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2012 NasrollaAmoozesh, Zahra Moeinfar and Zahra Mousavi<br />

17<br />

<strong>Evaluation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Relationship</strong> <strong>Between</strong> <strong>Disclosure</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> and<br />

Corporate Governance <strong>Quality</strong> in Tehran Stock Exchange<br />

Nasrolla Amoozesh<br />

Department <strong>of</strong> Accounting ,Gachsaran Branch , Islamic Azad University , Gachsaran , Iran.<br />

Email: E_amouzesh2011@yahoo.com<br />

Zahra Moeinfar and Zahra Mousavi<br />

Abstract<br />

Present research has been conducted to analyze the relationship between quality <strong>of</strong> corporate governance and disclosure quality.<br />

This research is important because in Iran, very fewer researches have been conducted regarding the effects <strong>of</strong> corporate governance<br />

system quality on the quality <strong>of</strong> information disclosure. Therefore 80 active companies from Tehran stock exchange market have been<br />

chosen during the year 2006 to 2009. Corporate governance quality has been considered as independent variable and disclosure quality<br />

as dependent variable. To test the relationship between these two variables Pearson correlation coefficient and linear regression have<br />

been used. The results show that the company strategic quality has a positive effect on the companies’ disclosure quality, which means<br />

that whenever the methods and works <strong>of</strong> the corporate governance system improved and strengthen there is more accuracy in disclosure<br />

by the companies. Key words: Corporate Governance, <strong>Disclosure</strong>, Concentration Of Ownership, Boardsize.<br />

<strong>Disclosure</strong> in accounting is a vast term and almost<br />

consists <strong>of</strong> all the financial reports. One <strong>of</strong> the initial main<br />

principals <strong>of</strong> accounting is the principal <strong>of</strong> disclosing <strong>of</strong> all<br />

the important realities regarding the financial events and<br />

activities <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it earning units specially LLP Company<br />

(public corporation Company).Adequatesuitable and<br />

complete terms are the terms which are mainly expressed<br />

for disclosure expression. In written accounting and<br />

auditing with regard to understanding <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> the<br />

writers from disclosure, accordingly adequate disclosure<br />

terms, suitable disclosure or complete disclose have been<br />

mentioned. But the most prevailing view <strong>of</strong> the mentioned<br />

concepts is adequate disclosure which consists <strong>of</strong> minimum<br />

needed disclosure and coordinates with this negative phrase<br />

(financial statements should not be deceiving). Suitable<br />

and complete characteristics are mainly positive concepts.<br />

Suitable disclosure is according to this moral basis which<br />

should face equally with the financial data disclosure.<br />

Complete disclosure consisting <strong>of</strong> all arranged data <strong>of</strong> a<br />

kind which show the financial basis <strong>of</strong>a complete image<br />

<strong>of</strong> financial activities and events <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it making unit.<br />

Even though it is necessary for the financial statement to be<br />

presented in complete way, but it should not contain data<br />

more than what is needed or with less importance, because<br />

there is a chance <strong>of</strong> users consideration goes towards<br />

the less important data and as a result important events<br />

and activities be neglected(Aaliwar 1386). <strong>Disclosure</strong><br />

causes increase in transparency and the market is a main<br />

mechanism for decreasing information symmetry between<br />

participants in the financial market( Blake& Loo 2006).<br />

It also helps the shareholders and other participants in the<br />

financial market to arrange their activities in a suitable way.<br />

With suitable disclosure <strong>of</strong> information,investors can buy<br />

and sell shares in a correct way and have more control over<br />

the company (Kinda 1999).<br />

Corporate Governance Mechanisms effects the disclosed<br />

information by company for the shareholders and there is<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> non complete and non suitable disclosure<br />

