Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014
Shale gas drilling rig. Frank Umbach 78 €408 billion on energy imports – six times more than in 1999, and equal to 3.9% of GDP. This “alternative” not only threatens Europe’s energy supply security and economic competitiveness, but also creates a much bigger CO 2 -footprint. If lifecycle analyses are calculated based on emissions not only from the production process, but also from the long distance transport via thousands of kilometres of pipelines from Russia, CO 2 emissions from domestic shale gas resources would be around 30% lower. The alternatives to domestically-produced shale gas would therefore lead to higher gas prices, reduced supply security and higher CO 2 emissions. In other words: the use of domestically-produced unconventional gas serves all three major objectives of the “energy triangle”: supply security, economic competitiveness and environmental/climate protection. With the increasingly wide price gap between the North American and the European oil and gas market (gas: US$4.5 per million British thermal units in the U.S. in comparison with US$9 in Europe and US$18 in Asia), a “re-industrialization” of energy intensive and other industries
is already underway on the U.S. side. The future economic competitiveness of Europe and Asia towards the U.S. faces increasing challenges with much higher gas and other energy prices. Confronted with rising oil and import dependency (in contrast to the U.S.) from politically unstable or other problematic suppliers, EU energy security faces even more severe risks, vulnerabilities, and uncertainties in the future. Increased European efforts to maximise the potential of its own unconventional oil and gas resources could also help the EU to retain or create industrial sector jobs, contributing to its overall future economic competitiveness. 79 CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING 2014
- Page 30 and 31: Matteo Verda 28 Azerbaijani gas wil
- Page 32 and 33: Matteo Verda 30 In the end, the via
- Page 34 and 35: Aura Sabadus 32 Southern Gas Corrid
- Page 36 and 37: Aura Sabadus 34 Russian-backed riva
- Page 38 and 39: Aura Sabadus 36 The criticism has g
- Page 40 and 41: Aura Sabadus 38 other large rival t
- Page 42 and 43: Aura Sabadus 40 player by selling v
- Page 44 and 45: and possibly further to Europe, alt
- Page 46 and 47: Aura Sabadus 44 The Southern Gas Co
- Page 48 and 49: Davide Tabarelli 46 Environmental e
- Page 50 and 51: Davide Tabarelli 48 evaluate potent
- Page 52 and 53: View of the old town Ostuni, Puglia
- Page 54 and 55: Davide Tabarelli 52 of some 200 mil
- Page 56 and 57: Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Turke
- Page 58 and 59: Mehmet AkIf Okur 56 posal stated th
- Page 60 and 61: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani an
- Page 62 and 63: Mehmet AkIf Okur 60 The steps that
- Page 64 and 65: Mehmet AkIf Okur 62 It is possible
- Page 66 and 67: Frank Umbach 64 Strategic Perspecti
- Page 68 and 69: Frank Umbach 66 Many of the shale g
- Page 70 and 71: Frank Umbach 68 are considerably hi
- Page 72 and 73: Frank Umbach 70 The UK government i
- Page 74 and 75: With Russia’s President Vladimir
- Page 76 and 77: Frank Umbach 74 During the last thr
- Page 78 and 79: Frank Umbach 76 approved by the gov
- Page 82 and 83: THE IMPORTANCE OF TAP FOR ITALY SOM
- Page 84 and 85: AntonIo SIleo 82 the end of 2011, g
- Page 86 and 87: AntonIo SIleo 84 Power generation o
- Page 88 and 89: ily limited because of the emergenc
- Page 90 and 91: AntonIo SIleo 88 ductant chemical r
- Page 92 and 93: AntonIo SIleo 90 emerge as a signif
- Page 94 and 95: Radu Dudau 92 Romania’s Energy St
- Page 96 and 97: Radu Dudau 94 countries pay for Rus
- Page 98 and 99: Radu Dudau 96 This industry, howeve
- Page 100 and 101: Radu Dudau 98 de facto monopolies i
- Page 102 and 103: Radu Dudau 100 In October 2013, the
- Page 104 and 105: Radu Dudau 102 In spite of the ling
- Page 106 and 107: caspian
- Page 108 and 109: Why World Oil Prices Should Be High
- Page 110 and 111: Luay Al-Khatteeb 108 for $1 of reve
- Page 112 and 113: emın akhundzada 110 Turkey as an E
- Page 114 and 115: emın akhundzada 112 markets. Given
- Page 116 and 117: emın akhundzada 114 First, it shou
- Page 118 and 119: FatIh Ozbay 116 Discussions about V
- Page 120 and 121: FatIh Ozbay 118 The Black Sea is a
- Page 122 and 123: FatIh Ozbay 120 these two countries
- Page 124 and 125: FatIh Ozbay 122 Montreux is quite s
- Page 126 and 127: MUbarIz Hasanov 124 Some Remarks on
- Page 128 and 129: Turkey will be USD 37 billion highe
Shale gas drilling<br />
rig.<br />
Frank Umbach<br />
78<br />
€408 billion on energy imports – six<br />
times more than in 1999, and equal<br />
to 3.9% of GDP. This “alternative”<br />
not only threatens Europe’s energy<br />
supply security and economic competitiveness,<br />
but also creates a much<br />
bigger CO 2<br />
-footprint. If lifecycle<br />
analyses are calculated based on<br />
emissions not only from the production<br />
process, but also from the long<br />
distance transport via thousands of<br />
kilometres of pipelines from Russia,<br />
CO 2<br />
emissions from domestic shale<br />
gas resources would be around 30%<br />
lower. The alternatives to domestically-produced<br />
shale gas would<br />
therefore lead to higher gas prices,<br />
reduced supply security and higher<br />
CO 2<br />
emissions. In other words: the<br />
use of domestically-produced unconventional<br />
gas serves all three major<br />
objectives of the “energy triangle”:<br />
supply security, economic competitiveness<br />
and environmental/climate<br />
protection.<br />
With the increasingly wide price gap<br />
between the North American and<br />
the European oil and gas market<br />
(gas: US$4.5 per million British thermal<br />
units in the U.S. in comparison<br />
with US$9 in Europe and US$18 in<br />
Asia), a “re-industrialization” of energy<br />
intensive and other industries