Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa
Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa
Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa
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<strong>L<strong>and</strong></strong> rights <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> forest peoples <strong>of</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> – Part II<br />
legal st<strong>and</strong>ards, nomadic peoples were traditionally considered to be at <strong>the</strong> bottom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
scale. Nomadic peoples had even fewer l<strong>and</strong> rights than o<strong>the</strong>r indigenous or native tribes, as<br />
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rules <strong>of</strong> territorial occupation under international law is <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> effective<br />
use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>. Only agricultural societies were deemed to use <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>s effectively; nomadic<br />
peoples were considered only to w<strong>and</strong>er across territories <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore have no rights <strong>of</strong><br />
occupation. The assumption was that nomadic peoples’ territories were not used productively<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore should be regarded as empty. Sir Charles Eliot, in his 1933 l<strong>and</strong> report on<br />
Kenya, said: ‘I cannot admit that w<strong>and</strong>ering tribes have a right to keep o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> superior<br />
races out <strong>of</strong> large tracts merely because <strong>the</strong>y have acquired <strong>the</strong> habit <strong>of</strong> straggling over far<br />
more l<strong>and</strong> than <strong>the</strong>y can utilize.’ 15 That agricultural societies were held to be superior is<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r expression <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> imperial bias at <strong>the</strong> roots <strong>of</strong> international law. Generally speaking,<br />
in international law nomadic peoples’ l<strong>and</strong>s were terra nullius, which means vacant l<strong>and</strong> or<br />
l<strong>and</strong> belonging to nobody, <strong>and</strong> open to colonisation. This assumption was partially challenged<br />
only in 1975, when <strong>the</strong> International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice, in its advisory opinion on <strong>the</strong> Western<br />
Sahara, recognised that nomadic peoples could also exercise some form <strong>of</strong> social <strong>and</strong> political<br />
organisation. 16 This affirmation, however, fell short <strong>of</strong> recognising <strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>of</strong> nomadic<br />
peoples to exercise territorial sovereignty. As highlighted by Reisman, ‘<strong>the</strong> Court formally<br />
acknowledged <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> a <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> international l<strong>and</strong> tenure based on a non-European<br />
conception <strong>of</strong> title as generative <strong>of</strong> “legal ties” […]. But such “legal ties” were not enough to<br />
defeat title deriving from European colonial claim.’ 17 The view that only societies with a<br />
permanently settled population could exercise territorial control remained. All <strong>of</strong> this had a<br />
huge impact on l<strong>and</strong> rights for nomadic communities. Colonial states felt that <strong>the</strong>ir ‘civilising<br />
mission’ was even more justified, as nomadic peoples were <strong>the</strong> remnant <strong>of</strong> ‘primitive’ societies<br />
that had to be brought to <strong>the</strong> enlightenment <strong>of</strong> ‘civilisation’. This historical bias against<br />
nomadic communities still has some impact in contemporary l<strong>and</strong> claims, as most nomadic<br />
communities throughout <strong>the</strong> continent have only very limited access to legal titles to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
l<strong>and</strong>s. The dominant assumption is still that <strong>the</strong>y do not ‘effectively’ occupy <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>and</strong>s.<br />
B<br />
The principle <strong>of</strong> ‘effective occupation’<br />
As stated earlier, <strong>the</strong> Berlin Conference had a great impact on <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rules<br />
governing title territory in <strong>Africa</strong>. Probably one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most significant rules came under <strong>the</strong><br />
Final Act, which put in place <strong>the</strong> ‘principle <strong>of</strong> effective occupation’. This principle meant that<br />
colonial states could no longer merely put a flag on a territory <strong>and</strong> claim it as <strong>the</strong>irs, but<br />
needed to exercise effective control <strong>of</strong> it. In contrast to o<strong>the</strong>r instances <strong>of</strong> colonisation, where<br />
European colonial powers decided that <strong>the</strong> colonised territories were empty <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
open to colonisation (Australia, <strong>the</strong> Americas), colonial powers in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (at least<br />
following <strong>the</strong> Berlin Conference) had to establish formal legal ties with <strong>the</strong> local populations<br />
to establish <strong>the</strong>ir authority. Article 35 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Final Act stated: ‘The signatory powers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
present Act recognise <strong>the</strong> obligation to insure <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> authority in <strong>the</strong> regions<br />
occupied by <strong>the</strong>m on <strong>the</strong> coasts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Continent sufficient to protect existing rights<br />
(droit acquis) <strong>and</strong>, as <strong>the</strong> case may be, freedom <strong>of</strong> trade <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> transit under <strong>the</strong> conditions<br />
15<br />
Kenya <strong>L<strong>and</strong></strong> Commission Report (1933) Government Printer, Nairobi, p 642.<br />
16<br />
International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1 C J Reports, 1975.<br />
17<br />
M Reisman (1995) ‘Protecting Indigenous <strong>Rights</strong> in International Adjudication’ in American Journal <strong>of</strong><br />
International Law, 89 (2), pp 354–5.<br />
Couillard & Gilbert 32<br />
March 2009