<strong>of</strong> information and disclosure <strong>of</strong> less credit data will be<br />

reduced (Katagortnam and colleagues 2007). Researchshow<br />

that if board <strong>of</strong> directorssupervises on the management<br />

effectively, quality and efficiency <strong>of</strong> published databy<br />

the management will increase(Karamono& Nikos 2005).<br />

Corporate Governance Mechanisms with the better quality,<br />

increases the quality and quantity <strong>of</strong> disclosed information<br />

by the company and causes reduction <strong>of</strong> asymmetric data (<br />

Rehimian and colleague 1388).<br />

Therefore the following research has been clarified after<br />

analysis <strong>of</strong> the effect <strong>of</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> corporate governance<br />

system on the quality <strong>of</strong> company’s disclosure. Therefore<br />

with the use <strong>of</strong> solidarity test and linear regression,<br />

direction and the amount <strong>of</strong> the effect are clarified and<br />

meaningfulness <strong>of</strong> the coefficient obtainedhas been tested.<br />

In this regard first the theatrical basis, research back ground<br />

Amoozesh N., Moeinfar Z., Mousavi Z. - <strong>Evaluation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Relationship</strong> <strong>Between</strong> <strong>Disclosure</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> and Corporate Governance <strong>Quality</strong> in Tehran Stock Exchange


18 School <strong>of</strong> Doctoral Studies (European Union) Journal 2012<br />

such as theoretical basis according to the definitions, views<br />

and hypothesis <strong>of</strong> the subject and practical background <strong>of</strong><br />

the research and views and results <strong>of</strong> different researchers<br />

have been <strong>of</strong>fered, then in the method <strong>of</strong> research section,<br />

the type <strong>of</strong> research, research variables, statistical society,<br />

its method <strong>of</strong> choosing and method <strong>of</strong> its use for data<br />

analysis will be introduced and then research hypothesis<br />

and research findings will be presented. At the end result <strong>of</strong><br />

the research and suggestions obtained will be <strong>of</strong>fered.<br />

Theoretical Framework<br />

Different elements can affect the amount and disclosure<br />

quality <strong>of</strong> the companies. One <strong>of</strong> these elementsis corporate<br />

governance system and regulatory mechanisms. With<br />

accurate use <strong>of</strong> this corporate governance regulation<br />

internal control system and specially accounting committee<br />

inspection cause disclosure <strong>of</strong> data and avoid volatility <strong>of</strong><br />

estimated pr<strong>of</strong>its and interference in the prices. Therefore if<br />

the corporate governance mechanisms supervision acts in<br />

an effective and efficient way, this system can be effective<br />

on the amount and quality <strong>of</strong> disclosed date by the company<br />

(Davani 1385).<br />

volubility and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> disclosed datadepends on<br />

conditions such as financial constructive type or company’s<br />

ownership body ( Kanda 1999) when the ownership <strong>of</strong> a<br />

company is completely at the authority <strong>of</strong> some limited<br />

people which usually it is expected that they are not able<br />

to answer the questions <strong>of</strong> other investors and the public<br />

because the controller shareholders are usually able to<br />

obtain their needed data through other methods (Karmeer<br />

2005). Also at the side <strong>of</strong> agents expenses regarding the<br />

separation <strong>of</strong> ownership from control will increase,minority<br />

shareholders have more motivation for supervising the<br />

people inside the company and therefore demand for<br />

company’s data disclosure increases (Golb 2000). Since<br />

ownership dispersion causes increase in the expenses,<br />

therefore it can improve the disclosure quality.<br />

On the other hand institutional investors are the main<br />

providers <strong>of</strong> fund in the financial market. They are usually<br />

owners <strong>of</strong> a high portion <strong>of</strong> companies’ shares and have good<br />

experiences and are usually pr<strong>of</strong>essionals. Their activities<br />

can cause protection <strong>of</strong> the rights <strong>of</strong> investors and cause<br />

wealth for them. This group <strong>of</strong> investors needscomplete<br />

disclosure which causes the risk <strong>of</strong> the company and<br />

the element <strong>of</strong> their success to be able to make a better<br />

estimation <strong>of</strong> cash distribution in the future (Bin Ali 2006).<br />

