Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
cessful are actually pursuing their<br />
desire to gain a greater share in the<br />
economic wealth that will follow.<br />
There are similarities between their<br />
benefits and the international actors<br />
at the table. The other side of this<br />
equation is the interests of the given<br />
system and the expectations in case<br />
the negotiations fail.<br />
Khamenei is the most influential person<br />
in the Iranian power matrix, and<br />
he remains at the centre of all the<br />
power balancing. The reason he supports<br />
nuclear negotiations lies in the<br />
internal and external dynamics he<br />
faces. With the events of 2009, the<br />
opposition acquired political energy<br />
through public support; this entailed<br />
a process of alienation to the regime.<br />
These events should have been managed<br />
before they reached a devastating<br />
point. 14 It was impossible to do<br />
this without shedding the burden of<br />
economic sanctions. The increasing<br />
influence of the groups who mobilised<br />
against Khatami and Ahmadinejad<br />
should have been managed<br />
before they became a threat. 15 Moreover,<br />
the Obama administration’s desire<br />
to reduce U.S. engagement in the<br />
Middle East extended the bargaining<br />
ground. It should be recalled that<br />
there was an expectation that following<br />
its withdrawal from Iraq, the U.S.<br />
would seek to establish pragmatic<br />
collaboration with Iran rather than<br />
chasing a regime change. In this way,<br />
Rouhani - famous for his pragmatism<br />
despite his position at the core of the<br />
regime- has found a way to meet the<br />
needs and expectations in question.<br />
Khamenei is the most influential person<br />
in the Iranian power matrix, and he<br />
remains at the centre of all the power<br />
balancing.<br />
On the U.S. side, the vision and policy<br />
changes that have occurred under<br />
the Obama government play a major<br />
role in today’s structure. Firstly,<br />
the U.S. government tried to develop<br />
a new perspective for the Middle<br />
East while shifting the foreign policy<br />
axis to Asia, and started to implement<br />
projects to end its energy dependence<br />
on the region. 16 Then it<br />
dealt with the Israeli security issue<br />
in a way that the Israeli right wing<br />
did not appreciate. According to<br />
Washington, signing a peace agreement<br />
with Palestine in the evolving<br />
Middle East will not only ensure Israel’s<br />
security, but also pave the way<br />
for its rise in the region. The political<br />
psychology based on the tension<br />
between religious sects - which escalated<br />
with the Syrian civil war - increased<br />
Israel’s room for manoeuvre.<br />
If Israel were to sign a peace agreement,<br />
it would find new allies within<br />
regional balances. Moreover, a possible<br />
agreement would facilitate Iran’s<br />
return to the system.<br />
59<br />
CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING <strong>2014</strong><br />
14.<br />
For the “Green Movement” in Iran and its consequences, see Hamid Dabashi, The Green<br />
Movement in Iran, Transaction Publishers, 2011.<br />
15.<br />
For the thesis claiming that the increasing power of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran can change<br />
the regime in the country, see Ali Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards Is<br />
Transforming Iran from Theocracy into Military Dictatorship, AEI Press, 2013.<br />
16.<br />
Robert D. Blackwill and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the Shale<br />
Revolution”, Foreign Affairs, March/April <strong>2014</strong>.