Caspian Report - Issue 05 - Fall 2013

CASPIAN
PUBLISHED BY CASPIAN STRATEGY INSTITUTE | FALL 2013 ISSUE: 05
Energy Future of Europe
and the Role of the
Southern Corridor
Efgan Nifti, Assoc. Prof. Fatih Macit
Caspian Region
A View from Georgia
Amb. Giorgi Badridze
The Southern Gas
Corridor Finally Becomes
Reality
Prof. Dr. Friedbert Pfluger
Azerbaijan
Presidential
Elections 2013
Prof. Dr. Bulent Aras
SPECIAL EDITION

CHOICE FOR
ENERGY OF
TURKEY’S
TOMORROW
Turkey’s largest private natural gas importer.
With its PNG and LNG portfolio, supplies major
industrial customers and cities throughout the country.
www.enercoenerji.com

CASPIAN
Publisher
Caspian Strategy Institute
Owner on Behalf of Publisher
Haldun Yava
Editor-in-Chief
Efgan Nifti
Managing Editor
Hande Yaar Ünsal
Editorial Board
Siddharth Saxena, Gönül Tol, Bekir Günay, Efgan Niftiyev, aban Karda, Svante E. Cornell, Taleh Ziyadov,
Amanda Paul, Mitat Çelikpala, Ayça Ergun, John Roberts, Fatih Macit, ener Aktürk, Cemil Ertem,
Kornely Kakachia, Ercüment Tezcan, Vladimir Kvint, Joshua Walker, Sham L. Bathija, Emin Akhundzada
Translator
Cansu Ertosun
Researcher
Seda Birol
Research Assistants
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Editor-in-Chief
Twitter: @enifti
efgan.niftiyev@hasen.org.tr

EDITORIAL...
ALIYEV’S TRACK
RECORD IN LAST
TEN YEARS OF
LEADERSHIP RECEIVED
FULL SUPPORT OF
AZERBAIJANI PEOPLE
TO LEAD THE NATION
FOR ANOTHER 5-YEAR
PRESIDENTIAL TERM.

CASPIAN
06
EFGAN NIFTI,
ASSOC. PROF.
FATIH MACIT
Energy Future of Europe
and the Role of the
Southern Corridor
16
PROF. DR. FRIEDBERT
PFLUGER
The Southern Gas
Corridor Finally Becomes
Reality
30
PROF. DR. BULENT ARAS
Azerbaijan Presidential
Elections 2013
50
ASSOC. PROF.
RADU DUDU
The Southern Corridor and
the EU Energy Security
70
DR. ROMAN RUKOMEDA
Importance of the
Southern Gas Corridor in
the Context of European
Energy Security
84
ASST. PROF. EMRE ISERI,
ALPER ALMAZ
Turkey’s Energy
Strategy and the Southern
Gas Corridor

TABLE OF CONTENS
96
AMB. GIORGI BADRIDZE
Caspian Region
A View from Georgia
104 130
SHAMKHAL ABILOV
The Caspian Region:
History, Theory, and
Practice
ASSOC. PROF.
AYHAN ERDEM
Importance of Energy
Transportation to Europe

ENERGY FUTURE OF
EUROPE AND THE ROLE
OF THE SOUTHERN
CORRIDOR
EFGAN NIFTI,
ASSOC. PROF. FATIH MACIT

The development of the Southern
Corridor has been envisioned to
contribute to the diversity of supply
sources of natural gas bringing energy
from the Caspian Region to Europe.
INTRODUCTION
THE REALIZATION
OF THE
SOUTHERN
CORRIDOR HAS
BEEN REGARDED
AS A STRATEGIC
UNDERTAKING
FOR ADDRESSING
GROWING
CONCERNS
OVER POTENTIAL
NATURAL GAS
SUPPLY TO
EUROPE.
EUROPEAN GAS MARKET

The development of the Southern
Corridor has been envisioned to
contribute to the diversity of supply
sources of natural gas bringing energy
from the Caspian Region to Europe.
INTRODUCTION
THE REALIZATION
OF THE
SOUTHERN
CORRIDOR HAS
BEEN REGARDED
AS A STRATEGIC
UNDERTAKING
FOR ADDRESSING
GROWING
CONCERNS
OVER POTENTIAL
NATURAL GAS
SUPPLY TO
EUROPE.
EUROPEAN GAS MARKET

140,0
120,0
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION (BCM)
2001 2002 20032 004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
NORWAY
UK
NETHERLANDS
GAS IMPORT PROFILE OF EUROPE

BCM/YEAR
CURRENT STATE
2012
FUTURE STATE
2030
DOMESTIC
PRODUCTION
202 155
CONSUMPTION 562 775
IMPORTS 360 625
% IMPORT
DEPENDENCE
64% 80%
% IN ENERGY MIX 24% 30%

FUTURE GAS SUPPLY SOURCES
Amsterdam
elles
GERMANY
Berlin
POLAND
Warsaw
Vilnius
Minsk
BELARUS
Kiev
Shah Deniz and the Southern Corridor
RUSSIA
Volgograd
Luxembourg
Zürich
Liechtenstein
SWITZERLAND
Prague
CZECH REPUBLIC
SLOVAKIA
Vienna
Bratislava
Budapest
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
MOLDOVA
UKRAINE
Chisinau
Monte Carlo
ITALY
Rome
Ljubljana
SLOVENIA Zagreb
CROATIA
BOSNIA
HERZEGOVINA
Sarajevo
Belgrade
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
Skopje
F.Y.R.O.M.
Tiranë
Sofia
BULGARIA
Bucharest
Black Sea
Ankara
TURKEY
GEORGIA Tbilisi
ARMENIA
Yerevan
Caspian
Sea
AZERBAIJAN
Baku
ALBANIA
GREECE
Athens
SYRIA
Tehran
Tunis
IRAN
TUNISIA
LIBYA
MALTA
Mediterranean
Sea
EGYPT
CYPRUS
Cairo
LEBANON
Beirut
ISRAEL
Amman
Jerusalem
JORDAN
Damascus
SAUDI
ARABIA
IRAQ
Baghdad
Baghdad
IRAQ Shah Deniz Field
Southern Corridor Phase 1
Southern Corridor Phase 2
Southern Corridor Phase 3
Kuwait
Other Gas Pipelines

Gazprom is one
of the major
natural gas
suppliers to
Europe

SOUTHERN CORRIDOR
ALTHOUGH TRANSPORTING THE NATURAL
GAS RESOURCES OF THE CASPIAN REGION
AND MIDDLE EAST IS THE MAIN PRIORITY OF
SOUTHERN CORRIDOR, THE FIRST CONCRETE
STEP WAS THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAKU-TBILISI-
CEYHAN PIPELINE, WHICH CARRIES AZERBAIJANI
OIL TO INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

Majority
of Russian
supplies
to Europe
go through
Ukraine

ALTHOUGH SOUTHERN CORRIDOR HAS BEEN
INITIALLY ENABLED BY AZERBAIJANI GAS, NEW
SUPPLIERS WILL CERTAINLY BE NEEDED GIVEN THE
POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE GAS IMPORTS OF EUROPE
AND A NEED FOR DIVERSIFICATION OF GAS SUPPLY.