Increase in the institutional ownership causes increase<br />

in the control on the company’s management which this<br />

may cause reduction <strong>of</strong> non disclosure <strong>of</strong> information by<br />

management (Chaoo and Gery 2002).<br />

In casewhich board members are many in numberswhich<br />

consist <strong>of</strong> skilled managers with different experience,<br />

the efficiency <strong>of</strong> data transfer can improve; this means that<br />

the companies with small board <strong>of</strong> directors will disclose<br />

less data in their financial statementscompare to the other<br />

companies (AlshiMiri 2004). Therefore we suggest that<br />

there is a positive relation between board <strong>of</strong> directors and<br />

disclosing. In the other words the number <strong>of</strong> board members<br />

<strong>of</strong> the company can affect the information disclosure. And<br />

therefore the disclosure is a strategic decision which is being<br />

adopted by the board <strong>of</strong> directors (chen and Jaji 2000).<br />

Also experimental evidence shows that when the<br />

number <strong>of</strong> management board is smaller, the quality <strong>of</strong> their<br />

supervision will improve (Bermak 1996). Ratio <strong>of</strong> nonbound<br />

member in the management board is a controlled<br />

mechanism which shows their independence.Non-bound<br />

members can be useful on the companies for disclosing<br />

more data (Ang& Mark 2003).<br />

Therefore it can be understood that management board<br />

independently can affect the disclosure quality <strong>of</strong> the<br />

companies.<br />

Generally it can be proved that corporate governance<br />

system mechanism( such as ownership centralization,<br />

institutional investors and the size <strong>of</strong> management board)<br />

give this confidence to the minority investors that the data<br />

will give the financial condition, company’s functioning<br />

and value clearly and protect their wealth against misuse <strong>of</strong><br />

the executive managementand majority investors.<br />

Considering the above mentioned, the question <strong>of</strong><br />

the research can be brought up as follows: can corporate<br />

governance system affect the data disclosure quality<br />

Research Background<br />

The most important researches conducted on this subject<br />

are presented as follows:<br />

Van Mohammad &Solang(2010) conducted a research<br />

with the title <strong>of</strong> “corporate governance mechanism and<br />

disclosure in Malaysia”. Their aim was to analyze the<br />

effectiveness <strong>of</strong> corporate governance mechanism on the<br />

amount <strong>of</strong> company’s disclosure. The results obtained show<br />

that the company with family members in the management<br />

board have lower level <strong>of</strong> disclosure in comparison to other<br />

countries.<br />

Loo and Chan 2009 analyzed the effective elements<br />

on the active companies in the Taiwan stock exchange<br />

market. They conducted this research with the use <strong>of</strong> 389<br />

School <strong>of</strong> Doctoral Studies (European Union) Journal - 2012


2012 NasrollaAmoozesh, Zahra Moeinfar and Zahra Mousavi<br />

19<br />

informative records during the year 2003. Their research<br />

show that percentage <strong>of</strong> institutional ownership and<br />

financial institutions, type <strong>of</strong> industry, size <strong>of</strong> the company<br />

and percentage <strong>of</strong> share under the control <strong>of</strong> institutional<br />

shareholders have considerable affect on the companies’<br />

information disclosure.<br />

Bin Ali (2006) in his research analyzed the relation<br />

between disclosure quality and corporate governance.<br />

He conducted this research with the use <strong>of</strong> some active<br />

companies in France stock exchange. The results <strong>of</strong>research<br />

showed that the companies with weak disclosure <strong>of</strong> quality<br />

have higher concentration <strong>of</strong> ownership.Also companies<br />

with suitable quality disclosure have higher percentage<br />

than those who are participating independently in the<br />

management board and not working as a family. Generally<br />

the results <strong>of</strong> hypothesis test in this research show that there<br />

