Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014
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AHMET YUKLEYEN<br />
18<br />
beards and long tunics for men and<br />
the niqab, or face veil, for women.<br />
Three sub-trends within Salafism—<br />
apolitical, political, and Jihadi—have<br />
emerged. 33 This division occurred in<br />
response to the arrival of US troops in<br />
Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War<br />
in 1992. Apolitical Salafists believe<br />
that they should obey the Saudi King<br />
even though his decision to invite the<br />
“infidel” to sacred grounds was wrong.<br />
They preach that only God can make<br />
laws and that Muslims must refrain<br />
from being involved in politics because<br />
it leads to compromise and corruption<br />
of faith. They are interested<br />
in fulfilling rituals, as well as learning<br />
and spreading “true” Salafism. Political<br />
salafists have criticized the Saudi<br />
King and became independent and<br />
got involved in politics. They also perform<br />
selective readings of Sayid Qutb,<br />
which justifies violence under some<br />
circumstances. Jihadi Salafists believe<br />
that Islam is under global attack, especially<br />
by the United States, and that<br />
nobody is defending it. To them, this<br />
means that all Muslims are responsible<br />
for taking up arms and fighting. Indeed,<br />
Bin Laden issued a fatwā against<br />
the United States, which was first published<br />
in Al Quds Al Arabi, a Londonbased<br />
newspaper. 34 It was entitled<br />
“Declaration of War against the Americans<br />
Occupying the Land of the Two<br />
Holy Places” referring to Mecca and<br />
Medina in Saudi Arabia. The reference<br />
to ‘occupation’ in the fatwā referred<br />
to US forces based in Saudi Arabia for<br />
the purpose of controlling air space<br />
in Iraq, known as Operation Southern<br />
Watch.<br />
The Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and<br />
Jihadi Salafism in the Middle<br />
East<br />
The Taliban’s extremely strict and<br />
anti-modern ideology combines Pashtun<br />
tribal codes, or Pashtunwali, with<br />
jihadism of Osama bin Laden. 35 Their<br />
ideology marked a departure from the<br />
Islamism of the anti-Soviet mujahideen<br />
rulers they replaced, who tended<br />
to be mystical Sufis, traditionalists, or<br />
radical Islamists inspired by Sayyid<br />
Qutb. 36 Both Osama Bin Laden’s Jihadism<br />
and Taliban’s ideology were pragmatic.<br />
They have found ways to justify<br />
their actions based on religious ideals.<br />
For instance, between 1996 and 1999,<br />
Mullah Omar reversed his opinions<br />
on the drug trade, apparently as it<br />
only harmed the infidels or kafirs. The<br />
Taliban controlled 96% of Afghanistan’s<br />
poppy fields and made opium<br />
its largest source of taxation. 37 Taxes<br />
on opium exports became one of the<br />
mainstays of Taliban income and<br />
their war economy. 38 According to<br />
33.<br />
Quintan Wiktorowitz “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 no.<br />
3, (2006): 2<strong>07</strong>-239.<br />
34.<br />
Peter L. Bergen (2002) Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York:<br />
Free Press).<br />
35.<br />
Rashid, Ahmed (2000) Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New<br />
Haven: Yale University Press) p. 132, 139.<br />
36.<br />
Rashid, Ahmed (2000) Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New<br />
Haven: Yale University Press) p. 87.<br />
37.<br />
Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud (2010) Opium: uncovering the politics of the poppy (Boston: Harvard<br />
University Press). p. 52.<br />
38.<br />
Dexter Filkins (2001) “A Nation Challenged: Rise and Fall; The Legacy of the Taliban Is a Sad and<br />
Broken Land” Dec. 31, 2001. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/31/world/nation-challengedrise-fall-legacy-taliban-sad-broken-land.htmlpagewanted=3.<br />
Retrieved on Feb. 10, <strong>2014</strong>.