Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

Mehmet AkIf Okur
62
It is possible to estimate the extent
of the current concerns and expectations
by looking at the geopolitical
shockwaves across the Middle East
following the signing of the interim
agreement. Some Gulf countries
think that the U.S. commitment to
their security will soften and there
will be more space for Iran. Those
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia,
have already embarked on a quest:
the increasing interaction with Russia
and China, and the struggle to
determine a common position with
Israel, demonstrates the complexity
of the balances in the Middle East.
Of course, Turkey will be among the
most affected countries in terms of
the consequences of either the U.S.-
Iran rapprochement or an escalating
conflict environment. The question
being asked is: “Which Iran would be
better to have as a neighbour” The
multiplicity of future routes makes
it harder to find simple answers.
Nonetheless, setting aside the risk
of ignoring the details and minor
scenarios, we can talk about three
major possibilities. If no agreement
is signed after the negotiations, we
should consider that the government
bloc we face in Syria, Iraq and
other areas will likely strengthen its
position in Tehran. Ankara found an
opportunity to test its strengths and
weaknesses against Iran in the context
of the Syrian civil war. As a member
of the Western alliance, Turkey
is a big power with a developed
economy and qualified population.
The same thing applies to its military
capabilities. Turkey has built its security
infrastructure on the basis of
its alliances, and it has a protective
shield as long as it avoids conflict
with its current alliance structure.
However, being a part of a system
also entails some restrictions. We
do not have the confidence of Iran,
which can conduct proxy wars by
organizing armed groups outside its
borders. It is extremely difficult for
us to carry out such activities without
abandoning our pro-global system
position. If Ankara cannot build
Turkish capacity to catch up with the
opponent in their areas of advantage,
the best way is to encounter the opponent
across platforms that will
limit its current capabilities. We can
predict that a transformation that
pushes Iran toward integration into
the international order will bring
Ankara’s advantages to the forefront
in the Turkey - Iran competition.
The second scenario foresees that
Iran will conclude the nuclear negotiations
with an agreement, and
develop pragmatic cooperation with
the West while protecting its alliances
and extensions in the Middle
East. In this case, Iran will continue
to utilise the qualifications and capacities
that give it asymmetric advantages
against Turkey, far from
the reach of the West. Above all, if
the U.S. and Iran succeed in adopting
an approach that sees them fighting
against “common enemies”, the balance
of power will be disturbed in
ways that affect Turkey.
In the latter scenario, it is assumed
that Iran will begin to resemble
Turkey with a transformation both
in the domestic and international
level through integration into the
global system. A scenario whereby
Iran relinquishes the interventions
and operations that it currently car-