is a negative relation between disclosure quality and family<br />

control and ownership concentration, but there is a positive<br />

meaningful relation between quality disclosure and buying<br />

share option <strong>of</strong> executive management.<br />

Boshi and Noaeh (2000) after their research got the<br />

results that there is a positive meaningful relation between<br />

the high percentage <strong>of</strong> institutional shareholding ownership<br />

and disclosure quality <strong>of</strong> the companies. They found out<br />

that institutional investors with high shares prefer higher<br />

quality <strong>of</strong> disclosure as a method for reducing other<br />

institutional expenses. Golb( 2000) used a sample <strong>of</strong> 3219<br />

from active companies in the United States <strong>of</strong> America<br />

and analyzed it in period <strong>of</strong> 1981 to 1993. His aim is to<br />

analyze the relation between ownership concentration<br />

and disclosure in the country. Where ownership has been<br />

dispersed widely, he got the result that ownership dispersion,<br />

increase people’s demand out <strong>of</strong> company for obtaining<br />

information and therefore company’s data disclosure will<br />

increase. Generally, controlling shareholders have better<br />

motivation and more opportunities for supervision on the<br />

other shareholders.<br />

Kemalian and colleagues (1389) in their research found<br />

out the most important effective elements on the degree <strong>of</strong><br />

data disclosure <strong>of</strong> the companies accepted in Tehran stock<br />

exchange market. Their research with regard to the degree<br />

which stock market has presented to them due to their<br />

time consciousness and its reliability on companies data<br />

disclosure have been published and wanted to recognize<br />

the elements effective on the degree <strong>of</strong> data disclosure.<br />

They use samples consisting <strong>of</strong> 520 years-companies<br />

from the financial year <strong>of</strong> 85, 86 and 87 elements which<br />

had the most effect on the degree <strong>of</strong> data disclosure. These<br />

elements are consisted <strong>of</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> auditing organization<br />

<strong>of</strong> the company, return on asset, debt ratio and management<br />

board being bound or non-bound. The result <strong>of</strong> their<br />

research show that analysis <strong>of</strong> above elements can help in<br />

recognition <strong>of</strong> company’s clear information as an informal<br />

system in decision making <strong>of</strong> the investors.<br />

Research Plan<br />

Even though the corporate governance quality<br />

calculation index consisted <strong>of</strong> four groups, but the final<br />

point <strong>of</strong> this variable is in the form <strong>of</strong> a unit. Therefore to<br />

answer the research questions a main hypothesis has been<br />

codified which this hypothesis is tested in the statistical<br />

society member companies. This hypothesis has been<br />

mentioned as follows:<br />

There is a meaningful relation between quality <strong>of</strong><br />

information disclosure and corporate governance system<br />

quality.<br />

Definition <strong>of</strong> Variables<br />

Dependent variable: in this research dependent variable<br />

is the quality <strong>of</strong> companies’ disclosure. <strong>Quality</strong> <strong>of</strong> disclosure<br />

is dependent on many elements which Tehran stock<br />

exchange has calculated the total companies’ activities <strong>of</strong><br />

quality disclosure during the past years and presented them.<br />

In this research the calculated marks <strong>of</strong> this company has<br />

been used as disclosure quality evaluation. This research<br />

reflects the stock market evaluation score regarding<br />

the amount <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> company’s disclosure. The<br />

mentioned scores according to average weighing score<br />

in being on time and reliability <strong>of</strong> data disclosure. Data<br />

evaluated according to the laws <strong>of</strong> data disclosure in the<br />

stock market consisting <strong>of</strong> matters such as annual financial<br />

list, accounting financial statements <strong>of</strong> midterm and income<br />

forecasting <strong>of</strong> each share at the period <strong>of</strong> 3, 6, 9, and 12<br />

