which requires systematic efforts from the personnel at the dangerous production
facilities, nuclear and radiological security specialists, leadership at industrial
facilities, construction and design organizations, specialists and managers at the Federal
Agency for the Atomic Energy. Based on the above safety analysis, the conclusions are:
1. Regarding the safety conditions of the operating nuclear plants, the safety
standards are based on the safety requirements and norms existing at the time of the
plants’ construction, and therefore are included in the design of such nuclear plants.
None of the plants meet modern safety requirements.
2. Today, none of the operating NPP have reasonable safety procedures, which would
include a potential outcomes analysis in case of violence of energy units exploitation.
3. In general, in the past three years, there has been a reduction in the number of
accidental automatic shut downs of power reactors. In average, the rate has been reduced
two times compared to last year. The magnitude of automatic emergency shut off systems
activation during 2002–2004 is in the range of 0.2–0.3 per power unit. Since 1998,
there has been a tendency towards average violation case reduction at NPP. The current
condition of Russian NPP safety is satisfactory and stable. Yet, the constant work on
safety indicators improvement in the plant’s operation should be constantly maintained.
For example, almost every other violation is based on repeating anomalies. This indicates
that during the operating NPP analysis, during correction measures development
and implementation, there is low efficiency based on previous experience.
4. The answer to the question, „What is the chance for a large accident at the
NPP” is „Yes, it can happen in case of poor equipment safety, qualified personnel, and
personnel safety requirements.” A large design based accident at the modern reactors is
related to the reactor’s explosion and the outcomes, which will largely exceed the allowed

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
norms for the population and environment. In case first generation power unit operation is
extended at the present design imperfection the chance for accidents will only grow. The
reconstruction conducted by Rosatom for the first NPP line with RBMK power units required
significant resources, time, specialists, and equipment, but the required safety level
was not achieved. Two key reasons are the lack of accident localization systems, and significant
radioactive and spent fuel waste accumulation. It is critical to start projects earlier
to shut down the first generation power units with their higher accident chances. Instead,
in different periods and at a number of levels, the concept of putting the first generation
power units at a 100% capacity may lead to catastrophe. In order to avoid a catastrophe
similar to Chernobyl, the first generation reactors must be removed from operation earlier
due to the high accident risk. Before these units are removed from operation, they should
operate at reduced power levels with additional managerial and technical cautions.
5. Since 1999, there has been a tendency for increased accidents at nuclear fuel
cycle facilities. The key reasons are:
––technology and technological requirements violations;
––lack of professional training and discipline for specialists and workers;
––lack of organizational measures to support technological process safety;
––the unsatisfactory Russian nuclear facilities’ equipment and systems’ technical
conditions;
––unaccomplished equipment substitution schedule;
––poor individual employee protection measures supplies;
––poor control over technology norms and requirements on behalf of units, factories,
and Rosatom agencies management;
––design and construction documentation mistakes;
––unilateral changes introduced in technology and equipment systems;
––lack of systematic work to increase safety levels against nuclear, fire and explosion
dangerous operations (for example, the established program does not occur at
„Mayak”);
––and dangerous facilities lack operational analysis. Such an analysis is absent
in the facilities’ design, and over time has not been accomplished at either nuclear fuel
cycle facility. The safety system analysis has been substituted with inefficient inspector
work, who conducted their work after the accident took place. As a result, emergency
cases were analyzed inefficiently and were incomplete. Take for example, the
emergency regimes at radio-chemical factories during 1982–1985. The measures to
eliminate emergencies were performed during seven years (1986–1992). An explosion
happened at the same installation in April, 1993, and it initiated a radiological accident.
The continuous incidents at the nuclear fuel cycle facilities happen because of severe
technological and technological regime violations; specialist and operator professional
preparedness short-comings and poor technological discipline; technological and ineffective
organizational measures to support safety; the unsatisfactory equipment technology
and systems condition at Russian nuclear facilities. At nuclear power facilities there
is insufficient utilization capacity at all activity levels.
Among the additional nuclear facility safety failures are:

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––Lake Karachay remains a potential source for a large scale radiation accident
due to delays in waste incineration installation construction and continued medium level
radioactive waste fluids dumping;
––hydro facilities of the Techensky cascade at the Mayak water facilities are
operating without a license, the low level waste has achieved its maximum volume and
threatens to destroy these hydro facilities (levies);
–– at the nuclear fuel cycle facilities the obsolescence equipment is operated
and represents a potential threat, including transportation packaging units which are to
transport spent fuel (for example, TYK-6). This resource is exhausted and is a potential
accident source;
–– many facilities, and first of all radio-chemical production, can be under terrorist
threat, which is why physical protection measures are critical.
6. Data analysis of industrial nuclear reactor safety conditions indicates negative
dynamics related to the inspection requirements and includes registration of all reactors
switch-off. The key violation reasons were personnel mistakes, equipment failures, depressurization,
and control-measuring equipment failure.
7. Nuclear research reactors incidents, as a rule, are caused by security system
shut offs as a result of external distortions. This fact requires a detailed study and analysis
of the installations’ general security systems.
8. The overall system is on survival’s edge due to the following factors: unsatisfactory
current special facilities activities and measures financing under the Program of
Nuclear Waste Management in regard to „Rodon” facility construction and upgrades;
poor Russian Federation government and district government attention to special facility
problems. The majority of storage facilities are close to their limits while the
technical conditions of construction and equipment demand immediate renovation and
upgrades. Radioactive facility security systems do not meet modern standards, and can
lead to serious radioactive contamination of the population and environment. Besides,
stable special facilities functions at „Radon” are complicated by an ineffective legislative
basis, which regulates their operation. The majority of these facilities help maintain
several organizations’ operations in different areas of Russia. Currently there is no federal
level management system for the „Radon” special facilities.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Innovative Projects for Nuclear Energy Development
Husein D. Chechenov, Vice-chair, Committee on Science,
Health, Environment and Education, Russian Federation
Council
Dear Forum participants! I thought it necessary to give a talk because, as the
Deputy Chairperson, I represent the Federation Council Committee on Health, Environment
and Education. I would like to assure you that the issue of nuclear energy is not
any less important than many other issues that are currently being addressed by the Federation
Council. Today, they already have a Nuclear energy subcommission within the
Commission on Natural Monopolies. There is also a coordination council on innovation
technologies in the field of nuclear energy. The latter was created with the Committee
on Science, Education, and Ecology.
Everyone in this auditorium knows just as well as I do, or even better, that the
biggest issues in energy today are those that have to do with hydrocarbons. We now
have many innovations in the area of renewable energy. The most recent visit of the U.S.
President to Brazil caused quite uproar. It was suggested there that one should switch
20% of fuel use to biofuel. Such suggestions are made at the time when, according to
various statistics, up to a million people in the world die of hunger every year! One
would need 500 million tons of grain to get this biofuel.
The moral and ethical questions, apparently, stay on the side. But with all the
circumstances, even if all the hopes do come true and even if all the scientific, technical,
material and financial programs will be implemented, it is hardly possible that we
would be able to use these energy sources to provide enough heat for big cities, to melt
steel and aluminum, and so on.
Just now Gennady Alekseevich stated that in the next 30 years, we might have
fusion energy. I highly doubt that. Because today, not even the most advanced specialists
are able to obtain heat in such a way. At least in this century, we will not obtain such
a commercially viable reactor.
Why do I say this Because we should admit – whether we like it or not – that
apparently there are no alternatives to nuclear energy. We need to admit it so we can
solve energy problems and problems related to global energy security, especially in the
post-petroleum period. This period is drawing near. According to various estimates,
the hydrocarbon reserves will start to decline by 2010, optimistically by 2020–2025.
Even in Russia, with all our vast natural gas reserves, we already have a deficit of some
three billion cubic meters. It is not a secret that Russian internal gas prices are planned
to match international ones by 2010. I suppose you can all draw both political and economic
implications from this.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
I am pleased to talk about nuclear energy here, at this Forum with Green Cross,
who has done such great things for the environment. So, even if we do it in a discussion
format, we really need to state this imperative quite clearly: there are no substantial
alternatives to nuclear energy today.
In over sixty years of nuclear defense production and over half a century of nuclear
energy, our country accumulated a lot of unique scientific, production, technical,
technological, and educational experience. This history allows us to think that in the
post-petroleum and post-natural gas era, we will continue to be in the leading positions
that we are in today in the nuclear and hydrocarbon fields. At some point, the hydrocarbon
period will end. Then a transitional period will follow.
We need to meet this transitional period with the technologies that will allow us
to continue to be competitive on the international market. I think that today, all those
interested in developing our country and all those interested in peaceful development
of the international community must understand and prepare for it. In my opinion, the
recently adopted Federal Target Program (FTP), which is supported by the Federal Assembly,
has major drawbacks. Anyone working in the nuclear field could confirm that
Sredmash has always placed science first. Practical aspects followed, and so did caring
for the people who bore this weight upon themselves.
Unfortunately, the current FTP is state-funded only up to 45%. The rest must be
either procured by the industry itself or by some investors. This FTP is the fifth one,
and I am sure that it will be implemented. Up till now, the programs were only 30%
completed. In order to achieve full implementation, everyone needs to work at full capacity.
Yet apparently, FTP will undergo some changes in terms of our understanding.
Just recently, we were at a point which S.V. Kirienko described so well by saying: „We
quietly watched as the nuclear industry was dying.” Now, to everyone’s delight, we
have passed that point and are facing the task of development. Hence, the FTP and the
interested parties are working to make the nuclear energy industry grow.
However, we are facing a number of problems. We know that everything created
by Sredmash and by the nuclear industry as a whole, is now dispersed over a wide range
of property and reporting levels, even if it is within the government structures. So, can
we say with confidence that, for example, the Izhor plant will be able to handle its route
map I have read today that Rosatom found a solution for the low-speed turbines. They
will develop and produce such turbines along with a French firm. The project is supposed
to be launched by 2010; but there is no time.
Today, we have to discuss projects that have not yet been started. There are issues
that will require making and implementing very tough decisions in terms of consolidating
everything that makes up nuclear energy into one whole; not piece by piece,
by various agencies or forms of property.
Unfortunately, we did have the Federal Law №13 adopted. It stipulates „special
forms of property management.” I voted for it, since there was nothing else. But it has
this drawback: hardly anything is said about science, while the scientific component is
imperative. We should start working towards changes in this law already. There should
be some kind of change that would close this loophole. If there is no science, there is no
nuclear energy and no nuclear industry as a whole! You can understand it very well.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Previously, we did not have funds. Now we do have funds, and we need to invest
them where they will have a positive high-tech chain reaction, because we are still
strong in these positions in Russia. In this regard, I would like to touch upon a few issues.
The long-term energy development perspective in Russia in the post-hydrocarbon
period demands long-term strategies. And this is where we have a problem.
Consider the same FTP up to 2020, the HRWs and fast-neutron breeder reactors.
One would think: what is so innovative and full of potential about it Yet with all due
consideration for today’s problems, we must not stop. We must not say to ourselves:
let us take a break until something new comes up. We need to support the NPP-2006,
the HRWs and the FBRs that are being modernized, in any way we can. We need to
continue, even though the French „superphoenix” of 1,200 MW (not just 600 MW) was
stopped. Similar experiments in Germany and Japan also gave negative results and were
stopped. By developing the FBR reactor on the Beloyarskaya NPP base, we at least
continue scientific development.
I have a question: does the fast-neutron breeder reactor present an export opportunity
Gennady Alexeyevich said: hardly. The presence of 20 tons of plutonium in one
unit and the necessity to equip such a plant with a radiochemical facility provide good
reasons for his answer. It could hardly be a commodity for the external market. This
trillion-dollar market needs to be conquered.
Our colleagues do pursue such a policy line with a European ICBM-type reactor
which is already working well in Finland. If it is realized by 2012, they can win a third
of the market. They have all the prerequisite necessities for such programs. I doubt we
have such prerequisites on the basis of the programs that we currently have today. A
thousand mice put together will not form an elephant. We can improve and perfect the
PWR endlessly, but it will not enable us to produce the next-generation reactors that are
expected from us. That is hardly possible.
Even if the breeder reactor programs are successfully implemented, with all the
construction and other technological work completed, we would obtain them by 2020–
2025. Do we have this kind of time The conclusion is simple: we can talk about gascooled,
light-water, high-temperature and other types of reactors, but let us talk about the
three positions stated by the President V.V. Putin. These positions are: to move away from
fission materials (U and Pu) in the field of nuclear energy, as was said at the Millennium
Summit; to make energy available to all countries (as was said on the St.-Petersburg Summit);
and to fully commit to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Let us respond to the President’s positions. The technological base that is currently
in operation is unable to provide answers to these three questions. If we take
into account the fact that nuclear renaissance started in „green” Europe, then how can
we be reassured about the Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, once
they make a decision to conduct nuclear energy research Even if they swear to us that
they will only develop energy reactors, we cannot be assured that they will not obtain
nuclear weapons to secure themselves against their opponents. It already happened in
India and Pakistan.
There are countries that must not under any circumstances obtain access to not
only nuclear weapons but even to radioactive materials, if we want to have peace in the

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
world. With such a pace of nuclear energy spread, can we, along with the IAEA, other
international organizations and the international community, ensure that such a thing
does not happen
We know from theory that there is a negative correlation between security and
the amount of details. It is applicable to this situation: there is a negative correlation
between nuclear technology nonproliferation and the number of countries that possess
it. And nowadays we can see that they cannot stay away from nuclear energy, because
even those who are sitting on petroleum reserves understand that one day, petroleum
and gas will end.
So, how do we go on Everyone knows the answer. That is why even the Persian
Gulf countries with all their petroleum started getting into nuclear energy. So, on the
one hand, we have the inevitable striving of countries such as Iran and North Korea
developing nuclear energy programs – either with us or without us. On the other hand,
if nuclear technology will be present in all the countries, how can we ensure security
On the one hand, developing nuclear power is their right, but on the other hand, what do
we do with the issue of nonproliferation I will not even mention the price of uranium.
If I am not mistaken, it is $95 per pound, having grown four times during 2006. When
everyone switches to nuclear energy with such prices and availability, there will be new
problems.
We should not discuss the shortcomings of others in this auditorium. Today, we
are all familiar with the issues of radioactive materials storage, bomb materials, and
other problems.
Let us look again at those three positions of President V.V. Putin. The current
technological base and even the current developments that will raise the security levels
and make things more economical – they also have those three shortcomings, plus some
other ones that I will not mention, but you know what they are. What is to be done
I have been collaborating with the VNIIAM [All-Russian scientific and design
institute for nuclear machine building] since 1983. This field is not new to me, although I
do not consider myself an expert in nuclear science. This is because I was involved in
security questions rather than in nuclear questions. So, what is now happening in the
world It turns out that there are new approaches to solving these problems in Russia.
These approaches not only address the three above-mentioned positions, but they also
solve the problems of waste and fuel, because they can work on thorium. We have a lot
of thorium in our country. And spent nuclear fuel could be used, as well.
Karl Rubbia talked about it some time ago. This is a hundred-year old program
that is being developed, if I am not mistaken, in the US. It is based on using non-fission
materials (as per the President’s first position). It involves solutions for the waste problems,
using accelerators, relativity clusters, thorium assemblies, and so on.
Today, we are ready to support it. I see the solutions in the following: first, Rosatom
should receive powerful support for its scientific activities, as well as for the Russian
Academy of Sciences and all of those who traditionally works in this field. The support
should come from the government and consist of funding for providing advanced
science development. It was something that always helped Russia, and it should happen
again. The money is available, the understanding of the issues is there, and the transitional

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
innovative economy is also there. In the President’s address which he will read in the next
few days, he will surely talk about it, and we will then receive powerful support.
We could get involved in the process on the Protvino base. As we know, similar
programs can only be conducted in Los Alamos, CERN, and in Protvino. Moreover, I
can tell you that evaluation experiments were paid for separately, and this year, the US
is ready to continue financing them for up to $3 million, so that the authors who are unable
to get into our offices, could already start working in Protvino. This is wise and the
right thing to do. We should respond to this proposition in such a way so that no group or
corporate interests of various schools can prevent us from working on our program. The
state interests demand that we finally obtain the funding so that we can finish developing
the physics of the process.
The first contacts with our foreign colleagues, the civil servants, indicated that
we can find support from a number of leading countries. Moreover, we could create an
international scientific center in Protvino, just like ITERA. The international community
is waiting for Russia to solve its problems with honor, to find solutions that would
help to provide energy security for all the countries in the world in such a way that we
could avoid the plague of nuclear weapons. This way, Russia could do it.
If, however, we are not able to find such solutions, there are two problems. First,
while thinking that we are conquering nature, we would in fact be just conquering ourselves.
Recently, there were hearings conducted regarding water purity. So, my dear
colleagues, right now we are on the verge of war not because of petroleum but because
of water.
Second: if we will find solutions for the energy problems of the post-petroleum
period, the external economic methods of solving these problems will be inevitable.
And what sort of methods those would be – let us not discuss it in this auditorium.
Thank you all for your attention.
Questions and Answers
Q: Today there are no opponents to the environmental expertise. I can present
conclusions made by a number of the state agencies that did not find any serious defects
in the projects including the Severodvinsk floating plant. I wonder for how long IAEA
will continue to operate without a reliable control from the international community. The
organization did not correct estimates of the Chernobyl accident outcomes, accepted a
false version of the accident causes and of its scale; IAEA was not able to evaluate the
Gorykovkaya hydro-atomic electric plant and a new facility under Tomsk-7. I wonder
how these aspects will be included in the new Russian atomic energy system.
H. D. Chechenov: I cannot take responsibilities for the IAEA or the Russian
executive power. I represent the Council of Federation Committee, but I can express
my personal opinion. Today’s cooperative work of Rosatom and Green Cross Russia is
a model for the future. I am confident that we are on the verge of a large scale nuclear
energy expansion. If we do not commit to a safe way of cooperation between decisionmakers,
we will make a huge mistake. Our previous experience was not successful.
Today we face global issues, and that is why cooperation between civil society organizations
and decision-makers is critical.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Question from A.M. Vinogradova: You decide to sell carbon resources, develop
the atomic energy industry, while postponing colossal expenses on its consequences
for the future generations, our children and grandchildren. I haven’t heard from you,
a state representative, about our large energy supply activities and energy efficiency. I
wonder how you can change your priorities towards this issue.
H. D. Chechenov: This week I was invited to State Duma of Russia, Yazev’s
energy industry Committee. We have this week included the project on energy supply
and efficiency as a key issue on the „Yedinaya Rossia” Party list for the upcoming
parliamentary elections. I was also charged to take care of the energy supply problems.
Specialists state that it is critical to save energy. For example, if we introduce luminescent
lamps, it will save Russia three billion kW-hour. Another solution is to substitute
a 100 kW-hour engine with a 7 kW-hour one at the enrichment plant. The problem is
really complicated. The problem is serious indeed. Today, energy supply and energy
efficiency issues have become one of the key tasks on the program list for the largest
Party in Russia. The program should also include sub-programs, such as housing and
Russia’s energy consuming industries. I believe that a related document will be adopted
by the Russian government soon. Everything that took place before – energy supply,
projects, competitions and winners’ awards – all of it has not been able solve the energy
problem yet.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Modern Energy Problems and Relative Heavy Nuclear Energy
Igor N. Ostretsov, PhD, Deputy Director, All-Russian
Scientific and Design Institute for Nuclear
Machine Building.
Today it is clear that energy problems of the upcoming century cannot be
resolved without nuclear energy. Oil and gas supplies may be close to exhaustion
and coal causes problems for the future century and has a negative
impact on the environment. Twenty year long attempts made by European
countries to introduce renewable sources of energy have failed.
The Russian Federation Strategy for nuclear energy development is based on the
following statements by President Vladimir Putin:
1. „Global energy industry in the 21 st century must be saved from operation on
highly enriched uranium and plutonium” (UN Millennium Summit).
Further given quotes from press-conference statements in Kremlin (09/31/2006).
2. Nuclear energy industry must develop, „I repeat, based on non-discriminatory
access by all interested in it.”
3. „We suggest establishment of a network of uranium enrichment cycle and provide
access for all interested parties to participate in nuclear energy development work.”
4. „There are so called fast reactors, which are relatively safe, and I already talked
about it many times. Specialists know what to do in this area. We strongly hope for effective
cooperation not only among „nuclear club” countries, but with everybody, who wants
to participate in cooperation.”
It is obvious, that the first quote excludes third and fourth quotes and visa versa.
Today there are two paths for nuclear energy industry development, based on the
guidelines indicated by the Russian President. My paper is devoted to this subject.
Nuclear technologies applied today are geared towards operations based on 235 U.
Our country is planning to build forty new nuclear power units. Both India and China have
already announced a wide reliance on nuclear energy, as have countries of Latin America
and South-East Asia. Due to the lack of any substantial alternatives, Europe and North
America are close to taking similar decisions
Widespread use of nuclear energy in the world, however, is impossible for the following
reasons:
1. Nuclear waste removal and storage related problems are not resolved. High level
radioactive waste is still being stored at industrial grounds (nuclear power plants’ sites) or
other intermediate facilities. Today almost all storages are filled in. Attempts to build storage
facilities in stable geology formations, for example in the United States, have failed.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
2. Problems of nuclear power plant’s (NPP) removal of nuclear technologies from
operation have not been solved. Today’s plan is to safeguard the plants, which have exhausted
their resources. The cost for the conservation of a single power unit in Russia is
projected to be 500 million dollars. Security and maintenance of the nuclear cycles at the
conserved NPP will cost up to 60 million dollars per year. The removal of many NPPs in
the next years will cause an extreme burden on the country’s budget. Russia’s Rosatom
does everything possible to extend the operating life of nuclear power plans, which has
already exhausted its resources. Despite the risks related to the operation of Chernobyltype
NPP, despite the fact that these NPP have exhausted their resources, and contrary to
the requests by Baltic sea and European countries, Rosatom does everything possible to
extend the operation of Laningradskaya NPP operation. If the program on nuclear unit
removal from operation was publicly announced, there would be a shock among society.
3. High costs for atomic energy industry for majority of developing countries.
4. Modern NPPs produce plutonium, a key material for nuclear bombs. This fact
makes NPPs expansion to developing countries (where energy production growth is needed
most of all) almost impossible. It is not a secret that any country possessing modern
nuclear power technology is capable of nuclear weapons development. India was the first
to demonstrate it in 1974. The country used a Canadian CONDU reactor and under the
IAEA Watch organized and conducted a nuclear weapon and entered nuclear club without
any authorization. It was a huge international scandal, but no practical measures were
taken, and the situation is similar to the one in Iran today
The Iranian crisis has demonstrated the existing problem of nuclear energy demand.
The causes for the Iranian deadlock are listed next. First of all, in perspective,
energy problems cannot be solved without atomic energy. Any country concerned with its
nuclear security has the right and must develop atomic energy industry, including the full
nuclear fuel cycle relevant to the existing nuclear technology. A proposal about uranium
enrichment centers in the leading countries cannot solve developing countries’ problems.
For example, Iran has significant quantities of low enriched uranium in other countries,
but nobody is willing to give it back to Iran. Therefore, refusal of a complete fuel
cycle on the territory of developing countries can be achieved only by means of power.
Today, we know that this is not the way to resolve the problem. Iran’s case indicates the
chain reaction of nuclear technology proliferation in the world. This highly dangerous
process has already started as a number of Latin American countries have announced the
start up of uranium enrichment on their territories.
Currently in our country, atomic energy industry development is based on neutrons
and reactors-multipliers, in other words, fast neutrons. Fast neutrons program development
is related to the fact that 235 U reserves are equal to the oil reserves. Therefore, a
large-scale program development based on fast neutrons will exhaust 235 U reserves in a
short time. One of the indicators is enriched uranium price growth, even at the stage when
atomic energy industry is relatively small. 235 U stockpiles preservation will be critical
in the second half of the century, when there will be 10–12 billion of people and human
problems could be solved only with industrial expansion to space.
Chemical engines cannot solve large tasks in space. The only solution, given to
people to solve this problem, is 235 U. Therefore, 235 U burned up in neutron reactors is a

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
crime against future generations. One of the solutions is conversion of 238 Pu by way of
239
Pu and 232 Th to 233 Pu. Breeder functions on artificial isotopes of 239 Pu and 233 U. This
phenomenon has been known since the 1940s, when academician Leypunsky developed
this program.
What is a breeder Every NPP operating on a breeder program has a radio-chemical
production in its fuel cycle. For every million kW at least 20 tons of 239 Pu or 233 U circulates
in such a program. If NPPs are going to spread fast, which will be required by the
2020s, there will be up to million tons of 239 Pu and 233 U in the world. What nuclear security
discussion can take place This is a completely unreasonable program. Even supporters
of the breeder program in our country accept the fact that such a program can remain
only inside Russia. Russia, however, cannot remain uninvolved in global problems. That
is why Vladimir Putin called for establishment of programs applicable by all countries. As
a result, modern atomic energy industry perspectives remain extremely pessimistic.
We can avoid such discussions and talk only about nuclear unit construction as the
industry development in Russia. We live, however, in the same world and solution to a
problem in one country does not help avoid global problems.
Today intensive nuclear energy capacity development is observable mostly in the
South-East Asia, particularly, in China and India. This fact closely relates to intensive
weapons build-up programs in these countries, and as a result there is a need for nuclear
technologies. These countries are repeating the path, taken earlier by the United States and
the Soviet Union.
As an alternative to nuclear energy, at present thermonuclear programs receive wide
financial support. Thermonuclear technology is based on the ideas of the „hydrogen bomb”
and has been developed since the end of the 1950s. Karl Rubbia, Nobel laureate, states in one
of his interviews: „This technology can be accomplished at the industrial scale only by the
end of the century, and we do not have this time. We have only twenty years.”
According to many experts creating a solid wall in the thermo-nuclear reactor during
its contact with plasma to milliard degrees is a very complicated task. It is important
to remember that earlier forecasts with respect to thermo-nuclear energy industry did not
prove to be reliable.
Officially adopted global energy development schemes are absolutely unsatisfactory
and lead to a global catastrophe. This fact is especially evident due to the growing
global tensions. As a result it is necessary to find ways of nuclear energy industry growth
and create a program, which could ease human problems of the 21 st century
President Putin formulated the following geopolitical conceptual basis for such a
program:
1. Establishment of nuclear energy technology that can function without fissile
materials ( 235 U and 239 Pu). In other words, development of such nuclear energy industry
should be beneficial to all the countries, and not only the ones with nuclear weapons.
2. Russia should obtain a status of a global energy leader.
In order to achieve these goals, a program of nuclear energy industry should be established.
This program must consolidate efforts of all countries to resolve global energy
problems in the 21 st century.
In our opinion, such a program must consist of the two major points:

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
1. Relative heave nuclear energy based on a direct fission of 238 U and Th by way
of high energy neutrons.
2. Nuclear space energy, based on 235 U in nuclear propulsion reactors.
A team of four specialists from Federal State Enterprise ASDINMB with participation
of a number of professional organizations in Russia and Belarus has initiated development
of a technical and physical basis of a new nuclear industry. A dense nuclear energy
industry is capable to resolve nuclear waste problem and nuclear non-proliferation.
Relative dense nuclear energy represents a new technology, industrial application
of which is based on the synthesis of the two unique Russian technologies. Direct burn
up of 232 Th and 238 U without intermediate products, 239 Pu and 233 U (which it takes place
in breeder programs), by neutrons with energy more than 10 MW. These neutrons are
received by way of bombardment of these nuclei by protons with energy level equal to
10–50 GW. Protons are generated by a compact three camera module accelerator at the
forwarding wave. Spent nuclear fuel can be used in such new reactors in the future.
An accelerator for the new reactor will initiate accelerating production, which is
fundamental. This invention will lead to new areas of unknown nature. This will lead
Russia to be one of the leaders in the fundamental physics. For the fundamental physics
of high energy a one km accelerator, which already exists, is based on protons energy of
0.5–1.0 TW with a number of accelerating particles up to 10 17 protons/second.
An initial relative proton batch with 10–50 GW energy during interaction with
238
U and 232 Th generates a cascade of neutrons with high energy, which cause a fissionable
chain reaction which do not fission in modern isotope reactors. Considering energy of particles
deformation, for one initial proton there may be 7,000 neutrons with energy higher
than fissionable threshold (which also initiates an energy of 1,200 GW). An acceleration
coefficient of more than 20 makes discussed technology energy efficient at different levels
of the present energy installation productivity.
Hard spectrum of cascade and fissionable neutrons excludes formation of 233 U and
239
Pu, and also dismisses particle spectrum to a mass symmetry area. In the area of high
energy neutrons, heavy nuclei fission forms neutron-deficit nuclei. Compared to today’s
reactors, this new nuclear fuel cycle reduces the production of the most dangerous materials
by two.
The idea of a nuclear energy industry with lower levels of waste, based on 238 U and
Th fission, was actively supported by an academician named A.M. Baldin. Thanks to him,
a first experiment took place with large lead target at the accelerator in Dubna with proton
energy equal to 5 GW.
Despite complete lack of funding, in 2002 at the accelerator U-70 of the Major
Scientific Center in Protvino, it became possible to conduct an experiment in a model lead
framework. Analysis of the results and some follow up results from other experiments
confirmed a probability of a new nuclear reactor scheme.
Physical and technical basis for nuclear relative heavy energy and a complex Program
was discussed at a number of Russian and international seminars, conferences, and
forums, in particularly, at the Committee of the Russian Federal Council on science, culture,
education, healthcare and environment. Russian Academy of Science members who
took part in these discussions were: U.A. Israel, D.S. Livov, G.I. Marchuk, A.I. Savin,

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
V.I. Subbotin, G.A. Fillipov, along with specialists from professional organizations in
Russia and Belarus.
Technology level condition analysis and knowledge level on key elements of the
studied scheme indicates that in case of resource consolidation, a key unit can be developed
during the upcoming ten years. Program implementation expenses will correspond
to the cost of a new 1,000 MW unit for the existing NPPs.
There are only three places in the world, where experiments with relative heavy
energy reactors are taking place: Los Alamos, CERN and Protvino. The best place to
conduct the study is Protvino, in particular, because the program is based on the two
Russian licenses.
Nuclear propulsion engine studies took place only in two countries, the Soviet
Union and the United States. A model for engines with large thrust (11B91 in the Soviet
Union and „Nerva” in the United States with a thrust equal to 4 tons) and nuclearelectric
engines were invented for operation in far space. For example, the „Nerva”
engine allows for a Moon board capacity increase from 5 to 40 tons. This fact initiated
a number of practical research steps on the Moon. Major industries for nuclear energy
equipment support are located in Moscow Suburbs (Lytkarino and Podolsk). Another
base is located in Kazakhstan (Semipalatinsk). The Soviet engine 11B91 is higher than
American in its technology characteristics. It is important to note, that technology preparedness
of these suggestions is much higher than the one in thermo-nuclear energy
industry, because experience of space technology and other constructions is extensive
and is constantly being improved.
Development of works in these directions is based on a doctrine, presented by
President Putin at the Millennium Summit and numerous interviews to international press.
Only a comprehensive program will promote integration processes in the world, which in
turn will be accepted by the people of the world and will help resolve the most complicated
energy problems of the 21 st century.
Fundamental energy programs, indicated above, will require large funds and can
develop only with the state financial support. In the 20 st century large state (socialists)
program development was based on the Soviet Union and US military industrial complex
and space programs. Today, large programs of a socialist type exist only in the U.S. The
21 st century will become a century where public wealth will depend only on public programs.
It will require making very difficult decisions in economy, and first of all based on
military programs reductions. Therefore, energy revolution in the 21 st century will be a
social revolution as well.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Renewable Energy and Efficiency – European Path to
Common Prosperity
Rudolf Rechsteiner, Member of Parliament, Swiss National
Council, Member Committee for the Environment,
Spatial Planning and Energy
Ladies and Gentlemen!
I am very happy to present today. In the West and the East climate change and
energy have become top discussion issues, and these topics are supported by the Switzerland
Constitution. Despite all these words, Switzerland and international consumption
of fossil fuel reached the limit.
The Swiss Government developed a forecast for the energy consumption. Today
the consumption per person is 17,500 kW-hour. Today, the average Swedish family (2
adults and 2 children) daily energy consumption is 4,960 W per person. Our goal is to
decrease this indicator to 1,950 W. Energy consumption must be based on renewable
energy sources, but it should not be connected to the quality of life indicator. Nobody
would say that the quality of life is lower in Switzerland than in the United States, where
the energy consumption is two-three times higher. Reduction of fossil fuel use will
require significant changes in buildings, constructions, equipment, as well as services
related to energy.
We wanted to make the materials and the processes more efficient. The key efficiency
investment is electricity and automobile production. Let me give you several
examples of how this task will be accomplished for buildings: Mr. Joseph Jyene and his
company have developed the first energy-sufficient house in 1989. It uses only solar energy
to produce its electricity need. Thousands of houses with similar heating and water
supply systems were built by Jyene with the help of his technologies. The concept is
simple: a system with a good isolation or several pools/tanks with water, concentrating
solar energy, is used as a key mechanism here. These tanks are located in the center of
the house and are installed at the beginning of the house construction and are linked to
the roof. In practice, a number of systems exist and sometimes they are supplied with
a small wood stove. Such system also works for the houses with several families. The
temperature in such tanks reaches 90 degrees Celsius in November. During the winter,
when the sun is seldom in Switzerland, the temperature falls down to 45-50 degrees
Celsius. Everything works without gas and oil. In February, the daylight starts to last
longer, and the temperature in the tank goes up. Therefore, the system provides heat and
water supply all year round.
We have exported our technologies and the house-design to Germany, where it
received a special award. The Swiss Parliament supported this policy by a number of

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laws. It has a special lower tax and a tax deduction for solar systems, and more additional
legislation will be implemented soon.
Swiss Energy & Climate Policy
1. Tax on carbon/emissions:
––0,09 CHF/ 0.06€/Liter heating oil, coal & gas;
––Tax for heavy trucks by ton-km (favouring transports by trains).
2. Tax reductions for:
––Solar systems;
––Biofuels and nat gas fuels.
3. Feed in tariffs for electricity from Solar, wind, biogas, small hydro, geothermal.
4. New efficiency standards announced.
Due to the fact that oil and gas are very expensive in Western Europe, we have
adopted Millerchi Standards. The houses consume 3-4 liters of oil per 1 square meter
of space. Such houses require special solar panels, isolation, and specialized photoelements.
As a result they become self-reliant from an energy perspective. Insulation
needed is 25–30 cm, and special windows with three layers of insulation exist for such
purposes. If such standards are to be reached, we can decrease energy consumption
by 80% in Switzerland. We have many old houses, which work inefficiently, and new
buildings are constructed with an improved self-reliant energy design.
There are also innovations in the automobile industry. A hybrid system “Toyota-
Prince” with electric engine is an example where the engine can be run with wind
energy.
From the Russian economy perspective, there is a reason to sell oil and gas at
a higher price. One cannot view such incentives for renewable energy, efficiency and
climate protection as a negative aspect in Russian policies. During the next decade oil
and gas will remain key fuel sources, and Russia will remain the major source of energy
and other goods. A new trend emerges, however, - renewable energy sources. In
order to understand this trend, it is important to look at several factors. First, renewable
energy is energy produced domestically. Nobody wants to be dependent on somebody
else, and the Ukrainian crisis depicted this problem very well. Renewable energy is
endless and safer than fossil fuels. Second, biomass, wind, geothermal sources are local
and regional, which means the establishment of energy source at the local level. Third,
many countries – the United States, Norway, Great Britain, Canada - face reduction in
gas and oil production.
Key factors for renewable energy
1. Endless energy for a secure supply.
2. Regional availability.
3. Worldwide depletion of oil sources (USA, Indonesia, UK, Norway, Mexico,
China).
4. Rising marginal cost for oil & gas developments.
5. Record prices for oil, gas coal and uranium.
6. Climate change costs.
7. Costs of renewables sinking fast. Declining oil production in many old oil areas.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1965
1967
1969
1971
Norway
1973
1975
1977
Yearly Oil Production
thous and barrels dayly
U nited K ingdom
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Picture 1. Oil production in USA
(billion barrels)
Picture 2. Oil production in Norway and UK
US example: the Oil and Gas Trap: higher decline rates, deeper wells, raising
costs, smaller discovery size (Pictures 3–5).
Picture 3. Natural gas production in the USA
Picture 4. Deposits opening in the USA
Picture 5. Drilling depth of oil boreholes in the USA
In Russia the growth period has also passed. Another oil and gas production
peak is expected in 2010. Oil and gas companies face similar problems: fast production
decrease, deep drilling, and extraction decrease. Since 2000, key energy produced from

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
all sources has become more expensive, excluding renewable, – oil, gas, uranium (10
time price increase), and to some extent coal. The record prices of the last summer have
not been forgotten yet and that is why many states prefer building their own systems,
and not being dependent on the others. The survey, conducted by the British companies,
indicated that key expenditures in the future will be related to climate change. That
is why the European Commission and the Ministry Council defend new policy in the
energy production field, trying to limit CO 2
emissions by 20% in 2020. Electric energy
reform, opening for competition, and growth of renewable energy sources represent the
key elements of this strategy and will lead us to a cleaner and environmentally friendly
system. Contamination will be reduced and this fact will be reflected in prices.
Key laws and regulations of the European Union in the area of energy supply
and renewable energy sources
––Directive 90/547
––Electricity transits
––Directive 2001/77 EG Renewables (RES)
––Directive 2003/54/EG
––Electricity market EU Regulation EG 1228/2003
Directive security of supply: renewable goal: + 20%, CO 2
reduction: - 20% by 2020.
It is important to mention nuclear energy and why the European Commission
does not promote it. Nuclear energy is a very controversial issue in Europe. Public
surveys indicate that people prefer solar energy: 80% indicate support for solar energy;
nuclear energy has only 20% support, where 37% of population is against nuclear energy.
With regard to private investors’ perspective, high expenses on nuclear energy
cannot be overridden at the open market. Uranium supply safety is not guaranteed in the
long-run, and the future generation will have to deal with the waste management problem.
Chernobyl and other accidents serve as an argument against nuclear technology.
Radioactive outcomes of Chernobyl remain and cannot be forgotten. People are against
nuclear energy even in those countries where nuclear energy is supported (for example,
France). Austria, Italy, Germany and Sweden abandoned nuclear technology and began
to actively implement renewable energy sources. One can observe this tendency even in
France. At the same time such a tendency can be seen in China and India, where wind
technology is in high demand. Overall, there is no nuclear renaissance and the growth
indicates the real history. Sun, wind, biomass indicate this existing tendency. As Picture
6 indicates, every three years, energy production from wind, and sun generated energy
increased two times (Picture 7). Eight reactors were decommissioned at a slow pace
despite a large addition of such reactors in East Asia. What will happen with nuclear
technology in the future I just presented you facts that in Western Europe that a new
less expensive technology development and growth takes place. Russia could use its
timber and technology, because your country has enough timber supply. Biogas receives
more interest, especially because it is produced from waste and compost.
Problems of nuclear power:
––high pollution in mining uranium;
––risks of accidents, dangerous low dose radiation;

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––no liability insurance, false prices;
––high radiation and pollution by reprocessing of fuel rods;
––no secure place for radioactive waste;
––real risks with Plutonium: terrorism, theft, accidents;
––no long term energy security (uranium scarcity within decades);
––high costs and costs overrun in Oikiluotu (Finland);
Picture 6. Electric energy production in the world, MW
Picture 7. Solar energy production in the world, MW

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Renewable energies: the real boom behind oil & gas. What”s next:
––heat by wood pellets:
––more efficiency;
––biomass/biogas;
––geothermal;
––wind;
––solar.
Average annual wind power growth 29% a year (10 year estimate).
Global growth in wind-generated energy (15,000 MW) is ten times larger that
in nuclear energy (1,050 MW), see Picture 8. Nuclear energy: average growth is 2.2%
(15 year estimate). Wind-generated energy potential is sufficient for even a 100 times
growth of energy demand (Cristina Archer, Mark Jacobson, Stanford University, 2005),
see Picture 9.
Picture 8. Growth rate relation between Wind-Generated (in grey) and Nuclear
Energy (in black)
One more energy source is geothermal energy combined with electricity.
Solar and wind energy, however, will achieve the most success in the next tenure.
Wind energy costs only 6 Euro kW-hour for the new installations. There is a boom
of such technology in Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom, Germany and China,
despite the fact that construction of such installations is rather complicated. We must
understand that in the eastern part of the U.K. there is an opportunity to build turbines

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
on a 60,000 square km area, which can provide electric energy for the entire European
Union, and it happens right now. Russia, as the largest country in the world, has a large
potential in the wind-generated energy industry, and it can use it when there is no gas
and oil. Moreover, capacities of such energy source will only grow and there is no doubt
about it. By 2017, wind energy will grow larger than the nuclear energy industry.
Picture 9. Wind-Generated Energy Growth Potential, TW
Dynamic technological development onshore and offshore:
––turbines 1990: 0,1 MW;
––turbines 2000: 2 MW;
––turbines 2007: 3–5 MW;
––turbines 2010: 5–10 MW (the forecast is based on the data of new units of
6MW capacity being under construction since 2005);
Renewable energy sources are so large that they can satisfy the existing demand.
There is no rise in price yet, despite the growing demand. There are no such cartels as
OPEC: one can see that the potential is large enough to satisfy 40 times the global energy
demand. Of course it can happen in the areas where the wind power is more than
7 m/hour. Such growth is based on economy, and not policy. Expenses on renewable
energy decrease, including 3–4% cost decrease for the wind-generated power, which is
the lowest price for energy. Today technology develops fast. In 1990, we had 100 kW,
in 2010 the turbines will have the capacity of 10 MW. Therefore, wind will substitute
oil and gas, as a result of a number of advantages. The growth of wind installation
is significant today. How one can deliver the wind-generated energy A new network
system is needed. China has developed a special installation, which has an energy loss
of only 3–4% for each 100 km. It is not significant, especially in comparison with gas
pipeline construction. Taxes experiences wind energy installations boom, where technologies
with a direct energy service to population take place. As a result of wind power
differences, various systems are required for different distances. In case the turbines
are spread around Europe, there is always a chance to catch the wind. There are special
hydro storage facilities in Norway and a high voltage system was developed especially
for that. There are similar facilities in Switzerland as well. In order to integrate wind
energy, 6 billion Swiss francs were invested in the project.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Wind Energy: specific cost dropped by 59% since 1991. Why can renewables
succeed Renewables market development:
––no cost for primary energy;
––cost Reduction of turbines,higher efficiency;
––growing power demand;
––no cooling water needed;
––short construction periods;
––abundant resource – wind, solar, onshore (roofs, façades), offshore (highways),
floating turbines, semi-deserts, deserts.
Conlusion I
1. Climate Change is a real problem that should be tackled by cooperation:
––Russia should export less oil and gas;
––doing so Russia could sell at a higher price;
––doing so Russia could sell over a longer time;
––doing so Russia will earn more money!
2. New growth business of the future:
––is efficiency and renewable energy;
––these technologies should be adopted by Russian academia, science and industry.
Conlusion II
1. There is a huge demand world wide for oil & gas.
2. Rather than squandering it at home Russia should maximize its export – over
the next five decades.
3. For efficiency reasons, oil&gas-price should be correct:
––international price levels in the long run;
––revenue sharing of oil income;
––personal or regional distribution.
4. Energy efficiency:
––is good for the economy;
––is good for everybody”s health;
––should be adopted with incentives and legal frameworks.
Conlusion III
1. Renewable energy is a world wide trend:
––there is a general interest for a continental, low cost, clean wind and solar energy system;
––to smooth fluctuations of renewable resources interconnection different weather zones;
––wind and solar are a new important source of income for any region adopting
these technologies;
––cost reductions will continue. Russia should buy or create its own wind and solar sector.
2. Energy security based on renewable energy is a peaceful affair for mutual prosperity.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Non-Nuclear Energy Scenario for Russia
Vladimir A. Chuprov, Director, Energy Programme,
Greenpeace, Moscow
The Government of the Russian Federation is planning to announce and start an absolutely
new energy plan 1 . The new energy strategy is supposed to be based on the maximum
introduction of nuclear energy generation, hydro-power engineering, and coal plants while
the „remainder will be filled with” energy based on gas.
Such a policy, first of all, is a result of a desire to limit internal gas consumption, which
takes more than half of the primary energy production, and increase natural gas exports.
Picture 1. Existing balance of Russian primary energy production
It is interesting to compare the existing and potential balances. Russia has the potential
to realize enormous energy savings through improvements in energy efficiency.
Moreover, new energy saving technologies can reduce energy consumption by
up to 40% (Picture 2) including natural gas. By comparison, nuclear energy does not
exceed 5% of the general energy balance.
This presentation compares the two possible ways to reduce natural gas consumption
in energy-production: „nuclear” (based on nuclear power plant construction, which is not
connected directly with nuclear efficiency) and „steam-to-gas” (based on upgrading existing
natural gas thermoelectric power stations) 2 .
Existing energy capacities and status of energy production
In Russia, 930 billion kilowatt (kW)-hours of energy is produced according to 2004
data. Thermodynamic generation has an established capacity of 148 gigawatt (GW), which
provides about 610 billion kW-hours, or 65% of the total electric power produced. Natural
gas stations (part of the hydro-energy complex), with an established capacity of 90–100 GW
(some sources give different estimates), consume 170 billion m 3 of gas, and produce according
to various estimates between 380–430 billion kW-hours (40–60% of the total electric
power, produced in Russia).
1 The report was prepared on March 3, 2007.
2 The article is based on I.V. Babaning, V.A. Chuprov, “Natural Gas Consumption Reduction and the Perspectives
of the Power Industry: “nuclear” and “steam-to-gas” scenarios”, Moscow: “Greenpeace Council.”

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Picture 2. Comparison of the potentials of untraditional recycling energy, energy
supply and nuclear energy share in the total energy balance
Nuclear power plants (NPP) have an established capacity of 23 GW, which produce
150 billion kW-hours or 16% of Russia’s total electricity production (see also table 1).
Table 1
Established electric power capacity and production at the thermodynamic plant and NPP
Total thermodynamic
Thermodynamic
gas based from
total hydro-energy
plant
Established
Capacity, GW
Electric energy
production (billions,
kW-hour
per year)
Share of energy
production in
the electricity
balance
Consumed/substituted
natural
gas, billion m 3
148 610 65% 65%
90–100
(according to
various estimates)
380–430
(according to
various estimates)
40–46%
(according to
various estimates)
40–46%
(according to
various estimates)
NPP 23 150 16% 16%
Total electric power 190 930 100% 100%
Plans for substituting natural gas with nuclear energy development
Existing NPP provide an equivalent energy amount to forty billion m 3 of natural gas
per year, assuming that thermodynamic natural gas plants have 34% efficiency.
According to the project, it is estimated that by 2015 an additional 10 GW of
new capacities will be created (replacing approximately 20 billion m 3 of natural gas
or providing additional production of 70 billion kW-hours) and 40–50 GW (replacing
80–100 billion m 3 of natural gas or additional production of 280–350 billion kW-hours)
by 2030, while plant use capacity factor is 70%. For comparison, Russian Joint-Stock
United Energy Systems (RAO UES) burns 140 billion m 3 of gas annually to produce
electric power and heat.
In the best case scenario, additional nuclear energy capacity can cover less than a
third of the growing electric power shortage, resulting from increasing power consumption,
but these capacities cannot substitute entirely for gas-produced energy. (Electric con-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
sumption growth in Russia is estimated to increase by 435 billion kW-hours or 50% to 930
billion kW-hours in 2004 and to 1365 kW-hours by 2020). See also Table 2.
New capacities introduction in the nuclear power-engineering
Table 2
2004 2015 2020
Introduction of the newly established NPP capacities relative to 2004 (GW) 0 10 20
Additional natural gas substitution relative to 2004 (billion m 3 ) 0 20 40
Additional electric energy production relative to 2004 (billion kW-hours) 0 60 120
Energy consumption growth by 2020 relative to 2004 according to
Russia’s Power Strategy indicators before 2020 (billion kW-hours)
0 275 435
In this case, one cannot talk about gas savings: if we take into account that the
existing gas plants, which are supposed to be substituted, will not stop operating, the
natural gas substitution effect equals zero. The best case scenario one can suggest is that
the nuclear power industry will slow gas consumption due to the construction of fewer
new gas thermodynamic plants (TDP).
In the case of existing thermodynamic based gas plant substitution, excess NPP
electricity production equals zero and, in this case, the electric energy deficit in the
country worsens.
Factors decreasing nuclear energy development indicators
Below are some factors which significantly decrease nuclear energy indicators
and accordingly planned volumes of the substituted gas and produced energy.
1. Nuclear energy growth calculation does not take into account decommissioning
old units – 3.7–5.6 GW by 2020 (according to various estimates) and approximately
10 GW by 2030. This is the capacity volume, which exploitation period will exceed 45
years by 2030. By 2020 gas substitution indicators or additional power production will
be lowered by approximately 20–30%.
2. There is a catastrophic shortage of energy units at present, when four small reactors
with a capacity of 1 GW were decommissioned (the deficit is 6.5 billion rubles).
Additionally, decommissioning is financed by earned profits, which are received from
35 GW nuclear capacities. We can assume that after 2015, when NPP construction will
become self-sustaining (at the expense of NPP tariff), there will not be enough resources
to introduce two new energy units per year. The latter will also be affected by the mass
decommissioning of old energy units and the necessity to resolve the growing nuclear
waste management problem.
3. When calculating gas substitution at the expense of new NPP, the gas-based TDP
have a 34% efficiency factor. The latter is not correct relative to thermodynamic steam-togas
plants which have a 50% efficiency factor. Upon the calculation of the substitution of
steam-to-gas TDP with nuclear ones the substitution potential reduces to 30%.
4. First of all, condensing plants (which produce only electric energy) are to be substituted.
Such substitution prospects at the Russian European region (where the major construction
of new NPPs will take place) will replace up to 30 billion m 3 of natural gas. This

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
amount of gas substitution will require 15 GW nuclear capacity introductions. After this potential
is exhausted (only 40–50 GW will be introduced at a time by 2030), heat power plants,
producing electric energy and heat, will have to be also substituted.
5. In most cases, NPPs produce electric energy, but not heat. This type of technology
does not allow building NPP within city borders, like Moscow for example,
and at the same time provide heat for this city. This means that the nuclear scenario at
a certain stage, after condensing plants are substituted, implies massive boiler-house
construction, which at any rate would still use gas.
6. Uranium used for stations design (thermal reactors) like this will be more rapidly
exhausted than gas, whose stockpiles will still last for several decades. Russia and the rest of
the world will experience a uranium deficit during the current generation’s lifetime. It is an
extremely dangerous and expensive power source, and requires a separate discussion.
7. In case construction of NPP is fulfilled, gas consumption reduction in the total
power balance will constitute 4% by 2020, according to the Power Strategy (reduction
from 50 to 40%). The reduction is planned not only at the expense of nuclear power, but
coal as well. Nuclear energy share in the total power balance will increase from 4.5 to 6.4,
and in electric – from 16 to 22–25%. Therefore, by 2020 the problem of switching from
burning gas to NPP will not be absolutely solved. Especially that in absolute terms, the gas
amounts burned will remain the same or even increase.
Alternative scenarios on gas usage reduction and electric capacities growh
Efficiency of gas-ased thermodynamic plants
The average electric efficiency factor of the Russian gas-based TDP is extremely
poor – only 30% (for RAO UES, including TDP work in the heating regime and boilerhouses).
There are so called steam-to-gas technologies which help to increase electric
plant efficiency by 1.5–2 times, up to 47–58%. Additionally, steam-to-gas TDP continue
working in the thermal-clamping regime. Complete gas-based TDP renovation only in
RAO UES (which would equal to introduction of 60 GW of steam-to-gas TDP capacity)
would help save more than 50 billion m 3 of gas annually at current electricity production
levels.
Unfortunately, the currently adopted Power Strategy implies only one third of
new technology introduction by 2020 and, even in the best case scenario the process
will include only half of the gas-based TDP. By 2020, every year 35 billion m 3 of natural
gas will be wasted in Russia because of the low generating units efficiency (and these
estimates include only RAO UES).
Price comparison of the „nuclear” and „steam-to-gas” scenarios
If we consider only capital investments in new power construction, then the
economic cost of one billion m 3 of natural gas in „nuclear” scenario will be 23% more
expensive, than in the „steam-to-gas” scenario (685 million dollars against 558 million
dollars accordingly). The calculation is based on the fact that for 1 billion m 3 of natural
gas economy, one needs 0.57 GW of nuclear power and 1.08 „steam-to-gas” heat power
plants, which substitutes for 1.08 GW of heat power plants with low steam-turbine
technology efficiency.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Cost calculations of NPP decommissioning and a significant price increase in the new
power plant construction process make this gap even larger. Additionally, every nuclear GW
is 2.4–3.5 times more expensive than gas (US $1,230–1,800 million for 1 GW of established
power capacity against $515 million accordingly). In other words, having the same investments
and natural gas consumption, gas energy can provide greater capacities (Picture 3).
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1230
Cos t per unit inves tments , U.S .
dollars /K W of the es tablis hed
capacity
685
515 558
Cos t per unit inves tments , million
U.S .dollars per 1 billion c ubic
meter of preserved gas
Nuclear Scenario
Steam-to-Gas Scenario
Picture 3. Comparison of the various scenarios: costs per unit in terms of established
capacity and unit of preserved gas
According to the „nuclear” scenario supporters, the introduction of new steam-to-gas
heat power plants does not have any advantage, because nuclear energy operating costs are
lower than thermodynamic (which also includes gas). The natural gas economy cost calculation,
from the point of capital investments and temporary factor, is not correct.
Leaving on the side the argumentativeness of the thesis about low operating
nuclear power component (which is, by the way, backed up by various nuclear energy
subsidy schemes), it is important to say that the existing Russian energy paradigm views
energy as not an object of market relations, but rather as the socio-economic basis for
the country’s development. This is also confirmed by the fact that the nuclear industry
management pays a lot of attention to a certain energy source, which is natural gas. In
such conditions, the future energy strategy must first answer the question: „Will the
country still be using gas” (It does not matter whether it is cheap or expensive), and
not „How much will operating one kW-hour of gas-based TDP cost” Otherwise, getting
involved in the construction of extremely expensive NPP with the „cheap” nuclear
power hope, thermo-electric complex will continue to irrationally burn natural gas in
the existing extremely inefficient TDP for the next 20–30 years. The latter leads to more
gas loss, than what will be saved at relatively few new NPP in the long-term future (if
the „nuclear scenario” is not interrupted by another radiation catastrophe, for example,
as a result of a terrorist attack or economic crisis caused by an oil price fall).
Timeframe comparison of the „nuclear” and „steam-to gas” scenarios
RAO UES plans to introduce 20 GW of new power in the next 5–7 years, or 3–4 GW
annually. Rosatom plans to introduce 10 GW (1 GW annually) by 2015 and probably 2 GW
of nuclear power capacity after 2015. Nuclear energy will not be able to for substitute gasbased
heat power plants (substitution needs only in RAO UES will be 60 GW). It is important
to note that the deterioration of the existing capacity in the gas industry is 57%t

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Conclusions
In general, modernization and efficiency factor growth in traditional heating
power allows rejecting introducing new nuclear capabilities. In the future, when
measures in the areas of power supply and development are achieved on the basis
of renewable energy sources, the country will be able to secure energy security for
unlimited term.
In the short-run, the government should conduct a policy, where the maximum
budget funds are allocated to nuclear energy, while gas-based energy industry does not
receive any support. The government must find the means to substitute the existing heating
power plants with steam-turbine technology to ones based on „steam-to-gas,” and
additionally it is important to stop inefficient natural gas consumption. (According to
open-source evaluations, today there are 90–100 GW heating power plants based on gas,
but only 2 GW have new „steam-to-gas” technology with efficiency factor of 50%).
Renovation Solutions for Heating Power Plants
Both solutions for gas power modernization incur additional gas consumption.
Both plans suggest rational utilization of existing natural gas stocks within gas industry,
which remains dominant over the next few decades.
The first solution proposal includes preservation of produced electric energy at
the existing level with opportunity to save more than 50 billion m 3 on natural gas. This
solution will require about 60 GW of high efficiency gas-based heating power plants
only in RAO UES alone. The cost of this project (capital investment on capacities’ construction
within RAO UES) is projected to be $30 billion. See table 3.
Table 3
Cost per unit of natural gas economy from a capital investment standpoint
„Nuclear”
scenario
„Steamto-Gas”
Scenario
New capacity introduction by 2020 (GW) 20 60
New capacity introduction (GW/year) 1,5 4,6
Additional substitution/economy/ natural gas extraction
by 2020 (billion cm 3 per year)
Cost per unit capital investments substitution/economy/
natural gas extraction (millions USD/1 billion
m 3 per year)
Total capital investments in new capacities construction
before 2020 and investments in Shtockman
deposits development (billions of USD)
Cost per unit capital investment in new capacities
construction (million USD/kW)
40 More
than 50
Shtockman
deposits development
22,5
685 558 450–580
24,6 30,9 10–13
1230 515
Table 3 additionally includes comparative data relative to the cost of the new gas
deposits’ development. Cost per unit of the Shtokman deposits is comparable or even
more expensive than gas economy in case of the industry’s upgrading.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Picture 4 provides a comparison of the natural gas substitution potential under the
condition of the same subsidy and capital investment.
Picture 4. Gas substitution potential (A) and capacities volume received, GW of the
established capacity (B), under the condition of the same subsidy and capital investment
(30.6 billion dollars) into building of various electric plants 3
The second solution – energy production is increased, but the gas consumption
remains constant. This project requires the introduction of 100 GW of „steam-to-gas”
heating plants only in RAO UES (with the 70% of established energy utilization factor
and 10% gas utilization in boiler-houses). The cost (capital investment into the capacities
construction) is projected to be $50 billion. During the consumption of the same
gas volume (current RAO UES rate) – 140 billion m 3 – will produce an additional 260
billion kW-hours 4 . See table 4.
Table 4
The comparison of additional energy received in „Nuclear” and „Steam-to-Gas” scenarios
New capacities introduction
by 2020 (GW)
Additional received electric
energy for the newly
introduced capacity by 2020
for nuclear and gas power
industry after upgrading (billions
kW-hours per year)
New capacity introduction
(GW/year)
Total capital investments in
the new capacity construction
before 2020 (billions USD)
Cost per unit capital investments
in new capacity construction
(millions USD/kW)
„Nuclear” Scenario
„Steam-to-Gas” Scenario
20 100
+ 120
(Taking into account the fact
that NPP do not substitute worn
out gas capacities, and the gas
consumption volume remains
the same)
+ 260
(Taking into account production
capacity substitution
and gas consumption
volumes preserved)
1,5 7,7
24,6
(Supporting infrastructure cost is
not included: waste storage etc.)
51,5
1230 515
3. 30.6 billion USD is the amount of projected subsidies of new NPP, according to the Russian Nuclear
Energy Strategy during the first half of the 20 th century
4. The magnitude will have 10–15% increase, because gas-based heating power plants function not only
under RAO UES

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Bioenergy – a Path to Solving Energy Problems
Victor V. Mokhov, Director General,
Company „GreenTech”
Biomass of agricultural animals and poultry waste presents a massive environmental
pollution source. In Russia, the amount of this waste reaches one billion
m 2 . At the same time, this waste presents a significant source of renewable energy.
The amount of energy that can potentially be extracted from waste on the territory of
Privolzhskiy federal district is equivalent to 50 Gorkovsky hydroelectric power stations
(about 30 GW).
One of the possible ways of reprocessing any type of organic waste is through the
methane fermentation method. It provides some unique opportunities, namely:
––A wasteless production line;
––Production of two secondary useful products from waste: biogas and organic
fertilizers;
––Using biogas for the „green” energy production (Kyoto protocol).
Waste reprocessing with the use of methane fermentation technology is widely used
in the EU countries, especially in Scandinavia and Germany, where the „green” energy production
from renewable sources brings in a noticeable contribution to the energy balance of
the countries and territories and has a noticeable tendency to grow. During the 1980s, similar
technologies were also developing in USSR. However, in the past 15 years, these trends have
virtually disappeared.
Bio-energy installations are used for reprocessing various types of agricultural and
food production waste. Any organic waste from animal farms, bird farms, creameries, meatprocessing
facilities, etc, can be used as raw material. The resulting products are highly efficient
organic fertilizers (feed additives) and biogas. The biogas that is a by-product of this
installation consists of methane (CH 4
) and carbon dioxide (CO 2
). The caloric capacity ranges
from 5,500 to 6,500 calories per m 3 . In a 24-hour period, one cubic meter-sized working reactor
releases between 5 m 3 (bovine raw materials) to 10 m 3 (bird dung) of gas. This gas can be
used for the farm’s own needs and electricity production. Judging from past experience, the
farm’s own needs take no more than 20% of the released gas. Therefore, such a bio-energy
installation is energy-sustainable and can cover a significant share of the farm main production
energy use.
This development profitably differs from other technologies not only in its usage
characteristics, but also in terms of environmental purity of the process. The biogas release
is 30 to 40% greater, while the installation cost is 40 to 50% lower than that of foreign-made
installations.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Inclusion of bio-energy installations into production cycle allows attaining at least
the following three goals:
1) Use of waste from agriculture production and processing and improvement of
environmental conditions;
2) Gaining additional energy resources based on local raw materials;
3) Obtaining inexpensive, environmentally safe and organic fertilizers and ensuring
the process of recovery and increase of natural soil fertility.
The use of these fertilizers provides 20 to 350% agricultural yield increases for
various crops. It also reduces necessity for mineral fertilizers and can even eliminate their
use completely; and decreases pesticide use. This allows to grow various crops more effectively
economically and to harvest products with better consumer qualities, producing
environmentally pure foodstuffs.
The above-described technology can be used as one of the bases for creation of
environmentally-pure, closed cycles of intensive agricultural production and ensuring a
country’s food security. This constitutes one of the main tasks of agriculture-related National
projects. The concept of waste disappears from the production process, because at
some stage of production this waste turns into raw material for further processing, which
can then be used to make ecologically pure products.
Fertilizers
Crops
Poultry
plant/farm
Waste
Bio-energy
installation
Feed
additives/sup
plements
Bio-energy
installation
Waste
Meat processing
plant
Picture 1.Conceptual diagram of an intensive agricultural, environmentally-pure,
closed production cycle

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Chernobyl, Biosphere, and Humans: a Look into the Future
Anatoly G. Nazarov, Director, Environmental Centre of the
Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, RAS,
Vice-Chairman of Public Council of Rosatom, PhD,
аcademician Russian Academy of Natural Sciences,
Elena B. Burlakova, Chairwoman, Scientific Council on
Radio-biology, RAS, Vice-Director of Biochemical physics
Institut of RAS named after N.Emmanuel, PhD, prof.,
Irina I. Pelevina, Laboratory Head, Institute for Biochemical
physics of RAS named after N. Semenov, PhD, prof.,
Ida V. Oradovskaya, Head of Laboratory, Institut
immunology, Medical-biological Agency of the Russian
Federation, PhD, prof.,
Victor N. Letov, Chair of Extended Vocational Training
for Radiation Hygiene, Russian Medical Academy of
Post-Diploma Education, PhD, prof.
The Landmarks in the Russian Radiation Research
The pre-determining factors for intensive development of Russian radiation research
formed at the end of the 19 th century (1896–1900). On May 21, 1896, Russian
scientists N.G. Egorov and A.L. Gerschun conducted A. Becquerel experiments on the
effects of uranium salts on photographic plate. The experiments were conducted at
the Medical Military Academy. The discovery of natural radioactivity in 1896 gave
a start to the research of physical effects of radioactive materials by the Petersburg
University professor I.I. Borgman and his students: A.P. Afanasyev, F.N. Indrikson,
and V.K. Lebedinsky. The studies included searching for radioactive minerals in the
mineral collections of the Geology Committee in Petersburg. The first works on radioactive
minerals and the museum collection studies were conducted by I.A. Antipov in
1900–1903. At the same time, laboratory worker B.G. Karpov began to collect geological
samples containing radioactive minerals from Ferghana valley.
The roots of radiobiology in Russia date back to the very early 20 th century. The first
experiments on the effects of radium rays on humans and animals were demonstrated in the