THE SOUTHERN GAS
CORRIDOR FINALLY
BECOMES REALITY
PROF. DR. FRIEDBERT PFLUGER
PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR ENERGY AND
RESOURCE SECURITY (EUCERS) AT KING’S
COLLEGE LONDON

Following the break-up of the Soviet
Union, the United States and Turkey
strongly supported the independent
development of the emerging new
economies in Central Asia and the
Caucasus region.
THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN
CORRIDOR DEBATE

THE SHAH DENIZ FIELD HAS PROVEN RECOVERABLE GAS
RESERVES OF 1.2 TRILLION CUBIC METERS (TCM) WITH
CONSIDERABLE UPSIDE POTENTIAL.

EU SUPPORT FOR THE SOUTHERN
CORRIDOR PROJECT
Inauguration
ceremony of
Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan
pipeline

The picture of
Shah Deniz
1. Opening remarks of President Barroso on the 2nd Strategic Energy Review, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
doreference=SPEECH/08/612&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
2. Prague summit calls for haste on Nabucco, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2009/05/08/
Prague-summit-calls-for-haste-on-Nabucco/UPI-24471241796633/

NORD AND SOUTH STREAM
WHILE GAZPROM HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THIS
PIPELINE WAS NOT PROJECTED TO OUTSTRIP NABUCCO,
THE TARGET MARKETS FOR THE GAS INCLUDE THE SAME
DESTINATIONS INITIALLY ENVISIONED BY NABUCCO.

NABUCCO’S
DECLINING CHANCES
3. Gazprom: South Stream’s fate depends on negotiations with Ukraine
http://en.for-ua.com/news/2011/12/26/144016.html

NABUCCO’S
DECLINING CHANCES
3. Gazprom: South Stream’s fate depends on negotiations with Ukraine
http://en.for-ua.com/news/2011/12/26/144016.html

TAP’S RISE AND
DASH TO THE FINISH LINE
4. Four additional companies have concluded shareholding agreements with TAP. TAP’s shareholding is now
comprised of BP (20%), SOCAR (20%), Statoil (20%), Fluxys (16%), Total (10%), E.ON (9%) and Axpo (5%).

TAP WAS DESIGNATED A “PROJECT OF NATIONAL
IMPORTANCE” IN ALBANIA, AND A SERIES OF MOUS
WERE SIGNED IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE ON
INTERCONNECTION WITH INCLUDING CROATIA,
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, MONTENEGRO, ALBANIA
AND SLOVENIA.
TAP’S CONTRIBUTION TO EU
ENERGY SECURITY

ITALY LOOKS NORTH
THE BAUMGARTEN QUESTION

GAS MARKET POTENTIAL IN
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

ADDITIONAL GAS SUPPLIES:
IRAQI-KURDISTAN AND EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN GAS

AZERBAIJAN
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS 2013*
PROF. DR. BULENT ARAS

The period of Haydar Aliyev’s government
(1993-2003) is considered as an era of
stability, providing a balance in diplomatic
relations with neighboring countries, and
initiating investments into the country’s rich
underground resources.
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
* I would like to thank
Mehmet Dikkaya,
Ferhat Pirinçci and
lkim Büke for their
help during different
stages of writing
this article.

AZERBAIJAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
1. Henry E. Hale, “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” World
Politics, Vol.58, No.1 (October 2005), p. 73

Flag of Azerbaijan
ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN
2. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative
Research,” World Politics, Vol.49, No.3 (April 1997), pp 430-451; Ross E. Burkhart ve Michael S. Lewis-
Beck, “Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis,” The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 88, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 903-910.

3. see. Azerbaijan Central Elections Commission, http://www.msk.gov.az

THE OPPOSITION COULD NOT OFFER ANY
ALTERNATIVE TO ALIYEV’S “GROWTH WITH
SUSTAINABILITY” SLOGAN
4. Ahmet Kara “The Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan, November 2005 and May 2006,”Electoral
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (September 2007), pp. 720-724.
5. M. Turgut Demirtepe, “The 15 October 2008 Presidential Elections: The Consolidation of Ilham Aliyev’s
Power in Azerbaijan,” USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, Vol. 2, (2009), pp. 363-377.

AZERBAIJAN DURING
THE ALIYEV PERIOD
6. The section on Azerbaijani economy was prepared with assistance from Mehmet Dikkaya.
7. Ina Ganguli, “Migration in Azerbaijan: The Transition to a Destination Country”, http://www.irex.org/
system/les/Ganguli.pdf
8. See, Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org

9. Mehmet Dikkaya, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya: Dönüüm Süreci ve Uluslararas Ekonomi Politik (stanbul:
Beta, 2009), p. 255.
10. Mehmet Dikkaya, “Trans Anadolu Doalgaz Boru Hatt Projesi (TANAP): Türkiye le Azerbaycan’nYeni
Dans,” http://www.usgam.com/tr/index.phpl=807&cid=844&konu=16&bolge=7
11. Lada Evgrashina, “Azeri Oil Fund to Spend $1 Bln on Property Abroad”, http://www.cnbc.com/
id/100652676

Inauguration
ceremony of
President elect
Ilham Aliyev
12. See, Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org
13. Gulgiz Dadashova, “ADB Sees Non-oil Sector as Azerbaijan’s Major Driver of Growth in 2013”, http://
www.azernews.az/business/54819.html
14. Arthur Bayhan, “Azerbaijan’s Growth Perspectives and Non-oil Sector Competitiveness,” Todays Zaman,
13 January 2013.
15. Vüsal Qasml ve Zaur Vliyev, 2003-2012-ci llrd Azrbaycan Respublikasnn Sosial-qtisadi
Göstricilri (Bakü, SAM, 2013), s. 16.

THE PRIORITY FOR AZERBAIJAN IS TO MAKE THE
COUNTRY IMPORTANT ACTOR BOTH IN THE REGION
AND INTERNATIONALLY.
16. Elman Muradov,“Azerbaycan ve Almanya’nn Bölgesel Kalknma Politikalarnn Karlatrmal Analizi,”
Nide Üniversitesi BF Dergisi, Vol.5, No.1 (2012), pp. 108-109.