months ( Nouroosh&Hossiani 1388).<br />

B. Independent Variable:<br />

Independent variable: in this research corporate rule<br />

<strong>of</strong> quality is calculated according to index presented by<br />

Desilverya (2007) which consists <strong>of</strong> 4 main sections:<br />

capability <strong>of</strong> accessing to data, data consistence, and<br />

construction <strong>of</strong> management board, and control <strong>of</strong> this<br />

index which is a check list <strong>of</strong> 20 question in relation to<br />

corporate governance system and each system has one<br />

point. If the answer the questions are positive, company<br />

gets one point but if it is negative the answer to the question<br />

Amoozesh N., Moeinfar Z., Mousavi Z. - <strong>Evaluation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Relationship</strong> <strong>Between</strong> <strong>Disclosure</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> and Corporate Governance <strong>Quality</strong> in Tehran Stock Exchange


20 School <strong>of</strong> Doctoral Studies (European Union) Journal 2012<br />

does not obtain any point.At the end the points obtained for<br />

each company will be summed and the number obtained<br />

show the corporate governance <strong>of</strong> the company. If the score<br />

<strong>of</strong> the corporate ruling quality is 15 to 20, the ruling <strong>of</strong> that<br />

company will be considered strong. And if it is 9 to 15 the<br />

company is about average and if the point is less than 9, the<br />

ruling <strong>of</strong> that company will be considered weak and this<br />

index will be mentioned in the article attached.<br />

Statistical Society and Sample<br />

Statistical society <strong>of</strong> this research was companies<br />

accepted in Tehran stock exchange. The research has been<br />

conducted during the years 1385-87. From this society,<br />

sample companies with the following conditions were<br />

chosen as samples:<br />

• Which are not among the investing companies or<br />

financial mediated companies ,holding, banks or leasing<br />

• To create comparison, the financial year ending will be<br />

fixed on 29thEsfand.<br />

• The financial data <strong>of</strong> the companies should be available<br />

during the study.<br />

• The companies share transaction should be conducted<br />

continuously in Tehran stock exchange and there should<br />

not be a stop <strong>of</strong> more than one month.<br />

According to the conditions mentioned above, 80<br />

companies had these conditions during the years 1385 to<br />

87 and have been chosen as statistical samples.<br />

Analysis Method<br />

Of course the disclosure quality in any <strong>of</strong> the sample<br />

companies will be summed and then with the use <strong>of</strong> notes<br />

together with the financial statements, data regarding the<br />

corporate governance system have been collected. Then<br />

with the use <strong>of</strong> these information and completion <strong>of</strong> check<br />

list about the corporate quality scores is counted as member<br />

<strong>of</strong> the companies. These activities have been done with<br />

EXCELL s<strong>of</strong>tware and then the use <strong>of</strong> SPSS s<strong>of</strong>tware this<br />

hypothesis test will be done.<br />

The method <strong>of</strong> present research is from the type <strong>of</strong><br />

solidarity. Solidarity research consists <strong>of</strong> researches which<br />

try to create relation between different variables with<br />

solidarity coefficient. In this type <strong>of</strong> research, coefficient<br />

determination (coefficient square) is a criterion which<br />

explains the relation intensity between independent<br />

variable and dependent variable. The amount <strong>of</strong> this<br />

coefficient shows the percentage <strong>of</strong> dependent variables<br />

by independent variables. In the other words solidarity<br />

analysis is a statistical tool which a displacement from one<br />

variable to another variable has been measured linearly<br />

is being discussed in two criteria which are coefficient<br />

determination and solidarity coefficient.<br />

Coefficient determination is the most important criterion<br />

which through it the relation between two variables X and<br />

Y is explained. Coefficient determination shows the ability<br />

and capability <strong>of</strong> the regression equation in forecasting<br />

dependent variables changes according to independent<br />

variables changes and its amount is within zero and one.<br />

(0< R 2 < 1).<br />

Solidarity coefficient (r).<br />

We take squar root from coefficient determination the<br />

amount obtained is called solidarity coefficient and show<br />

it with “r”:<br />

r = r2<br />

Intensive solidarity coefficient relation and also the type<br />

<strong>of</strong> relation show direct or reverse.<br />

In case there is a random sample <strong>of</strong> n number from<br />

variables (x,y) in this case obtaining the solidarity<br />

coefficient in the p society as follows:<br />

P = R =<br />

∑<br />

∑(<br />

( X − X<br />

X − X<br />

−<br />

)<br />

−<br />

2<br />

)( Y −Y<br />

∑<br />

−<br />

)<br />

Y −Y<br />

Which its amount is always between -1 and 1 (-1< r0 the linear relation between x,y is direct.<br />