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Petersburg Institute of Experimental Medicine in 1903. It was just the dawn of radiobiology.
The first Russian radiobiologists, in their practical recommendations on the limited application
of the radium substances, were talking only about small doses and limited application
time span. In the course of the experiments, they established the harmful effects of the radioactive
rays upon the spinal cord and cerebrum, the central nervous system and the blood generation
system. Later, the works of E.S. London, M. Zhukovsky and their followers allowed
for the formulation of the basis of the Russian school of radiobiology.
In 1903–1904, the first experiments with natural radioactivity were conducted.
These objects included mineral water sources, therapeutic muds, other water sources
and lakes, soils, and the air of certain areas and localities. These experiments led to the
creation of radiobalneology in Russia.
The first scientific radiation schools and centers were formed at physics laboratories
of the Moscow University (A.P. Sokolov) and the St.-Petersburg University, the
chemical laboratories of the Tomsk Technological Institute, the Tomsk University, Riga
Polytechnical Institute, and the Direction of the Caucasus Mineral Waters and Technical
Society (Odessa). In 1910, specialized radiological laboratories and the first related
printed editions were created in Odessa.
In 1900–1916, Russia began mining radioactive minerals. It is important to highlight
the role of the academician V.I. Vernadsky and the Russian Academy of Sciences in
establishing the fundamental scientific bases of radiology and in creating the uraniumradium
production process. In 1914–1916, the work was conducted by the Radium Expedition,
created by V.I. Vernadsky and A.E. Fersman. This is where specialists started
realizing the power and the danger of nuclear energy exploration. In 1918, V.I. Vernadsky
created the Radium Department in the Commission on Studying Production Power
of Russia (RDCSPPR). From this department, he then created the State Radium Institute
in 1922 in Leningrad (Petrograd) [2]. The cyclotron construction there opened new opportunities
for nuclear energy exploration.
At the same time, the study of physical qualities of natural radioactive substances
went on. V.I. Vernadsky’s discovery of the general law on chemical elements
dissipation (1911) was very significant. So did the studies of dissipation of
radioactive elements such as uranium, thorium, radium, and others by V.I. Vernadsky,
A.P. Vinogradov, D. Jolie, E. Rezerford, V.M. Goldschmidt , and others. They
also conducted important studies on the migration and accumulation of radioactive
elements in natural environments. Also, let us not forget the widespread development
of radiological studies on the periphery and in the remote regions of Russia.
The projects on determining radioactivity in the natural environments of South
of Russia went quite far. These territories included Caucasus, Krasnodarsky Krai, and
Central Asia. The searches for radon water sources and healing mineral water sources
went on and included narzan, borzhomi, essentuki, etc. E.E. Karstens, E.S. Burkser,
V.I. Spitsyn, L.S. Kolovrat-Chervinsky, V.I. Baranov and others were the outstanding
organizers of comprehensive radiation studies in the Southern regions of Russia and the
founders of scientific schools [3].
V.I. Vernadsky also organized comprehensive radiological research in the Uzbek
Ferghana Valley.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The history of radiation research in Siberia and Altai is just as rich. The pioneer in
radioactivity studies in Siberia was P.P. Orlov, a professor at Tomsk University. V.S. Titov
conducted field radioactivity definitions and compared measurement methods according
to Mach and Schmidt. The names of the radioactivity researchers of the Zabaikalye sources
are also famous. They include Dr. I.A. Bogashev, a self-taught peasant researcher
I.G. Prokhorov, V.K. Kotulsky, M.P. Orlova (one of the first women researchers of
radioactivity), and other researchers of natural objects in Siberia [4].
In 1920–1930, L.N. Bogoyavlensky was especially important. He was the creator
of radiometric survey/plotting, and a prominent theoretician and practioner of nuclear
and geophysical research. Thanks to the above-mentioned studies, a new fundamental
radiological and biogeochemical concept was established – the concept of Natural Radiation
Background.
The period of open research of natural objects radioactivity lasted until the midforties.
By this time, a significant amount was achieved: mineral sources of North-East
and Middle Russia were tested for radioactivity; radioactivity was found in the petroleum
stratum waters; studies were conducted on natural radioactivity in some of the
seas, oceans, and hydrothermal systems of Kamchatka.
The studies that were conducted allowed scientists to draw some conclusions
on the fundamental theoretical and practical meaning of comprehensive radiation research
in the center regions of Russia. This could be used for treating human tumors
and malignant diseases. Natural radioactivity of various biosphere objects could also be
used for other healing purposes (therapeutic muds, mineral and radon sources, radium
emanations into the atmosphere). Research findings could also be used for radioactive
mining and for the creation of raw material base for the future uranium and radium
production.
The next stage of the radiation research is characterized by the discovery of artificial
radioactivity and the nucleus annihilation (1933–1934). Frederick (1900–1958)
and Irene (1897–1956) Joliot-Curie stood at the forefront of this discovery and received
the Nobel Prize in 1935. The late twenties and mid-thirties witnessed the birth of quantum
mechanics, quantum statistics, and quantum field theory which constitutes the base
of nuclear physics. The influential contributors of this stage include Einstein, Bohr,
Dirak, Fermi, Rezerford, Pauli, Capiza, Lundow, Oppenheimer and others.
Enrico Fermi’s contributions include the creation of the first nuclear reactor in
the United States (1942), as well as achieving the first nuclear chain reaction and the
first nuclear explosion.
The creation of nuclear weapons in the United States and the detonation of nuclear
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9, 1945) marked the beginning
of the Cold War. In 1946, the USSR already started building an industrial nuclear reactor.
Thus, the creation of the nuclear shield began. Important individuals of this period
include I.V. Kurchatov, A.D. Sakharov, Y.B. Khariton, Y. Zeldovich and other Soviet
nuclear physicists. This period also marked the beginning of nuclear production in the
United States, USSR, United Kingdom and other countries [5].
The period of the nuclear arms race was marked by nuclear weapons tests in the
air, under water, and under ground. On-the-ground nuclear detonations also took place

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with their harmful consequences upon the biosphere and humans. The nuclear polygons
of Semipalatinsk, Novaya Zemlya, and Lobnor (Sin Tzyan, China) became the biggest
sources of radiation pollution. In 1963, the Moscow international treaty on banning nuclear
weapons tests in three environments became an important event in slowing down
the nuclear arms race.
Another event of great significance was the creation of the first nuclear power
station in Obninsk (USSR, Kaluzhskaya oblast) in 1954, with 5 MW power. This plant
marked the beginning of developing civil nuclear energy in the USSR and in the world.
But at the same time, it was the beginning of massive technically-induced accidents
and disasters. Radiation accidents were especially serious in terms of their impact upon
humans and biosphere.
The Age of Disasters (The concept of a radiation disaster)
According to V.I. Vernadsky, throughout its entire history, human civilization has
been „consciously dealing” with disasters and attempting to overcome them [6]. In the
first millennia of human history, disasters and catastrophes had exclusively natural origins.
By the Middle Ages and the New Era, in addition to natural disasters, humans started
experiencing localized technical-induced disasters that occurred as a result of widespread
development of various trades and industrial production [7]. Finally, the period of time
that we call the age of disasters (the entire 19 th and 20 th centuries, and, as we suppose,
the first third or half of the 21 st century) is characterized by a massive spread of technical
disasters that fall into a broader category of „civilization disasters.” Here, we can include
alcoholism, drug abuse, and disintegration of family life, loss of moral values, terrorism,
signs of ecological crisis, and other developed and developing symptoms of our civilization’s
„illnesses” and vices that might have unpredictable disastrous consequences [8].
A distinct feature of the last five decades of this period has been the transition
from local/regional to global/planetary type of technical disasters. The Chernobyl radiation
disaster that spread over the entire territory of the USSR, other countries and even
continents serves as a stark example of this trend [9].
In the course of some 50 or 20 years separating us from the Kyshtym and the Chernobyl
events, we are constantly coming against the indefinable concept of disaster. What
are they, really – accidents or disasters In their articles, atomic industry representatives
tend to write „accidents;” representatives of environmental and healthcare organizations
sometimes write „disasters,” but more often – „accidents.” It is becoming obvious that
this question of categorization has a profound social, philosophical, historical, scientific,
and technical meaning, and needs to be considered with special attention.
It may seem like a paradox, but to this time, there is no commonly accepted scientific
definition of the disaster concept. When using this concept, people might mean
„accident,” „cataclysmic event,” a massive „incident,” „extreme situation of technical
character,” environmental „crisis,” and so on. Such a wide spectrum of understandings
of this concept indicates the lack of specific criteria for categorizing a certain natural or
technical event like a disaster. The substance of this concept is not defined.
While studying radiation disasters over a number of years, authors start to understand
that, at the base of any disaster (whether natural or technical), lies an irremovable

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fundamental quality that constitutes the difference between a disaster and an accident
or another extreme event. If it is really so, then there is a possibility to find common
substantive attributes of many different kinds of disasters and to develop scientific approaches
to systemize and study in-depth these disasters.
Within the scheme of the historical-scientific timeline outlined above, it is important
to highlight the stage of scientific understanding/conceptualizing of disasters
which lasted about 150 years, from the first third of the 19 th century (1820s–1830s) to
the second half of the 20 th century (1960s–1990s). This is when the scientific bases of
theories of disasters were laid down, and when the main distinct criterion of disaster
was determined [10]. The largest amount of scientific interest for the purposes of our research
is present at the beginning of the stage that was connected to the work of George
Cuvier (1769–1832).
The prominent Russian geologist academic A.P. Pavlov, the creator of the term
„anthropogenic era” and of the understanding of the geological impact of humanity, was
also one of Vernadsky’s mentors and was connected to him by many years of friendship.
Apparently, he was the first Russian scientist to have fully realized the meaning of Cuvier’s
disasters theory and his works for the future development of science. In 1921, he
wrote: „Cuvier… was not a stubborn opponent of the idea of organisms’ development
and a proponent of sudden appearance of new life forms, as he is often presented. He
wished to base his work only upon the facts that were established strictly by science. His
work „On the overturns on the Earth’s surface,” after an initial profound effect on his
contemporaries, was forgotten and even discredited. And yet, one can say that this work
powerfully contributed to the rise and development of many of those brilliant theories
and fruitful directions in science that made up the glory of the 19 th century.” [11]. The
outstanding role of G. Cuvier as the creator of disaster theory was also noted by the
radiology founder V.I. Vernadsky in his works [12].
The ingenious naturalist George Cuvier anticipated, and for the first time scientifically
discovered the profound substance of any disaster: the loss of organization.
This means full, systemic, and irreversible loss. This means full loss of structural and
functional organization, when „nothing but rubble is left from the past” [13].
Therefore, from G. Cuvier’s ideas, we can draw the main distinctive criterion of
disaster that defines its substance: a disaster is always irreversible. It overthrows the
old organizational structure, the relationship between the whole and its parts, and the
means (technology) of this holistic functioning. When only rubble is left from the past,
its togetherness is lost. In this way, disaster defines the necessity of transition to a new
organizational structure of the disintegrated whole.
In relation to radiation and other technical disasters of human civilization, it signifies
a transition to new stages of scientific and technical progress, to a new scientific
paradigm. But a new paradigm a substantial system of outlooks in a given historical
period of development – must operate as a whole and not with its separate parts, no
matter how important they might seem. If a disaster did occur, one cannot „repair it a little
bit,” reconstructing its separate parts, be it nuclear installations, accident protection
systems, construction materials, or main circulation pumps and other details of nuclear
facility significance.

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The above-mentioned disaster characteristics that have to do with irreversible disintegration
of the whole and, therefore, make it „recognizable,” allow us to determine
its differences from an accident and other technical „incidents.” An accident is always
localized, no matter how significant its consequences are. It does not cross the boundary
of its small territorial manifestations. After repairing the broken parts, an accident allows
a return to the former organizational structure, and in this sense, it is reversible.
Numerous examples of reversible radiation and non-radiation accidents (malfunctioning,
damages, disruptions, etc) are exemplified in many works, and there is no
need to describe them here in detail. It seems that a distinct feature of an accident is its
reversibility, which we draw as a consequence, as opposed to the irreversibility of disasters
(„overturns”). This is quite realistic; the concept of an accident in Cuvier’s theory
of natural disasters is closer to the concept of change.
An off-design accident in nuclear energy, connected with breaking of the nuclear
reactor and ejection of large masses of radionuclides into the environment, can be an accident.
But, if it is not localized, it can momentarily grow into an irreversible radiation
disaster, destroying large biosphere spaces (or the entire Earth biosphere) and massive
amounts of people. Such was in the case of the Chernobyl disaster. Comparatively small
disasters, on the other hand, are usually termed as accidents.
The nuclear complex and the Biosphere: the problem of compatibility
Sometimes, mistakes in nuclear energy plant construction happen even at the
pre-project stage, during the planning of the future facility. What are the reasons for
such mistakes As historical and scientific analysis indicates, there is not one but many
reasons, each of them occurring at different stages of the facility creation, its functioning
and exploitation. But, from the point of view of Cuvier and his followers, one of
the main reasons for the emerging collisions between the practiced technique and its
further exploitation in the biosphere is rooted in the lack of knowledge of the structure
and functioning of the biosphere by the experts and technicians. The technical, dangerous
radiation plants along with their personnel and the surrounding population „live”
not in some hypothetical abstract space, but in a real time-space of the biosphere, its
ecoregions, its natural ecosystems, and sometimes even beyond. In the end, it is the
level of harmony and compatibility of these plants with the biosphere and its general organizational
structure that determines the biosphere stability and the safety of humans
and other living organisms.
According to V.I. Vernadsky, the organizational structure of the biosphere presents
in itself a dynamic balance („stable misbalance”) between the lifeless, inert bodies of the
biosphere (minerals, rock formations) and its active geological power, live matter, living
organisms, including humans. In the geological history of the biosphere, the balance between
the inert and living is supported by the incessant biogenic flow of atoms. A distinct
feature of the established „stable misbalance” is that not a single biosphere element (a
chemical element or an atom) ever goes back to its former state. The biosphere as a whole
of the highest class is constantly developing, its structure becoming ever more complex.
Its organization is constantly perfected as a result of evolutionary processes and the catastrophic/disastrous
renewal processes that periodically happen on Earth. These renewal

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processes include the change of the formerly established living organism communities
and geologic-geographic and ecological conditions of their habitation.
From Cuvier’s disasters theory and from V.I. Vernadsky’s general teachings on
biosphere, one can conclude that natural disasters are a necessary condition for biosphere
development. They are an imminent/intrinsic part of biosphere, its inherent attribute.
They do not lead to its destruction. Natural disasters of various strength and
frequency have always been happening in the history of Earth’s development; they continue
to happen regularly today.
Technical disasters, on the other hand, are a completely different matter. It especially
concerns those of nuclear energy and chemical production origins. Any technical
object is a foreign object to the natural biosphere. It is not inherent to its organization or
to its dynamic balance that was developing for billions of years; it is not intrinsic to its
biogenic atom flow. The biosphere compatibility level of the vast majority of humancreated
objects is still extremely low. To a significant extent, it is due to the gap between
technical thinking and the fundamental achievements in the sphere of laws of nature, the
knowledge of the biosphere and its structure and functioning.
In the 19th century, an ingenious naturalist scientist, academician K.M. Behr
quite perceptively noted that „for industrial development in different directions, a significant
spread of natural sciences is extremely important for Russia” [14, p. 120]. We
must not forget about the biosphere’s responding reaction to the invasion of technical
objects. The biosphere possesses complex systems: natural gases and water, microorganisms,
soil mezzo and macro fauna, the soil itself with its acidity or base, primitive
and higher flora, biosphere climate, the solar radiation and other cosmic rays permeating
into the biosphere. These entire systems attempt „to digest” the intruding foreign
objects; often, the response of the biosphere turns out to be a large or a small technical
disaster for the constructed buildings, transportation systems, and industrial objects, and
can even lead to numerous human casualties.
Is it possible to avoid technical, especially radiation-related disasters Unfortunately,
I do not think so. From the works of Cuvier and other naturalist classics (K.M. Behr,
V.I. Vernadsky, A.P. Pavlov, L.S. Berg, etc.), one can theoretically reach a conclusion that
is most important but difficult to understand. The path of disasters is, apparently, the
most common path of development. It includes evolutionism in itself like a part into the
whole. If practice is really the criteria of truth, then the practice of the current stage of
civilization development fully supports Cuvier’s scientific prognosis, and places in front
of science completely new challenges of studying this new reality of Being.
In this newly-unfolding reality of man-made effects on the biosphere of our
times, it is extremely difficult, and often altogether impossible to prevent technical disasters.
The avalanche of „civilization disasters” is ever-increasing and unstoppable, and
the contemporary world has indeed entered the era of disasters. In order to understand
and accept this non-traditional conclusion (which is based on many facts), let us ask
ourselves a question: why in almost four billion years of geological history, the Earth’s
natural disasters still have not destroyed the biosphere, this „thin film on the Earth’s
surface,” as Cuvier said V.I. Vernadsky’s teaching on the biosphere offers us a clear
answer. The biosphere, modified by human activities, becomes the most complex sys-

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tem in the universe. Despite its seeming fragility, the biosphere as the planet membrane
due to its organization presents in itself a stable system with a large number of freedom
stages. Its structure and functions are supported by the cosmos and Earth dynamic balance
between living, bio-inert, biogenic, and inert (non-living) biosphere subsystems.
Even in the event of a global radiation disaster and „nuclear winter,” the biosphere
functioning will continue due to the biogeochemical activity of algae, microorganisms,
primitive plants and animals able to survive high radiation doses. Alas, the biosphere
would then be without humans and complex plants and animals.
Technical creations of humans seem – as they are – quite defenseless in comparison
to biosphere. They are incompatible with the biosphere in material-energy or in informational
sense. In comparison with any natural objects, the number of their freedom
stages is decreasingly small. That is why every large multifunctional technical object
(including nuclear power plants, nuclear submarines (NS), waste reprocessing facilities,
and other radiation constructions) always hold a potential for developing disastrous
events. Overall, the number of industrial production plants in the world is growing, and
many of them have been built by old technologies and have already reached their time
limit of exploitation. Based on this, one can already predict increasing technical disasters
in the coming two-three decades. Technical pressure upon natural ecosystems and
the biosphere in general will increase correspondingly.
The biosphere problems of the nuclear complex are part of the overall security
and safety problem which defines the possibilities of radiation disasters eruption and
flow to a substantial degree.
When it comes to the question of getting rid of disasters’ consequences completely,
it is impossible due to the long half-life periods of many radionuclides. For
example, 239 Pu has a half-life of 244,000 years, and 129 I has a half-life of 17 million
years. These radionuclides form only in nuclear reactors. They did not exist in nature
prior to the atomic era. That is why the effect of radionuclides upon humans and living
organisms of biosphere after radiation accidents and disasters will continue to happen
throughout many generations.
On the one hand, there is the problem of the compatibility of nuclear energy and
radiation objects with the biosphere and achieving its maximum „embeddedness” into the
biosphere. On the other hand, there is the issue of finding effective ways of reducing the
legacy of radiation, of the Cold War, and of contemporary nuclear energy. Together, these
problems present some of the most complex issue of the current stage of human civilization
development. Specific examples of disastrous events that occurred during the early and modern
periods of the Russian and world nuclear complex are largely results not only of technical
and technological problems and personnel errors, but also the above-described problems of
biosphere compatibility and the „biosphere response” to the radiation effects.
The Chernobyl Disaster: an accident
From the ecological point of view, the history of humankind entering the nuclear
era can be presented as a history of radiation disasters. Large and smaller radiation
disasters serve as expression of human effects upon ecology. Many of them occur at
very high speed, thus preventing us from having any control over the first stages of the

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emerged disaster. This so-called „Time point” (the term of V.I. Vernadsky) serves as a
base indicator of disaster irreversibility. For the Chernobyl disaster, the „time point” of
technological disaster with an LWGR reactor rupture into a radiation disaster consisted
only of 56 seconds. This short time period practically excluded any possibility of response
and prevention of the catastrophe. In this way, achievement of unstable extreme
condition of the technical system with disaster signs, and its subsequent transition to the
irreversible destruction of the entire whole through the „time point” is the indicator of
the disaster that begun, of the irreversible natural-anthropogenic process. It is impossible
to stop and return the system into the former stable state.
The issues of the biosphere and the nuclear complex, considered above, are part
of the overall security problem which defines the possibilities of uprise and development
of radiation disasters and the elimination of their consequences. Yet theoretical premises
and practical experience of the so-called „elimination” of the consequences indicate that
ecological consequences of such disasters cannot be fully eliminated. They continue to
manifest themselves decades, centuries, and millennia later (due to the half-lives of radionuclides
of plutonium, americium, curium, etc). The effects of radiation on humans
and other biosphere organisms should and is manifested over several generations [15].
The concept of radiation security does not have a single scientific definition.
Although its practical importance for society is quite obvious, it has not yet become an
object of keen and multi-sided study of fundamental science. There are several reasons
for this in Russia, the most important of which is the command administrative system
of nuclear energy. It is also the resulting secrecy of radiation security problems over the
course of six decades, which is partly still existing and continuing into the future. A special
secrecy of the work connected with the production and testing of nuclear weapons
(1945–1985), arms race, NS fleet development, „peaceful” nuclear energy, and other
nuclear objects created a substantial shift in the system of priorities. In this system,
radiation security – with all its lack of scientific work and practical experience – was on
one of the last priorities. [16].
The pre-conditions of the Chernobyl disaster were rooted in the whole system of
social planning set up in the USSR in the late 1920s-early 1930s. This connection of Chernobyl
with the „age of social planning” so far did not attract special historical-scientific
analysis. Indeed, at first glance it seems rather artificial to compare the Chernobyl disaster
as a logical consequence of the Soviet nuclear project with the projects of rivers diversion
and other large national development projects and programs. But all the factual data and
the underlying historical-scientific analysis of the social planning age as a holistic socioeconomic
and political phenomenon indicate an unbreakable genetic link between all the
social projects and the Soviet command administration system that brought them to life.
The shortcomings of the system reflected on the atomic project, and, finally, led
to one of the gravest disasters in all the history of human civilization. Many important
scientists, public activists, and government officials (such as A.L. Yanshin, V.A. Kovda,
D.S. Likhachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, V.I. Vorotnikov, and others) understood the profound connection
of Chernobyl with other social „projects of the century.” Another such project was
the proposed diversion of North and Siberian rivers. Had that project been implemented, it
would have had catastrophic consequences for the country’s economy and culture.

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At the same time, the nuclear project, as any large project of the social planning
age, has its distinctive features; some of them drew the tragic Chernobyl ending nearer.
The comprehensive study of the Chernobyl disaster causes and consequences indicated
that there is no single cause of the tragedy [17]. It happened as a result of a long and complex
chain of events. We studied the protocols of the Politburo Operational Group of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Politburo member
and the Chair of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov led the group. Our study
revealed that already in 1986, the Chairperson and some members of the Operational
Group and the Governmental Commission realized that this event was not accidental.
During one of the first Operational Group sessions, N.I. Ryzhkov stated that the accident
at the Chernobyl NPP was not accidental, and atomic energy led to this event with a
certain degree of unavoidability [18]. Academic V. Legasov noted the same in his famous
publications in Pravda, some of which were published post-mortem [19, 20].
In the analysis of the nuclear energy development problems that led to the Chernobyl
disaster, the military-political genesis of nuclear energy is usually indicated as
the root of all problems [17]. This is, of course, true, but only partly. Other large social
projects were also directed towards military needs, especially in the post-WWII period,
when the two world systems’ confrontation really took off and led the world to the brink
of nuclear war. Providing defense power for the country became the first priority. This,
in turn, led to the militarization of economy and science. The Soviet’s own nuclear
weapons were created in record short period of time – only six years, from late 1943 to
September 1949 when the first Soviet nuclear bomb test occurred. This crash project
required substantial restructuring of many industrial branches, as well as scientific research
and practical work (research and advanced development).
The second stage of the Soviet nuclear development (following the successful testing
of the first bombs in 1949–1950) involved further improvement of nuclear weapons and creation
of a NS fleet. This stage saw the appearance of the predecessors of the future civil nuclear
energy reactors, military industry reactors that were used for the weapon-grade plutonium
development, and corpus reactors used for submarines. In the sixties, based on these „predecessors,”
the first civilian reactors were built. These reactors were the LWGR and the PWR
reactors, and they have determined the future of the civil nuclear energy development.
The stemming of nuclear energy from the military industry complex was not
unique to USSR. It was also the case in the United States and the United Kingdom. The
first large accidents occurred on the military nuclear installations: in Windscale (England)
and in Chelyabinsk-40 (the Kyshtym disaster of 1957). They have brought to light
the problem of dealing with nuclear waste which later became one of the most serious
problems in modern nuclear energy development.
Was the creation of nuclear energy necessary in the fifties, when the first NPP with
only 5 MW of electric power was built in Obninsk The analysis indicates that there was
no such necessity at that time. Both in Russia and abroad, the energy supplied by traditional
means was quite sufficient. It is interesting to consider the views of I.V. Kurchatov
himself, the nuclear project leader. In the late fifties, he was responding to a question of
one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party on the reasons
and profitability of the NPP construction at the Kremlin conference. In his response,

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I.V. Kurchatov emphasized the lack of profitability of nuclear energy development at that
particular point of time and in the foreseeable future. He said, „It will be a costly experiment
for another thirty years or so.” (See [21, p. 18]). I.V. Kurchatov’s opinion reflects the
views from within: „the father of nuclear energy” unlike anyone else distinctly realized
all the complexity and lack of preparedness for widespread use of peaceful nuclear energy
in the country. Of course, it does not mean that the transition to the NPP construction was
a mistake as such; but we are talking about the time frames and preparedness for such a
transition. It was important for a clear strategy development to come before this transition.
Such a strategy was never developed.
In the context of the military industry complex and the command administration
of the R&D deliverables, different ideological tendencies were defining. The question
of a real or possible loss of leadership was one of the first priorities. This concerned not
only nuclear program, but also other large programs. First and foremost, it was the space
program. This again emphasizes the interconnection of all social projects. The development
of industrial production NPP programs with large and powerful energy units in the
West immediately caused a response in the USSR, even though, as we already said, the
country’s industry and science were not ready for a full-scale nuclear energy development
at that time. In practice, it resulted in the accidents at the first energy units, in the
absence of a comprehensive program of providing nuclear and radiation security. This
topic was discussed extensively at scientific forums and in open publications.
One of the defining preconditioning factors for the Chernobyl disaster was the
total secrecy that was coming from the depths of the military industry complex and the
command administrative system. This secrecy was complemented and fortified by the
directive style of governing, typical for army but out of place and ineffective in the field
of science and technology. This governing style ruled throughout the entire era of social
projects, especially in the frequent periods of crash efforts and skunk works that became
widespread in the mid-twenties and early thirties.
The fact that nuclear energy was so closed from public and from the experts
themselves, to a large extent facilitated not accidental but quite characteristic disastrous
development of events. The brightest example is the accident at the LNPP in 1975
involving the melting of the technological channel in the active reactor zone. The events
took a course similar to that of the Chernobyl disaster, but it was successfully stopped,
possibly, due to better handling by the personnel and a luckier combination of circumstances.
However, the information about this incident was immediately classified and
not disclosed to the personnel of other NPPs with the same type of LWGR reactors.
One would think that such an unstable functioning of a nuclear reactor would
become a serious caution for the atomic scientists and the surveillance bodies; but it
did not. The nuclear complex was unstoppably moving towards a heavy „off-limits
accident” with the reactor fracture and the ejection of radionuclides into the environment.
One could name several other preconditioning factors for this nuclear disaster (for
more detail, see [17, 22-25]), but from what was said above, the non-randomness of the
Chernobyl disaster is quite clear. So is its unavoidability as a consequence of the entire
extensive path of national development projects implementation with all its secrecy,
prescriptiveness, and extreme closedness to public opinion.

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When we ask ourselves a question of whether it was possible to prevent the Chernobyl
disaster, the response based on a large amount of documented facts states that,
technically, it was possible. Yet technological prevention would only have a temporary
effect. It would only postpone the possibility of a significant accident for an undetermined
period of time. The causes of the Chernobyl disaster were systemic, they touch
many causes and effects, among which the technical causes are in turn effects of social,
economic and psychological causes that played a big role in the administrative decisionmaking
process. What was necessary was the restructuring of the entire nuclear field,
followed by that of the adjacent industries, such as mechanical engineering, , materials
technology, Research and Advanced Development, and other fields without which safe
nuclear energy is impossible. In 1986, one could feel the fresh breath of the „air of changes,”
but the changes themselves had not yet come. We have paid too much of a price by
going into the long-awaited Perestroika through the struggle with the river diversion, the
Chernobyl disaster, and the subsequent collapse of national development.
The key to the truthful re-creation of the preconditioning factors, causes, consequences,
and responsibilities of the Chernobyl disaster as a non-accidental result of the
nuclear project development (as is the case with the other „century projects”) is in the
coherent application of historical and scientific methodology. It demands the research
of common paths of the scientific-technological and public process formation and development.
We shall never fully understand how the largest social programs and projects
are implemented, their rises and falls without having studied the general and distinctive
features of the entire era of social projects. We have lived according to the laws of this
era for several generations. We still need many years in order to scientifically study
the accumulated problems and unresolved questions of safety and security of large social
programs implementation. To study them scientifically means to obtain knowledge,
compulsory for all, as V.I. Vernadsky was saying. We need to obtain it in the process of
research regardless of whether we like it or not. It is necessary so that we can develop a
scientific view on the further development. It is impossible without the society solving
such large social programs and scientific and technological projects. This means that, if
we will simply leave this „social projects era” in the past, we will continue to bump into
its problems. This is the main lesson of the Chernobyl disaster: not to forget the past.
The main results of the Chernobyl’s 20th anniversary
The consequences of small-dosage low-intensity radiation
Twenty years have elapsed since the Chernobyl disaster, 50 years since the Kyshtym
event and the Mayak dumping radioactive waste into the Techa River, and 60
years since the nuclear bombing of Japan. Even so, it is still early to give a final evaluation
of all the indirect medical consequences of Chernobyl and the massive emersion
of malignant tumors. However, the official viewpoint of some Russian and international
organizations is that there are no serious medical consequences except for thyroid cancer
[26]. Such viewpoints continue, when over 50 years since the disasters, epidemiological
and radiobiological research continues on the Japanese and Chelyabinsk populations,
and the last words have not been said yet. The risks of the small-dosage low-intensity
radiation are being re-considered [27-31].

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Following the Chernobyl NPP disaster, a significant number of people was affected
by small-dosage radiation. At that time, Chernobyl began a new era in radiobiology
development. The whole world started paying much more attention to the effects
of radiation in small doses. A significant role in understanding the post-Chernobyl effects
was played by the experimental research on isolated cells, animals, and lymphatic
cells of the radiation-affected individuals (the emergency responders and the polluted
regions’ population). This research enabled scientists to understand the mechanisms of
early and indirect consequences of small-dosage radiation.
Currently, the effects of such radiation are described as „non-target” effects: the
genome instability (GI); adaptive response (AR); bystander effect; hormesis; and clastogenic
effect on the organism level [32-38].
The reaction to small-dosage radiation is different from that in large dosages.
The classic model of radiation effects suggests that the discrete cell target has an individual
reaction depending on the quantity of unrepaired or incorrectly repaired DNA
damages. According to contemporary understanding, the reaction processes can occur
over distances exceeding the cell size. They are controlled by the cell signal systems;
direct impact is not necessary in order for a cell to become damaged. Then we have to
accept the fact that the dose-effect dependency is changing. The gene expression will
then be significant, which can lead to malignant transformation without direct mutations.
Cells unaffected by radiation exhibit gene expression changes; DNA reparation;
chromosome aberration, mutations and death; and radiation-induced genome instability
that can be connected to the formation of malignant tumors. Radiosensitive genes as
markers of genetic sensitivity of individuals and populations are studied in the epidemiological
research and for risk assessment (See [31, 39]).
We suppose that the problem of Chernobyl’s indirect consequences to a significant
degree is attributable to the understanding of the substance of small-dose radiation
effects and mechanisms. This leads to emergence of a new phenotype, a new cell population
with its own distinct features. What seems especially important is that the genome
instability is induced, leading to other reactions to external factors such as stress and
radiation. That is why one can suggest that in the case of many emergency responders,
the main phenomenon following small-dose radiation and living on polluted territories
is the genome instability that leads to a whole row of consequences [40].
The genome instability (GI) is a type of genome damage that is transferred
through cell generation and leads to increased mutation rate, chromosome aberrations
and death among the radiation-affected cell offsprings. It is observed both in vitro and
in vivo. GI can increase sensitivity to physical and chemical agents. The presence of
GI makes extrapolation of radiation effects from large doses to small ones impossible,
because it can modify the biological effects and demands reconsideration of the risk
assessment concept.
The study of radiation effects upon the health of the disaster emergency responders
and of the Chernobyl zone population began practically immediately following the
disaster by a number of medical and biological organizations. In the first years after the
Chernobyl event, many aspects of radiation effects on human body remained unclear. A
large amount of observations and laboratory experiments on animals were needed. They

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
were conducted for various purposes by the scientific organizations of the Academy of
Sciences and other agencies. The experiment data analysis and synthesis continues to be
conducted today. A number of important conclusions of fundamental meaning for science
and practice occurred 20 years after Chernobyl. Let us examine the main results of many
years of experimental laboratory data, clinical studies and biomedical monitoring.
A number of tissue culture cells (HeLa) were exposed in the disaster zone for 1,
4, and 6 twenty-four-hour periods (the sum doses of radiation constitute 0.083, 0.331,
and 0.497 Gr, respectively, with the gamma-radiation power of 100–300 reaction mass
per hour). The cells were then cultivated in regular laboratory conditions for many generations.
The following GI signs were observed (the controlled cultures were contained
under the same environmental and other parameters on the non-radionuclide polluted
territories): slowing down of the cell proliferation activity in the course of 6–7 generations
following the end of exposing them in the Chernobyl zone (Picture 1); the
control level is only reached at the 8 th generation. The number of the controlled HeLa
cells increases on average ~7,5 times; following the exposure to the Chernobyl zone,
the growth coefficient value immediately decreases by ~2 times. One can suppose that
the observed decrease of proliferation activity can be explained by the induced GI and
the death of cells in remote generations. This supposition is confirmed by the fact that
in the course of 24 generations, there is a marked decrease of clonogenic cell ability.
The analogous situation is observed in the study of the number of gigantic cells: their
amount augments twice and more and does not decrease for 20 generations.
Picture 1. Slowing down of the cell proliferation activity in the course of 6–7 generations
following the end of exposing them in the Chernobyl zone
There is yet another important phenomenon that can be regarded as a GI manifestation
with the offspring of the exposed cells: the increase of their radiosensitivity.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
With additional radiation of 3.0 Gr, the rate of survival (the clonogenic ability) of the
exposed cells becomes lower than that of the controlled cells. The frequency of formation
of cells with micronuclei as well as gigantic cells increases over 9–12 generations.
From these results, one can also conclude that prolonged cell radiation on the polluted
territories does not induce the adaptive reaction (AR). Such a reaction manifests itself
by increased radio-resistance, because acute radiation of the exposed cells only leads to
the increase of their radio-sensitivity.
The fibroblast cultures, obtained from the embryos of mice that were paired up
in the disaster zone, were subjected to the whole series of experiments. The cytogenetic
analysis revealed a credible increase of cells with chromosome restructuring of up to
24.5%. It also revealed the emergence of cells with multiple chromosome aberrations,
their dose in the overall number of aberration metaphases reaching 8%.
Thus, exposing the cells in the tissue culture to the Chernobyl zone causes GI,
which is manifested in the radiation-affected cell offspring by a slowing proliferation
speed, cell death over generations, increase in number of cells with МI, increase in
number of gigantic cells, lack of AR, and increase in sensitivity to additional radiation.
Naturally, the question arises whether radiation in itself can cause such effects. In
order to answer this question, model experiments were conducted on various cell lines
with the radiation of 10–40 Gr with the dosage power similar to that of the Chernobyl
experiments [41-43]. The observations revealed that remote offspring of the radiationaffected
cells exhibit reproduction death and increase in number of cells with МI. This
allows us to think that the described effects, caused by the exposure of the cells in the
tissue culture to the 10 km radiation-polluted Chernobyl zone, are mostly due to the prolonged
small-dose radiation.
Similar effects were observed on the organism level of mice exposed to the zone
for various periods of time in the cells that were faveolate on all the sides, and with a
separate dosemeter under every cell. Following chronic, ongoing radiation of 0,024–0,336
Gr (with the exposure time of 1 to 14 days), the animals were brought to Moscow. In
Moscow, after 2, 7, and 30 days, they were affected by 3, 5, 7, and 9 Gr radiation. All the
controlled animals were contained in the same ecological (and other) conditions, in the
non-radionuclide polluted zone. The survival rate of the animals was studied for 30 days
(Picture 2). It was found that with an additional radiation of 9 Gr (with the 2-day interval
following the zone exposure), the animal fatality sharply increased and reached 100% by
the ninth day. The effect of increasing radio-sensitivity to a substantial degree depends
on the time interval between the end of exposure and the additional acute radiation. For
example, in a two-day time interval, the increase in fatality is determined by the marrowy
syndrome rate, whereas with the time interval of 30 days, it is determined by the gastrointestinal
rate. This data indicates that on the whole organism-level, the prolonged radiation
and other factors effects in the zone lead to the increase in radio-sensitivity of mice.
In a separate series of experiments, the exposed animals were studied for the endotheliocyte
density in different portions of the brain using the fluorescence-histochemical
method (Picture 3). The mice were subjected to prolonged radiation of 2.0 Gr (as a
result of being exposed to the zone for one month). One year following the exposure, a
reduction of endotheliocyte density in various brain parts was observed [44].

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Picture 2. Survival rate of the animals for 30 days: after ongoing radiation of
0,024–0,336 Gr (with the exposure time of 1 to 14 days), they after 2, 7, and 30 days,
were affected by 3, 5, 7, and 9 Gr radiation
Picture 3. Endotheliocyte density in different portions of the brain of controlled animals
14-months age (А) and after one year following the exposure in the Chernobyl
zone, total doze – 2 Gr (B)
Therefore, the experiments on animals, much like those on the cell level, reveal
the increase in radio-sensitivity and the remote death of brain endotheliocytes. The effect
of the remote death of brain endotheliocytes might be an indication of a possibility
of cerebrovascular failures following exposure to the disaster zone.
Experiments were also conducted on the blood lymphatic cells, stimulated by
phytohemagglutinin (PHA), taken from children and adults residing in the polluted
zones (Vyshkov, Klintsy, Novozybkov with the pollution density reaching 40 Ku/km 2 ),
as well as from emergency responders. The cells were taken with a micronuclear test
using cytokinetic block by/of cytochalasin. In the course of the experiment, the scientists
studied the spontaneous frequency of damaged lymphatic cells, their radio-sen-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
sitivity (after being radiated with the dose of 1 Gr), as well as the presence of the AR
following the radiation of 0.05 Gr (adapting) and 1 Gr (permitting) after 5 hours.
It is noteworthy that children from Novozybkov and adults from Vyshkov had
a significantly lower lymphatic receptivity to the phytohemagglutinin stimulation: the
frequency of stimulated cells was 1.5–2 times lower. Similar results in the same population
were obtained by A.A. Yarilin (personal note).
It was discovered that the spontaneous level of lymphatic cell damage in adult individuals
was not significantly different from that of the observed Moscow residents (See
[40]). However, selected residents of polluted regions were found to have a high level of
individual variability. Some emergency responders were registered with a very high frequency
of lymphatic cells damage. Children were noted to have increased spontaneous
frequency of lymphatic cells with MN more than twice the amount of adults (Picture 4).
With the 1 Gr dose of radiation, neither the emergency responders nor the polluted
regions residents were observed to have increased levels of radio-resistance. That is, prolonged
radiation effects in these regions do not induce the residents’ AR. However, when the
residents of South Ural region living on the shores of Techa River were observed, the picture
looked different. Even after over 50 years following the radioactive waste dumping, they
were found to have increased radio-resistance. That is, chronic radiation in that region led to
inducing the AR [45, 46]. Apparently, these differences in the AR induction on the territories
of radioactive pollution can be caused by a different spectrum of radionuclides in the environment
(mostly strontium in the Urals and cesium in Chernobyl), as well as by different observation
timing and radioactive pollution patterns, different ecological situations, differences in
human populations, different critical damage systems, and other factors.
More data was collected in the research with the AR induced by the additional
radiation of 0.05 Gr and the following registered radiation of 1 Gr. It revealed the tendency
for the the children (Picture 5) residing on the polluted territories and for emergency
responders and adults (Picture 6) to have a decreased frequency of individuals
with the valid AR. The same was observed with the Techa River residents (See [45]).
Picture 4 Spontaneous level of cytogenetic Picture 5 Level of children (%) with the
damage in lymphatic cells of children of
AR amond children of
Novozybkov and Moscow cities

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
At the same time, a different effect was registered: that of an increase in radiosensitivity
of emergency responders, all adult residents of the radionuclide-polluted
territories (Picture 7) and children. This phenomenon is quite important for human
population and, possibly, depends on the original level of damaged cells, ecological
factors, defects in the DNA-repair systems, humoral and cell immune system condition,
individual particularities of the organism, and the presence of somatic diseases [47–49].
It is also important not to exclude the role of clastogenic factors in shaping the phenomenon
of increased radio-sensitivity. Clastogenic factors are found in the blood serum of
humans and animals subjected to low-dose radiation. They cause cell death, chromosome
aberrations, mutations, etc. (i.e. if one adds blood serum of a radiated individual
to the cells of tissue culture). This was described in the research for the first time [32].
However, a igh level of individual variability in the ability to shape clastogenic factors
was noted [50]. The appearance of individuals with high sensitivity to extreme factors
after being affected by low-dose chemical and physical agents possibly presents one of
distinct features of humans and other organisms inhabiting nuclear disaster territories.
Picture 6. Level of individuals (%) with Picture 7. Level of individuals (%) with
the AR among residents of Moscow (1),
increased in radio-sensitivity after
radionuclide-polluted sites: adapting radiation of risidents of Moscow (1),
Klintsy (2), Vyshkov (3) radionuclide-polluted city Klintsy (2),
emergency responders (4) emergency responders (3)
Thus, the obtained experiment results indicate the emergence of radiobiological
effects of low-intensity chronic radiation that happened as a result of the Chernobyl
disaster and its consequences over the 20-year period.
One can say that there is a new population of cells, animals, and, possibly, humans
with special characteristics, special phenotype. It is more sensitive to additional effects of
damaging factors. It has a lower ability for the adaptive response. It has a high individual
variability when it comes to spontaneous level of damage in molecular and cellular structures;
radio-sensitivity; and the adaptive response. This population exhibits the phenomenon
of increased radio-sensitivity following low-dose radiation more frequently.
As a result of radiobiological experiments, conducted in the post-Chernobyl period,
the following conclusions were drawn:
1. Low doses of radiation have an active effect on human and animal metabolism.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
2. With certain dose intervals, low-intensity radiation is even more effective
than high-intensity radiation.
3. The dependency of effect from radiation dose [the relationship between effect
and radiation dose] can be of non-linear, non-monotonous, polymodal character.
4. The doses at which extremes are observed depend on radiation intensity and
decrease when radiation dose decreases.
5. Low-dose radiation leads to changes (in most cases, to increase) in sensitivity
to damaging factors.
The non-linear and non-monotonous type of dose-effect relationship that we obtained
in the experiments can be explained by the changes in relationships between
damages on the one hand, and the damage repair on the other hand, with the low-intensity
low-dose radiation. With this radiation, the reparation systems, as we understand,
are either not induced at all, or are functioning with a substantially lower intensity and
are „turned on” at a later time, when the radiated object already acquired radiation damages
[51, 52].
“Safe living” in the Chernobyl zone
In fall 2005, the UN Scientific Committee on Atomic Energy, as well as the
IAEA, WHO, and the UNDP published reports and materials on the results of the
Chernobyl NPP accident. The materials also included evaluation of negative effects on
health of the population and emergency responders [53]. To a certain extent, this data
contradicts a number of Russian research publications and those of other international
organizations, such as the American BEIR (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation)
Committee. The contradictions come, first and foremost, from underestimation and insufficient
understanding of low-dose radiation, lack of willingness to introduce different
criteria of evaluation, and unsubstantiated certitude that low doses do not cause any
damages or cause only negligible effects.
The IAEA and the WHO did not take into account the new factors that appear
with low-dose radiation and increase risks of the programmed cell death (apoptosis),
the bystander effect, the radiation-induced genome instability which in turn causes increased
sensitivity to other damaging factors and to more difficult forms of the existing
diseases that an organism might have (even including non-radiation caused diseases). In
its report, BEIR-7 published the sources of errors that were committed in evaluations of
health condition of radiated groups of people and of the danger of low-intensity ionizing
radiation to their health. This report confirms the earlier conclusion that there is no safe
level of radiation and that even very low doses can cause cancer, among other diseases.
Low-intensity radiation causes other health problems also, such as heart disease and
stroke, liver disease, nervous system and psychiatric disorders, and so on.
The factor of dose effect and radiation power in relation to low doses is down
from 2 to 1.5. This means that the amount of negative effects on human health is greater
than was thought before [54].
The same recommendations on the risk assessment of low doses were made by
the Russian scientists who published five monographs devoted to the effects of lowdose
radiation on health.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Let us emphasize again some remarks concerning the reports of the IAEA,
WHO, and UNDP.
1. The changes in disease patterns that, according to experts, were connected to
the accident as a social but not radiation factor, were not accounted for. By the social
factor we mean the stress caused by the accident, relocation to different regions, change
in the living conditions, radio phobia (fear of radiation), and so on. The IAEA and the
WHO do not consider diseases caused by these factors as the results of the accident.
2. For a portion of cancer diseases, there was no usual dose-dependency that
could be explained by certain models. Radiogenic causes of diseases with low-dose
radiation should be determined according to specific biomarkers as is done in molecular
epidemiology, and not on the basis of dose dependence. Nevertheless, this portion of
cancer diseases was not accounted for.
3. A number of other non-cancer somatic diseases were unaccounted for, even
though, according to the D. Preston et al [55] data, for the majority of such diseases, the
radiation component is the important one. V.K. Ivanov and his co-authors demonstrated
that cerebrovascular diseases in emergency responders are of radiogenic nature [56].
One must also not deny the possibility of increase of such diseases among the affected
population. For example, the number of non-cancer thyroid diseases in children, caused
by radiation, should also be accounted for in drawing conclusions of radiation health
effects. Neither the IAEA nor the WHO does that.
4. Neither the IAEA nor the WHO take into account the increased rate of disability
in emergency responders. About 57% of emergency responders are officially disabled;
95% of their disabilities are connected to the Chernobyl NPP accident (Picture 8).
Picture 8. Indexes of disabilities for emergency responders Chernobyl NPP residing
in Krasnoyarsky kray (monitoring data for 2001–2004)
5. Recently, the question of premature aging of emergency responders is widely
discussed. There is a significant gap between their biological age and their passport
(chronological) age. This phenomenon occurs in connection with deterioration of their
health, yet it is also unaccounted for.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
6. The IAEA and the WHO recognize only thyroid cancer as a negative health
consequence in children affected by the accident. At the same time, these children’s
health deterioration connected with the presence of more than one chronic illness, is
not taken into account. Neither is the health deterioration of the children of emergency
responders is taken into account.
We should also consider the evaluation errors connected to the choice of control.
Usually, in order to establish a connection between certain diseases and radiation, two
types of control are used. The internal control is used for people who reside in the same
conditions, are in the same age groups, etc, as the target group, but who received much
lower radiation doses than the main mass of the studied population. The external control
is used for studying average values for the Russian population or for overall other
regions. Both of these approaches have advantages and drawbacks. If the dose-effect
curve does not have a threshold but is basically non-linear and has extremes in the low
dose area, choosing internal control can lead to artificial decrease of the relative risk of
disease in the main mass of the studied population and create an erroneous perception
of a positive radiation effect.
It is important to note that neither the IAEA nor the WHO directly deny the radiogenic
nature of the majority of somatic diseases. However, they do not regard these diseases as an
effect of the Chernobyl NPP accident. They stop themselves at saying that there is lack of statistical
validity for drawing conclusions about the radiation effects for such kind of diseases.
However, when it comes to statistical approach, there are other points of view.
As was said before, the problem of formation and manifestation of the Chernobyl
disaster consequences in many respects comes to understanding the mechanisms and
effects of low-dose ionizing radiation. In the US, there is a 10-year research program
on low-dose ionizing radiation effects, funded with $21 million per year. They plan to
study biological effects of ~ 0.1 Gr dose radiation with low LPE (in-Russian – ЛПЭ).
Another part of the program is to support fundamental research with the use of molecular
biology methods, cellular biology, and genetics, all directed to the study of low-dose
radiation mechanisms and effects (See [31]).
The main criteria of any disaster consequences evaluation (whether a natural
disaster or a technical one) is its impact on human health and on the conditions of the
territories they continue to inhabit. The Chernobyl disaster, being the largest disaster in
the history of human civilization, continues to be evaluated with differing results. There
have been attempts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Federal
Agency for the Atomic Energy (Minatom) to lower the possible effects of the Chernobyl
accident consequences. In 1988, the IAEA experts, with the active participation of the
USSR Minatom and Minzdrav, declared the Chernobyl-affected territories „practically
safe for residence,” according to the results of their „independent expertise.” Echoes
of this „expertise” are still audible in presentations of the IAEA representatives today,
20 years following the disaster. We know what the reaction of the affected regions’
population to such evaluations of their „safe and unharmed residence.” In 1988–1989,
popular movements and public organizations formed and demanded declassifying the
Chernobyl disaster materials and taking measures to improve health of the territories
and aid the affected people.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Intensity are „turned on” at a later time, when the radiated object already acquired
the detected tendencies allow us to conclude that, the lower the radiation intensity,
the later the reparation systems begin to work.
Therefore, the obtained results indicate a high biological activity of low-dose
radiation and an existence of different ways of impacting cellular metabolism than in
the case of high doses.
The second fundamental summary point of the experiment data, having an important
practical meaning, is the increase of sensitivity of living organisms affected
by low-dose radiation and the subsequent increase in susceptibility of biochemical
processes to other damaging agents. Most likely, this fact can be explained by radiation-caused
genome instability.
We attribute a very significant meaning to these facts, because a change in sensitivity
to the effects of many other damaging factors after being exposed to low-dose
radiation can be (and really is!) the cause of development of many diseases and disruptions
in adaptability mechanisms of humans. We would like to emphasize that these
processes are quite tightly connected with the aging process. In the process of aging, we
can also observe such increase in sensitivity to the effects of damaging factors and the
increase of likelihood of the eventual fatality.
Our purpose here is not to give a full analysis of changes in the biochemical and
biophysical processes in organisms affected by low-dose radiation. But the presented
data shows that these changes can cause various diseases and somatic illnesses. For
example, changes of correlation between various indicators of antioxidant and immune
status, connected with cellular membranes, were shown. That is why changes in contents,
structure, and functional activity of membranes are the most important indicators
of disruptions in cellular metabolism and can serve as a prognosis factors for disease development.
A portion of emergency responders received antioxidants and vitamins for a
period of a month as part of their treatment, and then was examined again. It was found
that 70% of changed values of the AR status and immunological indicators normalized
following the antioxidants intake.
The above-outlined tendencies came as a result of summarizing many experiments.
They are, we suppose, of a general biological character. Therefore, they can be applied in
the analysis of Chernobyl residents’ health and in answering the questions of whether one
can safely live on radiation-polluted territories that are a part of the Chernobyl zone.
The results on indirect consequences of low-intensity low-dose radiation on the
protective antioxidant human system demonstrate that young people under 30 years of
age constitute the extremely sensitive portion of the population next to children, while
middle-aged individuals are the most resistant to radiation. It is especially important to
note the latter in defining high-risk groups of industry production workers chronically
affected by low-intensity radiation. As for the young people, low-intensity low-dose radiation
causes misbalance in their antioxidant systems, typical for an aging organism.
L.S. Baleva and her colleagues measured some of these characteristics among
children population residing on the polluted territories. [57] The biggest changes were
found in children born between 1986 and 1987 who remained on the radio-nuclide polluted
territories. Serious deviations from norm were also observed in other age groups,

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
such as children who were born before 1986, lived through the disaster, and stayed on
the affected territories.
The Medical Radiological Science Center of the Russian Academy of Medical
Sciences conducts ongoing observation of the health status of emergency responders
and the population of the polluted territories. The observations that were conducted
from 1991 to 1996 indicated that in that time the emergency responders’ health deteriorated
significantly. In 1991, about 20% of emergency responders were in the I group
of health (overall healthy), 50% – in the II group, and 27% – in the III group (suffering
from three or more chronic diseases). By 1996, only 8% belonged in the I group,
while the III group grew to 68%. In 2002–2003, the picture looked even grimmer. No
healthy people whatsoever were found among the emergency responders residing in
Moscow or Moscow oblast, while emergency responders suffering from three or more
chronic diseases amounted to 100% in Moscow oblast, and to 85% in St.-Petersburg and
Leningradskaya oblast (Pictures 9–11). The number of emergency responders with the
disability status reached 37% (in 1999, it was 31%). From this number, the disability
connected to their work in Chernobyl was marked as 95%.
Picture 9. Level of emergency responders chronic diseases from Moscow and Moscow
oblast both with and without disability (monitoring 2003)
As is evident from this table, there is a tendency towards diseases that are more
typical for aged population. Indeed, the age of the emergency responders was up to
10–15 years lower than what one would assume from this evaluation.
Foreign physicians try to explain all the health problems of the emergency responders
and the population (adults and children) by the lack of medical care and difficult
social situation. It would be unfair to deny that our country is indeed struggling with such
difficulties. But the „local” comparison of radiated and non-radiated groups of people
residing in the same conditions and even working at harmful industrial productions, allows
us to conclude that radiation undoubtedly made its contribution into loss of health for
the radiated people in general and especially for the emergency responders and children.
We already demonstrated that the dose-effect connection is not necessarily the same for

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low-intensity radiation as it is for high-intensity radiation. The effect might not only be
a non-linear, but even non-monotonous. In connection with these findings, discovering
radiogenic nature of low and high radiation doses will be quite varied, and it would not
be valid to present unambiguous criteria and approaches. We suppose that the criteria for
establishing the dose-effect connection should be based on molecular epidemiology data.
Currently, the search for connection between somatic diseases and cytogenetic disorders
of radiation-affected people is a promising direction. The amount of works in which such
a connection was discovered, is rapidly growing.
Picture 10. Dinamic of diseases of blood circulation system, digestive organs and
musculo-skeletal systems of emergency responders residents of North-West of Russia
(per 1000 individuals), 1988–2004
Picture 11. Frequency (%) of blood circulation system diseases of emergency
responders residents of Moscow and Moscow oblast in depend of age
(monitoring 2001–2004)

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Table
Frequency of chronic diseases in persons who participated in the accident consequences
elimination [ACE] on the Chernobyl NPP according to the monitoring data, 2001–2003
Diseases
Moscow,
Moscow
oblast
North-West,
Leningradskaya
oblast
Krasnoyarsky
kray
2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002
n=110 n=133 n=104 n=108 n=74 n=194
Blood circulation system diseases 98,18 85,71 85,58 72,22 85,14 81,44
1 Atherosclerosis + hypertensive disease 82,72 56,39 63,46 47,22 58,11 44,32
2 Coronary disease 71,81 48,87 40,38 43,52 36,49 26,80
3. Angioneurosis, cardiopsychoneurosis 13,64 25,56 14,42 13,89 21,62 25,77
4 DEP – [dis]circulatory encephalopathy 86,36 49,62 59,62 42,59 71,62 51,03
Nervous system/psychiatric pathologies 80,0 41,99 34,62 25,93 82,43 40,72
5 Asthenia, neurasthenia 53,63 20,30 15,38 9,26 13,51 9,28
6 Chronic fatigue syndrome 62,72 19,55 17,31 18,52 78,38 22,68
7 Organic brain diseases, psychoorganic
syndrome
14,54 12,78 5,77 2,78 25,68 14,43
8 Polyneuropathy 9,09 3,03 0,96 - 2,70 4,12
Digestive organs diseases (total) 96,36 72,18 66,35 52,78 64,87 63,92
9 Gastrointestinal tract diseases
(chronic gastritis, gastroduodenitis,
stomach IB, 1–2 PK), total
10 Chronic cholecystitis, cholecystopancreatitis
95,45 51,88 56,73 47,22 47,30 42,27
49,09 40,60 25,96 20,59 45,95 41,24
11 Fatty hepatosis, hepatic steatosis 17,27 5,26 9,62 5,56 16,22 8,69
Musculo-skeletal system diseases 100,0 66,17 53,85 53,7 52,70 52,06
12 Deforming spinal osteochondrosis 91,81 56,39 48,08 46,30 48,65 44,32
13 Chronic polyarthritis, osteoarthritis 39,09 14,29 1,92 6,48 8,11 7,22
14 Osteoarthrisis 31,82 12,78 10,58 6,48 1,35 1,56
Other chronic pathologies
15 Vein diseases 8,17 6,79 15,39 10,19 4,05 4,12
16 Multiple cavities 10,0 6,02 0 3,72 1,35 4,12
17 Thyroid disease with AT 42,72 30,08 26,92 26,85 24,39 22,16
18 Visual pathology of non-infectious
etiology
50,0 9,77 8,65 8,33 16,22 6,19
19 Radial cataracts 8,18 3,76 0 4,63 2,70 2,06
20 Hearing pathology of non-infectious
etiology
6,36 1,50 0,96 0,93 4,05 1,55
21 Dyshidrotic eczema (non-allergic) 3,63 0,75 - - - -

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22 MSD (in-Russian – МКБ) 26,36 16,03 10,58 11,11 13,51 7,22
23 CKD (Chronic Kidney Disease) 4,54 - - - 1,35 0,52
24 Diabetes, type II 4,54 3,01 0 0,93 2,70 2,06
25 Benign tumors 35,45 14,10 12,50 16,67 13,51 4,12
26 Conditions following removal of
malignant tumor
2,72 1,50 3,85 2,78 4,05 4,12
27 Overall healthy 0 0 0 0 0 2,06
28 Presence of 3 or more diseases (polymorbidity)
100,0 84,21 86,54 72,22 77,03 74,23
29 Chronic diseases (total) 100,0 96,99 100,0 89,81 86,49 97,94
30 Disability in connection with the
ChNPP clean-up
35,45 33,08 26,92 25,93 43,24 38,66
including: I group 0,9 0,75 0 0,93 4,05 1,55
II group 25,45 23,31 20,19 13,21 18,92 18,04
III group 9,09 8,27 5,77 12,04 20;27 19,07
31 On overall diseases: 19,09 19,08 5,77 3,72 5,41 3,61
32 Total 54,55 51,13 32,69 29,63 48,65 42,27
Brief summary and conclusion
A cycle of complex experimental biomedical, biochemical, biophysical and cytogenetic
research was conducted in the post-Chernobyl period. This research included extensive
use of data on the Chernobyl disaster impact upon the health of the disaster emergency responders
and the population of the radiation-affected regions of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.
Two fundamental general biological tendencies were found. One of these tendencies scientifically
and with full validity establishes the role and effects of low-dose low-intensity radiation
on humans and natural environment objects. The second tendency, tightly connected with the
first one, indicates an increase in sensitivity of low-intensity radiation affected objects to other
types of damaging factors including higher doses of radiation.
Within these tendencies, new ones were found, specifying other effects of lowdose
radiation. Among them, the relationship between the destructive effect and the
damages repair effect; the defining defensive role of cellular membranes; the high value
of antioxidant stability process and the immune status with the low-dose impact; the
complex nature of dose-effect relationship in connection with several subsystem’s interaction;
information/signal nature of biologically significant low-intensity radiation; the
features of population response to low-dose impact; and other tendencies.
Although some of these findings do need to be further researched, overall, the
discovered tendencies and the new factual data can serve as a theoretical base for the
prognosis of the health conditions of the affected population, as well as for developing
practical recommendations for treatment and improving health conditions.
All of the above results present evidence of rapid and inevitable health deterioration
of all affected individuals. It is expressed in developing processes of rapid
aging and in widespread syndrome of the so-called polymorbidity – the presence in an

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
individual of three or more chronic diseases. By now, this serious syndrome among the
Chernobyl accident emergency responders reached 100% in Moscow and the Moscow
oblast, and 85% in Leningradskaya oblast.
Determining the impact of low-dose radiation for various age groups is also an
important conclusion of the conducted observation. Middle-aged individuals are particularly
resistant to the effects, whereas children, individuals under the age of 30 and
those over the age of 60 are most vulnerable. From a practical standpoint, this is a very
important finding. It can allow us to make estimates of the population’s occupations by
looking at various age groups in radiation-affected regions and the industry production
facilities with low-intensity radiation.
The question of whether one can live on the affected territories, stated in this
paper’s subheading, is, of course, of a rather polemic nature. It is also connected to
the IAEA position. Over many years, and especially in their most recent declaration of
2005, the employees and experts of this organization have been insistently attempting
to prove – no, to indoctrinate without solid proof – to the world community the idea
of „overall safe living” in the Chernobyl-affected regions. They have also been talking
about the „many measures” supposedly taken by the government to provide „fullfledged
help to the affected population.”
To any unprejudiced and untied by corporative interests researcher who has been at
least once in the Chernobyl region (especially in its Russian section, although the Ukrainian
and the Belorussian would make the same impression), the very thought of „excessive
measures” towards these poor people would seem a blasphemy. If we are to stay faithful to
scientific principles, then we can claim that there is no scientific proof of not only fictitiously
„excessive measures,” but even the minimum necessary measures for a normal life of the affected
population. The medical resources are insufficient for the necessary treatments, and so
are the social conditions directed at improving the quality of their life styles [62, 63].
Perhaps this is one of the biggest lessons of this most serious disaster in the
history of civilization: disaster is always irreversible by its nature. This irreversibility
concerns both humans and the environment. That is why the very question of the „possibility
of safe living on the radiation-affected territories” does not make any sense. One
can reside safely, but not in Chernobyl.
Today, we can analyze only indirect consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.
The results that we obtained demonstrate that the 20-year post-Chernobyl period is, apparently,
sufficient for analyzing the post-disaster events, but too little to detect indirect
consequences. If we assume that genome instability and the associated genetic apparatus
malfunctions, increase in radiosensitivity, absence of AR, and damages to the brain
vessels morphology are risk factors and increase the possibility of obtaining malignant
tumors along with a number of non-cancerous illnesses, then the development of these
pathological processes can happen in the significantly more distant future. But it would
not be distant enough to avoid the current and the next generation: most likely, 30–40
years. We hope that by that time, humanity will have developed new principles of safe
low-waste nuclear energy [64]. We also hope that the contemporary „dirty,” potentially
dangerous nuclear energy using fuel neutrons, which brought so much suffering to millions
of people, will only remain as a subject of the history of science and technology.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
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– M.: Izd-vo MNEPU, 2006. pp. 238–246.

