Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

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Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Mehmet AkIf Okur 58 nian economy via his companies in different countries. 9 The findings of the Parliamentary Commission obtained after scrutinizing the privatizations indicate that there may be even wider-scale proceedings, if balances of power allow. 10 Given the vital role of large foundations in the Iranian economy, 11 it is important to note that there are balances of political economy in the background of the nuclear negotiations. In his first substantial address to the Revolutionary Guards, 12 Rouhani stated that they should no longer be involved in big economic projects. This statement gives us an idea about the pillars of reform programme. The biggest changeover, which supports the extension of the civil sphere in Iran, will be the expansion of the economy over the settled actors within the government pyramid. This transformation is needed in order to attract the foreign capital investments that will connect Iran to the world. 13 Thus, the connection between reshaping the economic sphere and the nuclear negotiations is stronger than it first seems. Those who want the negotiations to be suc- 9. Farangis Najibullah and Arash Hassan Nia, “Babak Zanjani, Iran’s ‘Economic Basij,’ Now In Trouble At Home”, Radio Free Europe, Sunday, March 16, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/iranzanjani-corruption-charges/25217665.html 10. Kourosh Avaei, “Iran still digging out of Ahmadinejad-era corruption”, Al Monitor, December 21, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/iran-ahmadinejad-legacycorruption.html# 11. Evaleila Pesaran, Iran’s Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-Reform in the Post-Revolutionary Era, Taylor & Francis, 2011, p.35. 12. Kourosh Avaei, “Will Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Reduce Economic Role”, Al Monitor, September 19, 2013 13. For an interview indicating the awareness level in Iran about the issue, see Behdad Bordbar, “Iranian economist says foreign competition key to growth”, Al Monitor, March 11, 2014, http:// www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/iran-economy-reformists.html#ixzz2w9yeK3yG

cessful are actually pursuing their desire to gain a greater share in the economic wealth that will follow. There are similarities between their benefits and the international actors at the table. The other side of this equation is the interests of the given system and the expectations in case the negotiations fail. Khamenei is the most influential person in the Iranian power matrix, and he remains at the centre of all the power balancing. The reason he supports nuclear negotiations lies in the internal and external dynamics he faces. With the events of 2009, the opposition acquired political energy through public support; this entailed a process of alienation to the regime. These events should have been managed before they reached a devastating point. 14 It was impossible to do this without shedding the burden of economic sanctions. The increasing influence of the groups who mobilised against Khatami and Ahmadinejad should have been managed before they became a threat. 15 Moreover, the Obama administration’s desire to reduce U.S. engagement in the Middle East extended the bargaining ground. It should be recalled that there was an expectation that following its withdrawal from Iraq, the U.S. would seek to establish pragmatic collaboration with Iran rather than chasing a regime change. In this way, Rouhani - famous for his pragmatism despite his position at the core of the regime- has found a way to meet the needs and expectations in question. Khamenei is the most influential person in the Iranian power matrix, and he remains at the centre of all the power balancing. On the U.S. side, the vision and policy changes that have occurred under the Obama government play a major role in today’s structure. Firstly, the U.S. government tried to develop a new perspective for the Middle East while shifting the foreign policy axis to Asia, and started to implement projects to end its energy dependence on the region. 16 Then it dealt with the Israeli security issue in a way that the Israeli right wing did not appreciate. According to Washington, signing a peace agreement with Palestine in the evolving Middle East will not only ensure Israel’s security, but also pave the way for its rise in the region. The political psychology based on the tension between religious sects - which escalated with the Syrian civil war - increased Israel’s room for manoeuvre. If Israel were to sign a peace agreement, it would find new allies within regional balances. Moreover, a possible agreement would facilitate Iran’s return to the system. 59 CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING 2014 14. For the “Green Movement” in Iran and its consequences, see Hamid Dabashi, The Green Movement in Iran, Transaction Publishers, 2011. 15. For the thesis claiming that the increasing power of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran can change the regime in the country, see Ali Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards Is Transforming Iran from Theocracy into Military Dictatorship, AEI Press, 2013. 16. Robert D. Blackwill and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the Shale Revolution”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2014.

Iranian President<br />

Hassan Rouhani<br />

and Iranian<br />

Foreign Minister<br />

Mohammad Javad<br />

Zarif.<br />

Mehmet AkIf Okur<br />

58<br />

nian economy via his companies in<br />

different countries. 9 The findings of<br />

the Parliamentary Commission obtained<br />

after scrutinizing the privatizations<br />

indicate that there may be<br />

even wider-scale proceedings, if balances<br />

of power allow. 10<br />

Given the vital role of large foundations<br />

in the Iranian economy, 11 it<br />

is important to note that there are<br />

balances of political economy in the<br />

background of the nuclear negotiations.<br />

In his first substantial address<br />

to the Revolutionary Guards, 12<br />

Rouhani stated that they should no<br />

longer be involved in big economic<br />

projects. This statement gives us an<br />

idea about the pillars of reform programme.<br />

The biggest changeover,<br />

which supports the extension of the<br />

civil sphere in Iran, will be the expansion<br />

of the economy over the settled<br />

actors within the government pyramid.<br />

This transformation is needed<br />

in order to attract the foreign capital<br />

investments that will connect Iran<br />

to the world. 13 Thus, the connection<br />

between reshaping the economic<br />

sphere and the nuclear negotiations<br />

is stronger than it first seems. Those<br />

who want the negotiations to be suc-<br />

9.<br />

Farangis Najibullah and Arash Hassan Nia, “Babak Zanjani, Iran’s ‘Economic Basij,’ Now In Trouble<br />

At Home”, Radio Free Europe, Sunday, March 16, <strong>2014</strong>, http://www.rferl.org/content/iranzanjani-corruption-charges/25217665.html<br />

10.<br />

Kourosh Avaei, “Iran still digging out of Ahmadinejad-era corruption”, Al Monitor, December<br />

21, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/iran-ahmadinejad-legacycorruption.html#<br />

11.<br />

Evaleila Pesaran, Iran’s Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-Reform in<br />

the Post-Revolutionary Era, Taylor & Francis, 2011, p.35.<br />

12.<br />

Kourosh Avaei, “Will Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Reduce Economic Role”, Al Monitor, September<br />

19, 2013<br />

13.<br />

For an interview indicating the awareness level in Iran about the issue, see Behdad Bordbar,<br />

“Iranian economist says foreign competition key to growth”, Al Monitor, March 11, <strong>2014</strong>, http://<br />

www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/<strong>2014</strong>/03/iran-economy-reformists.html#ixzz2w9yeK3yG

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