If r


2012 NasrollaAmoozesh, Zahra Moeinfar and Zahra Mousavi<br />

21<br />

H0 rejected and H1 is accepted == if pvalue < α ( test is<br />

meaningful).<br />

Findings <strong>of</strong> the Research<br />

Descriptive statistics:<br />

In this research quality <strong>of</strong> corporate governance system<br />

means concentration <strong>of</strong> ownership and its relation with<br />

company’s data disclosure quality have been analyzed. In<br />

table No. 1 consisting <strong>of</strong> descriptive statistic variables have<br />

been tested.<br />

Table 1- descriptive statistic data <strong>of</strong> the research<br />

Since the meaningful level has been calculated according<br />

to what is mentioned above if it is less than 0/05, sig=0/001)<br />

statistical findings show that there is a meaningful relation<br />

between ownership concentration and rate <strong>of</strong> return <strong>of</strong><br />

the finance. In the other words the research hypothesis<br />

conformed and errors are rejected. And therefore it can be<br />

said that in a level <strong>of</strong> confidence <strong>of</strong> 95% there is a positive<br />

and meaningful relation between disclosure quality and<br />

corporate governance system quality.<br />

Table below shows the regression results and “t”<br />

statistics <strong>of</strong> this hypothesis:<br />

Table 3: Regression<br />

Variables<br />

Number <strong>of</strong><br />

Observation<br />

Minimum<br />

Max<br />

Average<br />

Standard<br />

Deviation<br />

<strong>Disclosure</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> 240 2 100 54/32 22/98<br />

Corporate Governance System 240 11 16 13/46 1/31<br />

The information mentioned in the table 1 show that the<br />

disclosure quality average in these sample companies and<br />

during the time <strong>of</strong> analysis has been 54/32. It also can be<br />

found out that the min points for disclosure quality in the<br />

companies chosen obtained 3 points which is absolutely bad<br />

point for disclosure <strong>of</strong> a company. Also average quality <strong>of</strong><br />

corporate governance system for these companies is 13/46.<br />

Considering min and max point <strong>of</strong> corporate governance<br />

at the amount <strong>of</strong> 11 and 16 can be proved that governance<br />

system laws have been followed by the companies’ very<br />

much and it has been suitable. An important point is that in<br />

this table there is dispersion <strong>of</strong> disclosed quality variable.<br />

At the last raw which belong to standard deviation the<br />

research variables show these claim.<br />

Results <strong>of</strong> Hypothesis Analysis<br />

As shown in the below table solidarity coefficient<br />

between the two disclosure quality variable and corporate<br />

governance system quality is equal to /210 (r=0/210).<br />

Variable<br />

Table 2: solidarity test<br />

Solidarity<br />

Coefficient<br />

Determinant<br />

Coefficient<br />

Adjusted<br />

Determinant<br />

Coefficient<br />

Meaningful<br />

Level<br />

Corporate governance system 0/21 0.044 0/040 0/001<br />

Model<br />

Beta<br />

Standard<br />

Error<br />

T Statistic<br />

Meaningful<br />

Level<br />

Stable amount 12/809 /213 60/114 /000<br />

<strong>Disclosure</strong> quality /012 /004 3/381 /001<br />

The results from the above table show that intensity<br />

<strong>of</strong> relation between disclosure quality and corporate<br />

governance quality is equal to 0/040, Which means 0/040<br />

<strong>of</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> the variable data <strong>of</strong> the company is done<br />