Azerbaijani youth
celebrating
election victory
2013 ELECTION
17. see. Azerbaijan Central Election Commission, http://www.msk.gov.az

THE ANALYSES ON POLITICAL SYSTEM AND
ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN PUT A SPECIAL
EMPHASIS ON THE CHRONIC DIVISIONS AMONG THE
OPPOSITION, INABILITY TO MOVE COLLECTIVELY, AND
LACK OF A COMMON VISION.
18. For participation to presidential elections, see, Azrbaycan Respublikas Mrkzi Seçki Komissiyas,
“Prezident Seçkilri - 09 Oktybar 2013: Seçici Fall”, https://www.infocenter.gov.az/e-services/prezident2013.aspxi=1

THE ANALYSES ON POLITICAL SYSTEM AND
ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN PUT A SPECIAL
EMPHASIS ON THE CHRONIC DIVISIONS AMONG THE
OPPOSITION, INABILITY TO MOVE COLLECTIVELY, AND
LACK OF A COMMON VISION.
18. For participation to presidential elections, see, Azrbaycan Respublikas Mrkzi Seçki Komissiyas,
“Prezident Seçkilri - 09 Oktybar 2013: Seçici Fall”, https://www.infocenter.gov.az/e-services/prezident2013.aspxi=1

THE IDEA OF HAVING A STRONG OPPOSITION LEADER
CONFLICTED WITH THE MESSAGE THATIN CASE
OF IBRAHIMBEYOV’S PRESIDENCY THERE WILL BE A
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH WILL SET THE
GROUND FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.
19. “Azerbaijani Opposition Leader Seeks Support In Washington,” RFE/RL, 14 June 2013, http://www.
rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-opposition-leader-rustam-ibragimbekov-seeks-washington-support/25017630.html
20. Sevil Nuriyeva, “Azerbaycan Seçime Doru,” Star, 8 July2013.

Young voter
turnout was high in
the elections
21. Zaur Shiriyev, “Clinton’s Visit to the Caucasus,” Today’s Zaman, 12 June 2012.

RESPONSES
AZERBAIJAN OPENED ITS DOORS TO INTERNATIONAL
OBSERVERS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS TO CREATE A
TRANSPARENT ATMOSPHERE FOR OBSERVATION.
22. see. Elnur Aslanov, “Azerbaijan’s Place in the World,” Economist, 14 September 2013.June 2012.
23. OSCE/ODIHR/PA, Azerbaijan – Presidential Elections, 9 October 2013, Statement of Preliminary
Findings and Conclusions, 10 October 2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106901, (e.t.
11/10/2013).

President Aliyev
casting his vote

HEAD OF PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF TURKISH
SPEAKING COUNTRIES HALUK IPEK AND MEMBER
OF BLACK SEA CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM ISMAIL SAFI,
DECLARED THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN A
TRANSPARENT, FREE AND FAIR ENVIRONMENT.
OBSERVATIONS AND
SUGGESTIONS
24. Itar-Tass News Agency, “No Major Violations Exposed at Azerbaijan’s Presidential Polls - CIS
Observer Mission”, 10 October 2013, http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/908648.html, (e.t.
13/10/2013).
25. hlas Haber Ajans, “Türk Gözlemci Heyeti Azerbaycan Seçimlerini Deerlendirdi”, 10 Ekim
2013, http://www.iha.com.tr/dunya/turk-gozlemci-heyeti-azerbaycan-secimlerini-degerlendirdi/304789,
(e.t. 13/10/2013).
26. “TürkPA: Azerbaycan’daki Cumhurbakanl Seçimleri Sakin ve eaf Bir Ortamda, Uluslararas
Standartlara Uygun ekilde Yapld”, 10 Ekim 2013, http://www.1news.com.tr/azerbaycan/
siyaset/20131010121208825.html, (e.t. 12/10/2013); http://www.ismailsafi.com.tr/Haber.
aspxPid=163&cid=2&Lang=TR
27. David M. Herszenhorn, “Observers Dier on Fairness of Election in Azerbaijan”, New York Times,
10 October 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/world/asia/observers-say-azerbaijanelection-marred-by-fraud.html_r=1&
(e.t. 11/10/2013).
28. “President Ilham Aliyev Addresses the Nation on Initial Results of Presidential Election”, 10 October
2013, http://sia.az/en/news/politics/370532-president-ilham-aliyev-addresses-the-nation-on-initial-results-of-presidential-election,
(e.t. 13/10/2013).

PROF. DR. BULENT ARAS
48
Aliyev addressing
Azerbaijani people

DURING THE ALIYEV PERIOD, THE STEPS TAKEN IN AREAS
SUCH AS EDUCATION, HEALTH, AND URBANIZATION
TOWARDS HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
ECONOMIC GAINS BUILT ON THE OIL REVENUES, HAVE
BROUGHT THE COUNTRY TO A NEW THRESHOLD.
49

THE SOUTHERN
CORRIDOR AND THE EU
ENERGY SECURITY
ASSOC. PROF. RADU DUDU 1

Many analysts have stated in the wake the
TAP’s victory that the outcome was only logical
and predictable in light of TAP’s being shorter,
sleeker, and more cost effective (only €1.5 billion
as opposed to Nabucco, more than €10 billion),
and given that it will serve the large and welldeveloped
Italian gas market.
1. THE SHAH DENIZ PIPELINE
COMPETITION AND THE LAYOUT
OF THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR
ABSTRACT
1. Radu Dudu is associate professor of International Relations at Bucharest University, and executive director at Romania Energy
Center (ROEC), an independent think tank focusing on energy policy.
2. For details, see Dudu (2012, 105-106).

ALTHOUGH NABUCCO WAS ALWAYS SUPPOSED TO
MAKE ECONOMIC SENSE, IT WAS BORN AS A PRIMARILY
STRATEGIC CONCEPT, DESIGNED MAINLY TO ADDRESS
EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE’S ENERGY
SECURITY VULNERABILITY.

Azerbaijan
President
Aliyev and EU
Commissioner
Barroso
meeting

3. As of 30 July 2013, BP, SOCAR, and Total opted to join the TAP consortium, so that its current
shareholding structure is the following: BP (20%), SOCAR (20%), Statoil (20%), Fluxys (16%),
Total (10%), E.ON (9%) and Axpo (5%) (www.trans-adriatic-pipeline.com/news/news/detail-view/
article/419/, accessed August 2013).

IF THE EUROPEANS HAD GAINED ACCESS TO CASPIAN GAS
THROUGH A MAJOR PIPELINE, COUNTRIES IN EASTERN
AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE COULD HAVE REDUCED
THEIR DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS CONSIDERABLY
4. The “Connecting Europe Facility” is a plan tabled by the EC in October 2011 envisaging the
allocation of €50 billion from the EU 2014-2020 budget for transport, energy, and communications
infrastructure. €9.1 billion are to be invested in energy transport infrastructure and climate
protection. As put in the EC press release (EC 2011), “The internal market for energy will be further
developed through better interconnections, leading to security of supply and the possibility to
transport renewable energy in a cost eective manner across the EU.”