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Color Insert

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Radiation Risks Assessment for Rosatom Personnel Within
the Framework of International Standards
Victor K. Ivanov, Deputy Director, Medical-Radiological
Scientific Centre, Russian Academy of Medical Sciences,
Obninsk
On 19–21 March, 2007, a meeting with the Head of the International Commission
of Radiological Protection (ICRP) took place in Essen, Germany. During this meeting a
new edition of ICRP Recommendations for radiological protection was approved.
As was repeatedly mentioned at the highest state level, successful and effective
nuclear energy development in our country is possible only with complete implementation
of the radiological protection standards for employees and the population, which
were approved by authoritative international organizations (ICRP, IAEA, UNSCNR).
New ICRP recommendations introduce strict limits for radiation levels during
operations, optimizing employee and population radiation protection.
The appropriateness of this decision is supported by the results of the assessment of
medical consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe, received by the National Radiation-Epidemic
Registrar at the Russian Academy of Medical Science, Obninsk. In the most radioactive
nuclide-polluted areas in Russia (Brianskaya, Kaluzhskaya, Tulskaya and Orlovskaya oblasts),
a significant number of the population was irradiated with a small dose of radiation. Collective
dose assessment shows that, by this time, 1,000–1,500 additional oncological diseases should
have been expected as a result of radiation. Such diseases, however, were not discovered; and
this fact confirms the accuracy of the ICRP’s proposed regulations with regard to utilization of
collective dose magnitude in optimizing the radiation protection system.
In the ICRP publication №101, which is devoted to radiation protection optimization,
the concept „dose matrix” is introduced. This matrix should take into account the
dynamics of the various dosages received by an employee, through the establishment of
individual radiation exposure control, and it should serve as the basis to assess each individual’s
personal risk. Individual radiological risk is assessed according to the UNSCNR
model, which, was developed through the studies conducted among the Japanese population
exposed to radiation as a result of the 1945 atomic bombings.
At present, the Administration of Nuclear and Radiological Security of Rosatom,
in partnership with the National Radiation-Epidemic Registrar, has started forming potential
risk groups among the employees of organizations in the industry and creating
automated mechanisms for individual risk assessment in order to develop the technology
for the optimization of radiological protection [1].
At this stage the „dose matrixes” have been organized for forty-three thousand
employees in the industry branch who are registered for dosimetric control (table 1)

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Table 1
Number of people in each employee group included in radio-epidemiology analysis
Branch Plant Number
of people
Rosenergoatom All nuclear power plants 22,626
TVEL
Industrial
Nuclear
Materials
Management
Science
Machine-building plant, Electrostal City Chepetsk Mechanical
plant, Glazov City
Angarsk Electrolyze Chemical Works, Mining Works (Zheleznogorsk
City), Urals Electrochemical Industrial Works (Novouralsk
City), Industrial Complex „Mayak” (Ozersk City), Siberian
Chemical Works (Seversk City)
State Scientific Center of the Russia – Phisico-Energetic Institute
(Obninsk City), State Scientific Center of the Russia – Scientific
Research Institute of atomic reactors (Dimitrovgrad City), Institute
of reactor materials (Zarechnyj City)
1,918
14,724
4,246
Total: 43,514
Picture 1 shows the employee distribution (43,514 individuals) according to the
increase of individual attributive (i.e. determined by radiation) risk of potential leucosis
induction (threshold 75%) and solid carcinoma (threshold 20%). It is significant that the
majority of employees (98.64%) do not fall under the category of high potential risk.
The risk group is 1.4% of the personnel (587 individuals) for both – leucosis and carcinoma:
leucosis – 0.95% of the personnel; solid carcinoma – 0.41% of the personnel;
Picture 1. Individual risks of rosatom employees (43,531 individuals) based on the „dose matrix”
Pictures 2 and 3 indicate the distribution of high potential risk groups on the
basis of seniority at Individual dosemetric control (IDC) and age. In the high potential
risk group for solid carcinoma, the average seniority at IDC is 40 years, and the average
age is 62. In the high potential risk group for leucosis, the average seniority at EIC is 13
years, and average age is 35.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Picture 2. High potential risk group distribution by seniority at IDC and age (solid carcinoma)
Picture. 3. High potential risk group distribution by seniority at IDC and age (leucosis)
The technique for outlining the potential risk groups, based on the IAEA methodology
and developed by the „MedInfo” Scientific-Production Enterprise, is applied in the
Automated Work Place Individual Risk Assessment (ARMIR) program. In the Rosatom
letter №02-6881, dated 8 November 2006, to the business heads, it is recommended:
––To introduce the ARMIR system at all plants in the industry;
––To utilize the ARMIR system for evaluating the condition and optimization of
radiological protection supply for personnel at the industry and individual facility levels;
––To use the results, received on the basis of this technique, in the system of
voluntary medical insurance adjusted for an option of special clinic-diagnosis service to
those in the group of high risk.
Reference
Ivanov, V.K., Tsyb A.F., Panfilov, A.P., Agapov, A.M. Optimization of radiological protection:
„dose matrix”. – Moscow: Medicine, 2006. – 304 pages

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Experience in solving social and environmental questions
in problem areas: The example of Muslyumovo village in the
Chelyabinskaya Oblast
Igor V. Konyshev, Advisor to the Head of the Russian
Federal Atomic Energy
Good evening, dear colleagues! I will try not take too much of your time and will
briefly talk about the situation in Muslyumovo. I will cover our work together with the
Chelyabinsk oblast Government about last year’s decision on a new approach to move
out (clear out) the population from the village.
Let me remind you that Muslyumovo is located near the Techa River, which was
polluted by the waste from the Mayak enterprise in the end of the 1940–1950s. Let me
clarify that the river was contaminated only by regulated waste at that time, when the
key standard in the Soviet Union, as well as in the United States, France and other countries
with nuclear industry, anticipated discharge of low-activity level waste into natural
water systems. This problem is more than fifty years old, and one way or the other, it
relates to the nuclear weapons race, experienced by the key participant countries in the
middle of the previous century.
Muslyumovo is the largest village from all those located near the Techa River. It is
located eighty kilometers from the current Mayak facility on the hills, and only the riverbanks
are contaminated (between 15–30 meters wide on each side of the river). The rest
of the territory, including villages and train stops, remains clean. This fact is confirmed by
regular studies conducted by Chelyabinsk specialists and independent experts.
So, why it is necessary to clear out Muslyumovo I believe that the key reason is
that the population accumulated more that 1mZv/year as a result of interaction with the
river. As I said earlier, the river goes through the village. In spite of our warnings and
attempts to close access to the river, the people continue to use the river for their cattle,
and the water meadows as hayfields. We offered a voluntary move out from the village,
which we have been conducting since last year.
I have collected a number of the documents, adopted together with Rosatom
and the Chelyabinsk oblast Administration, in order to show the decision-making process
and its efficiency. The first protocols refer to the end of May – mid July, 2006. The
Rosatom and oblast directors at the meetings confirmed that it was necessary to resolve
social problems. First of all, it is essential to improve the quality of life of the Muslyumovo
population.
A decision, offered by Chelyabinskaya oblast to clear out 741 households from
the village, was discussed and an amount of 1.05 billion rubles was proposed to help the

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
project. The amount was divided the following way: Rosatom was responsible for 600
million, and 450 million rubles was the Chelyabinsk oblast Government’s responsibility.
Rosatom used the money from its own profits, which were received through the Russian
Federation Government for environmental and social problems in the regions affected
by Rosatom activities. At the end of 2006, Chelyabinsk oblast allocated 250 and 200
million rubles for its 2007 and 2008 budgets accordingly. After Rosatom received the
money in October 2006, we coordinated a general plan with the Chelyabinsk oblast
Government (four months after the original proposal). We put down all the variables
and indicators to resolve the problem by September–November, 2009. We decided to
launch the process at the end of 2006, and finish no later than the second half of 2009.
Further to the agreement paper between the Rosatom and the Chelyabinskaya
oblast Government on funding of support to the Muslyumovo population, the plan was
adopted. The agreement on the first voluntary move out from the village was signed on
November 30, 2006 (five month ago).
The conditions we were able to propose for the Muslyumovo population are the
following: any citizen can take advantage of the voluntary move out from the village,
if he/she has a household there and is registered in Muslyumovo (before November
30, 2006). We agreed the law is straight forward and cannot be misinterpreted, and the
people have the right whether to be moved out and do it voluntarily. Households where
the inhabitants are registered must meet the living conditions. We are working on the
people’s problem, and not the house one. If a person is registered in Muslyumovo, but
has not lived there during the past 10–15 years, his problem should be solved on an individual
basis. A person must have ownership rights and when receiving compensation
for the house, he/she loses possession. It is a very important feature of the program. In
the past (Chernobyl and Chelyabinsk ecology programs) people received new houses,
but they did not lose possession of their old one and the problem, in the end, was not
resolved. People stayed in the old housing. Our funds allow pursing a radical approach
giving residents ownership of new housing and removing ownership of the old house
in Muslyumovo.
Here are some options for citizens. Every household receives one million rubles.
Further, he/she can use this million independently to: buy a new house or use for other
purposes in case the household members can prove they already possess another property
somewhere else in Muslyumovo. Another case would be when the person does not
want to buy a new place and wants to move out of Muslyumovo. The third possibility
is for people to build a new house near the Muslyumovo train station (which is 3 km
away from the village). We conducted a number of studies and they confirmed that the
location is environmentally safe. Today, only 96 households want to move near the train
station. It was an interesting situation for me. I do not understand why people make this
decision (either older people want to stay in the area or younger people prefer to stay
near the family, or maybe it’s due to other related social issues). For us it is a mystery,
why people with an opportunity to leave the territory and buy a new household want
to stay here (96+7=103 individuals or 15% of the entire population). It is a volunteer
clean out and we do not have the right to oppose construction of new houses near the
Muslyumovo train station.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
What can one buy for this million Of the 96 families, 48 bought new houses
(one or two bedroom apartments in Muslyumovo). From the 48 families only three used
credit, and the rest were able to buy within the one million limit and bought apartments
in the following cities: 5 people in Kopeysk, 1 in Kurgan, 1 in Bashkortostan, 26 in the
Kunashaksky rayon (Kunashak city is the capital of municipality), 7 from 26 people in
Muslyumovo, 7 in Chelyabinsk, while 7 preferred to receive the money compensation.
May 2007 is the beginning of construction and the end of the project is in 2009.
Questions and Answers on the Presentation by
––Q:
Several families bought apartments in Chelyabinsk. I would like to know the
price per square meter in Chelyabinsk
––I.V. Konyshev A one-bedroom apartment at Chelyabinsky metallurgical plant,
(plant is not a new location, but a city area downtown), despite the fact there are apartments
in the city’s business center, costs 1,700,000 roubles. People get a credit if it is
over 700,000. One can still buy an apartment at Chelyabinsky metallurgical plant or
Chelyabinsky katerpillar plant for up to 1,000,000 roubles.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Outstanding Problems of the Nuclear Industry
Lidiya V. Popova, Centre for nuclear ecology and energy
policies, Socio-ecological Union International,
Valery F. Men’shchikov, Co-director, Programme for nuclear
and radiation safety of the Centre for environmental
policy of Russia (CEPR) and Socio-ecological Union
International,
Alexey V. Yablokov, CEPR
By 2030 Russia plans to build up to 50 new reactors of 1,000 MW capacity. However,
some important issues are still to be resolved, including nuclear reactor safety. The safe
storage and disposal of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (including radioactive waste
resulting from reactor decommissioning and spent nuclear fuel recycling) and the safety of
radioactive and chemical substances emitted by the nuclear fuel cycle plants need to be evaluated.
Both the profitability of the nuclear power industry and the claim that new nuclear plants
can reduce the effects of global climate change are questionable. The issue of whether the
nuclear power industry is socially acceptable and trustworthy also remains unresolved.
1. Nuclear reactor safaty issues
All contemporary nuclear reactors (both thermal and fast) work on 235 U and 239 Pu
being burnt in the core of the reactor. The staff uses greater amounts of active material
than is necessary to keep production above the critical level. Therefore, there could be
several scenarios resulting in reactor explosion.
a) As a result of erroneous or intentional (act of terrorism, suicide) actions of the
staff, the control rods may get out of the reactor core. Hypothetically speaking of pressurized
water reactors (PWR), this may happen as a result of intentional or accidental
damage of the mechanisms that keep the rods inside the core. It is impossible to predict
and prevent all the situations that might cause rods to get out of the reactor, which would
result in a runaway chain reaction.
„… None of existing reactors functioning on the basis of burn-up processes can be
deemed totally safe as in case control rods get out of the core, considerable supercriticality
arises. Chain reaction in such cases may be so fast that no safety system would be effective.”
Runaway chain reaction meltdowns happened in 1979 at Three Mile Island nuclear power
plant (NPP), USA (human error) and in 1999 at Siga power plant in Japan (human error).
b) Power surge, outdated equipment, and/or lack of coordination among divisions
in case of a back-up oil-electrical engine fault may also entail a meltdown. Such
accidents have recently threatened the world’s nuclear safety:

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––In 2000, as a result of technical error in the Ural power supply system, nuclear
production unit „Mayak” was left without centralized power supply for more than half
an hour. Back-up electrical oil engines could only be started several minutes before a
serious meltdown was to happen.
––In 2006, a short circuit at a substation off Forsmark NPP in Sweden resulted in
an emergency shutdown of the reactor. Only two out of four oil electrical engines turned
on. Ex-director of the power plant, Mr. Lars-Olov Heglund, says, „It is a mere stroke of
luck that the core didn’t melt down. A simple short circuit could lead to a catastrophe”.
c) The following situations are also extremely dangerous:
––reactor destruction as a result of a hydrogen solution thermal explosion
(Chernobyl);
––emergency break of thermal liquid from the first stage of the reactor’s
cooling system;
––possible emergency cases of reactor after-cooling and consequences thereof;
––possible natural and man-made catastrophes (earthquakes, tornadoes, etc).
NPPs are perfect targets for terrorists. In case of hostilities, destruction of a NPP
would be more hazardous than demolition of any other target. Terrorists do not need to
hijack a NPP; all it takes is a missile brought by car and launched from a distance of
several kilometers or a mere electricity cut-off. Demolition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)
storage could also be extremely hazardous.
D. Sakharov and Ed. Teller suggested building NPPs underground. Even if we
disregard the possible radioactive nuclide pollution of subterranean waters in case of
reactor damage, this step would make the industry even less competitive
2. Radioactive waste and SNF
Nuclear fuel production, nuclear reactor maintenance and the use of ionizing radiation
sources involve production of big amounts of liquid, solid and gaseous radioactive
waste. In 33 regions on the territory of Russia, 1,170 radioactive waste storage sites
account for almost half of all the radioactive waste in the world. As of the end of 2003,
the amount of total liquid radioactive waste equaled 480 million m 3 . Solid radioactive
waste was over 75 million tons including 14 million tons at the tailing dump at the
hydrometallurgical plant in Lermontov, Northern Caucasia [2]. Around 5 million m 3 of
liquid radioactive waste and 1 million tons of solid radioactive waste are added annually.
Cumulative activity of radioactive waste stored in Russia amounts to over 2 billion
Ku [3]. Furthermore, cooling ponds of nuclear power stations and other storages contain
over 17,000 tons of SNF.
Classification of radioactive waste on the basis of specific activity adopted in
Russia and set forth in the Basic Sanitary Regulations cannot be deemed effective as
it disregards the impact that a radioactive nuclide has on the biosphere as well as the
danger of fissionable substance spreading
The main sources of radioactive waste in Russia are the following:
––Ural and Siberia radiochemical plants producing plutonium;
––Uranium mines, hydrometallurgical plants, nuclear fuel production, NPPs, nuclear
navy, SNF recycling plants;

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––Research centers;
––Testing ground for nuclear arms and other venues of underground nuclear
explosions;
––Areas polluted due to prior nuclear catastrophes (Ural, Chernobyl, Primorye)
––Shipbuilding facilities and shipyards in Northern Russia and in the Far East
that build, maintain, and utilize vessels carrying nuclear power installations;
––Ionizing radiation sources;
––Military bases and scientific facilities conducting research involving radioactive
substances;
––Oil and gas producing enterprises; and
––Ash-dumps of electric power stations
An RMBK reactor produces ca 100,000 m 3 of liquid radioactive waste a year,
PWR produce 40,000 to 135,000 m 3 a year. The major part of the waste is simply dumped
into bodies of water [6]. Solidification of liquid radioactive waste increases the amount of
solid radioactive wastes. Solid and solidified radioactive waste storages at NPPs are overloaded.
Much solid radioactive waste stored is simply piled up. Closing these storages up
and building new ones would mean producing more waste and land alienation. Considerable
investment as well as operational costs would also result.
Most liquid radioactive waste is produced and stored at plutonium producing
plants. Medium and low level waste is normally stored in water or underground reservoirs.
Some high-level waste is also stored in underground reservoirs. High-level
waste storage requires proper control and maintenance. Since 1991, „Mayak” has
glazed 12,500 m 3 of high-level waste (with cumulative activity of 300 million Ku) [7].
However, only nitrate solutions of high-level waste have been glazed. „Old” waste
(their cumulative activity amounts to 146.2 million Ku), is not recycled due to the absence
of adequate technology and has been stored in tanks since 1967 [5].
Processing one ton of SNF at RT-1 involves production of over 2,000 tons of liquid
radioactive waste (45 m 3 high-level waste of up to 10 Ku/l; 150 medium-level waste
of up to 1 Ku/l; 2,000 m 3 low-level waste of up to 10 -5 Ku/l) and over 7 tons of solid
radioactive waste (1 ton of high-level waste of up to 6 Ku/kg; 3 ton of medium-level
waste of up to 0.1 Ku/kg; 3.5 ton of low-level waste of up to 10 -3 Ku/kg) [8]. In addition,
medium-level waste is still dumped into Lake Karachai, which has turned into an informal
radioactive waste storage, as well as into the Techa River system.
The common notion of handling radioactive waste based on the idea that they
should be stored for 30 to 50 years with the possibility of prolonging the storage term
has led to the current situation. There is no typical radioactive waste isolation solution.
The storages do not meet the safety standards; there are no provisions for their decommissioning
and further rehabilitation of the territories [2]. „Cylinder platforms” of isotope-fractionation
plants in Tomsk, Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk and Krasnoyarsk regions contain
almost 0.5 million tons of depleted uranium (as a rule in the form of hexafluoride) [9].
Russian NPPs produce up to 650 tons of SNF which is stored at the plants in
special basins, at the storage of RT-1 plant („Mayak”) and a storage at the plant RT-2 (the
plant is still being built). Annually „Mayak” receives about 120 tons of SNF, the storage
– about 150 tons of SNF [10].

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Although RT-1 has a planned capacity to recycle 400 tons/year, local authorities
have only issued a permit for up to 230 tons/year. The reasons thereof are related to the
unfavorable environmental conditions in South Ural that have been formed in the first
place due to the activities of radiochemical plants.
Table 1 shows the capacity of SNF recycled at RT-1 in 2001–2004.
Table 1
Recycling of SNF (in tons) at „Mayak” during 2001–2004 (based on data Rosatom)
2001 2002 2003 2004
130 171,2 121 165,8
After PWR-440 reactor spent nuclear fuel is recycled, regenerated uranium is
mixed with higher enriched uranium, e.g. nuclear submarine fuel. Later this mixture is
made into uranium fuel for RBMK reactors, whose initial 235 U enrichment is 2% (for
regenerated uranium it is higher due to the necessity to compensate for 236 U isotope).
Regenerated fuel must not be re-recycled: nuclear reactions result in production
of 232 U (strong gamma emitter) and the staff involved may be over-irradiated. Manipulators
must be used for work with regenerated fuel. Spent regenerated fuel must be
disposed of.
Dry storage for PWR-1000 SNF is being built at the Balakovskaya NPP. Dry
storage for RBMK fuel installations (7 meters) is to be built at Leningradskaya NPP.
The installations are to be cut in half at the NPP site (the project has not been evaluated
in regards to its environmental influence).
SNF accumulation at Rosenergoatom NPP is given in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Production and accumulation of SNF at Rosenergoatom reactors in 2001–2004
(data provided by Rosatom)
Spent Nuclear Fuel 2001 2002 2003 2004
Annual production 537 601 654 616
Annual recycling 130 171,2 121 165,8
Accumulated as of the end of the year 13 480 14 196 14 768 15 537
Russia has fourteen radon industrial complexes with regional storages of lowlevel
and medium-level solid radioactive waste that are produced in health care, heavy
industry, the agricultural sector and research institutes. The Grozno complex was destroyed
during the war, and the Murmansk complex was closed on the grounds of having
been used to its capacity and not meeting contemporary criteria [2].
Much radioactive waste related data, especially liquid radioactive waste, is approximate
(including hundreds of kilograms of plutonium being stored underground or
in open pools).
Russia still has no legislation on handling radioactive waste and thus the actions
and measures taken are not properly coordinated, and radioactive waste other than SNF
is not dealt with. Many of the regulations on radioactive waste are outdated: they were
made by different departments and thus can sometimes be contradictory; they are hardly

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
applicable to radioactive waste in tailing dumps as well as natural and artificial water
bodies [11].
Gaseous radioactive waste from nuclear heating plants are mainly inert gases,
222
Rn, tritium, 137 Cs and radioactive iodine. Mid-1990s saw decreases in nuclear heating
and power plants’ radioactive emissions both due to the economic recession and filter
installation. However, at the same time, emergency situations at Leningradskaya NPP and
the Siberian chemical complex led to considerable increase (almost by 50%) in radioactive
iodine emission [12]. At the parliamentary session of October 31, 1995, it was stated
that inert gases and 14 C emission monitoring is not conducted and random measuring of
these emissions is not sufficient. Gosatomnadzor claims that, at some plants (i.e. uranium
isotope fractionation plants), some emissions containing radioactive nuclides are not filtered
because of the poor condition of the ventilation system [5].
Radioactive waste management is complicated and expensive. Billions of dollars
are needed for conditioning and burial of military program radioactive waste only.
Based on the data obtained through controlled implementation of subprogram, handling
radioactive waste and SNF, their utilization and burial and of the federal program,
nuclear and radioactive safety in Russia 2000–2006, the Chamber of Accounts of the
Russian Federation concluded that the handling of waste and SNF in Russia is in a critical
condition (only 10.7% of the necessary funds were allocated). At the State Council
meeting on December 16, 2004 the president of Russia admitted that the radioactive
water recycling infrastructure is not properly developed.
3. Solvency of the Russian nuclear industry
On March 17, 2005, a Parliament meeting was held to tackle the issue of a legislative
basis for innovative development of nuclear industry.
Innovative development implied in the first place use of fast reactors with closed
fuel cycles. Based on the discussion results, the following recommendations were made:
––prepare a federal program of nuclear industry development involving fast reactors
with a closed fuel cycle and consider it for priority funding from the national budget;
––consider the above national program as a basis for updating the federal program
Energy Efficient Economy in 2002–2005 and for strategic planning up to 2010.
Nuclear power industry advocates constantly call for state support of their
projects, thus trying to single it out in the system of energy production. For example,
Vestnik Leningradskaya NPP (LAES) Herald, issue №8 of February 27, 2006 printed
the message from the Union of territories and plants in nuclear energy production that
urges the government to create a plan of actions „to develop nuclear energy production
and nuclear fuel cycles as well as the necessary mechanisms of their full funding including
funds allocated by the government.”
The facts mentioned above help demonstrate that despite the declared low costs
of electricity produced at NPPs, Russian nuclear energy production cannot develop
without considerable investment and state subsidies.
Another serious problem is related to decommissioning of outdated reactors
and SNF. The parliamentary meeting mentioned above also included discussions of
legislation On creation and use of special provision to cover current and future ex-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
penses of handling SNF and decommissioning of NPPs that would stipulate the legislative
base of such funds, their security, and use. As Andrey Malyshev, ex-head
of Russian Federal Service for Environmental, Technical and Atomic Supervision,
states, the reserve for decommissioning outdated reactors that is used now was created
by the government in 2001 and is almost empty now.
For now there are no reliable estimates of the cost of decommissioning the reactors
at existing installations. However, the amount of investment can be estimated
on the basis of the cost of the Greifswald power plant decommissioning in Germany.
Dismantling of five PWR-440 reactors build by USSR, construction of solid waste storages,
site and object deactivation lasted 10 years and cost 3.5 billion Euros.
On February 17, 2005, the issue of the nuclear industry resource base was discussed
at the meeting of Nuclear energy section of the expert council of State Duma
Committee on energy, transport and communications. According to the materials presented
at the meeting, raw materials provided for the NPPs of Russia mainly include
dump uranium hexafluoride, stocks of various produce, customer-supplied raw materials,
and spent fuel recycling products (total 72%). By 2020 these sources are expected to
be reduced by 25%, whereas due to nuclear industry development, demand of uranium,
raw material will increase by 1.2%.
The whole world is running out of uranium while demand is growing: by 2010 it
is necessary to increase uranium production by 140%, by 2020 – by 340%. It is the only
way to develop Russian nuclear energy production based on our own raw materials, as
well as keeping our export potential on the market of new nuclear fuel and low-enriched
uranium. It would take billions of dollars to increase uranium production at existing
sites and develop new fields. TVEL, the only Russian company that produces nuclear
fuel and its components and mines uranium, will not be able to eliminate this uranium
deficit without assistance of the state. Members of the Section pointed out that delay
in uranium raw material development may in 7 to 10 years lead to crisis both for the
nuclear industry of Russia and nuclear fuel export.
The $50 billion allocated for the development of nuclear industry are just a
small part (10–15%) of the funds needed to handle radioactive waste, decommissioning
of outdated reactors, uranium production development, and measures to rehabilitate
polluted territories and alleviate the consequences of nuclear catastrophes for the
population.
4. Questionable claims of new NPP reducing climate change
Global climate change is one of the most acute environmental problems related
to reduction and consumption of energy. About 80% of СО 2
is emitted due to fossil fuel
burning. NPPs do not emit greenhouse gases, so nuclear energy production apologists
see it as almost the only way to reduce global climate change.
There are two reasons why NPPs will never become our saviors:
1. NPP do not considerably reduce СО emission. If world energy production
2
develops in the same pattern, i.e. intensively using carbon fuel, especially coal and
petroleum, by 2050 greenhouse gas emissions may total 40 to 50 billion ton of СО 2.
If
we make an effort to stop climate change, CO 2
emissions may decrease by 30% to 60%

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
against 1990 and amount to 10 to 15 billion ton CO 2
. The 25 to 40 billion ton CO 2
difference
may be covered by various measures to stop climate change.[13]
However, nuclear energy production with the huge investment it requires will
not be able to influence the situation with climate change. Even if overall capacity of all
NPPs in the world tripled, it would reduce CO 2
emission by 5 billion tons, which would
not be significant.
To achieve this insignificant reduction it would take:
––Annual introduction of additional 25 GW capacity, including replacement of
outdated reactors;
––Getting back to reprocessing and breeder technology, i.e. construction of 50
new radiochemical plants;
––Creation of permanent storages for SNF, equivalent to 14 Yucca Mountain
projects;
––Considerable investment into the energy production cycle [13].
Annual plutonium accumulation would increase by 560 tons, which would aggravate
the issue of terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation.
The calculations of CO 2
amounts should be corrected. We need to account for CO 2
emissions that are released in the process of production and enrichment of nuclear fuel,
production of fuel elements, handling radioactive waste, etc., rather than only emissions
released at the stage of NPP. Including these emissions shows that due to nuclear industry
development, cumulative CO 2
emissions will increase rather than go down.
2. Increased conductance of the atmosphere due to NPP emissions. In 1984 V. Leghasov
calculated that 85 Kr emissions (inter radioactive gas emitted by NPPs as gaseous radioactive
waste) must lead to a change in the Earth’s atmosphere conductance, which in turn would
entail change in frequency and strength of typhoons, cyclones and storms [14]. The current
amount of 85 Kr in the atmosphere is many times higher than that before the nuclear age.
If climate policy is based on nuclear industry development, it is very likely that a
single meltdown comparable with Chernobyl would ruin the policy itself, as investment
would stop and huge funds would need to be allocated to fight the consequences of the
catastrophe. It is worth reminding the reader that the total costs incurred by all countries
affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe over 10-year period amounted to over $500 billion
and will long be no less than several million dollars annually.
5. The importance of civil society in solving problems related to nuclear
industry safety
Nuclear industry representatives admit that „opinion of the society, including
that related to overly acute perception of radiation risks, greatly influences nuclear
power production development prospects in Russia as well as in other countries…The
problems that make it hard to alter the social perception are firstly, long-term delays
in handling radioactive waste accumulated earlier and secondly, absence of clear and
documented information policy of the state regarding use of nuclear energy.”[7]
Polls of the population both in Russia and the European Union show that in radioactive
risk evaluation people tend to trust independent experts more than representatives
of the nuclear industry. Thus, we may conclude that nuclear industry representa-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
tives have to listen to the fears voiced by independent experts, otherwise society would
not let them implement many projects (even if the necessary funds are available). The
authorities of such countries as Italy, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Spain, Germany and
many others pay closer attention to this issue.
Russia’s approach to creating a link with independent experts has recently worsened.
In this industry we are back to the times when information on environmental
problems was top secret and whoever tried to release it, was persecuted. Rosatom representatives
state that we need to inform the population and create „adequate attitude
to the work of nuclear industry and thus erase the consequences of statements of uninformed
critics of the industry.” [7] Issues of radioactive waste, lack of planning the
economy of the industry, reactor safety, etc. prove that criticism of independent experts
is often more reasonable than the position of the apologists of the industry.
References
1. Lev Feoktistov. The Weapon that Has Exhausted Itself. M., 1999, p 227.
2. O.E. Muratov „Strategic Tasks of Radioactive Waste Handling.” Material from the
seminar „SNF and Radioactive Fuel in North-Western Russia. Problems and Possible Solutions.”
November 23–24, 2006, Murmansk.
3. V.A. Lebedev „State Regulation of Radioactive Waste and SNF Handling in Russia.
Standpoint of Rosatom.” Material from the seminar „Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Fuel in
North-West Russia. Problems and Possible Solutions.” November 23–24, 2006, Murmansk.
4. Information provided by Rosatom.
5. Information provided by Gosatomnadzor (State Control Bureau over Nuclear Industry).
Environmental Safety in Russia. Security Council of the Russia. M., Yuridicheskaya Literatura.
1996.
6. V.F. Menschikov Spent Nuclear Fuel: Scale and Problems. Yadernyj Kontrol (Nuclear
monitoring), №5, 1997.
7. http://nuclearwaste.report.ru/material.aspMID=471.
8. Bulletin of the Environmental Center Mayak, №6, 1994.
9. V.F. Menschikov Environmental Risks of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel
Handling. Global Problems of Cntemporary Energy Production Safety (material from an international
conference). 20 years since the Catastrophe at Chernobyl NPP (Moscow, April 4–6, 2006).
– M: MNEPU, 2006. – 562 p.
10. Russian Nuclear Industry. Need of Change. Belonna Report №4 – 2004.
11. B.G. Gordon, R.B. Sharafutdinov On Legislative Regulation of Radioactive Waste
Handling Safety. Industrial North.
12. http://abc/kolaland/ru/lib/promsev/SWF/HTML/art_11_2002/htm.
13. State Committe for Environmental Protection and Natural Resources. Report „On Environmental
Situation in the Russian Federation in 1994,” M., 1995.
14. Felix Chr. Matthes. Nuclear Energy and Climate Change. Nuclear Issues Paper №6.
Nov. 2005. Heinrich Boell Stiftung.
15. V.A. Legasov, I.I. Kuzmin, A.N. Chernoplektov 1984. Impact of Energy Production
on Climate. AN SSSR (Academy of Sciences of the USSR), „Physics of Atmosphere and Ocean,”
volume 20, №11, pp. 1089–1103.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Nuclear Energy: Ecological Safety and Sustainable
Development
Rafael V. Arutyunyan, First Deputy Director, Institute of
the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy (SDNE) RAS, PhD
L.M. Vorob’yova, senior officer, ISDNE RAS
I.I. Linge, Director, Department of Environment Safety,
ISDNE RAS, PhD
E.M. Melikhova, Head of Department, ISDNE RAS, PhD
In evaluating the safety levels of any production activity, including enterprises that
are using nuclear technology, one needs to follow the current environmental policy, norms
and rules to ensure radiation and chemical safety. However, basing ecological safety on
the regulation indicators does not provide a clear evaluation of the impact of various
technogenic factors upon the environment and human health. An intelligent, comparative
analysis is possible if we use a single impact measure – the population health risks.
There are scientific evaluations of the existing risk levels to the human health in
connection with the ionizing radiation. They indicate that currently, the ongoing activity
of the enterprises which use nuclear technology, as well as residing in the areas affected
by radioactive accidents, causes risks of negligible or acceptable proportions (see Table
1). At the same time, a significant portion of the population is subjected to much higher
risks connected with chemical pollution of the environment.
One of the factors that present a particularly alarming threat to human health in
Russia has become atmospheric pollution in the cities. The pollution of the atmosphere
by suspended particles causes over 18,000 additional deaths per annum. [G.G. Onishchenko,
S.M. Novikov, Y.A. Rakhmanin, S.L. Avaliani, K.A. Bushtueva. The Bases of
Evaluation of Polluting Chemicals upon Human Health. M., 2002, 408].
Energy installations (especially those using coal) make substantial contributions
to atmospheric pollution in the cities. Calculations of the death risks for the population
residing in the cities with large coal-based electricity plants indicate that annual individual
risks constitute 10 -3 –10 -4 . The annual individual risks that occur in connection with
gas and aerosol ejections of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) constitute 2x10 -8 – 8x10 -7 .
One can compare the risk levels caused by the activities of two electricity-generating
plants: the Beloyarskaya NPP and the coal-based Reftinskaya. As the evidence indicates,
the difference between their risk values is as much as 4 orders of magnitude.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Death risks among Russian population per year
Table 1
Causes
Confirmed,
in millions
Risks Deaths /
annum
All causes 69 (men) 1,5х10 -2 1060000
Accidents 69 (men) 3,4х10 -3 240000
Extensive atmospheric pollution by typical
pollutants (as per the monitoring data)
Atmospheric pollution by carcinogenic
chemicals (as per the monitoring data):
– in Russian cities,
– in Moscow,
– in St.-Petersburg
43 10 -4 х10 -3 21 000
50
8,6
4,7
10 -5 – 10 -7 620
43
10,4
Population in the „Mayak” monitoring zone 0,21 5,3х10 -6 – 2,3х10 -5 1,4
Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk population by
atmospheric pollution:
– by suspended particles
– by the ethylbenzene
Population in the mining and chemical factory
monitoring zone
1,58 3,3х10 -4 – 1,0х10 -3 808
3,0х10 -5 5,2
0,22 6х10 -6 – 3х10 -7

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Picture 2. Various electricity-production fuel types: negative effects upon the health
of European population
Picture 3. Individual carcinogenic fatality risks from the yearly permissible dose of radiation
(1 mZv/year) and from atmospheric exposure to various chemicals (of the HPC-level
= the Highest Permissible Concentration) in populated areas
As demonstrated above, the risk from radiation exposure turns out to be hundreds
of times smaller than atmospheric exposure to certain common chemical carcinogens
at their Highest permissible concentration-levels. Even in the cases of radiation
accidents, the real health consequences are much smaller than those from other types of
technogenic accidents (Table 2).
Today’s dosages of additional radiation connected to the use of nuclear energy
present a very small portion of exposure from natural background radiation. The levels
of additional technogenic stresses are substantially lower than the natural radiation
background fluctuations of various regions and countries (Picture 4).
The plants and enterprises that use nuclear technology contribute relatively insignificantly
to the technogenic pollution of the country’s surface water. Only the small Techa
River has radioactive strontium above the permissible level. At the same time, many large
water bodies, such as the Ob and Enisey rivers, are polluted by harmful chemicals such as
phenols, petroleum products, copper, etc. In the majority of cases, their pollution exceeds
the highest permissible concentration-levels by 40, 50, and even 120 times.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Table 2
Discovered effects of three accidents with significant radioactive releases
Region
Monitoring
period, cohort
number
Main
scientific organization
The discovered effects
Techa river,
South Ural
1949–1956
1951 – till now
50 971 people
(31 234 radiated
and 19 737
their posterity)
ESPC – MR
– 66 verified cases of chronic radiation
sickness with the dosages of 1 Zv for
KKM
– 30 extra cases of serious cancer
– 20 radiation-induced leucosis
East Ural
radioactive
trace South
Ural 1957
1957 – till now
30 417 people
ESPC – MR
Increase (statistically unsubstantiated) of
fatality coefficients of the radiated persons
(from 590 to 950 mZv) within the first five
years following the accident
Chernobyl
1986
1989 – till now
550076 people
(including
179923 emergency
responders)
SCC IBPh:
IRSC
Russian
Academy
of Medical
Sciences
28 persons died from the acute radiation
syndrome. Remote consequences for Russia:
50 radiation-induced leucosis and 12 radiation-induced
thyroid cancer cases among the
liquidators; 120 (226) radiation-induced thyroid
cancer among children (at the time of the
accident) in Bryanskaya oblast (1991–2003)
Picture 4. Average annual radiation doses from various sources among population, mZv per year
Taking into account our massive experience with nuclear technology and the
consequences of past serious accidents, we can state that radiation safety for humans
and environment can be provided by the following:
––Keeping the personnel and the population within the dosage limits for normal
nuclear operations;
––Limiting the possibility of accidents, depending upon their seriousness;
––Preparing to minimize the accident consequences if an accident does occur.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Theoretical Analysis of Small Dosed of Radiation Concep
Vladimir N. Sorokin, Chief Researcher, United Institute
of Energetics and Nuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny),
Belarus
Today the effects of small doses of radiation on the human body are being studied
all over the world [1–2]. This type of research received additional impulse due to atomic
energy reemergence and the twenty-year anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
A small dose radiation impact is unclear at the quality level [1–3]. Quantity estimates
are different from experimental data. The impact of a small dose from the Chernobyl
catastrophe is impossible to determine in practice. Estimative results, produced by
various groups, do not correspond with each other [1–4]. Our preset knowledge does not
allow us to evaluate potential small radiation dose impact on humans.
Let’s look at the analysis of oncology consequences of radiation. Any radiation
dose has the risk of tumor development [2, 4]. Oncology disease can be caused by
chemical elements (carcinogens) and radiation. Radiation-induced malignant growth
in its qualities and appearance are not different from spontaneous growth, which are
not caused by radiation, but rather caused by some chemical agent. Radiation does not
cause new types of diseases and does not change quantity proportion of known cancer
cases. All the cases increase in the same proportion [5].
Radiation does not disturb proportionality between cancer cell quantity growth and
age. Average level of a certain cancer type varies by country. Radiation, in this case, increases
the number of cancer diseases in proportion to the number of the diseases in the country [5].
Radiation effects on the population did not reveal any unknown diseases, but
rather a proportionate growth of all known cancer types took place. Additionally, some
diseases not related to structural changes of cells’ functions, chromosomes and deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) were noticed, such as flu or lung diseases. It was also noticed
that radiation impact on parents does not affect children’s health [5]. To date, radiation
effects on children born from contaminated parents are not proved by science [5, 6].
DNA damage, observed after radiation, is similar to damage observed from impacts
from chemical elements [5]. The temporary delay between a disease onset and
development is similar to the one initiated by chemical carcinogens and radiation [7].
In cases of small radiation doses, there is a smaller chance of developing cancer than in medium
dose cases, which in turn is smaller than in high radiation dose cases [2, 5]. It was also found
that radiation effects can be seen in elements (cells or objects) that were not under the direct radiation
effect, but were located near an irradiated cell or object (bystander effect) [1, 2].
The specific radiation consequences listed above are only possible with ionized radiation
is not direct, but it still imitates the synthesis mechanism of carcinogenic and toxic
chemical substances. Chemical substances cause disease only when some specific substances

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
and milieu are present in the body. Radiation effects work the same way. The physical mechanism
of this process is as follows: When a cell splits into two to form two cell, only 1.6-2%
of the „birth’ energy is spent on this process. The other 98% is transferred to a wide area of
nearby neighboring cells. The energy is transmitted on a specific wavelength frequency and
transmitted from cell to cell. If there is a weak or malfunctioning cell, this cell accumulates
too much energy and free radicals are formed within the cell. If there are no weak cells, the
energy wavelength spreads evenly through the neighboring cells. The formed radicals react
fast in the presence of radiation, and form very different substances that can damage and
impair the cell. The new foreign substances found can kill the cell or create malfunctioning in
the reproductive function and thus causing cancer to form.
Under the proposed approach, further small dose irradiation consequences are expected
to be limited and unpredictable. The consequences exist, because any increase in
carcinogen and toxin amount raises cancer risk. The consequences are limited: small radiation
doses are contradicted by the small magnitude of negative substances magnitude and
a low level of cancer. Small dose radiation does not have a threshold for consequences.
Small radiation dose impact does not contain unpredictable long-term consequences.
Additional carcinogen and toxic synthesis, caused by irradiation, in this environment
will result in proportional growth of known diseases, which are typical for the
population of the region. Observable general growth of diseases is an attribute of this
civilization, and a small dose radiation effect is a small contributor to this reality.
A good measure for disease prevention can be effective radiation protection
measures. Decrease in the level of preexisting carcinogens and toxins in a human body
can decrease the negative impact of small radiation effects on humans.
For an adequate quantitative analysis on small dose radiation effects, it is important
to consider the dose size, its capability, anthropogenic environmental contamination,
nutrition quality, a person’s lifestyle and individual antitoxic immune system.
References
1. Burlakova, E.B., Najdich, V.I. “Radiation Safety as a Research Problem.” Vestnik
RAN. 2006. Vol. 76, №11, pp. 1034–1037.
2. Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation. BEIR VII. Phase 2.
Washington, D. C.: The National Academic Press, 2006. 424 р.
3. Butomo, N.V. et al. Medical radiobiology basics. S-Pb: “Izdatelstvo Foliant.” 2004. 384 p.
4. Ilyin, L.A. “Radiation Accidents: Medical Consequences and Contra-Radiation Protection
Experience.” Atomic Energy. 2002. Vol. 92, №2, pp. 143–152.
5. Goffman, D. Chernobyl Accident: Radiation Consequences for The Present and Future
Generations. Minsk: Vyschaya Shkola.1994. 574 p.
6. Doll R. “Effects of small doses of ionizing radiation” J. radiol. protect. 1998. Vol.18, №3 pp. 163–174
7. Demin V.F. et al. “Regulation and Comparison Human Health Risks From Various
Harmful Sources.” Atomic Energy. 2001. Vol.90, №5: 385–397.
8. Kudryashov, U.B. “Major Radio-Biology Principles.” Radiation Biology. Radio Ecology.
2001. Vo. 41, №5, pp. 531–547.
9. Vorbyev,. E.I., Stepanov, R.P. Ionizing Radiation and Circulatory Systems. Moscow,
Energoizdat. 1985. 124 p.
10. Shuker D. “Endogenous nitrozation and cancer.” Hum. and Exp. Toxycol., 1998.
Vol.17, №9. p.480

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Public Discussion of the Nuclear Capacity Development
Plans at the Siberian Chemical Plant
Alexei V. Toropov, Director, Siberian Environmental
Agency, Director Green Cross Russia Tomsk Office
The Siberian Chemical Plant (SCP) is located in the largest „closed city” ZATO
Seversk and has a population of 120,000 people. Seversk borders with the regional
center, Tomsk, with 500,000 in population. The closest SCP facilities are located within
1 km from the living quarters in Seversk and within 5–6 km from the living quarters in
the Shtamovo and Kuzovlevo communities near Tomsk. This is an unprecedented case
of a chemical plant being located so close to a regional center. 70% (700,000 people) of
the Tomskaya oblast population lives within the 30 km radius of the plant.
The SCP, which began its history in 1949, is the largest nuclear fuel cycle enterprise
in the world. Uranium ore mining and processing is the only stage not represented
in the uranium production chain at the plant. The following facilities for nuclear weapon
production were built during the 1950–1960s at the SCP: sublimate factory (uranium
hexafluoride production), isotope separation plant (uranium enrichment), radiochemical
plant (plutonium extraction from irradiated uranium rods), and metallurgical plant
(metal weapons-grade uranium and plutonium production). Additionally, five uranium
graphite reactors were built and put in operation. The SCP has developed a colossal
amount of radioactive waste during its 50 years of operation. More than 1.1 billion Ci of
first-grade liquid radioactive waste has accumulated in the underground water-bearing
layers at the SCP. There are also open pools with liquid radioactive waste, solid radioactive
waste storage and burial grounds.
From 1990 to 1992, the operation of three plutonium reactors was terminated. At
present, the basis of SCP production is the isotope separation plant, additional production
facilities and two plutonium reactors, ADE-4 and ADE-5.
There were several stages of SCP nuclear facilities already built when an open
discussion of socio-economic problems of the Russian Nuclear Weapon Complex was
conducted. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Tomsk community collected 100,000 signatures
against the building of a long-term fissile materials storage facility at SCP. Despite
the fact that the U.S. had allocated money for such a facility in Seversk, the storage
location for the weapons-grade uranium and excess plutonium became Chelyabinskaya
oblast. Long-term fissile materials storage was built 70 km away from Chelyabinsk, and
not 5–6 km from the living quarters in Tomsk. The environmental movement in Tomsk
originated from the Tomsk community’s opposition to the storage facility construction.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Over ten years, starting in the mid 1990s, there have been several discussions regarding
the nuclear power plant (AST-500) construction in Seversk, which was supposed
to substitute for the Seversk plutonium reactors taken out of operation. In 2000, two
public environmental expert meetings about the AST-500 project took place. The state
environmental review board approved the AST-500 project, but the plant was not built
due to the lack of investment and absence of any interest in an unprofitable project.
As a consequence of the SCP’s intent to build the AST-500 plant, the termination
of the ADE-4 and ADE-5 plutonium plants was delayed. In 2003, the SCP and Minatom
management finally agreed to the U.S. financing of modernization and capacity increase at
the Severskaya Heating Plant. The modernization allowed substitution of plutonium reactor
capacities. As a result, the operation of plutonium reactors, ADE-4 and ADE-5, will be terminated
in 2008 according to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement. In the meantime, Russia has
produced several additional tons of weapons-grade plutonium, which is in excess already.
In 2001, public hearings took place during the state environmental review of the
project extension on deep storage of liquid radioactive waste in Seversk. Despite the
number of critical points related to the legal aspects of such storage in the underground
water-bearing levels, the state commissioner approved the technical and economic justification
of the project.
From 2003 to 2005, the construction of a MOX-fuel facility in Tomsk was discussed.
The Tomsk „green” activists announced their protest as soon as they learnt
about Minatom plans to build a MOX-fuel plant at the SCP. The first significant action
was an international protest against the MOX-fuel program on May 27, 2003. The main
demand of the „green” activists was that, if the MOX-fuel plant passed the expert evaluations,
it was essential to consider the inhabitants’ opinions within the SCP’s 30 km
radius zone. A citizen’s initiative group was later organized in Tomsk to collect signatures

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
against the MOX-fuel plant construction. Several groups of Tomsk entrepreneurs also
began to show a negative attitude to MFFF-R construction in the oblast. More than 10,000
signatures of the Tomsk citizens against MFFF-R construction were collected and sent to
the local government, the Russian Federation President, and the US Congress.
During the Fall 2004, a city-wide protest, „Say No to MOX,” took place in
Tomsk. Russian environmental organizations, foreign representatives, and a local rock
band, „Chaif,” participated in the protest. Hundreds of letters were sent from the Tomsk
citizens to the local government, authorities, officials of different levels, as well as public
and media organizations against MOX-fuel plant construction.
The Tomsk State Duma discussed the MFFF-R construction numerous times. A
committee of deputies was organized by the Representative Alexander Deyev in October
2003, and the committee confirmed that the MFFF-R construction should include
Tomsk citizens’ opinions. With the help of independent lawyers, the committee wrote
a bill called the „Discussion order of nuclear energy use in Tomskaya oblast.” The bill
does not guarantee adequate inclusion of the public opinion on MFFF-R construction,
but such an initiative from local officials in Russia deserves special attention.
Political parties also participated in the discussion of the MOX-fuel plant construction.
The Seversk City office of the United Russia decided to support the SCP development
program, which includes MOX-fuel plant construction. The Tomsk Regional
Party office did not make a formal decision to support the program. However, at the
regional conference, in November 2004, the leader of the Tomsk United Russia Party
members, Vladimir Zhydkikh, noted that the plant construction is a priority and criticized
the SCP management for poor promotion of the project. After numerous phone
calls from Tomsk citizens, who were astonished by the Zhydkikh position, the MOXfuel
plant issue was not discussed by the United Russia in public any more.
Tomsk Democrats, on the contrary, believe that the MOX-fuel plant construction
at SCP is antisocial and against public interest. A presentation made by MOX-fuel project
representatives in 2005 did not convince the representatives of the United Political Council
of Pre-Election Union comprised from the Union of Right Forces and „Yabloko.”
Tomsk citizens believe that their opinion should be taken into account during
the MFFF-R project discussion. According to the interactive survey conducted by the
State TV channel „Tomsk” in December 2004, 789 of 861 Tomsk citizens responded
„yes” to the question: „Whether the public opinion should be taken into account during
the MOX-fuel plant construction” However, this survey does not reflect the attitude
towards the MFFF-R construction.
According to the interactive survey conducted on October 18, 2004 by TV-2
broadcasting company (2,537 responders), 83% believe that „peaceful atoms” is an
environmental threat, 11% – „future of the energy industry”, 6% – the driver for science
in Tomsk. This survey is based on the perception of an active TV-2 viewers group, and
therefore, these results cannot be used for an objective public opinion evaluation.
Public opinion on the MFFF-R construction, which does not depend on any media
channel preference, was surveyed by sociologist A.V. Konyashkin and Tomsk Ecology
Student Inspection (TESI) in December 2004. Out of 662 survey respondents to the
question „Do you know that near Tomsk Minatom facility there will be constructed a

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
new weapons-grade plutonium plant („MOX-fuel Project)” 50% answered „Yes” and
50% answered „No”. Independently from the above question, another question was
asked: „TESI is against MOX-fuel plant construction. Are you ready to support this
act” 83% responded „Yes” and indicated various types of support (signature on a petition,
public protest and other).
Tomsk citizens’ attitudes towards the plant construction remain negative. In
2000, 80% of Tomsk citizens supported the „green” activists in an attempt to stop construction
of dangerous nuclear and radiological production facilities (based on the results
of the „Tomsk and Ecology” survey, conducted by TESI under sociologist N.L.
Kutepova leadership, Ozersk, August 2000).
A question still remains: what territory around MFFF-R or municipal unit should
be strongly included during the decision making process If one does not take into account
potential consequences of a large-scale accident at the nuclear facility, the social
and economic consequences will affect oblast citizens only (the fallout was registered
on all Northern Hemisphere Continents; the soil with „radioactive contamination” status
is accounted for hundred thousand square km”). The entire regional center with key
transport connections are in the 30 km radius of SCP.
In 2005, based on the initiative of the public organizations Russian Greenpeace,
„Ecozashita!” and the Tomsk „green” activists, foreign import of uranium hexafluoride
was brought into discussion. As a result of Russian and foreign nuclear entrepreneurs,
90% of this imported material remains at Russian facilities, including at SCP. According
to the report of the Russian Federal Inspection on Nuclear and Radiological Security,
in 2003 the storage of uranium hexafluoride at a number of facilities does not comply
with safety requirements.
On April 12, 2006, at the meeting with the Tomsk public, Sergey Kirienko, Rosatom
Director, responded to the question from the Tomsk Center for Nuclear and Radiological
Safety: „If foreign import of uranium hexafluoride is profitable, then what
method and finances will be used to reprocess uranium tails leftovers, accumulated as
a result of such contracts” Kirienko answered, „I support your approach. Currently we
review three ways to facilitate reprocessing. If we do not accept one of them, I am ready
to make a decision to stop import of this material.” It is known that Rosatom adopted
the Convention of Uranium Tails Safe Facilitation on December 27, 2006. The content
and concrete solutions to the above indicated problems were not shared with Tomsk
citizens. They are still awaiting the answers.
During the past few years, the Rosatom management has demonstrated a readiness
to an open dialogue with the population close to nuclear fuel cycle facilities. SCP
management, however, continues to not learn how to respond to the Tomsk citizens
concerns. On the contrary, there is misinformation, an inability to answer the questions,
facts fabrication, and attempts to misrepresent the real facts.
The state environmental review has not been accomplished for the AST-500 nuclear
power plant (NPP) in Seversk, when the 2000 brochure invited to the „excursions
at the operating facilities of SCP”, which also included „AST-500, buildings, constructions
and plant communication system.” Another booklet under the heading „Neighbors
Make Friendship through Cities,” published biannually in 500,000 copies, describes

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
the SCP participation in the Tomsk social programs. Special attention in the booklet
is devoted to the children’s support: „Siberian Chemical Plant takes care of the Urtam
school-orphanage, Naumovskaya middle school pupils and schoolchildren of Tomsk.”
It is true that SCP has been supporting the Urtam school-orphanage for the past ten
years. The Naumovskaya middle school director, however, says that the school never
received any help from SCP.
The discussion about MOX-fuel plant construction started in 2004. A formal
step towards the plant construction was a declaration from the TVEL Company to the
Administration of oblast about intentions to build an MFFF-R plant. The grounds for
construction, however, have already been prepared. A director of a radiochemical plant,
located in a close proximity to the MOX-fuel plant grounds, complained to the media,
that the trucks spread radioactive dirt near his plant. Today the decision to construct a
MOX-fuel plant at SCP is set aside. Anyone, however, can see the plant’s grounds for
construction at Google satellite pictures.
Misinformation by the Severskaya NPP lobby group is a new element in the
history of the project. Below is one example of misinformation tactics used: „If there
is no new NPP, the two dangerous old plutonium reactors will continue to operate near
Tomsk.” The authors of this claim know that Severskaya NPP construction does not
relate to reactors’ operation. The termination of the two plutonium reactors’ operation is
already confirmed. The U.S. Department of State allocated $240 million for the Russian
nuclear specialists to substitute the two reactors’ capacities.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Unfortunately, lately, Governor Kress, who was directly elected by the local citizens,
has become an active member of the lobby group, which promotes the Severskaya
NPP construction. A year ago, Governor Kress stated that the NPP construction in Seversk
will occur only if it is approved by the citizens. Today, he seems to have forgotten
that claim, and stays besides the local government that is interested in attracting nuclear
investments. Additionally Sergey Kirienko, Rosatom Director, also confirmed in 2006
that NPP construction in Seversk will occur only if it is approved by the citizens.
It seems that Governor Kress does not care what Mr. Kirienko or the population
think, especially after the Russian Federation President appointed him for another term.
Local officials prefer to rely on such concepts as „attracting investments per capita.”
Tomskaya oblast is on 6 th place on the list, according to this indicator, among the Russian
regions. Once there are investments in NPP construction, one might get to the third
place, after Moscow and Saint-Petersburg.
In July 2006, Viktor Kress initiated a group to work on „Proposals for the NPP
construction in Tomskaya oblast”, which did not meet once until March, 2007. The
group finally met, after a meeting of the Tomsk „green” activists on March 15, 2007.
The only member who was not invited was the only public representative; the other 16
members were public officials. The decisions made by the group were geared towards
public signs of support of the NPP construction, including a number of TV and radio
shows on nuclear energy use (6 shows), a separate page on the Tomsk Administration
website about nuclear energy development, training of municipal chief officers in
Tomsk about nuclear energy perspectives in Russia; organizing a media-club on the
NPP construction.
But the efforts of Governor Cress and SCP management cannot convince the
Tomsk public to support the plant construction. On April 16, 2007, when a decision on
nuclear reactors installation „road map” has not been taken, under a heavy rain, a public
protest took place. A decision about writing a letter to President Vladimir Putin was taken
at the meeting. Tomsk citizens began to collect signatures against NPP construction and a
movement called „For the nuclear free Tomsk future!” was established.
Rosatom’s and „Rosenergoatom” enterprise top management often states: „We
are building NPPs in the regions due to the public request,” but there is no such request
from Tomskaya oblast.
Conclusions
––Cooperation between Rosatom, regional authorities, and the nuclear industry
with local populations on nuclear facilities construction must be built on fair principles
and dialogue.
––Public opinion in the regions must be taken into account when a decision on
nuclear facilities construction takes place.
––The basis for public discussion of the nuclear energy plans must be documents
and decisions of the public environmental reviewers, conducted independently.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Social environmental review experience of Balakovskaya
Nuclear Power Plant, Units 5 and 6
Anna M. Vinogradova, Head, Balakovsko affiliate (Saratovskaya
oblast) of the All-Russian society for conservation
of nature
Environmental review in Russia originally was planned to be a unique institution
of the state control, which would allow for the state to make decisions and plan activities
without listening to public opinion. This decision complies with the international
environmental law, which views environmental review as implication of preventive
policy, environmental impact evaluation, and active public participation at all the stages
of review and decision-making during the project, and additionally publication of the
review results.
Previous environmental review experience in Russia set the basis for norm regulation
and its improvement, and it also indicated several problems, solutions for which
will impact Russian success and position in the international community. Formalities,
excessive bureaucratic procedures, and various abuses of power partially come from the
absence of productive and planned work. Such bureaucratic mechanism sets poor credit
for environmental review, its independence and objectivity. The poor mechanism for
environmental review has changed to such extent that it does not take into account the
importance of social and economic needs and activities of the population.
Balakovo (Saratovskaya oblast) has been on the list of the fifty most environmentally
unfriendly Russian cities. New industrial construction and development of the
existing production facilities was prohibited here by the USSR Ministry Council Act
№567, dated June, 18, 1981. The atmospheric contamination index (ACI) in Balakovo
currently equals 15, which is very high. The Balakovo branch of the All-Russian society
for conservation of nature is monitoring since 1989 all the decisions made about the activities
planned on the territory of Balakovo Municipality. We try to exercise our rights
in this decision-making process, basing it on the public environmental review, inviting
independent scientists and specialists in the discussion. Before the Federal Law „Environmental
Review” was adopted, we conducted a series of public scientific reviews of
the project materials of the Hydro-nuclear electric plant existing prior to 1979, leather
production, European furniture company project and 4 power unit designs for Balakovskaya
Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) created in 1992. The conclusions, made by specialists,
allowed us to make correct decisions such as: the projects for the Hydro-nuclear
electric plant, leather production based on Italian technology with 6 valence chrome disposal
were declined; the preliminary projects for European furniture company project
and 4 power unit designs for BNPP in 1992 were updated and improved. We were happy

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
to have special law in place and were confident that it will support our public environmental
reviews and study of the BNPP Power Units 5 and 6 without any problems. It
was clear that our rights were supported by the special legislature. It was necessary to
conduct public environmental reviews, because the initial construction project of the
power units was illegal. Because it did not comply with modern requirements for NPPs
location, it was declined by the State Sanitary Inspection and the State Nuclear Inspection
of the Soviet Union in 1988 and 1990. The Power Units 5 and 6 continued to be
built according to the drawings of the unapproved project, and the public had to express
its protest and continue demonstrations against the construction.
On April, 25 1993, according to the Balakovo Council and based on the Federal
Legislation „Environment Protection,” a city referendum took place to find out the public’s
opinion regarding the construction of the power units. The media was also fairly
involved in the process. 72.8% of the population voted against the construction of the
new Power Unites 5 and 6. According to the Small Council of Balakovo City decision,
dated July, 2 1993, the referendum results were delivered to the Russian President, the
Russian Federal Congress, Government, Nuclear Ministry, Saratov Council and State
Executive Committee.
The referendum results were debated and taken into consideration by the Russian
Government and the Congress:
– The Parliamentary Hearings in the Federal Congress took place in June 1993.
– Russian Government charged the Nuclear Ministry, Financial Ministry, Ministry of
Nature, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), the Russian United Energy System to consider
the referendum results in the planning of the State Energy Program for the period until 2010.
In 1993, the Power Units 5 and 6 were excluded from the State Complex Energy
Program up to 2010. In 1994, new attempts to rework the project and begin operation
of the second line of power units took place, despite the statement of Paragraph 3,
Article 48 of Federal Law on „Environment Protection” and public protest. Interestingly
enough, the Russian Government was the key body to abuse the legislation on
„Environmental Expertise” by approving „Russian nuclear energy strategy development
up to 2020” and supporting the Federal Central Plan „Energy efficient economy
for 2002–2005 and prospects for 2010.” This plan includes the Power Units 5 and 6 of
BNPP. Both documents did not go through state environmental reviews.
Since 2001, based on evaluations by a number of experts from the BNPP, the preliminary
investment plans took place in the form of:
––Investment Plan;
––Intentions Declaration;
––Investment Justification;
––Construction Plan.
Key supporting organizations – The Enterprise „Rosenergoatom” and Saratov oblast
Governor, Ayatskov D.F. – the head of the territories with nuclear facilities – those who lobby
for additional power unit construction. The only authority opposing this lobby group is the
environmental public organizations that have the power to conduct the public environmental
reviews at all the project stages. We used our legislative rights, and in 2001 declared to the
local authorities and the heads of „Rosenergoatom” about our intention and preparedness to

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
organize the public environmental reviews for preliminary and project design papers for additional
capacity development of BNPP. Russian Greenpeace also declared to participate in
the public environmental reviews, and we combined our efforts and resources.
Our statements were put together according to the Russian legislation, and there
were no reasons for rejection of our intention. But the lobby group in the nuclear industry
did everything possible to prevent public environmental reviews. When such efforts
failed, they tried to minimize the role of such public reviews. It is hard to name all the
legislative abuses and artificial difficulties from the nuclear agencies and local authorities
for conducting a public environmental review. For example, we received the environmental
impact evaluation materials only 3 months after the state review was over, we
could not timely get project materials and additional materials on emergency situations.
In the end, Balakovo Federal Security Service decided to withdraw the project’s papers
on the reason that classified information was present in these papers.
The representative of the State expertise department, Russian technical inspection,
L.N. Shilkina played a very special role She constantly misinformed us and took advantage
of the limited timeframe for the public environmental review. We could hardly find out the
due date for our review presentation, when the group meetings of the State Expert Council
took place. That is why our experts often missed these meetings. Our experts, I.N. Ostretsov
and V.M. Kuznetsov, were not included in the State Environmental Expert Group, despite our
official nominations. Our protests on the matter of the nominations of Larin and Khrustalev in
the Group were not taken into consideration. Some violations were reviewed by the Moscow
Prosecutors on the compliance with legislation at special facilities, where Greenpeace sent its
petition. Our expert commission was responsible for the key action, which conducted reviews
in very challenging conditions and was able to present its conclusions to the State Expertise
Department, Russian Technical Inspection on time.
The Expert commission of the public environmental expertise was headed by the
scientists, who are professionals in the nuclear industry, and have objective and independent
attitude on the nuclear safety issues, pluralistic views on industrial ecology and
are famous for their numerous publications on the matter.
Below are listed the members of the Expert Group with a respective short bio:
––Ostretsov Igor Nikolayevich – the Head of the Expert Group, PhD (Technical
Science), Professor, Deputy Director on Science of Russian scientific research institute
of atomic energy machine industry, the Russian Federation Ministry of Industrial Science,
Member of Industrial Ecology Academy. He is the author of more than twenty
scholarly articles and publications on the problems of nuclear energy safety.
––Kuznetsov Vladimir Mikhaylovich – Deputy Chairman of the Expert Group,
PhD (Technical Science), Member of Аcademy of industrial safety; Nuclear and Radiological
Safety Program Director, Green Cross Russia; senior staff, expert-auditor of the
„Certification system of equipment, products and technologies for nuclear installations,
radiation sources and storage facilities.” Kuznetsov also worked at Chernobylskaya
NPP, then in the Russian State Atomic Inspection as a head of inspection on nuclear
and radiological safety of atomic energy in Russia. He is the author of 90 publications,
including 5 monographs devoted to the issues of safe atomic energy operation.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––Nazarov Anatoly Georgievich – PhD (Biological Science), Russian Academy
of Natural Science member; Head of the Ecology center, Institute of natural history
and technology of S.I. Vavilov, RAS; Chairman of the group on radiation ecology and
safety, Radiobiology science council, RAS; chairman of the Ecology committee, Moscow
group „The Chernobyl Union”. During 1989–1996, he was Co-Chairman of the
Chernobyl committee and the Head of Permanent expert roup of the USSR Supreme
Council, Head of under-committee on radiation safety, participated in liquidation of
nuclear weapon testing and Chernobyl catastrophe outcomes (1959–1964, 1988–1996).
Nazarov is the author of 250 publications, including 10 monographs on the Vernadsky
studies of bio- and noo- spheres, biogeochemistry, ecology, radiation safety and Chernobyl
accident.
––Kuznetsova Elena Egmontovna – PhD (Technical Science), a leading expert
of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program of Green Cross Russia. She worked in the
Department of NPPs, the Russian technology institute of F.E. Dzerzhinsky; she also
was the Chief State Inspector of Design and Construction Inspection, Central District of
Russian State Nuclear Inspection. Kuznetsova is the author of 30 scholarly articles and
publications on the issue of nuclear energy safety operation.
––Simonov Eugeny Yakovlevich – the Expert commission head secretary; the
leading expert of Green Cross Russia’s Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program. He
worked at Obninskaya NPP as an Engineer, then Head engineer of management facility,
and Head of the shift at the plant. In the Russian scientific research institute of NPPs, he
was the head of technical review lab, responsible for design of NPPs; he also served as
a State Inspector of nuclear safety in the USSR State Atomic Inspection; additionally,
he was the Chief engineer of the curator department, NPP operation, the lab of physics
of active atomic zones in nuclear reactors in the power plants. Simonov is the author of
100 scholarly articles and publications, devoted to nuclear energy safety operation.
––Minikh Maxim Georgievich – professor at the State Saratov university of N.G.
Chernyshevsky (SSU), Geology Department, GeoEcology Program; Member of the International
Academy of Mineral Resources.
––Chuprov Vladimir Alekseevich – B.A. in Ecology; Head of the Energy Department,
Russian Greenpeace; the author of „How much nuclear electricity costs” (Moscow,
2004), various publications and reports on nuclear energy.
––Khudiakov Gleb Ivanovich – member of the RAS; Professor at the SSU, Geology
Department, the USSR State Award laureate; Head of the public environmental
review group for the power unit №4, BNPP.
––Rusin Sergey Aleksandrovich – PhD (Technical Science); Adjunct, Balakovo
Institute of technology, mechanics and management (BITMM); author of more than 40
scholarly articles and publications in the area of human safety.
––Sayenkov Alexander Sergeyevich – PhD (Technical Science); Adjunct BIT-
MM; Expert-Engineer of the Russian Technical inspection system; the author of 70
scholarly articles and publications on industrial risks studies.
––Soldatkin Stepan Innokentievich –Adjunct, the State Saratov university.
––Vinogradova Anna Michaylovna – Expert commission technical secretary;
head of the Balakovo branch of All-Russian society for concervation of nature (regis-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
tered as an initiator of the public environmental review of the second line project for
BNPP). Has an experience in public environmental review: the organizer for the review
group at Hydro NPP in 1998, and the project for the power unit №4, BNPP in 1992.
Conclusions and recommendations, proposed by experts of our Public environmental
expert group:
1. Originally the site for the BNPP construction was selected in the second half of the
1970s. At that time, there were no norms and regulations in terms of NPP location relatively
to cities with 300,000 population.
During the evaluation of the facility utilization, the issues on the capacity limit
were not settled, especially in terms of overall evaluation of the NPP impact on environment
and radiation safety of population, as well as factors of human activity and
environmental issues, which also affect safety:
The materials do not contain enough justification for ground stability in terms of additional
facility construction and technology equipment and system changes (quantity and
overall operation mass) comparable to the first line of the power units at the NPP. Moreover,
there is no evaluation of potential changes in the ground stability during the NPP operation.
The project papers do not include the requirement of Emergency Ministry of Saratovskaya
oblast, but they represent the basic requirements for the initial facility design. The
requirements of seismic conditions in the region are 8 points, as specified for the BNNP.
The NPP proximity to the city with 230,000 population and industrial plants, does not
comply with modern safety rules and norms. This fact leads to the unfavorable technological
situation, which has a negative impact on the atmosphere near the power plant.
Additionally, the changes in Russian legislation were not taken in consideration
during the plant design (for example, ruling out of the Federal Law „Natural Environment
Protection” and introduction of the new articles on environmental abuses in the
Russia Codex „Administrative Violations”, changes in some other acts, which define
basis for land, forest and water law).
2. The project materials, with regard to the content and data, do not meet the requirements
of the ND list P-01-01 and the original task. There is almost no any technical information
with regard to the initial requirements. The information given can be qualified as a short
technical description with some elements for safety justification, but without any particular
technical justification for construction and design solutions for the system and equipment.
There is no evaluation of potential system failures and its impact on the power units’ safety.
The documents, reviewed during the project improvement for the second line of
BNNP cannot serve as justification materials for the unit’s safety in order for the beginning
of new construction. These documents must be reviewed again and include the
suggested advice. The quality conditions of design and project documentation should
have special attention and exploitation instructions. The matters of system and equipment
technical conditions should receive a special attention; some training and personnel
action is needed to find out the system and equipment failure, as well as management
during the pre-emergency, emergency and after-emergency situations.
3. In terms of environment protection, the project needs a detailed review and
redesign. Independent evolution on „extra-clean” radiation impact of the BNNP on the

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
environment and people should take place. It is important to analyze the specter of all
potential impacts on the environment and health in case of radiation accident and emergency.
In the future the project cannot take place without a well-established safety system
for the BNNP and potential radiation incidents from minor accidents to critical radiation
catastrophes. The potential impact of the NPP on the environment requires evaluation,
especially for old equipment, unfavorable environment conditions of huge old blocks
and new constructions (engineering and geology seismic instability and flood) and effect
complex of technology factors in Balakovo region.
4. The designers of radiation management, safety systems and engineers for the
NPP units must carefully review their projects and reveal the least secure constructions
for radiation management, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage and other materials storage,
for design solutions, technology operation capabilities. On the basis of the nuclear and
radiological safety review, the new design must include these corrections in order to completely
exclude terrorist attack and illegal intentions on behalf of the personnel and other
individuals. If it comes out that it is impossible to exclude terrorist attacks with terrific
consequences, then the construction of such plants must be completely stopped. There are
no „minor” cases in work at NPPs, because even a least important incident can cause a
catastrophe.
5. The safety measures for the Balakovo population are insufficient, in terms of
civil defense and security during the accident, when an evacuation is needed in case of
unplanned accident at the NPP.
In order to raise safety and security level for the Balakovo population in case of an
evacuation, the following is needed:
––To ensure enough shelters in the city limit, utilizing basement facilities with
necessary equipment for living conditions (ventilation, heating, water supply, utilities
and medication);
––The road quality should be improved in the city area, with allocation of special
resources;
––A second bridge is needed to ensure evacuation safety;
––To increase the number of public transportation by 2,000 with evacuation purposes
6. The chosen concept of the BNPP removal from operation (complete removal up to
100 years) does not have technical and economic calculations, which can confirm the plant’s
construction and supporting facility reliability and safe operation for this lengthy period.
Given the worsening criminal situation inside the country and overall increased
terrorism activities, it is not safe to postpone the plant’s removal from operation for
a long period. Additionally, such a delay increases expenditures related to necessary
physical protection of the NPP at the required level for the entire delayed period and
may lead to serous economic problems.
The concept adoption of the delayed removal from operation of the plant has
moral consequences as well: the solution of this problem automatically becomes a responsibility
of future generations.
7. The project’s security is based on the new methodology of new management
system operation of unplanned accidents. The methodology shows the importance to

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
indicate and justify reliability of the system’s functions even with existing limitations,
which also include economic factors.
In order to justify the reliability of the functions, it is important to review not
only the work of such a system but its ability to operate in case of an unplanned accident.
In traditional safety and security systems, the latter aspect is resolved, but in the
new suggested management systems it is important to conduct a program – Scientific
Research and Construction Development, which includes theoretical end experimental
studies of the key problems. Such studies include:
––Studies of boron concentration change at the exit from the system during the
system’s set off;
––Studies of temperature area and boron concentration at the entrance to the active
zone during the system’s set off;
––Studies to justify support for the system of fast boron injection at the standby
mode and elimination of the system’s false alarm.
Based on SPOT the studies include:
––Evaluation of heating capacity of natural heat exchanging units, depending on
internal and external environment parameters;
––Evaluation of circulation stability in heat exchange pipes and heat exchanging
unit capacity;
––Evaluation of non-condensed gases impact on heat exchange and ways to remove
these gases.
The studies of additional system of active zone (GE-2) flooding are also relevant:
––Studies of the processes during the system’s connection to the first layer;
––Studies of expenditures during the system’s construction accidents.
Additionally it is important to conduct a comprehensive study in RU and simultaneous
work of SPOT and GE-2 processes.
8. The implementation of the decisions, noted in paragraph 7.7, as those not tested
by previous experiments, additionally provide to meet the project compliance with the Act
1.2.5. OPB-88/97. The implementation of the indicated systems will significantly increase
the accumulative weight of RU with container. This will lead to an even greater speed and
amount of radioactive deposits. Therefore, in the project there is no justification for the inconstruction
units, under RU and containment of which there will be established a permanent
platform (the grounds under the platform will remain unchanged). Additionally, there
are no indicators for radioactive deposits. There is no multipurpose safety justification in
the project, including the construction quality of the second-line construction units at the
BNPP; the radioactive deposits of the in-construction units are inevitable.
9. The project fails from the economic standpoint. At the level of the current
tariffs for electric power, the actual NPP expenditures on industrial capacity building
are three times or 200% higher than declared. According to the project’s authors, the
increase of capital investment into the industrial capacity construction of more than
60% makes such a project unprofitable. Besides, the actual cost of industrial capacity
building is higher than originally planned. For example, the start up of a power unit in
2004 at the Kalininskaya plant appeared to be 50% or three times more expensive than
planned (and this sum equals to the amount for a completely new unit construction).

