Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

Mehmet AkIf Okur
60
The steps that Obama tried to take
in this regard during the early years
of his presidency failed due to the
power of the Israel lobby. Netanyahu’s
active dissident behaviour during
his campaign for the second term
was unprecedented in the history of
U.S.-Israel relations. But still, the U.S.
government has not given up. This
process, the end of which remains
difficult to predict, has the potential
to yield crucial results with regard
to U.S.-Iran relations beyond nuclear
negotiations.
The Obama administration’s policy
of forcing Iran to transform through
economic sanctions is based on a
prudent strategy that keeps pragmatic
cooperation opportunities at
hand, using professional and clever
diplomatic language and ‘back doors’
ajar. The architecture of this strategy
not only increases the cost of
The steps that Obama tried to take in
this regard during the early years of his
presidency failed due to the power of the
Israel lobby.
avoiding negotiations, but also rewards
actions taken toward reconciliation.
In particular, the shared
understanding of the opportunities
offered by the Syrian civil war
to Al Qaeda affiliates, the two parties
found a way to build a common
approach toward the region. ISIS’s
activities in Ambar have brought
the U.S., Iraq, and Iran together, and
have given clues about future possibilities
for cooperation.
However, it remains unclear which
of these alternative scenarios will
become real - collaboration or conflict.
Thus, the consequences of both
possibilities for the Iranian system
should be kept in mind. The highest
priority for the dominant factions
in Iran is to ensure the continuity
of the regime to which they are tied,
through ideological but also material
interests. When we examine the possible
scenarios, we can map out the
scenario as follows. Signing an agreement
after the nuclear negotiations
will not only relieve Iran economically
but also enable it to further develop
its relations with the West in
the future. Thanks to foreign investments
and increased production triggered
by technology, the rising level
of national welfare will alleviate the
social and economic problems that
provide political ammunition for the
opposition. However, that interaction
will raise the demand for certain
rights, particularly among minority
groups that regard themselves as outside
the power centre. This climate
will heighten the impact of the West’s
criticisms of Iran’s human rights violations,
and could give rise to a future
where contradictions within the regime
are further questioned.
In this case, while the dynamics
that support the reformist movement
in Iran are increasingly potent,
it is likely that minority rights will
become a flashpoint, with Turks,
Arabs, Kurds and Baluchs expressing
their identity-related demands
more loudly. 17 Among these developments,
the most important one is the
17.
For a study emphasizing the importance of the minority issue for Iran’s future, see Rasmus
Christian Elling, Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini, Palgrave Macmillan,
2013.