Caspian Report - Issue: 07 - Spring 2014

Georgians
protesting a
Russian army
encampment in
western Georgia.
of influence and ‘backyard’, deployment
of the US military at the heart
of the region where energy and
transportation lines pass through
and new lines are being planned,
and the presence of NATO warships
in the Black Sea are among the greatest
concerns for Moscow.
Russia which regards these developments
as a threat against its interests,
have preferred to use the Black Sea
and Montreux factors as important
components in its relations with Turkey
after the end of the Cold War due
to some objective reasons. Following
the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s military
power decreased in the Black
Sea because of financial difficulties,
sharing of the Russian fleet, and
disabling a great amount of Russian
ships in the Black Sea fleet. However,
Turkey became the most powerful
naval force in the Black Sea region.
As a result, Turkish fleet became
the most powerful fleet in the Black
Sea region. In a sense, Turkey filled
the naval power gap emerged in the
Black Sea after these developments.
Russia, unavoidably, had to admit
this in the first years. On the other
hand, it was a wise choice for Russia
to cooperate with Turkey because
it was not sure what would happen
if the Montreux Convention is abolished
or amended and which new
conditions would it bring. Turkey’s
firm attitude during the Russian-
Georgian War in August 2008 about
the US warships’ strict compliance to
the Montreux Convention prevented
any change in the balances related to
the Black Sea and the Straits which
Russia was highly sensitive about.
Turkey’s policies and attentiveness
about the Montreux Convention in
the 2008 War considerably pleased
Moscow.
Russia has been frequently making
official declarations that Montreux
Convention is being violated. In the
declarations, Turkey was accused
of not implementing the Montreux
Convention properly. At this point,
some questions emerge: How did
119
CASPIAN REPORT, SPRING 2014