Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014
Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Turkey Mehmet AkIf Okur Mehmet Akif Okur DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GAZI UNIVERSITY 54
The internal dynamics of the U.S. and Iran, along with their interpretation of regional and global balances, have contributed significantly to the provisional agreement. The fate of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and P5+1 and the future of the Iranian-Western relations are hot topics for academics and researchers working on the Middle East. If the ongoing negotiations give rise to an agreement, significant developments may occur both at the regional and global level. In order to fully understand this critical process and its possible consequences, the motivations and objectives of the parties involved should be carefully analysed. The internal dynamics of the U.S. and Iran, along with their interpretation of regional and global balances, have contributed significantly to the provisional agreement. Both parties have chosen to re-evaluate their worries, aims and expectations on different issues and establish a dialogue. Any achievements or problems encountered on the way from dialogue to agreement would either strengthen or destabilise each party’s initial motivations. However, in order to answer our questions, we must analyse the original and current motivations of the parties involved. We should go back to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The pillars of the proposal for a direct meeting, reportedly presented to the U.S. in April 2003 with Khamenei’s approval, provide significant clues about Iran’s expectations and objectives. 1 Essentially, Iran was suggesting full-scale cooperation with the U.S. in return for acknowledgement of its demands in relation to the new order to be established in Iraq. These included recognizing Iranian defence needs and “legitimate” interests in the Middle East, ending economic sanctions, maintaining its “peaceful” nuclear, biological, and chemical programs, and protecting the regime. The pro- 55 CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING 2014 1. Discussions about the details of Iran’s proposal for a “Grand Bargain” to the USA in May 2003 still continue. Some documents about the issue were published in New York Times in 2007 by Nicholas D. Kristof. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Iran’s Proposal for a ‘Grand Bargain’”, The New York Times, April 28, 2007, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/28/ irans-proposal-for-a-grand-bargain/
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- Page 8 and 9: AHMET YUKLEYEN 6 Afghanistan’s Un
- Page 10 and 11: AHMET YUKLEYEN 8 In Afghanistan’s
- Page 12 and 13: AHMET YUKLEYEN 10 want to face the
- Page 14 and 15: AHMET YUKLEYEN 12 In short, ANF has
- Page 16 and 17: US President Barack Obama holds a b
- Page 18 and 19: AHMET YUKLEYEN 16 The second big ch
- Page 20 and 21: AHMET YUKLEYEN 18 beards and long t
- Page 22 and 23: Anti-war demonstrators rally near t
- Page 24 and 25: Matteo Verda 22 CONTRIBUTION OF Tra
- Page 26 and 27: Matteo Verda 24 TAP will be a 760 k
- Page 28 and 29: SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURE OF TAP Matteo
- Page 30 and 31: Matteo Verda 28 Azerbaijani gas wil
- Page 32 and 33: Matteo Verda 30 In the end, the via
- Page 34 and 35: Aura Sabadus 32 Southern Gas Corrid
- Page 36 and 37: Aura Sabadus 34 Russian-backed riva
- Page 38 and 39: Aura Sabadus 36 The criticism has g
- Page 40 and 41: Aura Sabadus 38 other large rival t
- Page 42 and 43: Aura Sabadus 40 player by selling v
- Page 44 and 45: and possibly further to Europe, alt
- Page 46 and 47: Aura Sabadus 44 The Southern Gas Co
- Page 48 and 49: Davide Tabarelli 46 Environmental e
- Page 50 and 51: Davide Tabarelli 48 evaluate potent
- Page 52 and 53: View of the old town Ostuni, Puglia
- Page 54 and 55: Davide Tabarelli 52 of some 200 mil
- Page 58 and 59: Mehmet AkIf Okur 56 posal stated th