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
A number of financial allocations are not mentioned or lowered in the project. There
are no allocations for social infrastructure construction around the NPP, as it supposed to allocate
10% from the entire capital investment. There are no guaranties that such infrastructure
will be built, based on the first line construction at the NPP in Balakovo. There are no indications
for three of four types of financial allocations on nuclear energy development, which
are required by the Russian law (41% of the profit). The allocations to the decommissioning
reserves for the new power units (1.3% of the profit or 14% from the construction cost) in the
reality are reduced. For example, the budget deficit for the decommissioning of new power
units in Rosenergoatom was 6 billion rubles in 2004. Additionally the payment for SNF storage
service in the federal storage at Krasnoyarsk is also lowered comparable to the real price.
Overall, the project looses its efficiency (and projected efficiency is only 48%).
The declared budget efficiency of the project is degraded by direct and indirect
subsidies from the federal budget into nuclear energy, which is up to billions of rubles
annually. Tax allocations to the local budgets are not included into the project, and most
likely represent low numbers, because these numbers are actually correct and are written
under the „other” expenditures.
From the socio-economic efficiency standpoint, the construction of a second-line facilities
at the BNPP in the near future does not make any sense at least for the oblast’ due to
the energy capacity overload. To increase competency factor of the energy based industries, it
is first of all important to conduct activities with respect to energy utilization efficiency.
Conclusion:
––The project materials in their content and information have only a formal character,
and do not comply with the requirements on P-01-01 list and the initial goal.
––The site choice for new power units of the Balakovskaya plant is extremely unfavorable
with respect to ground, seismic factor, dangerous proximity to a large industrial
city of Balakovo and the Volga River, which has drinking and economical significance.
––Based on the expert conclusions, the project is insufficient from the technical and economical
standpoint (and is unattractive from commercial point of view). In the end, the project
does not guarantee a sufficient level of radiation and environmental safety of population.
Based on the information, presented above, the Expertise Commission believes
that the project to construct a second-line of facilities at the BNPP must be declined and
prohibited from implementation.
An additional public environmental review was conducted at Saratov regional department
of Russian Ecology Academy, based on the agreement with the BNPP management,
and supposedly paid by the plant. The expert council of this review was headed by the scientists,
Chebotarevsky U.V., Larin E.A., Khrustalev V.A., which has worked with the BNPP for
a long time. The two of the experts has performed scientific-research projects for the secondline
facility construction at the plant, in other words, created the project. Larin and Khrustalev
continued their work as a part of the State environmental expertise of the project.
It is important to indicate the positive conclusions of the Saratov public environmental
review and the State environmental expertise; the papers contain serious recommendations
and suggestions, which make the installation of additional power units questionable. The conclusions,
to some extent, support the recommendations of our environmental review group.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The conclusions of independent experts created a large interest of the Balakovo population,
the local council representatives, state ecology services’ representatives, and leaders of
social organizations. Press- for the media, covering the public environmental review results,
was held in Balakovo, Saratov, and Moscow and had a wide coverage. The public opinion
surveys, conducted by our group in 2006 in Balakovo, confirmed the public’s negative attitude
towards construction of the power unites №5 and №6. The public believes that this
construction is environmentally dangerous and economically insufficient.
All emergency cases at potentially dangerous facilities in Russia, based on the
official data, are due to violations of facility design and operation. We believe, that there
is a need for emergency capacity building at the BNPP located on the Volga River bank,
near the densely populated Volga area; these violations indicate the inappropriateness
of such project design.
The environmental review of the second-line construction at the BNPP, including
the public review, is the ultimate review in 2005, which was based on the federal legislation
„Environmental Review”. Now it is not late to talk about how the conclusions should
have been reviewed and taken into the consideration. More importantly the question of
local population rights should be discussed with regard to the public environmental interests.
In the recent years in Russia there is a weakening of the state policy in the area of environmental
legislation compliance; a clear tendency to weaken the laws and standards of
ecology regulations becomes more vivid along with a limited access to the information.
In my opinion, such changes have a tendency when the legislation is fixed with regard
to the Russian industry development, and including industry development. There is no
opportunity to push a decision behind the established legal system, but the legislation itself
changes. Nuclear experts often talk about the „pendulum effect”: after the Chernobyl accident
a very strict system of laws and norms was adopted to ensure nuclear safety; with the passage
of time the system was loosened up. It seems that now we have come to a period when there
are no restrictions to place a NPP, if there is a safe operation guaranty. Unfortunately, this
parameter is not confirmed by the international accident statistics at NPPs. Many specialists
believe that nuclear energy capacity building while loosening up the requirements is a direct
path to new accidents. The general public does not have a sufficient knowledge in nuclear
energy, but it has common sense and overall wisdom, which helps the public react to the
new developments and actions by the authorities. If the nation will resist the striving for NPP
development, the authorities must consider the public opinion.
The potential environmental danger presumption of any industrial activity, extremely
large number of environmental catastrophes and crimes in Russia must lead the
country to the strengthening of legislation. During the past eleven years the experience
of practice the legislation on environmental review has only grown. This experience
must be processed and utilized by the government agencies in order to create additional
public barriers for unjustified risks for human health and environment. The state support
of real public organizations and their intention to make living conditions safer will help
to form an atmosphere of mutual trust between the government and civil society. The
economic growth in Russia will help develop a better action plan: „Environmentally
friendly activities, in the end, are economically beneficial”.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Sea Atom and NGOs
Sergei N. Zhavoronkin, Expert, „Nuclear and Radiation
Safety’ Programme, Green Cross Russia,
city of Murmansk
Many environmental problems accumulated in the north of Russia during the
years of atomic energy development. Resolution of these problems is a technically
difficult and expensive task, which also involves environmental risks.
What is „sea atom” The concept includes the entire infrastructure, vessels and
ships with nuclear power installations, service ships and on-shore facilities.
In order to understand the subject and atomic energy complex on the sea in the
North of Russia, we should identify key problems in two areas:
––Military fleet problems;
––Civil nuclear ice-breakers’ fleet problems.
Military fleet problems
Dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines (NS) is among the top
priority issues. Solution of this problem in Russia has a favorable time-frame. The NS
dismantlement will be accomplished shortly. During this program, a consistent problem
of final stage was not resolved: no decision was made whether to place reactor
modules on the shore or to build a storage place for these reactor modules. Note that
in Saida Guba the first line of facilities was accomplished.
From an environmental point of view, the rehabilitation of technical bases in
Andreyeva and Gremikha remain a key concern. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management
at these facilities is connected with large environmental risks.
NGOs supported the idea and actively participated in discussion of the Strategic
Master Plan, which provided a deep problem analysis of the region and defined
high priority activities for Russian and foreign specialists.
Civil nuclear ice-breakers’ fleet problems
The civil ice-breaking fleet in Russia developed under military fleet is facing
similar problems. Technical conditions of the vessels, however, are better than in the
military fleet and the scale of environmental problems is smaller.
Major concerns environmental problems:
––of technical base „Lepse” and its dismantlement.
––related to spent nuclear and radioactive fuel management.
Environmental problems of the coastal technical base „Lepse” are related to
SNF, which was unloaded from the first generation reactors. We, however, believe that

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
the environmental aspect of this case is in the complex dismantlement process of the
ship. Project „Lepse” has a ten year history, but there was no significant progress until
recently.
Similar positions of the NGO „Bellona-Murmansk” and the ship’s owner, Rosatom,
with regard to the project, allowed for significant changes in the management
of the project. Today we believe that the project can be successfully accomplished with
respect to environmental safety.
The civilian nuclear fleet has also accumulated problems related to nuclear spent fuel
and radioactive waste: non-recyclable fuel at the floating base „Lotta,” overflowing storages
of solid radioactive waste, unsatisfactory condition of installations for combustible radioactive
waste reprocessing, which has negative affect on solid radioactive waste management.
The incomplete international project of upgrading storage facilities for liquid radioactive
waste in the Murmanskaya oblastis another problem that needs to be solved.
„Sea atom” has common environmental problems. Some of these problems will
need attention only in the future, but we need to resolve them today.
1. Dismantlement of ships with nuclear energy installations.
2. Dismantlement of atomic technical service ships.
3. SNF and radioactive waste management.
Problems related to the dismantlement of ships with nuclear energy installations
are caused by lack of the necessary infrastructure on large-size installations in the region
(especially with respect to long-term storage of large installations). Such problems
are also typical for dismantlement of atomic technical service ships.
New infrastructure to manage large installations in the region will require modern
technology for radioactive waste management, and, therefore, environmental monitoring
at the facilities and surrounding area.
SNF affects safety in the region.
SNF downloading from facilities in Andreyeva Bay and Germikha represent
nuclear and environmentally dangerous works. SNF transportation to Chelyabinskaya
oblast is connected to the Federal State Enterprise „Atomflot” in Murmansk, where the
loading from sea to railroad transport takes place.
Factors affecting efficiency of NGOs
I will bring only several conditions, which, in my opinion, are important in NGO
activities. In the next paragraph I will give examples with practical examples of NGOs
in the region. Factors affecting efficiency of NGOs are the following:
––urgency of the problem researched,
––NGO’s position on the issue,
––independency,
––experts’ professionalism,
––financing level.
NGOs have accumulated a significant experience in various work methods in
the North:
––situation analysis and report preparation,

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––position statement,
––organization of conferences and seminars,
––organization of public hearings,
––organization of public environmental expertise,
––communication with media.
For example, „Bellona-Murmansk” and other organizations prepared several
reports based on the analysis they conducted in the region. They are classified by the
type of cover: black, blue and yellow: „Radioactive sources in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk
oblasts” (1994), „Northern Fleet. Potential Risks of Radioactive Contamination in the
Region” (1996), and „Atomic Arctic: problems and solutions” (2001).
Lately, position statements are being prepared on significant environmental
problems, including a position on „Murmansk Initiative – Russian Federation,” „Dismantlement
of the Floating Technical Base „Lepse,” „Atomic Technical Service Ships
and their Dismantlement.” A seminar, involving leading institutes and Rosatom, took
place in Murmansk in February 2007 on the problem discussed above.
NGOs are organizing public hearings on discussion of environmental impact and
its evaluation. In 2006, hearings on environmental impact and its evaluation during SNF
and radioactive waste infrastructure construction in Andreyeva Bay took place. In 2007,
similar hearings were conducted with regard to the floating technical base „Lepse.”
It is important to note, that if one NGO organizes the event, all other NGOs involved
in environmental studies, also participate in this event.
I would like to especially mention a public environmental review as a public
participation activity. NGOs participation in nuclear field is a matter of trust. It took us
more than half a year to negotiate a public environmental review with our client, the
British donor, on the technical merits of reconstruction project of facility №5 at „Atomflot”
and its transformation to storage (up to 50 years) of SNF from nuclear ice-breakers,
which cannot be reprocessed.
As a result, a public environmental review led a shorter timeframe for the facility
construction. This happened due to the reform in state environmental regulations,
which took place in 2004 and did not even allow starting ground works (in the North
such works may take up to six month). Public environmental review resulted in decision
to finance the works, which will not have negative effects on the facility’s safety
in the future.
Dealing with the Cold War legacy in the North of Russia together with the people
and NGOs is a positive case. When working on a Sea Atom problem, regional NGOs
search for environmentally safe solutions to clean the North of the nuclear and radioactive
legacy.
We want to live in harmony with a fragile and vulnerable environment in the
North of our country.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Underestimating Public Opinion in Nuclear Projects
Implementation Report
Lina S. Samko, Public Expert Council, Sosnovyi Bor,
Leningradskaya Oblast
Good evening, dear Forum organizers, participants, and guests!
I am a journalist and a member of the Ecological Journalists Association of
St. Petersburg. I reside in Sosnovy Bor. First of all, let me echo the words of Lidia
Popova in thanking the Forum organizers for the opportunity to present the public
viewpoint from this podium.
One gets an impression that Rosatom is still working on achieving full understanding
with the population and the public organizations. For example, according to all the media
statements and all the press conferences (in which I participated, as well) atomic scientists
claim that the population fully embraces the idea of constructing new atomic power stations.
However, Russian public organizations publish rather different information.
For example, according to one of the best-known of these organizations, „Ecodefense!”
group, 89% of the Murmanskaya oblast population is against the Kola nuclear
power station construction, and 93% are for the development of wind energy. The South
Ural nuclear power plant (NPP) in Chelyabinskaya oblast was suspended following a
referendum at which the vast majority voted against its construction. The 2006 public
opinion poll conducted by the „Ecodefense!” indicated that over 60% of Chelyabinskaya
oblast residents are still against the NPP construction. In Seversk (Tomskaya
oblast), over 80% of the population view new NPP quite negatively, according to the
public opinion polls. And the examples can go on and on.
I will not try to draw conclusions as to who is right: that would require special
research. I will just tell you of the „green” public opinion in Sosnovy Bor regarding
their relationship with atomic scientists.
Today, the „Rosenergoatom” group General Deputy Director V. G. Asmolov
highly rated the public hearings that took place on February 7 of this year in our city.
Indeed, the gathering was so large that not all the people were able to get into the auditorium.
But why Because the Leningradskaya NPP (LNPP) and the TITAN group
administration directed their whole departments’ workforce to the „Constructor” Culture
House, having given them time off from work. However, having provided masses
of people, the directorate was unable to guarantee that their workers were made fully
aware. The Environmental Impact Assessment was read by only about 30 citizens.
This is why people, supposedly keenly interested in the hearings, had only a
vague understanding of the LNPP-2 project. Still, up to this time, the city’s popula-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
tion is unaware of the fact that the new nits will be cooled not by the gulf, but with the
help of four giant 150 meters-tall cooling towers. Such cooling towers have never been
constructed in Russia before! The Sosnovy Bor residents do not realize that, for the first
time in the world, sea water would be used for the cooling. They are equally unaware
that the concrete cooling towers would eject 100,000 cubic meters of steam and smoke
mixture into the atmosphere daily.
If such humidification devices were installed in the Sahara desert, they would undoubtedly
be beneficial. But for the Gulf of Finland with its high humidity, fog and rain,
such cooling towers become an additional risk factor – especially as they would „increase
the likelihood of radioactive fallout” (Environmental Impact Assessment, p. 74).
The most unpleasant fact is that the plume from the cooling tower will spread
not only onto the industrial zone, but also onto the city itself, its streets, its beaches, its
gardens. I have talked about the spray problem at the public hearings, and not only on
February 7 in Sosnovy Bor, but also two days later, at the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly.
Moreover, I wrote about it in the city paper, in the St. Petersburg media, and on
the Internet. However, no reaction followed from the „Rosenergoatom” specialists – no
official statements, answers, presentations to the media, or discussion panels.
Or is it that silence is the sign of consent
If so, then the cooling towers should be moved further away from the city, to
protect Sosnovy Bor from the effects. Yet the site for the cooling towers is already identified
at the Science and Research Technological Institute (NITI), with permission for
the construction of the nuclear plants, because some ten years ago a pressurized water
reactor 640 (HPR-640) was planned here. This approval, long-ago, presents a significant
economy of time and resources, because there is no need to fill out new documents.
And if we take into account the fact that the head of Rosatom gave his word to the President
to begin construction as soon as 2008, starting construction is a good opportunity
to raise Rosatom’s status in the eyes of the country’s government.
So, how can one call this line of policy friendly towards the population
Here are a few more of examples. The water for Sosnovy Bor is provided by the
LNPP – that’s the way it was from the early days of the city. Over the past third of a century,
the water-supplying structures and installations have become really worn out. The
water pipe is now so rusty that 30% of the purified drinking water simply leaks out into
the ground. And in order to prevent the population from contracting intestinal diseases,
the water is excessively processed with chlorine.
At the same time, the LNPP spends enormous amounts of money for remodeling
its buildings, for interior decoration and contemporary furniture. Of course, these things
are important. But if we weigh design and architectural aesthetics against the health of
70,000 citizens, which one will weigh more For a socially responsible corporation, it
should be the latter.
I can give yet another example. There is a huge wage gap between the LNPP administrators
and its workers. People who do construction work in dangerous zones and
risk their health are getting lower wages (possibly, many times lower) than the managers.
It is not a secret from anyone that wages and premiums of the station’s administration are
measured in millions of rubles. This wage gap undoubtedly creates social tension.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Half a year ago, I heard one of the LNPP workers say: „So what, let it all explode,
I’m fed up with it!” Witnessing such scenes made me nervous. A situation of
drastic social inequality and tension is a dangerous one. This is yet another aspect of
public opinion which must not be neglected.
Public outreach is a sphere where concern should not be limited to how the
agency appears to the public. The public hearings to which the „masses” were directed
were, in a sense, manipulative. Aesthetically appealing buildings and well-decorated
LNPP office interiors with low quality drinking water for the population are also manipulative.
The intention to build new units without having resolved the radioactive
waste problems of the existing units is yet another case of manipulation. And behind
each of these cases lurk the personal interests of specific individuals.
The population understands these problems both on the conscious and subconscious
levels. That is why, no matter what the multitude of the glossy Rosatom publications
say, full public understanding will only happen when real openness replaces public
relations moves and manipulation. I would like to hope that this atomic forum will be a
start for such a dialogue with the public.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Discussion at the End of the First Day
––Y. A. Israel: Our Forum is called „Nuclear Energy, Society Safety.” Therefore,
the role of the society should be somehow emphasized. What do you think about the role
of the public in nuclear energy development, both in a positive and a negative sense
Very many people are simply afraid of nuclear energy, especially since Chernobyl. Another
thing is that everyone understands that today’s opposition to nuclear energy is
similar to the opposition to electricity in the past. Does this mean that we should work
out some kind of mechanism that would increase the participation of the public in the
construction, creation, and other aspects of nuclear power
––V. G. Asmolov: Thank you for such a good question. We think that whatever
we do, we do it for the society, because we are members of this society, and we are trying
to offer what we think it needs. The society always reacts in different ways. The society
should have its own experience. This experience is based on the social perception,
on what people think of what they are offered. It also depends on us, because in the past,
we provided very little information to the public about our activities. All of our virtues
as well as our shortcomings result from the fact that our nuclear energy programs were
born out of the secret work on the atomic bomb.
I personally entered the nuclear field after viewing the film Nine Days of One
Year. It was such a wonderful time. The public is unable to believe that it is possible, I
am sure. If you start mentioning numbers such as 10 -5 or 10 -7 , it does not mean anything
to people. For example, no one believes in God with uncertainty – either you believe in
God or you do not. The arguments we are trying to offer today will determine the course
of the issues.
Vladimir Mikhailovich (Kuznetsov) presented a wonderful piece of research. It
contains a vast amount of violations statistics, with all the violations being different.
It contains an international scale with levels from zero to seven and others. There are
incidents and accidents, which are events and violations. If we analyze all these violations
and suggestions with the Green Cross together, they are all level one, – that is, they
would not affect public safety. Such are the 40 or 45 violations that have occurred in the
last four years in the field of Russian nuclear energy. This is where our picture turns.
Secondly, we are not afraid to go out on the street, we are not afraid to be hit by a
car, because we are sure of our ability to control such processes. For example, we can cross
the street only in designated places, only on a green light; we can even avoid going outside.
But when it comes to nuclear energy, people think it’s something uncontrollable. These are
the arguments we should put out on the table: there is a very specific space within which we
provide safety and security. This is the so-called system of deep echelon protection, in-depth
protection with barriers of physical defense standing in the way of danger. For each physical
defense barrier, there is a certain group of soldiers on guard. These soldiers can stay in silence
for 60 years, but when the danger comes, they are ready to face it.
Such are the measures to operate these barriers, figuratively speaking. We could
have a double control system. First, we must do everything to prevent accidents and prove

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
that we can prevent them. Then, we must forget that we have proved it and construct barriers
and measures of fighting this supposed accident which, as we already proved, cannot
happen. All of these things would be perceived by the public in a certain way.
We also need to have middle men between us, the technocrats, and the people
whom we serve. If we do not know how to do something, we should learn how to do it.
Our explanations do not always come out easily; that is why we need teachers and middle
men or facilitators of some sort. Vladimir Mikhailovich talked about the importance
of closing the F-1 reactor. What is an F-1 reactor It is 500 tons of graphite and 50 tons
of uranium. We bring people there every week (I am still the deputy director of the Kurchatov
Institute). Even schoolchildren can hold this metal uranium in their hands, the
same uranium that is inside of the reactor. This reactor is functioning today with about
20–30 Watt power. It does not release anything at all, and we use it as a neutral source
so that we can calibrate the equipment. There is no better one. Our fathers constructed it
from uranium and graphite and obtained the first chain reaction. There are zero releases,
the limits are over 20 Watts of power. With its first load of fuel, it can work another
300 years. It is in the Guinness book of records. I live 50 meters away from it, and I am
definitely not afraid of it, because I know everything about it. We need to sit down and
solve these problems together. I am absolutely certain that we can explain everything to
each other in a simple way.
––Y. A. Israel: Vladimir Grigorievich, you have talked very interestingly about
the reactor. It is indeed safe. But when it comes to creating a new nuclear power plant
(NPP), does the region’s population participate in this decision somehow
––V. G. Asmolov: The latest example is quite famous. We are going to build the
Leningradskaya NPP-2 (LNPP) as a replacement plant for those four LWGRs which
function on the LNPP-1. That is where the first unit will be located. It will be the second
one since the NPP-2006. We have organized public hearings. It was amazing for me,
because in the auditorium for five hundred people, eight hundred people came.
These hearings were completely open. We published an Environmental Impact
Assessment – the evaluation of the unit’s impact upon the environment, and people
had an opportunity to read it. We had visitors, such as Russian experts as well as our
foreign colleagues from nearby Estonia and Finland. It was a very interesting four-hour
dialogue with tons of questions and tons of answers. It was quite important for me to see
that our community/society is growing.
The questions that were asked mostly concerned the releases of heat, cooling
towers, and so on. The risk of radiation as such was no longer present in the questions.
It means that the public is beginning to understand that in order to fight the radiation
risk, one has to make a monster out of it, and it should be giant. At the same time, after
everything we have been through, all the statistics point to the fact that the radiation risk
is really not such a monster. And fighting, let’s say a dog rather than a monster is not
as fun for some people. This is why I consider the analysis of the LNPP events and the
final document in which all the questions were answered (not a single one forgotten) as
a form of public dialogue.
––Y. A. Israel: But still, can the population legally refuse you the permission for
the construction

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––V. G. Asmolov: Of course.
––Y. A. Israel: Has there been such a case
––V. G. Asmolov: There were many more such cases in the previous decade.
They would close our sites one after another. Whereas now we have regions standing on
the waiting list, requesting to open sites for nuclear power stations. But the situation is
such that we do not come into a region that does not have the demand from the public.
––Y. A. Israel: I would still differentiate between the concept of region and that
of population. Region can either mean a governor or the region’s population, and one
can understand it differently.
––V. G. Asmolov: Every individual and each individual opinion should integrate
with the rest somehow, they should consolidate. There are regional powers, dumas,
cities, villages, et cetera. I cannot say that the situation changed substantially. Well,
actually, it did, because we understood these risks for life and how they are different.
The risk to live without heat and electricity is a very high risk in comparison with the
risk of radiation, even when taking into account all the past accidents. The public now
begins to understand it. Today, the public attitude towards it is serious, respectful, and
constructive in most regions. I can talk about it confidently, because the entire year of
1986, I was inside the fourth unit of the Chernobyl NPP.
––Paul Walker: First of all, thank you for the wonderful presentation. I would
like to ask everyone, and especially Vladimir Kuznetsov, a question concerning the
risk of terrorism. Mr. Lyulyashnik raised this question today. There is a huge discussion
going on in the United States regarding the ways and means of fighting terrorism
and how vulnerable we are to this threat. Another thing that is being discussed is the
risk of transporting the materials. There is a wide discussion going on regarding the
security measures and future spending on constructing new reactors. I would like
to ask the following question: here, in Russia, is there a serious evaluation of risks
connected to potential terrorist attacks Is the spending and insurance responsibility
taken into account when it comes to nuclear facilities and materials that are under
special risk
––V. G. Asmolov: There is no specific Russian position; there is a consolidated
international position on this issue. Following the events of 9/11, Russia specifically as
well as the world community in general started looking at the vulnerability of nuclear
energy facilities and materials with more concern. What is terrorism For us, it is one
of the so-called external events, an attack from outside, which we regard in a similar
way as tornadoes, earthquakes, and floods. In Russia, we conducted an evaluation of
Boeing-767 plane attacks on our units with full tanks and concentrated masses such as
propulsion reactors. The two latter ones are particularly vulnerable to attacks. Planes
can attack New York’s Twin Towers in such a flight, but it cannot dive downwards on
the plant, it can only land on it.
We had a very serious team looking at this issue. We in Russia as well as our
foreign colleagues possess very sensitive data which I cannot discuss in detail due to
its sensitive nature. So my answer is the following: even small improvements in the
construction of the reactor containment drastically reduce the likelihood of a disastrous
outcome in case of an attack. As for the rest, it is viewed as an external threat.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
On the other hand, at the most recent INSAK meeting in India, a similar situation
was considered. This is a philosophy of security and nuclear safety; this is the so-called
physical protection or defense. Physical protection should be viewed as one of the barriers
of safety. It should be like a physical barrier so it can counteract both external events,
such as terrorist attacks, and internal events, such as attempts to steal nuclear materials
from the inside of the facility. Therefore, although many people are now willing to
invest as much money as possible into the external physical barrier defense, we need
to limit it and have a balance. The balance should be the synergy of the nuclear safety
system and physical security.
What kind of suggestions can one offer here Take, for example, our NPP: should
we protect it from 15–20 terrorists, 100 terrorists, or a whole army of terrorists We
want to understand: when we are located in the middle of Russia, are we the last barrier
that fights terrorism or is there anyone else protecting us on the way In our understanding,
15–20 people are a substantial group; it would be difficult to imagine an army. If it
is indeed an army, the suggestions that were presented earlier will terribly increase the
insurance costs of the NPP. It was suggested to place rocket installations by the NPPs
and use them. But then, we as the utilizing organization will have to cover the costs of
these installations. Although people were saying even then: let us build stratostats as we
did during the war, and it will be much cheaper.
––V. A. Chuprov: The physical defense such as the internal army and the work
of the research institutes involved in the nuclear energy field, – are they included in the
cost of nuclear energy production And if they are not included but would be added to
the cost, how much would that increase the total cost
––V. G. Asmolov: The NPP project includes an estimated cost of the power-generating
unit. The cost of the power-generating unit also includes the technical project.
The technical project is tended to by the research director, the general constructor, and
a bunch of science and research institutes. It all costs money and it is all included in the
estimated cost, and they all receive the same salary that is included in the project cost.
As for the physical protection of the NPP, a separate chapter of the same project
is devoted to it. Its cost is indeed high and increases annually. We have to find a balance
in this aspect, as well. Of course, it is also included in the cost of the overall spending
that is allocated to the NPP. Payments to the employees who occupy themselves with
the physical defense are included in the NPP estimated exploitation costs. The budget is
paying for the internal army.
––I. V. Konyshev: Take the Balakovskaya NPP, for example. Everyone still remembers
how, in 2004, the residents of the Saratov, Samara, and Ulyanovsk regions
bravely consumed iodine. It happened because of a few careless words. And who was
better off as a result People who all poisoned themselves to hell Excuse my language.
––A. M. Vinogradova: If you would allow me to correct you, please. This is not
true. I would like to remind you of your promise to speak the truth. First of all, I must assure
you that there was not a single person in Balakovo who was poisoned by iodine.
––I. V. Konyshev: We are not talking about Balakovo, but about the Saratov region.
––A. M. Vinogradova: I just want to say that you have again said something
untrue. The public reaction to the events on the Balakovskaya NPP back then and in

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
February of this year was quite inadequate. But it was happening not because someone
said something wrong. In 2004, the Rosatom representatives (the NPP information
service) informed the public of what happened only on following day (on November 4).
Moreover, a representative of the Civil Defense and Emergencies department came out
to speak on the local television. He was all shaky. I do not know why he was shaking
like that, it would have been better if he had not come out at all.
Only after the Moscow specialists explained the situation on national television
was there some clarity. As for this year’s February incident – again, the Moscow service
disclosed the correct information, whereas our people lied again. The information
regarding the accidental stopping of the power-generating unit that was provided by
the NPP did not at all coincide with the official information provided by the Moscow
experts. That is why I ask you to please pay attention to your experts and not to the
public reaction.
––I. V. Konyshev: I was not talking about the public reaction; I was talking
about the comments of the Civil Defense and Emergencies Department. Besides, I can
remember one more „accident”: the explosion of the power substation at the factory in
Gorniy. If you remember, it happened in 2002 or 2003. The substation malfunctioned,
and the Civil Defense and Emergencies Department commented on it as if it were a
critical accident. As a result, half of the Saratovskaya oblast thought themselves to be
poisoned with mustard and lewisite gas, neither of which is explosive by definition. You
and I, we are both saying the same thing: one should treat information carefully. The
news of some type of an extreme situation in itself must be carefully verified in order to
avoid inflicting any kind of socio-psychological trauma upon the population.
In connection with this, my dear colleagues, we are the new Rosatom team.
What happened in 2004 was, of course, on Rosatom’s watch; but it was when different
people worked there. What we are now trying to do, what we are trying to correct, and
whatever is coming out of it or not is, basically, what we do. If we do it together, I think
it will be productive. But if we are busy accusing each other of something, we will not
be productive. Moreover, it will be harmful to the people who surround us. That is our
position, and with this position, we are open for communication and dialogue. Honestly,
I have really liked today’s discussion, because everyone was able to state their position.
Everyone was able to express whatever information or views they have accumulated,
to which they have devoted themselves and their time, so that this information could
become interesting to others, as well.
Thank you so very much.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Radiation Heritage of the Cold War
Vladimir M. Kuznetsov, Director, „Nuclear and Radiation
Safety” Programme, Green Cross Russia, PhD
The Cold War left us with enormous radiation heritage, which is a serious radiation
danger from the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation regime and environmental
security as well as significant financial costs. Billions were spent on nuclear development
and testing of nuclear weapons (since 1945, the United States has produced 550 tons of
weapons-grade uranium and 112 tons of weapons-grade plutonium with total costs on nuclear
weapons arsenal accounting for 3.6 trillions dollars). Today unaccountable expenses
are added on radiological security, cutting down and dismantlement of these materials.
Many countries accumulated enormous amounts of excess fissile materials, including
industrial reactor-grade plutonium. In 2002 the Russian HEU inventory was
1,500 tons, and weapons-grade plutonium was 140–160 tons (according to other sources
– 150 tons of plutonium and 30 tons of plutonium fuel). These numbers do not include
plutonium and uranium extracted from spent nuclear fuel (SNF), or produced by nuclear
reactors, transport installations and industrial reactors. Most of these materials are not
under international safeguards.
It is also important to note that, before the start up of the first nuclear reactor by
Fermi in 1942 in Chicago, there was less than 50 kg Pu in the entire Earth core and in
the ocean waters. Due to nuclear weapons tests, accidents and imperfect recycling technologies,
plutonium spread to the environment near the nuclear industries locations in
the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and other countries. According to the
evaluations of the UN Commission on Environment, about 3.9 tons of 239 Pu and 240 Pu
have fallen out on the earth’s surface.
March 5, 1946 is considered to be the beginning of the Cold War, which was
initiated by Churchill’s speech in Fulton against the former Soviet Union: „…A shadow
has fallen upon the scenes so lately light by the Allied victory… the Communist parties
or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization. For
that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we
can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”
The speech was not his personal point of view. Churchill, who by that time had
lived for many years in Florida (he was not needed in England after the end of the World
War II), often had consultations with Truman, the U.S. President, and the President’s
inner circles, with the goal of confirming his position. Truman himself arrived at the
historical lecture by Churchill and personally introduced the speaker to the audience. The
essence of Sir Winston’s speech was the call for all the English-speaking countries and
peoples to unite against the major threat to the world – the Soviet Union. Churchill cyni-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
cally mentioned that the West has superiority in weapons, including in the nuclear arsenal
and there was an opportunity to dictate its own conditions. In case the Soviet Union
refused to take these conditions, a preventive war could take place against the country.
Churchill used the phrase „Iron Curtain” for the first time. Churchill’s metaphor
became the basis for the creation of NATO. In the middle of the 20 th century a superweapon
was created – a nuclear bomb. In August 1945, the first two atomic bombs,
based on nuclear chain reaction, were dropped by American aviation on the two Japanese
cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the Soviet Union, the first nuclear weapon test
was conducted four years later, in 1949. Almost immediately after the end of World
War II, in which the Soviet Union and the United States were allies, a Cold War begins
against the Soviet Union. In order to find out the relation between the growing international
tensions and intensification of works on atomic project, it is necessary to indicate
historical stages of the cold war.
The first period (end of the 1940s–1960s): extreme confrontation period
– Stalin’s demand to review the borders in Europe and Asia, the Black Sea channels;
Winston Churchill’s speech in Fulton in March, 1946 with the call to protect the Western
world from the USSR influence by all possible means; Truman Doctrine (February, 1947).
The measures to „save Europe from the Soviet expansion” (including the creation
of the military bases near the Soviet borders). The major doctrines:
– the Containment doctrine;
– the Soviet Union block of Eastern-European countries (with the support of local
Communist parties and the Soviet Union bases), and reproduction in these countries
of the soviet model of development;
– the „Iron Curtain,”
– the Stalinist interference in the domestic and international politics of the Soviet
block countries;
– the purges, repressions and executions.
Atomic project: creation and launching of the first nuclear research reactor „A” in
Eurasia (12/26/1948), first radio-chemical plant „B” (12/22/1948), launch of the chemical-medical
factory „B” (February, 1949), nuclear weapons testing (08/29/1949).
The Cold War climax – 1949–1960s: NATO establishment, the Economic cooperation
council and Warsaw pact organization:
– confrontation of the two military and political blocks, weapons build up, including
nuclear missiles;
– the Berlin crisis and establishment of the two German republics;
– conflicts and wars in South-East Asia (Korea, Vietnam) and Middle East with
direct participation of the Soviet Union and the United States;
– Cuban missile crisis of 1962 (the world at the stage of a new world war);
– Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Atomic project: the launch of 16 industrial reactors at facilities №№ 817, 816,
815; the beginning of HEU production at the facility №813 (the Urals Electrochemical
Plant, Novouralsk city, Sverdlovskaya oblast), launch of facility №814 on HEU production
(„Electrokhimprovod” plant, Lesnoy); launch of the factory №250 – Novosibirsk
plant of the chemical concentrates – nuclear fuel production for industrial and power

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
reactors; launch of the plant №544 in Glasov (the Udmurt Republic) – nuclear fuel
production for industrial reactors and zirconium rolling; launch of the factory №12,
Electrostal (Moscow obalst) – nuclear fuel production for the transport and transportable
nuclear power installations; nuclear installation creation for the first generation of
under-water nuclear ice breakers; nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons testing; launch
of the first power units at the Belojarsk and Novovoronezh atomic power plants, widerange
research nuclear installations.
The second period of the Cold War (the 1970s): the international policy of détente
––The treaties between the German Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, Poland,
German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia;
––Western Berlin agreement, the Soviet-American negotiations on arms control;
––the 1975 Helsinki Agreement on security and cooperation in Europe (attempts
of the two systems’ coexistence, and their challenges and antagonisms);
––military and political parity between the Soviet Union and the United States.
The Atomic project: nuclear parity with the United States based on the amount
of nuclear warheads (1978) and nuclear submarines (NS); large-scale fissile materials
production; nuclear power stations entry to operation.
The third period (end of the 1970s – mid 1980s)
––The end of the „detente” policy, international confrontation intensification of
the two blocs;
––Soviet-American relations change for the worse;
––new weapons race, the U.S. SDI program;
––increased interference in the policy of the Middle East and Latin American
countries;
––the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; continuing Cold War policy during the
Socialist system crisis.
The Atomic project: Start up of operations of the two industrial reactors at the
Mayak facility; the third generation NS invention; start up of power reactors based on
the fast neutrons (Shevchenkovskaya and Beloyarskaya nuclear power plants); largescale
fissile material extraction at the radio-chemical plant RT-1, Mayak facility; further
introduction of the second generation nuclear power units.
The fourth period (end of the 1980s – early 1990s): international policy of détente
––The Soviet President, M.S. Gorbachev; the August 1991 putsch and „perestroika”
crisis as an attempt of socialist reforms;
––the Soviet Union collapse, Russia’s independence declaration, B.Yeltsin became
the first President of Russia and starts implementation of liberal reforms;
––the Communist party stopped to exist;
––Russia transitioned to market economy and liberal political system;
––the economic crisis and „shock therapy.”
Atomic project: NS accident in Chazhma bay (1985); end of enriched fissile material
production (1988–1994); Chernobyl catastrophe (1986); declassification of information
about radioactive accidents at Mayak in 1957, 1966, 1967; NS Komsomolets
accident (1986); radiation accident in Tomsk-7 (1993); sharp decrease in nuclear power
plants (NPP) construction.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The fifth period (mid 1990s – present): international policy of détente
––Controversies and social consequences of privatization;
––price liberalization effects on the people;
––savings devaluation, price increase, unemployment rate growth;
––the kolkhoz system crisis; inflation; workers protests; brain drain; growth of
entrepreneurship; bank system establishment; stock companies, private banks and business
growth; capitalism system development;
––establishment of new economic management system;
––development of international trade and Russia’s integration into global economy.
Other changes:
––consumer market grows;
––the Russian Federation political system development and attempts to preserve
the territorial unity of Russia;
––combat with terrorism and crime, anti-terrorism campaign in Chechnya;
––Putin elected as a new president of Russia;
––9/11 in the United States, war on domestic and international terrorism.
Atomic project: „Megatons to Megawatts” program; conversion of industrial nuclear
reactors to peaceful use facilities; decommission of the first and second generation
NPPs; 13 nuclear power units operation termination; decommissioning of nuclear research
reactors; nuclear warheads production less than 10% of the Cold War production
rate; large scale destruction work takes place (1,500 warheads are destroyed annually);
military research decreases; the number of employees at the nuclear laboratories decreased
by 2/3 of the Cold War estimates.
Despite the changes, Russia still has two times more nuclear facilities and four
times more defense personnel, than the United States. The program adopted by the
Russian government in 1998 envisioned the termination of nuclear explosive devices
production at two of the four facilities in the industry by 2000, the ending of nuclear
explosive device research by 2003 and integration of HEU and plutonium production
in one facility. By 2005 the number of the personnel at the defense program will by
reduced by 40,000 and at the manufacturing production from 40,000 to 15,000 people.
Even if this plan was accomplished, the military industry will be able to produce 2,000
warheads per year. Actual production is 200–300 units per year.
Each of the Cold War periods is closely connected to the atomic project. For example,
during the first period (1940s–1960s), the nuclear weapons system in the Soviet
Union included twenty enterprises, and the most important of them were located in ten
closed territories and had an ability to produce up to three-four warheads per year. At
these enterprises there have been sixteen nuclear industrial reactors, which produced
nuclear fissile materials for the weapons and special isotopes for thermonuclear weapons.
Some examples of work load, planned for 1950–1954 by the Soviet Union Council
of Ministers Resolution №5060–1943, dated October 29, 1949 (Book 4, Volume 2 „The
USSR Nuclear Project”, 342–354): for 1949–1954 – plutonium units – 154 (plus one
testing unit), 1949 – 2 units, 1950 – 7, 1951 – 18, 1952 – 30, 1953 – 42, 1954 – 54.
The plan for 1949–1954: 992 kg of plutonium, in particular 890 kg at uranium-graphite

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
reactors and 102 kg at heavy-water reactors, with daily plutonium production of 114 g
on January 1, 1950 and 1,255 grams on January 1, 1955. The approximate production
investment in 1950–1954 was established for 16 billion rubles (based on prices in 1949)
and 3.96 billion rubles for uranium ore extraction in foreign mines. The Resolution’s
content is an example of the extraordinary development of atomic production, starting
in 1945 and developing during the first five years, at the time when an atomic industry
was starting from scratch.
At the nuclear installations, during the 1940s and later, major attention was given
not to the personnel and population protection from radiation dangers, but rather to
higher results in economic and production indicators. These indicators, in turn, were the
result of the arms race. Unique and expensive materials as well as equipment for nuclear
technology, which could be disturbed or destroyed in an accident, were valued more
than health and lives of soldiers, scientists, prisoners and other people at the facilities.
This same anti-human and administrative approach was used in the construction
of NPPs. Up until 1992, the radiation safety norms of allowed radiation effects on
a human were the fourteenth priority in 1973 and the sixth priority in 1990 in the legal
papers of atomic industry, far away from the top priorities: the nuclear security production
papers and legislation (“The Statute on Security Support” and „Nuclear Security
Rules”), and included the maintenance rules for reactor equipment. Such an approach
led to a large-scale contamination of the environment. The most intensive fluid radioactive
waste discharges at Mayak (facilityies №817) into the Techa River took place from
1949–1956 and were presented as radio-chemical waste [1]. Almost entire beta-activity
of the fluid radioactive waste consisted of uranium fission elements with various halflives.
As a result of irradiation of the units before their chemical dissemination, the
outcome was mostly a medium and long-term products. Alpha-activity of the waste
(uranium isotopes, plutonium and other trans-uranium elements) was much lower.
The difficulties, existed at the first stage of Mayak activity on liquid fuel waste
control, including analysis and instrumental difficulties in defining radionuclide amounts,
and absence of technical accountability documentation until 1958, allow us establish only
approximate evaluation of Techa contamination [2]. For the period of 1949–1956, discharges
of 90 Sr and 137 Cs, which caused long-term contamination of the river system are
estimated as 0.35 mKu. Other radionuclide make up for 0.2 mKu. The date is available
only from the Mayak facility, the similar data from other facilities is classified [1].
Nuclear weapons tests, large radiation accidents, emissions and discharges of
NPPs and industry led to human-generated radionuclides in the biosphere in general and
high radioactivity of some territories. From the environmental security perspective, the
most significant consequences grew out of military activities. These activities include:
––environment contamination near Mayak (Chelyabinsk-65), Siberian Chemical
Plant (Tomsk-7), the State Chemical Plant (Krasnoyarsk-26) during the first years of
nuclear weapons production;
––nuclear and radiological waste accumulation, particularly near the NS bases;
––radioactive materials accumulation at the nuclear fuel cycle facilities, particularly
large amounts of radioactive waste, which was not recycled to a safe environmental
condition;

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––large number of nuclear and radiation dangerous facilities, which also include
reactor installation and weapons-grade nuclear materials production, removed from the
Federal Navy Fleet, and fissile materials resulting from weapons destruction and dismantlement.
Radionuclide-contaminations took place at 22 facilities of atomic power
industry, which are located in 16 Russian districts.
The total contamination accounts for 480 km 2 , including lands – 376 km 2 , and waters
– 104 km 2 . Industrial grounds include – 63 km 2 , including – 220 km 2 in inhabited areas, and
observation territories – 197 km 2 . Territories with contamination level with more than 2 micro
Zv/hour expand to 6 km 2 . The largest amount of contaminated territories has five plants: the
Siberian chemical plant – 10.4 km 2 , Priargunskoye production chemical union – 8.5 km 2 ,
mountain-chemical plant – 4.7 km 2 , Chepetsky mechanical plant – 1.35 km 2 .
Historically, radioactivity in the air above earth surface and waters equals
0.12x10 -9 and 0.01x10 -9 Ku per m 3 . The data is taken from P.N. Teverskoy „Atmospheric
Electricity,” published in 1949 and has a special value, because it was calculated before
nuclear tests effects on the atmosphere [3]. According to the recent data the atmospheric
fallout is a result of air-based nuclear tests in the 1960s and to industrial waste. For
example, NPPs add to the surface activity approximately 0.1 Ku per km 2 . The data comparison
with Tverskoy’s book data shows that in the nuclear era, the radioactive fallout
magnitude from the atmosphere has increased by 10x10 6 times.
From 1955 to 1996, the Soviet Union built five ships with nuclear power units,
nine nuclear ice-breakers (one has not been completed), an atomic barge and 249 NSs.
By 1996, the Russian Navy included 241 NSs: 55 – first generation, 142 – second
generation and 34 – third generation vessels, as well as 8 NSs with fluid metal power
supply and 2 research submarines (Papa and Mike as in NATO classification), and 5
super-small NSs. The submarines had 441 nuclear power installations, the ships had 8,
and 15 installations were placed on nuclear ice-breakers.
In general the Russian atomic fleet (including civilian vessels) consisted of 30
vessel and ship types. For example, 240 nuclear powered military ships have been built.
In Russia, according to January 1, 2004 data, the entire first generation of NSs was
decommissioned, including most of NSs with OK-560 B-3 reactors, and all NSs with
a power unit.
The maximum service period of decommissioned nuclear war-head missiles is
forty years (K-3), the life-time of the first generation NSs is 35.8 years on average, and
35% of the submarines served more than thirty years. Up to 40% of decommissioned
NSs have been without any service up to twenty years. Long-term stationing in the
waters led to corrosion and defects. The first-generation NSs are in the worst condition,
whose corrosion has achieved a critical level. The largest part of NSs with SNF
lost the integrity of tanks main ballast and can sink. In order to avoid sinking, 15 NSs
were moved closer to the shore. Submarines with nuclear spent fuel represent a serious
radiation danger for the population and the environment. The risk of accidents increases
each year and can happen due to various causes, but the most likely ones are personnel
mistakes, fires and flooding.
The real scale of potential nuclear and radiation danger in Russia is based on
the following data: large-scale decommissioning of the NSs fleet, resulted in 300 active

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
areas (or more than 70,000 heat-emitting bodies); more than 14,000 m 3 of fluid radioactive
waste and 26,000 m 3 of solid radioactive waste stored at the overloaded Russian
fleet bases. This waste causes increasing pressure on the environment and the population,
in particular the Scandinavian population. A separate concern is an imbalance
between increasing nuclear reactors active zones at the vessel-repair plants and SNF
shipment for further recycling. The SNF from NSs makes up 500 million Ku, and half
of this activity is accounted for nuclear fuel, which remains in nuclear installations of
decommissioned submarines. The total activity of radioactive waste resulted from the
entire Russian nuclear industry activity makes up billions of Ku; during the Northern
fleet exploitation with nuclear power installation (nearly 200 reactors) 5,000–7,000 m 3
of fluid radioactive waste is annually produced with activity of 3.7 ТBq (100 Ku): 30%
– in White sea region and 70% – in Barents sea.
At present in the storages of the shore-based technical bases and technical tankers
there are approximately 14,000 tons of liquid radioactive waste, and there are no available
tanks to accept this waste. In the storages of the bases there is 20,000 tons of solid
radioactive waste with the total activity – 37 TBq. High-activity radioactive waste accounts
for 5–7%. The total activity of the accumulated radioactive waste from NSs’ activity
exceeded 270,000 Ku; shore-based storage for solid radioactive waste does not provide
necessary storage space. The total magnitude of radioactive construction materials of NSs
under utilization is 600,000 tons; the number of NSs material is 1.5 million tons.
The USSR navy sank 8 reactors of the first generation NPPs at the Northern fleet
and 2 reactor installations in the Pacific. During the 1950–1970s at the seabed of Northern
and Pacific oceans more than 25,000 containers with nuclear waste were discharged:
in the North more than 17,000 containers, and the rest – in the Pacific. According to the
official data, in Russia the total radioactive materials waste into water was 325 kKu,
unofficial data states – 2,500 kKu.
Since the first Soviet NS launch in 1957, the Soviet NSs had 26 declassified accidents
(and 19 remain classified). 5 NSs were lost, and 405 people died. On diesel submarines,
10 accidents took place and 369 people died. 20 accidents on NSs (273 dead)
took place in the Soviet era and 6 (132 dead) – after 1991. 5 accidents on NSs (27 dead)
are due to atomic reactors and mismanagement. Fires and explosions at NSs took place
12 times (316 dead). 4 submarines sank. Nine more accidents were related to technical
fault, mismanagement or navigation mistakes. These accidents resulted in 62 deaths.
The space navigation history has 48 spacecrafts with nuclear power installations
on board (36 Russian and 12 American units) [4]. Six of the installations had experienced
accidents. As a result of spacecraft destruction, the most danger stems from radioactive
plutonium: 450 g 238 Pu, if it equally spreads, is enough to cause cancer of the entire
population on Earth. In addition, 238 Pu emits 280 times more energy, than 239 Pu, and,
therefore, is 280 times more radioactive. In space, the danger from 32.75 kg of 238 Pu
equals 770 kg of 239 Pu. As a result of accidents, related to destruction of a spacecraft,
equipped with nuclear power unit, the Earth atmosphere receives a significant amount
of radionuclide with long half-life (for example, cesium or strontium).
Similar to a forest after human activity, the near-earth cosmic space accumulated
a significant amount of waste, brought there by man – more than 3,000 tons. At present

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in the near-earth space there are 8,000 fragments larger than 10 cm in size and 300,000
smaller elements, but which are still very dangerous. Space debris, if not removed, will
spin at high near-earth orbits for many years. Man-caused contamination may lead to
catastrophic satellite collision and rockets with hard waste. At a 800–1,000 km altitude,
currently, there are approximately 50 objects with radioactive fragments.
The danger stems not only from radioactive contamination of the environment
and related consequences. The danger can be for the personnel at nuclear facilities, as
well as for neighboring populations (in the 30 km distance from NPPs or atomic industry
facilities there are 1,300 settlements with 4 million people). On January 1, 2003 the
total personnel of Minatom composed 1.634 million people. In the Russian Federation
Government Resolution (dated February 23, 1997, №191) the health indicators show
their decline for both facility personnel and inhabitants of human settlements near nuclear
facilities. 58% of the cases are malignant growth and makes up for 28% of the total
magnitude of the patients served by the Federal Department of medico-biology and other
extreme problems in the Russian Ministry of Health. The number of cases of late diagnosis
of malignant growth has risen sharply, and most of these cases are not caught during
routine medical check-ups. At the nuclear fuel cycle facilities, 2,000 people are registered
as carriers of high level plutonium in their bodies. A direct connection between plutonium
levels and lung cancer rate has already been proven.
The number of mental disease cases of the nuclear facilities’ employees for the
past three years grew by 50%. There is a serious danger for potential accidents at a nuclear
facility due to an employee’s mistake. The number of highly qualified personnel
at especially dangerous production facilities decreases. Among the employees there are
individuals, who received exceeding standards doses of ionized radiation and dangerous
chemical elements, and who also suffer from other work-related diseases. At especially
dangerous production facilities, 80% of employees have second-grade immune deficiencies.
General health indicators of the population near nuclear facilities are not positive.
The death rate of the population in „closed cities’ and around Minatom production
facilities has grown by 1.5 times. In addition, there is a decrease in birth rates and the
rate of children born with deformities is two time the Russian rate.
Conclusion
The development of life on Earth took place against a background of natural
radioactivity. The sources of such radioactivity are cosmic radiation and various radionuclides.
As a result of nuclear industry activities, artificial radionuclides are injected
into the biosphere, and mining increases the magnitude of natural radionuclides.
The problem became a characteristic of the 20 th century and will have consequences
for the next thousand of years. At present all ecosystems in one way or another
are contaminated with radioactive elements, caused by nuclear explosions on land, in
the atmosphere and water. The major contaminated regions, which require large-scale
financing, at present are the places of construction, location, repair and utilization of
NSs: Murmanskaya oblast – $1.67 billion; Primorsky kray – $735 million; Arkhangelskaya
oblast – $580 million; Kamchatkaya oblast – $285 million.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Further there are regions which had nuclear weapons elements production at
their site (first of all – plutonium, uranium and tritium). These regions need financial
support in the following amounts: Chelyabinskaya oblast – $845 million; Krasnoyarsky
kray – $504 million; Tomskaya oblast – $353 million. Furthermore, there are the cities
with key research and experimental nuclear industry bases: Moscow and Moscow oblast
– $246 million; Obninsk (Kaluzhskaya oblast) – $131 million; Dmitrovgrad (Ulyanovskaya
oblast) – $112 million; Saint-Petersburg and Leningradskaya oblast – $92
million; Sarov (Nizhegorodskaya oblast) – $17 million.
At the end of the list are the regions, which require finances to eliminate peaceful
nuclear explosion consequences; modernization of the Rodon facilities, which
allocate and temporary store radioactive waste; rehabilitation of uranium mines territories;
nuclear tests grounds and NPPs: Permskaya – $110 million, Orenburgskaya
– $12 million and Arkhangelskaya oblast’s – $11 million; Sakha-Yakutia – $10 million;
Sverdlovskaya – $9 million, Penzenskaya – $9 million and Chitinskay oblast’s – $8
million; Bashkortostan – $6 million; Khanty-Mancijsk Autonomy oblast – $5 million;
Novosibirskaya oblast – $6 million; Tatarstan – $5 million; Stavropol Kray – $4 million;
Kirovskaya – $3 million, Volgogradskaya – $2 million and Saratovskaya oblast’s
– $2 million; Krasnodarsky kray – $1 million; Ivanovskaya – $1 million, Rostovskaya
– $1 million and Samarskaya oblast’s – $1 million.
Bryanskaya oblast needs $12 million to eliminate the consequences of Chernobyl.
The total cost of activities is $5.81 billion. This is the price of the Cold War for Russia.
References
1. Kuznetsov, V.M. The Major Problems and Modern Safety Condition of Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Plants in the Russian Federation, 2nd edition, reviewed. Moscow: Epicenter, 2003. 461 p.
2. Kuznetsov, V.M. Russian Atomic Power Industry. Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.
Moscow: Golos-press, 2000. 287 p.
3. Tverskoy, P.N. The Atmospheric Electricity. Leningrad, Hidrometeoisdat, 1949. 252 p.
4. Vlasov, M.N.; Krichevsky, S.V. Environmental Security of Space Activity, Moscow:
Nauka, 1999. 268 p.
Kuznetsov – Questions and Answers
– A. V. Yablokov: I admire the work of this book’s authors. It will serve as an excellent
resource for data in this field. My question is the following: When speaking about
the Chernobyl accident, you only mention the three former Soviet republics: Ukraine,
Belarus, and the European part of Russia. However, a large amount of the fallout ended
up beyond these territories. Why do you not mention that
V. M. Kuznetsov: The question of environmental pollution resulting from the
accident should be considered separately. Last year, for the 20th anniversary of the
Chernobyl accident, Green Cross Russia held what I consider a powerful international
conference regarding the independent International Environmental Politics University.
This conference served as a discussion forum on the issue of pollution not only on the
territory of the Russian Federation, but also on those of other former Soviet republics.
An impressive amount of literature and information was presented there, including

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research on European and Asian countries. Copies in English were distributed in the
hallway, and, at the end, only two or three copies were left. They represent a summary
of the work that was conducted, and contain a lot of useful information. And I already
found plenty of information in the present research paper, as well.
– A. G. Nazarov: Alexey Vladimirovich presented the question very well. One
thing that we can say is that we also had the question of how to consider such accidents
as Chernobyl. Should we consider civil nuclear energy as a direct „radiation legacy”
of the Cold War We do understand that Chernobyl was a direct consequence of the
Cold War, and this was a reactor that came out directly from the depths of the military
nuclear complex. If we succeed one day to restart the reactor (although it is unlikely
we will be able to do so in our lifetime, but perhaps some later generations will), then
I think we can say that. But there is no substantial analysis or research done on all the
countries, unfortunately. When we were writing our research and collecting data, there
had not been any analysis or evaluation of the effects of the Chernobyl accident on all
the European and non-European countries. I was involved in it and monitored it and
now the situation has improved. We are preparing a separate piece of research devoted
specifically to radiation accidents. We do not know whether said research will be successful,
nor do we know if we will be able to publish it. However, we intend to publish
our findings.

