Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa
Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa
Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa
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<strong>L<strong>and</strong></strong> rights <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> forest peoples <strong>of</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> – Part I<br />
B<br />
Hunter–ga<strong>the</strong>rer perceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> environment<br />
From within <strong>the</strong> hall <strong>of</strong> mirrors it is almost impossible to imagine talking, thinking,<br />
writing, doing, smelling, imagining <strong>and</strong> realizing worlds without ‘law’, ‘spaces’, ‘places’,<br />
‘time’, ‘scale’, ‘nature’ <strong>and</strong> ‘self’. However, local <strong>and</strong> indigenous communities are doing<br />
this as <strong>the</strong>y construct processes, experiences, thoughts <strong>and</strong> actions. 27<br />
What is missing from <strong>the</strong> previous (‘nature–culture divide’) account is <strong>the</strong> alternative<br />
discourses <strong>and</strong> perspectives <strong>of</strong> indigenous peoples. For example, indigenous peoples relate to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir environments in ways manifestly different to <strong>the</strong> dualistic approach outlined above, as<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir environment is not simply something inhabited but something experienced in a<br />
relational way. It is this very concept that leads <strong>the</strong> Mbuti <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ituri forest, for example, to<br />
relate to <strong>the</strong> forest as <strong>the</strong>ir ‘fa<strong>the</strong>r’ <strong>and</strong> ‘mo<strong>the</strong>r, ‘sibling’ <strong>and</strong> ‘lover’ <strong>and</strong> to describe<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves as ‘children’ <strong>and</strong> ‘people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forest’. 28 In <strong>the</strong>se contexts it should be argued that<br />
any attempt to separate culture <strong>and</strong> nature can be done only through an imposed<br />
distinction. 29<br />
The anthropologist Tim Ingold argues that in ‘Western’ ontology, culture <strong>and</strong> nature are<br />
represented as two distinct entities, where nature is representative <strong>of</strong> what might be called<br />
scientific nature. Culture has also become divided to form <strong>the</strong> culture that <strong>the</strong> western world<br />
creates <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> culturally perceived world <strong>of</strong> nature. 30 By this Ingold means that each<br />
individual or society is understood as having <strong>the</strong> capacity to ascribe meaning to <strong>the</strong><br />
environment it occupies, which may be completely different to <strong>the</strong> representation created by<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r person. These different representations are created culturally <strong>and</strong> are distinctly<br />
different from <strong>the</strong> ‘real’ nature to which science is understood as having access. In <strong>the</strong> ‘West’<br />
we see nature as something to which we have to ascribe meaning, something that we st<strong>and</strong><br />
outside <strong>of</strong>, as opposed to something that we dwell within. Ingold argues that hunter–<br />
ga<strong>the</strong>rers perceive <strong>the</strong>mselves as acting within an undivided world <strong>and</strong> as engaging with its<br />
constituent parts, which are already inherently meaningful: ‘(<strong>the</strong> western ontology) may be<br />
characterised as <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a view, that is, as a process <strong>of</strong> mental representation. As<br />
for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, apprehending <strong>the</strong> world is not a matter <strong>of</strong> construction but <strong>of</strong> engagement, not<br />
<strong>of</strong> building but <strong>of</strong> dwelling, not <strong>of</strong> making a view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world but <strong>of</strong> taking up a view in it’. 31<br />
How does this dwelling manifest itself for hunter–ga<strong>the</strong>rers Turnbull 32 <strong>and</strong> later Mosko 33<br />
have shown how Mbuti forest people relate to <strong>the</strong> forest as <strong>the</strong>ir ‘fa<strong>the</strong>r’ <strong>and</strong> ‘mo<strong>the</strong>r, ‘sibling’<br />
27 R Howitt <strong>and</strong> S Suchet-Pearson (2003) ‘Ontological Pluralism in Contested Cultural <strong>L<strong>and</strong></strong>scapes’, in K<br />
Anderson, M Domosh, S Pile <strong>and</strong> N Thrift (eds), H<strong>and</strong>book <strong>of</strong> cultural geography, Sage, London <strong>and</strong><br />
Thous<strong>and</strong> Oaks, California, p 566.<br />
28 See M S Mosko (1987) ‘The Symbols <strong>of</strong> “<strong>Forest</strong>”: A Structural Analysis <strong>of</strong> Mbuti Culture <strong>and</strong> Social<br />
Organisation’, in American Anthropologist, vol. 89, no. 4, pp 896–913; C Turnbull (1983) The Mbuti<br />
Pygmies; C Turnbull (1962) The <strong>Forest</strong> People; T Ingold (2000) The Perception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Environment:<br />
Essays in Livelihood, dwelling <strong>and</strong> skill, Routledge, London, pp 43–7.<br />
29 T Ingold (2000) The Perception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Environment, pp 40–43.<br />
30 Ibid., p 41.<br />
31 Ibid., p 42, emphasis in original.<br />
32 C Turnbull (1962) The <strong>Forest</strong> People; C Turnbull (1983) The Mbuti Pygmies.<br />
33 M S Mosko (1987) ‘The Symbols <strong>of</strong> “<strong>Forest</strong>” ’.<br />
Kidd & Kenrick 12<br />
March 2009