- Page 60 and 61: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani an
- Page 62 and 63: Mehmet AkIf Okur 60 The steps that
- Page 64 and 65: Mehmet AkIf Okur 62 It is possible
- Page 66 and 67: Frank Umbach 64 Strategic Perspecti
- Page 68 and 69: Frank Umbach 66 Many of the shale g
- Page 70 and 71: Frank Umbach 68 are considerably hi
- Page 72 and 73: Frank Umbach 70 The UK government i
- Page 74 and 75: With Russia’s President Vladimir
- Page 76 and 77: Frank Umbach 74 During the last thr
- Page 78 and 79: Frank Umbach 76 approved by the gov
- Page 80 and 81: Shale gas drilling rig. Frank Umbac
- Page 82 and 83: THE IMPORTANCE OF TAP FOR ITALY SOM
- Page 84 and 85: AntonIo SIleo 82 the end of 2011, g
- Page 86 and 87: AntonIo SIleo 84 Power generation o
- Page 88 and 89: ily limited because of the emergenc
- Page 90 and 91: AntonIo SIleo 88 ductant chemical r
- Page 92 and 93: AntonIo SIleo 90 emerge as a signif
- Page 94 and 95: Radu Dudau 92 Romania’s Energy St
- Page 96 and 97: Radu Dudau 94 countries pay for Rus
- Page 98 and 99: Radu Dudau 96 This industry, howeve
- Page 100 and 101: Radu Dudau 98 de facto monopolies i
- Page 102 and 103: Radu Dudau 100 In October 2013, the
- Page 104 and 105: Radu Dudau 102 In spite of the ling
The internal dynamics of the U.S. and Iran,<br />
along with their interpretation of regional<br />
and global balances, have contributed<br />
significantly to the provisional agreement.<br />
The fate of the nuclear negotiations<br />
between Iran and P5+1 and the future<br />
of the Iranian-Western relations<br />
are hot topics for academics and<br />
researchers working on the Middle<br />
East. If the ongoing negotiations give<br />
rise to an agreement, significant developments<br />
may occur both at the<br />
regional and global level. In order to<br />
fully understand this critical process<br />
and its possible consequences, the<br />
motivations and objectives of the<br />
parties involved should be carefully<br />
analysed.<br />
The internal dynamics of the U.S. and<br />
Iran, along with their interpretation<br />
of regional and global balances,<br />
have contributed significantly to<br />
the provisional agreement. Both<br />
parties have chosen to re-evaluate<br />
their worries, aims and expectations<br />
on different issues and establish<br />
a dialogue. Any achievements or<br />
problems encountered on the way<br />
from dialogue to agreement would<br />
either strengthen or destabilise each<br />
party’s initial motivations. However,<br />
in order to answer our questions,<br />
we must analyse the original and<br />
current motivations of the parties<br />
involved.<br />
We should go back to the U.S. invasion<br />
of Iraq. The pillars of the proposal<br />
for a direct meeting, reportedly<br />
presented to the U.S. in April 2003<br />
with Khamenei’s approval, provide<br />
significant clues about Iran’s expectations<br />
and objectives. 1 Essentially,<br />
Iran was suggesting full-scale cooperation<br />
with the U.S. in return for<br />
acknowledgement of its demands<br />
in relation to the new order to be<br />
established in Iraq. These included<br />
recognizing Iranian defence needs<br />
and “legitimate” interests in the Middle<br />
East, ending economic sanctions,<br />
maintaining its “peaceful” nuclear,<br />
biological, and chemical programs,<br />
and protecting the regime. The pro-<br />
55<br />
CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING <strong>2014</strong><br />
1.<br />
Discussions about the details of Iran’s proposal for a “Grand Bargain” to the USA in May 2003 still continue. Some<br />
documents about the issue were published in New York Times in 20<strong>07</strong> by Nicholas D. Kristof. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Iran’s<br />
Proposal for a ‘Grand Bargain’”, The New York Times, April 28, 20<strong>07</strong>, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/20<strong>07</strong>/04/28/<br />
irans-proposal-for-a-grand-bargain/