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Russia’s Priorities under the Global Partnership Framework
Valery I. Biryukov, Head of Unit, Department for Security
and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
The Global Partnership (GP) against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction began at the Kananaskis Summit in Canada in 2002. The GP priorities
included chemical weapons destruction, nuclear submarine (NS) dismantlement,
plutonium disposition, and employment of former weapons scientists. The consensus
was that, in the beginning, the GP would focus on projects in Russia. From the GP
priorities mentioned above, two were identified as primary ones, destroying chemical
weapons and dismantling NSs.
The unique feature of the GP was that leaders coupled political agreements with
financial obligations. The G-8 countries accepted the obligation to contribute up to $20
billion. Among them, Russia agreed to allocate $2 billion.
At the Kananaskis Summit, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin noted
that Russia had inherited a number of complicated problems from the Soviet Union.
One of these problems was the large amount of weapons that had been stockpiled and
were aging and awaiting destruction. These weapons posed no threat of proliferation
because they were under tight control. However, first and foremost, they presented a
danger from an environmental perspective. In this context, the Russian President pointed
out that the Russian GP priorities should be the destruction of chemical weapons,
which was a disarmament project for us, and the integrated dismantling of NSs which
had been decommissioned from the Russia’s Northern and Far Eastern Fleets. In other
words, these priorities encompassed environmental tasks.
Since 2002, we have obtained a substantial level of success in fulfilling these two
priorities. During this period, we have succeeded in establishing a multilateral framework
for cooperation between the G-8 countries. Without this legal base, it would have been
impossible to begin our work. Believe me, it was not easy. The turning point for Russia
was the Framework Agreement on Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the
Russia, which entered into force in 2003 and has become a model agreement. On the basis
of this agreement, intergovernmental agreements for priority areas have been signed with
the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Norway, France, and Switzerland.
Chemical weapons destruction facilities have been built at Gorny (Saratovskaya
oblast) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic). Another facility is being built in Shchuch’ye
(Kurganskaya oblast). With our partners’ help, we have dismantled 21 NSs (out of a
total of 69). In addition, we are conducting work on the physical protection of nuclear
materials, radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) disposition, and the employment
of former nuclear scientists.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
I cannot ignore the substantial increase in funding from Russia for GP programs. We
have already allocated $1.896 billion for chemical weapons destruction and $348 million for
NS dismantlement. That is, the two priority programs are mainly funded by Russia. Moreover,
in the next five years we intend to allocate about 117 billion rubles to chemical weapons
destruction and about 1.2 billion rubles to NS dismantlement. In this case, the total funds
contributed by Russia to the GP will exceed 156 billion rubles by 2012. That is, we will have
allocated 104 billion rubles more than we pledged at Kananaskis.
In comparison, from 2002 to 2006, Russia received approximately $740 million
from GP members for the priority projects. Of that amount, $297.4 million was spent on
chemical weapons destruction and $443 million on dismantling NSs. However, these
figures represent the resources that have actually been used for projects in Russia.
Without a doubt, we expected more. If we add up the funds promised for chemical
weapons destruction from 2002 to 2006, we should have received $1.6 billion. As I have
already mentioned, according to Rosatom’s calculations, only $297 million were contributed
to projects in Russia during this period. That means that there is a gap between the
declared resources and those actually spent on the projects.
There is another substantial problem. Taking into account that the construction of
the last chemical weapons destruction facility should be completed in 2009, the bulk of
the foreign aid will be needed in 2007–2009. Literally, that is now. The aid constitutes
over 30 billion rubles. Unfortunately, so far we have not seen any efforts from our partners
to allocate these funds to us.
There are partners who still have to turn their political obligations into projects.
Some limit themselves to the old programs that were started prior to the GP initiative. We
know that some political obligations undertaken in Kananaskis have not been substantiated
by financial means. This applies first and foremost to the European Union and Italy.
Additionally, all donor countries choose their own companies as contractors.
These contractors are basically in charge of the allocations, and in some cases, their services
cost up to 70% of the appropriated money. It is often suggested that we should purchase
the equipment from the collaborating countries. The use and service of the foreign
equipment require additional employee training, and parts and accessories can only be
purchased from the supplying companies. All of this contributes to a substantial increase
in cost, which leads to an increase in compensation spending for Russia.
There are also difficulties in the sphere of NS dismantlement. Overall, the international
collaboration on integrated NS dismantlement is developing quite well in Northwest
Russia. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the Russian Far East (RFE).
In RFE, only the United States, Japan, Australia, and South Korea are providing us assistance.
And yet, as soon as 2010, we will need to have dismantled 20 NSs in the North
and 25 in RFE (not taking into account the additional NSs that will have been decommissioned
by 2010). It is extremely important that the partners participate in programs
concerning nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste. If we cannot deal with nuclear spent
fuel and radioactive waste properly, then there is not much point in dismantling NSs, as it
is not the remaining metals but the radioactive materials that are dangerous.
According to Russian assessments, there is no need to discuss changes in the GP
priorities until at least 2010, as we are still facing the massive tasks of destroying chemical

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
weapons and dismantling NSs. If we create another priority program without finishing the
ones we have already begun, thus stopping half-way, we will only scatter our resources.
I would also like to inform you that, in accordance with the decision stated in the
GP report at St. Petersburg, a study on the accomplishment of GP goals will be conducted
at the Heiligendamm Summit in 2007. We assume that the study’s main purpose is to objectively
evaluate the GP members’ participation. We will need to determine what steps
should be taken to accomplish our priorities based on this evaluation.
In conclusion, I would to note that in spite of the difficulties we have, which seem
inevitable in a collaborative process within the framework of this unique program, the
Russian Federation highly values the GP’s contribution to chemical weapons destruction
and NS dismantlement.
From our viewpoint, this program is gradually acquiring truly global characteristics.
The addition of thirteen donor countries and one recipient country since 2002 to the
GP is testimony to that fact.

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Integrated Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines and
International Cooperation
Аlexander V. Grigoriev, Head Department of Dismantlement
Nuclear and Radiation-Dangerous Facilities, Rosatom
Since the end of the 1950s, in the former Soviet Union, large-scale projects of
the naval nuclear complex took place, which included development of nuclear-powered
submarines and surface ships. In order to maintain these ships, the Navy built support
infrastructure of coastal technical bases and technical service vessels.
To date 250 nuclear submarines (NS) of different types have been built; five
ships with nuclear powered installations, several dozen technical service vessels and
four coastal technical bases for docking and repairs and temporary storage of solid and
fluid radioactive waste, which are formed during ship’s operation and service.
During the nuclear Navy development, the total number of nuclear-powered vessels
were as follows; NS – 250, ships with nuclear powered installations – 5, ice-breakers
– 8, light cargo ships – 1.
As a result of the service life termination and Russia’s accomplishment of its
international obligations, an intensive process of multi-purpose NS and ship dismantlement
was initiated in the second half of the 1980s.
Up until 1998, only three to five NS per year were dismantled, and 13–14 NS per
year were disarmed. This slow pace led to the fast accumulation of NSs in depots. The
majority of these submarines had nuclear fuel waste on board. Today the dismantlement
pace has increased and complete dismantlement of NS is planned for 2010. You can see
the dynamics of the process in Picture 1.
Scale of the problems with NSs dismantlement
The total activity of the accumulated materials from NSs and radioactive waste
is eight million Ku. The total weight of radioactive construction materials is one million
tons. It will take 300 special trains to transport this spent nuclear waste. Based on
technical and economic evaluations, only four billion US dollars are needed to solve
the top-priority dismantlement of nuclear ships and vessels, as well as rehabilitation of
other related facilitates.
In order to resolve problems related to NS disassembly and the rehabilitation of
unsafe facilities due to radiation, the Russian Federation Government in its Act, dated
28 May 1998, established Minatom as a contractor to accomplish the task. Five plants
in the northern region (Sevmorput, Nerpa, Poliarinky, Zvezdochka, and Sevmashpredpiatie)
and three in the Far East (Zvezda, Chazhminki, Viluchinsky) were named for the
project’s execution.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Picture 1. NSs removal from Navy operation and rurther disassembly
Technical service bases in the Northern Region are located in Gremikha and Andreeva
Bay, and in the Pacific Ocean Region; Sisoyev Bay and Krasheninnikov Bay.
International inter-governmental agreements were in the framework of Kananaskis
talks, which include:
––Global Partnership agreement against proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons
of mass destruction Heads of State Initiative formulated at the Kananaskis in 2002;
––An agreement on multilateral nuclear-environmental program in the Russian
Federation, dated 21 May 2003;
––Communications Expert Group Establishment to work with the IAEA;
––Additional Protocol to the Russia–UK Agreement on cooperation in the peaceful
nuclear energy cooperation, dated 26 June 2003;
––Russia–Italy Agreement on cooperation in Russian NSs dismantlement and
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) safe management, dated 5 November
2005;
––Russia–Canada Agreement on cooperation in the area of chemical weapons destruction,
NSs dismantlement, accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear and
radioactive materials, dated 9 June 2004;
––Russia – North Environmental Finance Corporation Agreement.
Table 1 represents the means to accomplish signed agreements.
International agreements and arrangements list as indicated in international
documents
––Agreement between Minatom of the Russia and the Federal Economy Ministry
of Germany on support in Russian nuclear weapons disarmament by way of NSs disassembly
(10/09/2003).
––Agreement between Rosatom and Norway Foreign Affairs Ministry on partnership
in nuclear and radiation safety (12/06/2006).

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––Executive Agreement on multilateral nuclear-environmental program application
between the Russian Federation and the French Atomic Energy Commission to pursue
nuclear energy cooperation in the framework of the Global Partnership (02/16/2006).
Picture 2. NSs B-431 and B-314 in the emergency condition in Pavlovky Bay
Table 1
International assistance in NS dismantlement (January 1, 2007 data), USD, millions
Country
Declared funds to
be contributed,
Global Partnership
agreement
Declared
funds on NS
disassembly
Funds under
signed contracts
since
July, 2002
Received for
NS dismantlement
USA 10000 *) 106,70 93,82
Canada 800 150 77,70 70,39
UK 750 200 102,00 96,00
Germany 1800 360 225,70 225,30
France 900 20 5,39 5,24
Italy 1200 430 7,37 1,60
Japan 200 100 14,20 6,70
Norway 100 100 41,90 41,90
Sweden 1,34 1,34
EU 1200 48 3,95 1,59
Australia 7 7
Northern dimension 160 17,79 11,80
Total from donors 16957 1415 591,55 558,77
Russia 2000 669 348,00 347,99

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––Executive Agreement between Rosatom and Russia–Japan Committee on cooperation
in nuclear weapons destruction based on NSs dismantlement in the Far East
(11/21/2003).
––Agreement between Rosaviacosmos and US Department of Defense on SORT
with amendments on 04/12/1995, 06/19/1995, 05/27/1996, 04/11/1997, 02/11/1998,
06/09/1998, 08/16/1999, 08/08/2000, 06/09/2003, with an extension amendment on
08/30/2002 (According to the amendment signed 05/29/2003, Rosaviacosmos transferred
its responsibilities on dismantlement of launching vehicles for ballistic missiles,
SNF and radioactive waste management to Russian Minatom under CTR).
Results achieved based on Canada’s assistance: 6 NSs were dismantled; additional
infrastructure was built at the Zvezdochka plant. After a NS drowned in the
northern region and, a unique experiment with the submarine transportation by lightcargo
ships took place. See Picture 3.
Picture 3. NS transportation for dismantlement on the transshelf vessel, 2006
Results achieved due to Japan’s assistance: 2 NSs were dismantled; additional
infrastructure is built at the Zvezda plant.
Results achieved due to Norway’s assistance: 4 NSs were dismantled; physical
protection facilities were built in Andreeva Bay for temporary storage of SNF and
radioactive nuclear waste; a comprehensive study of the territory took place and additional
infrastructure was built such as an administrative complex, roads, water pipe reconstruction,
and lockers for the employees. Additional utilization of RTGs takes place
in Murmanskaya oblast.
Results achieved due to Sweden’s assistance: Technical-economic justification for
radioactive nuclear waste management has been developed for Andreeva Bay facilities
and investment justification for the infrastructure construction. Partial physical protection

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
construction in Andreeva Bay was accomplished. A film on the happenings in Andreeva
Bay, Center for public relations and information in Murmanskaya oblast was made.
Results achieved due to the UK’s assistance: 3 NSs were dismantled. Facilities for
radiation safety support in Andreeva Bay, including a temporary shelter at the one SNF
storages; two mobile sanitary filters; two deactivation grounds; and medical office and
radio-biology lab were set up. Investment justification was developed for infrastructure
to manage SNF and radioactive nuclear waste in Andreeva Bay, and a study of emergency
condition of SNF storage in Andreeva Bay was constructed. Faulty SNF storage
was restored at Atomflot.
Results achieved due to Germany’s assistance: Long-term storage for disassembled
NSs parts were planned in the North-West region, Sayda Bay, and is now under construction.
Infrastructure was upgraded at „Nerpa” for NSs disassembly and conversion
of three-department reactor blocks to reactor modules. Sayda Bay water treatment from
submerged vessels now exists. Equipment was delivered for NS storage in the Far East.
Results achieved due to France’s assistance: Installation to burn solid radioactive
waste is being upgraded at the Zvezdochka plant. A comprehensive engineering and
radiation study of SNF and radioactive waste storage facilities in Gremikha took place.
Equipment for the safe storage of SNF and radioactive waste in Gremikha; infrastructure
facilities are being reconstructed.
Results achieved due to Italy’s assistance: 1 NS was dismantled. A project for
physical protection of dangerous facilities modernization has been implemented. A
number of solid radioactive waste facilities are being planned in Andreeva Bay. Finally,
plans are being made to construct a multi-purpose vessel for SNF and radioactive waste
transportation.
Results achieved based on cooperation with the Fund „Environment Partnership
Northern Dimension” and its assistance: Strategic master-plan developments have been
made that benefit the north-western region including a radiation environment monitoring
system in Murmanskaya oblast. „Alfa” type storage facilities for SNF from NSs are under
renovation in Gremikha. Physical protection facilities and conceptual projects to improve
SNF storage conditions are also in the development stage.
Results achieved due to the European Union assistance: A study of storage
grounds for SNF and installation of a sanitary facility to support safety for radiationdangerous
works in Gremikha was conducted.
The major goal of the program is the dismantlement of all decommissioned NSs
by 2010 (see Picture 4).
The number of decommissioned NSs due to the international assistance in Table 2.
Russian priorities in NSs dismantlement field:
1. The continuation of NS dismantlement.
2. Above-water vessels with nuclear energy installations dismantlement.
3. The continued construction on a long-term storage of radioactive waste in
Sayda Bay.
4. SNF removal from temporary storage sites in Andreeva Bay and Gremikha.
5. The establishment of a center to manage solid radioactive waste in Russian North.

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6. The construction of a storage facility for NSs that pacify the present emergency
conditions in the Far East.
Picture 4. NS dismantlement schedule
Table 2
Data on decommissioned NSs as of April 1, 2007
Nuclear Submarines Total Northern Region Pacific Region
Decommissioned 198 120 78
Dismantled 148 97 51
Under dismantlement 23 10 13
Expecting dismantlement 24 12 12
A special decision (NS in the emergency conditions) 3 1 2
Data on the decommissioned NSs since 2002
Table 3
Donor Decommissioned NSs Under Dismantlement Agreements
USA 10 - 1
Canada 6 5 1
UK 3 - 1
Japan 2 1 3
Italy - 1 2
Norway 4 - -
Total 25 7 8
Projects planned in the field of SNF and radioactive waste management:
1. Dismantlement of „Papa” type NSs;
2. SNF unloading and dismantlement of above-water vessels with nuclear energy
installation;
3. Design and construction of a regional center for air conditioning and storage
of solid radioactive waste in Sayda Bay;
4. Storage construction for medium and high level radioactive waste;

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
5. Design and construction of a multi-purpose vessel;
6. Design and construction of radioactive waste storage in Andreeva Bay;
7. Treatment of at-risk facilities for radiation in Andreeva Bay (buildings 5–6);
8. Reconstruction of building 162 at Zvezdochka plant;
9. Reconstruction of the bridge across the Severnaya Dvina River.
List of new projects at the temporary storage facility in Andreeva Bay, funded by
the UK and Sweden in 2006–2007:
––general shield plan at the dry storage facility (building 153);
––facility development to manage SNF (buildings 151–153);
––building 154–155 (priority: buildings themselves, additional systems without
equipment), including water management in tankers of the dry storage facilities;
––building 167 (cafeteria);
––builders settlement;
––open storage grounds;
––electric network investigation at the storage grounds;
––creating a shelter over the grounds near building 35 for production and storage
of type 3 containers;
––storage for treated radioactive waste;
––building 162 (garage for „clean” machines);
––temporary improvements at the dry waste storage 2a and 2b such as the installation
of plugs;
––projects on the dry waste storage shelter with horizontal protection and container
removal (type 6);
––construction of a temporary treatment system for fluid radioactive waste at the
temporary storage facilities;
––general contractor tender for infrastructure construction;
––equipment for ejecting of changers from dry waste storage;
––additional examination of dry waste storage 3а and radiation environment at
the dry waste storage 3a modeling;
––detailed chemical analysis of fluid radioactive waste samples from the building
N6 and dry waste storage (2а, 2b, 3а);
––design and disassembly of building 1.
List of new projects at the temporary storage facility in Andreeva Bay, funded by
Italy in 2006–2007:
––Project design of shelters for solid radioactive waste storage grounds – buildings
201–202;
––Preliminary design (correction of decisions by OBIN and TEI) of complexes
for solid and fluid radioactive waste management (permanent and mobile);
––Working project development to manage solid and fluid radioactive waste;
––Mobile installation delivery to recycle low-activity fluid radioactive waste.
New projects at the submarine storage in Andreeva Bay, funded by Norway in
2006–2007 include project development, pier reconstruction, and construction network
project development at the NS storage.
Thank you for your attention.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposal: Existing Conditions
and Perspectives
Anatoly S. D’yakov, Director, Centre on Investigation of
Problems of Demilitarisation, Energetics and Environment,
Moscow Physical-Technical Institute
The reduction of nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States has resulted
in large amounts of spare nuclear materials, particularly, high enriched uranium (HEU)
and plutonium.
In September 1997, the former Russian president, B.Yeltsin, in his message to
the General Session, declared that the Russian Federation is ready to eliminate 500
tons of weapons grade uranium and 50 tons of weapons grade plutonium. The United
States stated that they are ready to eliminate 175 weapons grade uranium and 45 tons of
weapons grade plutonium. In 2005, the USA raised the amount of the excess weapons
grade uranium to 200 tons.
Spent nuclear materials management and policy are determined by two factors.
The first factor is nuclear terrorism – a national and international security threat that is
a recognized problem today. The second factor is the creation of conditions to stimulate
nuclear weapons disarmament. Therefore, spent nuclear materials management should
first of all be concerned about safe and reliable storage of these materials, which exclude
theft and smuggling. Storage, however, even with the most reliable system, does
not guarantee absolute security. Therefore, these materials require disposal and their
transformation in such a condition that they cannot be used in weapons.
Disposal of weapons grade uranium can be achieved by blending down weapons
grade uranium with natural or low-enriched uranium, which decreases overall concentration
of the 235 U isotope. Weapons grade uranium disposal is also attractive from an
economic standpoint, because the resulting product can be used as nuclear reactor fuel.
Today Russia has utilized more than 300 tons of weapons grade uranium (50 tons in the
United States) through this blending process.
Plutonium disposal is a more difficult technical task. Many research projects addressed
the topic of an optimized solution to the problem in the 1990s at the national and international
levels. In the fall of 1996, at a meeting of international experts in Paris, the following methods
were adopted as the most acceptable ways to dispose of weapons grade plutonium:
––Plutonium use for MOX-fuel and its future irradiation in power reactors;
––Mixing plutonium and highly radioactive waste for storage in glass containers
and further burial.
During discussions on all the aspects of plutonium excess management, the Russian
position was determined by two factors:

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––Plutonium is a valuable energy source, and, therefore, MOX-fuel production
should be among the priorities on the disposal list;
––Large financial expenditures will be needed to build the infrastructure for disposal,
and, therefore, the international community should allocate necessary financial
support for Russia to speed up the plutonium disposal process.
These statements were reflected in the agreement between Russia and the United
States in September 2000 on the utilization of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium. MOXfuel
was chosen as the major disposal method. Despite the fact that both Russia and the United
States had some limited experience in MOX-fuel production, they do not have the necessary
infrastructure to accomplish the program. Practical realization of the agreement was planned
to launch in 2007 and be accomplished by 2025. Both sides due to various reasons have not
yet started plutonium disposal, and today it seems that they lost an interest in the project.
The delay may have at least two reasons: responsibility agreements of both parties
and lack of adequate financing.
The discussion on responsibility continued during almost six years and the parties
reached an agreement only last fall, when the agreement was finally signed.
Adequate financing was another reason for the delay. Studies conducted in 2001
concluded that all expenditures on the Russian program were estimated to be 1.8 billion
dollars. The U.S. Administration decided to invite other countries to finance the
program, instead of providing necessary funding from its own sources. In 2002, Russian
plutonium disposal received priority in the Global Partnership „10+10 over 10” and was
adopted at the G-8 summit in 2002. Today western countries have allocated 850 million
dollars, including 400 million dollars provided by the USA.
Some negative effects on the program come from a discussion in Russian nuclear
circles about light-water and fast neutron reactors’ role in plutonium disposal. The
absence of an agreement on responsibility and the above mentioned discussion were not
helpful in attracting additional funding.
According to the latest evaluation, conducted in 2006, the cost of the Russian
plutonium has already reached 3.5 billion dollars. Estimated costs of the American program
have increased as well. In 2001, the American program cost was estimated to be
3.1 billion dollars, while today the price is 10 billion dollars.
Table
Cost of the plutonium utilization program in Russia (estimation 2001), million USD
Upgrade of reactors 289
Fuel production 1178,8
Operation cost 1645,8
Operation with the SNF 75,3
Licensing 286,6
Total: 3475,5
Input of Russia 257,7
Lack of financing 3220,8

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Delays of the program accomplishment and cost increase cause negative attitudes
in the U.S. Congress. There are already attempts to review the program and reject plutonium
disposal by way of MOX-fuel production. The final decision was not adopted yet,
but if the United States rejects the MOX-fuel model in favor of vitrification, the rejection
can lead to a revision of the 2000 agreement. Russia, in this case, may not agree with such
a disposal process. According to Russian nuclear experts, vitrification is a way to conserve
rather than dispose of plutonium.
The existing situation of Russian-American agreement on plutonium disposal
causes many doubts about the agreement’s fulfillment. It is obvious that the agreement
will remain in force if the parties follow their intentions and its practical accomplishment
will require more than ten years. Taking into account the duration of the disposal program
(several decades), we, unfortunately, come to a conclusion that declared excesses of
weapons grade plutonium will remain in existence for several decades.
It seems reasonable to get back to an idea of storage of the excess nuclear weapons
materials under international control. It could give some guarantees to the international
community that nuclear materials are secured, risks of theft and smuggling are minimized,
and their use in nuclear weapons is diminished.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
UK International Nuclear Security and
Nonproliferation Programme
Evans Simon, Deputy Director, International Nuclear
Policy and Programmes, UK Department of Trade and
Industry
I represent the department responsible for the Global Partnership (GP) and for nuclear
cooperation in general. I would like to present key provisions of the program. There is a philosophic
discussion with regard to the challenges of what we have already achieved. For those
who want to learn detailed information on what we are doing in the United Kingdom, there is
a website with publications of the work outcomes in the GP.
The United Kingdom program started before Kananaskis. We conducted some work
in the area of nuclear safety and after the Kananaskis summit we agreed to provide 750 million
dollars before 2012 to Russia, while other countries promised only 25 million dollars.
I know that this program will continue, because the threat exists not only to
Russia, but to other countries as well. The program will be related to the materials and
nuclear technologies. Today many companies and international funds are involved in
contributing to this program.
The United Kingdom works towards its key issues introduced in the GP. Russia’s
North-West is under our close watch and we have started work in Andreyeva Bay, that
is the construction of special storage for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from ice-breakers.
Today we focus our attention on Andreyeva Bay. It is a big program, but I do not participate
in it. My colleagues from Green Cross know the problem very well; they also
know about the installation we are working on in the Urals. Additionally we work on
the Zheleznogorsk reactor shut down.
We work closely with the United States and direct finances to the United States
within this program. We have promised 80 million dollars based on the agreements in
Okinawa, Japan and we do our best to work within this budget. Everybody knows that
there is a shadow over our program. We are fulfilling our Kananaskis obligations, but if
we direct all the funds only to the nuclear weapons storage, other programs will have to
be stopped, and this is impossible to do tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.
There are a number of institutions in the Russian Federation that work as a part of
the IAEA International Security Fund, as well as other Former Soviet Union countries. An
old program on nuclear power plant security exists in Russia and the countries of former
Soviet Union. Additionally, there are programs related to Chernobyl, and I will touch on
them later. I listened very attentively to what the Minister of Foreign Affairs said. I do
not agree with him that Western governments spend significant amounts on the western
contractors. We conduct only control over the program, but we watch very closely how the

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
program is being accomplished at the site and we try to utilize equipment of the accepting
country, hire personnel from this country, but we also have to consider our interests.
Some concerns exist, however. First of all, it is a long-term strategy for work in
Russia’s North-Eastern regions. We direct some funds in the framework of the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Regardless how much money we allocate
and how much equipment we send, our efforts will amount to nothing if we do not
manage to accomplish our goal. We need infrastructure related to transportation and storage
in the North-Eastern regions, and that is why we invited donors, including EBRD.
We also know that some part of the SNF in Andreyeva Bay was damaged and, therefore,
requires careful handling. We will work in a close collaboration with our Russian partners,
because without a defined direction of our activities, we will only waste money.
Everybody knows that coordination is a great achievement, but it is hard to establish
this coordination. There are groups which we contract under EBRD. It is very
important to have such combinations of partnership between various groups, rather than
duplicating our attempts. We accept that we often work in regions that are very sensitive
and contain classified information. Therefore, it is essential to find a balance to protect
information, but also effectively share some of the information. We move away from
traditional methods and think how the future partnership in the non-proliferation field
will develop in the United Kingdom. We have already made our contribution to the IAEA
Nuclear Security Fund, and we are working to develop partnership with a number of the
Former Soviet Union countries in the Central Asia; we have started to work in Ukraine.
We focus on certain geographic regions, because we understand that UK cannot
solve all the world’s problems, and that is why we would like to focus on certain regions
and apply our skills and knowledge.
Sustainability is a key element for appropriate investment and equipment operation.
Equipment being used today can be repaired and used in the future. We know that
it is essential to use local equipment, and that will help us in the learning process.
I would like to say several words about Chernobyl. Unfortunately, two years
ago we thought we had the required amount to EBRD for the existing programs development
in the Chernobyl region aimed at storage construction and resolution of other
problems. We learned that that money is not enough and additional funding is needed.
It is a challenge. I would like to mention the lessons we have learnt.
There is always a need to improve planning and coordination. The problem we
often encounter is coordination in the field of physical protection, coordination with
various donors with respect to safety and security. It is critical to use the first-line experience
and exchange it. We find it hard, however, to talk with each other. It is easy
to talk, but hard to accomplish projects in practice. We did not want to conduct many
programs just with the purpose of completion to what we are already doing. We are tired
of new initiatives. We work here at the political level and our key concern is fulfilling
our Kananaskis obligations. We must demonstrate our intentions to provide additional
funding, but this funding should be allocated for reasonable goals. We have to think
about our programs in very complicated regions. It is hard to accomplish the program
worth 40 million pounds in two days.
Thank you.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Norwegian Nuclear Assistance to Russia in the Framework
of the Global Partnership
Hakan Mattsson, Advisor, Department for Radiation
Protection and Nuclear Safety, Norwegian Radiation
Protection Authority
I would like to talk about Norway’s assistance to Russia in the framework of the
Global Partnership as it relates to nuclear issues. The two countries signed a bilateral
agreement, and then, in 1993, we initiated a nuclear safety program at the Kol’skaya
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). In 1995, Norway adopted an action plan for nuclear industry
cooperation with Russia. I will talk about it further. The Russian-Norway partnership
started in 1993. The action plan in the nuclear industry includes six issues:
destruction of nuclear submarines (NS), radioisotopes, RTG generators, Andreeva Bay
rehabilitation, NPPs safety, and nuclear security cooperation with Russian authorities. I
will elaborate on each of these issues.
With regard to NSs, Norway is currently providing funds for NSs destruction. In
cooperation with the Great Britain, we are going to destroy a 5 NS, which will be the
last one funded by Norway.
Regarding generators, the work to remove generators from operation started in
2002. Norway will dismantle these generators in the Russian North-West. This project
will be accomplished by 2009 and will include 60 generators.
An outstanding international work is taking place at Andreeva Bay. It is a longterm
project, and Norway is particularly involved in the infrastructure projects, local
studies and physical protection. Norway has worked on this project from the very beginning
of the reconstruction of the Andreeva Bay facilities.
Norway works on the Kol’skaya and Leningradskaya NPPs to ensure their safety.
There are a number of technical projects, including personnel training.
Norway has partnered with Russian regulatory institutions especially with Rostechnadzor
on generators’ dismantlement and related issues. We also work with Rosatom
on Andreeva Bay projects.
Future challenges and developments. The Andreeva Bay and Gremikha rehabilitations
will continue, as well as work with generators. Additionally, we will strengthen
cooperation with Russian regulatory institutions and continue coordination between
Russia and donor countries. Norway involves NGOs and civil society by way of information
exchange and the decision-making process. Norway has developed a strategy
for 2008, which includes coordination with other Scandinavian countries.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
German–Russian Project on Decommissioning Nuclear
Submarines in the Saida Guba
Joerg Kirsch, Counsellor, Economical Division, Embassy
of Germany in Russia
The main goals of the project are as follows:
––Construction of a long-term storage facility for 150 nuclear submarine (NS)
reactor blocks and other nuclear objects in the Saida Guba;
––Modernization of the ship-repairing plant „Nerpa” in order to conduct dismantling
of NSs and to transport reactor blocks on a floating dock;
––Establishment of a computerized system for accounting and control of radioactive
materials.
The main task of the project is the modernization of the ship-repairing plant
„Nerpa” and construction of long-term reactor block storage.
On July 10, 2004, within the framework of the project implementation, the foundation
was laid, and the construction of the decommissioning center began. A small
construction town was ready by September.
On July 18, 2006, the first complex of the long-term storage facility was brought
into operation.
The main process in the NS dismantling is cutting out the reactor blocks from
the body of the submarine.
There are plans for expansion of the project and construction of the Saida Guba
Center for Dismantling (SCD) for the period of 2008–2013. This would follow the example
of the German long-term radioactive waste storage „Zwischenlager Nord.”
The 2008 – 2013 implementation of the project is planned to follow three stages:
1 st stage: Creation of long-term storage facility for 150 reactor blocks.
2 nd stage: Expansion of the concrete plate for the blocks storage.
3 rd stage: Creation of the Saida Guba Center for Dismantling (SCD).

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
French-Russian Cooperation in the Framework of the
Global Partnership
Alain Mathiot, Director of the G8 Global Partnership
Programme for France
Web site: www-pmg8.cea.fr/.
Objectives:
––contribute to an effective threat reduction,
––implement a real partnership between the French and Russian organisations
and companies,
––promote in the long run industrial cooperation between France and the Russian
Federation in the corresponding areas.
Priorities (according to Kananaskis):
––the disposal of weapon grade Plutonium,
––securization and safe disposal of highly radioactive materials,
––the destruction of chemical weapons,
––nuclear safety and security,
––bio-terrorism threat.
Future trends:
––employment of former weapons scientists.
Bilateral:
––Nuclear – Multilateral Nuclear-Environmntal Partnership Program (ratified
01/2005), implementation agreement (ROSATOM-CEA) 02/2006;
––CWD: intergovernmental agreement (02/2006), enter into force 03/2007; implementation
agreement for the Shchuchye project to be signed soon;
––Bio threat response: projects through International Scientific &Technical
Center;
––CEA in charge of the implementation (special budget with 3 Ministries funding).
Multilateral:
––Contribution to the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership – 40 M€
committed,
––Chernobyl Sarcophagus – 22 M€ committed,
––Contribution to Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Group – 70 M€ proposed.
Gremikha
Remediation of the ex naval base at Gremikha:

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
––Packing and transportation of irradiated fuel elements, solid and liquid waste
elimination;
––Site decontamination and clean-up before closure.
Constraints: site access, polar climate, status of the „closed city”.
France, EBRD and European Commission are funding the feasibility study: coordination
group for donors, steered by Rosatom, connected to Andreeva bay project.
Roadmap:
––delivery of radioprotection equipment and preparatory work the remediation,
––feasibility study started end 2006, choice of options: mid 2007,
––securization and remediation 2008–2015.
Total up to now: up to 10 M€ for feasibility, up to 10 M€ for preparatory work and
safety enhancement.
Severodvinsk: solid waste incinerator
Zvezdochka plant: facility not working since more than 10 years.
Objective: refurbishing to operate with a process flow of 20–40 kg/h:
––Feasibility and detailed design (2004–2006),
––Realisation (2,5 years; started 01/2007).
Radioisotope thermal generators (RTG)
––France ready to contribute to the elimination of a significant number of RTG,
with other countries involved : Norway, USA, Canada, Germany…;
––2005–2006 cooperation with Norway (piggy backing: 0,7 M€);
––2007: development of bilateral cooperation with Russia, (conditioning, shipment,
final storage).
Kalinin nuclear power plant
––EdF & REA proposed in 2003 a common program to enhance safety of reactor 2;
––Total cost: over 20 M€ over 5 years.
Plutonium disposition
––France is part of the Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Group and pledged 70
M€ for the funding of a dedicated MOX fuel facility in Russia, on the same model as
the US one at Savannah River;
––Recent evolution of the Russian position: the context as changed (and certainly
the time schedule).
Lessons learned
1. The global partnership allows development of a real partnership:
––With Russia as well as with other donors;
––A strong potential of long term partnership exists.
2. Real challenge to define, set up and implement projects with Russian agencies:
expense of energy and time objective.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
3. Importance of using internal evaluations: audit by independent organization,
with use of defined criteria.
Nuclear
1. According to Kananaskis need to focus on most accessible and vulnerable
nuclear materials;
2. Plutonium disposition: future has to be reconsidered;
3. Large nuclear projects necessitate a permanent risk analysis;
4. Good coordination needed and is now efficient, with involvement of Rosatom
in each project.
Global partnership is now half way (2002–2012):
––Progress to date suggests we are all pulling in the right direction;
––However a lot remains to be done to achieve Kananaskis’ objectives;
––Communication and share of information is a key;
––France is willing to maintain effort.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Canadian Global Partnership Program: Protection of Nuclear
and Radiological Materials
Colleen Pigeon, Second Secretary, Global Partnership
Program, Embassy of Canada in Russia
Good Morning!
I am pleased to be here this morning to present to you the contribution that
Canada is making to help secure nuclear materials and facilities in Russia and the CIS.
As you may be aware, Canada and Russia have a very active bilateral cooperation
program under the framework of the GP (GP). This Program of course started in
Kananaskis at the G8 summit in 2002. The main goal of the program is the non-proliferation
of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Since the time of the Kananaskis
Summit Canada has developed and implemented projects in all five of the priority areas
defined at the Summit, namely, dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines; nuclear
and radiological security; destruction of chemical weapons; redirection of former weapons
scientists; and biological non-proliferation..
Today, I would like to focus on two areas of our cooperation which relate to today’s
topic, that is, the dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear and
radiological security. Non-proliferation can be broken down into a number of discreet
activities which should be taken into consideration to ensure the security of weapons
and materials of mass destruction. You can consider both activities which provide for
security of material while it is in transit and you can also consider ways to secure material
or reduce the amount of material at a given site. Canada has focused its activities on
the latter – that is, ways to secure and reduce material at sites and facilities.
It is known that close to 600 tonnes of weapons-grade nuclear material, enough for
tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, is located at facilities across Russia which do not
have adequate security. From the beginning of the GP, Canada has focussed on improving
the physical protection of facilities. We now have contracts with 5 nuclear facilities in
Russia and we are spending 20 million Canadian dollars per year to upgrade the physical
protection of these sites. We have also contributed 8 million dollars to the IAEA’s Nuclear
Security Fund to secure sites outside of Russia in other CIS countries.
Canada is also working to reduce the amount of weapons-grade material that is
available – the thought being the less material that exists, the less chance of terrorists
gaining access to such material. In this area, Canada has contributed to the project to
shut down one of the last 3 remaining Russian reactors which produces weapons-grade
plutonium. And in addition we are contributing to the Multilateral Plutonium Disposition
program.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The third major activity we are participating in is the removal of material from
sites. The Canadian program to dismantle nuclear-powered submarines in the Russian
North-West focuses on the removal and safe storage of highly enriched uranium which
was used to fuel these submarines and which could potentially be used in a nuclear
warhead or dirty bomb. Canada is contributing 120 million Canadian dollars to defuel
and dismantle 12 nuclear powered submarines. We have also contributed to the EBRD
program to secure and store SNF in the Russian North. We are currently examining the
possibility of expanding this program to include the dismantlement of submarines in the
Russian Far East.
In addition to all these activities Canada is also working on projects to improve
border controls and to remove radioactive sources (RTGs) from lighthouses in the Russian
North which could be used for dirty bombs.
I would like to thank Green Cross for the invitation to speak today and for their
continuing efforts to provide opportunities for the public to discuss issues related to
both the nuclear field and chemical weapons destruction.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Italian–Russian Cooperation Agreement in Global
Partnership Program (Nuclear Issues)
Massimiliano Nobile, Director, Project Management
Unit, Italian–Russian Cooperation Agreement
Bilateral Agreement on the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines
(NS) and the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (SNF).
1. The Agreement
The Agreement between Italy and the Russian Federation in the field of NS dismantlement
and radioactive waste management was ratified with the Law №160 of 31
July 2005 and entered into force on the 17 November 2005. The financial envelope of
the Agreement is 360 million Euro over a period of 10 years.
As for issues regarding nuclear liability, tax exemption and access to sites, the
Agreement draws directly from the relevant clauses of the Multilateral Nuclear-Environmntal
Partnership Program.
The Agreement covers the main topics, namely:
1. Decommissioning of NSs, nuclear ships and service vessels;
2. Reprocessing, treatment, transport and storage of radioactive waste and SNF;
3. Physical protection systems for nuclear sites;
4. Rehabilitation of contaminated soils and facilities;
5. Provision of equipment for facilitating shipyard work.
The management structure of the Agreement provides for a Steering Committee, cochaired
by representatives of MSE (the Italian Ministry for Economic Development) and
ROSATOM. The Steering Committee will approve all the projects under the Agreement.
Project management and administration has been entrusted to a dedicated unit
(PMU) based in Moscow, composed of Russian and Italian experts. Contracts for project
execution will be awarded by the relevant Russian organisations.
The Italian state-owned company SOGIN has been entrusted by MSE to carry
out general co-ordination, administrative, technical and operational tasks for project
implementation. SOGIN is the Italian company in charge for the decommissioning of
Italian nuclear power plants and fuel-cycle facilities.
2. The co-operation Programme
During 2005, a number of projects have been identified within the main programme
areas covered by the Agreement. The selection process has been based on the
urgent needs of the Russian counterpart and the specific experience and capabilities

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
of the Italian side. Selected projects have been reviewed and approved by the Steering
Committee and at the same time funds for the preliminary design of the selected
projects have been allocated.
2.1. The dismantlement of NSs
Decommissioning of NSs, nuclear ships and service vessels represents the core
area of the whole programme.
Russia has requested funds and equipment for dismantling three submarines and
for the fuel unloading and dismantlement of the „Admiral Ushakov” nuclear cruiser. A
contract for a Yankee class submarine has been entrusted to „Nerpa” shipyard in July
2006. The dismantling work has been almost completed without any significant delay
or inconvenience. A contract for the dismantling of another submarine (Victor class) is
ready to be signed.
The scope of work includes also the supply of special tools and equipment such
as cutting machinery, welding and sealing technologies, mobile cranes and other handling
and transferring systems. A tender is presently under way to assign two supply
contracts in this field, one for „Nerpa” and one for „Zviozdochka”.
2.2. The management of low and medium level radioactive waste
Contracts have been signed for the preliminary design of:
––Creation, in the Andreeva Bay site, of a Centre for the treatment and conditioning
of radioactive waste, at the site where most of the solid radioactive waste of the Kola
peninsula are located.
––Supply of transportable modular systems to condition liquid radioactive waste,
in their current locations, limiting in this way the number of transports of liquid material
and optimizing the choice of treatment.
––Due to an urgent request by Rosatom a contract has been signed for the design
of buildings 201 and 202 for the safe management and retrieval of solid radioactive
waste at the Andreeva Bay site, presently in the open area.
2.3. The management of low and medium level radioactive waste and of SNF
Design and construction of an interim facility (25.000 m 3 ) for the storage of conditioned
low and medium level radioactive waste at the Andreeva Bay site.
2.4. Sea transportation of radioactive waste and SNF
Preliminary design of a ship for transportation to treatment and storage sites of
radioactive waste containers and SNF transfer casks.
A contract has been signed for the ship preliminary design, also addressing the
adequacy of the existing ground infrastructure, in particular for the loading and unloading
of transported items.
2.5. Physical protection system
Five sites, in the northern Kola Peninsula and the Arkhangelsk area, have been
selected by ROSATOM for intervention under the Italian assistance programme.
For the „Nerpa” shipyard a preliminary study has been started to establish the
improvement needs of physical barriers, both peripheral and internal, and related serv-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
ices (intrusion detection, access control, radiation monitoring, etc.), as well as of accounting
and computerised tracking systems for radioactive and fissile materials.
2.6 The working schedule
Works are divided into three phases:
The first phase is dedicated to strategic studies and preliminary design activities
(in progress);
The second phase is related to the preparation of technical specifications, tendering
and awarding of contracts to selected main contractors;
The third phase is related to the project implementation by main contractors and
sub-contractors. This will typically include: detailed design, equipment procurement,
component fabrication, civil works and mechanical assembling, start-up tests and preliminary
operation of supplied facilities and equipment;
The duration of each phase will vary from project to project; it can be estimated,
however, that the first two phases will be completed in six months time frame, while for
the third phase duration may range from a minimum of two years, to six years (including
preliminary plant operation) for the more complex projects.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Japan’s Cooperation for the Dismantlement of
Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines in the Russian Far East
Takashi Kurai, Minister, Political Affairs Division,
Embassy of Japan in Russia
Japan has been actively cooperating with Russia in the field of dismantling of
decommissioned nuclear submarines (NS). It was in 1993 when Japan concluded a bilateral
agreement with Russia, almost 10 years before the launch of G8 Global Partnership.
According to this agreement, Japan and Russia established a special bilateral Committee,
to which Japan made contribution of approximately 200 million dollars up until
now. The dismantlement programme of decommissioned NSs in the Russian Far East is
called „Star of Hope”, and has been implemented as part of the G8 Global Partnership.
To date, under the Committee, Japan provided Russia with a facility of processing
low-level radioactive liquid waste, and assisted the implementation of a project of
dismantling one decommissioned NS. At present, the Committee is going to implement
the dismantlement of 5 decommissioned NSs in the Russian Far East. The dismantlement
work of one of them is already in process.
The reason why the Government of Japan has been implementing the cooperation
programme for Russia is threefold: non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and the
preservation of the environment.
In 1993, the fact was revealed that the Russian Navy had dumped low-level radioactive
waste into the Sea of Japan. This really shocked Japanese citizens. And Japan, on
the one hand, required Russia to take necessary measures as soon as possible to stop the
dumping, and on the other hand, decided to construct a facility capable of processing the
low-level radioactive liquid waste as cooperation for Russia. This facility was named „Suzuran”
and is now moored at the Zvezda Shipyard in Bol’shoy Kamen’ city near Vladivostok.
Its capacity is enough to process not only liquid radioactive waste already stored in
the Russian Far East but also additional waste which will be generated by the dismantlement
of decommissioned NSs in the region. It plays a key role in solving the problem of
the dumping of liquid radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan.
According to the ROSATOM, 11 decommissioned NSs are still moored in the
neighbourhood of Vladivostok and in Kamchatka in the Russian Far East. Many of these
still have nuclear fuel on board. Most of them have been moored for 10 years or more and
their hulls have been corroded. If those submarines floating on the sea remain neglected,
there will be both a danger of serious radioactive contamination and a risk of burglary of
nuclear materials from the submarines. Thereby, Japan, through the Japan–Russia Committee,
assisted the project of dismantling a Victor III class decommissioned NS. The

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Committee is going to implement the dismantlement of 5 more decommissioned NSs in
the Far East in accordance with the Implementing Arrangement signed in November 2005
during the visit of President Putin to Japan. At present, one of the five, a Victor I class
submarine, is being dismantled and the rest will be dismantled one after another.
In addition, the Committee decided, in January 2007, to cooperate for the construction
of an on-shore storage facility for reactor compartment units at the Razboinik
Bay, the Far East.
Taking this opportunity, I would like to make some brief references to 3 points
which we regard as prioritized through our experiences of cooperation with Russia.
First, a sense of asymmetry in the speed of implementation between that of the
Northwest and of the Far East. According to the ROSATOM’s latest data, there are
120 decommissioned NSs in the North-West and 77 in the Far East. Also according to
ROSATOM, 12 of them are waiting to be dismantled in the North-West whereas 11 in the
Far East. These figures imply that the speed of dismantlement in the Far East is behind
that in the North-West. We do hope that the dismantlement in the Far East be more
accelerated. In this connection, we highly appreciate the participation of Australia, Republic
of Korea and Canada in the projects of this area. Australia, contributing 10 million
Australian dollars to the Japan–Russia Committee in 2004 and the ROK, providing
250 thousand US dollars to the Committee in 2006, participate in our programme
and form a new framework in the Far East. Their funds are used for the dismantlement
of the Victor I class NS mentioned earlier. And Canada announced that it would implement
dismantlement projects in the Far East. We will carry out the dismantlement
programme in the Far East in cooperation and coordination with these participants and
the programme will be promoted under the new framework.
Second, it is needed that Russia fully cooperate for the acceleration of the implementation.
Although I understand the sensitivity in the Russian side with regard to the
military confidentiality, it took quite a long time, more than a year, until the Implementing
Arrangement on the dismantling of 5 NSs was signed. As I said earlier it is important to
swiftly dismantle decommissioned NS in the Russian Far East, and in light of this, we need
cooperation from the Russian side to accelerate the implementation of this programme.
Third, this has something to do with the modernization process of Russian naval
forces. What is the most important is the transparency and providing relevant information
with taxpayers so that the project is well supported by them. The Japanese government
should always let the Japanese people fully understand not only that the proposed
projects are necessary but also why the projects should be financed by Japanese taxpayers.
I would like to ask Russia to pay due attention to the need to keep full accountability
to the people about the relationship between the modernization process of naval forces
in Russia, including launching of the new types of NSs to the fleets, and the support
from international community of the dismantlement of submarines.
Thank you very much.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Working Within the Framework of the G8 GP: Australia–
South Korean–Japanese Cooperation to Dismantle Nuclear
Submarines in the Russian Far East
Alexandra Siddall, Second Secretary,
Embassy of Australia in Russia
Working within the framework of the G8 Global Partnership (GP):
Australia–South Korean–Japanese cooperation to dismantle nuclear submarines
(NS) in the Russian Far East 5 June 2004 – Prime Minister Howard announced that Australia
would donate A$10 million dollars to the GP as a non-G8 country.
Donation to be given under the framework of the Russia–Japan bilateral agreement.
A$10 million was directed to the dismantling of one Victor I class NS decommissioned
from the Russian Pacific Fleet.
Australia regarded this donation as an important practical contribution to threat
reduction and non proliferation in our region.
– Importantly, the GP program also reduces the environmental threat in the Far
East.
Australia was attracted to this particular project because it is located within our
own region and adds to Asia-Pacific security and safety in the key North Asia region.
South Korean contributed money via Japanese bilateral agreement for similar
reasons.
Project implementation, or disbursement of the money, has been long and at
times difficult.
– On 24 June 2004 Australia and Russia–Japan Committee exchanged letters
providing in principle agreement that the donation of Australian money to GP via the
Japanese bilateral agreement.
– Project initially delayed by Japan–Russia negotiations on an Implementing arrangement.
This was finally signed by both parties in November 2005.
– Japan and Australia identified a ship – Victor I (Hull 614) to which our money
was directed.
– Project was then delayed while Japan and Zvezda shipyard to negotiated individual
contracts for dismantlement.
– The main delay was because of a lack of agreement between Australia/Japan
and Russia on the issue of access to and protection of information acquired by Australian
project inspector during site visits, as well as liability for Australian inspectors, and
financial reporting.
From donation to project implementation process taken two years eight months.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
On 23 March 2007, letters were exchanged between Australia and the Governing
Council of Russia–Japan Committee which set out access and liability arrangements,
and cleared the way for disbursement of Australian funds to Zvezda.
Dismantlement now begun at Zvezda ship yard in Russian Far East under Japanese
project management.
As result of exchange of letters, an Australian expert will be included in the
Japanese inspection team under the provisions of the Russian–Japanese Implementing
Arrangement.
Australia will receive a statement at conclusion of project from Committee that Australia’s
grant fully exhausted, as well as regular financial reporting (information on how much
of project has been completed and how much of Australian grant has been spent).
No further Australian contributions are planned at this time but we remain open
to considering further activities within our capabilities and priorities.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Finnish Assistance for the Nuclear Safety of Russia in Frame
of Global Partnership
Jyrki Terv, Second Secretary, Economic Section,
Embassy of Finland in Russia
Uvazamie dami i gozpoda!
On behalf of the Embassy of Finland I want to thank the organizers for the opportunity
to speak in this important conference. Let me also convey warm greetings to the
conference from my ambassador Harry Helenius. In my brief presentation my intention
is to say a few words on the Finnish–Russian cooperation in the area of nuclear safety.
The cooperation lies in within the framework of the Global Partnership Programmes.
Dorogie druzja!
The Finnish support programme for the nuclear safety in Russia started in 1992.
The aim of the programme is to contribute to the prevention of nuclear accidents at nuclear
facilities located near Finnish territory. The Finnish coordinator of the programme
is the radiation and nuclear safety authority of Finland. During the years from 1992 to
2006 a total of 31 million Euros have been used in the Program. From this amount 10
million Euros have been spent on the Leningradskaya Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and 8
million Euros in the Kol’skaya NPP. Current annual use of funds is 2 million Euros.
So what have been the results during the past 15 years Let me speak you through
of few examples of the ongoing work.
In 1992 manual push-button panels were installed in Kola and Sosnovy Bori in
order to send pre-programmed incident messages via satellite to Moscow as well as to
Finland in case of any unusual events. Rostechnadzor is operating the system at the site.
By 2003 the system was upgraded to send incident messages to Nordic countries using
modern automated digital technologies and satellites.
In 1995 an automated radiation monitoring network was installed within 30 km
zone surrounding Leningradskaya NPP (LNPP). The system provides plat operator real
time information and enables transmission of data to Finnish and Russian authorities.
By 2004 real-time electronic dosimeters system was delivered and the system was extended
to 26 measuring stations around the plant. Similar system is operating also in the
Kol’skaya NPP.
Finland has also participated in developing the capabilities of the Rosatom Emergency
response center in St.-Petersburg. These include upgrading telephone central system,
providing equipment for radiation surveillance, enhansing information exchange
between Finnish and Russian authorites and regular testing of emergency notification
system between our countries.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
In addition to this the programme has been supplying the two NPPs training in
operational safety procedures development, non-destructive ultrasonic and radiographic
inspection technologies, corrosion protection, fire safety equipment and upgrades to
plants electrical systems. Spent fuel storage of LNPP, which has been a public concern,
has been inspected in the programme and leaks of the pools have been repaired by the
plant operator.
LNPP is underway to increase the storage capacity for spend nuclear fuel. We
think this is an important opportunity to reduce loading in the old storage and to inspect
further its structures. Conducting an in-depth safety assestment together with an
international partnership of Russia, USA, UK, Sweden and Finland has been important
baseline study for future work in LNPP. Another important process underway in the
LNPPs that should be strenghtened in the coming years is the improving of the physical
protection of the plant.
The program for the rapid development of the civilian nuclear power sector is
now starting in Russia. This year February Finnish authorities participated to the public
hearing in the LNPP concerning the new construction projects at the site. Based on
this meeting Finland wants to further encourage Russia to cooperate with neighbouring
countries in new contruction projects that have potential transboundary environmental
impacts even though Russia has not yet ratified the Espoo convention.
Bilateral support programmes, Cooperation of European Development Banks,
the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, Chernobyl Shelter Fund and other
instruments of Global Partnership Programmes show that there is a continuing international
interest to ensure safety in the nuclear sector for years to come. It is continuously
important to keep in our minds the lessons learned from the terrible accident in Chernobyl,
that happened soon 21 years ago.
Thank you for your attention.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Swedish Nuclear Assistance to Russia in the Frame of the
Global Partnership
Asa Gustafsson, Desk Officer, Department for Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation, NIS, Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs
Sweden has been active with respect to implementing nuclear non-proliferation
activities in the former Soviet Union since 1992. The first efforts were directed towards
Kazakhstan and Ukraine and aimed at ensuring an early entry of these countries into the
safeguards control system of the IAEA and make these states join the Non-Proliferation
Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States.
Later, Sweden also gave assistance to Lithuania and Latvia in this field of „safeguards”
and integration into the IAEA’s verification system for nuclear materials. So
when the Global Partnership was launched in 2002, Sweden already had a tradition
for cooperation with the countries in this region that was ten years old. We had already
quite a lot of experience and knowledge on procedures for how to implement projects,
carry out tender procedures, transfer knowledge and technology.
The Global Partnership, which Sweden joined in June 2003, meant that there
was suddenly a new framework and a common shared goal and agenda by the G-8 states
and this has in itself been of paramount importance for Sweden’s efforts.
It merits attention that there are also other frameworks of importance for Sweden’s
assistance to this region. For instance the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental
Projects in Russia that Sweden and other states have adhered to. That is a practical
instrument for making sure that taxation and liability issues are cleared in an efficient
manner between Swedish and Russian parties in the concrete context of project implementation.
Currently Sweden supports a number of projects in Russia that are implemented
by Swedish authorities with reference to the priorities, the spirit and the cooperation
between Russia and other donors that has developed since 2002.
A few words about the cooperation and projects in question:
For this year, 2007, Sweden will contribute approximately 39 million SEK
(Swedish crowns) (approx. 5.7 million USD) to nuclear safety in the framework of
the Global Partnership for projects in Russia. The contribution to nuclear security will
amount to around 12 million SEK (approx. 1.8 million USD) for projects in Russia.
As to nuclear safety, cooperation include reactor safety, safe disposal of nuclear
waste and spent fuel, nuclear emergency preparedness and radiation protection, primarily
in Northwest Russia. As to nuclear security there are currently six cooperation
projects being implemented, namely the following:

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
1. The biggest project moneywise concerns the physical protection of nuclear
materials from dismantled submarines.
A number of international donors are engaged in dismantling old Russian nuclearpowered
submarines. This work releases large amounts of nuclear fuel. Sweden works to
create protection systems for the released fuel at the Shipyard „Nerpa” near Murmansk. In
February this year Swedish experts from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI,
were in Murmansk to finalise the tender documents for the security works.
2. Combating illicit trafficking on the Kola Peninsula
The Kola Peninsula (Murmanskaya oblast) has the highest concentration of radioactive
and nuclear waste in the world. In February this year, the Swedish and Russian
parties have completed a study of the situation as it is today. Under a new project to be
implemented in 2007 a plan will be worked out for how to solve the identified problems
and with this plan, the parties will try to identify international donors that are ready to
contribute to the material investments in training and equipment.
3. Training in the field of nuclear non-proliferation
In Russia there are thousands of nuclear experts that have too bracketed knowledge
of the non-proliferation issues and objectives that surround any nuclear activity.
SKI has since 2004 offered training to two universities in Tomsk and will this year initiate
similar activities with universities in the southern Urals region.
4. Nuclear material control at the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant, Udmyrtia
SKI has initiated a project with Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy, „Rosatom”
and the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant. The project aims at strengthening the accounting
and control over nuclear materials at the facility and thus avoid situations
where materials can deviate from the facility.
5. Physical protection at the Center for Applied Chemistry, St-Petersburg
Near St.-Petersburg there is a chemical combine where a part of the buildings
and activities concern the manufacture of radioactive substances for industrial purposes.
The physical protection of these buildings is in an appalling state and in 2006 several
attempts of intrusion by outsiders have been detected. SKI will in 2007 upgrade the
physical protection at the facility and building.
6. Legal cooperation
Russia is currently modernising and improving the legal framework for the control
and security of nuclear materials. SKI offers Swedish expertise for the review of
new Russian legislation in the nuclear non-proliferation field.
Finally, in concluding, I would again like to emphazise that from a Swedish point
of view the Global Partnership is a very valuable tool at the level of project implementation
simply because it is an excellent point of reference. It is a very useful umbrella for
the activities that we strive to carry out.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Questions and Answers after “Foreign” Plenary Session
Question from participant: My question is to Simon Evans, Mr. Grigoriev and other
participants of the group. I am interested in Simon Evans’ presentation on the master-plan. It
is a change of various tasks for us. I have two questions on the master-plan. I wonder if the
master-plan involves only Russia’s North-Western regions or does it include work on similar
problems in Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk and the Far East. Does the plan cover entire
Russia or only Russia’s northwest
The second question is on public opinion. Public opinion has a large impact, especially
with regard to the transportation issue. The citizens are concerned about nuclear energy.
Do you involve only expert groups or do you also discuss such questions with the public
Simon Evans: Today, the program is being conducted only in the North, and that is
why we concentrated our work on Russia’s North-West as it includes nuclear and non-nuclear
issues. The Northern region is a program for the country’s north-west and includes problems
of transportation and recycling. The program does not expand on the Far East, Tomsk and etc.
I do not know the answer to the second question.
Grigoriev: I think that the strategic master-plan will be discussed with the public.
V.P. Vasiliev: I can answer this question. Together with the British–Canadian organization
NSS, we have conducted consultations with the public in Moscow, Murmansk and
Severodvinsk (two meetings in each city with the master-plan distribution) on such issues as
environmental security and master-plan management. We have collected many questions and
prepared the answers, and sent new information again. The citizens expressed their interest in
these problems and its concerns, but supported treatment works in the region.
We have formulated problems, which require donor support. One of them is fuel
transportation through Severodvinsk. The bridge there is in very bad condition. The citizens
asked for help to renovate the bridge, because it is the key route for the spent fuel export. Additionally,
a bulk-oil terminal is planned in the region for the management of heavy tankers
with fuel. Murmansk citizens asked to direct spent fuel transportation not through Andreyeva
Bay or Gremikha, but through Severodvinsk. Severodvinsk supports this idea. In general,
public attitude is very good. A. Nikitin from Belluna even said that for the first time Rosatom
asked the public to participate in resolving existing problems.
A.M. Vinogradova: There is information that poisonous materials were converted,
and that some highly-toxic masses continue to exist. It is a reason of concern among the Saratovskaya
oblast population. I would like that the problem of radioactive materials were given
the international community’s attention. My second question is to all our guests: I wonder
whether your countries, which possess nuclear materials, are more responsible for the management
of such materials or do you have similar assistance programs, like those we have
just heard about
Simon Evans: The British people recognize the problem. We have very strict control
over all fissile materials. We seldom receive complaints with regard to radiological and nuclear
material safety conditions. I am not an appropriate person to talk about nuclear submarines,
but I believe that we have many questions with respect to this issue. We have a program in the

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Ministry of Defense on how to resolve problems related to nuclear submarines, but this issue
is still being discussed inside the Ministry.
In addition, we are working on the establishment of a non-governmental organization
in the United Kingdom, which would deal with decommissioning nuclear facilities and
would be responsible for control over related issues, project competition and other activities,
which used to be under operators’ control. This would allow the control system to strengthen
and transfer responsibility from the operators for operation (to be conducted in two-three
years). This type of work takes place in the North-West of England and in Scotland.
Paul Walker: I would like to note, as I am the only American here, that long-term issues
of security, nuclear waste storage, especially high radioactive, and fissile waste represent
a huge problem for all countries. We all know that it is a very expensive process. When we
refer to uranium and plutonium from nuclear warheads and reactors, we are talking about
long-term expensive processes.
Chemical weapons destruction in the United States has been incorporated in a large
program, which has existed for twenty years. Its first estimate was two billion dollars, and
now it up to forty billion. Nuclear waste and its long-term storage significantly exceed these
expenses. Therefore, the chemical problem is not as significant as nuclear waste. That is why
we are so concerned about nuclear proliferation, nuclear processing and nuclear power plants.
It is not only the matter of nuclear power plants, but the long-term waste storage. In our group
today, we all talked about nuclear and radioactive waste, radioactive waste clean up in shortterm,
intermediate and long-term perspectives. In the United States we have been working on
his subject for 30–40 years, invested tens of billions dollars into the research of such facilitates,
but the problem has not been resolved yet.
The terrorism threat is a very serious problem we need to work on. It is not possible to
solve this problem on our own; we need to strengthen partnerships in resolving these issues.
Alain Mattiot: In France, we follow the principle that the organization which produced
waste, must reprocess and clean it. In 1991, we adopted a law to resolve issues with
high and low radioactivity levels. Last year, after a 15 year long study with a number of
national organizations, we decided to look at various possibilities that we need to consider.
In northern France, we established a special storage for the waste. The waste will be buried
deep in the ground. The national organization „Andra” is responsible to bury the waste. The
problem of long-term waste has not been solved yet, but we are going to work on it in the next
ten years till we find an appropriate solution to these problems.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Chelyabinskaya Oblast: Experience Gained with the
Remediation of the Legacies of Nuclear Accidents
Svetlana Y. Kostina, Deputy Minister, Head of Department
of Radiation Safety, Ministry for Radiation and
Environmental Safety, Chelyabinskaya Oblast
Dear Conference Participants!
The Chelyabinskaya oblast has experienced the consequences of the establishment
and development of the Russian atomic complex, possibly to a larger extent than
any other Russian region. In the 1940s, a production enterprise known as „Mayak” was
established on the territory of the oblast. „Mayak” was the „first born child” of Russia’s
atomic industry; it is an enterprise that played a major role in creating the country’s
„nuclear shield.” Currently, there are also other nuclear and radiation-related dangerous
objects on the territory of the Chelyabinskaya oblast: the Russian Federal Nuclear
Center and an appliance-manufacturing factory. The production at these facilities includes
the full nuclear cycle – from creation to removal of nuclear devices, including
nuclear waste disposition.
It was specifically the shortcomings in the nuclear waste disposition field during
the initial years of the „Mayak” operation that became the cause of unprecedented environmental
pollution in the region. In the initial years of the atomic project, the question of
environmental pollution was not considered a priority. The consequences of dumping the
nuclear waste into the open biospheres were not taken into account, and were not even all
known. That is why, from 1949 to 1956, about 76 million m 3 of radioactive waste (of about
3.0 million Ku) were dumped into the shallow-water Techa River. About 22 million Ku of
radioactive substances was also dumped into the environment as a result of the 1957 explosion
of the high-radioactivity spent fuel storage. This is how the famous Eastern Ural radioactive
trace was formed. In 1967, the sediment deposits of the Karachay water reservoir
(medium-radioactivity industry waste storage) were spread onto an adjacent territory.
More than 18,000 people had to be evacuated. The Techa River was no longer used
for economic activity, and the inundation plots were alienated. In addition, 16.6 ha of land, on
which the East Ural radioactive reservation area is located, are still out of use.
The consequences of technological decisions that were taken at that time and
of the accidents that happened have still not been overcome. The regional government
is still obligated to devote a considerable amount of time to solving social problems of
the population that stayed and continues to reside in the area, and who were affected
by „Mayak” as well as in residential areas by the Techa River. The government also
devotes its time to solving environmental problems in connection with the radioactive
pollution of the „Mayak” area.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The „Mayak” radioactive waste is deposited in many open natural environments:
bodies of water, underground water sources, and the upper soil levels. The first appeals
of the necessity to make decisions regarding safe ways to treat and store this waste on
the governmental level were made in 1990, with the initiative of the regional head, P.
I. Sumin. In 1992, the government undertook its first program directed at finding solutions
for technical and technological problems of the „Mayak” radioactive waste. This
program also included a large complex of initiatives for medical and social rehabilitation
and protection of the population that was affected by the radioactivity. In 1993, the
Russian Federation (RF) Law on social support initiatives, as well as on benefits and
compensation payments for such population groups was enacted.
The government’s support in overcoming the problems regarding the consequences
of the radiation accidents in the Ural region is still ongoing. Along with the Emergency
Situations RF, Minatom developed and uses a third federal target programming which will
be active until 2010. The regional government invests the budget sources into the solutions
of these problems throughout the entire duration of the federal program’s implementation.
Since 2003, the region has adopted and implemented a corresponding regional target program,
which is also directed at solving problems of the „Mayak” area residents.
Throughout the years of the program implementation, the region delivered (through
building or acquiring) over 100,000 m 2 of housing. This means that 1,350 people acquired
free housing which they legally deserved. Over seven healthcare buildings (for 387 beds),
three large regional-scale buildings (a data acquisition building, a development design office,
and an office building), three pre-schools for 2,500 children, water supply units, gas
pipes, and other infrastructure objects – all of this was constructed on the region’s affected
territories (five municipal districts and one city precinct).
There were also organized initiatives such as health assessments (of 100,000 people)
and in-depth clinical examination treatments for citizens who were affected by the
radiation. This was conducted at the UNPTs RM clinic or at a specially created rehabilitation
section of a regional clinical hospital. In all the central district hospitals, ultra-sound
and functional diagnostics offices were created. The precinct hospitals and OB-GYN centers
acquired ambulance cars and dental offices. Over 500 physicians received training
through the „Radiation-sanitation and Medical Aspects of Radiation Accidents” program.
Since 1996, the region has conducted outgoing consultative examinations of children residing
on the affected territories with follow-up treatments at the clinic. Examinations are
conducted every four years. Currently, this initiative is in its third cycle for children on the
„Mayak”-affected territory (about 7,000 children in two programs).
Since the first target program implementation in 1992, the regional government
has devoted the most serious attention to the organization of the radiation monitoring
system in the „Mayak” zone and other radiation-prone objects. In 1998, the TSRM
system was created. It includes monitoring of radioactive pollution sources and of the
surrounding natural environments, as well as health-radiation monitoring. The system
framework also provides for the monitoring data exchange, conducted by the „Mayak”
and the government monitoring services (Rosgidromet, Rospotrebnadzor). Currently,
this system is fully funded by the regional budget resources. It presents opportunities
to obtain operational information on the radiation background fluctuations and current