SOCAR
President
Rovnag
Abdullayev at
the Shah Deniz
Consortium
signing sales
agreement
with 9
companies

5. €7 million in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) Cross-border
Cooperation (CBC) Program Romania-Ukraine-Moldova 2007-2013, out of a total cost of €28
million. Romania has also committed to invest €12 million and to assist Moldova with €9 million
(EC 2013).
6. The Energy Community was established in October 2005 and aims to extend EU energy market
rules and infrastructure into EU neighbors. The current members are Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine, and Kosovo. For an excellent
discussion of its importance, see Alan Riley (2013).

2. HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE
SOUTHERN CORRIDOR
IN EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, THE
GAS MARKETS HAVE LONG HAD A MONOPOLISTIC
STRUCTURE, WITH GAZPROM AS A SOLE EXTERNAL
PROVIDER.

2. HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE
SOUTHERN CORRIDOR
IN EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, THE
GAS MARKETS HAVE LONG HAD A MONOPOLISTIC
STRUCTURE, WITH GAZPROM AS A SOLE EXTERNAL
PROVIDER.

Haydar Aliyev
and Eduard
Shevardnadze
collaboration
was critical
in realizing
regional energy
projects

FOR AZERBAIJAN’S PART, SEVERAL OFFSHORE GAS
FIELDS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED WITH PROVED RESERVES:
ABSHERON, UMID, AND THE DEEP-LEVEL GAS RESERVOIR
UNDERNEATH THE AZERI-CHIRAG-GUNESHLI (ACG)
OILFIELD.

FOR AZERBAIJAN’S PART, SEVERAL OFFSHORE GAS
FIELDS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED WITH PROVED RESERVES:
ABSHERON, UMID, AND THE DEEP-LEVEL GAS RESERVOIR
UNDERNEATH THE AZERI-CHIRAG-GUNESHLI (ACG)
OILFIELD.

7. Here is a brief inventory of the East and Southeast European gas interconnectors, financed totally
or partly by the EU: the Arad-Szeged pipeline, connecting Romania to Hungary, finished in 2010,
with a capacity of 1.4 bcma; the Hungary-Croatia interconnector, finished in 2011, with a capacity
of 6.5 bcma; the Romania-Bulgaria (Ruse-Giurgiu) interconnector, of 1.5 bcma, due to be finished
by the end of 2013, but likely to be delayed until 2014; the Slovakia-Hungary pipe, with capacity of
6.5 bcma, due to be commissioned in 2014; the Sofia-Dimitrovgrad-Nis interconnector, linking
Bulgaria with Serbia, planned to be inaugurated in 2015, with capacity of 1.8 bcma; the Iai-Ungheni
interconnector, which will enter into operation in 2014. Add to this the numerous reverse ow
projects – completed or under construction—which will provide better access to the regional
storage and trading gas hubs, listen in EC (2011, 4-5).
8. Although TAP does not directly address the East European markets, its planned extensions into the
collateral markets along the way (Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia) will indirectly
yet significantly contribute to South East Europe’s overall gas interconnectivity

7. Here is a brief inventory of the East and Southeast European gas interconnectors, financed totally
or partly by the EU: the Arad-Szeged pipeline, connecting Romania to Hungary, finished in 2010,
with a capacity of 1.4 bcma; the Hungary-Croatia interconnector, finished in 2011, with a capacity
of 6.5 bcma; the Romania-Bulgaria (Ruse-Giurgiu) interconnector, of 1.5 bcma, due to be finished
by the end of 2013, but likely to be delayed until 2014; the Slovakia-Hungary pipe, with capacity of
6.5 bcma, due to be commissioned in 2014; the Sofia-Dimitrovgrad-Nis interconnector, linking
Bulgaria with Serbia, planned to be inaugurated in 2015, with capacity of 1.8 bcma; the Iai-Ungheni
interconnector, which will enter into operation in 2014. Add to this the numerous reverse ow
projects – completed or under construction—which will provide better access to the regional
storage and trading gas hubs, listen in EC (2011, 4-5).
8. Although TAP does not directly address the East European markets, its planned extensions into the
collateral markets along the way (Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia) will indirectly
yet significantly contribute to South East Europe’s overall gas interconnectivity

3. THE STRUCTURAL MARKET
SHIFT IN THE EU SINCE 2008
9. “Gazprom is also studying the possibility of building one or two additional lines within the Nord
Stream gas pipeline project across the Baltic Sea to northern Europe, which would bring its total
capacity up to 110 Bcm/year. [...] On top of this, within a few days in December [2012] Russian
oicials announced plans to add around 15 Bcm/year of capacity to the existing gas pipeline running
via Belarus [“Yamal 2”] (which is fully owned by Gazprom and has capacity of nearly 50 Bcm/year) and
did not rule out a possible increase in the capacity of the 16 Bcm/year Blue Stream pipeline across
the Black Sea to Turkey to transit Russian gas on to third countries” (Rodova 2012).

Trans Adriatic
Pipeline map

THE TRANSITION PROCESS COMES DOWN TO
THE REDEFINED INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR WEST
EUROPEAN ENERGY UTILITIES, UNDER THE PRESSURE
OF THE EU MARKET LIBERALIZATION MEASURES.
10. According to Platts European Gas Daily (Jan. 2011, 2), the average prices at the Dutch TTF (Title
Transfer Facility) gas hub traded in 2010 on average 25% cheaper than the oil-indexed prices.
Tellingly, TTF trades at slightly higher prices than UK’s NBP (National Balancing Point).

