Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Mehmet AkIf Okur 62 It is possible to estimate the extent of the current concerns and expectations by looking at the geopolitical shockwaves across the Middle East following the signing of the interim agreement. Some Gulf countries think that the U.S. commitment to their security will soften and there will be more space for Iran. Those countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have already embarked on a quest: the increasing interaction with Russia and China, and the struggle to determine a common position with Israel, demonstrates the complexity of the balances in the Middle East. Of course, Turkey will be among the most affected countries in terms of the consequences of either the U.S.- Iran rapprochement or an escalating conflict environment. The question being asked is: “Which Iran would be better to have as a neighbour” The multiplicity of future routes makes it harder to find simple answers. Nonetheless, setting aside the risk of ignoring the details and minor scenarios, we can talk about three major possibilities. If no agreement is signed after the negotiations, we should consider that the government bloc we face in Syria, Iraq and other areas will likely strengthen its position in Tehran. Ankara found an opportunity to test its strengths and weaknesses against Iran in the context of the Syrian civil war. As a member of the Western alliance, Turkey is a big power with a developed economy and qualified population. The same thing applies to its military capabilities. Turkey has built its security infrastructure on the basis of its alliances, and it has a protective shield as long as it avoids conflict with its current alliance structure. However, being a part of a system also entails some restrictions. We do not have the confidence of Iran, which can conduct proxy wars by organizing armed groups outside its borders. It is extremely difficult for us to carry out such activities without abandoning our pro-global system position. If Ankara cannot build Turkish capacity to catch up with the opponent in their areas of advantage, the best way is to encounter the opponent across platforms that will limit its current capabilities. We can predict that a transformation that pushes Iran toward integration into the international order will bring Ankara’s advantages to the forefront in the Turkey - Iran competition. The second scenario foresees that Iran will conclude the nuclear negotiations with an agreement, and develop pragmatic cooperation with the West while protecting its alliances and extensions in the Middle East. In this case, Iran will continue to utilise the qualifications and capacities that give it asymmetric advantages against Turkey, far from the reach of the West. Above all, if the U.S. and Iran succeed in adopting an approach that sees them fighting against “common enemies”, the balance of power will be disturbed in ways that affect Turkey. In the latter scenario, it is assumed that Iran will begin to resemble Turkey with a transformation both in the domestic and international level through integration into the global system. A scenario whereby Iran relinquishes the interventions and operations that it currently car-
ies out via third parties abroad and which are contrary to international law, and instead starts to extend domestic freedoms will be significantly more advantageous for Turkey. Thus, Ankara should utilise its limited transformative effect on bilateral relations in this regard. However, it must be noted that the actor which commenced the negotiations would not want to get into this way voluntarily. Khamenei wants to reconstruct the regime’s legitimacy by finding pragmatic solutions to cumulative problems, and he will do his best to prevent Iran turning into a country that he cannot control. the expected domestic reform process. Unsecurization of the demands for right in Southern Azerbaijan will lead to more stability in Iran and less hostility in the region. 20 It is possible to evaluate Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan through the same lens. As long as Iran’s concerns (which underpin its hostile policy against Baku since its independence) are eliminated, the opportunities and legitimacy offered by the negotiations will strengthen former positions. 19 In order to draw a new road map, Iran needs to face the demands for freedom, which also cover ethnic/cultural rights. In view of the potential contribution to permanent stability in Iran, the steps taken in this regard will demonstrate the baselessness of Iran’s concerns towards Azerbaijan. If Iran reviews its priorities in relation to Armenia and its Caucasus policy in accordance with the new political realities, it will see the energy which will strengthen 63 CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING <strong>2014</strong> 19. Iran’s concerns about Azerbaijani Turks affect its approach toward the Caucasus, Turkey, and the Turkic world in general. For an assessment about this issue, see Alam Saleh, Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p.77-79. 20. Findings of a field study carried out in Ardabil underline the importance of the issue by indicating that “ethnic feelings are like the fire under the ashes” as stated by the researchers. Mansour Salehi and Mohammad Bagher Sepehri, Ethnic Challenges in Iran: A Case Study of Ardabil, Canadian Social Science, 6/30/2013, Vol. 9, <strong>Issue</strong> 3, p.74-83.