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
information on the region’s environment radioactive pollution levels, as well as information
on scope and structure of the ongoing technology-induced radiation levels that
affect the population.
Only the presence of this independent system allows the regional government
to state with confidence that over the last 15 years, the ongoing activities of „Mayak”
did not lead to above-average environmental pollution. The scope and structure of the
ongoing radiation doses of the overall region as well as the population residing in the
affected zones, on average corresponds to the RF dosage structure.
At the same time, the presence of this system allowed the regional government
to evaluate the real radiation situation in the polluted territories of the region. This occurred
for the first time since dumping of the radioactive waste into the Techa River and
the 1957 accident. It has been determined that for the population residing mostly on the
radiation-polluted areas in the first years following the accidents, the accumulated doses
exceeded not only 70, but also 350 mZv – the threshold values at which it becomes
necessary to take actions for the citizen’s social protection. In 1998, the regional government
along with the Sverdlovsk and Kurgansk regional power bodies developed the
relevant corrections in the federal legislation and directed them to the State Duma. As
a result of the changes that were made since 1999, the citizens who accumulated doses
exceeding 70 mZv and who reside along the Techa River, are receiving compensation
payments. Citizens who accumulated over 70 mZv dosages and reside in the danger
zone are also in need of social protection. The relevant suggestions have been prepared
and are in the RF Government.
The TSRM data confirmed that Muslyumovo village (which is the nearest to the
river on which the „Mayak” dams are located) currently possesses technology-induced
radiation exceeding 1 mZv. All the population in that area is receiving the relevant
compensation payments. At the same time, the impossibility of completely shielding
the population from the contact with the Techa River demanded more radical measures
to be taken. In November 2006, an agreement between Rosatom and the Chelyabinsk
regional government was signed, directed at solving these problems. Within the frameworks
of this agreement, Muslyumovo residents are offered a free-will decision to move
to any settlement or residential area according to their choice. The resources for this
project are invested by the Rosatom, as well as by the Chelyabink regional government.
Currently, this unique project, unlike any other, is already in the stage of implementation,
and some of the Muslyumovo residents have already left the village. I would like
to note the active partner role of Rosatom in implementing this complex project.
Currently, a search for ways to use the Muslyumovo village territories following the
evacuation completion for agricultural purposes is being conducted together with Rosatom.
The regional government also devotes its attention to general questions of providing
radiation safety on the territories of the region. In 1999, a regional law „On radiation
safety for the Chelyabinskaya oblast population” was passed and is currently in
action. This law divides up the legislative and the implementation competencies of the
region in the sphere of radiation safety and defines the specific competency for the regional
body with the delegated powers. The regional budgetary spending commitments
have also been specified in the given sphere.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
An annual radiation and health check-ups of the region’s territory was organized
and is conducted according to the regional legislation. Reports for 11 municipal formations
were written. This monitoring allowed the identification of unique natural anomalies
on the region’s territory with the elevated radioactivity levels. Some problems were
also identified: there are settlements on the region’s territories the residents of which
receive from 10 to 100 mZv per year from natural radiation sources (the equivalent
equilibrium volume activity of the radon products reaches 16,000 Bk/m 2 and exceeds
the standard norm by 80 times). At the same time, in these very settlements, the radionuclide
content in drinking water sources also exceeds the health criteria in terms of the
sum of the alpha- and beta-activity, on the content of 222 Rn (specific activity/volume
activity reaches 1,000 Bk per liter). Currently, in accordance with the Governor’s provision,
there are initiatives being developed to lower the influence of the natural radiation
factor upon the population.
An information and analytical center for accounting and control of radioactive
substances and radioactive waste has been created and is active under the Ministry for
Radiation and Ecological Safety.
Much attention is also devoted to the tasks of informing professional groups,
media, and the population about radioactive sources and their treatment. Educational
seminars and qualification-boosting courses for enterprise specialists are conducted
every year. They are funded from the regional budget resources. For media, education in
the form of seminars was chosen – journalists visited the „Mayak” enterprise four times.
They also visited other radiation-danger prone objects, familiarized themselves with the
radioactive waste treatment technologies and with the problems concerning this field.
There were a total of 11 of such seminars. Various public organizations’ representatives,
teachers, and physicians working on the affected territories also joined these seminars.
As for the population, the format of public hearings – an open participatory dialogue
– was chosen and implemented. From 1996 to 2005, seven public hearings were
conducted, five of which took place on the territory of a specific municipal district and
addressed the interests and needs of this specific region’s population as much as possible.
During this period of time, over 2,000 people took part in the hearings. The regional
government along with Rosatom began preparing for the conference devoted to the 50th
anniversary of the 1957 „Mayak” accident. This conference will take place in the city of
Chelyabinsk 24–25 of September.
In conclusion, I would like to note that Rosatom has made solving these problems
a top priority, has taken many positive steps towards the solution, and has searched
for a collaborative mechanism of social protection and rehabilitation of the affected
population.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Radiation Monitoring and Accident Alert System Upgrade in
the Arkhangelskaya Oblast
Anatoly N. Gurov; PhD (in Economics), Director,
Department of Industry, Arkhangelskaya Oblast
Vladimir S. Nikitin, Director, Research Bureau „Оnega”,
M.A Kozhin, FGUP NIPTB „Onega”
Nuclear and radiological safety is a very important component of the Russian
national security program and represents the key priority in our government’s agenda.
The Russia’s national interests in nuclear and radiological safety are defined by
the goal of risk minimization with respect to life and health of the population, the environment,
as well as the flora and fauna, individual and jurisdictional property, state and
municipal possessions in case of a nuclear or radiological accident, environmental contamination
treatment resulted from nuclear or radiological accidents, and technological
and defense activities in the previous years.
Overall the level of nuclear and radiological safety in Russia and, particularly in
the Arkhangelsk oblast, complies with the legal requirements and recommendations of
the expert international organizations.
At the same time, the system crisis in Russia at the beginning of the 1990s
caused a number of complicated problems, including a sharp economic reduction in the
much needed government funding of the nuclear weapons and nuclear submarine (NS)
dismantlement programs, which became obsolete after the ending of previous defense
activities in the area. A large part of the facilities are in poor condition and pose a high
rate of nuclear risks, particularly the ones in the North-West. The international community
has constantly expressed its concerns with the situation in this region.
In December 2001, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) established a new fund called „Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership”
The Fund’s goal is to resolve problems connected with radioactive contamination risks in
the North-West. Due to a complicated situation, the donor-countries and EBRD came to
an agreement with the Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy (Rosatom) about a comprehensive
strategy on the nuclear problems resolution in the North-West during NS dismantlement,
environmentally safe rehabilitation of radiology dangerous facilities, and nuclear
materials physical security upgrade.
In this context, in 2003, a decision to develop a two-stage Strategic Master-Plan was
adopted. The first stage was developed by Russian experts. The final report included basic
information necessary for the second stage. This final report includes a detailed analysis of the

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
existing situation and establishes long term goals for the comprehensive dismantlement and
rehabilitation process. The report also indicates and provides justification for the most urgent
actions in the Russian North-West. In addition to the existing recommendations the report defines
strategic policies for the Russia in order to complete the strategy. The strategic policies
are the basis of large-scale works on the comprehensive rehabilitation in the North-West.
The donor countries and the Russia certified that the results of the first stage of the
Strategic Master Plan represent the conceptual strategy, which needs additional strategic
decisions to become a pragmatic and comprehensive program for large scale events. As a
result of the Plan analysis, high priority events were named, including the establishment of
objective and regional monitoring and an accident alert system in Arkhangelskaya oblast.
It is necessary to develop a radiation monitoring and accident alert system in
Arkhangelskaya oblast for the current and automated control of radiological and radio
ecological environment at the key radiation dangerous facilities and zones of radio ecological
research and evaluation in routine and accident situations.
This radiation monitoring and accident alert system is being developed for the
following issues: the early alert of the personnel and population in case of radiation accident
at the facilities; decision-making process support and prevention of the radiation
contamination of the environment; timely information and analytical support during the
nuclear and radiological accident consequences liquidation; operative support of the local,
regional and central Rosatom constituencies, as well as local and federal authorities
with necessary information updates; and open information release upon decision of the
Client about the accident to Russian and international public and media.
The key radiation monitoring and accident alert system tasks:
––automated non-stop support for receiving, analysis and information release on
radiological at radio ecological situation at the facilities and zones of study, including
territories, waters, stationed and moving subjects;
––radiation accident modeling with local and trans-border consequences of radiological
elements dispersion;
––radiation and radio ecological situation evaluation during the routine facilities’
regime and accidents, danger levels evaluation, management information support for
decision making on accident minimization and liquidation;
––personnel training and group division by action and department in case of an
accident;
––information and communication systems in the everyday and accident situation
with local, regional and central authorities, and media at the professional level,
which is easy for the general public.
The project on establishment of the radiation monitoring and accident alert system
with facilities including navy, spent nuclear fuel and radar systems envisions an
opportunity for further development and can be viewed as a part of the second stage of
the north-western region environment monitoring. The volume of works in the project
includes various activities which help achieve the common goal – monitoring, early
warning and management of an accident in order to protect the Arkhangelskaya oblast
population. The project takes place in the systems and facilities, is being coordinated
and is a part of other projects, which are financed by the Russia and other donors.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The potential of the system:
1. Timely access to the information on radiation dangerous facilities, existing
condition of radiation and environment contamination on the basis of geo-information
technologies.
2. Radiation monitoring data;
3. Database of reference accidents and functions of the sources of the radiationdangerous
facilities;
4. Modeling and projection of radiation contamination and waste dispersion of
radiation-dangerous facilities into air and water; and radiation impact on personnel,
population and environment;
5. Decision-making support to personnel and population protection in case of
an accident;
6. Program support of training and practice of personnel and emergency response
groups in case of an accident;
7. Systematic information support for the regional authorities and population on
radiation and environmental risks caused by utilization and rehabilitation of the contaminated
territories.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Color Insert

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Informing the Population of Severodvinsk on the Safety of
Nuclear Submarine Recycling Based on Comparative
Analysis of Nuclear, Radiological and Social Risks
Vladimir S. Nikitin, Director, Research Bureau „Оnega”
Nikolai G. Scherbinin, Director, Green Cross Russia
Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk
Presently, dismantlement of nuclear submarines (NS) after their withdrawal from
operational status in Russia consists of the following stages:
––Removal of pent nuclear fuel;
––Removal and subsequent transportation of the reactor block to the place of
storage that is distanced from inhabited places;
––Full recycling of the submarine body and equipment, except for the reactor block;
––Collection of toxic and radioactive waste and its preparation for burial.
On the basis of these steps, the requirements for the enterprises fulfilling the
whole cycle have been set forth. They are to provide safety of the staff, local population,
and the environment.
Severodvinsk has become the main center for the disposing of NSs in the North-
West of Russia.
Severodvinsk is located along the shoreline of the White Sea, where it flows into
the Nikolsk arm of the Northern Dvina, 35 km off Arkhangelsk [1]. Its population as of
1 January, 2007 amounted to 195,000 inhabitants. The majority of the population are
employed by the ship-building plant as it has around 40,000 employees.
Production enterprise Sevmash and federal state unitary machine-building enterprise
Zvezdochka, constituting State Russian Center for Nuclear Ship-Building, are two
of the most important enterprises in NS building, refurbishment and recycling.
Over the past 50 years, Sevmash has built 35 diesel-driven and 128 NSs. According
to the START agreement between the United States and Russia, and through
financial help received through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the
shipyard agreed to dismantle two 941-type NSs. As part of G8 initiative in cooperation
with Zvezdochka, the Sevmash shipyard has finished recycling the two 949-type NSs,
OSCAR-1 [2].
Zvezdochka is located on the Yagry Island and has a population of around 40,000
people.
Since its foundation, the enterprise has refurbished 114 submarines, 81 of which
carried nuclear power installations [3].

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Since 1977, Zvezdochka has been dismantling and recycling missile components
of NSs as part of the agreement between Russia and the USA on the reduction of
strategic nuclear weapons. As of today, 31 NSs have been recycled in compliance with
Russian and international ecological standards.
Onega is the main organization in research and technology maintenance of recycling
of vessels with nuclear power installations in Russia. As potentially health threatening
work (e.g. NS recycling) is conducted in Severodvinsk, the population is growing
increasingly concerned; therefore, local authorities and the public support complete
openness related to environmental, shipyard staff and local population protection.
Since the start of the project, both Onega and Zvezdochka have taken additional
efforts to inform the public about the work done in NS recycling. Pursuant to the recommendations
of the International Committee on Radiation Resistance [4], the acceptability
of activity involving radiological substances is evaluated based on risk analysis for
the staff, local population and the environment. Onega, in cooperation with Rosatom,
conducts complex research on radiological and non-radiological factors and their contribution
to environmental risks during NS recycling at Russian ship-building plants.
The main objective of risk assessment during the processes of construction, refurbishment
and dismantlement of NSs is a complex assessment of data, information,
and technological processes in order to provide the managers of the enterprises with the
necessary information based on which they would be able to make reasonable decisions
for reduction of radiological and non-radiological risks at the Russian ship-building
enterprises.
One of the requirements for NS and nuclear installation carrier recycling is assessment
of impact on the environment. Throughout the course of the assessment, such
aspects as impact on air, water, soil, staff of the enterprise and local population are
tested. The conclusion is made based on the assessment results.
Projects and processes of ship-building facilities requiring safety control include
toxic waste, NSs that are being refurbished and recycled, vessels carrying nuclear installations,
onshore facilities, vessels of nuclear technological maintenance, toxic waste
recycling installations, towage of NSs and reactor blocks, technical processes of recycling,
dismantling of NSs.
Research has shown that radiation-related mortality among the population as
well as staff not involved in radiation-related works does not exceed the rate of 1х10 -6
people/year, which corresponds to the level of insignificant hazardousness as set forth in
the recommendations of the International Committee on Radiation Resistance [5].
Over the past seven years, Severodvinsk has hosted a number of conferences
and seminars related to the issues of NS recycling attended by both Russian and foreign
experts. For example, on July 4–9, 2001, the international conference Environmental
Issues of NS Recycling was held. On March 26–27, 2003, Zvezdochka hosted an IAEA
expert panel seminar on the issues of complex recycling of NSs in the North-Western
region. It was attended by experts from Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, France,
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Canada, the United States and Italy. As part of the seminar,
Rosatom backed by executive authorities, made an agreement with Canada that the
latter would finance recycling of 12 NSs at Zvezdochka. On November 19–21, 2003,

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
meetings of the Russian Nuclear Society Safe Nuclear Power for the Society were held.
Participants during the meetings stressed the importance of complex work on clarification
and popularization of modern nuclear technology safety and the importance of the
Russian Nuclear Society in the process.
Considering the importance of nuclear industry for the Arkhangelskaya oblast
(nuclear facility at the Novaya Zemlya, building and recycling of NSs at the Severodvinsk
enterprises, building of offshore nuclear heat and power plant in Severodvinsk
and other nuclear projects), we deem it appropriate to hold a number of seminars on nuclear
energy safety. We understand the significance of high-tech works conducted in the
Arkhangelskaya oblast of the nation and thus it should be supported and continued.
Onega in cooperation with the International Center for Environmental Safety
have held two meetings with the people of Severodvinsk, where the topical issues related
to recycling of decommissioned nuclear fleet and environmental rehabilitation of
facilities of infrastructure of the North-West were discussed. These issues have been set
forth in the strategic master-plan prepared by a group of Russian experts and engineers
led by the member of the RAS A.A. Sarkisov.
The first meeting was held on November 24, 2004 in Severodvinsk; more than
100 experts took part in the discussion of the master-plan, 15 experts made speeches
and suggestions. The second meeting was held on June 8, 2005 and its main objective
was to get to know the attitude of Severodvinsk public towards the project Report on
the Strategic Environmental Valuation of the master-plan. Link to the report had been
previously forwarded to all the participants of the first meeting. The event was attended
by 82 people, 14 of whom took part in the discussion of the report. Information regarding
the international conferences, seminars, meetings, and public hearings was provided
to the public via mass media.
The bulletin, Issues of NS Recycling, was first published in 2002 and since then,
11 issues have been published. The head of the editorial board is V.S. Nikitin, PhD.
All of the mentioned improvements have provided a good foundation for the
Research and Information Center working with the population on NS recycling issues.
The center was opened in 2002 and is a subdivision Green Cross Russia. The center’s
objectives are the following:
––To increase public awareness of the nuclear recycling issues, including environmental,
political, medical and other issues;
––To learn the attitude of the public to the issues of NS recycling;
––To create links among the governmental bodies, experts, and the public.
The center has already held a number of interesting events.
On February 8, 2007, Severodvinsk hosted public hearings on Improvement of
Radiation Control and Emergency Response in the Arkhangelskaya oblast that were
jointly organized by Onega and the Research and Information Center.
On March 30, 2007, the Research and Information Center held a meeting with
journalists of Severodvinsk on NS recycling issues.
Different events are regularly organized for the students of the city; these include
seminars and trips to the facilities involved in the recycling process. On April 9, 2007,

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
the Research and Information Center organized a one-day seminar for the teachers of
local schools on Environmental Safety of NS Recycling.
The Research and Information Center’s personnel are active members of the
Steering Committee on environmental events, affiliated by the City Council of Severodvinsk
as well as the Community Environmental Council. On April 2, 2007, the Research
and Information Center participated in the city’s round table discussion on the building
of an offshore nuclear power plant commissioned to Sevmash.
The first stage of building of the offshore generating unit Academician Lomonosov
for the low-capacity nuclear heat power plant started on April 15, 2007 and in accordance
with the agreement with Rosenergoatom, Sevmash will build and exploit the
first plant as well as the onshore facilities. This will mean informing the public regularly
of the safety risk of the offshore nuclear power plant compared to other technology.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the majority of the population of the city understands
and approves of NS recycling-related activity. However, informing the public
regularly is necessary.
References
1. Russian Cities: Encyclopedia, M.: Science Publishing Bolshaya Rossiyskaya Entsyklopediya;
TERRA – Kinizhnyj Klub, 1998. – 559p.
2. Vessel Sevmash. Photo album 2006, printed by Partner NP.
3. Shipwrights of Zvezdochka: historic and regional compilation. Issue №2. – Severodvinsk
Zvezdochka, 2004 – 384p.
4. Radiological Safety. Recommendations of Radiological Commission on Radiological
Protection 1990. Release 40, part 1.2. Translated from English. M., Energoatomizdat, 1994.
5. A.M.Agapov, G.A.Novikov, V.S.Nikitin, Risk Assessment and Management in the
process of nuclear submarine recycling at the ship-building facilities of Russia, Volume 1, 1,
2003 – 79–96 p.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Radiological Problems of the Yenisey River Near
the Rosatom Chemical Plant
Alexander Y. Bolsunovsky, Deputy Director, Institute of
Biophysics of SB RAS, Krasnoyarsk
The Yenisey River is one of the largest rivers in the world. On its bank, near
Krasnoyarsk city, there is a Rosatom Chemical Plant. Nuclear reactors and radiological
chemical factories are located at the facility, which produces weapons-grade plutonium.
Two reactors used water from the Yenisey River for cooling purposes, but now are out
of operation. At present, a third reactor continues its work and it partially uses Yenisey
water for reactor cooling.
During the long operation of the radiological chemical factory, a large amount
of liquid radioactive waste with various activity levels accumulated on site. A part of
the waste is stored in open pools and another part is filled in underground water layers
in „Severny” grounds. Scientific expeditions by the Biophysics Institute and other
institutes revealed a number of facts, which indicate an unfavorable radio-ecological
situation in the Yenisey waters:
1. A High level of radioactive contamination of some underground parts of the
river’s basin takes place at 330 km distance from the facility. As a rule, these are local
areas, but a long anomaly was determined with up to 47 kBq/kg level of 137 Cs in the
basin near the city of Yeniseysk.
Some shore lands of the river near the Chemical Plant contain up to 850 kBq/kg
of 137 Cs. Such 137 Cs levels are comparable to the radioactive contamination of the Techa
River. A probable source of high radioactive cesium contamination of the Yenisey basin
is an onshore pool (radioactive substances storage), which might have been affected by
abnormal flooding in 1966.
2. Hot particles with 137 Cs activity up to 30 MBq/particle were found in soil layers
of the river’s shore area. Lab research proved that a reactor was the source of these particles
and determined the approximate age of this formation. A comparative magnitude analysis of
137
Cs/ 134 Cs ratio for newly found particles indicated that all the particles can be divided into
two groups based on this correlation:
a). Particles with isotope rationale 137 Cs/ 134 Cs more than 3000 and the age higher than
30 years.
b). Particles with isotope rationale 137 Cs/ 134 Cs less or equal to 1000. It is obvious, that
cesium isotope ratio the age of the newly found particles is less than in group a). Statistical
analysis indicated that for the first group an average rationale of isotopes 137 Cs/ 134 Cs comprises
3600±700; and for the second group – 900±500.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Hot particle flow into the Yenisey took place thirty years ago at least twice.
Lately, however, some particles with 137 Cs/ 134 Cs rationale less than 200 (50¸200) were
found (by the Geology and Mineralogy Institute, RAN, Novosibirsk). These particles
are quite young. Some micro particles, a tenth of micron in size, were found in the soil
layers and river bed sediments. In these hot second generation particles, 137 Cs activity
reaches tens of hundreds of Bq and is registering high levels of 241 Am.
One can suggest that hot second generation particles are micro-particles of large
hot particles, but it is hard to explain the high presence of 241 Am in them, and therefore
trans-uranium elements as well. The new director of the Chemical Plant in an interview
with the regional paper noted that hot particles are buried in the river basin and are not
dangerous for the population. In the fall of 2006, however, after a large flood, hot particles
were found near B. Balchug neighborhood.
We can imagine that the incident happened at a large scale, because the particles
were found near the Chemical Plant and at a 330 km away down the river. It is possible
to expect highly active micro-particles along with reactor fuel particles, whose source
may be caused by metal pipe corrosion and deformation in the reactor system.
Metal micro-particles become radioactive when they go through a reactor’s active
zone. Radionuclides of an active nature have a shorter lifetime than radionuclides from a splinter
source. Large amounts of highly active particles in the river basin near the industrial Chemical
Plant up to Eniseysk city represent a source of potential health threats to the population.
Thus, gamma-irradiation power at a one-meter distance from some particles
reached 0.1 mZv/hour, and that is why the particle study took place in a lab (in a protected
box). The particles were found in the area with dense local populations. Several
hours exposure near such particles is equal to a year dose of 1 mZv.
Further studies of active particles will allow for an evaluation of real radiation
exposure in the Yenisey River basin.
3. The data on maximum Plutonium isotope accumulation is 16 Bq/kg and is
registered in the river bed near the Chemical Plant was in an earlier publication of
specialists from Radii Institute and the Chemical Plant. At a distance more than 20 km
from the plant’s waste, the amount of plutonium in the Yenisey basin is at the level of
global fall-out. The studies of the Biophysics Institute Siberian Branch of RAS (SB
RAS) together with Geochemistry Vernadsky Institute and MosNPO RADON indicated
abnormal amounts of trans-uranium elements in the Yenisey River basin – 239, 240, 241 Pu,
241
Am, 237 Np and Cm isotopes. In some soil layers, the maximal amount of trans-uranium
elements is the same in the Yenisey and Techa river basins.
4. Annual monitoring shows man-made radionuclide accumulation, including
trans-uranium elements by hydro biotical organisms, at the 250 km distance from the
Chemical Plant. Therefore, radioactive element dumping takes place into the Yenisey.
Cytogenesis studies of water plants indicated that plants have large numbers of chromosome
abnormalities comparable to the region up the river flow.
5. Trans-uranium elements, including Curie and Americium isotopes, were found
in berry bushes, such as black currant and its berries. Actinolite levels are low, but considering
spot radioactive contamination of the soils, one can expect much higher levels
of biota contamination.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
6. Critical levels of 137 Cs, up to 10,000 Bq/kg (exceeding standards by a factor of
10), were found in mushrooms in some areas of the Yenisey River.
7. New sources of tritium flow into the Yenisey were revealed. Besides tritium,
which is present in reactor water waste, tritium from the underground radioactive waste
storage at Severny facility may also flow into the Yenisey.
Biophysics Institute, SB RAS together with Radioecology Department in the
Institute of Plants and Animals Ecology, Urals Branch of the RAS, work together in the
Integration projects framework in the Siberian Branch and the Urals Branch to evaluate
radionuclide migration patterns in Yenisey and Ob’–Irtysh river system. The projects
are funded by the Russian Fundamental Studies Fund.
The Krasnoyarsk Administration constantly refuses to help finance radio ecological
studies of the Yenisey and supports a map company and the Chemical Plant (7
million rubles per year), which does not have any radiometric equipment or experience
in the field. In the Krasnoyarsky Kray radioactive level evaluation is conducted by
GKH-PARADOKS and supported by the Administration. Whose interests are those
During Kirienko’s visit in Krasnoyarsk, he honestly noted that everyone looks
in the Yenisey for something he/she wants to find in terms of the river’s radioactive
contamination. The RAS is looking for objective data.
Conclusions and Suggestions
1. Radioecology studies of the Yenisey River, conducted by the Biophysics Institute
and other organizations in Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Krasnoyarsk, indicated
that some areas of the Yenisey River contain abnormal amounts of man-made radionuclides,
including trans-uranium elements. Similar levels of radionuclides are present in
the Yenisey and Techa rivers. The significant numbers of hot particles (only in the Yenisey)
cannot be explained from a standpoint that there were no accidents at the Chemical
Plant. Rosatom should open existing files on the accidents at the plant, including those
on the matter of the Chemical Plant pools and storages condition.
2. Man-made radionuclide presence, including trans-uranium elements, in berry
bushes, high radioactive phosphorus in fish, and exceeding 137 Cs presence in mushrooms,
requires constant monitoring of biota in the Yenisey eco-system.
3. Increasing background amount of tritium in the Big Tel’ River (Horizon Enterprise
flows its waters with radionuclide from the Severny Grounds) requires longterm
studies of radionuclide presence in the Severny Ground wells and other water
drainage.
4. Rosatom should invite Institute of Biophysics SB RAS to join the radioecological
studies of the Yenisey River basin, because it is the only institute of the RAS
beyond the Urals and has a long experience in radioecological studies, international
recognition and is well equipped.
References
1. Bolsunovsky, A.Y., Yermakov, A.I., Sobolev A.I., Degermendgy, A.G., „First Data on
Trans-Uranium Presence of Curie in the Ecosystem of the Yenisey River Basin.” Academy of
Science Reports. 2006. Vol. 409,№2: 227–230.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
2. Bolsunovsky, A.Y., Dementiev, D.V., Bondareva, L.G. „An Evaluation of the Man-
Caused Radionuclide Accumulation in Mushrooms in Krasnoyarsk Chemical Plant.” Radiation
Biology. Radio Ecology. 2006. Vol. 46, №1: 64–70.
3. Sukhorukov, F.V., Degermendgy, A.G., Bolsunovsky, A.Y., Belolypetsky, V.M., Kosolapova,
L.G. et al. Spread and Migration Pattern of Radionuclide in the area of the Yenisey
River. Novosibirsk. SO RAN, „Geo”. 2004. 286 pages.
4. Bolsunovsky A. „Artificial Radionuclides in Aquatic Plants of the Yenisey River in
the Area Affected by Effluents of a Russian Plutonium Complex.” Aquatic Ecology. 2004. V.38
(1): 57–62.
5. Bolsunovsky, A.Y., Sukovaty, A.G. „Radioactive Contamination of the Yenisey River
Fauna in the Area of Chemical Plant Influence.” Radiobiology. Radio Ecology. 2004. Vol. 44,
№3: 393–398.
6. Bolsunovsky A.Y., Bondareva L.G. „Tritium in Surface Waters of the Yenisey River
Basin.” J. Environmental Radioactivity. 2003. V.66, №3: 285–294.
7. Bolsunovsky A.Y., Yermakov, A.I., Miasoyedov, B.F., Novikov, A.P., Sobolev, A.I.
„New Data on Trans-Uranium Elements Presence in the Yenisey River bed.” Academy of Science
Reports. 2002. Vol. 387, №2: 233–236.
8. Bolsunovsky A.Y., Yermakov, A.I., Burger, M., Degermendgy, A.G., Sobolev, A.I.
„Man-Caused Radiation Nuclide Accumulation by the Yenisey River plants in the area of the
Chemical Plant.” Radiation Biology. Radio Ecology. 2002. Vol. 42, №2: 194–199.
9. Bolsunovsky A.Y., Tcherkezian, V.O. „Hot Particles of the Yenisey River Flood Plain,
Russia.” Journal of Environmental Radioactivity. 2001. V. 57, №3: 167–174.
10. Bolsunovsky A.Y., Cherkezyan, V.O., Barsukova, K.V., Miasoyedov, B.F. A „Study of
High-Active Soil Samples and Hot Particles of the Yenisey River basin.” Radiochemistry. 2000.
Vol. 42, №6: 560–564.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The Problems of Radioactive Waste on the Territory of the
Kirovskaya Oblast
Tamara Y. Ashikhmina, Ph.D., Bio-monitoring Laboratory
Komi Institute of Biology Russian Academy of Sciences &
President Green Cross Russia Public Outreach
and Information Office in Kirov
The problem of radiation safety today is just as present in the Kirovskaya oblast
as it is in other regions of Russia. The extent of ecological problems in different regional
territories varies, depending on the territory’s natural characteristics, its economic development
level, the resistance of its natural complexes to the human-induced stresses,
and the intensity of human-induced activities.
For over 60 years, one potential ecological danger source for the Kirovskaya
oblast is the Kirovo-Chepetskiy Chemical Industrial Complex (KChKhK). In the past,
this complex was a uranium-processing facility. The industrial work of the KChKhK,
beginning in 1944, was directed towards obtaining concentrated enriched uranium as a
first step of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Today KChKhK is a large chemical industrial complex. With the help of unique
technology, it produces complex fertilizers, ammonia, nitric acid, chloride, and sodium
hydrate. The largest polymeric factory in Russia also functions under the KChKhK
structure. It produces 96% of all fluorine in Russia. This fluorine is also used at the
factory to produce unique materials such as fluorocarbon polymer, a blood replacement
ingredient, as well as fluorine heart valves, threads for sewing blood vessels together,
pipelines for pumping corrosive chemical components, et cetera.
KChKhK is located approximately one to two kilometers west from the Kirovo-
Chepetsk area, which has about 88,000 residents.
Today’s KChKhK enterprise inherited a large amount of radioactive waste from
past production activities. The industrial complex’s disposal site contains eight radioactive
waste (RAW) storages amounting to 784500 tons. In the process of filling up these
facilities, this RAW is being preserved with the help of a variety of substances including
concrete, asphaltic bitumen, and common clay. The first storage site went into use in 1953,
and by 1980 it was fully preserved and isolated by concrete, asphalt and clay. The second
site was filled up about 20% of the way and preserved due to cessation of the production
process. The total mass of radioactive waste reaches 1176.7 Ku. The waste contains the
following: 238-235 U, 232 Th, 239-240 Pu, 60 Co, 90 Sr, 137 Cs, and some short-lived isotopes of 134 Cs
and its daughter particles. The sites containing radioactive and other toxic waste are located
at Kirovo-Chepetsk’s border, about 2 km from the residential zone.
The land on which the waste is located is in a tall bottomland and on the first terrace
above the bottomland on the coast of the Vyatka River, the Kirovskaya oblast main

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
drinking-water source. The distance between the chemical industrial complex (and its
radioactive waste sites) to the Vyatka River is 1.5 to 3 km.
Also, the chemical industrial complex and the waste sites are located in Kirov
city’s irrigation intake and close to point where water is pumped from the river for household
use, 19 km upstream of the Vyatka River. The total amount of production waste
buried close to this location amounts to 18 million tons. In Kirov city’s regional center, the
population mostly uses water from the Vyatka River. This is why local residents are seriously
concerned with the Vyatka River water quality – their main drinking water source.
The ground water, soil and water stream sediment deposits are polluted with
radioactive and toxic materials and are located near the radioactive waste storage. This
presents a serious ecological danger. About 17.5 ha are polluted with alfa-active nuclides
(plutonium, uranium) with an average density of 0.7 Ku/km 2 ; and about 53 ha
are polluted with 137 Cs with an average density of 50 Ku/km 2 . There is a possibility of
radio-nuclide ground water pollution in connection to the long-term exploitation of the
objects that have been placed there.
According to the data on ground water control, radioactive pollution was noted
on the lower lots in the preceding years in soil and sediment deposits along the Elkhovka
River streambed. This was a consequence of earlier radioactive materials dumping
in the area. For a more in-depth and independent evaluation of Kirovo-Chepetsk city’s
radioactive situation in the Kirovskaya oblast, sediment deposit probing was conducted
in the rivers and lakes near the KChKhK (Elkhovka, Prosnitsa rivers) and in the area of
Kirovo-Chepetsk and Kirov city.
The gross uranium content is mostly low; in most cases it is less than 2.5 g/ton (of
dry mass). The maximum concentrations of up to 4.5–6 g/ton are noted in the Elkhovka
River’s lower and middle courses, downstream from the solid radioactive waste storage
locations. Aside from the gross uranium, mobile uranium and simultaneous general mineralization
of aqueous extracts were noted. The liquid uranium content in the vast majority
of cases comes to (1.9–4.6)x10 –6 g/l (grams per liter); in four points of Elkhovka River’s
lower lots, gross uranium content comes to its maximum 4.5–6.0 g/t (grams per ton),while
thinly fluid uranium increases up to (24.0–30.6)x10 – 6 g/l. In the same points the highest
level of general mineralization is noted, reaching 210–230 mg/l. The thorium content in
all the probes is low and does not exceed 5–7 g/t. Thus, one can ascertain a low level of
sediment pollution with uranium which might possibly be coming from the radioactive
waste storages. One could identify the pollution source more precisely by conducting
isotope research of the sediment deposits for the radioactive isotope content ( 90 Sr, 137 Cs,
60
Co or 239 Pu and 235 U).
Highly toxic industrial complex effluents are pumped into the underground disposal
range’s deep bedrock. Toxic matter migration into the upper soil and bedrock used for
the water supply is possible due to the fact that the disposal range is located in a complex
geological situation with many lots being quite fractured and porous in nature.
Hydro-technical constructions (such as slurry repositories and tailings storages)
are some particularly dangerous. Their destruction in the case of an accident can lead to
major threats to human health.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
In a case of an accident or emergency of either natural or technological causes, a
significant amount of the dangerous chemicals that are kept in storage present a serious
threat to the Kirov and Kirovo-Chepetsk populations.
In our region, the Kirovskaya oblast administration enacted three present-day
stage regulations, directed at the provision for and the legislative regulation of radioactive
safety. The three regulations are titled „On Introduction of Organizations’ and Regional
Territories’ Radiologically Hygienic Passports”, „On the Provision of Radiological Safety
of the Population”, and „On Further Development of Socio-Hygienic Monitoring”.
The radiological monitoring of the region started in 1961, when the Hygienic-
Epidemiological Service began analyzing indicators of x-ray procedure frequency and
the effective doses the population received during these procedures. In the sixties, a
systematic research program on air and atmospheric precipitation was organized. Monitoring
the power of equivalent dose gamma-rays in an open space (gamma background)
has been conducted in the entire territory since 1990. The amount of radiation in foodstocks,
drinking water and in enclosed living spaces) were determined. At this point,
the monitoring system of radiation factor as a component of social and public health
monitoring is fully developed.
The obtained results are generalized and analyzed in the Gossanepidnadzor State
Hygiene and Epidemiological Control Regional Center. This work allowed gamma background
control level determinations for each regional district and for Kirov city, which is
very important for a timely evaluation of a radiological situation in the event it changes.
The gamma background level in the city of Kirov ranges from 5 to 10 mkR/hour
(0.05–0.1 mkZv/hour) and underwent practically no changes in the past five years. The
data is presented in Table 1.
Month/
Year
Table 1
Gamma background dynamics in the city of Kirov in 2001–2005 (mkR/hour)
I II Ш IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII min max average
Average values
2001 6,5 6,0 6,0 6,0 7,5 7,5 7,5 7,5 7,5 7,5 8,0 7,0 5,0 8,0 7,0
2002 6,0 5,5 6,0 6,0 8,0 7,0 6,5 7,5 8,0 7,0 6,5 5,0 5,0 8,0 7,0
2003 5,0 5,0 5,5 5,0 5,5 5.0 5,0 5,0 5,5 5,5 5,0 5.0 5,0 5,5 5,0
2004 7,0 7,0 7,0 6,0 8,0 8,0 7,5 8,0 8,5 8,0 8,0 8,0 5,0 10,0 8,0
2005 8,0 8,0 6,5 7,0 8,0 7,0 6,0 6,5 6,5 7,0 6,5 6,5 5,0 10,0 7,0
A selection of air and atmospheric precipitation probes was conducted in order to
determine radioactivity levels. The data is presented in Tables 2 and 3.
The strontium and cesium radionuclide concentration in the atmospheric air are
basically on the same (background) level.
In 2004–2005, the researched soil probe quantity increased. Specific activity of
90
Sr in the soil comes to an average of 1.4 Bk/kg, and specific activity of 137 Cs comes to
about 2.1 Bk/kg. This corresponds with the background values.
The quantity of analyzed water probes from open water sources remained the
same. Element-by-element radioactive water content ( 90 Sr and 137 Cs) is determined at

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
two main points: the water draw-offs/irrigation intakes of the Kirov and Kirovo-Chepetsk
cities. Both irrigation intakes are located in the zone of possible influence of the
KChKhK production waste. The analysis of these probes is conducted by radiochemical
means. The strontium concentration amounts to 0.02 Bk/l, and the cesium concentration
comes to 0.01 Bk/l. This corresponds to the background values.
Atmospheric precipitation radio-activity (Bk/m 2 per year)
Year Total Beta-activity 90 Sr-Content I37 Cs-Content
2001 45 8,3 3,2
2002 44 9,0 2,5
2003 60 16,9 3,3
2004 84 21,0 4,6
2005 78 26,4 5,8
Table 2
Average Atmospheric Air Radioactivity (10–5 Bk/m 3 )
Table 3
Year Total Beta-activity 90 Sr-activity I37 Cs-activity
2001 7,4 0,3 0,1
2002 7,4 0,3 0,1
2003 7,4 0,3 0,1
2004 11,1 0,3 0,1
2005 10,8 0,4 0,1
Taking into account the fact that the main rivers – Vyatka and Cheptsa – provide
drinking water to the cities of Kirov and Kirovo-Chepetsk, it is necessary to conduct
comprehensive evaluations of possible pollution matters contents in the natural complex
and to study its influence upon ecosystems and human health. In order to achieve
a representative monitoring of the Vyatka and Cheptsa hydro-systems, it is necessary
to conduct additional water basin inspections. It is also necessary to conduct informative
indications selections for controlling and monitoring the natural environment and
objects.
There were research projects conducted in the uranium deposit locations (Karinskoye
uranium deposits in lowland moors/turfaries). These research projects included
measuring the power of gamma-rays equivalent dose in open space and determining
natural radionuclide concentration in the soil and surface waters.
Therefore, the gamma background control is conducted over the Kirov region’s
entire territory. An effective external exposure dose amounts to 0.73 mZv per person per
year. The study of the obtained data allowed the finding of the gamma-background level
ranging/rating of the Kirovskaya oblast (see Picture 1).
According to the evaluation results, inputs from various sources of ionizing radiation,
radon and its daughter-fractionation products are responsible for the largest share

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
of radiation brought into the population (41%). Medical radiation takes the second place
with 31%; and outer space and Earth radiation (aside from radon) amount to 28%.
Overall, the radio-ecological situation of the Kirovskaya oblast is normal. It does
not exceed the limits of acceptable indicators in any environment type. This is true of
both natural and artificial radio-nuclides.
Picture 1. Ranging of gamma-background levels in the Kirovskaya oblast

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Environmental Safety of AECC as a Project Component for
the Creation of an International Center for Uranium
Enrichment in Angarsk
Alexandr G. Teterin, Head, Technical Planning
Department, Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine
The first time that the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex (AECC) became
interesting to the public and mass-media was after the Presidents of Russia and the
United States announced at the G8 summit in St.-Petersburg the plan for further development
of nuclear energy production. At the same summit, Sergey Kirienko, Head
of the Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy (Rosatom), stated that Angarsk would
become the location of the first international center for uranium enrichment.
Business Card of AECC
AECC is located in Eastern Siberia, 30 km off Irkutsk and 100 km away from
Baykal Lake. It is one of the main enterprises in Angarsk and has 6,300 employees. The
cumulative taxes paid to the budget totaled 1.3 billion rubles. AECC is part of the nuclear
fuel cycle and supplies the world market with uranium hexafluoride of natural and enriched
isotopic composition, fluorine-containing chemical substances and products of nuclear instrument
engineering. The plant has a certified quality management system meeting the
ISO 9001 standards. The share of export in the plant’s activity is about 50%. The issue
of environmental protection is no less important in the course of project implementation
than political and social issues. The population of the area is especially concerned about
the issue. Until recently the complex was considered a secure facility and thus information
on its activity was unavailable to the public. Geographical proximity to Baykal Lake adds
more importance to the environmental safety of the international project.
Environmental Policy
The Director General of the plant introduced the Environmental Policy of the
Plant that defines the main objective of the plant’s activity to minimize the impact on the
environment. The policy also sets the means to achieve the primary objective, liabilities
and responsibilities of the management in accordance with ISO 14000 standards. For
the first time, the environmental report of the plant’s activity was released and made
public in 2006. It sets forth the norms and criteria of the AECC impact on the environment.
The main means to secure environmental safety are also discussed.
Current Cost
Another proof of AECC’s concern with environmental protection is the
environmental measures taken in 2005–2006 that cost the plant 225 million ru-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
bles. The most important objective of environmental protection on the premises is
the centralized gas conditioning system of the chemical plant; special ventilation
equipment forces the production gases into the system. The main components of
the system are the granular-bed filters filled with sawdust and foam scrubbers that
neutralize and purify aerial emissions. Due to this highly reliable system, the plant
is ahead of many other plants in the nuclear and chemical industry in terms of environmental
protection.
Cumulative emissions of AECC account for 0.1% of overall emissions of the
city’s industrial facilities. Taking into account the fact that the emissions of the plant
that are supposed to host the International Center for Uranium Enrichment account for
6% of the complex’s emissions, therefore, construction of the ICUE would not significantly
affect the amount of cumulative emissions of the city.
The Plant
Good environmental conditions of the surrounding forestry can also be taken
into effect when considering the efficiency of the complex’s environmental policy.
Radiological conditions of AECC are characterized by stability and absence of radiological
situations. The standards of radiological impact are set by the Department of
radiological safety of the Ministry of natural resources of the Russia. The actual indices
have not yet approached the safety limit. The norm for annual radioactive emissions is
165,039х10 12 Bq and the actual figure for 2006 is 501,27х10 6 Bq.
The annual effective radiation dosage is set by the norms at 1 MZv; the 2006
figure for Angarsk population was 0.03 MZv. The set norm for volumetric activity of
radioactive aerosols in the bottom layer of atmosphere air is 36х10 -3 Bq/m 3 . In 2006, the
figure on the premises of the complex was 0.78х10 -3 and in residential areas of the city
– 0.32х10 -3 Bq/m 3 , which is considerably lower than the norm. As for the emissions to
the hydrosphere, the set annual norm is 500.62 ton and over the last year the complex’s
emissions totaled 74.12 tons.
An important issue among those related to environmental safety is handling depleted
uranium hexafluoride that is produced at AECC in the process of 235 U gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment.
Work of the Centrifuge
In compliance with the Federal Law of the Russia „On the use of nuclear energy”
and IAEA expert conclusion (ISBN 92-64-195254, 2001), depleted uranium hexafluoride
is considered a valuable energy resource and a potential source of fluoride for the
sublimating-separating cycle and is not considered radioactive waste. On December 27,
2006, The Head of the Rosatom S.V. Kirienko approved the Concept of safe handling
of depleted uranium hexafluoride developed to secure implementation of the federal
program of Development of the nuclear energy production in Russia in 2007–2010 and
planning for 2015.
Pursuant to the concept mentioned above, depleted uranium hexafluoride as a
raw material resource, one of the additional uranium sources, or substances containing
or able to produce fissile nuclear substances are subject to federal control and accounting
as part of the state nuclear substance control and accounting.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
According to the technical rules, depleted uranium hexafuoride is stored in steel
tanks at open-air sites, which is an internationally recognized storage method for such
substances. Term of use for such tanks is 40 years; after required measures and checks
it can be extended to 80 to 100 years.
The staff of the complex in cooperation with specialists from leading research
centers of the country is working on an industrial installation to recycle depleted uranium
hecsafluoride that would first, transform the substance into uranium tetrafluoride, a
safer storage state, and second, bring hydrogen fluoride back into production of primary
uranium hexafluoride. Hydrogen fluoride made of calcium fluoride is to be replaced
with hydrogen fluoride produced of depleted uranium hexafluoride.
Automated System of Control over Radiation and Chemical Conditions
It is one of the few systems of its kind that operates in the region of the country.
Both on the premises and in neighboring parts of the city sensors are put to control radiological
and chemical pollution.
The system includes the following:
––2 information and control centers
––7 control centers for effective dosage monitoring
––4 centers for hydrogen fluoride monitoring
––2 gamma-spectrometric centers
––weather center
––information boards on the premises and in the neighboring districts
The system measures the level of radioactive nuclides, gamma-ray radiation dosage,
hydrogen fluoride concentration, air temperature and humidity. Data processing
and control over radiological condition is done in two information and control centers.
Three times a day the data is transmitted to the unified Rosatom Crisis Center.
The complex fully complies with environmental legislation; it monitors the environmental
condition both on the premises and in the neighboring residential areas as
well as pollution of both open and ground (via 43 observation wells) waters, snow, soil,
plants. Laboratory control of these is done by the certified laboratory of the complex
that is recognized as an independent organization.
The complex also has plans of action for emergency situations that contain the
possible scenarios of dangerous situations, conditions, measures and ways to liquidate
their consequences. The instructions also contain the order and frequency of emergency
situation training held at the complex.
It is also worth mentioning that despite the high level of environmental safety,
we still have to prove to the public that creation of the international uranium enrichment
center would not change the nature of the plant’s core activity, and more importantly,
would not have any negative impact on the environment of the region.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Remediation of Technical, Coastal Navy Bases in Northern
Russia: The Case of Andreeva Bay. Position of the Regional
NGOs
Sergei N. Zhavoronkin, Expert, „Nuclear and Radiation
Safety” Programme, Green Cross Russia,
city of Murmansk
Introduction
In the northern region in the 1960s, two coastal technical bases were established
that supported the operation of the Northern Fleet of nuclear submarines (NS). These
bases also had the following functions: accepted, temporarily stored and prepared nuclear
waste for recycling and collected, partially processed and temporarily stored solid
and liquid radioactive waste.
The coastal technical base in Andreeva Bay was constructed in 1961–1963 and
is located on the western shore of Western Litsa Bay in the Andreeva Bay. While the
base was in operation, some buildings and structures were constructed and rebuilt. In
1989, the plant focused on nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste, as well as technical
maintenance of NSs was stopped at the base.
Currently at the Andreeva Bay base there are 21,640 exhaust heat-emitting units
(93 active zones), which contain approximately 35 tons of fuel material with the average
activity of 1017 Bq (99% of the total activity), 17,600 m 3 of solid radioactive waste
(SRW), 2,280 m 3 of liquid radioactive waste (LRW), which are 1% active.
The physical and technical condition of the buildings and structures are not satisfactory,
and some of them are in emergency conditions. The isolation barriers for the
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste are damaged and continue to decay, and
as a result, the radiation situation is not satisfactory. In some cases, the radionuclide
leak has spread far outside the buildings and structures, and the leak has also reached
the subterranean and surface waters, including the Andreeva Bay accident. There are
problems safely storing SNF and radioactive waste, and there is not full compliance
with preventative regulations for nuclear or radiological accident.
The Russian Federation Government Act №518, dated 28 May 1998, acknowledged
the environmental remediation of the former coastal technical base as important.
The Russian Federation Government Act №220-r, dated 9 February 2000, „On transferring
dangerous facilities of the Russian Federation defense Ministry and their financing to
the nuclear energy Ministry” set up the Andreeva Bay base under Rosatom authority for
remediation. A Federal Unitary Enterprise „The Northern enterprise on radioactive waste
management” (FGUP „SevRAO” in Murmansk) and an Office of FGUP „SevRAO” in
Zaozersk were set up to accomplish the works at the Andreeva Bay base.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
In 2004, a new concept of environmental remediation for the coastal technical
bases in the Russian North was adopted, and the Andreeva Bay technical base was expected
to be completely taken off from the operation.
1. Problem Description
Among the key problems is the significant amount of nuclear spent fuel and
radioactive waste at the base, which set up the amount of work, financial support and
environmental risks, particularly important for the region.
The major criteria for the completed and planned works at the factory, which defines
all the conditions and risks, is the storage condition of SNF and radioactive waste.
For a complete technical base remediation such technical conditions of the facilities as
the presence of the essential infrastructure to manage SNF and radioactive waste on
the base and in the region, are critical. Another essential condition is the availability of
facilities for acceptance, storage, and recycling of a significant amount of radioactive
waste (first of all, SRW).
1.1. Existing Storage Facilities for SNF
Description. At present, the spent fuel storage consists of dry storage units. For
spent fuel storage, three tanks (2А, 2B, 3А) are used. These tanks were constructed for
the LRW collection and storage and were part of the special water purifier unit.
The tanks are monolithic, ferroconcrete units with a volume of 1000 m 3 . Tank 2А
is covered with carbon steel. The rest have metal coating.
The SNF storage tank was constructed in 1983–1985. For the exhaust heat-emitting
units’ cases’ storage in a tank, the metal pipes were installed and this allowed putting
cells for the cases of various types (each case in a separate cell). Concrete plugs in steel
jacket were installed over the cases. The cells were covered over the top with steel plugs.
In the early 1990s the tanks 2А and 2B were equipped with a ventilation system
and purification system to trap polluted air. The main equipment was placed in a special
building (unit with special ventilation). Currently the system does not work and is
partially dismantled.
1.2. SNF Quantity and Characteristic
The SNF is stored in casings, which are located in dry storage unit cells, and in
containers (containers of type 11 and 12).
Tank 3А – 1,200 cells for cases, 900 cases loaded;
Tank 2А – 1,220 cells for cases, 1,021 cases loaded;
Tank 2B – 1,191 cells for cases, 1,138 cases loaded.
Overall activity of SNF, according to 2004 data is 1,3х10 17 Bq.
A permanent storage pool for the SNF (construction N5) was designed and built.
In 1985 a radiological accident took place, when as a result of the pools’ depressurizing,
a cooling water leak spread to the areas around the facility.
Major shortcomings, which have environmental significance
Dry storage units for SNF have significant structural weaknesses:
1. The structures are not hermetic: tank 3А and 2B are not coated with metal,
which could provide SNF isolation from subterranean waters.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
2. The units’ cover is not hermetic and does not protect against atmospheric
precipitation on tank 3А – due to the poor design and quality – and on tanks 2А and 2B
– due to poor construction by utilizing removable metal sections.
3. The water removal system from the storage cells and cases by the exhaust
heat-emitting units.
4. There is no ventilation system to remove and purify polluted air.
5. There is a poor system of material deactivation in the SNF storage (concrete
and carbon steel).
6. During the 15 years of use, 3А tank has never been inspected. Additionally,
several concrete covers were displaced, which also affected hermetic condition of the
structures. As a result, there is high radioactive water present in the cases.
7. Precipitation and subterranean water leaks into the dry storage units leads to
increased contamination levels of equipment and instruments. This creates an unfavorable
radioactive environment and increases the LRW amount during the process of the
SNF management.
8. A separate project is needed to design a remediation of SNF storage (construction
5). Currently there are a number of environmental risks: a potential leak of
radioactive materials into the environment, accumulation of radioactive waste during
construction, and increasing radioactive levels that affects personnel.
1.3. Existing Storage Constructions for SRW
Description. At the coastal technical base, the following SRW storage facilities exist:
––deepened concrete units, for high and medium activity SRW storage;
––open ground for the temporary SRW storage (the territory of 280 m 2
);
––ground-based concrete unit, for the high and medium activity SRW storage;
––half-depend concrete unit, for the temporary storage of high and medium activity
SRW (filter-traps, large-size equipment, management and security system rods)
and for the temporary storage of high and medium activity SRW.
1.4. Total Amount and Characteristic of SRW
There are 12 types of SRW. The total amount of all SRW is 17,600 m 3 , including
14,082 m 3 of low activity waste, 2,982 m 3 of medium activity, and 563 m 3 of high activity.
The total activity of SRW according to the 2004 data is 6,6х10 14 Bq.
There are 10,473 m 3 of waste in the open ground storage, and 7,127 m 3 in the
deepened storages and in the buildings.
Major shortcomings, which have environmental significance.
1. None of the SRW storage containers have the necessary design to protect
against the precipitation, as well as to collect, control and purify the drained water.
2. The large-sized equipment is stored without package and highly active equipment
is in the open, which resulted in nuclides leaking out the container and into the
surface and subterranean waters at a significant distance.
3. While the coastal technical bases are under remediation, it may lead to an
increase of SRW.
4. In some cases, the handling of highly active SRW without protective gear
might lead to increased radioactive doses for personnel.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
1.5. Existing Storage Constructions for LRW
Description. In the territory around the coastal technical base the following storage
facilities exist:
––a deepened concrete tank, coated with carbon steel for LRW (and used for collecting
precipitation waters).
––LRW tanks, which were not used as recommended. There is a crane platform
designed to support transporting and technical operations in at the dry storage facilities
over tank 3B.
––the LRW treatment facility (special water treatment), which was not used as
recommended as special technical equipment was not installed.
––highly active concentrates of processed LRW, designed for a long-term storage
of concentrates.
The storage includes six underground tanks, coated with stainless steel, each
with a volume of 400 m 3 and a ground-based construction with a basement for technical
equipment.
Currently, 4 tanks are used for LRW storage (LRW amount in them is 730 m 3 ),
and 2 tanks are used for the SRW storage.
Due to the lack of heating in the Construction 6, 3 tanks have defrosted (the top part)
and partially depressurized, which led to an LRW leak outside the construction barriers. As a
result, the pipe corridor of the construction is now filled with 360 m 3 of LRW.
1.6. Total amount and characteristic of LRW
LRW is stored in special containers (Tanks 2–4) of Construction 6, and in facilities,
where LRW leaked from an accident (pipe corridor and basement), because of
failures or lack of construction barriers due to improper technical solutions.
The total LRW amount is 2,280 m 3 , including 1,581 m 3 of low activity waste and
699 m 3 of medium activity waste. The total LRW activity according to the 2004 data is
4,5х10 12 Bq.
Note: the amount of LRW at several facilities is approximated.
Major shortcomings, which have environmental significance
1. All tanks used for the LRW storage in Construction 6 have passed their 25 year
limit, and secure containment is no longer guaranteed.
2. The non-containment of the Tanks 2–4 may lead to further destruction of the
construction barriers and additional radionuclide leaks outside of the facility in surface
and subterranean waters.
3. The technical condition of construction №6, and especially of the wall in the
pipe corridor, adds an additional risk of radioactive spread in the coastal technical base
territory. This factor may lead to an increase in SRW during base remediation.
4. In some cases, the handling of highly active SRW without protective gear
might lead to increased radioactive doses for personnel.
1.7. Environmental conditions at the coastal technical base in the Andreeva Bay
1. The existing data on radioactive and environmental conditions is not complete.
2. The majority of construction barriers have damages, and, as a result, there
have been radioactive leaks to the environment.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
3. The facilities and constructions, along with other services, continue to deteriorate.
In the territory around the coastal technical base, there are areas with high levels
of gamma-radiation (from 16 microZv/hour to 0.4 mZv/hour). There are some local zones
with increased level of gamma-radiation: a half-destroyed pier – 460–1000 microZv/hour,
the coast near the new mooring – 50–150 microZv/hour. A section of the stream near
Construction 5 has a very high radiation level: gamma-radiation 5 m from the stream is
0.03–0.04 mZv/hour and where the stream flows to the Andreeva Bay is 2,3x10 -3 mZv/
hour. The gamma-radiation near the SRW storage facility is 5 to 100 microZv/hour.
The territory around the SRW storage is characterized by high levels of surface
contamination (up to 166 kBq/m 2 ), and the territory around Constructions 5 and 6 has
surface contamination of up to 1700 kBq/m 2 . The coastal technical base construction and,
above all, Construction 5 (where water leaks from storage pools for exhaust heat-emitting
units) are the source of the contamination of surface waters in the Andreeva Bay. In some
stream and sea water samples, the amount of 137 Cs was in the range of 45–600 Bq/l, and
90
Sr was 80–200 Bq/l. Some sea water contamination was noticed near the moorings at the
level of 1.1–2.2 Bq/l while the average background level is 0.22–0.26 Bq/l.
There are also an increased number of anomaly zones with soil contamination at
the base territory, particularly near facilities. The most contaminated soils are the soils
near the SRW storage grounds (near Construction 5), and is radionuclide 137 Cs (gammaactivity)
and 90 Sr (beta-activity).
Near the SRW grounds, the contamination reaches 9x10 6 Bq/kg of 137 Cs and 10 6 Bq/
kg of 90 Sr. Near the moorings, the contamination reaches 4,000 Bq/kg and in the lowland near
SNF and SRW storage and NSs settlings, it reaches 2x10 4 Bq/kg of 137 Cs.
According to studies of subterranean waters by drilling, water contamination
was indicated near construction №5. The specific activity was 2.4х10 3 Bq/kg of 137 Cs
and 9х10 2 Bq/kg for 90 Sr.
In the dry storage area, water contamination is as high as 90 Bq/kg for 90 Sr. In
several drilling holes near the dry storage, the soil contamination reaches 7х10 5 Bq/kg for
137
Cs. The soil was taken from the same depth as the dry storage tanks. Near Construction 6,
contamination was found in the waters from a second subterranean water source as well.
Study results on radiation, which have a significant environmental impact
1. Subterranean waters and soil are contaminated with low activity LRW and SRW
levels, which leads to an increase in LRW and SRW during the territory’s remediation.
2. Around the moorings, there are traces of contamination, which indicate a sea
water contamination tendency.
3. The gamma-radiation level increase will require an organized and planned
response at the facilities.
4. The radiation study of the territory must be continued.
2. State of facilities’ remediation
After the coastal technical base in the Andreeva Bay was placed under the Rosatom
in 2000 and based on preliminary studies, one suggested the following actions:
1. Creation of necessary infrastructure for safe working conditions for the FGUP
„SevRAO” personnel;

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
2. Creation of necessary conditions to remove SNF;
3. Creation of a radioactive nuclear waste management system; and
4. Preparation for remediation of former SNF storage facilities and territories.
The study results and key recommendations were presented at the Communication
Expert Group seminar in Vienna in 2001. An additional Communication Expert
Group for technical support solutions was established. This meeting determined key
functions of the donor-countries:
––Norway – building infrastructure to provide security,
––Great Britain – nuclear spent fuel management,
––Sweden – radiological waste management.
The technical assistance from donor-countries has been maintained up until now.
The first projects at the coastal technical base in the Andreeva Bay by Rosatom with
technical assistance from donor-countries were for the construction of essential infrastructure.
The latter was supposed to provide safe working conditions for the FGUP
„SevRAO” personnel and the facilities’ security.
The regional NGOs believe that such works are justified and necessary first stages
of the project.
Outcomes of the studies, design solutions and accomplished projects, which
have environmental significance:
––results from studies of the facilities at the coastal technical base (financed by
the donor countries):
––radiological waste problems are identified;
––more complete date on radiation conditions of the base and surrounding territories
is collected;
––4,500 tons of radiological waste were processed and packaged; 2,800 tons of
metal SRW were processed and packaged; and
––the grounds for the first-line projects are prepared (dry storage facility 3A)
Radiation studies results are key for SNF and radiological waste management and for
environmental monitoring decisions. According to the study results, the decision to create the
necessary infrastructure for SNF and radioactive waste was made.
A more detailed problem study and additional donor countries made it necessary to
create a Coordination group composed of the countries’ representatives and specialists.
As a result of all of the activities, the problem with and need for the SNF and
radioactive materials management was acknowledged. The rehabilitation of Constructions
5–6 and the base territory, including subterranean waters, requires a separate solution.
It is necessary to consult with the population and develop detailed plan for its
success in northern Russia.
3. Possible Solutions
Currently, works are being conducted in project design to justify investments in the infrastructure
for the SNF and radioactive waste management at the Naval base in the Andreeva
Bay. The State Contractor is Rosatom, and the major planner is FGUP „The Head Institute
„Russian design and research institute of the complex energy technology.”

