Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

Mehmet AkIf Okur
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posal stated that Iran would recognise
a two-state solution in relation
to the Israel- Palestine issue, support
to Palestinian groups would be cut
off within certain parameters, and
Hezbollah would be transformed a
political group whose activity was
limited to Lebanon. It is believed
that subsequent to rejecting this
suggestion, the Bush administration
decided to avoid dialogue with Iran,
which it regards as a part of the “axis
of evil”. 2 Thus, the proposals presented
by President Rouhani’s delegation
during the current nuclear
negotiations between Iran and the
European trio were not accepted by
the U.S. Although Iran suspended
its programme during the negotiations,
it found the economic facilities
offered by the European contingent
for the final agreement to be inadequate.
3 The actual objective was
to reach an agreement with the U.S.
uranium enrichment activities were
resumed in 2006 when Iran was feeling
much stronger in relation to the
U.S., which was under pressure due
to the escalating political unrest in
Iraq. Would it open a “huge bargaining”
window that is suitable for new
balances in the future The similarity
between the proposal rejected
by the diplomatic mission under the
leadership of Rouhani and Zarif, and
the current status of Iran strengthens
the belief that this was a key question
during that stage.
In examining the relationship between
the fluctuation in nuclear negotiations
and the changes in Iran’s
domestic policy, the critical turning
points are: overthrowing the reformist
wing, the transition to the Ahmadinejad
era, and Rouhani’s accession
to power. 4 It is certainly true that
Khamenei remains the ultimate decision
maker on foreign policy issues
such as nuclear negotiations within
In examining the relationship between the
fluctuation in nuclear negotiations and the
changes in Iran’s domestic policy, the critical
turning points are: overthrowing the reformist
wing, the transition to the Ahmadinejad era,
and Rouhani’s accession to power.
the Iranian state system. The nuclear
programme has gradually become a
national issue that is supported by a
large part of Iranian society. 5 However,
these views do not assert that
Iran lacks a political sphere that also
incorporates nuclear negotiations.
Regarding the negotiations, there are
differences between the approach
of the Revolutionary Guards 6 (who
gained more power as Ahmadinejad’s
2.
Trita Parsi, “The Price of Not Talking to Iran”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter, 2006/2007), pp. 11-17.
3.
For documents about the negotiations between the European Trio and Iran, see Great Britain/Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Collection of Documents, The Stationery Office, 2008
4.
For an example about transition discussions, see Yonah Alexander, Milton M. Hoenig, The New Iranian Leadership:
Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East, Praeger, 2008.
5.
For the relation between nuclear program and state identity at the discourse level and its transformation, see Homeira
Moshirzadeh, “Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy”, Security Dialogue, December 2007 Vol. 38, no. 4, pp.
521-543.
6.
Ali Alfoneh, “The Revolutionary Guards’ Role in Iranian Politics”, Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2008, Vol. 15 Issue 4, pp.3-14.