ITALIAN COMPANY EDISON HAS ALSO LAUNCHED
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GAZPROM IN AN
ATTEMPT TO ALIGN ITS SUPPLY CONTRACT WITH THE
MARKET PRICES,

4. CONCLUSIONS

4. CONCLUSIONS

IMPORTANCE OF THE
SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR
IN THE CONTEXT OF
EUROPEAN ENERGY
SECURITY
DR. ROMAN RUKOMEDA

The Southern Gas Corridor is one of few
new options that can directly contribute
to European energy security and gas
diversiication.
EUROPEAN GAS DEMAND AND
CASPIAN GAS POSSIBILITIES
1. Natural Gas Growth to Slow as European Demand Falters, IEA Says - http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-20/natural-gasgrowth-to-slow-as-european-demand-falters-iea-says.html

BY IEA ESTIMATIONS, THE WORLD’S ANNUAL GAS
DEMAND WILL RISE TO 3,962 BILLION CUBIC METERS IN
2018 FROM 3,427 BILLION IN 2012.
COMPETITION FOR LNG IS
GROWING
PRICING STRUCTURE
NORWEGIAN PRODUCTION
SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS
2. IEA Sees Strong Growth in Asian and North American Gas as Europe Lags - http://www.powermag.
com/iea-sees-strong-growth-in-asian-and-north-american-gas-as-europe-lags/pagenum=1

STORAGE CAPACITY AVAILABILITY
CASPIAN SEA REGION GROSS NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION (2000-12)
trillion cubic feet per year
Source : U.S. Energy Information Administration, IHS EDIN, Eastern Bloc Energy, Rigzone, and
Rystad Energy
Note : 2012 values are preliminary estimates. Iran and Uzbekistan do not have substantial
production in the Caspian Region. All production outside Caspian Region is excluded . 4
3. U.S. Energy Information Administration - http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
4. U.S. Energy Information Administration - http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfmid=12911

SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR ROLE
IN EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY
5. EU still considers Nabucco’s short version - http://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/60711.html

Energy import
dependence
graphic in EU
6. Azeri Gas Sells Big in Europe - http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Azeri-Gas-Sells-
Big-in-Europe.html
7. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/pci/doc/2013_pci_projects_country.pdf

THE ROLE OF TURKEY FOR
EU GAS SUPPLY
EU PRACTICAL SUPPORT FOR
SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR
8. Turkey Key to Future European Energy Security - http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/09/
turkey-key-to-future-european-energy-security/
9. Turkey membership key to Europe energy security, says foreign minister - http://www.aa.com.tr/en/
news/236126--turkey-membership-key-to-europe-energy-security-says-foreign-minister

Among the other “projects of common
interest” in the framework of
the Southern Gas Corridor are:

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR
DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN
GAS CORRIDOR
10. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/pci/doc/2013_pci_projects_country.pdf
11. Ukraine and EU agree on new route for gas from Croatia via Hungary - http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/
en/148/545897/

12. Ukrainian Gas Diversication: Shale And LNG Considerations – Analysis - http://www.eurasiareview.
com/03092013-ukrainian-gas-diversication-shale-and-lng-considerations-analysis/

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

TURKEY’S ENERGY
STRATEGY AND THE
SOUTHERN GAS
CORRIDOR
ASST. PROF. EMRE ISERI*,
ALPER ALMAZ**

Access to reliable, affordable and environmentally
friendly energy resources is essential
for modern economies.
1. INTRODUCTION
TURKEY HAS
BECOME A
CRITICAL
TRANSIT
COUNTRY FOR
TRANSPORTING
CASPIAN/
MIDDLE
EASTERN
RESOURCES TO
EUROPE.
*Asst. Prof. Emre Iseri, Department of International Relations Yasar University, Izmir, Turkey. E- mail: emre.iseri@yasar.edu.tr
** Research Assistant Alper Almaz, Department of International Relations Yasar University, Izmir, Turkey. E-mail: alper.almaz@
yasar.edu.tr
1. G. Bahgat, Energy Security: An Interdisciplinary Approach, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2011,p.1-3.
2. C. Egenhofer, K. Gialoglou, and G. Luciani, Marked-based Options for Security of Energy Supply, Center for European Policy
Studies (CEPS), March 2004, http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/965/pdf

2. THE SOUTHERN GAS
CORRIDOR IN BRIEF
Map 1

Table 1: Key Central Asian Natural Gas Data in tcf 4 , 2012
Source:
BP Statistical Review
of World Energy
2013.
3. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has carried out signicant and successful energy pipeline projects,
through which it has become a reliable oil and gas supplier for the EU, Turkey and Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil
pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline which runs from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey are the largest
projects through which Azerbaijan has brought new energy supplies to the world energy market.
4. See conversion table for trillion cubic feet (tcf) and billion cubic meters (bcm), available at: http://www.iea.org/stats/unit.asp
5. “Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council”, the Council of the European Union, Available at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/103441.pdf (22.09.2013).
6. “Press Release on EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review”, European Commission, 2008,
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-703_en.htmlocale=en (22.09.2013)
7. “ Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan”, the European Commision, 2011,
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-14_en.htm (22.09.2013).

8. Map 1
9. ”EU Commission welcomes decision on gas pipeline: Door opener for direct link to Caspian Sea”, the European Commission, 2013,
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-623_en.htm (23.09.2013).

3. TURKEY’S ENERGY PROSPECTS
Figure 1:
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s Energy Strategy, Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa
(21.09.2013).

13. Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) and Turkey’s Turcas signed an agreement to build a renery in Izmir which could process
10 million tons of crude oil. “Azeris, Spaniards Ink $4.8Billion Turkish Renery Deal”, Hurriyet Daily News, Available at: http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/azeris-spaniards-ink-48-billion-turkish-renery-deal.aspxpageID=238&nid=47258 (21-09.2013).
14. “Energy in Southeast Europe”, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/infrastructure/sectors/energy/
oilgas.htm (21.09.2013).
15. “Key Figures”, European Commission, 2011, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/countries/doc/key_gures.
pdf (22.09.2013).
16. “Background on Energy in Europe”, the European Commission, 2010, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/energy_
background_en.pdf (24.09.2013).

Figure 2: 2012 EU Natural Gas Imports
4. RISKS FOR THE SOUTHERN
GAS CORRIDOR
Source:
BP Statistical Review
of World Energy
2013.

4.1. SHORT-TERM ENERGY
SECURITY RISKS
4.2. LONG-TERM ENERGY RISKS: IS
THERE ENOUGH GAS
17. “Georgia PM Optimistic on Russia Relations”, Voice of America, 2013. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/georgiaprime-minister-optimistic-on-russia-relations/1724063.html
(22.09.2013).
18. E.Iseri, “Addressing pipeline security regime of the prospective regional energy hub Turkey.” Security Journal, 8 October 2012
(online version).

CONCLUSION
19. I. Tsakalidou, “ The southern European corridor”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013, Available at: http://www.iss.
europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_Trans-Adriatic-_Pipeline.pdf (24.09.2013).

CONCLUSION
19. I. Tsakalidou, “ The southern European corridor”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013, Available at: http://www.iss.
europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_Trans-Adriatic-_Pipeline.pdf (24.09.2013).

CONCLUSION
19. I. Tsakalidou, “ The southern European corridor”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013, Available at: http://www.iss.
europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_Trans-Adriatic-_Pipeline.pdf (24.09.2013).