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The planned infrastructure should consist of the three main facilities for the
SNF, SRW and LRW management. During the upcoming 10–15 years, the following is
planned to be accomplished:
1. The entire SNF, which is stored in dry storage, will be put in new cases and
removed from the facilities.
2. All management and control rods will be removed, fragmented, loaded into
secure containers, and placed in the SRW.
3. SRW materials will be processed, loaded into secure containers, placed in
SRW storage or sent to another facility.
4. LRW materials will be processed into solid material and placed in secure
containers.
5. Secondary radioactive waste from facilities’ use with SNF, SRW, LRW, and from
the SRW storage treatment will be recycled and put into protected containers.
According to the environmental concept of the Northern region’s coastal technical
base rehabilitation, its constructions, facilities, and territories must be treated up
to the level that eliminates any potential radioactivity contamination for the water and
environment (level of the „brown ground”).
In order to solve stated problems, reconstruction and new construction is required.
Reconstruction of old additional supportive facilities and constructions is also
included in the plans.
Key technical designs of the planned infrastructure, which have environmental
significance:
1. All newly planned constructions and buildings should be evaluated from a
lifecycle view (from a construction to an operation point);
2. It is important to include in the project „Removal from operation and utilization
newly constructed and reconstructed facilities” with secondary radioactive waste evaluation,
which are formed during new facilities’ use (as a part of the „brown ground” concept).
3. Utilized construction materials should be properly deactivated.
4. Small additional facilities and constructions should be made with an assembly
mode, which will help to the construction and de-construction of such facilities in shortterm
and will help to decrease costs.
4. Conclusion. Regional non-governmental organizations’ position
1. The remediation problem in the former shore-based technical base in the Andreeva
Bay is a complex engineering and environmentally-sensitive problem.
2. The Andreeva Bay facilities’ design does not consider the climatic conditions
in the Far North and is of low quality construction. This design failure resulted in their
untimely failure.
3. The management infrastructure of SNF and radioactive waste is practically
destroyed.
4. SNF and radioactive waste storages are not sufficiently isolated from the environment
and a radionuclide leak has taken place into the soil, subterranean and surface
waters at the coastal technical base in the Andreeva Bay.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
5. During some construction, and especially SNF management, an accident with
sever consequences on the environment has a high probability.
6. The suggested recommendations, based on the studies due to the infrastructure
construction from SNF and radioactive waste management, can be resolved only
in the next 10–15 years.
7. Currently, there is no solution to complete remediation of the entire coastal
technical base in the Andreeva Bay.
8. The „brown ground” concept for the remediation of coastal technical base in
Northern Russia requires consultations with the general public and NGOs in order to
develop a plan and its implementation based on existing experiences.
The idea of the remediation of a huge facility with heavy „environmental luggage”
in the coastal base in the Andreeva Bay and in Gremikha is a major interest for environmental
regional organizations. Among the first is Bellona, which in its first report („Potential
Sources of Radioactive Contamination of Murmansk and Archangelsk regions”) in
1994 indicated the need for coastal technical base remediation as essential.
Other non-governmental organizations were looking to cooperate with the regional
authorities, Rosatom, and the Russian Navy in order to find solutions to the
problem. At that time, we understood that a constructive dialogue is critical to resolve
such problems. We think we achieved some positive results.
Currently some dialogue has already been created between NGOs and Rosatom.
The first public hearings focused on the evaluation of environmental impact and first
investment projects: „Infrastructure investment for SNF and radioactive waste management
at the Andreeva Naval Base” on October 10 2006. In November 2006, NGOs
conducted a seminar: „Spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste at the North-West of
Russia. Problems and solutions.”
There are many unsolved cooperation problems between the NGOs, Rosatom
departments and other authorities. The information and facility access are among the
key obstacles. Some officials behave according to old traditions and routines.
It is especially important to pay attention to one conclusion at this Forum, which
is equally relevant to the bureaucracy in Russia and in donor-countries: environmental
problems do not have national borders, and bureaucracy does not accept the international
status of such problems.
In our opinion, it is essential to review the old view on the issue. In turn, during
the design and concept development stage for the works in the North of Russia, the
government should consult more with non-governmental organizations, which will help
them to objectively evaluate decisions.

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Inextricable Connections between Atomic Energy and
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Alexey V. Yablokov, Professor, Corresponding Member of
the RAS, Programme for Nuclear and Radiation Safety
of the Centre for Environmental Policy of Russia and
Socio-Ecological Union International
The question of why the nonproliferation regime is ineffective has two overlapping
answers: political and technological. The political answer is uninterrupted proliferation
occurs as a result of the fact that five „great nuclear powers” do not want to
commit to the obligations that they took upon themselves, in terms of destroying their
nuclear arsenals. In this situation, more and more countries decide that nuclear weapons
will enhance their national security. The technological answer without which the political
answer would not have been possible is as a result of the inextricable link between
nuclear weapons and atomic energy, the IAEA legalizes nuclear weapons.
1.Countries that had (and possibly still have) nuclear weapons programs
Australia. In 1966, it was suggested placing two „research” reactors under
IAEA control. These reactors were HIFAR (High Flux Australian Reactor), a heavywater
enriched-uranium 10 MW reactor, and a less powerful MOATA. The Australian
government refused to place them under the IAEA control „out of concern that it would
encumber the future nuclear weapons creation program” (Timerbayev, 2004, p.149).
Secretly in 1978, such a program was created by the Australian government. The secret
laboratory Silex (Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation) exists in Lucas Heights
and conducts uranium enrichment using laser technology.
Algeria. The secret nuclear program Spector, 1995, has existed at least since
1986. There are two reactors. One of them is Nur („The one that gives light”), 1989, a
1 MW, Argentinean-constructed, pool-reactor, light-water, water-graphite, using up to
19.75% enriched uranium, located in Draria. The second is El Salam („Peace”), 1993, a
Chinese-constructed, 15 MW, heavy-water, located in the Atlas Mountains near Birine
at Ain Oussera. In 1998, The Nuclear Engineering Research Unit was created. Both
reactors are capable of producing up to 5 kg of plutonium per year. In the early 1990s,
the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) reprocessing plant was established in Ain Oussera with
Chinese funding. From 2000, Algerian nuclear fuel production, based on uranium and
uranium-bearing phosphate deposits was established with Argentinean help.
Argentina. The country’s secret nuclear program began in 1951. There are four
nuclear research centers with six reactors. They became operational, respectively, in 1958,
1965, 1966, 1968 (5 MW), 1973, and 1982. In 1974, a German reactor Siemens/KWU
PHWR, 335 MW came into operation at Atucha, using natural uranium as fuel. In the six-

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ties, SNF reprocessing factories started working in Eseis, and factories in Pilkania started
enriching uranium with a capacity of about 500 kg of 20% U235 per year. In 1966, about
2,000 specialists were working in the Bariloch atomic center and its branch in Buenos-
Aires. Following the launch of a more powerful Canadian heavy-water reactor CANDU
(600 MV) in the Embalse settlement (Cordoba province) in 1984, the program was expanded.
Heavy water was then obtained from China. It is believed that the country can
create nuclear weapons within several months after making such a political decision.
Brazil. Aside from an open program that existed for about 20 years, there was also
a „parallel” secret military-arms program, the Solimões Project. It began in 1957 with the
purchase of a powerful US research reactor. The key role in the program’s realization was
played by the Civilian Institute for Energy and Atomic Research (IPEN), as well as the
Air Force Center for Aero-Spatial Technology, the Center for Technical Development of
the Brazilian Army, and the Institute for Atomic Research. The nuclear explosive device
was created and prepared for underground testing (Byvshiy, 2005). The country possesses
a full nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining and enrichment (in Belo-Horizonte and
Rezenda, using the „swirl nozzle/sprayer” method, in a factory constructed with German
help), to SNF reprocessing. There are four research reactors: IEA-R1 (pool-reactor, 5
MW; 1957), and three others (TRIGA MARK I, 1960; Argonaut, 1965; and IPEN/MB-01,
1988). In 1990, it was officially stated that the arms program was discontinued.
Germany. High-profile German officials in the fifties emphasized the necessity of
creating their own atomic weapons. In the sixties, there was a „just-under-the-threshold” secret
atomic program based on developing dual-purpose (peaceful and military) technologies.
In 1955, six powerful atomic centers were created in Karlsruhe, Geschtacht, Julich, Berlin,
Hamburg, and Darmstadt. All in all, in the period from 1957 to 1979, there were 46 functioning
research reactors. In 1957–1958, the first five reactors became operational. In 1959–1962,
seven more were operationalized (including FR-2, 44 MW; heavy-water FRJ-2, 23 MW).
In 1963–1965, an additional eleven more became active, including a heavy-water MZFR,
58 MW. In 1966–1969, ten more reactors were operational, including the breeder reactor
KNK-2, 58 MW and OTTO HAHN, 38 MW. In 1970–1973, there were eight more reactors.
The country also possesses a „paramilitary plutonium power without producing the bomb”
program (Kollert, 1996). It is believed that a nuclear weapon can be created by the Germans
in the course of several weeks after making the political decision to do so.
Egypt. In the sixties, there were attempts to obtain nuclear weapons creation
technologies from both the USSR and China. There are two research reactors in Egypt:
ETRR-1 (light-water WWR, 2 MW, 1961, USSR-constructed and (with the help of India),
and Argentina-constructed ETRR-2 (fuel – 19.75% enriched uranium). Since 1998,
an Argentinean-built uranium fuel production factory has been operating in the Atomic
Research Center in Inshass. With the help of France, „The Waste Treatment Center Hot
Laboratory” was created. According to evaluations, a secret nuclear-weapon program
may possibly exist in the country now. In February 2005, the question of Egypt’s nuclear
programs was discussed in the IAEA administrative council, because it had been
discovered that Egypt concealed from the IAEA some of its nuclear activities.
Israel. Nuclear programs began in 1949. In 1959, France gratuitously gave to Israel a
heavy-water nuclear reactor (IRR-2, 24–26 MW in Dimon) along with technical documenta-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
tion for its assembly and skilled personnel. The heavy water for this reactor was secretly purchased
in the UK and shipped through Norway. In 1960, a SNF re-processing and plutoniumobtaining
factory became operational. The US company, NUMEK, illegally supplied Israel
with uranium. A large uranium shipment (200 tons) was captured by Israel in 1965 from
the cargo ship „Scheersberg” that was sailing under the Nigerian flag. A drastic increase in
Dimon’s reactor power (up to 75 – 150 MW) gave an opportunity to produce 20–40 kg of Pu
per annum. The first nuclear explosion device was apparently created in 1966. On the 22nd of
September 1979, with the collaboration of the South African Republic, plutonium bomb testing
was conducted in the South Atlantic. In 1984, a second heavy-water reactor (250 MW),
capable of producing up to 50 kg of Pu yearly was operationalized. The nuclear infrastructure
includes: the Center for Nuclear Weapons Development; a six-floor underground factory for
producing weapons-grade plutonium in Dimon; a factory for nuclear ammunition assembly
and disassembly in Jodefate; a nuclear rocket base and an atomic bomb storage in Kfar
Zikharia and tactical nuclear warheads storage in Aylabune.
India. The 1974 atomic bomb explosion under the name of „Buddha has smiled”
on the Pokhran, Rajastan proving ground became the first obvious global proof that a
civil nuclear program can be effectively used to cover nuclear weapons development.
Plutonium for this bomb was obtained from the „research” reactor „CIRUS”. India received
it from Canada under the framework of assistance as per the „Colombo plan” with
the US supplying 10 tons of heavy water. The condition was that the reactor would only
be used for peaceful research purposes. In 1965, a SNF re-processing factory in Trombay
came into operation, with the capacity of 1,200 tons of SNF per annum. There were (or
still are) also eight research reactors, including the most research reactor powerful in the
world – „Dhruva” (heavy-water, 100 MW, 1985) and FBTR (breeder-reactor of 40 MW,
1985). 70 tons of heavy water for „Dhruva” was obtained from China; 15 tons – from the
Norwegian „Norsk Hydro”, and 18.7 tons – from the Soviet Technabexport.
Iraq. The secret nuclear weapon program started in 1957, with the creation of the
Atomic Center in Towait. In 1967, the „research” reactor IRT-5000 was introduced (5 MW,
Soviet-built). In 1976, a treaty with France for construction of two „research” reactors (Tammuz-1,
„Osirak”, 70 MW, and Tammuz-2, pool-reactor, 0.8 MW) was concluded. In 1981,
„Osirak” was destroyed by Israeli planes. Under the aegis of the IAEA and with Italy’s help,
the SNF-reprocessing facilities were created (1978), and several tons of depleted uranium
were obtained from Germany. About seven thousand specialists were employed in the Iraqi
nuclear-weapons program. In 1991, Iraq had only several months left before creating an
atomic bomb, when this program was interrupted by Operation „Desert Storm.” After 1991,
Iraq succeeded in hiding 96 fuel-assemblies from the IRT-2000 reactor (80% enriched uranium)
and planned to use this uranium for nuclear charge manufacturing.
Iran. In the sixties, a nuclear weapon creation program was decided upon. There are
five research reactors, including a powerful TRR (pool-reactor, on enriched uranium, 5 MW,
1967, US-built); and MNSR reactor (25 MW, Chinese-built, 1997). In the nineties, Russia
presented to Iran its documentation for hydrometallurgical factory construction. With Pakistan’s
help, uranium enrichment facilities were created. There are also US-made laboratory
facilities for SNF re-processing. The Iranian nuclear infrastructure includes the following:
the Nuclear Research Center in Teheran with a subdivision for laser uranium enrichment;

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Nuclear Technologies Center in Isfahan; Department of Nuclear Research at Yazd University;
and at least two uranium enrichment facilities (in Mo’alem Kalayeh – under the guise of Kalae
Electric Company, and an underground enterprise in the city of Natanz).
In 2003–2004, IAEA inspections detected traces of uranium, enriched up to 20 – 36%,
which constitutes highly-enriched uranium. In 2002, an experienced installation for laser
uranium enrichment started working in Lashkar-Abadeh (such enrichment does not require
cumbersome centrifuges). There is also a radio-chemical factory and a factory for producing
zirconium pipes for the Isfahan fuel and heat-production elements. In 2004, heavy-water „research”
reactor IR-40 construction began in the city of Arak. The 1992 agreement on nuclear
collaboration with Russia suddenly expanded Iranian specialists’ access to dual-use technologies.
Just as in nuclear collaboration with North Korea, Pakistan, and China, this development
could allow Iran to create its own atomic bomb by no later than 2008.
Spain. The secret nuclear weapons program began in 1958, during the Franco
regime. It was based on plutonium obtained from the research reactor JEN-1 (pool-type,
2 MW, US-made). Under the guise of civil atomic energy development, the program
of creating Spain’s own nuclear weapons even included nuclear test preparations in
the Spanish Sahara. In 1964, France and Spain concluded an agreement that resulted
in construction of the French-Spanish atomic power station Vandellós-1 by the city of
Tarragona. It contained a uranium-graphite reactor, 500 MW, and its chief purpose was
obtaining plutonium for the French nuclear weapons program.
Canada. Canada began its nuclear weapons program along with the UK, as a
partner of the US Manhattan project. The first Canadian „research” reactor NRX (National
Research X-perimental) is heavy-water, with a power of 40 MW. It became operational
in 1947 with the purpose of producing plutonium for American (and later
British) nuclear bombs (Martin, 1996).
Libya. This country attempted to obtain nuclear weapons back in the 1970s. At that time,
the Atomic Research Center was created in Tajoura. Here, in 1981, a powerful USSR-made
research reactor became operational (light-water, pool-type, IRT-1, 10 MW, 20 kg of 80%-enriched
uranium). In the seventies, Libya purchased 1200 tons of the uranium concentrate (by
2004, there was already 2263 tons). In the eighties, Libya began developing both uranium and
plutonium bombs. In 1984, Libya purchased a uranium ore processing factory (apparently, from
Belgium). In 1985, Libya obtained (apparently, from either China or the USSR) 39 kg of uranium
hexafluoride. In Tajoura, German experts were working on uranium enrichment. Several
attempts have been made to obtain or build a more powerful reactor. Economic sanctions, introduced
in 1988, slowed down this project’s development. In 1995, Libya decided to speed up
the nuclear weapon creation process. In 1997, the first 200 centrifuges for uranium enrichment
were purchased. At the same time, in a factory in Janzour, the preparations for producing their
own centrifuges started. In 2000, in an enterprise in Al Hasan, Libya started centrifuge installation
preparations. In 2002, 10,000 centrifuges were purchased from Pakistan. Their production
was started in Malaysia by two Sri Lankan firms with the participation of Swiss, British, and
German specialists. In 2001, two tons of uranium hexafluoride were received from North Korea
via Pakistan. This amount is sufficient for producing one nuclear explosive device. By 2004,
nuclear program activities were conducted in at least 10 places. In 2001, Chinese technological
nuclear bomb production designs were received from Pakistan. In October 2003, a vessel trans-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
porting centrifuge parts from Malaysia to Libya was intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea. In
2004, Libya admitted having violated the Nonproliferation Regime and declared its cessation of
secret programs (in which also participated companies from the South African Republic, Switzerland,
Singapore, South Korea, Dubai, and Turkey). However, three months later, it became
known that Libya secretly received a new shipment of centrifuges.
Nigeria. The first official statement of the country’s desire to pursue its own nuclear
weapons development came in the 1980s. Between 1999 and 2004, over 250 Nigerians took
nuclear-radiation courses in the IAEA system. There are significant U ore deposits in the
country. In 2004, a new nuclear research reactor NIRR-01 became operational (light-water,
30 KVt, Chinese construction) in the Center for Energy Experiments and Research in the
University of Ahmadu Bello in Zaira city. In early 2005, the Nigerian Ministry of Defense
stated that the question of obtaining nuclear weapons from Pakistan is being discussed. (Later,
this message was claimed to be a „typographical error”; „Nigeria…,” 2005).
Norway. Nuclear weapons creation activities began in 1946 in the Norwegian Institute
of defense research. In 1951, a small heavy-water reactor for plutonium was introduced
near Oslo. In 1959, with the assistance of the European Atomic Energy Agency, one more
research heavy-water reactor („Halgen”) was introduced. Following the scandal caused by
the exposure of Israeli nuclear weapons programs, Norway returned 10.5 tons of heavy water
(Israel claimed that 9.5 tons were spent in the process of experiments). Obtaining plutonium
and enriched U from SNF was started up even in the sixties. Swiss attempts to sell 3 kg of
239
Pu is an evidence of that effort (in 1977, this plutonium was sold to Belgium, but turned
up in Germany).
Pakistan. The Pakistani nuclear program began in 1965 on the basis of research reactor
PARR-1 (pool-type, 10 MW, in Ravalpindi). It expanded significantly following the CANDUtype
heavy-water reactor in 1971 near Karachi with Canadian help. In 1983, based on U enrichment
technology (stolen from the Netherlands in 1976), a „research” atomic center with a U
enrichment factory was opened in the Kahuta settlement. In 1998, a powerful heavy-water „research”
reactor („Khusab”, 40 MW, Chinese-built, Joharabad settlement) came into operation. It
is capable of producing up to 10 kg of Pu per annum. An SNF re-processing factory that was built
with French assistance has been operational since the mid-nineties next to the Pakistani Institute
for atomic research and technologies (PINSTECH) and the atomic power station „Chasma”
(built with the help from China). The first nuclear explosive device was created in 1984.
Romania. Several months following an official statement in 1989 that Romania
was close to producing nuclear weapons, this secret program was discontinued due to the
regime’s overthrow. This nuclear weapons program began in the 1990s and was based on
three „research” reactors (light-water reactor VVR-S, 2 MW, USSR-made, in the Magurele
suburbs of Bucharest, 1957; and two reactors „TRIGA”, 14 and 0.5 MW, US-made, 1979,
in the Institute for the Atomic Energy in Pitesti). Starting in 1985, in Pitesti’s chemical
industrial complex, there were secret experiments conducted on producing weapons-grade
plutonium (up to 1 kg per year) and enriched U. With technical assistance from Canada,
Romania established heavy water production and its own uranium fuel.
North Korea. The secret nuclear weapons creation program was started in the late sixties,
based on the powerful „research” gas-graphite Soviet-made reactor (25 MW, HEU) and
a reactor of their own production (5 MW, gas-graphite). These two reactors (placed in under-

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ground tunnel-type shelters in the Yongbyon region, 60 km north of Pyongyang) are capable
of producing up to 8 kg of plutonium annually. In 1993, North Korea officially left the NPT.
The country’s nuclear infrastructure includes the following: a) the Atomic Center in Yongbyon
with the institutes of nuclear physics, nuclear electronics, isotopes, radiation chemistry, critical
assembly facility (0.1 MW), 3 reactors (5, 8, 50 MW), radio-chemical laboratory, SNF reprocessing
facility, and nuclear fuel factory; b) the Institute of Atomic Energy, radiology, and
nuclear physics at the Pyongyang University; c) Department of atomic research and research
of nuclear technologies at the Polytechnic Institute of Kim-Ch’aek. Starting from 2004, several
official statements on nuclear weapons possession have been made.
Taiwan. The nuclear weapons program began in 1961 with the first research reactor
„TRIGA” (2 MW, US-made, 1961). It was substantially expanded as per President
Chiang Kai-shek’s directions following nuclear bomb testing by continental China
in 1964. Soon, six „research” reactors operated in the country, including one powerful
heavy-water reactor (NRX, 1969, Canada-made; ZRPL, pool-type, 0.03 MW, 1971,
TRR, 40 MW, 1973; „Argonaut”, 0.01 MW, 1974). During the sale of the NRX reactor,
Canada specified that this reactor must not be used „for military purposes of any kind”.
This means that both sides then understood that Taiwan needed this reactor specifically
for the nuclear weapons program. There are four atomic power stations (six BWR-type
energy blocks, total power – 5144 MW). Since the early seventies, SNF re-processing as
well as uranium and plutonium production is functional (equipment came from France,
Germany, and the US). Since 1965, the Atomic Energy Institute has been active and presently
has over 1100 employees. So is the National Institute of science and technology
of Ministry of defense with the purpose of developing „independent nuclear capacities”
(Temirbaev, 1999, p. 150). The US, worried about the possibility of Taiwanese nuclear
weapons creation, demanded the dismantlement of the plutonium production facilities.
The TRR reactor was stopped in 1988. The country has the capacity to produce a nuclear
bomb within several weeks after making such a political decision.
France. The first commercial atomic power station „Chinon-1” (70 MW, 1962) was
created based on a dual-purpose reactor – it was used for producing electricity and Pu. It has
been admitted that France possesses the largest atomic power station network in the world
that simultaneously produces plutonium for military purposes. These are reactors Chinon-1,
Chinon-2, Chinon-3, St. Laurent-1, St.Laurent-2, and Bugey-1 (French…, 2001).
Switzerland. Of the six „research” reactors, the first became operational in 1956
(pool-type, „SAPHIR”, 10 MW); the fourth and the most powerful one became operational
in 1960 (heavy-water „DIORIT”, 30 MW). In the early sixties, the Federal Government demanded
the use of dual technology during the construction of the commercial atomic power
station „Lucens” (fuel – metal U, possibility of SNF removal at any time). In 1958, the Swiss
Federal Council released an official statement on its decision to create nuclear weapons (the
production plans already existed for 15 years for up to 400 atomic warheads). In 1965, there
was a dual-use technology research program called „Verbundforschungsprogram”, connected
with obtaining enriched U. All military programs were discontinued in 1977. There are 5 NPP
with an overall power of 53,220 MW, and an atomic research center in Wurenlingen.
Sweden. The Swedish secret nuclear weapons program „Laddningsprogrammet” began
in 1945 and quickly developed following the introduction of four reactors: a heavy-water

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R-1, a light-water R-2 (0.6 MW, US-made), a heavy-water underground „Agesta” (R-e, in
Stockholm suburb, 65 MW, 1950s), and „Marviken” (R-4, 10 MW, 1964). These reactors
were used for plutonium production. The latter two were commercial and produced electricity.
In 1960, one of the most powerful research reactors in the world, Studsvik Nuclear AB
(50 MW) became operational. A decision was taken to construct a nuclear explosive device
of the implosive style. In 1957, the director of the National Administration of the Defense
Research officially declared that Sweden can produce its own nuclear weapons in six years. It
was intended to produce up to 20 atomic munitions per year. The military program was closed
down in 1965, and the plutonium laboratory was dismantled in 1972. According to expert
evaluations, the task of nuclear bomb construction development was successfully achieved.
South Africa. The secret nuclear weapons program was started in 1965 based on the
„research” reactor „SAFARI-1” (light-water, pool-type, 20 MW, US-made, in Pelindabe). In
the 1980s, France shipped two PWR-type 900 MW energy reactors to the SAR. The political
decision on nuclear weapons creation was made in 1974. The first atomic bomb (80% enriched
U, gun type, with the power of about 3 kt) was tested the ocean in 1979 after 400 kg of
weapon-grade U was obtained from the Valindabe enterprise. Israel also took part in creating
the nuclear bomb by supplying about 30 g of tritium in exchange for 600 t uranium oxide. In
the course of the following ten years, six more nuclear warheads were secretly produced. The
program was stopped after the apartheid regime’s fall in 1991. At that point, all seven nuclear
warheads were dismantled, and the documentation was destroyed. The IAEA conducted 150
regular inspections during the course of many years, but none of these inspections detected
any traces of nuclear weapons creation.
Yugoslavia. Starting from early fifties, there has been a secret nuclear weapons
program. In the late forties, the country collaborated with Norway and the USSR in the
field of atomic technologies. There are 2 research reactors: one in the Institute of atomic
research „VINCA” (heavy-water, 6.5 MW, 1959, USSR-made) and one light-water reactor
(„TRIGA Mark II”, 0.25 MW, 1960). In Slovenia, there is a small atomic power
station „Krisko” (PWR-type reactor, 664 MW, built by „Westinhause,” USA). In 1966,
small laboratory-type facilities were created for SNF re-processing. Under the guise of
atomic energy research (the so-called „Programme A”), military developments were
conducted with the purpose of creating nuclear weapons („Programme B”). In 1987, a
decision was made to discontinue the „Programme B” developments.
South Korea. The secret nuclear weapons creation program started in 1951 with
the participation of Japanese specialists. The contract to purchase a SNF re-processing
factory from France was signed in early 1975. In June 1975, the South Korean administration
stated that if US support decreases, then South Korea will have to defend itself
using its own nuclear weapons. In order to create an atomic bomb, significant amounts of
resources were invested in atomic energy development. In 1962, in a Seoul suburb, the
first research reactor started working („TRIGA MARK-II”-type, 0.25 MW). In 1972, a
more powerful „TRIGA MARK III” came along (2 MW). In 1995, the third and the most
powerful research reactor started working in the Korean Institute for the Atomic Energy
Studies in Hanaro (pool-type, 30 MW). The country possesses the full nuclear fuel cycle
(based on U imported from Australia, Canada, France, USSR, the US, and South Africa).
In 1980, the country officially decided to discontinue pursuing nuclear weapons creation.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
However, in 2004, U enrichment equipment (AVLIS) was found, which presents evidence
of continued nuclear weapons program pursuits. The nuclear weapons creation contemporary
policy of – „waiting and seeing” – is based on the technical possibility to create an
atomic bomb within several months following such a political decision.
Japan. Nuclear bomb creation activities were conducted in Japan even during
WWII. Allegedly, six days following the Hiroshima bombing on August 12, 1945, nuclear
weapons testing was conducted on an island 20 miles from the coast of Korea (Japan…,
2005). The magnitude of the Japanese SNF re-processing and Pu-obtaining program (there
is over 50t of the latter) were for a long time causing doubts in regards to the direction of
the country’s peaceful atomic energy development. From time to time, high-profile government
officials declare the necessity of having nuclear weapons. The level of nuclear
technologies development in the country is comparable only with Germany (considering
non-nuclear countries only). Both Japan and Germany have the capacity of creating nuclear
weapons within weeks after making the necessary political decision.
Indonesia. In spite of the fact that Indonesia did not intend to build an atomic power
station, the National Agency on Atomic Energy (BATAN) was created in 1965. The Center
for Development of the Atomic Technologies of Dual Use is functioning as part of its structure.
In 1987, a powerful (30 MW) multi-purpose pool-type reactor came into operation in the
research complex PPTN – Serpong (West Java). There are two research centers: one for nuclear
fuel and the SNF re-processing, and one for radioactive waste treatment. There are two
research reactors, located in the atomic institutes in Bandunga (2 MW TRIGA Mark II, 1964)
and Yogyakarta. Many of the research and development projects conducted there are dual
purpose, and may become the foundation for nuclear weapons creation. In 2005, the government
publicly declared the construction plan for 2010–2016 of four energy blocks with total
power of up to 4000 MW, with the official purpose of „satisfying the growing energy needs”
(Indonesia…, 2005). This purpose causes some doubt, because all these atomic power stations
will be able to yield no more than 1.9 % of the country’s electricity needs.
Myanmar (Burma). In 2002, news of Rosatom preparing to sell a research nuclear
reactor to Myanmar appeared in the international press. This was followed by an
official statement that the country „has right to create nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes.”
A 10 MW reactor was constructed in Central Myanmar, by the city of Magway.
In recent years, over 300 Myanmar citizens interned within the nuclear field in Russia.
In 2003, the Ministry of Atomic Energy was created.
Syria. Suspicions of the existence of a secret nuclear weapons program in Syria
have existed since 1979. An open CIA (US) 2003 report states: „We look at Syrian nuclear
intentions with an increasing alarm.” In 1996, a research reactor SSR-1 (Chinese
construction, light-water, MNSR-type, 0.3 MW) became operational.
2.Links between atomic energy and nuclear weapons
After an energy reactor operates for some time, nuclear fuel contains more 239 Pu
than 235 U. By changing the time that the fuel rods stay in the nuclear reactor, one can also
change the plutonium isotope content in the irradiated fuel. With the neutron absorption,
239
Pu becomes 240 Pu. The latter can also support the chain reaction and therefore can be
used to make a nuclear explosion device.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
One energy reactor with the power of 1,000 MW produces enough plutonium in
one year to make 40–50 nuclear warheads. Even in research reactors with only a few MW
power, one can quickly produce sufficient plutonium amounts for a small bomb (Table 1).
Table 1
Plutonium production in reactors with various power levels over one year of activity
Reactor Power, MW Кg City, Country
Heavy-water graphite 20–30 (t) 5,5–8 Yongbyon, North Korea
Heavy-water, CIRUS 40 (t) 9 India
Heavy-water Kushab 50 (t) 12 Pakistan
Heavy-water, DHRUVA 100 (t) 25 India
Heavy-water 100 (t) 40 Dimona, Israel
Light-water 1000 (e) 230 Bushehr, Iran (project
t – fuel power; е – electric power
For many years atomic scientists carefully cultivated a myth that in order to
make nuclear bomb, one needs special „weapons-grade” plutonium that consists of
239
Pu isotope over 90%. In reality, a mixture of plutonium isotopes that can be obtained
in any nuclear reactor type is perfectly suitable for making a nuclear bomb.
If one compares all aspects of nuclear weapons creation (cost, covertness, accessibility,
effectiveness), it turns out that creating a nuclear warhead based on crude
low-enriched U is a thousand times more accessible and hundreds of times more covert
than doing it based on HEU or Pu.
3. How to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is based on three pillars. Under these
pillars, the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that officially signed the Treaty agreed
not to develop their own nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapon states (NWS) agreed
to „peaceful nuclear” proliferation. The three pillars are: prohibition of nuclear weapons,
and components and technology transfer from the five Nuclear Weapons States to
the Non-Nuclear Weapons States; dismantlement of nuclear arsenals by these States;
and exclusively peaceful use of atomic energy, widespread proliferation of the „peaceful
nuclear” energy (atomic energy, medical and industrial isotope use) solely for the
peaceful purposes. Each of these three pillars has been violated.
Violation of the First Pillar. Since the Pakistani bomb was apparently made with
the use of the Chinese blueprints (and these blueprints proliferated from Pakistan further
on), at least one of the NWS is guilty of breaching the first pillar.
Violation of the Second Pillar. Only two NWSs (the USA and Russia) drastically
decreased their nuclear arsenals in the 1990s. However, it was done not so much in
connection with the NPT conditions as due to the need to reduce the excessive nuclear
stockpiles that were produced during the arms race. Currently, none of the NWS intends
to liquidate its nuclear weapons arsenals. This is an open and demonstrative violation of
the second NPT pillar by all the „nuclear club” members that have signed it.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Violation of the Third Pillar. As is shown above (see part 2 of this survey), at
least 18 countries after 1968 (the year the NPT was signed) have violated the pillar regarding
the peaceful use of obtaining nuclear technologies. All five NWS have breached
the pillar not to use civil provisions for nuclear weapons production.
The IAEA proliferation control system stands upon two „whales”: upon the socalled
„guarantees,” and upon the obligations voluntarily undertaken by the five official
NWS. Most of the NWS in their pursuit of momentary political purposes and pushed by
commercial interests of large companies, actively facilitated proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The key factor that helped and facilitated this process was and remains the IAEA.
The IAEA was created with two purposes in mind. The first and foremost task has been
nuclear technologies proliferation. The secondary task has been limiting the proliferation of
the same technologies that can be used for production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials
(creation and support of the nonproliferation regime). The moving forces behind these contradictory
tasks turned out to be uneven. The atomic industry’s commercial interests of the most
developed countries were and remain the most powerful proliferation incentive. The political
will of the majority of other countries to prevent proliferation is a much weaker force.
It is not the IAEA efforts, but the overall political situation in these countries, that
resulted in discontinuation of nuclear weapons programs for IAEA member states such
as Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Spain, and Argentina. The same is true
for halting nuclear weapons creation near completion for Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and
Argentina. Again, the same is true regarding nuclear disarmament of the South African
Republic and other countries. The number of countries that obtained, with help from the
IAEA, access to nuclear technologies, and on this basis created their own nuclear weapons
against the NPT regulations, exceeds the number of those officially possessing nuclear
weapons. The IAEA turns out to be a cover screen for nuclear weapons proliferation.
The nuclear weapons history shows that in the beginning, nuclear energy was
just a „tail” of nuclear arms. Later, the situation became the opposite: if a country wanted
to obtain nuclear weapons, it had to start with legal peaceful atomic energy development.
Both the first and the second scenarios demonstrate the inextricable link between
the nuclear weapons and atomic electricity.
Conclusion
Fifty-two years ago, physicists N. Arley and H. Skov wrote: „Peaceful and military
applications of the atomic energy are inextricably connected – by the same common nuclear
physics principles, the same scientific and technological research, the same chemical
industry, the same financing, the same organizations.” (Kollert et. al, 1996, pp. 59 - 60).
The myopia of political leaders and the nuclear industry interests for a long time muffled
the voices of the concerned specialists and separate organizations that, for many years,
directed their activities against proliferating nuclear weapons under the excuse of peaceful
atomic technologies proliferation. Today, it has become clear that all existing nonproliferation
agreements, the IAEA „guarantees,” and the whole idea of the „atoms for peace” (1956)
have been no more than a disguise hiding the nuclear weapons proliferation process.
In order to slow down nuclear proliferation, it is necessary to transform the IAEA and create
on its foundation an International agency for weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Civilian Highly Enriched Uranium and Nuclear Terrorism:
Russia’s Role in Reducing the Threat
Elena Sokova, Director, NIS Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
of International Studies
I would like to talk about nuclear terrorism, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and the
use of HEU in the public sector. Let me explain why I chose these issues. All the prior presentations
have clearly defined the dual nature of nuclear technology: peaceful and military. And
unfortunately, the same materials can be used in both. The main problem is that these materials
could end up in the hands of terrorist organizations. Nuclear terrorism can have many forms:
attacks made with stolen nuclear weapons, creation of a terrorist-made nuclear device, etc. Of
course, making a nuclear device is not easy, but the hardest part is access to HEU. More importantly,
the U does not necessarily need to be 95% enriched; research proves that even 20%
enriched 235 U would suffice, but in this case it would take higher levels of U. For instance, the
bomb dropped on Hiroshima contained U enriched up to 80% and weighed 60 kg.
To make a nuclear device one can use both fresh and spent nuclear fuel. As fissile
material, one can use spent fuel that has been stored for longer periods of time, and thus
is no longer active or recently spent fuel. The easiest nuclear weapon design is to make
the gun-type nuclear charge, which doesn’t need to be tested first by terrorists. Of course,
even a gun-type weapon is a complicated device, but a terrorist organization that includes
engineers, metal-makers, and technicians could easily produce one.
Unfortunately, highly enriched uranium is available not only to the military and government,
but also to a number of civilian organizations. There are around 2 million kg of HEU
in the world and it takes only 50 kg to produce one gun-type nuclear weapon, so there is the
potential for tens of thousands of bombs. More importantly, around 50 to 100 tons of HEU
belongs to civilians, and it is distributed in many countries, including countries that do not
officially possess nuclear weapons. More than 40 countries have HEU and it is distributed
across more than 100 facilities. The amount at each of these facilities is more than enough to
make one nuclear weapon. HEU is also difficult to detect by radiation sensors at the border. If
the material is transported abroad, even minimal radiation encasing makes it hard to detect it.
This factor also makes it one of the most dangerous substances in terms of terrorism threat.
How can enriched U be used in civilian production First of all, it can be found
in research installations, critical installations, or production facilities of medical isotopes.
Moreover, medical isotopes are, as a rule, produced at reactors using HEU. HEU
is also used in fast reactors, although it is planned that in the future these reactors will
use fuel of mixed U and Pu without HEU. However, these plants are still experimental
and they are using highly enriched fuel at this stage.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The next category is ice breaker ships where enrichment is done at a rate 36–80%.
In the past, HEU was also used at space installations both in the USSR and the USA.
The threats of highly enriched uranium being used in nuclear weapon production
are not new. Fissile materials have a double nature. This fact was further acknowledged
after India had its first nuclear explosion, although in that particular case plutonium was
used. The U.S. started a conversion program for research reactors into those working on
low-enriched uranium. These could be supplied to other countries as part of the Atoms for
Peace program. This work is still in progress as the change of fuel is difficult. Sometimes
it is necessary to change configuration of the whole reactor.
The USSR also had some projects of fuel replacement for those reactors sent to socialist
countries, so by late 1980s these reactors were converted to lower-enriched (36%) fuel.
The 1970–1980s also saw some programs of bringing HEU back into the countries of its
production. Those were primarily projects of the USA, but after the collapse of the USSR, in
2000s, some fuel was brought back from Romania, former Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.
In 2004, all these initiatives were included in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
Despite all the potential threats related to highly enriched uranium, there is no
universal policy. Some countries forbid export of HEU, others undertake measures not to
develop technologies related thereto but there is no global initiative. The first attempt to
launch such an initiative was made in 2005. It was based on the risks related to HEU and
restriction of its use in civilian production. Another point is that in many cases it can be
replaced with lower-enriched Uranium that does not pose such a threat in terms of nuclear
terrorism. The first step in this should be to make sure HEU is not used in civilian production
as, first, it is not as well protected as military production and, secondly, more people
have access to it so that terrorist organizations might also get hold of it. This initiative was
launched by a group of countries including Norway, Iceland, Lithuania and Sweden.
The following actions were proposed: improve security, accounting and control
over HEU used in the civilian sector; minimize its use and stop its sale and when possible,
convert the installations to lower-enriched U. Another step was not to develop the technologies
involving its use. Unfortunately, this initiative has not been ratified yet. The issue
of imposing international obligations is still unresolved: it has been suggested that rules of
HEU use should be adopted similarly to IAEA adopting the rules for the use of Pu. One of
the ways could be to develop and voluntarily ratify the rules, create centers for the reactors
most valuable in terms of technology and raise their level of safety.
As far as Russia in particular is concerned, for now it has approximately 15–30 ton
of HEU in the civilian sector. The figures are approximate as there is still no official data
regarding this issue. One third of all research reactors of the world are in Russia. Some of
these reactors are only used seven to ten days per year, thus the state could probably do
without these reactors. Russia is the only country using nuclear fuel for ice breaker ships.
HEU is also used in fast reactors. Unfortunately, we still have reactors working on Pu
but soon they are to be closed down. Plus, Russia still uses the material in question in the
production of isotopes. HEU is extensively used in the Russian civilian sector.
Russia still has no clear unified policy on enriched U, and sometimes there are contradictory
steps and policies. Russia takes an active part in the research reactor conversion
to lower-enriched fuel but has not started converting its own reactors. Despite being part

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
of the initiative to remove nuclear materials from other countries, Russia is still supplying
nuclear materials abroad. Even though it is legal, what matters is that it makes other countries
to do the same. For example, when Germany had doubts about what type of reactor
to build, highly- or low-enriched U, Russia’s consent to supply HEU became the decisive
factor for the construction.
One of the reasons for the absence of such policies might be that the use of lowenriched
uranium means considerable expenditures on new fuel and reactor development.
However, the political aspect is still more important. We still do not pay proper attention to
the possibility of terrorist organizations creating a nuclear weapon, whereas the prospect of a
dirty bomb creation seems more feasible. Moreover, nuclear industry representatives are reluctant
to stop development of the technologies that might be useful for future development.
Russia has several strong points that would help take the necessary decision and
even assume leadership in the initiative. Firstly, Russia has some reactors that are not
fully used, so they could be shut down without any harm to the industry output or development.
Secondly, shutting the reactors would also be economically reasonable as
their maintenance and safety are expensive. The cost of modernization or conversion to
lower-enriched Uranium should pay off. Thirdly, Russia with its extensive experience in
nuclear research could assume leadership of the initiative. Some of its reactors could be
modernized and later used as international centers. In light of the latest global tendency to
use low-enriched U, development of low-enriched fuel and reactor reconfiguration could
become an important source of income for the country. All it would take at this stage is a
political decision and devotion to the task.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Threat Reduction Cooperation in 2015
Rose Gottemoeller, Director, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Moscow Center
I would like to say several words about a number of reports, which were prepared together
with the Russian Academy of Science, and about current projects on cooperative threat reduction
in 2015. I would like to explain what the „cooperative threat reduction in 2015” means. Will the
Global Partnership (GP) end by 2015 Will Russia or its partners in the GP finish their work in
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Why should we talk about GP and
threat reduction
I believe there are three ways we can approach this problem. The first is a narrow question
of stability and progress in the last ten-fifteen years in partnership for the threat reduction in
the GP framework, or on bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia, as well as other countries.
How can one support these achievements after the official end date of the GP in 2012 The
second is what can be achieved after 2012, through an extension of the GP. E. Sokova, in her
presentation, discussed the GP’s possible ways and spheres of communication after 2012, and
what obligations can be taken by each side. There are also financial and political support issues,
and G-8 policies, which need revision in the next few years. The third sphere, which interests
me, is the use of the GP experience in resolving new and existing nonproliferation problems
beyond Russia and CIS, together with Russia and CIS countries, in particular in Kazakhstan.
From a US perspective, I would like to focus on three issues, in which Russia and
the U.S. can cooperate in the near future. First, I am familiar with the studies conducted by
the Academies of Science in the United States and Russia. Three years ago a research report,
conducted in parallel by Russia and the United States, was published on the progress made
through cooperation and the obstacles that remained. This fact sets the basis for future work.
Second, strengthening cooperation between Russia and the USA in the non-proliferation field
is described in the papers of the Academies of Science, which also include recommendations.
The major conclusion was that Russia was able to transform the relationship from receiving
assistance to an equal partnership within the GP, and later even play a strong partnership role
in the relations with the USA and other countries. One of the areas, discussed in the report,
is that the United States, Russia and other partners can cross the GP’s current limits and look
at non-proliferation in other countries and regions. Similar studies between Russia and the
U.S. may be a good avenue to research ways of what can be done beyond Russia’s borders
cooperatively. I understand it is a very unpopular idea today, and I cannot recall a time when
the US-Russia relations were as bad as they are today. I believe, however, that it is very important
to consider our long-term interests from the national security perspective and what
can be done from the non-proliferation standpoint. These issues are in your and our national
interests.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
I would like to talk about plans for 2015 and look at four spheres where we could
successfully cooperate in the future with regard to non-proliferation threats and problems. In
new research we will concentrate on the threats emerging by 2015. In the framework of this
research we can develop a larger set of questions for the GP. The first sphere to be seriously
considered is cooperation based on threat reduction in Iran, and particularly N.Korea. We have
already achieved an agreement with N.Korea on the plutonium production reactor closure in
Pyongyang. It is important that Russia and the U.S., perhaps together with other partners in the
GP, can think about ways to support closing down this reactor. We hope for the reactor’s complete
deactivation and a complete elimination of its existing capacities. In previous research,
it was mentioned that negotiations were not successful and we could not even think about
cooperation with N.Korea. It may be a first step in the right direction, but I believe that today
negotiations are much more successful and we can plan for cooperation in this sphere.
The second sphere is Iran. This area is where negotiations are not moving forward as
successfully as in N.Korea’s case. We, however, can think of what we can offer in negotiations
with Iran. Another area is cooperation under the GP in the sphere of nuclear energy, following up
President Putin’s initiative about the international nuclear fuel cycle center and policy actions in
this direction. There are a number of areas that we could continue works under the GP. For example,
we can look at the new security technology and Russia can offer a lot in this area.
The third sphere is integrating other countries in the non-proliferation regime, and here
I, first of all, mean India and Pakistan. Perhaps you all already know about the US-India deal.
I have my own doubts about the deal and its consequences for the non-proliferation regime,
which can be rather significant. There are some possibilities to involve Indians in the dialogue in
the non-proliferation regime framework and approach the deal with stricter requirements.
We can think about three lessons and talk to the Indians about the latest innovations, protection
of the materials, accountability and related issues. We can cooperate on the energy industry
basis. Russia is actively approaching India with nuclear reactor sales, but it has not successful yet.
We could look at threat reduction, such as physical protection, based on commercial interests.
Finally, a complicated issue comes from the current U.S. Administration’s arms
control disarmament and non-proliferation measures. We must look at the issue beyond
2015 and in the context of next cooperation phase on nuclear disarmament between
Russia and the USA. The GP has a very important transparency component, which is
also related to commercial contracts and methodology used in the physical protection
of materials. For many years there were many complaints about the absence of transparency
in such Russian programs. I think we should have thought about cooperative
programs with the U.S. We must start the planning. I suggest that both the Democratic
and Republican parties in the USA, and first of all, the experts, conduct active discussions
about the next phase of nuclear weapons control. It is essential, that P-5, including
China, take part in discussions about what should be done for arms reduction and control.
These are all different categories, where a partnership can take place in the future. I
think that such spheres where we could use lessons and experiences from the GP should
be developed beyond 2015. The GP produced outstanding results in the past five years,
but we have entered the cooperation phase and both Russia and the U.S., must take on
additional obligations. Today we cannot reject this conception, especially if we are concerned
about the national security of Russia and the United States.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Opportunities to Minimize Stocks of Nuclear-explosive
Materials
Frank N. von Hippel, Professor, Co-chairman of the
International Panel on Fissile Materials, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University, professor
One legacy of the Cold War is 1350–1950 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and 250 tonnes of separated Pu, virtually all produced by the Soviet Union and the U.S. An
additional 250 tonnes of separated plutonium is a legacy of the nuclear-energy establishment’s
premature vision of a future powered by plutonium breeder reactors (see Pictures 1, 2).
Picture 1. HEU Stocks: almost all Russian and US Cold War legacy
(500 t Russian, 234 t US) declared excess & being blended down
These stocks are vastly in excess of the world’s needs today and should be reduced to
make nuclear disarmament irreversible and minimize the danger of theft and sale to would-be
nuclear countries or terrorists. In this talk, I discuss four policies to facilitate these reductions:
1. Russia & U.S. should reduce their weapons stocks of HEU and Pu to reflect
their warhead reductions;
2. Russia, U.K. & U.S. should fuel their next-generation nuclear-propelled ships
and submarines with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, as France is beginning to do;
3. Reprocessing should be discontinued where there is no near-term use for
separated Pu;

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
4. Needed HEU-fueled research reactors should be converted to LEU and unneeded
ones decommissioned.
Picture 2. Separated plutonium: Half is civilian (Mostly in Russia, U.K, France and US)
Reduce weapon stocks. Because of the downsizing of their Cold War nuclear
arsenals, Russia and the U.S. have stockpiles of fissile materials far in excess of what
they need for weapons. Russia has declared 500 tonnes of HEU and 34–50 tonnes of
Pu to be excess of its military needs. The U.S. has similarly declared 234 tonnes of
HEU and 45 tons of Pu excess. The two countries are eliminating most of their excess
HEU by blending it down to low-enriched uranium for use in power-reactor fuel. Their
plutonium-disposition programs are stalled, however.
More weapons HEU and Pu could be declared excess. If we assume that an average
modern nuclear warhead contains 4 kg of Pu and 25 kg of HEU and add an extra
20% for working stocks and research and development, it would require only about 30
tons of Pu and 180 tons of HEU to support the stockpile of approximately 6,000 warheads
that the U.S. expects to have in its active and reserve stockpiles in 2012. If Russia
and the U.S. reduced to 1000 warheads each, they would only require 30 tons of Pu and
5 tons of HEU each (see Pictures 3 and 4.)
Convert naval propulsion reactors to LEU. The U.S. and U.K. fuel their naval propulsion
reactors with weapon-grade HEU. Russia fuels its naval and icebreaker reactors with
medium-enriched but still weapon-usable HEU. The U.S. has declared128 tonnes of weapongrade
HEU excess for weapons purposes but has placed it into a reserve for future use in
naval-reactor fuel (see Picture 1). Russia presumably has a similar stockpile (I have assumed
100 tons in Picture 1.) As the stockpiles of weapons materials are reduced, the naval stockpiles
will become an increasingly large part of the HEU problem (see Picture 3). A simple
way to eliminate this problem is to fuel future naval reactors with low-enriched uranium (U
enriched to less than 20% 235 U). France is already making this shift. Russia similarly has
developed LEU fuel for the floating nuclear power plant that it has under construction. Since
the reactor for this floating power plant is adapted from an icebreaker reactor, the icebreaker
reactors could be converted – and perhaps Russia’s nuclear submarines as well.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Picture 3. Global HEU stocks: What it Russian and U.S. military stocks reflected
warhead reductions (non-Russian/USA stocks total about 90 tonnes)
Picture 4. Global plutonium stocks: Potential for reductions
(non Russian/USA weapon stocks about 13 tonnes)
The situation is a little more difficult for the U.S. and U.K. Unlike France and
Russia, which refuel their reactors every 5–10 years, the U.S. and U.K. have developed
reactors that have „lifetime” cores. The U.S. Navy insists that, to convert to LEU cores,
it would have to return to a refueling cycle of every 15 years or so. Future submarines
and ships, however, could be designed around reactors that have lifetime LEU cores.
Discontinue civilian reprocessing. Reprocessing of power reactor fuel in most of
the industrialized states was originally launched in the 1960s and 1970s in the expecta-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
tion that plutonium breeder reactors would soon be built by the hundreds. plutonium in
the spent fuel of power reactors was therefore separated out to provide startup fuel for
these breeder reactors.
In 1974, the proliferation dangers associated with this vision of plutonium fuel became
obvious when India used the first plutonium that it separated out with U.S. assistance
under the „Atoms for Peace” program to make a nuclear explosive. The U.S. cancelled its
civilian plutonium program.
Other countries continued for some time, however. In some cases, as with Germany
and Japan, exporting spent fuel to Britain and France to be reprocessed became a
way to bypass their domestic anti-nuclear movements, which were making it impossible
to establish central storage sites for spent fuel. This worked only for a decade or so,
however, because Britain and France began to ship back to the countries of origin the
solidified high-level waste that resulted from the reprocessing and central storage sites
had to be found for this returning waste. The result is that Britain and France have lost
virtually all of their reprocessing customers.
The U.K. has decided to abandon reprocessing but is faced with a costly legacy
from its program, including about 80 tonnes of separated civilian plutonium for which it
has no disposition plan. Russia has a dispositon plan for its 90 tonnes of separated civilian
and excess weapons plutonium but that plan depends primarily on future plutonium
breeder reactors. The U.S. has a disposition plan for much of its 45 tonnes of excess
separated plutonium but the estimated cost of that plan has already climbed above $10
billion. France is recycling its separated plutonium into mixed-oxide fuel for irradiation
in light-water reactors. The irradiated „mixed-oxide” fuel is being stored at France’s
reprocessing plant.
It makes little sense to separate more civilian plutonium until the huge stocks of
already separated plutonium can be dealt with. For interim storage, plutonium is much
more secure in spent fuel than in separated form (see Picture 5).
Picture 5. Separated plutonium is much less secure than plutonium in spent fuel

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Convert or decommission HEU-fueled research reactors. There are currently
more than 140 HEU-fueled research reactors in the world. The HEU at these reactor
sites amounts to only a few percent of the total global stock of HEU but many of the
sites are civilian and much less well protected than sites in the weapon complexes.
Some critical assemblies and pulsed reactors contain hundreds of kilograms of barely
irradiated HEU. This is a concern because converting HEU into a gun-type (Hiroshimatype)
of nuclear explosive is well within the potential reach of terrorist groups. The material
also could be diverted to weapons use by the host countries. Indeed, on the eve of
the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein launched a crash program to convert into a weapon
HEU in French and Russian supplied research-reactor fuel.
In 1978, out of concern about these dangers, an international Reduced Enrichment
Research and Test Reactor program was launched with the objective of converting HEUfueled
reactors to LEU. There are plans to convert an additional 48 using existing LEU
fuels and another 21 are to be converted with LEU fuels that are under development.
This leaves about 75 research reactors for which there are no current conversion
plans. 90% of these are in Russia. While Russia is cooperating in efforts to convert to
LEU fuel Soviet exported research reactors in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, it has
not yet decided to convert its own research reactors. Institutes that are interested in exploring
the feasibility of converting their reactors are not being allowed to do so.
In any case, most of the world’s HEU-fueled research reactors are no longer
needed. In some cases, such as most critical assemblies and pulsed reactors, the experiments
can be adequately simulated with computer codes. More generally, the era
in which each nuclear research institute did experiments on its own research reactors is
coming to an end. Increasingly, experiments are being done in a few well-equipped international
centers and institute groups are becoming „user groups” that travel to those
centers to do experiments. Most of the world’s HEU-fueled reactors are therefore falling
into disuse. They should be shut down and their HEU fuel removed to centralized
secure storage.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Green Cross Russia Public Outreach and Information Office
in Chelyabinsk: Discussing Its Experience in Overcoming
the Legacy of the Cold War By Presenting Its Work in the Settlement
of Muslyumovo, Chelyabinskaya Oblast
Maria Y. Sobol, President, Green Cross Russia
Chelyabinsk affiliate
The most challenging aspect of overcoming the Cold War legacy that we have
encountered on the territory of the Muslyumovo settlement is the conscience of the local
public. This has been not only fear and lack of faith in the future, but also unpreparedness
and complete disorientation when given a CHOICE. Performing the program of
free-will evacuation that was suggested by the Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy
(Rosatom) and the Chelyabinsk regional governor, from its inception stipulates the right
to a CHOICE that must be made by the Muslyumovo residents themselves. This choice
concerns: where to live, what kind of housing to obtain, and on which territory.
The Muslyumovo residents’ perplexity was so great that the initiative group that
was formed demanded to build a multi-story house and move everyone there. There was
also a share of the population who did not support this idea. The media interpreted this
situation in various ways.
I consider it my duty to bring some clarification to this story. The Muslyumovo initiative
group independently chose the territory of the sanitary zone of the Chelyabinsk city
purifying facility (Miassky farm) for the construction of this common housing. Of course,
no one from the Chelyabinsk city administration, and no one from the territorial federal
control services, was able to grant their permission for such a construction project.
I won’t mince words: the implementation of the Muslyumovo residents’ evacuation
plan is quite a complicated process. It is mostly connected with organizational activities. Lack
of preparation on the side of the municipal government, as well as the extreme negligence of
the Muslyumovo housing record-keeping system, manifest themselves as major problems.
The situation is further complicated by the lack of the residents’ legal knowledge, including
legislative deputies and the settlement’s and municipal region’s Administrators.
In order to calm the social tension and to normalize the work of the Rosatom, an
Information Center was opened to help the Muslyumovo population. It was headed by
the Muslyumovo rural public organization, NABAT, in partnership with Green Cross
Russia and the Public Chamber of the Chelyabinskaya oblast. We realized our lack of
experience in organizing voluntary evacuation (as is the case in Russia), where, as I mentioned,
the issue of CHOICE is the chief and the most difficult one for the population.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
We often hear that the Center employees are allegedly agitating the population for
a new microregion – Novomuslyumovo. I take full responsibility upon myself to declare
that such is not the case. One of the principal conditions under which the Center employees
work is that their work consists strictly of providing advice in regards to filling out
paperwork, technical assistance with the paperwork, and its transfer on to the Evacuation
Support Fund for further work. In this process, the Center consultants did not have
the right to influence or agitate the population for forming Novomuslyumovo. One’s
move would mean not only a new place of residence, but also a new place of work, new
kindergarten for one’s children, a medical registration in a new district, and so on. No
Center employee could possibly undertake such a responsibility, making such a choice
for someone. To be more convincing, I can say that today, out of 406 applications, there
were only 100 for Novomuslyumovo. These numbers speak for themselves.
In the beginning of implementing this plan, we found out that only a small part
of the population had formally established personal property documents. One had to not
only explain to the population how to fill out the paperwork and how to obtain property
Certificates, but also to reduce the amount of time for the paperwork processing as
much as possible. With this purpose in mind, and as per the agreement with the Federal
Registration Service, a representative of the latter works in the Center every Tuesday,
accepting the paperwork and providing advice to the population. The paperwork processing
time was also reduced from one month down to two weeks. I do not doubt that in
this very hall, there are people who had to deal with the registration service more than
once and who understand how important this decision was and how much effort it cost
to ensure that this type of help would be as close to the population as possible with the
minimal protractions and conflicts.
With all their due desire to deliver timely assistance to the population, the Center
employees must follow the Russian legislation, without breaking the lawful practice.
Many legal questions that spring up require immediate solutions; even more often, they
require coordination with other current laws. Legal advice was necessary, and only qualified
lawyers could provide them. So, then we addressed the lawyers of the State Duma
Deputy and the Chair of the Legal Committee of P.V. Krashennikov with a request for
assistance. With these lawyers, the Center obtained not only knowledgeable specialists,
but also an opportunity to address legal questions and receive advice (including those
conducted via telecommunications) at the highest levels and on an immediate basis.
The Center was able to prevent situations where the law is violated. Unfortunately, the
knowledge and experience of our lawyers, as well as their recommendations are often ignored
by the local government bodies’ representatives. Most errors and violations come
from their side.
One of the problems that we have encountered is the incapability of the local
government bodies to take responsibility and make decisions. In terms of the village
evacuation, 741 households are participating, according to the municipal data. However,
after the relevant information appeared in the media, 30 more citizens residing outside
of the village declared their rights to personal property. Currently, they are in the process
of establishing these rights. Instead of administering this process by denoting certain
criteria that would allow regulating the requests within the legal frameworks, the mu-

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
nicipal power bodies are deciding the order of priorities in terms of providing the legal
consultation services that the Center gives. Moreover, the 741 declared households were
not confirmed by the registry, which also placed the legal base of the evacuation under
doubt. Today, our lawyers and employees find themselves in quite a difficult situation.
On a daily basis, they encounter private-type problems, each of which creates conflicts
which, in turn, adversely affect their work. Currently, there are residents who prepared
their paperwork, and yet, due to being close to the bottom on the waiting list, are unable
to complete their dossier.
The signed registry was published in our Center in early April, as a result of the
pressure applied by our outreach office and the Chelyabinskaya oblast Public Chamber.
However, certain points of this registry do cause some doubt to the population. In our
opinion, the delay of this registry and the public participation in checking how well it
matches the reality, brings artificial tension to the situation. The new registry, prepared
by the commission under the leadership of the regional head, contains 856 households
rather than the 741 that were originally reported. You can judge for yourselves as to what
else the Center employees and the population can expect.
Lack of any information whatsoever relating to the planning and deadlines of the
Novomuslyumovo settlement construction presents yet another problem. In our opinion,
this constitutes a breach of responsibility on the part of the municipal power that must
provide information to the population which wishes to stay on a given territory. The lack
of information prevents the population from being able to make a choice. It also forces
people to turn down plans for the new settlement out of fear of losing their money or
missing out on a better investment opportunity with that money. Operational efficiency
plays a big role in this program due to the rapid growth of housing prices. It causes much
frustration, because at times, the cost of a chosen dwelling increases during the time that
it takes to conclude the transaction.
We do understand that the majority of problems that cause tension in the implementation
of the Muslyumovo residents’ evacuation have an internal, regional character.
As you see, many organizations joined us in attempts to solve these problems. Gradually,
the Center is acquiring experience in its public outreach activities; a team of colleagues
and associates is forming. And yet, as often happens, there are mistakes that must not
only be admitted, but also corrected. Different people use these mistakes in different
ways. For some, it is an opportunity to find solutions; for others, to create social tension
and to use them for their political games. We have prepared and sent out appeals to all
political parties. Using this opportunity, I also appeal to you, the participants in this Dialogue,
asking you not to turn the Muslyumovo population into a political commodity.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Mining Tails as a Legacy of the Cold War
Larisa I. Korneva, Fund for the Development of the
Mineralni’e Vody Region, Stavropolsky Kray
The most unfavorable, if not catastrophic, situation is developing today in the
smallest town of the region – Lermontov. In the Russian Radiological Security Law, the
maximum dose of radiation for the general population is 1 millizievert (mZv) per year.
In Lermontov, however, the average dose of radiation is about 10 mZv, ten times above
the allowed regulations. The average dose of radiation is calculated like the average
wage – one person has a salary of one thousand rubles, another – two hundred rubles,
and the average is six hundred. In fact, in Lermontov there are apartment buildings
where the radiation level reaches 15–20 or even 70 mZv. Yet, such a high level of radiation
is not found in the offices or the production departments of the former Industrial
Complex „Almaz,” which worked on the enrichment of uranium ore before the early
1990s and extracted it from mines in Beshtau and Byk. This radiation level is found on
the ground floors of apartment buildings, in schools, and even in kindergartens.
Office areas with concentration levels of radon, a radioactive gas, of 1,000 Bq
per m 3 , which, according to professional regulations, is equal to maximum exposure
limits for a mine-worker in an uranium mine, can be found in the schools of Lermontov:
school 1 (gym), 2, 4, 5 (1st floor), and kindergartens located on Patrice Lumumba,
Gagarin and Khimiki Streets.
According to the results of several thousand measurements, it has been found
that the average level of radon emission in the Lermontov City limits is more than 250
mBq/m 2 /s, and at the maximum level, it is more than 4,500 mBq/m 2 /s, while average
global level is 18 mBq/m 2 /s. In other words, in some parts of Lermontov the level of
emission of the radioactive gas exceeds international standards by 250 times. The effective
average equivalent background dosage of radiation for the city’s population makes
up around 15,018 mZv per year, and its maximum exceeds 70 mZv, while the established,
acceptable limit from all sources of radiation is 1 mZv per year, according to the
Russian Statute „On Radiological Security of the Populations.” In order to give you a
better comparison, the majority of those working on waste elimination at the site of the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident were exposed to a smaller dose of radiation
than the citizens of Lermontov receive annually.
If you look at the map of radiation-affected areas produced by the employees
of the Lermontov Center of Sanitary-and-Epidemiologic Inspection, you can see that
over half of the houses in Lermontov have levels of radioactive radon concentration
that noticeably exceed acceptable norms. According to preliminary estimates, around

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
2,000 apartments in the city have unfavorable radon conditions, while 1,000 apartments
have a radon concentration of more than 400 Bq/m 3 . (According to the requirements for
radiation security, inhabitants of such apartments are to be resettled.) And in 500 apartments,
the radon concentration exceeds the professional maximum dosage for mineworkers
in uranium mines. Fifteen hundred individuals, including 300 children, live in
these apartments.
The reason for such disastrous living conditions for the citizens of Lermontov
is well-known: the town was built as a village for mine-workers of uranium mines
in Beshtau Mountain and employees of „Almaz.” The houses were constructed at the
western root of Beshtau Mountain, where this naturally high concentration of uranium
is being recorded, which causes a high gamma-background (20–70 mR per hour) and an
increasing level of radon emission from the soil. Additionally, another negative factor
that is worsening the radioactive situation is the use of local building materials during
construction in the 1950s and 1960s. In simple Russian language, forty years ago during
the construction of living quarters they used the rocks, extracted from uranium mines
and containing radioactive radium.
What are the outcomes for residents in the area with high radiation levels In
the past several years, Lermontov Center of the State Sanitary-and-Epidemiologic Inspection
№101 in partnership with the State Scientific Center of Russia’s „Biophysics
Institute” received preliminary data on the health condition changes in the town population.
It has been identified that in town, the frequency of illnesses in pregnant women
has increased, including anemia and pyelonephritis; stillbirths and premature births have
also increased; and the number of all types of diseases in newborns has grown in the
recorded period. The highest rise has typically been in such diseases as newborn infections,
asphyxia and hypoxia conditions, and breathing disorders in infants born with
normal weight. During delivery, local women have more frequent labor stimulation and
induction, as well as abnormal labor. The mortality data for 10,000 persons indicates
the constant growth of mortality rates from all oncological diseases, particularly from
pulmonary system pathology. Since 1958, mortality rates from all oncological diseases
have tripled. It is determined that in Lermontov the mortality rate of lung cancer is 1.5
times higher than the region’s average. For sure, the death-rate from breast cancer has
increased 2.5 times. It is also known that the mortality rate from the sum of tumors and
prostate cancer is higher in Lermontov. It is officially admitted that one of the potential
reasons for the origin of the identified pathology can be a complex influence of radiological
factors on the citizens of Lermontov in both working conditions and private life.
Do the representatives know these facts It is, as always, that they (including
Governor Chernorogov, Mr. Katrenko, the Kavminovodsk area State Duma Representative,
as well as the Minister of Nuclear Industry) do know, but they do nothing. It’s been
two years since the Program for the „Decrease of the Level of Exposure to Radiation
in the Population from Natural Radioactive Sources” was supported by the Council for
Security of the region and by Governor Chernogorov, and then it was sent to the federal
level, where it was buried. At the end of the day, in order to completely resolve the problem
of Lermontov, it is necessary to build several apartment buildings, 2–3 schools, and
kindergartens. But it seems that the Russian government does not have the necessary

