Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014
Aura Sabadus 38 other large rival that may enter the scene, is to offer flexibility and promote greater integration through appropriate infrastructure. It is expected that the price for Caspian gas paid by Turkish and European customers should be between 10 to 12% cheaper than that paid for Russian gas. Upholding the status quo by insisting on TPA exemption and failing to develop interconnectors with reverse flows connecting regional countries would not only fall short of Europe’s diversification goals, but also place the SGC at a severe disadvantage to South Stream. Furthermore, in their drive to secure further growth and lock in new markets, the Shah Deniz consortium should reconsider their ambitions to expand into Western Europe, which already benefits from multiple sources of supply and opt instead to compete directly with Russia in central and Eastern Europe, where there is a greater need for diversification. Caspian gas can beat off competition from South Stream, providing it is supported by flexible transport option and commercially viable terms. Commercially attractive A product is commercially viable if it brings financial benefits to both buyers and sellers. From a seller’s perspective it has been argued 12 that the choice of TAP was decidedly more attractive than its rival Nabucco West. TAP offered the Shah Deniz consortium a transit tariff of €3 ($4.11 at April 2014 exchange rate) per 100 km of pipeline, fractionally cheaper than that advanced by Nabucco West over the same distance. TAP was also 459 km shorter than its competitor, making for even cheaper tariffs; the investment needed to build TAP was €4.4 billion ($6 billion) compared to €6.6 billion ($9 billion) for Nabucco West. 13 It is expected that the price for Caspian gas paid by Turkish and European customers should be between 10 to 12% cheaper than that paid for Russian gas. The exact values are not known, nor are the formulae by which they are determined. However, it may be assumed that they are largely linked to the price of oil and, from a buyer’s point of view, should be more competitive than those charged by Russia in the region. Nonetheless, the commercial viability of the Southern Gas Corridor should be seen not only against present conditions, but also in the long-term against the impact of two potential developments: competition from existing and emerging regional producers as well as US LNG and the future of oil indexation. This subchapter will discuss the viability of the SGC against these two developments and reflect on its potential to bring greater economic efficiency, its impact on the liber- 12. Abbasov, S., Ibid. 13. Ibid.
European natural gas network. alisation process in target countries and further afield and its ability to remain competitive in the long run. The regional and global energy scene is in flux. New gas producers such as Cyprus, (northern) Iraq and Israel are expecting to establish themselves as firm suppliers by the end of the decade, bringing into the equation more choice for Turkish and European markets. In that sense, they will be fulfilling the role that Azerbaijan expects to undertake within the Southern Gas Corridor. These projects are still in their early stages and have the added inconvenience of being fraught with political problems that will first have to be resolved. Nevertheless, it is widely discussed that up to 10 bcm/year and another 7 to 8 bcm/year could reach Turkey and possibly Europe from northern Iraq and Israel, respectively, by the end of the decade. Analysts have told this author that the price of northern Iraqi gas could be one of the cheapest in Turkey and Europe, while Israel’s may be close to that charged by Azerbaijan. Prospective buyers suggested in an interview with the author that if Israel opts to sell gas via pipeline to Turkey, rather than as LNG, the price for the volumes may contain an element of hub indexation, possibly one linked to the British NBP, bringing much greater flexibility than a purely oil-indexed value. Another regional competitor could be Iran if sanctions introduced in response to its alleged nuclear programme are lifted. Sitting on over 33 trillion cubic metres of gas, the country has the potential to become an energy superpower. However, its infrastructure remains poor and would require multi-billion dollars’ worth of investment to ramp up production for internal and regional needs. As an emerging supplier in great need of finance, Iran could consider establishing itself as a competitive 39 CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING 2014
- Page 1: caspian published by caspıan strat
- Page 4 and 5: CASPIAN Report 2 The urgent need to
- Page 6 and 7: caspian CASPIAN Report 4 06 AHMET Y
- Page 8 and 9: AHMET YUKLEYEN 6 Afghanistan’s Un
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- Page 20 and 21: AHMET YUKLEYEN 18 beards and long t
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- Page 24 and 25: Matteo Verda 22 CONTRIBUTION OF Tra
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- Page 28 and 29: SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURE OF TAP Matteo
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- Page 46 and 47: Aura Sabadus 44 The Southern Gas Co
- Page 48 and 49: Davide Tabarelli 46 Environmental e
- Page 50 and 51: Davide Tabarelli 48 evaluate potent
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- Page 54 and 55: Davide Tabarelli 52 of some 200 mil
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- Page 58 and 59: Mehmet AkIf Okur 56 posal stated th
- Page 60 and 61: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani an
- Page 62 and 63: Mehmet AkIf Okur 60 The steps that
- Page 64 and 65: Mehmet AkIf Okur 62 It is possible
- Page 66 and 67: Frank Umbach 64 Strategic Perspecti
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- Page 84 and 85: AntonIo SIleo 82 the end of 2011, g
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European natural<br />
gas network.<br />
alisation process in target countries<br />
and further afield and its ability to<br />
remain competitive in the long run.<br />
The regional and global energy scene<br />
is in flux. New gas producers such as<br />
Cyprus, (northern) Iraq and Israel<br />
are expecting to establish themselves<br />
as firm suppliers by the end of<br />
the decade, bringing into the equation<br />
more choice for Turkish and European<br />
markets. In that sense, they<br />
will be fulfilling the role that Azerbaijan<br />
expects to undertake within<br />
the Southern Gas Corridor.<br />
These projects are still in their early<br />
stages and have the added inconvenience<br />
of being fraught with political<br />
problems that will first have to be<br />
resolved. Nevertheless, it is widely<br />
discussed that up to 10 bcm/year<br />
and another 7 to 8 bcm/year could<br />
reach Turkey and possibly Europe<br />
from northern Iraq and Israel, respectively,<br />
by the end of the decade.<br />
Analysts have told this author that<br />
the price of northern Iraqi gas could<br />
be one of the cheapest in Turkey and<br />
Europe, while Israel’s may be close<br />
to that charged by Azerbaijan.<br />
Prospective buyers suggested in an<br />
interview with the author that if Israel<br />
opts to sell gas via pipeline to<br />
Turkey, rather than as LNG, the price<br />
for the volumes may contain an element<br />
of hub indexation, possibly one<br />
linked to the British NBP, bringing<br />
much greater flexibility than a purely<br />
oil-indexed value.<br />
Another regional competitor could<br />
be Iran if sanctions introduced in<br />
response to its alleged nuclear programme<br />
are lifted. Sitting on over<br />
33 trillion cubic metres of gas, the<br />
country has the potential to become<br />
an energy superpower. However, its<br />
infrastructure remains poor and<br />
would require multi-billion dollars’<br />
worth of investment to ramp up<br />
production for internal and regional<br />
needs.<br />
As an emerging supplier in great<br />
need of finance, Iran could consider<br />
establishing itself as a competitive<br />
39<br />
CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING <strong>2014</strong>