Download PDF - Robson Hall Faculty of Law
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210 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL |VOLUME 35 NUMBER 1 fact, Development registered prior to the plaintiff Furmanek, 61 but in so registering, Development erroneously omitted to refer to the purchaser’s inventory in its financing statement. 62 When the purchaser failed to pay what it owed, a priority contest arose between the vendor and Development as to the purchaser’s inventory. In other words, in this scenario, in accordance with the nomenclature used previously, Development was Creditor #1, Furmanek was Creditor #2, and the purchaser was the debtor. Furmanek (for obvious reasons) argued that the PPSA required that a secured party strictly comply with the applicable registration rules, failing which it should not be considered to have perfected its security interest, or, in other words, it should not be entitled to priority as against Furmanek’s proper registration. 63 The Court noted the following facts: 64 a) Furmanek knew that without Development’s financing, the sale and purchase transaction would not have been completed; b) Furmanek was actively involved in the negotiations between the purchaser and Development leading to the provision of the Development financing, and represented to Development that the assets being acquired by the purchaser from Furmanek were “free and clear” and that accordingly, Development expected to obtain a first charge on the inventory; c) Furmanek knew that if Development did not obtain a first position on the purchaser’s inventory, Development would not provide financing; and d) in the sale and purchase agreement between Furmanek and the purchaser, the security interest granted by the purchaser back to Furmanek for part of the purchase and sale price was referred to as a “second mortgage”. 65 The Court of Appeal held in favour of Development. On the facts, in the view of the authors, justice was done, as it would have been manifestly unfair to allow the vendor to take advantage of Development’s registration omission. However, it is exceptionally important to note that the Court based its decision on more than just what seemed fair or unfair. In particular, the Court held that: a) generally speaking, registration of a security interest with knowledge of a prior unregistered security interest will not of itself constitute bad faith or operate as an estoppel against the registering party 66 (affirming the third principle referred to above); 61 62 63 64 65 66 Supra note 56, at para 2, citing the chambers judge. Ibid. Ibid para 6. Ibid para 12, citing the chambers judge. Ibid at para 15. Ibid at para 12, citing the chambers judge.
Fraud and Knowledge 211 b) however, the circumstances in the case went “beyond mere knowledge of the fact that [Development] was asserting a prior interest” 67 (meaning that the third principle did not apply); c) although the vendor did not expressly agree to subordinate its security interest in favour of Development’s security, the PPSA makes it clear that a secured party may subordinate its interest in ways other than inclusion of a subordination provision in a security agreement. 68 The statute provides that “Any secured party may, in a security agreement or otherwise, subordinate his or her security interest to any other interest…”; 69 d) the Court of Appeal also held that Development could have priority over the vendor on the basis of an implied agreement or undertaking by the vendor to subordinate its security position to that of Development. In this regard, remember the above-noted factual holding that in the purchase and sale agreement, the vendor referred to its security interest as a “second mortgage”; 70 e) On these facts, PPSA priorities may be determined by the application of equitable principles 71 (affirming the fourth principle referred to above); f) On the basis of equity, the Court imposes an obligation on the individual who is seeking to take what the Court believes to be an inequitable advantage against one or more others on the basis of the strict operation/application of the legislation, without invalidating the legislation in any way; 72 g) The Court held that on the basis of the vendor’s unfair conduct, the vendor’s security interest in the purchaser’s inventory was equitably subordinated to Development’s interest. 73 It is implicit in the reasoning of the Court that if the vendor had not known of the prior security interest of Development (or had not induced Development to believe that Development would get a first priority position), the equities would not have favoured Development; and h) While the vendor’s knowledge and unfair conduct protected Development as against a claim by the vendor, the same would not have been true if an innocent third party was involved. 74 Thus, if the vendor had sold its debt claim and security interest to a bona fide assignee, that 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 Ibid citing the trial judge. Ibid at para 19. PPSA, supra note 1, s 40(1). The British Columbia equivalent is found in the Personal Property Security Act, RSBC 1996, c 359, s 40. Supra note 56, at para 15. Ibid at para 21. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid at para 19.
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Fraud and Knowledge 211<br />
b) however, the circumstances in the case went “beyond mere knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />
the fact that [Development] was asserting a prior interest” 67 (meaning<br />
that the third principle did not apply);<br />
c) although the vendor did not expressly agree to subordinate its security<br />
interest in favour <strong>of</strong> Development’s security, the PPSA makes it clear<br />
that a secured party may subordinate its interest in ways other than<br />
inclusion <strong>of</strong> a subordination provision in a security agreement. 68 The<br />
statute provides that “Any secured party may, in a security agreement or<br />
otherwise, subordinate his or her security interest to any other<br />
interest…”; 69<br />
d) the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal also held that Development could have priority over<br />
the vendor on the basis <strong>of</strong> an implied agreement or undertaking by the<br />
vendor to subordinate its security position to that <strong>of</strong> Development. In<br />
this regard, remember the above-noted factual holding that in the<br />
purchase and sale agreement, the vendor referred to its security interest<br />
as a “second mortgage”; 70<br />
e) On these facts, PPSA priorities may be determined by the application <strong>of</strong><br />
equitable principles 71 (affirming the fourth principle referred to above);<br />
f) On the basis <strong>of</strong> equity, the Court imposes an obligation on the<br />
individual who is seeking to take what the Court believes to be an<br />
inequitable advantage against one or more others on the basis <strong>of</strong> the<br />
strict operation/application <strong>of</strong> the legislation, without invalidating the<br />
legislation in any way; 72<br />
g) The Court held that on the basis <strong>of</strong> the vendor’s unfair conduct, the<br />
vendor’s security interest in the purchaser’s inventory was equitably<br />
subordinated to Development’s interest. 73 It is implicit in the reasoning<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Court that if the vendor had not known <strong>of</strong> the prior security<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> Development (or had not induced Development to believe<br />
that Development would get a first priority position), the equities would<br />
not have favoured Development; and<br />
h) While the vendor’s knowledge and unfair conduct protected<br />
Development as against a claim by the vendor, the same would not have<br />
been true if an innocent third party was involved. 74 Thus, if the vendor<br />
had sold its debt claim and security interest to a bona fide assignee, that<br />
67<br />
68<br />
69<br />
70<br />
71<br />
72<br />
73<br />
74<br />
Ibid citing the trial judge.<br />
Ibid at para 19.<br />
PPSA, supra note 1, s 40(1). The British Columbia equivalent is found in the Personal Property<br />
Security Act, RSBC 1996, c 359, s 40.<br />
Supra note 56, at para 15.<br />
Ibid at para 21.<br />
Ibid.<br />
Ibid.<br />
Ibid at para 19.