CASPIAN REGION
A VIEW FROM GEORGIA
AMB. GIORGI BADRIDZE

For many centuries the Caspian Region connected
Eastern and Western civilizations by means of
the Silk Road. When oil, and later natural gas,
started to fuel the world economy, the region’s
strategic importance started to make a dramatic
comeback.
BACKGROUND

RECENT PAST AND CURRENT
REALITIES

RECENT PAST AND CURRENT
REALITIES

RECENT PAST AND CURRENT
REALITIES

FUTURE PROSPECTS
ENERGY SUPPLIES
THE REGION IS STRATEGICALLY POSITIONED
TO PLAY AN INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT
ROLE IN THE GLOBALIZING WORLD THROUGH
ITS NATURAL RESOURCES AND POTENTIALLY
THROUGH FUTURE TRANSPORT
INFRASTRUCTURE.

ROAD AND RAILWAY
TRANSPORTATION
Russian
transportation
network

CONCLUSION

THE CASPIAN REGION:
HISTORY, THEORY,
AND PRACTICE
SHAMKHAL ABILOV

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Caspian Region has been transformed into a
battleground for power confrontations between
the world’s leading countries, not only due to
its geo-strategic position, but also because of its
immense hydrocarbon resources.
INTRODUCTION
GEOGRAPHICALLY,
THE CASPIAN
REGION CONSISTS
OF THE FIVE
LITTORAL STATES:
AZERBAIJAN,
IRAN,
KAZAKHSTAN,
RUSSIA, AND
TURKMENISTAN.
DEFINING THE CASPIAN REGION:
HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
1. Kleveman, Lutz, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York, Grove Press, 10 August 2004), p. 4.

THE CASPIAN REGION, CONNECTING TWO
DISTINCT AREAS OF THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA.
2. Zeinolabedin, Y., et all., “Geopolitics and Environmental Issues in the Caspian Sea”, Caspian Journal of Environmental Sciences, Vol.
7, No. 2, 2009, p. 116.
3. Zeinolabedin, Y., et all., “The Geopolitics of Energy in the Caspian Basin”, International Journal of Environmental Research, Vol. 5,
No. 2, Spring 2011, p. 504
4. Sasley, Brent, “The Intersection of Geography and Resources: Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Basin”, in Tchantouridze, Lasha, ed.,
Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns (Winnipeg: Center for Defense and Security Studies, University of Manitoba,
2004), p. 194.
5. Aydin, Mustafa, “Oil, Pipelines and Security: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region”, in Gammer,Moshe ed., TheCaspian Region,
Volume 1: A Re-Emerging Region (Routledge, 2004), p. 3.

THE “GREAT GAME”: RUSSIAN
AND BRITISH ENGAGEMENT IN
POWER POLITICS INTHE “GREATER
CASPIAN REGION”
6. Kaliyeva, Dinara, “The Geopolitical Situation in the Caspian Region”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, Enoro de 2004, p. 1.
7. Akbar, Zehra, “Central Asia: The New Great Game”, The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Aairs, October 2012; (http://
www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/central-asia-the-new-great-game.html)). Access date 14 September, 2013.
8.Cooley, Alexander, “Central Asia: A Political History from the 19th Century to Present”, Asia Society, 14 August 2008; (http://asiasociety.org/countries/conicts/central-asia-political-history-19th-century-present).
Access date 14 September, 2013.
9. Fromkin, David, “The Great Game in Asia”, Foreign Aairs, Vol. 58, No. 4, Spring 1980, p. 936.

10. Morgan, Gerald, “Myth and Reality in the Great Game”, Asian Aairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1973, p. 55.
11. Ibid, Morgan, Gerald, p. 55.
12. Rasizade, Alec, “The New “Great Game” in Central Asia after Afghanistan”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 125.

THE ABOLITION OF SERFDOM IN RUSSIA IN
1861 GAVE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY AND TRADE
A POWERFUL IMPETUS.
13. Ibid, Fromkin, David, p. 937.
14. Ibid, Cooley, Alexander.
15. Penzev, Konstantin, “When Will the Great Game End”,Oriental Review, 15 November 2010; (http://orientalreview.
org/2010/11/15/when-will-the-great-game-end/). Access date 17 September, 2013.
16. Ibid, Cooley, Alexander.

AZERBAIJAN IS ONE OF THE BIRTH PLACES
OF THE OIL INDUSTRY AND ONE OF THE FIRST
COUNTRIES IN WHICH PEOPLE LEARNED HOW
TO PRODUCE OIL AND TO USE IT FOR MEDICINE
AND HOUSEHOLD NEEDS.
17. Ibid, Fromkin, David, p. 939.
18. Hopkirk, Peter, “The Great Game Revisited”,Asian Aairs, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2002, p. 61.
19. Ibid, Penzev, Konstantin,
20. Ibid, Fromkin, David, p. 947.

Onshore oil fields
in Caspian
21. Ibid, Peter, Hopkirk, p. 61.
22. Cornell, Svante E., Azerbaijan since Independence, (M. E. Sharpe, 2011), p. 29.
23. Alakbarov, Farid, “An Overview - Baku: City that Oil Built”, Azerbaijan International, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2002; (http://www.azer.
com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai102_folder/102_articles/102_overview_alakbarov.html). Access date 17 September, 2013.
24. Ibid, Alakbarov, Farid.

25. John P. McKay, “Baku Oil and Transcaucasian Pipelines, 1883-1891: A Study in Tsarist Economic
Policy”, Slavic Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 1984, pp. 606-607.
26. Gokay, Bulent, “Caspian Uncertainties: Regional Rivalries and Pipelines”, Perceptions,Journal of International Aairs, Vol. 3, No.
1, 1998, p. 1.
27. Israloglu, NazimRza,NeftQlobalMünaqilrmnbyi (Oil as a Source of Global Conicts) (rq-Qrb, 2009), p. 102.
28. Mostashari, Firouzed, “Development of Caspian oil in Historical Perspective”, inAmirahmadi, Hooshanged., The Caspian Region
at a Crossroad: Challenges of a New Frontier of Energy and Development (Palgrave Macmillan, 10 June 2000); pp. 98-99.

29. Bagirov, Sabit, “Azerbaijani Oil: Glimpses of a Long History”, Perceptions, Vol. 1, No. 2, June-August 1996, p. 34.
30. Qafarov, Vasif, “Ekim 1917 DevrimindenSonraBolevikRusya’nnAzerbaycanSiyasetive Bakü Sorunu (Russian Policy on Azerbaijan
and the Question of Baku after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917)”, GaziAkademikBak (Gazi Academic View), Vol. 2. No. 3, Winter
2008, p. 149.
31. Ibid, Alakbarov, Farid.
32. Ibid, Fromkin, David, p. 939.

33. Gökay, Bülent, “The Battle for Baku (May-September 1918): A Peculiar Episode in the History of the Caucasus”, Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, (1998), p. 39.
34. Hasanli, Jamil, “Azerbaijan at the Crossroads of Epochs: The First Attempt to Join the Free World (1917-1920)”, The Caucasus &
Globalization, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2009, p. 127.