Page 1:
caspian published by caspıan strat
Page 4 and 5:
CASPIAN Report 2 The urgent need to
Page 6 and 7:
caspian CASPIAN Report 4 06 AHMET Y
Page 8 and 9:
AHMET YUKLEYEN 6 Afghanistan’s Un
Page 10 and 11:
AHMET YUKLEYEN 8 In Afghanistan’s
Page 12 and 13:
AHMET YUKLEYEN 10 want to face the
Page 14 and 15: AHMET YUKLEYEN 12 In short, ANF has
Page 16 and 17: US President Barack Obama holds a b
Page 18 and 19: AHMET YUKLEYEN 16 The second big ch
Page 20 and 21: AHMET YUKLEYEN 18 beards and long t
Page 22 and 23: Anti-war demonstrators rally near t
Page 24 and 25: Matteo Verda 22 CONTRIBUTION OF Tra
Page 26 and 27: Matteo Verda 24 TAP will be a 760 k
Page 28 and 29: SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURE OF TAP Matteo
Page 30 and 31: Matteo Verda 28 Azerbaijani gas wil
Page 32 and 33: Matteo Verda 30 In the end, the via
Page 34 and 35: Aura Sabadus 32 Southern Gas Corrid
Page 36 and 37: Aura Sabadus 34 Russian-backed riva
Page 38 and 39: Aura Sabadus 36 The criticism has g
Page 40 and 41: Aura Sabadus 38 other large rival t
Page 42 and 43: Aura Sabadus 40 player by selling v
Page 44 and 45: and possibly further to Europe, alt
Page 46 and 47: Aura Sabadus 44 The Southern Gas Co
Page 48 and 49: Davide Tabarelli 46 Environmental e
Page 50 and 51: Davide Tabarelli 48 evaluate potent
Page 52 and 53: View of the old town Ostuni, Puglia
Page 54 and 55: Davide Tabarelli 52 of some 200 mil
Page 56 and 57: Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Turke
Page 58 and 59: Mehmet AkIf Okur 56 posal stated th
Page 60 and 61: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani an
Page 62 and 63: Mehmet AkIf Okur 60 The steps that
Page 66 and 67: Frank Umbach 64 Strategic Perspecti
Page 68 and 69: Frank Umbach 66 Many of the shale g
Page 70 and 71: Frank Umbach 68 are considerably hi
Page 72 and 73: Frank Umbach 70 The UK government i
Page 74 and 75: With Russia’s President Vladimir
Page 76 and 77: Frank Umbach 74 During the last thr
Page 78 and 79: Frank Umbach 76 approved by the gov
Page 80 and 81: Shale gas drilling rig. Frank Umbac
Page 82 and 83: THE IMPORTANCE OF TAP FOR ITALY SOM
Page 84 and 85: AntonIo SIleo 82 the end of 2011, g
Page 86 and 87: AntonIo SIleo 84 Power generation o
Page 88 and 89: ily limited because of the emergenc
Page 90 and 91: AntonIo SIleo 88 ductant chemical r
Page 92 and 93: AntonIo SIleo 90 emerge as a signif
Page 94 and 95: Radu Dudau 92 Romania’s Energy St
Page 96 and 97: Radu Dudau 94 countries pay for Rus
Page 98 and 99: Radu Dudau 96 This industry, howeve
Page 100 and 101: Radu Dudau 98 de facto monopolies i
Page 102 and 103: Radu Dudau 100 In October 2013, the
Page 104 and 105: Radu Dudau 102 In spite of the ling
Page 106 and 107: caspian
Page 108 and 109: Why World Oil Prices Should Be High
Page 110 and 111: Luay Al-Khatteeb 108 for $1 of reve
Page 112 and 113: emın akhundzada 110 Turkey as an E
Page 114 and 115:
emın akhundzada 112 markets. Given
Page 116 and 117:
emın akhundzada 114 First, it shou
Page 118 and 119:
FatIh Ozbay 116 Discussions about V
Page 120 and 121:
FatIh Ozbay 118 The Black Sea is a
Page 122 and 123:
FatIh Ozbay 120 these two countries
Page 124 and 125:
FatIh Ozbay 122 Montreux is quite s
Page 126 and 127:
MUbarIz Hasanov 124 Some Remarks on
Page 128 and 129:
Turkey will be USD 37 billion highe
show all

Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?