by the corporate governance quality and about 96% <strong>of</strong> it is<br />

because <strong>of</strong> other variables which have not been analyzed in<br />

this research.<br />

Conclusion<br />

In this research corporate governance system quality<br />

regarding the disclosure quality <strong>of</strong> data in a period <strong>of</strong> 3<br />

years has been analyzed. The aim <strong>of</strong> this research is to<br />

analyze the effect <strong>of</strong> corporate governance quality on<br />

the disclosure quality <strong>of</strong> information. This research is<br />

important because in Iran, there islittle research about the<br />

determination <strong>of</strong> relation between corporate governance<br />

quality and disclosure quality <strong>of</strong> data has been conducted.<br />

In general findings <strong>of</strong> the research are evidence regarding<br />

the positive effect <strong>of</strong> corporate governance system quality<br />

on the disclosure quality <strong>of</strong> data. It means that findings <strong>of</strong><br />

this research show a positive relation between these two<br />

variables when the company’s leadership practice has<br />

been invigorated and run with high quality. The quality<br />

<strong>of</strong> disclosure by these companies is also increased. These<br />

findings are match with the researchers conducted by Ven<br />

Mohammad and SouLoung (2010), Lou and Chen (2009),<br />

Bin Ali (2006), Boshi and Noa ( 2000), and Kemalian<br />

Amoozesh N., Moeinfar Z., Mousavi Z. - <strong>Evaluation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Relationship</strong> <strong>Between</strong> <strong>Disclosure</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> and Corporate Governance <strong>Quality</strong> in Tehran Stock Exchange


22 School <strong>of</strong> Doctoral Studies (European Union) Journal 2012<br />

(1389). Considering these results it can be proved that<br />

companies with corporate governance system mechanism<br />

can be operated in a suitable way that in ratio to the other<br />

companies and data disclosure can be observed better.<br />

When disclosure quality <strong>of</strong> data have been improved by the<br />

company this causes more attraction <strong>of</strong> the financers and<br />

finally causes more investment with longer term investing.<br />

Increase in the absorption <strong>of</strong> investment by the companies<br />

cause reduction in the company’s financial expenses and<br />

therefore increase in the price <strong>of</strong> shares.<br />

Therefore considering the results <strong>of</strong> this research it<br />

can be proved that suitable establishment <strong>of</strong> corporate<br />

governance mechanism in the companies because clear<br />

increase and therefore reduction <strong>of</strong> data asymmetry.<br />

Therefore it is suggested to the stock exchange market<br />

to force the companies to model their annual reports<br />

according to the corporate governance model and explain<br />

their mechanisms. Also with regard to the results <strong>of</strong> this<br />

research it is suggested that a unit scope should be proposed<br />

for corporate governance quality by the stock exchange<br />

and the companies have the duty <strong>of</strong> reporting this number<br />

in the note with its financial list. Future researchers can<br />

execute this corporate governance quality with the use <strong>of</strong><br />

calculative index. Also in the future research the effect <strong>of</strong><br />

other financial variables and companies activities such as<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>it earning, capital construction and other data disclosure<br />

quality can be analyzed.<br />

Acknowledgement<br />

This research has been obtained from Islamic Azad<br />

University research <strong>of</strong> Gachsaran Branch.<br />

References<br />

Aalivae Aziz, disclosing in financial reports, No<br />

68 research center for accounting and editing<br />

publication.<br />

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the relation between <strong>Disclosure</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> , Ownership<br />