MACKINDER’S HEARTLAND
THEORY: GEOGRAPHIC PIVOT
AREA OF THE WORLD
35. Ewalt, Donald , “The Fight for Oil: Britain in Persia, 1919”, History Today, Vol. 31, Issue 9, 1981; (http://www.historytoday.com/
donald-ewalt/ght-oil-britain-persia-1919). Access date 17, September 2013.
36. Ibid, Hasanli, Jamil, pp. 129-130.
37. Ibid, Hasanli, Jamil, p. 134.
38. Ibid, Ewalt, Donald ,
39. Nasibli, Nasib, “Azerbaijan: Oil and Politics in the Country’s Future”, in Crossant, Michael P., & Aras, Bülent ed., Oil and Geopolitics in
the Caspian Sea Region (Praeger Publisher, 1999), p. 103.

Map 2. Mackinder’s ‘pivot area’, the ‘inner’ and ‘outer crescents’ 43
40. eri, Emre, “The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century”, Geopolitics, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2009, p. 33.
41. Ashworth, Lucian. M, “Realism and the spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the reality of the League of Nations”.
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 2011, p. 285.
42. BogdanVlad, Liviu et all., “Active Geo-strategic Players, Geopolitical Pivots and The Changing Balance of Power in Eurasia”,
RevistaRomân de GeograePolitic, Year 12, No. 1, May 2010, p. 118.
43. Mackinder, Halford J., “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4, April 1904, retrieved from
(http://www.anselm.edu/academic/history/hdubrulle/WWII/WWII2010/text/grading/food/fdwk05b.htm). Access date 21
September, 2011.

Map 3. Mackinder’s “Pivot” and “Heartland” Designations 46
44. Ibid. Mackinder, Halford J., 1904.
45. Ibid, Mackinder, Halford J, 1919, p. 113.
46. Megoran, Nick, &Sharapova, Sevara, “Mackinder’s Heartland: A Help or Hindrance in Understanding Central Asia’s International
Relations”,Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 4, No. 34, 2005, p. 9.

Map 4.
Spykman’s
Rimland
47. Spykman, Nicholas John, The Geography of the Peace (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944), p. 43.

CONTRIBUTION OF KARL
HAUSHOFER TO THE
GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE
OF THE EURASIAN PIVOT
48. Hekimoglu, Levent, “ Whither “Heartland” Central Asia, Geography and Globalization”, Central Asia
and the Caucasus, Vol. 4, No. 34, 2005, pp. 66-67.
49. Ibid, Hekimoglu, Levent, p. 67.
50. Tuathail, Gearóid Ó., “Introduction”, in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, & Paul Routledge ed., The
Geopolitics Reader (Routledge, 1998), p. 19.

51. Costachie, Silviu, “German School of Geopolitics. Evolution, Ideas, Prospects”, RevistaRomân de GeograePolitic, Year XIII, No.
2, November 2011, p. 270
52. Heernan, Michael, The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics (Arnold, 1998), p. 134.
53. Blouet, Brian, Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century (Reaktion Books Ltd, 2001), p. 59.
54. Ostrovsky, Max, “The Idea of Eurasia”, Working Paper, 2008/9, p. 14. Retrieved from European Forum at the Hebrew University;
(http://www.ef.huji.ac.il/).Access date 26 September, 2013.
55. Haushofer, Karl, “The Continental Bloc: Mittel Europa - Eurasia - Japan”, p. 373. Retrieved from “The Idea of Eurasia” by Max
Ostrovsky, p. 15.
56. Ibid, Costachie, Silviu, p. 271.
57. Weiger, Hans W., Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 157.

Map 5. Haushofer’s
Pan-regions 59
58. Ibid, Ostrovsky, Max, p. 25.
59. Ibid, Ostrovsky, Max, p. 15.
60. Ibid, Costachie, Silviu, p. 272.

ACCORDING TO HAUSHOFER, GERMANY HAD
TO ENLARGE ITS EXISTING TERRITORY.
61. Haushofer, Karl, “Why Geopolitik”, in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, & Paul Routledge ed., The Geopolitics Reader (Routledge,
1998), p. 34.
62. Ibid, Tuathail, Gearóid Ó., p. 20.
63. Ibid, Haushofer, Karl, p. 34.
64. Ibid, Costachie, Silviu, p. 271.
65. Ibid, Brzezinski, Zbigniew, p. 39.

Karl Haushofer
66. Ibid, Tuathail, Gearóid Ó., p. 22.
67. Hitler, Adolf, “Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy”, in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, & Paul Routledge ed., The Geopolitics
Reader (Routledge, 1998), pp. 38-39.
68. Ibid, Tuathail, Gearóid Ó., p. 22.
69. Ibid, Blouet, Brian, p. 59.

THE “NEW GREAT GAME” OVER
THE CASPIAN REGION
70. Thimas Murphy, David, The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933 (Kent State University Press,
1997), p. 244-247.
71. Haushofer, Karl, “Defense of German Geopolitics”, in ”, in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, & Paul Routledge ed., The Geopolitics
Reader (Routledge, 1998), p. 41.
72. Kumar, Pankaj, “The Unrealized Dream of Caspian Oil”, International Politics,Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer & Autumn 2009, p. 9.

Nicholas John
Spykman
73. Laruelle, Marlene &Peyrouse, Sebastien, “The Militarization of the Caspian Sea: “Great Games” and “Small Games” Over the
Caspian Fleets”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 29.
74. Imani, Masoud, “Caspian Basin Energy Resources and Iran’s Foreign Relations with India and Pakistan”, International Politics, Vol.
2, No. 3, Winter & Spring 2009, p. 60.
75. ParviziAmineh, Mehdi, Globalization, Geopolitics and Energy Security in Central Eurasia and the Caspian Region (The Hague,
Clingendael International Energy Program, 2003), p. 209.
76. Smith, Jeff M., “The Great Game, Round Three”, The Journal of International Security Affairs, No, 17, Fall 2009; (http://www.
securityaairs.org/issues/2009/17/smith.php). Access date 29 September, 2013.
77. Kleveman, Lutz, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York, Grove Press, 10 August 2004), p. 2.

ECONOMIC AND ENERGY ISSUES
POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES
78. Ibid, Lutz Kleveman, (2004), p. 3.
79. Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Crude Face of Global Capitalism”, The New York Times, 04 October 1998; (http://www.nytimes.
com/1998/10/04/magazine/the-crude-face-of-global-capitalism.html).Access date 29 September, 2013.
80. Bhadrakumar, M.K., “Catalysts of conict in Central Asia”, Asia Times, 2 June 2005; (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/
GF02Ag01.html).Access date 29 September, 2013.
81. Molchanov, Mikhail A. &Yevdokimov, Yuri, “Regime Building as a Prime Mover of Technological Progress: The Energy Sector in the
Central Asia-Caspian Region”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2004, p. 418.

