Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

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Mehmet AkIf Okur 56 posal stated that Iran would recognise a two-state solution in relation to the Israel- Palestine issue, support to Palestinian groups would be cut off within certain parameters, and Hezbollah would be transformed a political group whose activity was limited to Lebanon. It is believed that subsequent to rejecting this suggestion, the Bush administration decided to avoid dialogue with Iran, which it regards as a part of the “axis of evil”. 2 Thus, the proposals presented by President Rouhani’s delegation during the current nuclear negotiations between Iran and the European trio were not accepted by the U.S. Although Iran suspended its programme during the negotiations, it found the economic facilities offered by the European contingent for the final agreement to be inadequate. 3 The actual objective was to reach an agreement with the U.S. uranium enrichment activities were resumed in 2006 when Iran was feeling much stronger in relation to the U.S., which was under pressure due to the escalating political unrest in Iraq. Would it open a “huge bargaining” window that is suitable for new balances in the future The similarity between the proposal rejected by the diplomatic mission under the leadership of Rouhani and Zarif, and the current status of Iran strengthens the belief that this was a key question during that stage. In examining the relationship between the fluctuation in nuclear negotiations and the changes in Iran’s domestic policy, the critical turning points are: overthrowing the reformist wing, the transition to the Ahmadinejad era, and Rouhani’s accession to power. 4 It is certainly true that Khamenei remains the ultimate decision maker on foreign policy issues such as nuclear negotiations within In examining the relationship between the fluctuation in nuclear negotiations and the changes in Iran’s domestic policy, the critical turning points are: overthrowing the reformist wing, the transition to the Ahmadinejad era, and Rouhani’s accession to power. the Iranian state system. The nuclear programme has gradually become a national issue that is supported by a large part of Iranian society. 5 However, these views do not assert that Iran lacks a political sphere that also incorporates nuclear negotiations. Regarding the negotiations, there are differences between the approach of the Revolutionary Guards 6 (who gained more power as Ahmadinejad’s 2. Trita Parsi, “The Price of Not Talking to Iran”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter, 2006/2007), pp. 11-17. 3. For documents about the negotiations between the European Trio and Iran, see Great Britain/Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Collection of Documents, The Stationery Office, 2008 4. For an example about transition discussions, see Yonah Alexander, Milton M. Hoenig, The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East, Praeger, 2008. 5. For the relation between nuclear program and state identity at the discourse level and its transformation, see Homeira Moshirzadeh, “Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy”, Security Dialogue, December 2007 Vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 521-543. 6. Ali Alfoneh, “The Revolutionary Guards’ Role in Iranian Politics”, Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2008, Vol. 15 Issue 4, pp.3-14.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei while visiting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force exhibition in Tehran. support increased), and the approach of Reformists/Pragmatists 7 (who play a significant role in the domestic politics of Iran). The Reformists understand the importance of developing Iran’s relations with the West in order to realise their visions at the domestic level. The military, political and economic elites at the conservative core of the regime, including the Revolutionary Guards, have a different conception of the current situation. They are aware of the benefits of pragmatic relations. Besides, they are not sure whether they can preserve their privileged position in the new equation, the dynamics of which will emerge as the dialogue continues. For example, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, an essential part of national economic life since the Rafsanjani era, enjoy privileged political positions whereby they carry out high-budget construction and energy projects as well as overseeing high-income businesses. The income generated by some businesses operating under extraordinary conditions due to economic sanctions should also be included in this table. 8 Investigations launched after Rouhani’s victory in elections reinforced international opinion about the dimensions of those relations. The businessmen close to former President Ahmadinejad have been accused of embezzling more than two billion dollars. Zanjani, notably, was assigned to market Iranian petrol as a foreign import, and then to bring the money back into the Ira- 57 CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING 2014 7. For ideology/pragmatism aspects in Iranian foreign policy, see R.K. Ramazani, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy”, The Middle East Journal, Volume 58, Number 4, October 2004, pp. 1-11(11). 8. Nader Habibi, “The Iranian Economy in the Shadow of the Sanctions”, in: Iran and the Global Economy: Petro Populism, Islam and Economic Sanctions, (ed.) Parvin Alizadeh, Hassan Hakimian, Routledge, 2013, s.187-190
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Luay Al-Khatteeb 108 for $1 of reve
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FatIh Ozbay 116 Discussions about V
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FatIh Ozbay 120 these two countries
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FatIh Ozbay 122 Montreux is quite s
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MUbarIz Hasanov 124 Some Remarks on
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Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

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