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
money for construction, or it does not want to allocate the money. Yet, the story of money
will take us away from the focus of environmental and healthcare protection and shift the
discussion into the realm of big politics. The analysis of that is not a part of our task today.
Having noted the failure of the local and federal authorities to resolve this problem,
let’s look at the radioactive situation in the towns of the Caucasus Mineral Waters.
In Zheleznovodsk, there have been no detailed studies, but some selective measurements
in several areas indicate a high gamma radiation background. In several houses
of old construction, concentration of radon was 400 Bq and higher. In Essentuky, no
detailed studies have been conducted, but some protection measurements (there are 50
radiation sensors installed in various houses) indicate that, in 10% of the buildings, the
level of radon concentration exceeds allowed regulations. In Kislovodsk, there have
been no detailed studies. However, during the investigation of the Dzhinal resort out of
50 sensors given to employees, 2 cases revealed radon concentrations exceeding 1000
Bq (It should be noted, that Kislovodsk is the safest place in the region of Caucasus
Mineral Waters – 95% of the measurements indicate concentration less than 20 Bq,
which is equal to the international level). In Pyatigorsk, there are locations with high
radon concentrations (in particular on the Teplosernaya Street, where the radon concentration
is 5,000 Bq).
To put it simply, locations with high radiation levels are present in every town of
the Caucasus Mineral Waters. Because there have not been any massive inspections nor
studies, the problem is not as critical as in Lermontov. It is questionable if in the future
there will be such studies and whether the situation will change.
For this publication, the information was provided by Mr. S.P. Verejko, Head
of the Industrial Medical Lab of the Center of State Sanitary-and-Epidemiologic Inspection
№101 (which is part of the Federal Management of Medico-Biological and
Extreme Problems Agency), and Master of Medical Science.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Environmental and Radiological Monitoring in the Far East
V.A. Abramov, Ph.D., Head Researcher, Russian Academy
of Sciences & Green Cross Russia Vladivostok Public
Outreach and Information Office
Multi-purpose environmental-radiological monitoring (ERM) is a comprehensive database
of natural and man-made effects on the environment. This database is used to develop
tactics and strategies to protect the environment physically and ethically from various effects
in the fields of radiation, chemistry, bacteriology, seismology, volcanism, tectonophysics
– the physics of tectonics—meteorology (tsunami, tornadoes, solar wind) and other.
Strategic and tactical challenges of the ERM are solved on a step-by-step basis
(preventatively and permanently) both regionally and globally. International politics,
specifically economic, technological, and social issues, will be based on the ERM.
In the past century, natural and man-made disaster processes using radio-isotopes
have disturbed the Earth’s natural balance by causing processes with irreversible
and unmanageable consequences.
Seismic and tectonic factors (volcanic, geophysical or other phenomena) have
not even been taken into account by the many countries that conducted nuclear tests for
both military and peaceful purposes. Radiation leaks, accidents, and disasters on many
nuclear objects in a number of countries contaminated the planet’s living space and
caused incurable diseases in humans and animals. As per the international norms of global
environmental safety, the ERM established a number of socio-political requirements
based on public opinion in order to be able to foresee future environmental conditions.
The global environmental-monitoring system provides a comprehensive study of
human-caused factors, such as technological impact on radiological and isotopic components
of the environment, migratory flows, pollution accumulation, and food chains.
The society and the environment are interconnected and subjected to the law of
biospheric degradation, where integral accumulation of „negative quantity” unavoidably
leads to the „negative quality” of the human-nature coexistence.
The approach of the ERM to these problems will allow us to direct our efforts to
maxi-cycles and mini-cycles of seismic-tectonic activity. These cycles have detrimental
effects on the environmental and radiological balance and provoke technology-induced
disasters. The change in regional and local geological structures is evidence of that.
These structures are experiencing technology-induced constraints due to construction
of potentially hazardous products and industries. Exploration and urbanization of new
territories in Siberia, RFE (Russian Far East), and South-East Asia are connected to
mineral deposits exploration and development including radioactive ores and ore-bearing
mixtures with a wide spectrum of dangerous radioactive isotopic elements.
A brief analysis of FER (Far-East Region) and APR (Asia-Pacific Region) seismic
conditions indicate that there is a stable tendency of tectonomagmatic – tectonic
and magmatic—and seismic activity on the planet (also known as the NAP phenomenon

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
in Russian, 1985–2002). The incidence of earthquakes, volcanic activities, and tsunami
is on the rise. Just the Primorye territory and surrounding regions, from 1850 on, have
experienced over 250 earthquakes. On the MSK-64 (Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karnik)
scale, three of these earthquakes scored a 10, seven scored a 9, eleven scored an 8, and
twenty-seven scored a 7 with the hypocenter depth ranging from 5 to 500 km.
The level of seismic danger for FER and APR (especially for cities and urbanized
areas) is officially declared 1–3 scores lower on the existing maps of seismic regions in
Russia (map set SP-78, SP-84, OSP-97, A, B, and C). This happened because the specialists
who compiled the maps did not take into account regional and depth particularities
of ruptures/seismic faults. They also ignored contemporary data on lithospheric magnetic
flows, tectonospheric funnels, and tectonic movements. They also did not take into account
the latent active tectonic fissures that came out due to space and aerial observations
decryptions and due to the analysis of new tectonospheric geologic-geophysical data on
Siberia, RFE and South-East Asia. The new facts and data on earthquake hypocenters and
epicenters reveal that the fracture patterns are old, deep, and present seismic danger.
The comprehensive analysis of seismic nature of the Primorsky Kray territory
in the RFE in combination with the detailed study of tectonics and neotectonics, unambiguously
determined and located the following: nodes and areas of seismic hazard; the
earthquakes’ maximum magnitudes; the frequency of impact; the dynamic criteria of
uniformity and non-homogeneity of geophysical milieu; the possible seismic processes
that are developing in the planet’s depths; the stable megablocks sizes; the firmness and
intensity of geoblocks’ interaction; the basis of two-stage or three-stage principle during
seismic activity; the necessity of creating 2–3 interconnected models for seismic hazard
prognosis; the primacy of the model of sudden appearance of epicenters and zones of
migrating earthquakes; the sudden and unpredictable appearance of epicenters is of
greater importance than the destructiveness of a particular earthquake.
The conducted developments and calculations drew well-grounded conclusions
on the critical, seismically hazardous areas and the locations of nodes that are currently
active. („South Primorye Ecological-Radiometric Ecomonitoring”, 2005).
Currently, the Russian government workers of all levels are taking measures to develop and
construct nuclear energy and nuclear repository objects in the areas of seismic danger in Siberia and
the RFE – without considering the many negative and technology-driven factors. This approach of
„pushing” and lobbying NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) into regions with potential seismic activity in
a time of growing seism-tectonic activity in our planet is evidence of today’s deep degradation of
relations between humans and the environment. It also comes out in the forms of dangerous 3-phase
social crises (phobi-crises, zombie-crises, lemmi-crises, and so on).
In their third phase, the government officials make important decisions on security
questions of the country in terms of energy, military, space or other issues. They often forget
historic, destructive events that were caused by thoughtless actions while pursuing political
and economic objectives and neglecting global and regional environmental security.
The process of organizing and conducting of the ERM in Siberia and the RFE
considers the economic practicability of developing wasteless nuclear energy in this
region of seismic-tectonic activity. The ERM will be the science-based foundation used
to make responsible decisions about NPP and the Nuclear Heat-and-Power Plant.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
The Overall Discussion of the Forum Results
––Question from participant: This is a question to everyone regarding nuclear
weapons nonproliferation. The system of international control of nuclear weapons nonproliferation
should indeed be reformed. The IAEA is, apparently, outdated: it should
either be modernized or replaced with a different body. But organizationally, what specifically
should the IAEA member-states do And what should the UN do in general in
order to improve the situation, to place it under control and to secure the world from the
threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism
––Rose Gottemoeller This is a very important question for anyone who is concerned
about the future of the nonproliferation regime and the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT). Currently, there are discussions on the NPT shortcomings. Yet I do not
agree with such evaluations. The NPT was based on special conditions. It is a contract
between the nuclear and the non-nuclear states. In my opinion, the problem consists of
the fact that, in the recent years, the NPT has not been enforced as it should be. In other
words, the nuclear states are not paying as much attention as they should to their obligations
under the Article 6 of the NPT on reducing their nuclear arsenals. This is the main
problem, and, in my opinion, it must be solved in the coming few years.
There is also the question of non-nuclear states and their obligations to continue
peaceful use of nuclear energy without using the NPT as a cover-up for weapons and military
purposes. Such is the case of Iran and of North Korea. We have a number of problems that we
need to solve within the NPT framework.
However, by no means should we regard the NPT regime as a failure. We need to
work in the direction of strengthening the work of the IAEA. I must say that the IAEA really
does work on civil aspects of the issue. It does not touch and should not be responsible for
the military nuclear programs. This is why I think that we should place more emphasis on
Article 6 and on the countries’ obligations to reduce and destroy their nuclear arsenals as per
this article. We must think of ways to strengthen and enforce the NPT regime from the side
of non-nuclear states. As for the right to acquire nuclear energy, we should think that peaceful
atomic energy can proliferate, but it should be isolated from any possibility of providing
access to nuclear weapons. We must prevent development of secret nuclear programs that are
outside of international control. It can be difficult to prevent a country from obtaining nuclear
materials for peaceful purposes. I have already mentioned the necessity to strengthen the
IAEA safeguards and possibilities. This is necessary so that the IAEA can guarantee the enforcement
of nuclear programs within the provided frameworks only. Perhaps, my colleagues
can add something to what I said.
––A. V. Yablokov: We need political will in order to prevent certain things from
happening. Those are such things as when China helped Pakistan to create nuclear
weapons. The United States covered it up, and the whole affair was hidden. The United
States, instead of taking strong measures to prevent it, covers it up. When we ship a
nuclear reactor for an unknown purpose (or, rather, for a known purpose) to Burma, it
is clear what is to follow. And so on… Behind the short-term economic goals, we need

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
to see global problems. Perhaps, it is only the society – not the government, not the
corporations, not the agencies – but only the public, the civil society that must say: „we
do not want this ineffective system of global security to continue, we need to change it.”
But we do need political will to accomplish it. As for how to change it – we will find a
way, lawyers will tell us. First, we need to make the decision, a political decision. The
system that has formed, showed its inefficiency, and it must be changed. This is first and
foremost of what I wanted to say. Thank you.
Frank N. von Hippel I would also like to add something about the IAEA. The more I
get to know them, the more I understand the great work they do. With more power delegated
to them, they are better able to discover various secret programs.
––Y. Y. Simonov (former State Inspector on Nuclear Safety/Security of the USSR,
later the Russian Federation): First of all, I would like to acknowledge the quality of the
information presented by Dr. Paul Walker. Basically, the information that he presented
here constitutes a death sentence to nuclear energy. One of the issues is the lack of solutions
for the radioactive waste problem. Considering the fact that such nuclear energy
develops plutonium, it must be simply crossed out of peaceful nuclear energy category.
This is first. Second: we were informed here that a floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP)
is being constructed in Severodvinsk. The former Minister of Defense, Sergey Ivanov,
announced with a special joy that a FNPP will be constructed some 500 meters from
kindergartens and sandboxes where children play. It was announced on almost all the
channels of the Russian public television.
In the case of Chernobyl, the location was about 8 km away. The distance we have
here amounts to some 500 m. I have a question to the people who were just talking about this
FNPP and telling that it will provide this and that. I would like to ask them: are they aware of
the results of public organizations’ evaluations on the same project that was supposed to be
constructed near Pevek, in Chukotka, not far from the sites of the largest white bears population
Well, if this information and the evaluations’ conclusions did not reach the Severodvinsk
public, then I consider it a crime.
And I would really like to hear an answer to the following question: is it true that the
Severodvinsk public is unaware of these evaluations’ conclusions Is the public unaware of
the fact that this nuclear power station has significant shortcomings That the accident that occurred
due to the first contour decompression has not been fully investigated It can certainly
lead to the explosion of the reactor containment or even the reactor itself. And there are other
shortcomings, also.
––N. G. Shcherbinin: I would like to answer this question as a Severodvinsk resident.
The question of coming to an agreement regarding the FNPP in Severodvinsk has
been under consideration since 2001. There was a special decision on the part of the city
mayor. Hearings were conducted within the framework of the FNPP project with the lowpower
nuclear plant with the KLТ-40 reactor installations in the city of Severodvinsk.
Within the framework of this project, public hearings were conducted. There have also
been hearings in the municipal city council, that is, all the deputies gathered together to
consider this issue. As a result, on March 21, 2002, the Severodvinsk municipal city council
took decision number 28, „to support the construction and placement of a low-power
floating NPP in Severodvinsk.” On April 15 of the same year, construction of the first unit

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
officially took place. On the eve of that day, an ecological organization „Etos,” composed
mainly of young students from Arkhangelsk, appealed to the Severodvinsk Environmental
Council with the proposal to meet with the enterprise experts.
Our city is quite interesting when it comes to public involvement I environmental issues.
We actually have two environmental councils. One of them is a public Environmental
Council. It is mostly attended by various representatives who themselves do not work at the
shipyards. (Even though there are several people who work at „Sevmash”). The second is the
Environmental Council organized by the Severodvinsk city mayor. The difference between
the two councils is that the latter one also includes the leaders of the environmental agencies
from all the city enterprises and shipyards. For example, it includes the chief environmentalist
of the „Sevmash” shipyard, the chief ecologist of the „Zvezdochka” shipyard, or the leader
of the Environmental Protection Department. These agencies are responsible for these issues
over the entire enterprise just as the factory director is responsible for them at his factory.
So, the meeting took place on April 2. The Public Council asked me to invite the enterprise
experts, since I do have some useful connections through my work. All experts were
present at this meeting, including the head of the „Sevmash” nuclear safety department and
„Zvezdochka” chief deputy engineer, Mr. Shepurev, who is responsible for a similar nuclear
safety department at „Zvezdochka.”
For three hours, they explained everything about this situation to the absolutely unprepared
third-year students. They even included the Pevek book which, as we can say, is the
young environmentalist’s Bible; they all have it. What I am trying to say here is that everyone
already has this information, and this book has been read by everyone. But at the time of the
FNPP construction, all the official decisions had been made.
Nevertheless, after the talks, this small group of students expressed a lot of enthusiasm.
Those young people are great! They even posted announcements around the city appealing
to the people to come for a demonstration on the central city square. Unfortunately, I was
not there, because I was at a Lomonosov Fund session in Arkhangelsk that day. But one of
my friends was there. Twelve people came there altogether. It means that they know about it
and have read the book I mentioned.
But now we entered a different era and we have a new Rosatom leadership. Speaking
of which, there is an interesting moment: on June 15, 2006, exactly a year ago, Mr. Kirienko
came to Severodvinsk with an official delegation. It was publicly announced everywhere and
in all the media sources, including the national ones. But all of the excitement actually started
a week before the official beginning of the FNPP construction. That is why there was plenty
of time for discussion.
V. S. Nikitin, the General Director of the RMTB (Research Manufacturing Technological
Bureau), is present here today. With the support of the Rosatom International
Center of Ecological Safety and Albert Petrovich Vassiliev, we could probably conduct
a serious conference or a seminar. It could even be an international seminar, if necessary.
My proposal is to conduct some kind of an initiative with the support of Green
Cross Russia to invite Alexey Vladimirovich Yablokov. I already asked him to come to
Severodvinsk, and he said: „I will come either way.” We should talk about these issues,
we should discuss them. Such is the situation. I make my statements as a city resident
and not in an official capacity.

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––V. S. Nikitin: Today we do have the documents evaluating the impact of the
PNPP construction and use upon the environment. These documents may not have been
around yet when the Pevek book was written. The plant’s construction and functioning
is placed upon the same production program that is responsible for the submarine
construction and repair. „Rosenergoatom”, „Energoproekt” – today, these organizations
are responsible for the oversight of this construction. According to an agreement that
was signed, there will be six more floating nuclear plants in addition to the „Akademik
Lomonosov” platform. They include „Akademik Aleksandrov” and others. There is also
n emergency planning zone project and other documents for which „Rosenergoatom”
and „Energoproekt” obtained the necessary agreements.
––A. M. Vinogradova: We still did not get an answer to the following question
concerning the results of the public environmental expertise that were studied and
evaluated: have you approved them or rejected them
––V. S. Nikitin: No, we do have people who participated in these issues. But as of
today, they are history. Now we have new calculations and new methodology. But there
are documents proving that the ecological impact does not exceed the allowable limits,
even when taking into account the production norms.
––S. I. Baranovsky: There are two things here that we are talking about. We
discussed the environmental review that Green Cross conducted for Pevek, whereas this
is Severodvinsk. Another question is that while the Pevek expertise results have been
disclosed to Severodvinsk, the public has not exhibited any particular desire to discuss
them. There was such an opportunity, yet no one addressed the public organizations or
our authors with any requests for discussion (Kuznetsov, Green Cross Russia, and many
others participated in this expertise). Had the public requested anything, our people
would have come and given a talk about it. But there was no such interest.
––Y. Y. Simonov: There was a discussion of these points exactly for the Pevek
case inside of the Ministry. Rosatom discussed them in the presence of the national
project manager Khlopkin. This is not such a simple question. There have been very
specific questions posed to Mr. Khlopkin. They included certain unresolved issues and
the accident that was not properly investigated (the latter concerned the seal failure, that
first contour decompression that I mentioned earlier). Mr. Khlopkin just banged the door
and left, and that was the end of it. And from then on, it was like an ice-skating rink.
Just think about it, I have examined and studied all the conclusions, evaluations
and official documents that were mentioned here, including the Severodvinsk public
organization created by the city mayor’s decree. No state agencies’ conclusions on this
Severodvinsk „floating” construction are able to withstand any criticism whatsoever.
They have significant shortcomings on purely technical aspects. Even the four concluding
reports of the Gosatomnadzor were unacademic, almost illiterate. This whole
affair was directed to GAN, while their scientific-technological center as such was no
longer qualified for these matters. So, the allegations were quite serious, and they are
still there.
––
V. F. Men’shchikov: Our discussion pattern goes in two directions. There is
the public, which, in my opinion, is mostly (although not always) non-professional. The
public has its concerns, and that is important. It is good that our public can still be con-

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cerned about some issues. And searching for answers to their questions, which is what
we did today and yesterday, is a very normal start for a discussion.
But now I would like to concentrate a little more on the problem that was just being
discussed here. This is the problem of professionals asking questions on the topics that worry
them in terms of safety violations. This is where we are getting quite a mix of responses such
as „hey, you, from this environmental or some such organization, why do I have to answer
you” If a specific question is asked, no one answers it. There are many such examples. For
example, if someone asks about the BNPP: „Considering the seismic conditions of the region,
are there norm violations” They would just reply: „Well, we have the environmental evaluation.”
When it comes to very specific professional and educated questions, no one would
answer them properly. They would say: „Well, we had some 50 students come, and we gave
them a talk about the situation.” The interactive logic is broken somewhere: there is a gap
between the overall concerned public and our answers to their specific questions.
There is one more remark I would like to make. Towards the end, we discussed a very
serious topic of the links between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. I think that we, as a
technologically advanced civilization, are in a deadlock. If, say, Iran will continue to work
on their centrifuges, and if there are clear indications that they are about to acquire a nuclear
bomb in a month, the only likely response would simply be military measures. This would be
similar to what already took place in Iraq. This means a deadlock for the containment policy,
the system of counter-balance, and the nonproliferation regime.
Lastly, the 21 st century will be a harsh struggle for resources. The first struggle, as
was already mentioned, will be for water. The next struggle will be for energy. It will be a
tough struggle. In this sense, I cannot imagine not considering the issue of possible terrorist
attacks. I had a short dialogue with Rosatom scientists who told me: stop it, why do you think
that some terrorist will choose an NPP as a target; he has plenty of other targets such as water
reserves and chemical enterprises. I do not see a serious assessment of the risks of possible
terrorist actions behind such a response. Thank you.
––A. P. Vasiliev: With all my dislike of the IAEA and its bureaucracy, I would
like to say a few words in their defense. We should distinguish between some very
different things. The Bushehr reactor is the kind into which the fuel is loaded and not
taken out for a year or a year and a half; even the lid remains unopened during that time.
Unloading some fuel rods part by part is impossible in this type of reactor. The opening
of the lid would mean a visit from the IAEA and their presence throughout the whole
process. If the fuel is unloaded, it must be transported to Russia as per the agreement
that was signed and insisted upon by both the United States and Russia. That is why
these types of reactors do not threaten the nonproliferation regime.
On the other hand, heavy-water reactors or pressure-tube reactors that easily produce
plutonium and where each tube can be taken out one by one, – these type of reactors must not
be exported anywhere. The pressure-tube reactors in general must not be exported anywhere.
Heavy-water research reactors are also very dangerous, because they present means for plutonium
production. As for low-enriched uranium, it is not very good for a cannon-type bomb,
because the neutron background that is created by the 238 U does not allow the production of a
normal explosion. Instead, a pop or a bang is produced. I can tell you this as a specialist who
developed nuclear warheads himself, and Mr. Hippel knows it, too. This neutron background

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problem for initiating a detonation is present even when using highly enriched uranium. Trust
me, all nuclear physicists know this.
As for using reactor plutonium for a bomb creation – yes, it is possible. I held our
weapon-grade plutonium in my own hands. This type of Pu, by the way, is purer than the
American one: it has a higher level of 239 Pu. That is why, when you hold it as a little ball, it
feels warm even through the glove. As for the plutonium that is used in the reactor due to
the high contents of the 238 Pu, it is hot. It heats up so much that it needs to be cooled down
all the time. This is why, when they take the fuel out of the reactor, they keep in water for a
long time. Moreover, it is impossible to produce it without special robots. One needs a very
complex system for all of this. And the warhead itself – how would you cool it inside of the
warhead This is all so problematic. There are many more simple and efficient ways to harm
the humanity. It is all politics rather than technology.
Belgrade was bombed, and Iraq was invaded, even though it was known that
there were no WMDs. Then, we were getting the news of the Saddam Hussein’s prosecution,
of 160 people killed in the village where the assassination attempt on him
occurred. And now, 100 to 200 people are getting killed every day there, do you understand
After this, all the countries understood: if you do not possess nuclear weapons,
you are defenseless in front of the United States of America. That is why the political
will must first come from the United States. Now already nation-states are being threatened
one after another. Naturally, people are scared for themselves; they do not want
to be „democratized.” Do you know what we call the policeman stick A democratizer.
People do not need such democratizers.
We have discussed some unresolved nuclear energy problems here. These problems
block the way to nuclear energy. It is indeed a fact that peaceful nuclear energy is
a legacy of nuclear weapons programs. Both in Russia and in the US, we still reprocess
our fuel. It is specifically this process that generates radioactive waste. At first, the
waste is compactly concentrated in the fuel element. But as soon as reprocessing starts,
it generates several thousand tons of waste. This waste is mostly liquid and is the most
dangerous kind of waste. We really need to stop using this technology. In the United
States, the Argon National Laboratory and the Idaho National Laboratory developed
a good electrochemical way of fuel reprocessing. What we now call a non-reprocessable
fuel can be easily reprocessed using their technology. We have the same kind of
technology but even more perfected, including its practical usage. It is implemented in
Dimitrovgrad and presents in itself a practical semi-production installation that already
processed several active zones of a fast-breeding reactor. And it works wonderfully,
reducing waste almost in half.
There is also a third kind of technology that was developed in Russia. But, as I
told Kirienko during my speech at the latest Public Council meeting, without intervention
into these events by someone in the upper echelons of government, this technology
will not go on. People got so used to the old technology that the lobbyist groups will
simply not allow the new one to blossom. The same old experts are in charge, whereas
the technology needs to evolve.
By the way, this technology is based upon the gaseous-fluoride technologies
that have been used for decades at the Angar facility. They obtain a one-to-one ratio of

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
product to waste, with neither liquid nor gaseous waste. There is only one shortcoming,
and quite a significant one: it is very easy to separate out Pu and U. So, using these electrochemical
technologies (both what we have in Russia and the one in the United States)
would allow us to separate out U, Pu, Np, all of these things. All of it is then combusted
in the reactor so as to eliminate transactinides. So, this problem must be solved. This
technology is very inexpensive.
However, we do need political will to solve this issue. I feel that together, we are
capable of making this kind of political decision. We need to build this facility. Currently,
it is operating on imitation materials. We could build it somewhere on „Mayak” or at
the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors [full name: Federal State Unitary Enterprise
(FSUE) Scientific Center of Russian Federation Research Institute of Atomic Reactors],
so that it could prove its advantages in practice.
In regards to radioactive waste, I published an article on this topic, and I travelled
extensively in Europe. As the Director of Center for Environmental Safety, I have collected
information on where and how one treats this waste and how much it costs. Some
discoveries have really amazed me. In the West, a substantial quantity of waste is low radioactivity.
They categorize it as „very low-level waste.” In Russia, we do not have such
a category. Recently, we negotiated with our controlling bodies and have formulated
demands to introduce such a category within the frameworks of our strategic master-plan
development. This would allow us to bury the waste in the surface storages, under small
hills. This waste needs to be stored for some 300 years maximum, anyway.
What especially shocked me in Holland was the presence of thick, huge layers of salt,
which makes it the best place for burying any kind of waste. They, however, prefer to bury
any kind of waste – low-level, high-level, fuel waste – on the surface, so that people could
see it and witness that everything is in place and everything is fine. There are, of course, 1.5
meter-high iron and brick walls surrounding the high-level and fuel waste. But people see
that it is there and that everything is fine. People prefer to trust what they see rather than to
speculate of how the waste is spreading under ground.
As for the cost, it is about 200 euros/m 3 . That is such a good cost! With wise and
efficient use of nuclear energy, it does not generate much waste in the first place. The
amount of high-level waste is extremely small: for one ton of fuel, it amounts to only 0.1
tons. The English demonstrated it very well. The technology of decommissioning NPPs
was also conducted and verified in England. I witnessed it myself many times. Moreover,
they need to bring one plant, one unit to the „green pasture” condition, as per public
demand. Economically, this is less viable than their usual decommissioning technique.
Such technique involves taking away all that is unnecessary, demolishing old buildings,
and concentrating high-level waste in the reactor chamber, taking out only the fuel. They
demonstrated that it is possible and not at all as expensive as people say. But England is
going through some tough times now. During the miners’ strike, Margaret Thatcher gave
them all the reserves that were saved up for the plants’ decommission.
We do not have any reserves either, but for a different reason, as you know. Both
Sweden and Finland created reserves by raising the cost of electricity by a percentage
point. They will use this money to remove and store the waste. Sweden, unlike Holland,
chose a different path: they constructed a waste storage site beneath the ocean floor,

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
and that is where they will bury the waste. I have seen it. The waste will be covered
with water, and in 500 years it will all be below the background, so to speak. They have
calculated all the safety measures for the next 500 years. That means that they do not
currently have any unresolved technical problems.
Politically, our problem is not allowing the experts to implement such ideas in
practice. Right now we are trying to do that at Andreeva Bay. We are developing several
disactivation technologies that would be cheaper and ecologically-friendlier, without
liquid radioactive waste. In the United States, they have developed a wonderful deactivation
technology at the „Pentek” firm. Overall, we do have solutions, and our common
task – especially for those of us who consider themselves „green” – is to help implement
these solutions. But it is difficult to do that alone from the inside. Together, we can do it
much faster. Thank you for your attention. Excuse me for having talked so extensively.
––A. M. Vinogradova: I would like to discuss yet another aspect of our „Nuclear
Energy, Society, Safety” topic: the quality of state control in the field of nuclear energy
use. I live in a city with a powerful four-unit nuclear energy plant only 8 km away. The
state control quality, as we analyzed it, could be much better. The largest amount of the
state control agencies data is just taken out of the BNPP nuclear services data.
So, I would like to ask everyone here to write down the following suggestion:
out of all possible control measures, the government should make it mandatory to periodically
inspect all the territories that have nuclear facilities on them. The only such
inspection took place in 1993 by the President’s mandate. It was specifically that inspection
that gave us this idea.
It revealed interesting things. For example, the BNPP, which up to 1993 was
boasting and proclaiming to be the best and most reliable NPP, was found to have local
radioactive pollution in the emergency planning zone, with 60 to 3.5 thousand mkR per
hour. Such inspections and research at least in some way demonstrate to the government
and to the public the conditions of the nuclear facilities.
I would like to request everyone to write down that the government quality control
level in Russia could really be much better, and that it is necessary to organize such territorial
inspections, perhaps, every five years or so. This is very important. Thank you.
––S. I. Baranovsky: We would like to ask you to relay what you have just said in
written form right here. That way it can all be published in the proceedings of our Dialogue
Forum in both Russian and English. It will go to Rosatom, to the US Department
of Energy, to the IPA, to all our ministries and agencies, and to the Russian Academy
of Sciences.
––A. Toropov: First of all, I would like to thank all the organizers whose efforts
made this meeting possible. There should be many more of such forums – perhaps,
more general ones as well as more focused ones. In this sense, we have more potential
participants from our regions. During the second day of the Forum, I realized that I
could have probably invited more participants. But then again, we hardly had any time
for questions and answers anyway. I think that everyone here would support my suggestion.
I would like to have more such forums, but to have them with the development
of specific decisions, solutions, and recommendations. I would like us to be able to
develop concrete recommendations for governments, agencies, the UN and the IAEA. I

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
would like these forums to be real roundtables rather than consist solely of listening to
each other’s opinions. Although, I repeat myself, it is wonderful that we all got together
here. Thank you.
––Question regarding the low-enriched and high-enriched U. I think that it is
a very important decision. Technically, it is only possible with low-enriched U. Yet the
government did not disclose: which fuel will be used
––Stephan Robinson: I hope to be able to give you a good answer. The decision
has indeed been made, and it will be low-enriched fuel. The FNPP that is being
constructed is based on the information provided by Rosatom. Rosatom sent a fax to the
scientist who is dealing with it, letting him know to use U enriched to less then 20%.
This means that we can assume that low-enriched fuel will be used. This is not an official
piece of information, but it was published by an official Rosatom body.
––Paul Walker: In conclusion, I would like to make some general remarks. I
would like to thank all the organizers for facilitating this event in such a professional
way. I know that Green Cross Russia also put forth a lot of effort in order for all of us
to be present here today. In the chemical weapons field, we have been conducting such
dialogues for ten years already. As you know, we always thought that it would be getting
easier and easier to meet as time goes by. But there are always some kind of difficulties
there. I would really like to thank Sergey Baranovsky, Vladimir Leonov, and the entire
Green Cross Russia personnel for this Forum’s organization.
There are several important questions. I think we have conducted a good discussion
on energy production. There were many questions regarding nuclear energy,
conventional energy, and renewable energy resources. We will continue this discussion,
because there will not be easy answers available to these questions in the future. There
is an active discussion on this topic in the United States, and many people there see a
nuclear energy renaissance there. We have not requested any NPP construction for decades
now. It was a while ago – I do not even recall – since 9/11, after the advent of the
threat of terrorist attacks. It concerned the NPP security which relates to the questions
of nonproliferation.
We also had a good discussion on the topic of nuclear weapons nonproliferation,
and the control of fissile materials. All the discussion points regarding energy production
and the use of fissile materials for military purposes point to the fact that one should
break down the prices according to the life cycle. As a result of the Cold War, we see
that disarmament costs 10 or 50 times more than weapons creation. Such is the Cold
War legacy. Yet this is relevant not only in terms of the weapons; we need to break down
the prices according to the life cycle also for NPPs, wind energy, etc. We need to calculate
the costs starting at the beginning of the cycle and ending with its end. If you will
look, for example, at the costs of cleaning an ordinary warf in Russia, you will never
want to build another ship. This is the same in other countries, too.
I would like to note the following: we discussed nonproliferation, our concerns
regarding Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, India and other countries. In the course of these
discussions, it is absolutely evident that we should concentrate more on creation of a
common space and to avoid double standards. There have been situations where some
countries were allowed to create nuclear fuel cycles, others were not; some countries

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fell under detailed inspection procedures while others avoided them. I think that such
games are unsafe right now. We should not play them. There are five members of the
UN Security Council. There are nine nuclear states which might soon become ten, or
eleven, or twelve. If we continue to apply double standards, these numbers and groups
will continue to grow and expand. It will lead to vertical proliferation. If we do not want
Iran and North Korea to obtain nuclear bombs, then we ourselves – first of all, Russians
and Americans – must learn to get rid of bombs. We still have a few years, perhaps this
generation, to solve this issue.
In conclusion, I would like to say that we are becoming increasingly interdependent
in attempting to solve these complex questions. We are even more interdependent
than we can imagine. Nuclear materials produced in Russia or in the United States will
affect the entire world. Nuclear weapons that we produce in one country will have effects
on far-away regions, well beyond our countries. It also has effects on resources,
on health, on environment. Dialogue is very important in these issues. It is a good thing
that we have discussions, that they are taking on a more transparent and open character.
I strongly encourage the continuation of such discussions not only in Russia, but also in
the United States. That way we can gradually conceptualize these issues in a more overarching
way. That way we can be better prepared for the future of our vulnerable planet.
Thank you.

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Conclusion and Summary of the Session
Stephan Robinson, International Coordinator Legacy
Programme, Green Cross Switzerland
First and foremost, I would like to thank everyone who stayed with us until
the end. This dialogue has been very interesting to me, because for many years I have
worked with Green Cross Russia. I have worked in Russia quite intensively from the
very beginning and participated in the chemical weapons dialogue.
When we started our first dialogue on nuclear issues, I knew that it would be very
different from the one on the chemical weapons issues. It reminded me of the chemical
weapons dialogues that we conducted seven years ago. For me, it is like a small tree that
we planted. We do not know yet whether it will grow or which shape it will take; therefore,
I would rather not draw any conclusions or comparisons with the chemical field.
In the chemical field, there are seven groups of stakeholders, and everyone wants to get
rid of the weapons. They also have a substantial level of foreign aid. In 2012, chemical
weapons should become history.
As for the nuclear weapons, the situation is more complex. Here we have military
aspects, civilian aspects, and a wider range of stakeholders. The civil nuclear issues
are also more polarized. I am a scientist myself. I would like to say that a nuclear physicist
must know everything about nature. But when he talks about his nuclear physics,
he becomes more religious.
How to make this dialogue an effective process that will help us bridge the
gaps that currently separate us We will be grateful if you share your thoughts with us,
whether you do it today or in two weeks or in two months. How can we find pragmatic
solutions that would be acceptable to all of us What would you like to share with us
We will be grateful for everything you have to say.

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Closing Remarks
Sergey I. Baranovsky, President, Green Cross Russia
It is time for me to conclude our first Nuclear National Dialogue with the following
final remarks. Let me note that we are no longer at point zero. For me personally, the
most important conclusion is that the Forum took place, and it was a dialogue.
In the field of chemical weapons, our first three so called chemical forums were
not dialogues. Many people who are here today were at those forums as well. The Ministry
of Defense used to be responsible for chemical weapons destruction, and right
now it is Rosatom. For several years we tried to talk the Ministry into the Forum-dialogue,
and we were finally allowed to organize the first one, but with some conditions.
These conditions were: no foreign representatives, no questions or discussions.
Despite a very good representation (even the Brianskaya oblast Governor attended),
there was no discussion at the first Forum. At the second Forum we had foreign
representatives, our traditional partners, and some questions were allowed. At the third
Forum, we started to have some sort of discussion, with participation of representatives
from the military. A real dialogue occurred only at the fourth Forum, where every
participant, including Kambarka citizens, a representative from a small Udmurt village
and a minister, participated in the discussion. Sergey Kirienko, Chairman for the State
chemical weapons commission, and Zinovy Puck, Head of ammunition agency, openly
answered the questions. We have a serious achievement, because people opened their
hearts, and environmental education plays a huge role in it.
People can change. We thought that there is nothing more conservative than the
Army. Even in the Army, there are normal Russian people, who start understanding the
issue. We believe that Green Cross International can register this unique event at the
United Nations. It is not a conference or workshop, or even a Forum. It is a unique child
of the Green Cross – a public Forum-dialogue.
Why do I think the Forum was a success You remember my opening speech and
the scheme about four segments of a society, which are involved in a large process, including
disarmament, chemical and nuclear weapons destruction, and energy issues. There are
four segments of international community that must take part in such processes.
The first segment is people of towns and villages near chemical weapons storage
sites, or nuclear plants: Angarsk, Sosnovy Bor, Balakovo, Kirov, Lermontovo, Severodvinsk.
These are real people and they were able to express their diverse points of views
and pose questions to the Forum participants.
The second level is the regional level, which was represented by Chelyabinskaya,
Archangelskaya and Leningradskaya oblasts bureaucracy. Our chemical forums’

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
experience indicates that it is critical to increase attempts and contracts in order to involve
regional authorities and ministries, and parliaments. We had local authority representatives
at every forum, which is necessary. Also we had media representatives
– „Udmurtskaya Pravda” and local newspapers – and they wrote about the Forum to
attract more people. Our hopes rely on the existing network of the Green Cross offices
in Tomsk, Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Saint-Petersburg. Therefore, we have the potential
to attract more local authorities and political elites.
Now, the third level is the most difficult, and is represented by the federal level
and ministries. There are eight ministries related to nuclear disarmament, and we invited
them, but their responses varied. Presently, our major partner is Rosatom. Albert
Petrovich is the only remaining representative today, and he is not a Rosatom officer. He
coordinates the environment center, but was basically representing Rosatom. I address
this point to Sergey Kirienko, so that higher officials and department managers listened
to the people and answered the questions we are unable to answer. We represent the
general public and are unable to give the answers people need.
Therefore, we need to continue to attract a larger number of higher officials. We had
some other Rosatom branch representatives: Rosenergoatom, TVEL, etc. The key institutions
were represented by the Kurchatov Institute, International Eco-Center, ISDNE (IBRAE) and
others. We had good representation from the Russian Academy of Science; we had real academy
representatives who worked at the conference. Dr. Sagdeyev and I met Dr. Izrael near a
hotel elevator, who told us: „I just learned about it and if I knew earlier, I would have come. It
is so interesting. I have never heard about this Forum before, but I need to leave today. Please
invite me next time.” We had representatives from the Federal Council. Now, I start to name
key players. The State Duma. Where is the State Duma Where is Grachev, the Chairman for
the Duma environmental committee, whom we invited Grachev is a member of the Public
council, he agreed to come, but did not do so. Such behavior is very typical. In our Forums we
always have the Federal Council representatives, but there are never representatives from the
State Duma. There are parliamentary representatives from the regions of chemical weapons
stockpiles, who get their salary for work, and who must defend their voters’ interests, and they
never come. We have our regional activists who actively communicate with these representatives,
but these representatives never come to our forums.
We also have departments in the Ecology Ministry, but nobody cares. Danilov-Danilyan
or Poryadin promised to come, but none of the State Ecology Committee showed up.
There were no representatives from the State Technical Investigation Committee, and no
questions were answered. Our task is to ask Rosatom to have these people at our forums.
The fourth level, which is key to nuclear disarmament, is the financial level. Thanks
to Global Partnership, and other donor countries, including Switzerland, we initiated nuclear
disarmament. There was one person who worked with us in Geneva and Moscow, and who
supported us. There were fourteen participants from other countries as well as other foreign
participants, and you saw Paul Walker’s panel with twelve so called soldiers, who gave us
presentations. We had an opportunity to ask questions, these people keep their hands on pulse,
they talked to you. It is critical where the allocated money goes and whether it is spent on
nuclear disarmament and nuclear submarines dismantlement. We are grateful to these people,
because all these people are secretaries at the embassies; they are key officers, like Simon

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Evons, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and others. Such people found the time to cross the ocean
and come here. We even had representatives from Japan and Australia. Our first three chemical
forums were without any international representation. Today, unlike before, we discuss
our key concerns as equal partners with federal and regional authorities.
The uniqueness of our Forum-dialogue is in its active involvement of civil society
at the four levels. First level is branches of large non-state networks of our country
in Sosnovy Bor, Angarsk and etc, branches of the All-Russian environment protection
society, and a great network of nonprofit organizations. There was no Forum where at
the same table one could find representatives of Russian Ecology Academy, „Bellon”,
Greenpeace, Green Cross, Socio-Ecological Union International and its program on
nuclear environmental policy, Center for environmental policy of Russia, Russian ecological
congress, and Russian regional environmental center.
I am one of the leaders in the green movement, and I cannot think of a network
in the country that did not participate in the Forum. We are all very different and our
views are different, but we have an opportunity to share our views, argue and come to
a consensus at the Forum. All these nonprofit organizations and centers do not meet
(exception – Environment protection forum) and talk. It is great that a green movement
is alive and can influence processes in the country. At the Forum we had so many great
proposals from green public organizations. Finally we had representatives of international
NGOs: colleagues from Global Green USA, Green Cross Switzerland, Nuclear
Threat Initiative and other participating organizations. These organizations expressed
their opinions, they support and encourage us. This is Forum number one, but I promise
you that soon we will have a Forum-dialogue number two.
Now I would like to say what we need for the second Forum-dialogue and what
we did not have at this Forum. We need financial support, especially in the area of nuclear
power, though we will ask our Finnish and British friends again. We would like to see as
our sponsors France, Italy, Japan, Australia, and Germany. This is our plan for future efforts;
we will attract these countries at least for participation in our Forum-dialogue, and
later in our programs. We hope to have support from the green movement in our country.
Green Cross in Vladivostok almost does not participate in our discussions because this
problem is not as critical for the Far East as it is for the western part of our country. Here
I mean nuclear submarines destruction, because we cannot exclude Far East from our
discussion. I ask representatives of other organizations to help us in this issue.
We need to put proposals on paper, we need evaluations, and answers to the
questions before June. By August we should have our first newsletter about the second
international Forum. Unlike in 2007, we started late and many western representatives
could not come. We will have more time next year to organize communication and invite
even more participants. Toporov noted correctly that we want many more people in
Russia to come to the Forum.
In order to complete our Forum, we should publish our presentations. Based on our
ten-year chemical forum experience, publishing is not easy. We need the texts in two languages
in order to publish the Forum discussions in one Russian month (A Russian month
means one month and a half, because Russians are on vacation for the first half of May.)
Therefore, before June 1, you all must submit your reports. The people responsible for

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
publications are: for the Europeans, Stephan Robinson; for North America – Paul Walker;
and for Russia – Alexander Fyodorov, Green Cross Russia Communication Director.
Finally and most importantly: Thank You! Paul Walker has already thanked participants,
but I want to thank you again. I especially want to note our colleagues from
California who came here for two days to listen to our complicated issues. Their visit
took a great effort and I am really honored. I want to thank our sponsors. All the sponsors
are in front of you, and we would not have achieved anything without them. Now I
want to thank representatives of Green Cross, my own employees who worked night and
day to organize this program. You know what it takes to organize a small conference. I
want to thank my colleagues in the United States and Switzerland. I want to thank the
interpreters, because it was not easy for them, as we all are from different places and we
think in different ways. They did a great job and we are so grateful to them.
Well, I thank all of you. See you again. Goodbye. Have a great trip home!

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Participants
Russian participants
ABALKINA Irina Leonidovna, Senior Researcher, Institute on Problems of the
Safe Development of Nuclear Energy, RAS
ALEKSAKHIN Rudolf Mikhailovich, Director, All-Russian Scientific Institute
for the Investigation of Agricultural Radioecology
ARUTYUNYAN Rafael Varnasovich, First Deputy Director, Institute of the
Safe Development of Nuclear Energy, RAS
ASHIKHMINA Tamara Yakovlevna, President, Green Cross Russia Kirov affiliate
ASMOLOV Vladimir Grigor’evich, Deputy Director General, Concern
„RosEnergoAtom”
BARANOVSKY Sergey Igorevich, President, Green Cross Russia
BARISHPOL Ivan Fedotovich, President, All-Russian Society for Concervation
of Nature
BEZRUKOV Eugeny Konstantinovich, Scientific Secretary, All-Russian Scientific
and Design Institute for Nuclear Machine Building (ASDINMB)
BIRYUKOV Valery Ivanovich, Head of Unit, Department for Security and Disarmament,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russia
BOGDANOV Pyotr Konstantinovich, Advisor to the Scientific Deputy Director,
ASDINMB
BOLSUNOVSKY Alexander Yakovlevich, Deputy Director, Institute of Biophysics,
SB RAS, Krasnoyarsk
BRYSGALOVA Natalie Vladimirovna, Director, Russian Environmental Congress
BURLAKOVA Elena Borisovna, Chairwoman, Scientific Council on Radio-Biology,
RAS
CHECHENOV Husein Dzhabrailovich, Vice-chair, Committee on Science,
Health, Environment and Education, Russian Federation Council
CHEPENKO Boris Alexandrovich, Director, Centre for Radiation Safety of The
Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russia
CHILAP Valery Viktorovich, Laboratory Head, ASDINMB
CHINENOV Alexandr Vladimirovich, Laboratory Head, ASDINMB
CHUPROV Vladimir Alexandrovich, Director, Energy Programme, Greenpeace,
Moscow
D’YAKOV Anatoly Stepanovich, Director, Centre on Investigation of Problems
of Demilitarisation, Energetics and Environment, Moscow Physical-Technical Institute
EFANOV Alexander Dmitreevich, Head of Department, Institute of Physics and
Power Engineering, Obninsk
FAL’KOVSKY Lev Naumovich, Head of Department, ASDINMB
FILIPPOV Gennady Alexeevich, Scientific Director, ASDINMB
FONARYOV Boris Il’ich, Laboratory Head, ASDINMB

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
GOROSHKO Oleg Viktorovich, Coordinator, Nuclear Programme, British Embassy
in Russia
GOVERDOVSKII Andrey Alexandrovich, Head of Department, Institute of
Physics and Power Engineering, Obninsk
GOVYRINA Elena Vyacheslavovna, Director, Public information centre, “Mayak”
nuclear facility, city of Ozersk, Chelyabinskaya Oblast
GRIGOR’EV Alexander Vladimirovich, Head Department of Dismantlement
Nuclear and Radiation-Dangerous Facilities, Rosatom
GUROV Anatoly Nikolaevich, Director, Department of Industry, Administration
of the Arkhangelskaya Oblast
IMPOLITOVA Alexandra Alexandrovna, Deputy Scientific Secretary, International
Independent Environmental-Political University (IIEPU)
IVANOV Viktor Konstantinovich, Deputy Director, Medical-Radiological Scientific
Centre, Russian Academy of Medical Sciences
IZRAEL Yury Anton’evich, President, Russian Environmental Academy, academician
of RAS
KAZNOVSKY Pavel Stanislavovich, Senior Researcher, ASDINMB
KAZNOVSKY Stanislav Petrovich, Head of Department, ASDINMB
KONYSHEV Igor Valer’evich, Advisor to the Head of the Russian Federal
Atomic Energy
KORNEVA Larisa Ivanovna, Fund for the Development of the Mineralni’e Vody
Region, Stavropolsky Kray
KOSTINA Svetlana Yur’evna, Deputy Minister, Head of Department of Radiation
Safety, Ministry for Radiation and Environmental Safety, Chelyabinskaya oblast
KRIVOV Yury Ivanovich, Deputy Head of Administration of the town of Zarechny,
Penzenskaya oblast
KUZNETSOV Vladimir Mikhailovich, Director, „Nuclear and Radiation Safety”
Programme, Green Cross Russia
LEONOV Vladimir Alexandrovich, Programme Director, Green Cross Russia
LETOV Viktor Nikiforovich, Chair of Extended Vocational Training for Radiation
Hygiene, RMA of Post-Diploma Education
MAKAROVA Irina Sakibzhanovna, Scientific Secretary, IIEPU
MALYSHEV Dmitry Vladlenovich, Deputy Director, Department for Corporate
Clients, Insurance Group “Sogaz”
MATVEENKO Vladimir Anatol’evich, Russian Engineering Academy
MELIKHOVA Elena Mikhailovna, Head of Department, ISDNE, RAS
MEL’NIKOV Vladimir Vasil’evich, Advisor to Minister of Industry of Chelyabinskaya
oblast Government
MEN’SHIKOV Valery Fedorovich, Co-Director, Programme for Nuclear and
Radiation Safety of the Centre for Environmental Policy of Russia (CEPR) and Social-
Ecological Union International (SEU-Int)
MESHKOVA Tatiana Vladislavovna, Head, Department for the Liquidation of
Radiation Accidents, Ministry for Radiation and Environmental Safety, Chelyabinskaya
oblast

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
MOKHOV Viktor Valentinovich, Director General, Company „GreenTech”
NAZAROV Anatoly Georgievich, Director, Environmental Centre of the Vavilov
Institute for Natural History and Technology, RAS
NAZAROV Oleg Igorevich, Head of Department, ASDINMB
NEGROBOV Oleg Pavlovich, Head of Department, Voronesh State University
NIKITIN Arkady Timofeevich, Prorector for Science, IIEPU
NIKITIN Vladimir Semyonovich, Director, Research Bureau “Оnega”
ORADOVSKAYA Ida Vasil’evna, Medical-Biological Agency of the Russian
Federation
OSTRETSOV Igor Nikolaevich, Deputy Director, ASDINMB
PELEVINA Irina Ivanovna, Laboratory Head, Institute for Bio-Chemical Physics,
RAS
POPOVA Lidiya Vladimirovna, Centre for Nuclear Ecology and Energy Policies,
SEU-Int
RIKHVANOV Leonid Petrovich, Head of Department, Tomsk Polytechnical
University
ROMANOV Yegor Vladimirovich, Director, NGO “Dialogue +”, city of Ozersk,
Chelyabinskaya oblast
RYLOV Mikhail Ivanovich, Director, Centre for Nuclear and Radiological Safety,
St.-Petersburg
SAMKO Lina Sergeevna, Public Expert Council, Sosnovy Bor, Leningradskaya
oblast
SAVCHENKO Vitaly Alexandrovich, Head of Presidium, Board of the All-Russian
Society for Conservation of Nature
SAVIN Anatoly Ivanovich, Academician, RAS
SHAVORONKIN Sergey Nikolaevich, Expert, “Nuclear and Radiation Safety”
Programme, Green Cross Russia, city of Murmansk
SHCHERBININ Nikolay Gennadievich, Director, Green Cross Russia public
outreach office, Severodvinsk
SIMONOV Eugeny Yakovlevich, Expert, „Nuclear and Radiation Safety” Programme,
Green Cross Russia
SKOBELEV Yury Viktorovich, Advisor, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency,
Far-Eastern Okrug
SOBOL Maria Yakovlevna, President, Green Cross Russia Chelyabinsk affiliate
SOROKIN Vladimir Nikolaevich, Chief Researcher, United Institute of Energetics
and Nuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus
SOROKIN Vladimir Vladimirovich, Senior Researcher, United Institute of Energetical
and Nuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus
STAROSTINA Lyudmila Borisovna, Scientific Researcher, Environmental Centre
of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, RAS
SUBBOTINA Elena Borisovna, Editor, “Global Energy” newspaper, section
“Education, management, ecology”
TALEVLIN Andrey Alexandrovich, Centre for the Support of Public Initiatives,
Chelyabinsk

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
TETERIN Alexander Gennadievich, Head, Technical Planning Department, Angarsk
Electrolytic Chemical Combine
TIKHOMIROV Valery Viktorovich, Director, All-Russian Scientific Institute
for the Investigation of Nature Conservation
TOROPOV Alexey Vladimirovich, Director, Green Cross Russia Public Outreach
Office, Tomsk
VASIL’EV Albert Petrovich, Director, International Centre for Environmental
Safety of Minatom of Russia
VINOGRADOVA Anna Mikhailovna, Head, Balakovskaya affiliate (Saratov
Oblast) of the All-Russian Society for Conservation of Nature
VUKOLOVA Tatiana Vladimirovna, Senior Advisor, Department for International
Relations, Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
YABLOKOV Alexey Vladimirovich, Professor, Corresponding member of the
RAS, Programme for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Centre for Environmental
Policy of Russia and Social-Ecological Union International
YES’KOV Yury Mikhailovich, Head of Department, ASDINMB
ZOLOTKOV Andrey Alexeevich, Board Director, “Bellona-Murmansk”, city of
Murmansk
Foreign participants
ARNAUDO RAYMOND, Senior Advisor, U.S. Department of Energy – Moscow
Office
BEGLINGER LUKAS, Minister, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland
in Russia
CAVANAGH BERNADETTE, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of New Zealand
in Russia
DASH MICHELLE, Deputy Director, U.S. Department of Energy – Moscow Office
EGOROV SERGEY, Director, U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation,
Moscow office
EVANS SIMON, Deputy Director, International Nuclear Policy and Programmes,
UK Department of Trade and Industry
FLORY DENIS, Nuclear Counselor, French Embassy in Russia
GARDNER DONALD, Business Development Lead Russia/FSU Markets,
Washington Group International, Cleveland (Ohio)
GOSENS DIANA, Senior Policy Officer, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control,
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
GOTTEMOELLER ROSE, Director, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Moscow Center
GUSTAFSSON ASA, Desk Officer, Department for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,
NIS, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
HALLOUIN MATTHIEU, Assistant to the Nuclear Counselor for the G8 Global
Partnership, French Embassy in Moscow
JEREMENKO ELENA, Officer, Science, Environment and Nuclear Safety Division,
Embassy of Germany in Russia

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
KIRSCH JOERG, Counselor, Economical Division, Embassy of Germany in Russia
KURAI TAKASHI, Minister, Political Affairs Division, Embassy of Japan in Russia
KURAKIN VLADIMIR, Senior Program Manager, Nonproliferation Program,
U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation, Moscow office
MATHIOT ALAIN, Director of the G8 Global Partnership Programme for France
MATTSSON HAKAN, Advisor, Department for Radiation Protection and Nuclear
Safety, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority
McCUTCHEON ROBERT, Nuclear Nonproliferation Officer, Office of Environment,
Science, and Technology, U.S. Embassy to the Russian Federation
MEYER UWE, Counselor, Head of Science, Environment and Nuclear Safety
Division, Embassy of Germany in Russia
NOBILE MASSIMILIANO, Director, Project Management Unit, Italian-Russian
Cooperation Agreement
ORITO EISUKO, First Secretary, Political Affairs Division, Embassy of Japan
in Russia
PIGEON COLLEEN, Second Secretary, Global Partnership Program, Embassy
of Canada in Russia
RECHSTEINER RUDOLF, Member of Parliament, Swiss National Council,
Member Committee for the Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy
ROBINSON STEPHAN, International Coordinator Legacy Programme, Green
Cross Switzerland
RODZIANKO MICHAEL, Head of Moscow Representative Office, Washington
International, Inc.
SIDDALL ALEXANDRA, Second Secretary, Embassy of Australia in Russia
SOKOVA ELENA, Director, NIS Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey (California)
TERVA JYRKI, Second Secretary, Economic Section, Embassy of Finland in Russia
TRAKHTENBERG ELENA, Expert, Coordination Office, Embassy of Switzerland
in Russia
TRETTIN CARL, Associate, Office of Environment, Science, and Technology,
U.S. Embassy to the Russian Federation
VAN BEUNINGEN FRANK, Advisor Security Affairs, Non-Proliferation and
Arms Control, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
VAYNMAN JANE, Fulbright Fellow, Carnegie Moscow Center
VON HIPPEL FRANK, Professor, Co-chairman of the International Panel on
Fissile Materials, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University
WALKER PAUL, Legacy Program Director, Global Green USA
WHITNEY MARK, Executive Director, U.S. Department of Energy – Moscow
Office
YAMASHITA YASUNORI, First Secretary, Economic Affairs Division, Embassy
of Japan in Russia

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
List of Acronyms
ADE – type of plutonium nuclear reactor
AECC – Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex
AMB – nuclear reactor type
ASDINMB– All-Russian scientific and design institute for nuclear machine building
BN – nuclear reactor on fast neutrons
BNPP – Balakovskaya Nuclear Power Plant
CA – critical assembly
CI – chromosomal instability
CIS – Commonwealph of independent states
CWD – chemical weapon destruction
DNA – deoxyribonucleic acid
EBRD – European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
EGP – type of nuclear reactor, power graphite steam
FBR – type of nuclear reactor
FL – Federal Law
FNPP – floating nuclear power plant
FSUE – federal state unitary enterprise
FTP – federal target program
HEU – highly-enriched uranium
HPR – hydro power reactor
HRW – high-level radioactive waste
GP – Global Partnership
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA EP – IAEA expert panel
INSAG – International Nuclear Safety Advising Group of IAEA
ICRP – International Commission on Radiological Protection
IIEPU – International Independent Environment-Policy Univrsity
ISDNE – Institute of the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy of RAS
ISO – International Organization for Standards
KChKhK – Kirovo-Chepetskiy Chemical Industrial Complex
LEU – low-enriched uranium
LNPP – Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant
LRW – liquid radioactive waste
LWS – liquid waste storage
MOX fuel – mixed oxide fuel
MPDG – Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Group
NGO – non-governmental organization
NIB – nuclear icebreaker
NII – research institute
NPP – nuclear power plant

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
PWR – type of nuclear reactor
RAO UES – Russian Joint-Stock United Energy Systems
RAS – Russian Academy of Sciences
REA – Russian Environmental Academy
RI – reactor installation
RMBK – type of nuclear reactor (LWGR)
Rosatom – Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy
RSRC – Russian State Research Center
RTG – Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
SB RAS – Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
SCP – Siberian Chemical Plant
SEU Int. – Socio-Ecological Union International
SNF – spent nuclear fuel
SRC – Scientific Research Center
SRW – solid radioactive waste
TDP – thermodynamic plant
TESI – Tomsk Environmental Student ispection
UN SCNR – United Nations Scientific Committee on Nuclear Radiation
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
USD – United States dollar
UrB – Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WHO – World Health Organization

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
Contents
Preface ................................................................................................................3
S.I. Baranovsky. Opening Remarks ....................................................................4
Y.A Israel. Opening Forum-Dialogue ............................................................... 7
S.V. Kirienko. To the Participants of the Public Dialogue Forum „Atomic
Energy, Society, and Security”.........................................................................9
V.G. Asmolov. Priority Programs of the Nuclear-Energetics Complex............. 10
Troy Lulashnik. International efforts for protection of Nuclear and
Radioactive materials in Russia and CIS.......................................................16
D.V. Malyshev. The Vienna „Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage”
Convention: Key problems.............................................................................19
V.M. Kuznetsov. Current Safety Conditions at Russian Nuclear Installations..24
H.D. Chechenov. Innovative Projects for Nuclear Energy Development..........39
I.N. Ostretsov. Modern Energy Problems and Relative Heavy Nuclear
Energy.............................................................................................................45
Rudolf Reichshteiner. Renewable Energy and Efficiency – European Path
to Common Prosperity....................................................................................50
V.A. Chuprov. Non-Nuclear Energy Scenario for Russia..................................58
V.V. Mokhov. Bioenergy – a Path to Solving Energy Problems......................... 65
A.G. Nazarov, E.B. Burlakova, I.I. Pelevina, I.V. Oradovskaya, V.N. Letov.
Chernobyl, Biosphere, and Humans: a Look into the Future ........................67
V.K. Ivanov. Radiation Risks Assessment for Rosatom Personnel Within
the Framework of International Standards ...................................................97
I.V. Konyshev. Experience in solving social and environmental questions
in problem areas: The example of Muslyumovo village in the
Chelyabinskaya oblast .................................................................................100
L.V. Popova, V.F. Men’shikov, A.V. Yablokov. Outstanding Problems
of the Nuclear Industry ................................................................................103
R.V. Arutyunyan, L.M. Vorob’eva, I.I. Linge, E.M. Melikhova. Nuclear
Energy: Ecological Safety and Sustainable Development ...........................111
V.N. Sorokin. Theoretical Analysis of Small Dosed of Radiation Concep ......115
A.V. Toropov. Public Discussion of the Nuclear Capacity Development
Plans at the Siberian Chemical Plant ..........................................................117
A.M. Vinogradova. Social environmental review experience of
Balakovskaya Nuclear Power Plant, Units №5 and №6 ............................. 123
S.N. Zhavoronkin. Sea Atom and NGOs .........................................................132

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
L.S. Samko. Underestimating Public Opinion in Nuclear Projects
Implementation Report.................................................................................135
Discussion at the End of the First Day ...........................................................138
V.M. Kuznetsov. Radiation Heritage of the Cold War .....................................143
V.I. Biryukov. Russia’s Priorities under the Global Partnership
Framework....................................................................................................153
A.V. Grigor’ev. Integrated Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines and
International Cooperation............................................................................156
A.S. D’yakov. Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposal: Existing Conditions
and Perspectives...........................................................................................163
Evans Simon. UK International Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation
Programme...................................................................................................166
Hakan Mattsson. Norwegian Nuclear Assistance to Russia in the
Framework of the Global Partnership............................................................ 168
Joerg Kirsch. German–Russian Project on Decommissioning Nuclear
Submarines in the Saida Guba.....................................................................169
Alain Mathiot. French-Russian Cooperation in the Framework of the
Global Partnership.......................................................................................170
Colleen Pigeon. Canadian Global Partnership Program: Protection of
Nuclear and Radiological Materials............................................................173
Massimiliano Nobile. Italian–Russian Cooperation Agreement in Global
Partnership Program (Nuclear Issues)........................................................ 175
Takashi Kurai. Japan’s Cooperation for the Dismantlement of
Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines in the Russian Far East.......................178
Alexandra Siddall. Working Within the Framework of the G8 GP:
Australia–South Korean–Japanese Cooperation to Dismantle Nuclear
Submarines in the Russian Far East.............................................................180
Jyrki Terv. Finnish Assistance for the Nuclear Safety of Russia in Frame
of Global Partnership...................................................................................182
Asa Gustafsson. Swedish Nuclear Assistance to Russia in the Frame of
the Global Partnership.................................................................................184
Questions and Answers after „Foreign” Plenary Session..............................186
S.Y. Kostina. Chelyabinskaya Oblast: Experience Gained with the
Remediation of the Legacies of Nuclear Accidents......................................188
A.N. Gurov, V.S. Nikitin, M.A Kozhin. Radiation Monitoring and
Accident Alert System Upgrade in the Arkhangelskaya Oblast....................192
V.S. Nikitin, N.G. Scherbinin. Informing the Population of Severodvinsk
on the Safety of Nuclear Submarine Recycling Based on Comparative
Analysis of Nuclear, Radiological and Social Risks.....................................195

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
A.Y. Bolsunovsky. Radiological Problems of the Yenisey River Near
the Rosatom Chemical Plant........................................................................199
T.Y. Ashikhmina. The Problems of Radioactive Waste on the Territory
of the Kirovskaya Oblast..............................................................................203
A.G. Teterin. Environmental Safety of AECC as a Project Component
for the Creation of an International Center for Uranium Enrichment
in Angarsk.....................................................................................................208
S.N. Zhavoronkin. Remediation of Technical, Coastal Navy Bases in
Northern Russia: The Case of Andreeva Bay. Position of the Regional
NGOs.............................................................................................................21
1
A.V. Yablokov. Inextricable Connections between Atomic Energy and
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation....................................................................219
Elena Sokova. Civilian Highly Enriched Uranium and Nuclear
Terrorism: Russia’s Role in Reducing the Threat.........................................229
Rose Gottemoeller. Threat Reduction Cooperation in 2015............................232
Frank van Hippel. Opportunities to Minimize Stocks of
Nuclear-explosive Materials.........................................................................235
M.Y. Sobol. Green Cross Russia Public Outreach and Information
Office in Chelyabinsk: Discussing Its Experience in Overcoming the
Legacy of the Cold War By Presenting Its Work in the Settlement
of Muslyumovo, Chelyabinskaya Oblast......................................................240
L.I. Korneva. Mining Tails as a Legacy of the Cold War.................................243
V.A. Abramov. Environmental and Radiological Monitoring in the Far East. 246
The Overall Discussion of the Forum Results.................................................248
Stephan Robinson. Conclusion and Summary of the Session..........................258
S.I. Baranovsky. Closing Remarks...................................................................259
Participants of Forum-Dialogue..................................................................... 263
List of Acronyms..............................................................................................268

Nuclear National Dialogue – 2007
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR NATIONAL DIALOGUE
“Energy, Society, and Security”
Editors: Richard Bell, Alexander Fyodorov, Cristian Ion,
Vladimir Leonov, Paul Walker.
Translation: Elena Ilina, Olga Kovarzina
Photo: I.I. Manilo, M.I. Rigosyk, А.А. Stepashkin
Cover Design: A.E. Burov
Layout: A.E. Shkrebets