Structure and Stock Liquidity .<br />

Bleck , Alexander ., Liu , Xuewen . (2007 ) . Market<br />

Accounting Regim . Journal <strong>of</strong> Accounting<br />

Research , vol 45 . No. 2 , pp.229-256 .<br />

Bushee , B , Noe , C . (2000) . Corporate <strong>Disclosure</strong><br />

Practices , institutional investors and stock return<br />

volatility . Journal <strong>of</strong> Accounting Research , vol 38,<br />

pp: 71-202 .<br />

Ch<strong>eu</strong>ng , S.Y., Connelly, J.T., Limpaphapom,P., Zhou,<br />

L. (2006 ). Determinants <strong>of</strong> corporate disclosure<br />

and transparency: Evidence from Hong Kong and<br />

Thailand.<br />

Gelb, D.S. (2000). Managerial Ownership and<br />

Accounting <strong>Disclosure</strong>: An Empirical study,<br />

Review <strong>of</strong> Quantitative Finance and Accounting,<br />

vol 15 , pp. 169-185.<br />

Hsiu, J.F. (2006). Effect <strong>of</strong> financial information<br />

transparency on investor behavior in Taiwan Stock<br />

Market. Proquest Database, 16(3), pp.6-22.<br />

Kanagartnamkiridaran, lobo Gerald j., whalendennisj.<br />

does good corporate governance reduse<br />

information asymmeety around quarterly earnings<br />

announcements journal <strong>of</strong> accounting and public<br />

policy 2007: 26 ( 4 ): 497 – 522 .<br />

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Governance: A Japanese perspective. “conference<br />

on corporate governance in Asia: A comparative<br />

perspective.<br />

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between corporate boards, audit committees, and<br />

management earnings forecasts: an empirical<br />

analysis. journal <strong>of</strong> accounting research 2005: 43:<br />

453 – 486.<br />

Kemalian Amin Reza, NikNafs Ali Akbar,<br />

Afsharizadehomid and Gholamali pour Reza, the<br />

most important elements effective on the degree<br />

<strong>of</strong> company’s disclosure date from the companies<br />

accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange market with<br />

journal <strong>of</strong> stock exchange market, No. 11, Fall 89,<br />

p. 144-125.<br />

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Market, accounting and editing analysis 16 period,<br />

No. 58 winter 1388 page 71-86.<br />

School <strong>of</strong> Doctoral Studies (European Union) Journal - 2012


2012 23<br />

Appendix<br />

Corporate Governance <strong>Quality</strong> Checklist<br />

1. Is the company’s report avialabe in the internet<br />

Question Yes No<br />

2. Is the web site consist documents <strong>of</strong> corporate governance such as ruling guidance, model <strong>of</strong> ruling<br />

explanation Etc<br />

3. Is the company web site aviable for analysts with useful financial date<br />

4. Has the company website planned a part for investor<br />

5. Isn’t it necessary to contact company for more information<br />

6. Are the corporate governance model and its methos explained for annual reports<br />

7. Are the financial list prepared according to accounting method<br />

8. Is the annual report <strong>of</strong> the company or web site consist <strong>of</strong> section for estimation <strong>of</strong> financial return (ROA.<br />

ROE)<br />

9. Did the annual report or other documents <strong>of</strong> the company <strong>of</strong>fers the value-added<br />

10. Are the management board and director <strong>of</strong> the company same<br />

11. Are the management members <strong>of</strong> the company between 5 to 9<br />

12. Are more than 80% <strong>of</strong> the management members from out side the company<br />

13. Are more than 80% <strong>of</strong> management members from out side the company ( non-bound members)<br />

14. Has the company any agreement with the shareholder<br />

15. Is the company producing only ordinary shares<br />

16. Is the premium share less than 50% <strong>of</strong> published shares<br />

17. Are the controlling shareholders owners <strong>of</strong> less than 70% <strong>of</strong> the whole ordinary share <strong>of</strong> the company<br />

18. Are the differences between least controlling shareholders ( percentage <strong>of</strong> share which has the right for<br />

voting (% <strong>of</strong> total share is less than 23%)<br />

19. Did the company give any voluntary rights to any premium shareholder<br />

20. Are the annual reports or any other documents reveal executive manager reward<br />

Total:

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