CONCLUSION
Figure 2. Historical
Evolution of the
Eurasian Pivot Area:
Caspian Region 82
82. Ismailov, Eldar and Papava, Vladimer, Rethinking the Central Eurasia (the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies
Program, 2003). p. 91.

CONCLUSION
Figure 2. Historical
Evolution of the
Eurasian Pivot Area:
Caspian Region 82
82. Ismailov, Eldar and Papava, Vladimer, Rethinking the Central Eurasia (the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies
Program, 2003). p. 91.

CONCLUSION
Figure 2. Historical
Evolution of the
Eurasian Pivot Area:
Caspian Region 82
82. Ismailov, Eldar and Papava, Vladimer, Rethinking the Central Eurasia (the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies
Program, 2003). p. 91.

INTEGRATION OF NORTHERN IRAQ GAS INTO THE
SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR PROJECT:
IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY
TRANSPORTATION TO
EUROPE
ASSOC. PROF. AYHAN ERDEM
HASEN EXPERT, CENTER ON ENERGY AND ECONOMY

Increasing energy demand throughout
the world has led to global competition,
and transformed oil and natural gas
reserves into strategic instruments.
SUMMARY

AZERBAIJAN HAS THE POTENTIAL TO ENSURE
INTEGRATION AND ENERGY SECURITY ACROSS THE
ENTIRE REGION FOR COUNTRIES ALONG
THE SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR ROUTE.
INTRODUCTION
1. Ramazan ERDA (2013 ). An analysis of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP)’s eects on global energy
politics, International Journal of Social Science Volume 6 Issue 3, p. 867-877, March.
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of Turkish Foreign Policy, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
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Eskiehir Osmangazi University Journal of Social Sciences, 10, p.125.

CASPIAN BASIN
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Ankara.
5. PAMR, A. N. (2006). Enerji Güvenlii, Stratejik Öngörü 2023, Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM), Avrasya-Bir
Foundation Publication, October, p.24, Ankara
6. http://www.mfa gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa. (22.10.2013)

7. SHAH, Ali and SYED Adnan “Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region: A Russian Perspective”, The Institute of Strategic
Studies Islamabad: (http://issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.phpdatald=192).
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11. ARAS, Osman Nuri (2001). Azerbaycan’n Hazar Ekonomisi ve Stratejisi, Der Publishing, stanbul
12. VURAL, Zeliha (2006). Hazar Havzas Enerji Kaynaklarnn Uluslararas Politikadaki Yeri ve Türkiye’ye Etkisi, Ankara.

SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR:
NABUCCOWEST, TAP AND TANAP
13 BP in Azerbaijan Sustainability Report http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/
downloads/A/Azerbaijan_Sustainability_Re-port_2010.pdf
14. Kristin LINKE and Marcel (2010). International Policy Analysis, Beyond Turkey, TheEU’s Energy Policy and the Southern
Corridor, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November, p.16

TRANS ANATOLIAN NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE (TANAP)
15. http://en.trend.az/media/thumbnails/512×512/2011/01/13/President_13012011-1.jpg
16. http://www.botas.gov.tr/icerik/docs/faalrapor /2011/ tur/fr2011044-064.pdfAccessed on: 31.01.2013

TRANS ADRIATIC NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE (TAP)
17. www.tanap.gov.trAccessed on: 22.10.2013
18. RZAYEVA, Gulmira (2013).TANAP - Hazar Gazn Avrupa’ya Tayan Atlm Projesi, Hazar World Journal, p.14

IRAQ AND THE SOUTHERN
GAS CORRIDOR
19. Selçuk HAYL, Hayati DOANAY (2007). “Irak’n Balca Corafi Özellikleri ve Petrol Yataklar”, Frat University, Elaz, 2007, p. 4..
20. Petrol ve Doal Gaz Gazetesi, 2012, p.1-2.

21. HAYL Selçuk, DOANAY Hayati (2007). “Irak’n Balca Corafi Özellikleri ve Petrol Yataklar”, Frat University, Elaz, p. 8.
22. PEK, Pnar (2009). “Irak’ta 2010 Seçimleri Öncesi Petrol Kaynaklarnn Önemi”, Ortadou Analiz, Volume 1, Issue 11,
November, p. 61
23. DOANAY, Hayati ve SELÇUK, Hayati (2007). Main Geographical Characteristics and Petroleum Deposits in the Iraq, p.8-9.

Council of Europe
24. Press TV, “Attack on Iraq-Turkeyoilpipelinehaltsow” (May 13, 2013), http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/05/13/303350/
iraqturkey-oil-pipeline-bombed
25. Eissler, R., E., (2012), “RegionalEnergy Security: Turkey’s Ambition to Become a Regional EnergyHub”, ResearchTurkey,
http://researchturkey.org/wp/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/ResearchTurkey_Regional-Energy-Security_Eric-
R.-Eissler.pdf
26. http://www.globalenerji.com.tr/hab-23000202-5,109@2300.html

27. Referans Newspaper, “3 trilyon $’lk petrol Erbil’i ihya ediyor”, http://www.referansgazetesi.com/haber.
aspxHBR_KOD=123718.
28. Reuters, March 10, 2007 &Economic and Social Researches Center (ESAM), Research Center Publication Ekopolitik,
“Türk Firmalar Kuzey Irak’ta Shell ile Ortaklk Yapacak”, http://www.ekopolitik.org/public/news.aspxid=182&pid=29.
29. Yener Yalçn, Star Newspaper, Economy “Kuzey Irak’ta petrol dahil her ite Türk imzas var”, 16.11.2011, http://www.
stargazete.com/ekonomi/kuzey-irak-ta-petrol-dahil-her-iste-turk-imzasi-var-haber-397522.htm
30. The Economist & Tempo, “2012’de Dünya” Özel Says, p. 82.

CONCLUSION
31. YORKAN Arzu (2008). “Kerkük-Yumurtalk Ham Petrol Boru Hatt ve Gelecei”, BLGESAM Pub.
32. Ece ATE (2012). Türkiye’nin Enerji Stratejisi, Development Bank of Turkey Publications, October-December, Issue:66,
p.16

CONCLUSION
31. YORKAN Arzu (2008). “Kerkük-Yumurtalk Ham Petrol Boru Hatt ve Gelecei”, BLGESAM Pub.
32. Ece ATE (2012). Türkiye’nin Enerji Stratejisi, Development Bank of Turkey Publications, October-December, Issue:66,
p.16

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